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DEVELOPMENTAL REVIEW,
ARTICLE NO.
17, 239–249 (1997)
DR970435
COMMENTARY
Culture, Self, and Development: Are Cultural Templates
Useful or Stereotypic?
Melanie Killen
University of Maryland, College Park
In this paper it is asserted that dichotomous cultural templates such as independence and interdependence, as well as individualism and collectivism, do not accurately reflect the complexity of social life in Western and non-Western cultures
and often result in stereotypic, rather than actual, characterizations of the social
orientations of individuals and of cultures. Viewpoints that (a) promote the use of
dichotomous labels, (b) espouse dualities for some aspects, but not other aspects
of cultures, and (c) critique the notion of broad templates used to describe cultures
are discussed. In general, it is concluded that acknowledging the limitations of cultural dichotomies is incompatible with proposing the notion of an individualistic
American self.  1997 Academic Press
Culture predominates in discussions about social development, and it
should. Including culture in explanations of social development is important
because it reveals the complexity of social life, and it is essential for theorizing about universal developmental patterns. Yet recently researchers have
argued that the labels used to characterize cultures are stereotypic and do
not accurately reflect the complexity among and judgments by persons living
in Western and non-Western cultures, respectively. It is proposed that the
emphasis on culture has obscured the reality of intracultural diversity because the labels used to characterize cultures ignore intragroup and intraindividual variation.
There appear to be at least three positions taken by theorists investigating
cultural influences on development, and in particular those studying independent and interdependent social orientations. First, some theorists support the
use of broad templates to characterize cultures in dichotomous ways and
Thanks are extended to Judith Smetana, Elliot Turiel, and Grover J. Whitehurst for helpful
feedback on the manuscript.
Correspondence and reprint requests should be sent to the author at: Department of Human
Development, 3304 Benjamin Building, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, 207421131 or email: [email protected].
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0273-2297/97 $25.00
Copyright  1997 by Academic Press
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
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MELANIE KILLEN
argue that these templates are useful (Triandis, 1995; Markus & Kitayama,
1991). According to this view, culture can be characterized in terms of individualism and collectivism (see Triandis, 1995), and independence and interdependence (see Markus & Kitayama, 1991). The attributes associated with
individualism include autonomy, creativity, competition, and independence;
collectivism is said to be reflected by familial obligations, duty, hierarchy,
obedience, and interdependence. It is further asserted that individualists
value curiosity, hedonism, and an exciting lifestyle (Triandis, 1995, p. 74);
collectivists prefer security, social order, respect for tradition, and politeness
(Triandis, 1995, p. 74). The attributes associated with individualism and collectivism cover a wide range of social dimensions, such as personality characteristics, self-concepts, motivations, attitudes, conflict resolution styles,
social behavior, interpersonal relations, and intergroup relations. Characteristics associated with these dimensions are typically depicted in dichotomous
ways (individualists do and think X; collectivists do and think Y).
A second view asserts that dichotomies are sometimes inappropriate because the proportion of independence and interdependence varies in different
cultures (Greenfield, 1994; Greenfield & Cocking, 1994). It is argued that
some cultures are extremely independent and others extremely interdependent and that many cultures fall somewhere between the two polarized ends.
It is proposed that cultures should be conceptualized as being located along
a continuum from individualistic to collectivistic. A third perspective rejects
broad labels to characterize cultures on the grounds that they are stereotypic.
It is proposed that independence and interdependence orientations coexist
within cultures and within individuals (Killen & Wainryb, in press; Sinha &
Tripathi, 1994; Spiro, 1993; Turiel, 1996; Turiel & Wainryb, 1994; Wainryb,
1995). Individuals, in all cultures, make judgments reflective of both individualistic (independent) and collectivistic (interdependent) social orientations.
In her article, Raeff (1997) appears to take a midpoint position between
the second and the third perspectives. In her critique of cultural dichotomies,
Raeff rejects the assumption that independent orientations are exclusively
characteristic of individualistic societies and interdependent orientations are
solely reflective of collectivistic societies. Rather, Raeff argues that independence and interdependence are intertwined in all cultures, both individualistic and collectivistic ones. Raeff proposes that this intertwining of independence and interdependence is revealed in analyses of the individualistic
American self. Acknowledging the coexistence of orientations, however,
seems to be incompatible with the proposition of an individualistic American
self. Is the self not multifaceted as well?
