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Xi Credibility Disadvantage (Aff Answers)
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Xi Credibility Disadvantage Answers
Xi Credibility Disadvantage Answers ............................................................................................ 1
Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 2
Glossary ...................................................................................................................................... 3
Non-Unique-- Xi Credibility Low Now ..................................................................................... 4
Non-Uniq-- Xi Not Committed to Market Reform ..................................................................... 6
No Link- Opposition to Reform Blocks Reform ........................................................................ 8
No Internal Link- Reforms Impossible In China ...................................................................... 10
No Impact- Chinese Growth Not Sustainable ........................................................................... 12
No Impact- China won’t start a war .......................................................................................... 14
Impact Turn- Reform Harms Chinese Economy ...................................................................... 15
Impact Turn- Reform Causes Authoritarian Rule ..................................................................... 16
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Xi Credibility Disadvantage (Aff Answers)
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Summary
The thesis of this disadvantage is that cooperation with the United States will
undermine President Xi Jinping’s domestic economic reform efforts. Currently,
President Xi Jinping (pronounced “she jean-ping”) of China is embarked on
domestic efforts to reform China’s economy, most of which consist of opening China
to market forces and reducing state owned enterprises. However, such reforms are
politically contentious, and require Xi to maintain domestic political strength.
Hardliners in China distrust cooperation with the United States, thus such
cooperative efforts will undermine Xi domestically, derailing his reform efforts,
which are the key to China’s economy.
Debaters should note that Xi is actually the surname, as in many Asian countries the
first name is the equivalent of the last name in English (even though the name Xi
comes first it is the equivalent of Obama in Barack Obama’s name).
Thanks to Selene Figueroa, Samford Debate Institute, Northwestern University
Debate Institute, Michigan National Debate Institute and Gonzaga Debate Institute
for their contributions to this project.
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Glossary
Accrue- accumulate or receive (such payments or benefits).
Xi Jinping- is the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, the President of the People's Republic of
China, and the Chairman of China's Central Military Commission.
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or Communist Party of China (CPC)- political
party of China. Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the CCP has
been in sole control of that country’s government.
Clout- influence or power, especially in politics or business.
Hardliners- a member of a group, typically a political group, who adheres uncompromisingly
to a set of ideas or policies.
Market based reforms- proposed reforms of the Chinese economy to reduce the influence of
the state in production and business to a more open and market based economy.
Political Capital- the trust, goodwill, and influence a politician has with the public and
other political figures. This goodwill is a type of invisible currency that politicians can use to
mobilize the voting public or spend on policy reform.
People’s Liberation Army – the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China
People’s Republic of China – official name for the government of China
Vested interests- a personal stake or involvement in an undertaking or state of affairs,
especially one with an expectation of financial gain.
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Non-Unique-- Xi Credibility Low Now
[___] Financial sector reforms spur more investment in China.
Eswar Prasad, 2016 (Tolani Senior Professor of Trade Policy at Cornell University), China’s
economy and financial markets: Reforms and risks, Apr. 27, 2016. Retrieved May 9, 2016 from
http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2016/04/27-china-economy-financial-marketsprasad
There could be significant effects on the patterns of global capital flows if this decision does
lead to further financial sector reforms, capital account liberalization, and exchange rate
flexibility in China. These changes would open the doors for more capital inflows into
China and also further tilt the composition of China’s outflows away from foreign exchange
reserve accumulation by the central bank, as it will spur more foreign investments by China’s
households, corporations, and institutional investors.
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Non-Unique-- Xi Credibility Low Now- Extensions
[___]
[___] Slowing economy threatening Xi’s credibility.
Andrew Nathan, 2016 (Columbia University) Signs of growing discontent for Xi Jinping in
China, Mar. 31, 2016. Retrieved May 9, 2016 from http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/signs-ofgrowing-discontent-for-xi-jinping-in-china/
There are many people unhappy because the economy is slowing down and because people
are losing jobs. Xi Jinping is attacking the state-owned enterprises to try to force them to be
more efficient. He wants to reorganize the military. He has this big anti-corruption campaign.
