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May 13, 2014
Final Paper
Jonathan Gallo
History 220-0 Nationalism and Revolution in Modern Latin America
Spring 2014
St. John’s University
Prof. Alejandro Quintana
Disunited Fruit: The Role of the US in 1954 Guatemala
On June 14, 1954 the government and country of Guatemala was invaded by Castillo
Armas and his rag tag army of refugees.1 After some brief intense fighting President Jacobo
Arbenz resigned from the presidency on June 27, 1954. This event would lead to the installation
of a military junta, and the eventual rule of the Carlos Castillo Armas.2 Much has been said about
this revolution. Was it an organic homegrown rise against communism, or was much of it well
orchestrated by foreign powers? The United States’ and the United Fruit Company’s
involvement in the conflict has been questioned. Was the United States motivated to act on
behalf of the United Fruit Company? Was it the result of Cold War politics and the Good
Neighbor Policy, or was the United States’ involvement overstated? The founder of the
Guatemalan Communist Party José Manuel Fortuny and close friend to President Arbenez stated
that the revolution would have occurred even if there were no bananas.3 Land expropriation is
wildly believed to have been the main cause for the revolution overthrowing Arbenz. United
States economic interests in the region fostered the rise of the Armas led rebellion.
Jacobo Arbenz was the last link of a revolution in 1944 that ousted Jorge Ubico. Ubico
was a tyrant, an enemy of the middle and lower classes. He opposed unionization and executed
munion leaders on a whim. . He was a harsh ruler who opposed unionization, and even pushed
1
Blanche Wiesen Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower: A Divided Legacy of Peace and Political Warfare (Garden
City, New York: Doubleday & Company Inc. 1981), 277.
2
Ibid., 284.
3
Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope the Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954 (Princeton, N.J:
Princeton University Press 1991), 7.
for the execution of union leaders. He took land from and abused the native people. Guatemalans
wanted a more liberal and progressive ruler. They wanted a president like Lazaro Cardenas of
Mexico, who pushed for reform and land distribution. They wanted a president like Franklin
Delano Roosevelt, because of his economic reforms.4 This anger and resentment lead to the
natural overthrow of the Jorge Ubico government. Guatemalans believed that if they were in
control of their own resources, it would no longer exist as a feudal impoverished society. Under
Ubico the United Fruit Company paid no taxes, were in control of the railroads and ports. The
United States was fine with the overthrowing of the Ubico government.5 The United States
valued the income they earned through the United Fruit Company, but the Ubico government
crossed the line with its totalitarian tactics.
Juan Jose Arevalo was not directly involved with the armed forces that helped overthrow
Jorge Ubico. Arevalo was a former Education minister, who was democratically elected
president in 1944.6 Arevalo offered moderate social reforms, which included increasing the
minimum wage, and nationalizing formerly German owned plantations abandoned due to World
War II. Very few saw Arevalo was a communist or a threat to the country and the United States.7
The United Fruit Company, as well as the International Railways of Central America (IRCA),
however did oppose many of Arevalo’s reforms.8 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles served as
an attorney for the IRCA thus complicating the matter.9 In response Arevalo emphasized that
Guatemala was indeed allies with the United States, and that his people, as agrarian peasants
4
Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America (London: University of North Carolina Press 1988), 43.
Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower, 221.
6
"Juan José Arévalo," The Biography.com website, http://www.biography.com/people/juan-josé-arévalo39364 (accessed May 13 2014).
7
Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower, 223.
8
Bryce Wood, Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press 1985), 154.
9
Wood, Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy, 158.