In my view, the limitations of the independent/interdependent dichotomy
apply to the individualistic/collectivistic dimension and to the notion of an
individualistic American self. In order to avoid the perpetuation of cultural
stereotypes, it is essential to consider the stereotypic implications of both
sets of labels for analyzing social orientations and perspectives of cultures
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and individuals. As mentioned, for some researchers (particularly those taking the second and third views), cultural labels come precariously close to
stereotypes. Stereotyping involves indiscriminately attributing a label to a
group of persons with the assumption that the attribution is a shared trait
among the members of the group (Stangor & Schaller, 1996). Research on
stereotypes and stereotyping behavior has shown that individuals frequently
focus on confirming evidence and ignore disconfirming evidence, often subconsciously (Stangor & Schaller, 1996). Unfortunately, social scientists are
not free from invoking stereotypes. This has been shown by Gould (1981)
in his analysis of research on race and intelligence and has been argued
by Mednick (1989) in her critique of gender studies. Claims about cultural
differences also need to be scrutinized for the perpetuation of stereotypic
attributions. I will first discuss some of the limitations of the use of broad
labels to characterize culture, and then I will address specific points regarding
culture, self, and development.
There are several bases for the claims that labels such as individualism
and collectivism (and independence and interdependence) are problematic.
It is argued that the use of broad labels to characterize cultures (and individuals within these cultures) involves a false assumption of homogeneity; it is
assumed that individuals within a given culture think and act alike (Killen &
Wainryb, in press; Mines, 1988; Spiro, 1993; Turiel, 1996; Turiel, Killen, &
Helwig, 1987; Wainryb & Turiel, 1995). For example, statements such as
‘‘Japanese are collectivistic’’ and ‘‘British are individualistic’’ (see Triandis,
1995) assume that the majority of Japanese (or British) think and act in a
particular and similar way. Research from an array of perspectives has shown
that diversity exists within cultures, that is, that individuals within the same
culture approach problems from very different perspectives. Attributions of
homogeneity of groups form the basis for much of stereotyping behavior; a
group is assumed to think and act alike (Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Schadron, 1994).
Further, researchers have asserted that the attributes associated with broad
social orientations are applied indiscriminately without taking contextual,
interpretative, and cognitive factors into account. Invoking broad labels ignores the cognitive construal of situations by individuals. Asch (1952/1987)
and others (e.g., Ross & Nisbett, 1991) have proposed that individuals construct social reality by transforming information and giving it meaning, particularly with respect to their cognitive level. Individuals interpret some issues in individualistic terms and other issues in collectivistic terms
depending on their construal of the situation. For example, much recent research in social (Smetana, 1995; Tisak, 1995; Turiel, 1983) and cognitive
(Feldman, 1994; Fischer, 1980; Keil, 1985) development has examined domain-specific aspects of behavior and judgment. In the social area, research
has shown that Western and non-Western individuals value both individual
rights and fairness as well as interpersonal obligations and social responsibility (Song, Smetana, & Kim, 1987; Smetana, Killen, & Turiel, 1991; Tisak,
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1995, for Western; Nucci, 1996; Wainryb, 1995, for non-Western). Fairness
is not always subordinated to interdependent values in non-Western cultures,
nor is it always given priority in Western cultures. Conversely, interpersonal
obligations are not always subordinated to independent values in Western
cultures, nor are they given priority in non-Western cultures. Individualistic
and collectivistic values coexist within individual social orientations in both
Western and non-Western cultures.
In addition, critics of cultural dichotomies have argued that the differences
between ideology and psychological reality are not well delineated. While
cultures may espouse certain principles and expectations, this does not directly translate into the psychological reality of individuals within that culture (Spiro, 1993; Wainryb & Turiel, 1995). In other words, cultural norms
are not directly mirrored by the persons in the culture that hear and receive
such messages. Cultural norms may be influential but are not directly reducible to how individuals interpret and evaluate social issues.
Culture. Raeff considers the inherent complexities of diverse cultural
orientations by arguing that independence and interdependence are intertwined within all societies and that an essential aspect of social development
is the interrelationship between individuals and social relationships. As an
illustration, she cites attachment theory, which asserts that independence in
development is an outcome of interdependence (secure attachment provides
for independence and exploration). The dichotomous view of independence
and interdependence is incompatible with the position that ‘‘all humans are
simultaneously physically separate and socially connected beings’’ (Raeff,
1997). Yet, if interdependence is an integral aspect of American social life,
then why is American culture characterized as individualistic? Raeff cites
evidence to show that independence is also a central feature of non-Western
cultures. Why, then, are non-Western cultures characterized as collectivistic?