[___] Slower growth is sapping the legitimacy of Xi now:
ECONOMIST, 2012 The man who must change China, Oct. 27, 2012. Retrieved May 9,
2016 from http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21565210-xi-jinping-will-soon-be-namedchina%E2%80%99s-next-president-he-must-be-ready-break
Mr Xi portrays himself as a man of the people and the party still says it represents the masses,
but it is not the meritocracy that some Western observers claim (see article). Those without
connections, are often stuck at the bottom of the pile. Having long since lost ideological
legitimacy, and with slower growth sapping its economic legitimacy, the party needs a new
claim on the loyalty of China’s citizens.
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Non-Uniq-- Xi Not Committed to Market Reform
[___] Xi is not committed to market reforms.
THE ECONOMIST, 2016 In his exercise of power at home, Xi Jinping is often ruthless. But
there are limits to his daring, Apr. 2, 2016. Retrieved May 9, 2016 from
http://www.economist.com/news/china/21695923-his-exercise-power-home-xi-jinping-oftenruthless-there-are-limits-his
Mr Xi has been even more hesitant in his handling of the economy. Months after taking
power, he proclaimed that under his leadership markets would play a “decisive” role. Since
last year he has begun to talk of a need for “supply-side” reforms, implying that inefficient, debtladen and overstaffed state-owned enterprises (SOEs)—ie, most of them—need shaking up. But
his approach has been marked by uncertainty, U-turns and, occasionally, incompetence.
[___] Xi is not fully committed to market reforms.
THE ECONOMIST, 2016 In his exercise of power at home, Xi Jinping is often ruthless. But
there are limits to his daring, Apr. 2, 2016. Retrieved May 9, 2016 from
http://www.economist.com/news/china/21695923-his-exercise-power-home-xi-jinping-oftenruthless-there-are-limits-his
It is true that some prices have been liberalised. In the second half of 2015, more marketfriendly systems were introduced for setting exchange and interest rates. But the reform of
SOEs has barely begun, stymied by the vested interests of SOE managers and their
political friends, by fear of increasing unemployment, and perhaps by Mr Xi’s own oft-stated
belief that the party should keep its hold on the main economic levers. There are few signs
yet that loss-making SOEs will be shut down or that any will be subjected to real competition.
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Non-Uniqueness Extensions – Xi not committed to market reform
[___] Economic liberalization has stalled under Xi.
THE ECONOMIST, 2016 In his exercise of power at home, Xi Jinping is often ruthless. But
there are limits to his daring, Apr. 2, 2016. Retrieved May 9, 2016 from
http://www.economist.com/news/china/21695923-his-exercise-power-home-xi-jinping-oftenruthless-there-are-limits-his
Another implication is that it is no longer reasonable to argue that China is a model of an
authoritarian country opening up economically without doing so politically. Mr Xi has
increased control over the political system, but economic liberalisation has stalled. At the
moment, the two are moving in lockstep in the wrong direction, to China’s detriment. The
third is that Deng’s policy of putting “economic construction at the centre” is no longer the
country’s most hallowed guiding principle. For Mr Xi, politics comes first every time.
[___] China’s commitment to reforms wavering now:
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 2016 Soros says China's debt-fueled growth echoes U.S. in 2007-08,
Apr. 21, 2016, Retrieved May 9, 2016 from http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns-wp-blmchina-soros-ff3c697e-07d3-11e6-bfed-ef65dff5970d-20160421-story.html
"Whether we call it stabilization or not, I am not sure," Colquhoun said in an interview in New
York. "From a credit perspective, we'd be more comfortable with China slowing more than
it is. We are getting less confident in the government's commitment to structural reforms."
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No Link- Opposition to Reform Blocks Reform
Opposition to reform prevents Xi’s reform efforts.