5
2
were not ideologically wired for communism. He knew that it would a major mistake
diplomatically to cross the United States.10
These reforms laid the groundwork for Jacabo Arbenz, who in March 1951 assumed
power, marking the first successful and democratic transfer of power in Guatemalan history.11
Arbenz decided to build off Avevalo’s legacy, and came out strong issuing vast and expansive
reforms. Upon ascending to the presidency his stated objectives were “to covert our country
from a dependent nation with a semi-colonial economy into an economically independent
country; secondly, to transform our nation from a backward past with a predominantly feudal
economy, into a modern capitalist country; and, third, to see that this transformation is carried
out in such a way that it brings with it the highest possible elevation of the standard of living of
the great masses of people."12 Arbenz's first act was an Agrarian Reform Law. In it he states that
the law would "eliminate all feudal type property in rural areas, abolish antiquated relations of
production, especially work-servitude and the remnants of slavery,... to give land to the
agricultural workers who do not possess such or who possess very little, facilitate technical
assistance, expand agricultural credit for the benefit of all who work the land."13 During the years
1952 to 1954 1.5 million acres of land were redistributed, including 1,700 acres of land which
were owned by Jacobo Arbenz’s family and wife.14 This land reform was seen as more moderate,
than similar reforms in the US, UK, and Mexico. This was seen and hailed as a Guatemalan
Homestead Act. Arbenz sought to create a nation of land owners.
10
Ibid., 156.
Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America,44.
12
Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower, 224.
13
Ibid., 224.
14
Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America,44-45.
11
3
The United Fruit Company owned 550,000 acres of land, 85% of which were unused.
They claimed they needed them as reserves for crop rotation. 15 Guatemala wanted to pay the US
$3 an acre for United Fruit Company land. This was the approximate value the United Fruit
Company priced their assets, but the US wanted $75 an acre.16 This was the major point of
contention between Guatemala and the United States and this sowed the seeds for the eventual
ousting of Arbenz government. Jacobo Arbenz saw reform as a way to modernize society. Many
of the ideals he supported were upheld by both Adam Smith and Karl Marx. Arbenz and Arevalo
were both against the subsidies, tax cuts, and sweetheart deals the United Fruit Company
received from the Ubico government. This goes against the idea of lassie-faire and nongovernment inference in the economy. Arevalo and Abenz’s references to agrarianism, and
feudalism are direct references to Karl Marx. Karl Marx believed that a society progressed from
feudalism to capitalism and then to communism. That is why Arevalo insisted that his agrarian
peasants were not ideologically communists. 17 Flora Lewis put it best in the New York Times
Magazine that “the arguments are about land reform, imperialism, and so on, not Marxism versus
capitalism… Tales of Russian plots to soak up all of Central America's coffee dollars with cheap
Soviet exports are jungle fantasies."18 John Foster Dulles admitted that it'd "be impossible to
produce evidence clearly tying the Guatemalan Government to Moscow."19 The United States
could have interfered in many other Latin American and Guatemalan affairs, but they just so
happened to wait until Guatemalan expropriated land that belonged to the US government
connected United Fruit Company. The United States manufactured many of its own crises. Its
15
Ibid., 45.
Ibid., 46.
17
Wood, Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy, 156.
18
Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower, 256.
19
Ibid., 269.
16
4
refusal to sell Guatemala weapons, lead Guatemala to trade and rely on Czechoslovakia.20 This
was not ideologically, but a mere matter of convenience. Arbenz offered reform and did not rely
on a strict political and economic code to do so. This would eventually become his undoing.
The coup d'état that overthrew Jacobo Arbenz’s government and lead to the presidency of
Carlos Castillo Armas, is often seen as one in a long line of American proxy wars in Latin
America in the midst of the Cold War. It is remiss to ignore the role economics and agrarian
reform played in the revolution, it is not at all to place all the blame on the United States, or to
even refer to Castillo Armas as a Yankee puppet. The situation in Guatemala was far more
complex, contrary to many people’s popular beliefs, Arbenz was no saint. He made many crucial
mistakes which lead to his downfall, these mistakes and incompetencies justified Armas’
revolution. Armas ushered in a fair amount of moderate reforms and was not a right-wing strong
man. Arbenz’s crackdown on civil liberties, Armas’ moderate policies, and Arbenz’s inept
foreign policy, justified the actions of conservatives Guatemalans.
