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Free Will: Are We Truly in Control of Our
Actions?
Anna Slezak
Dr. Hubert Bray
Math 89s
27 September 2016
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Introduction
The idea of human free will has been controversial for quite a while in the world of
philosophy. In the modern world, technology exists that allows physicists and neuroscientists
to quantitatively study the nature of free will as well. Even with this technology, many
questions remain. Primarily, do we have free will? How do we define free will? Why does this
all matter? Each discipline and each researcher offer a different approach to answering these
questions, and society must evaluate each solution critically.
What is free will?
This simple question yields a quite complex answer and would vary depending on the
source. Merriam Webster Dictionary defines free will as “the ability to make choices that are
not controlled by fate or God.” A neuroscientist would explain that free will is an allusion
created by the brain’s subconscious. Physics defines free will not as possibility of human
choices, but in terms of the predictability of elementary particles. Sociologists do not even
bother arguing over what free will is and rather focus on the implications of the concept of free
will on human behavior. Obviously, there is not on straight answer to this question. In this
paper, I address each viewpoint and create a complete picture of our current understanding of
free will.
Free will as defined by neuroscience
The study of neuroscience is entirely focused on the structure and function of the
nervous system, particularly the brain. This field has seen tremendous change in recent years
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due to advances in technology. The modern theories in neuroscience would say that free will
does not exist and that all human interactions are controlled by chemical and physical
processes in the brain. This perspective is backed by years of research; the cornerstone of
which was a controversial 1985 experiment by neuroscientist Benjamin Libet. The basis of his
argument is that the human brains initiate involuntary bodily actions before the person has
consciously decided to move (Clarke).
Prior to Libet’s experiment, researchers discovered that there is a slow build-up of
electrical potential over the motor cortex in the brain that begins as early as a second before
simple motions. This measurement of this process is referred to as the Bereitschaftspotential
or the readiness potential (Shibasaki & Hallett 2341-2342). Libet measured the timing of this
build-up in relation to the conscious decision to move. In the actual procedure, Libet’s research
team asked participants to randomly choose a time to flick their wrist. Meanwhile, they
measured their brain activity in terms of the readiness potential. Libet then compared the
subjects reported time of motion (in terms of position of the second hand on a clock) to the
beginning of the readiness potential build up. He found that unconscious brain activity leading
up to the subjects’ conscious decision to flick their wrists begins, on average, half a second
before their reported decision to move. This result lead Libet to conclude that the belief of free
will is an illusion and that sensation is nothing more than a retrospective view of a
neurobiological process (Libet et al.). The diagram below demonstrates Libet’s findings:
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http://rationalvedanta.com/free-will/free-will-and-consciousness-seminar-1st-february-2015/
Despite heavy criticism, these findings have been used frequently as a basis for further theories
and research on the nature of free will and consciousness.
More recently, Daniel Wegner, a social psychologist at Harvard University, conducted a
series of experiments on the concept of free will and authored a book with his findings entitled
The Illusion of Conscious Will. Wegner and his colleagues defined conscious free will as the
working interaction between human thoughts and actions as having priority, consistency, and
exclusivity. Priority means that the thought occurs prior to the initiation of action; consistency
is described in terms of the correspondence between the thought and the action; and
exclusivity meaning that the thought is the only plausible cause leading to the resulting action
(Wegner & Wheatly 480-481). With this clear description of conscious free will, Wegner set out
to evaluate the modern theory of conscious willingness through a series of complex
neurological studies (the specific studies are to vast and complex for the purposes of this paper,
but can be explored more deeply in his book The Illusion of Conscious Will). His findings
revealed that our perception of free will is nothing more than an “emotion of authorship” that
enables us to take mental responsibility for our actions. In other words, people claim
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responsibility for actions that are initiated either by others or by a subconscious mental process
(Clark). Wegner’s experiments and results provide strong evidence against the neurological
existence of human free will and are generally accepted to be sound scientific findings (Bayne).
These particular studies provide only a summary of the mass of information available on
neuroscience and free will. Other notable experiments include the following:

A study by Masao Matushashi and Mark Hallett which validates Libet’s findings titled
“The Timing of the Conscious Intention to Move” (2008).

An experiment performed by Chun Siong Soon, Marcell Brass, Hans-Jochen Heinze, and
John-Dylan Haynes titled “Unconscious Determinants of Free Decisions in the Human
Brain” (2008) uses fMRI scans to effectively predict subjects’ conscious choices up to
seven seconds before they report making said decision.