THE ECONOMIST 2016, In his exercise of power at home, Xi Jinping is often ruthless. But
there are limits to his daring, Apr. 2, 2016. Retrieved May 9, 2016 from
http://www.economist.com/news/china/21695923-his-exercise-power-home-xi-jinping-oftenruthless-there-are-limits-his
Some optimists still argue that Mr Xi believes the time is not yet ripe for bold economic
change but that, once he has cleaned up the party, he will be able to turn his attention to
economic reform. In this view, a critical period will come after a party congress due late
next year. At that meeting, Mr Xi will put many more of his loyalists in positions of
authority. But it is just as likely that he will continue to dawdle on reform, because
opposition to it will have become entrenched. It is rarely possible to change course sharply
after several years in power.
Xi retreating on reforms now.
Goh Sui Noi, 2016(East Asia Editor), Why is Xi Jinping the reformer resorting to rule by fear?
Mar. 28, 2016. Retrieved May 9, 2016 from http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/why-isxi-jinping-the-reformer-resorting-to-rule-by-fear
After what seemed like an initial reformist turn, Chinese President Xi Jinping appears to
be changing course. Soon after taking power in late 2012, he dropped references to
Marxism and Mao Zedong thought and came up with an impressive reform blueprint.
More recently, though, he seems to be moving in the opposite direction. He has detained
human rights lawyers, reined in the media and allowed a personality cult around him.
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No Link Extensions – Opposition blocks reform
Xi needs to replenish his political capital.
Minxin Pei, 2015 (director of the Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies at
Claremont McKenna College), FORTUNE, China-Taiwan Summit: Why Now? And What to
Expect, Nov. 4, 2015. Retrieved May 10, 2016 from http://fortune.com/2015/11/04/chinataiwan-summit/
Xi also has a compelling political reason to showcase his leadership and meet with Taiwan.
With a struggling economy and an anti-corruption campaign that has made him unpopular
with the bureaucracy, Xi needs to replenish his political capital. A landmark summit with
Taiwan could offer that benefit. It demonstrates Xi’s bold leadership, particularly since
such a meeting would have been inconceivable under his less decisive and powerful
predecessors. Xi is also concerned that, should the DPP recapture the presidency in Taiwan
next January, he would risk criticism of doing nothing to prevent such an outcome.
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No Internal Link- Reforms Impossible In China
[___] Real pro-market reforms are impossible in China:
Minxin Pei, 2015 (director of the Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies at
Claremont McKenna College), AMERICAN INTEREST, Asia's Game of Thrones, Nov. 12,
2015. Retrieved May 9, 2016 from http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/11/12/thetwilight-of-communist-party-rule-in-china/
To be sure, the economic policies of the CPC have changed beyond recognition since the end of
the Mao era. However, the Chinese party-state has yet to shed its predatory instincts and
institutions. Despite rhetoric professing respect for the market and property rights, the
actual conduct and policies of the Chinese ruling elites show that they neither respect
private property rights nor wish to protect them. The most telling evidence of the absence
of their willingness to constrain the predatory appetite and capacity of a one-party state is the
top leadership’s undisguised hostility to the idea of constitutionalism, the essence of which
is enforceable limits on the power of the state and its rulers. The CPC’s rejection of any
meaningful limits on its power, in practical terms, implies that China cannot have truly
independent judicial institutions or regulatory agencies capable of enforcing laws and
rules. Since genuine market economies cannot function without such institutions or
agencies, it is clear that, as long as the party places itself above the law, real pro-market
economic reforms are impossible.
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No Internal Link- Reforms Impossible In China- Extensions
[___]
[___] China will never commit to the type of reforms necessary to save its economy:
Minxin Pei, 2015 (director of the Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies at
Claremont McKenna College), AMERICAN INTEREST, Asia's Game of Thrones, Nov. 12,
2015. Retrieved May 9, 2016 from http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/11/12/thetwilight-of-communist-party-rule-in-china/
Thus, the continuation of China’s predatory and extractive institutions precludes
successful, radical, and complete market reforms. The impossibility of the task of
constructing a genuine market economy supported by the rule law can be summarized in a wise
Chinese proverb, yuhumoupi, or bargaining with a tiger for its skin. The long-term prospects for
China’s economic growth, key to the CPC’s survival, are not optimistic. As the era of rapid
growth produced by partial reforms and one-off favorable factors or events ends,
sustaining China’s growth requires a radical overhaul of its economic and political
institutions in order to achieve greater efficiency. But since this fateful step will destroy the
economic foundations of CPC rule, it is hard to imagine that the party will actually commit
economic, and hence political, suicide. Those unconvinced by such reasoning should count
the number of dictatorships in history that willingly gave up their privileges and control
over the economy in order to ensure long-term national prosperity.