The demographic makeup of Guatemala helps to put the revolution in context. In 1954,
Guatemala had a population of around 2,900,000. A substantial portion of this population was
comprised of indigenous peoples. These peoples were relatively outside the political process,
many were poor, illiterate, and not familiar with modern politics.21 The capital was described as
comprising of some Europeans, and mestizos, but native peoples were the dominate force.22 It is
interesting to the limited role they played in the revolution. This revolution was for the political
elite. This was not an organic grassroots uprising. Most political advocacy and protest came from
educated college students, there were no mass protests. Indians were drawn to the Communist
20
Ibid., 273.
"Guatemala Erupts," New York Times (1923-Current File), Jun 20, 1954,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/112878959?accountid=14068.
22
Flora Lewis, "Communism in Guatemala: A Case History," New York Times (1923-Current File), Feb 21, 1954,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/112982856?accountid=14068.
21
5
ideals surrounding land redistribution.23 They had a sympathetic ear for the Communist cause.
The political culture in Guatemala was rather non-existent at the time of the revolution. There
was vast political apathy, democracy was less than a decade old, the economy was in turmoil,
and there was a great need for both social and economic reforms. The liberals and conservatives
knew that whoever held control of the 6,000 man army would control the country.24 The main
backers of the conservative cause were the finqueros, who were comprised of large land owners,
coffee brokers, and lawyers. These men were the brains and the money behind the coup.25 It was
through this apathetic and infantile democratic culture that Communists were able to ascend and
control certain sectors of society. This included control of the radio, control of newspapers, and
various governmental organizations.26 This revolution pitted the liberal educated elite versus the
conservative wealthy elite.
Much of the discontent among military officials surrounding Jacobo Arbenz, was due to
an incident that occurred, before his presidency. During the election of 1950, candidates were
running to replace President Arevalo. One of Jacobo Arbenz’s primary rivals was Francisco
Javier Arana. They were both army officers, but Arana became chief of the armed forces, and
attracted more conservative and moderate supporters. He represented Arbenz's main political
challenge.27 It was believed that it was Arbenz’s close friends and allies that orchestrated and
carried out the assassination.28 During the campaign two of Arbenz's opponents, General
Ydigoras Fuentes and Colonel Miguel Angel Mendoza were forced into hiding; mobs also
23
Ibid.
"The World," New York Times (1923-Current File), Jul 4, 1954,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/113007030?accountid=14068.
25
Milton Bracker, "The Lessons of the Guatemalan Struggle," New York Times (1923-Current File), Jul 11, 1954,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/112872620?accountid=14068.
26
Lewis, "Communism in Guatemala”, 11.
27
Cole Blasier, The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Change in Latin America 1910-1985 (Pittsburgh, PA:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985), 152.
28
"Guatemala Chief a Career Officer," New York Times (1923-Current File), Jun 28, 1954,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/112989229?accountid=14068.
24
6
interfered with the campaign of Jorge Garcia Granados. Arbenz, won the election by a fair
margin, and did not need the help of these strong arm tactics. It was widely believed and held
that the Arbenz campaign was guilty of election fraud. Arbenz employed Marxist rhetoric
referring to the transition from a feudal to capitalist economy.29 The repression of civil rights did
not just start under Arbenz. In July, 1950 students were killed at an anti-Communist rally.30
Castillo Armas states that, Jacobo Arbenz purchased weapons from Czechoslovakia, in order to
fend off and harshly deal with citizen uprising. 31 Armas claimed that ninety percent of
Guatemalans would rise up against the government, and he claimed that he was the target of
assassination attempts by the Guatemalan government.32 The $10,000,000 worth of weapons,
would pose great danger to the region, and would be the first step toward spreading communism
in the region.33 In the midst of conflict, the Arbenz regime was guilty of kidnappings,
assassinations, torture, deportations, economic vengeance, suspending civil liberties, as well as
the writ of habeas corpus.34 As Anthony Trawick Bouscaren of the World Affairs Institute stated
“Arbenz and his associates were not conventional Latin Absolutists but totalitarians who
believed in class struggle and in the annihilation of their opponents.”35
Castillo Armas and his troops were a breath of fresh air for Guatemala. They were
inevitably tied to the United States and its alleged business interest in the United Fruit Company,
but Information Chief Manuel Orellana Portillo said that “With or without the recent declarations
29
Blasier, The Hovering Giant, 152.