In both cases, the coexistence of independence and interdependence in diverse cultures raises the question of the validity of the individualistic/collectivistic dichotomy.
Other researchers taking positions similar to Raeff ’s have argued that
while independence and interdependence are present in different cultures, the
manifestation of these orientations differs. Independence in a non-Western
culture is different from independence in a Western culture (Greenfield &
Cocking, 1994). As an illustration, Japanese preschool teachers have been
shown to foster autonomy by encouraging children to resolve conflicts on
their own (Killen & Sueyoshi, 1995; Lewis, 1995). Japanese teachers believe
that when children become self-reliant they have fewer conflicts, engage in
self-management, and have fewer discipline problems. These observations
have been interpreted differently by researchers studying the role of culture
on social development. On the one hand, these observations have been interpreted as an example of how non-Western adults value independence and
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self-reliance (reportedly individualistic attributes) and how independence
and interdependence are coordinated in the Japanese preschool pedagogy
because both individualistic and collectivistic values are communicated by
adults to children. Cultural variation exists in the way that values are coordinated, and this differs from claims about whether these values are present
or absent (Killen & Nucci, 1995).
On the other hand, it has been proposed that these findings provide evidence for interdependence in Japan because it is asserted that Japanese adults
foster autonomy (independence) in order to strengthen the social group (interdependence), a collectivistic goal (Greenfield, 1995). From this view, it
is argued that while autonomy exists in collectivistic cultures it is subordinated to interdependent goals and that the reverse is true for individualistic
cultures (when interdependence manifests it is subordinated to independence). Whether Japanese teachers encourage autonomy solely to strengthen
the group or whether they do it because they value self-reliance on its own
is not really known. Both of these interpretations of pedagogical goals in
Japan, however, require a new interpretation of the individualistic/collectivistic dichotomy because the values associated with each dimension are present in a range of cultures (both Western and non-Western). What appears
to be at stake is what exactly is meant by the terms ‘‘intertwining’’ and
‘‘coexistence.’’ Clearly, how social orientations are intertwined within cultures is not well understood.
Raeff addresses the intertwining issue by providing a historical analysis
of the ways in which independence and interdependence have coexisted in
the history of American culture. She begins with colonial origins and works
her way through present day social life. Raeff demonstrates how the patriarchical system of the Puritans frequently repressed independence by maintaining children in dependent positions until they married or were in their
mid-20s. Further, the Puritans often encouraged independence for the interests of the community (interdependence). Raeff highlights 19th-century urban life by pointing to places in which the privatized family was a ‘‘central
sphere for the development of interdependence, emotional ties, and cooperation for the good of a social unit . . . [and] for individual self-fulfillment’’
(Raeff, 1997).
These examples provide a beginning toward understanding the concept of
‘‘intertwining.’’ Most likely, an even stronger demonstration of intertwining
will emerge from psychological data (interviews, observations, surveys) regarding how individuals construct social practices, norms, and expectations.
The selection of historical examples is limited in its forcefulness as a demonstration of coexistence because many of these sources involve an observer’s
inferences about social practices rather than a direct and systematic observation of how individuals construe such expectations. For example, the viewpoint on the role of interdependence in the privatized family in 19th-century
urban life probably varies greatly depending on the perspective of the family
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member. Husbands and wives most likely had different viewpoints on the
notion of the ‘‘good of a social unit.’’ Further, historical anecdotes reflect
a mixture of ideology and accounts of actual practices during selective time
periods. An important distinction between ideology and psychological reality
needs to be considered.
As mentioned earlier, the notion that cultural ideologies are mirrored in
the judgments, behaviors, and attitudes of members of the culture has been
challenged by psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists (Killen &
Wainryb, in press; Spiro, 1993; Strauss, 1992; Turiel, 1983; Wainryb & Turiel, 1995). It is argued that cultural ideologies are often more complex and
multifaceted than typically depicted and, in addition, that individuals within
cultures may interpret such symbols, values, and practices in different ways.
For example, sociologists McCloskey and Brill (1983) surveyed Americans
regarding their support of civil liberties and found that, in many cases, layman and law enforcement officials did not support freedom of speech, the
right to assemble, and other Bill of Rights principles, in specified contexts.
As an example, an item such as ‘‘crackpot ideas have as much right to be
heard as sensible ideas’’ was not unanimously supported by individuals (McCloskey & Brill, 1983, p. 53). What was missing from their report were the
reasons why individuals negated individual liberties (see Turiel, Killen, &
Helwig, 1987, for an analysis of these findings). However, the survey findings indicate that cultural ideology and the psychological reality of individuals’ social orientations are not one and the same. Individuals construct and
transform cultural messages in a myriad of ways.