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No Impact- Chinese Growth Not Sustainable
Chinese growth is not sustainable:
Minxin Pei, 2015 (director of the Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies at
Claremont McKenna College), AMERICAN INTEREST, Asia's Game of Thrones, Nov. 12,
2015. Retrieved May 9, 2016 from http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/11/12/thetwilight-of-communist-party-rule-in-china/
However, investment-driven growth in the Chinese context has had three negative
consequences. One is the diminishing returns on investments, because each incremental
increase in output requires more investment, as measured by capital output ratio (the amount of
investment needed to produce an additional yuan of GDP). In the 1990s, Chinas capital output
ratio was 3.79. In the 2000s, it rose to 4.38. This trend—growth requiring ever-rising
investment—is simply not sustainable. China is already investing nearly half of its GDP, an
extraordinary number made possible by state control of infrastructure development. The
extent of overcapacity and misallocation of capital are equally extraordinary.
Sustainable Chinese growth is impossible:
Minxin Pei, 2015 (director of the Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies at
Claremont McKenna College), AMERICAN INTEREST, Asia's Game of Thrones, Nov. 12,
2015. Retrieved May 9, 2016 from http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/11/12/thetwilight-of-communist-party-rule-in-china/
Another harm inflicted on the economy is that investment squeezes out household
consumption (36 percent of GDP in 2013, compared with 60 percent in India), causing a
massive structural imbalance and making sustainable growth impossible. That sustainable
growth must come from moving away from export-led modalities to domestic market
growth, but it cannot set roots with household consumption so artificially low.
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No Impact- Growth Not Key to Stability
Growth cannot sustain Chinese autocratic rule.
Minxin Pei, 2015 (director of the Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies at
Claremont McKenna College), AMERICAN INTEREST, Asia's Game of Thrones, Nov. 12,
2015. Retrieved May 9, 2016 from http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/11/12/thetwilight-of-communist-party-rule-in-china/
However, trends since Xi Jinping came to power in late 2012 suggest that repression and
nationalism are assuming an increasingly prominent role in the CPC’s survival strategy.
An obvious explanation is that China’s faltering economic growth is creating social tensions and
eroding public support for the CPC, thus forcing the regime to deter potential societal challenge
with force and divert public attention with nationalism. There is, however, an equally valid
explanation that many observers have overlooked. A survival strategy that depends on
delivering economic growth to maintain legitimacy is inherently unsustainable not only
because economic growth cannot be guaranteed and ever-rising popular expectations will be
impossible to meet, but also because sustained economic growth produces structural
socioeconomic changes that, as demonstrated by social science research and histories of
democratic transitions, fatally threaten the durability of autocratic rule.
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No Impact- China won’t start a war
[___] Economic and political instability will cause domestic crackdowns not
international lashouts.
Feng 2010 [5/10, Zhu, PhD, Professor of School of International Studies and Director of the
Center for International & Strategic Studies @ Peking University, has served as research fellow
@ Washington based CSIS & Fairbank Center for East Asian Studies @ Harvard University,
visiting scholar @ Durham University in UK, “An Emerging Trend in East Asia: Military
Budget Increases and Their Impact”, May 10, 2010,
http://www.fpif.org/articles/an_emerging_trend_in_east_asia]
Many China watchers in the West contend that the weak legitimacy of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) has spurred its military buildup. But this is mostly an attribution
error. Despite a great number of challenges from home and abroad, the CCP’s ruling
legitimacy has not suffered from any shock. The Chinese people do not believe that a
change of ruling party or the party’s relinquishing of power will resolve their complaints.