Paul P. Kennedy, "Castillo Pledges Guatemala Gains," New York Times (1923-Current File), Jul 13, 1954,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/113081802?accountid=14068.
31
"Guatemalan Exiles Firm," New York Times (1923-Current File), Jun 14, 1954,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/112877461?accountid=14068.
32
Ibid.
33
"Exile Warns of Red Plans." New York Times (1923-Current File), Jun 8, 1954.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/112880703?accountid=14068.
34
Anthony Trawick Bouscaren, “Guatemala in Transition,” World Affairs 120, no. 4 (Winter 1957): 108-110.
accessed April 4, 2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20669444.
35
Ibid.
30
7
of General Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles [about the Communist menace in Guatemala], we
would have entered Guatemala.”36 While Armas and his forces represented the more
conservative side of the conflict, his policies were not inherently regressive. A lot of his policies
that he put forth were slight variations and extensions of Jacobo Arbenz’s policies. Armas felt as
though the Agrarian Reform Law was purely political pandering. He opposed the government
control of property, and wanted to revise the law so that it would “give more land and more
economic independence to a greater number of campesinos [farm workers].”37 Castillo Armas
did have some support among Guatemalans. In 1950 his name was associated with a possible
presidential run. He did not run, but he did maintain a group of supporters and backers.38 Armas
and his men spent most the time leading up to the invasion in exile. He firmly believed he was
not leading an invasion, but “thousands of Guatemalans who are just forcing the doors of our
own country to return to our homes.39 Government aims were to be “social justice, sustenance,
education, employment, improved economy, and respect for the human being.”40 Armas wanted
to deal with labor, education, land reform, and foreign policy issues. The Arbenz government
placed all their attention and funds on land reform, and by doing so they ignored improving local
healthcare facilities, most notably the Roosevelt Hospital.41 Communism permeated all aspects
of society, outside of organized religion. Once Armas came to power he granted basic labor
36
Milton Bracker, "U. S. Likely to Get the Blame however Latin Revolt Ends," New York Times (1923-Current
File), Jun 21, 1954, http://search.proquest.com/docview/112876188?accountid=14068.
37
"Rebel Chief Maps Farm Law Change," New York Times (1923-Current File), Jun 21, 1954,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/112877369?accountid=14068.
38
Ibid.
39
"Rebels Demand Surrender," New York Times (1923-Current File), Jun 22, 1954,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/112903736?accountid=14068.
40
Kennedy, "Castillo Pledges Guatemala Gains,"
41
Ibid.
8
rights, ended organized labor abuse, pushed moderate land reform, and lifted the ban on all
political parties, outside of the communist party.42
Castillo Armas was nowhere near the regressive politician he is made out to be. One area
where he clearly trumped Arbenz, was foreign policy. Arbenz offered an inept and divisive
foreign policy. He seemingly went out of his way at times to stick it to the “Colossus of the
North.” When you are neighbor to a global power it is best to seek cooperation, and not conflict.
