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To: Delegates
From: Nicolas Maduro
Re: Drug Policy
Date: December 2015
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Venezuela Memo Outline
1. Introduction: Due to ineffective government control of certain border regions and its strategic
geographic location, Venezuela operates as a key trafficking country in the international drug
trade. Narcotics originating from Colombia often move through rural regions, from which they
are transported globally. Allegations against high Venezuelan officials in both government and
security forces suggest strong ties with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a
powerful Marxist guerilla group driving the Latin American drug trade. In addition to substantial
profits, relations are further incentivized by shared Bolivarian ideology however a novel
Colombian-FARC peace accord may affect trafficking unpredictably. Nevertheless, an ardently
dissatisfied public challenges the status quo, where officials must decide to either nationally
confront illegal activities and or covertly protect their interests. In either case, the selected
approach will have important implications for Venezuela’s political trajectory and economic
strife that has ensued since the collapse of oil prices in 2014.
2. Status Quo
a. Geography: A porous 2,200km border dividing Colombia and Venezuela allows for vast
drug transport to poorer, loosely monitored regions. In states like Apure or Zulia,
civilians have learned to coexist (albeit under intimidation) with the FARC, who exercise
de facto local control, conducting global airlifts and shipments of drugs like cocaine,
marijuana, and heroin. Venezuela’s long Caribbean coastline and strategic position links
Colombia to other drug transit points like Puerto Rico, Honduras, or Trinidad renders the
path reliable and established.
b. Government Policy: Ties with official Venezuelan positions foster a FARC tolerant
atmosphere, enabling trafficking activity. Prior allegations accusing top government
officials of smuggling cocaine and branches of the military like the Cartel de los Soles of
exchanging arms for drugs are some examples of these relations. Especially in the current
economic devastation, the lucrative nature of this trade makes it extremely appealing to
those capable of profiting. Upon severing ties with the DEA in 2005, the United States
has repeatedly stated that Venezuela “is not doing enough to stop drug trafficking in the
American continent,” despite opposing Venezuelan claims.
c. Politics and Ideology: The political doctrines of Bolivarianism and Chavism have
intimately linked the FARC and Venezuelan government. Accordingly, FARC activity in
Venezuela “increased exponentially after Hugo Chavez came to power in 1999, and after
the rebels lost their government granted safe haven [in Colombia] in 2002.” Similar
ideology has provided further incentive to tolerate the FARC.
3. Policy Goals
a. Maintain Power and Ideology: On June 23rd Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos
announced a cease-fire agreement between the FARC and Colombian government,
initiating gradual rebel disarmament. This historic agreement adds a new dimension to
Guerilla relations in Venezuela that could have unpredictable effects on trafficking.
Regardless of the consequences, so far for Venezuelans the dynamic remains the same:
the insider positions of certain high officials continue to benefit select Venezuelans of
key authority. Furthermore, maintaining ties with the FARC allows for the enforcement
and potentially spread of Bolivariansim, in addition to its Venezuelan subtype, Chavism.
However as often is the case, the group enjoying the perks of power and money
constitutes only a small fraction of the population, while the majority of the country
struggles in adversity suffering from skyrocketing inflation and scarcity of basic goods.
Regardless, securing positions of power and spreading Chavismo doctrine are the top
priorities of this administration.
4. Policy Recommendations
a. Drug Trade and Stability: Actively addressing drug trade is feasible though indirect,
given Venezuela’s passive role as a transport country. Policy solutions will ultimately
depend on the government’s choice to resist, regulate, or ignore FARC activity in
affected regions. Confronting activity by forming new alliances and enforcing rural
government presence will likely be followed by conversations with other governments
(Colombia, United States, etc.) and associations like the DEA. However it is important to
note that such an approach could jeopardize existing government power relations.
Furthermore, the outcomes of intervention are unpredictable given the Colombian-FARC
peace accord and the volatile national climate. Maintaining a passive status quo to protect
insider profits will ensure select benefits but must be accompanied by some sort of policy
to alleviate national frustration. While the approach towards FARC activity can vary,
what is not flexible is the dire need to address the misery of the general population. This
intense dissatisfaction is only exacerbated by a drug trade that compromises the quality of
living for most while benefiting the select elite.
5. Conclusion
a. Goals and Considerations: To set effective trafficking policy this administration must
consider drug trade as both a power struggle and facet in a complex array of economic
difficulties. However, increasing national stability should be the foremost consideration
in addressing FARC activity. Stabilization would also be in the party’s best interest as a
means of gaining public favorability and maintaining political control. This is especially
true in light of the current economic turmoil and crushing defeat of the United Socialist
Party of Venezuela in the 2015 Congressional elections. Furthermore, considering the
effects, if any, of the recent FARC-Colombian peace accord on trafficking should be
factored into the chosen approach. Note that while achieving national stability is a
universal goal, the means to do so are not. In other words, varying stances on FARC
activity have important political implications which ought to be considered before they
alter the nation’s trajectory moving forward.
Sources
 Wikipedia, “Illegal Drug Trade in Venezuela”
 NYT, “Venezuela is Cocaine Hub Besides Its Claims”
 InSight Crime, “Venezuela”
 Humanosphere, “Colombia’s FARC Deal Marks a Step Toward Peace, But Violence
Is Far From Over”
 Business Insider, “Venezuela Is on the Brink of a Political and Economic
Meltdown”
 United Nations, World Drug Report 2010
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United States Department of Treasury, Treasury Targets Venezuelan Government
Officials Supporting the FARC
Cunningham, Brokers and Key Players in the Internationalization of the FARC
Scaramozzi, Economic Geography of Venezuela and Brazil: U.S. National Security
Implications