Researchers studying traditional cultures have also demonstrated ways in
which ‘‘collectivistic’’ individuals value and actively pursue personal goals
and agendas (Spiro, 1993). As an illustration, Mines (1988) examined the
life histories of men and women from all strata of Indian society (a reportedly
collectivistic, hierarchical culture) and found that individuals develop and
value personal goals and aspirations separate from (and often in conflict with)
the goals of their social group, and take responsibility for the direction of
their own lives. Mines reports about a man who dreamed of being a Tamil
folk scholar at a young age but was prevented from doing so by his parents;
he put off his pursuit until age 55, at which time he retired from the family
business and became a full-time Tamil scholar. In this case, disinheritance
and social isolation were weighed against the goal of pursuing a personal
ambition. Based on his study, Mines concluded that conforming to traditional
expectations is often due to the negative societal consequences of not abiding
by such expectations and should not be taken as a sign of a lack of personal
goals.
If dichotomies are not useful, how should cultural differences be characterized? Wainryb and Turiel (1995) have argued that social and economic structures within cultures form the bases for different social practices and that
these practices should not be equated with psychological and social orienta-
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tions (e.g., ‘‘individualism’’ or ‘‘collectivism’’) of members in the culture.
In their studies, they interviewed members of the Druze culture in Israel, a
very traditional and hierarchical culture that would be classified as ‘‘collectivistic’’ by many cultural theorists. Their interviews with men and women
revealed that men have a strong sense of entitlements and rights (typically
reflective of individualistic cultures) and women hold deep concerns about
fairness and justice (with respect to gender roles). At the same time, both
men and women supported the traditional, hierarchical social arrangement
that existed in the families interviewed. Thus, while a culture may be characterized as ‘‘traditional’’ it is inaccurate, in their view, to label it as collectivistic, if what is meant by this is that individuals in the culture hold a certain
set of values, expectations, and beliefs. It is stereotypical to attribute a set
of psychological beliefs to members of a culture based solely on their economic and social conditions. Cultural differences need to be understood in
terms of the complexity of the ways that independent and interdependent
values coexist within the culture and within an individualistic perspective.
Analyses of the self reveal this multiplicity.
Self. Raeff asserts that an individualistic, American self is a pluralistic
concept. Is Raeff ’s proposal a call for a pluralistic definition of self or a
pluralistic definition of an American self? The former position would be
consistent with the views espoused in this paper, that individual social orientations are multifaceted and heterogeneous. The latter position is more difficult to interpret. Proposing a pluralistic definition of an American self implies
that American selves are multifaceted but are somehow different from nonAmerican selves along a particular dimension or set of attributes. Why is an
American self contrasted with a non-American self? This interpretation is
vulnerable to appearing value laden; American selves are complex and nonAmerican selves are simple. Raeff argues against this view but it is not unreasonable to propose that this is an implication of the postulation of an ‘‘American self.’’ Triandis’ writings on individualistic and collectivistic cultures
provide this type of interpretation in several places.
For example, in his paper on the self in differing cultural contexts Triandis
states that ‘‘as societies become more complex and affluent, they also can
become more individualistic’’ (1989, p. 509); ‘‘people in the more complex,
individualistic, and loose cultures sample the private self more than the public self, because complexity, individualism and looseness lead to a more
complex private self. . . . Conversely, in collectivism, the opposite conditions
are important’’ (1989, p. 513). The implication is that individualistic selves
are complex and collectivistic selves are simple. By postulating an American
self, one is left with the question of how it contrasts to a non-American
self. Clearly, characterizations of cultural selves as complex and simple can
quickly lead to negative stereotypes.
In his critique of Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) article on independent
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and interdependent selves, Spiro (1993) asked whether the notion of the self
is peculiar to Western cultures. Spiro cited evidence from studies that were
conducted in Japan and Burma to show that individuals in non-Western cultures had distinct notions of self and that they had personal goals and ambitions that were often disguised in public settings due to negative repercussions (rather than a lack of a sense of agency). He argued that the notion of
a self-concept is not peculiar to Western cultures because individuals in nonWestern cultures also have a sense of boundedness and agency. Spiro cited
philosophers such as William James (1890/1981), who theorized about the
universality of a differentiation between self and other, an essential part of
human nature. Raeff supports Spiro’s position when she critiques the
independent/interdependent dichotomy. Some of these same concerns arise,
however, when theorizing about the notion of the self, particularly the concept of an American self.