The leaders of Latin American countries sought continental unity. They saw the adoption of
Soviet style foreign ideologies as a deterrent to this unity, and a violation of the Monroe
Doctrine.43 American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, scolded Guatemalan Foreign
Minister Guillermo Toriello for denying the existence of “international communism.”44 Arbenz
refused to assuage the army’s fears, and failed repudiate communism.45 Guatemala consistently
voted against Pan American resolutions.46 After Armas took over US-Guatemalan relations
improved. Aid and investment increased GNP four percent each year, between 1954 and 1960,
infrastructure improved, and Vice President Nixon declared that the US improved Guatemala
more in two years than the communist leaning government has in a decade.47
Jacobo Arbenz’s blatant disregard for civil liberalities helped facilitate and justified
Castillo Armas’ actions. Arbenz’s involvement in the overthrow of Jorge Ubico does not give
Arbenz a free pass in his actions. The United States does not back coup d'états for every country
Bouscaren, “Guatemala in Transition, ”.
Sam Pope Brewer, "Unity Plea Opens Caracas Meeting," New York Times (1923-Current File), Mar 02, 1954,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/113153589?accountid=14068.
44
“The Americans: Keeping Communists Out,” Time, Mar 15, 1954,
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,857395,00.html.
45
"Uprising Plotted Early This Year," New York Times (1923-Current File), Jun 19, 1954,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/112851646?accountid=14068.
46
"The Text of Dulles' Speech on Guatemalan Upset," New York Times (1923-Current File), Jul 01, 1954,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/113078028?accountid=14068.
47
Stephen M. Streeter, “The Failure of ‘Liberal Developmentalism’: The United States’s Anti-Communist
Showcase in Guatemala, 1954-1960,” International History Review 21, no. 2 (Jun 1999): 386-413. accessed April 4,
2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40109008.
42
43
9
it has a disagreement with. Arbenz should have dealt with the political and social upheaval in
Guatemala more democratically, being more sympathetic towards opposing political views and
ideologies would have gone a long way in keeping Arbenz in power.
The Guatemalan coup d'état of 1954 pitted liberal and conservative forces against each
other. The army of Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas prevailed over the democratically elected
President Jacobo Arbenz, it was not a populist uprising as it was made out to be. History has not
been on the side of Armas, The United Fruit Company, and the United States for their respective
roles in the revolution. Arbenz advocated and passed moderate reforms. These reforms were
needed for the vastly rural Guatemala living under a quasi-feudal system. He tried to foster the
growth of a democratic tradition, but that was shot down by the armies of Armas. Arbenz, did err
in the realm of foreign policy, in particular regards to Guatemala’s relationship to the United
States and Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Guatemala’s actions were justifiable, and were hardly
unprecedented especially compared to other countries in the region, particularly the United
States and Mexico.
Most Latin American countries were ambivalent towards speaking out against the United
States and its perceived business interests in Latin America. Many of these Latin American
countries were reliant on the United States as trade partners. In many cases the United States was
one of the largest land owners and employers throughout Latin America. At the Tenth InterAmerican Conference, held in March 1954, in Caracas, Venezuela, Guatemalan Foreign Minister
Guillermo Toriello used the forum to attack the United States for its policies towards Latin
America. He challenged the idea and theory of international Communism, he labeled the United
States as imperialists and monopolists, and he stated that recent United States’ actions were a
pretext to war. Guillermo Toriello referenced earlier “Big Stick” and “dollar diplomacy “which
10
wreaked havoc on the region, which ultimately lead to the intervention of United States’
mariners in Latin American ports.48 It is interesting to see Guillermo Toriello decry the theory of
international communism. The fear of the spread of communism, and Domino Theory loomed
largely over the United States during the Cold War. The United States believed that if
communism were to grow, undeterred, it would spread country to country, making its way
around the globe and eventually to the United States. While Guatemala marked the closest
country to date to be associated with communism, it is ludicrous to believe a series of social and
economic welfare policies, would plant the red roots of communism in the region. All politics
are local, and the situation in Guatemala is truly unique to Latin America. Americans did not
have to deal with foreign countries and companies owning American land. There are few if any
parallels between the United States and Guatemala. Even Castillo Armas would go so far to say
to the New York Times’ Mexico City correspondent, Sydney Gruson that the United States did
not believe that the Communists are trying to win Guatemala for the Communist camp in the
internationalist sense.”49
The idea that the Guatemalan coup d'état was a populist uprising is very much a fallacy.