Even if domestic unrest flares up, China would likely turn inward rather than outward,
even at the cost of effectively muting an assertive foreign policy.
[___] China has no national intereste in proving the United States into a war.
Rudd, 2015 – Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Former
Prime Minister of Australia (Kevin, Belfer Center, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations Under
Xi Jinping”, April 2015, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20USChina%2021.pdf, //11)
Xi Jinping is a nationalist. And China, both the U.S. and China’s neighbors have concluded, is
displaying newfound assertiveness in pursuing its hard security interests in the region. But there
is, nonetheless, a very low risk of any form of direct conflict involving the armed forces of
China and the U.S. over the next decade. It is not in the national interests of either country
for any such conflict to occur; and it would be disastrous for both, not to mention for the rest
of the world. Despite the deep difficulties in the relationship, no Cold War standoff between
them yet exists, only a strategic chill. In fact, there is a high level of economic interdependency in the relationship, which some international relations scholars think puts a
fundamental brake on the possibility of any open hostilities. Although it should be noted the
U.S. is no longer as important to the Chinese economy as it once was.
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Impact Turn- Reform Harms Chinese Economy
Reforms will cause economic decline not save the Chinese economy.
Naughton 15 (Barry, China Leadership Monitor, “Is There a “Xi Model” of Economic Reform?
Acceleration of Economic Reform since Fall 2014”, China Leadership Monitor, No. 46)
This is a remarkably bold and thorough proposal. Indeed, there are substantial implementation
risks because the proposal may be too demanding in terms of compliance, and somewhat
disruptive in its economic impact. Local governments were told in October to inventory their
debts as of year-end and report them by January 5. Compliance with this schedule is not really
realistic, and only one province, Hainan, was approved to announce it debt figures by the end of
February. In the event, commentators suggested that the Hainan numbers were approved for
disclosure not because they were accurate, but because they didn’t display any big shortcomings:
total debt was not large relative to provincial GDP, and the growth rate of debt was acceptable.9
Hainan reported that its local debt grew 22 percent between mid-2013 and end-2014, and that 84
percent of the debt was local government responsibility, with government possessing various
degrees of contingent liability for the other 16 percent. None of this debt could be converted into
enterprise debt in the short term. The release of this one province’s debt figures is thus quite
revealing. The delays show that local governments are under great time pressure, and
indeed may be intentionally dragging their feet on a measure that certainly does not work
in their interests. Moreover, the fact that the rapid 22 percent growth of Hainan’s government
debt was considered acceptably moderate shows that local governments have incentives to come
up with as large a number as possible for the debt they acknowledge. If they have to accept a
new debt ceiling, it should be as large as possible, and local governments can probably
assume that the central Ministry will be cooperative in helping them to get this debt
restructured and listed on the local government capital budget.10 The Ministry of Finance
is thus struggling to impose limits on new local government debt without acknowledging—
and de facto accepting— excessively high levels of existing debt.
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Impact Turn- Reform Causes Authoritarian Rule
[__-] Xi’s reform model only consolidates power and strengthens his position as
ruler in China
Naughton 15 (Barry, China Leadership Monitor, “Is There a “Xi Model” of Economic Reform?
Acceleration of Economic Reform since Fall 2014”, China Leadership Monitor, No. 46)
Xi Jinping’s policy agenda continues to be marked by abundant contradictory components.
Ideological repression, great power aspirations, and great leader propaganda coexist with
an ongoing campaign against corruption and significant measures of economic reform.
Some pundits argue that these contradictory elements can be explained by one or another
simple formula: Xi is “really” a reformer, or really a leftist, or really just a dictator. These
overly simple approaches should be ignored.
Those who advance them are merely inventing
plausible stories to reconcile apparent contradictions. Although all these simple
characterizations of Xi Jinping may contain elements of truth, no simple formula comes
anywhere close to explaining the disparate, shifting, and sometimes massively contradictory
elements of Xi’s agenda. It is enough right now if we can clearly describe the elements of the Xi
agenda, and perhaps assess the relative weight and possible trajectory of some of these elements.
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