Thus, proposing the notion of an American self raises several issues:
(1) What is meant by the concept of ‘‘self ’’? (2) What is meant by the term
‘‘American’’? (3) Is there something about one’s identity that transcends
intracultural contexts and situations but does not generalize across cultural
boundaries? and (4) Do individuals in a diverse and complex society like
the United States share traits that reflect their sense of self? Space limitations
do not permit in-depth responses to these questions but these issues must be
addressed before it is assumed that individuals within a culture share a concept of the self. For example, in Spiro’s (1993) analysis of self-concept research he argues that there exists a ‘‘lack of terminological and conceptual
clarity’’ (p. 113) in the use of the term ‘‘self.’’ He points to a number of ways
in which the term is used, which include personhood, the cultural concept
of personhood, psychic entity, the individual construal of psychic entities,
personality, self-awareness, self–other differentiation, and self-representation. Cultural studies of the self are confusing, he asserts, because in many
cases researchers do not mean the same thing by the term ‘‘self.’’ A similar
argument could be made for the term ‘‘American.’’ The term American has
been used to refer to Western, North American, urban American, AngloAmerican, and centrist American. The term is used loosely without rigorous
clarification. Thus, the criticisms levied against cultural dichotomies are applicable to the notion of an individualistic American self; homogeneity is
assumed when heterogeneity may be more accurate.
Wainryb and Turiel (1995) assert that heterogeneity exists within individuals, not only within cultures. Diversity within cultures means that some individuals in a culture hold one orientation (independent or interdependent) and
other individuals hold a different orientation. Diversity within individuals
implies that individuals use diverse orientations depending on the nature of
the issue or consideration; independent and interdependent selves coexist
within individual social orientations, and how these perspectives manifest
depends on the specific context or situation. For example, studies have shown
COMMENTARY ON RAEFF
247
that different dimensions of the self are important for the construction of
civil liberties at different ages (Helwig, 1995). In interviews with children
and young adults, Helwig found that young children view individual freedom
in relation to a psychological self defined in terms of agency, thoughts, and
feelings, whereas adolescents perceive liberties in terms of the community
and the implications for interpersonal relationships and obligations (Helwig,
1997). Just as cultures are multifaceted, so too are concepts of the self. This
brings us to the question of acquisition. How are these social orientations
acquired in development?
Development. Raeff proposes that cultural values shape development.
The view that cultural values shape behavior suggests a unidirectional influence. The child acquires social values as a result of cultural norms, expectations, and influences. Yet, Raeff discusses the ways in which children construct social categories out of parent–child interactions. The social
interactional data she cites suggest that children are not passive recipients
of cultural messages; rather, children actively transform adult messages and
give meaning to cultural norms based on their level of development and
interpretation of behavior. In fact, Raeff ’s social interactional data support
such a constructivist, rather than a passive, view. Further, Raeff states that
‘‘cultural values are standards for good or right ways of being.’’ From a
cognitive–developmental model, morality is defined in terms of universal
principles, rather than cultural values (see Turiel, in press). Frequently, cultural values contradict, or go against, moral and ethical principles; thus, they
are not one and the same thing. The role of cultural values in development
requires more clarification. Much recent research has been designed to determine how social and moral knowledge is constructed by children through
social interaction with peers and adults (Killen & Smetana, 1996; Nucci,
1996; see Smetana, 1995, for a review), yet research on how cultural values
are acquired in development has only just begun.
In conclusion, many researchers now point to the limitations of using dichotomies to characterize cultures, selves, and development and yet dichotomies are still quite commonly invoked to explain cultural differences. Despite much evidence now available to demonstrate the ways in which
independence and interdependence (and individualism and collectivism) are
intertwined in American culture, there is still a heavy reliance on these constructs to predict, explain, and analyze cultural dimensions of social life. Not
only are independence and interdependence interwoven in Western culture
but these orientations are interwoven in non-Western cultures as well because all cultures are made up of both individuals and groups. The next step
might be to consider ways in which independence and interdependence (and
individualism and collectivism) are also interwoven aspects not only of cultures, but also of individuals. All individuals (as humans) value individualistic and collectivistic goals; how these are given priority, weighed, and coordi-
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nated remains to be better understood. To propose otherwise is to deny the
complexity of social development and to fall back on stereotypic representations, which too often involve making assumptions about homogeneity
within groups when heterogeneity is the more accurate characterization.
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Received August 26, 1996; revised September 27, 1996