The belief that Castillo Armas was leading thousands of Guatemalans back to their exiled
homeland and not leading a coup is rather laughable.50 The majority of Guatemalans were native
Maya-Quiche, who stood outside the country’s economic and political systems.51 There was no
real middle class, and politicians often had to rely on rhetoric and political pandering to get their
message across. It is often said that “in a land of prevailing illiteracy, the vote can be delivered
“The Americans: Keeping Communists Out”.
"Guatemala Chief a Career Officer".
50
"Rebels Demand Surrender".
51
William Krehm, “A Victory for the West in Guatemala?,” International Journal, 9, no. 4, (Autumn 1954): 295,
accessed April 4, 2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40197909.
48
49
11
so neatly packaged that as to make Tammany Hall itself turn green with envy.”52 This perfectly
describes the lack of democratic tradition in Guatemala. Native Guatemalans were often
exploited by capitalists, in order to produce goods such as coffee. While this system of economic
exploitation was not new to Guatemala, the United Fruit Company sought to exploit the
economy of Guatemala. Through the use of subsidies the United Fruit Company was able to gain
control of the ports and most of the trade in Guatemala.53 Jacabo Arbenz’s reforms were very
comparable to those of other Latin American leaders. During the 1930s, President Lazaro
Cardenas of Mexico, expropriated foreign oil companies as well as instituted his own form of
agrarian reform. He too, like Arbenz, was reliant on the thoughts and inputs of communist in
order to carry out his social and economic programs. Cardenas was not viewed as a communist
by the United States government, despite the fact that he took many suspicious decisions such as
granting asylum to revolutionary Russian Marxist, and former head of the Red Army, Leon
Trotsky. The Good Neighbor Policy was still in full effect, and American oil companies were
compensated well for their land.54
The United States criticized Guatemala for its paranoia surrounding American and other
Latin American countries possible involvement in a coup. Guatemala discovered a so called
“white paper” which allegedly mentioned American, Venezuelan, El Salvadorian, and
Dominican Republic support in overthrowing Jacobo Arbenz.. The United States State
Department strongly refuted said reports, and criticized the Guatemalan government for
implicating the United States in such a fanciful plot.55 This paranoia was justified. More
evidence came out implicating the United States and its American allies in a coup. The
52
Ibid., 297.
Ibid., 296.
54
Ibid., 297-298.
55
"Guatemala: Plot Within a Plot," Time, February 8, 1954, accessed March 11, 2014.
http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,860376,00.html.
53
12
Guatemalan government published conversations between the exiled Castillo Armas, and
Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza. These conversations revolved around the idea of
purchasing arms from Germany in order to launch an attack on Guatemala.56 It is understandable
with such news that Guatemala felt the need to protect itself, bearing in mind the close
relationship the Somoza family and the United States. Germany associated with arming the
region. After the fiasco dealing with expropriation the United States decided not send Guatemala
arms, even for their police or shooting clubs. The United States presumably told Europe to
follow their precedent. Meanwhile, the United States armed Guatemala’s hostile neighbors,
Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador.57 With this Western weapon ban, as well as the
mobilization of its hostile, anti-democratic neighbors and militants, it is of no shock to see
Guatemala turn towards the Soviet bloc for protection. This essentially gave the United States,
the justification to attack. In the midst of the struggle over the control of Guatemala, the Arbenz
government suspended civil liberties. The Eisenhower administration saw the suspension of
liberties for more than it was worth. Democracy within Latin America was nowhere near
entrenched as it was to its northern neighbors. Democracy was less than a decade old in
Guatemala, and they were in the midst of a civil war. The United States did not seem to mind the
behaviors of the anti-democratic Rafael Trujillo and Somoza regimes58 Why is that? After all did
not the United States suspend habeas corpus in the midst of the American Civil War? The United
States’ justification could not have been a pro-civil liberty one, for the aforementioned reason. It
couldn’t have been a pro-democratic one since the United States helped prop up anti-democratic
regimes in the region, and it could not have been a pro-capitalist one either, for the United States
did not attack the Cardenas government in Mexico for its expropriation of the oil industry, and
56
Ibid., 299.
Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower, 274.
58
Krehm, 300-301.
57
13
because the United Fruit Company was the benefactor of subsidies and corporate welfare from
the Guatemalan government. These economic principles are the exact opposite of those espoused
by economic liberalism.
Upon entering office the United States vied Arbenz as a political opportunist whom they
expected to eventually eliminate extremist leftists from the government and political life.59 When
that did not occur, the United States became distressed “the communists were too successful at
democratic politics for the United States to allow democracy to survive.”60 The United States’
statements and actions in Guatemala are mired in contradictions. The Guatemalan ambassador to
the United States, Guillermo Toriello told American Secretary of State Dean Acheson that the
goal of the Arbenz government was "to avoid dictatorship" he stated that the "best way to combat
Communism is to improve the maladjusted social and economic conditions which produce unrest
among the under-privileged classes." Repression would "drive communism underground." The
idea of a harsh crackdown was counter intuitive.61 This policy is somewhat similar to the one
employed by President Theodore Roosevelt. President Roosevelt, who is seen as the father of the
modern progressive movement, ushered in progressive and socially liberal policies in order to
deter popular support from communists and socialists.
Jacobo Arbenz was a transcendent figure in Guatemalan political history. He never truly
got to fully implement the policies he advocated for as President. Guatemala was due for some
growing pains, after all a decade earlier Guatemala was still under totalitarian rule. Critics may
point at Arbenz for the death of Francisco Javier Arana. Arana’s death largely remains a
mystery. Conservative forces, who were upset that Arana failed to lead a right wing coup, were
Gordon L. Bowen, “U.S. Foreign Policy toward Radical Change: Covert Operations in Guatemala, 1950-1954,”
Latin American Perspectives 10, no. 1 (Winter, 1983): 90, accessed April 4, 2014,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2633365.
60
Ibid., 92.
61
Cook, 232.
59
14
also implicated in his death.62 It is unfair to blame his death on Arbenz. It is also unfair to blame
Arbenz for cracking down on civil liberties for the sake of safety. The United States has backed
countless strongmen and dictators throughout the region. One of the United States’ closest allies
was the President of Nicaragua Anastasio Somoza. Somoza was later assassinated by his own
people, in response to his years of tyrannical rule. The United States should have provided
Arbenz more leeway. A full Arbenz presidency would have led to the continued democratization
of Guatemala. Guatemala was transferring from a improverished nation to an increasing
industrialized one under Arbenz’s presidency. More people, particularly the indigenous
Guatemalans, would have appeared from the edges of society and would have gained more from
Arbenz that from Castillo Armas’ watered down social and economic reforms. 63
The United States supported the Castillo Armas regime, as a means to get back at the
Arbenz government for the expropriation of United Fruit Company land. The coup d'état was
based on American economic self-interest. A bastardized version of capitalism led the United
States and its allies to oppose Arbenz and support Armas. The United States did not act on some
idealist principles. In the case of Lazaro Cardenas in Mexico, the United States welcomed the
exchange of money for land. The United States did not welcome such an exchange in
Guateamala, because they felt as though they were being undercompensated. The United States
played public and international fears about communism, in order to drum up domestic and
international support for the overthrow of the Jacobo Arbenz government. If the Arbenz
government were to have offered more in exchange for land, Castillo Armas could have been a
simple footnote in Guatemalan history.
Piero Gleijeses, “The Death of Francisco Arana: A Turning Point in the Guatemalan Revolution,” Journal of Latin
American Studies 22, no. 3 (Oct., 1990): 527 accessed May 13, 2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/157468.
63
Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower, 224.
62
15
Bibliography
Primary
Bouscaren, Anthony Trawick. “Guatemala in Transition.” World Affairs 120, no. 4 (Winter
1957): 108-110. Accessed April 4, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20669444.
Bracker, Milton. "The Lessons of the Guatemalan Struggle." New York Times (1923-Current
File), Jul 11, 1954. http://search.proquest.com/docview/112872620?accountid=14068.
Bracker, Milton. "U. S. Likely to Get the Blame however Latin Revolt Ends." New York Times
(1923-Current File), Jun 21, 1954.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/112876188?accountid=14068.
Brewer, Sam Pope. "Unity Plea Opens Caracas Meeting." New York Times (1923-Current File),
Mar 02, 1954. http://search.proquest.com/docview/113153589?accountid=14068.
"Exile Warns of Red Plans." New York Times (1923-Current File), Jun 8, 1954.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/112880703?accountid=14068.
"Guatemala Chief a Career Officer." New York Times (1923-Current File), Jun 28, 1954.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/112989229?accountid=14068.
"Guatemala Erupts." New York Times (1923-Current File), Jun 20, 1954.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/112878959?accountid=14068.
"Guatemalan Exiles Firm." New York Times (1923-Current File), Jun 14, 1954.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/112877461?accountid=14068.
“Guatemala: Plot Within a Plot." Time. February 8, 1954. Accessed March 11, 2014.
http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,860376,00.html.
Kennedy, Paul P. "Castillo Pledges Guatemala Gains." New York Times (1923-Current File), Jul
13, 1954. http://search.proquest.com/docview/113081802?accountid=14068.
Krehm, William. “A Victory for the West in Guatemala?.” International Journal. 9, No. 4.
(Autumn 1954): Accessed April 4, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40197909.
Lewis, Flora. "Communism in Guatemala: A Case History." New York Times (1923-Current
File), Feb 21, 1954. http://search.proquest.com/docview/112982856?accountid=14068.
"Rebel Chief Maps Farm Law Change." New York Times (1923-Current File), Jun 21, 1954.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/112877369?accountid=14068.
"Rebels Demand Surrender." New York Times (1923-Current File), Jun 22, 1954.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/112903736?accountid=14068.
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“The Americans: Keeping Communists Out.” Time. Mar 15, 1954.
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,857395,00.html.
"The Text of Dulles' Speech on Guatemalan Upset." New York Times (1923-Current File), Jul
01, 1954. http://search.proquest.com/docview/113078028?accountid=14068.
"The World." New York Times (1923-Current File), Jul 4, 1954.
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"Uprising Plotted Early This Year." New York Times (1923-Current File), Jun 19, 1954.
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Secondary
Blasier, Cole. The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Change in Latin America 1910-1985.
Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985.
Bowen, Gordon L. “U.S. Foreign Policy toward Radical Change: Covert Operations in
Guatemala, 1950-1954.” Latin American Perspectives 10, No. 1 (Winter, 1983):
Accessed April 4, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2633365.
Cook, Blanche Wiesen. The Declassified Eisenhower: A Divided Legacy of Peace and Political
Warfare. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company Inc., 1981
Gleijeses, Piero. Shattered Hope the Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954.
Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1991.
"Juan José Arévalo," The Biography.com website, http://www.biography.com/people/juan-joséarévalo-39364 (accessed May 13 2014).
Rabe, Stephen G. Eisenhower and Latin America. London: University of North Carolina Press,
1988
Streeter, Stephen M. “The Failure of ‘Liberal Developmentalism’: The United States’s AntiCommunist Showcase in Guatemala, 1954-1960.” International History Review 21, No. 2
(Jun 1999): 386-413. Accessed April 4, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40109008.
Wood, Bryce. Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy. Austin, Texas: University of Texas
Press, 1985
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