A study by Simone Kühn and Marcel Brass suggests that it is often not a conscious
decision to cancel an action. Rather, it occurs as an instinct and is often mentally
indistinguishable from a conscious choice. The study is titled “Retrospective
Construction of the Judgement of Free Choice” (2008).
Free will as defined by particle physics
As the last section explains, neuroscience generally believes that humans do not possess
free will. Their research tells us that people do not make conscious decisions and are not
necessarily completely responsible for their actions. Particle physics and quantum mechanics
begin with an entirely new approach to the study of free will, and thus an entirely new
perspective. The core concepts in quantum mechanics on free will are found in the Free Will
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Theorem, proved in 2004 by John H. Conway and Simon B. Kochen of Princeton University. The
basis of the theorem is this: “If there exist experimenters with (some) free will, then elementary
particles also have (some) free will” (Nagra). Simply stated, free will such that our decisions are
not a function of the past can only exist if some elementary particles also have free will in this
sense.
In order to prove this theorem, Conway and Kochen assumed three simple physical
axioms which they called fin, spin, and twin. Fin states that there exists a maximum speed at
which information can be transmitted (not necessarily the speed of light). Spin deals with
complex quantum mechanics and states that, “A triple experiment for the frame (x,y,z) always
yields the outcomes 1, 0, 1 in some order” (“Free Will Theorem” 2). For example, when you
measure the spin of a particle to be 1 in a given dimension, the measurements in other
dimensions will be 1 and 0 in some order. Finally, twin states that two “entangled” elementary
particles will have angular momentum of the same quantity with opposite signs. Twin is a
complicated consequence of the theory of quantum entanglement and cannot be
experimentally verified (Nagra). For this reason, Conway and Kochen published a continuation
of the Free Will Theorem three years later called the Strong Free Will Theorem. They replaced
the twin axiom with the min axiom, which is basically just a simplified version. It essentially
postulates that there exists some information about the choices of measurements that does
necessarily abide by the maximum speed of transmission (“Strong Free Will Theorem” 228).
This new axiom accounts for complete quantum entanglement, or, as Einstein called it, “spooky
action at a distance.”
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Once a foundation had been laid in regards to the necessary assumptions of the
theorem, Conway and Kochen could draw on outside sources to prove their perspective. They
first draw from the Kochen-Specker theorem. For our purposes, this theorem tells us that an
elementary particle does not “decide” on the value of its spin in any direction until it is
measured, making clear the fact that the spin is not predetermined and therefore unable to
predict from previous data (Nagra). Next, Conway and Kochen consider the Einstein-PodolskyRosen paradox. The paradox demonstrates that making a measurement on one component of
a quantum system can instantaneously effect measurements elsewhere in said system
(“Stronger Free Will Theorem” 228). The key component is that the effect is instantaneous and
therefore not limited to a maximum speed. This means that a particle may be affected at the
moment of measurement of its entangled particle, but there is no way to make a prediction on
either particle prior to its measurement since the phenomenon is exactly simultaneous.
So what does this all mean? The complex mathematics and quantum mechanics of the
proof lead us back to a fairly simple conclusion. Essentially, if we assume experimenters are
free to choose which measurements to take, the results of the measurements cannot be
determined by any prior knowledge. This statement combines our knowledge of elementary
particle behavior and the assumption of free will in a way that implies the existence of free will
for both said particles and experimenters. Below is a visual diagram of the conclusions of the
(Strong) Free Will Theorem:
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https://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~jas/one/freewill-theorem.html
Implications of the assumption of free will on society
As seen in the previous sections, it really is not known for certain whether we as
humans possess free will. The oppositional views of quantum mechanics and neurobiology
make reaching any realistic conclusion very difficult. What we do understand, though, is the
profound impact that the belief in free will has on human behavior. Can you imagine a world
where no one took responsibility for their actions? The criminal justice system would cease to
exist as lawbreakers could plead that they had no choice but to commit whatever criminal act.
Religion as we know it would become obsolete, as most religions are built on the concept of
human choices. The assumption of free will is integral to the proper functioning of society.
To examine this issue, Roy Baumeister of Florida State University studied free will and its
consequences in terms of evolutionary psychology. In his paper “Free Will in Scientific
Psychology,” he proposes that “the defining thrust of human psychological evolution was
selection in favor of cultural capability” (Baumeister 16). Essentially, he argues that humans are
evolutionarily significant because of particular behavioral controls such as personal
responsibility, autonomous initiative, and the ability to resist urges that should be instinct but
run contrary to cultural norms. Baumeister also states that the two most significant aspects to
free will are self-control and rational, intelligent decision making. Humans, apart from any
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other species, have developed a complex way of controlling actions that is yet to be completely
understood. Aside from the neurological or quantum mechanical perspectives, this macro-level
view of human interaction yields a perspective in support of free will. Regardless of the actual
mechanics at work in our minds or in elementary particles, we as humans generally believe we
have free will and thus act accordingly.
This human belief in free will causes Baumeister to raise an interesting question: “If free
will is entirely an illusion, however, then it becomes especially perplexing that people devote so
much time and effort to sustaining those illusions” (Baumeister 18). He does not ultimately
answer this question, but he offers one possible solution. Past research has established that a
belief in free will supports socially desirable actions. Over time, humans have evolved to hold
this belief in order to better function in a social society. According to this hypothesis, it is not
certain whether or not we truly have free will, but it does imply that the belief that we do is an
integral aspect of our everyday interactions.
Conclusion
Essentially, the issue of free will remains an unsolved puzzle. The neuroscientific
perspective would tell us that all of our actions are results of neurological processes and free
will is nothing but an illusion. On the contrary, quantum mechanics would say that there is
some degree of randomness and unpredictability in elementary particles and that the same
principle can be applied to human interactions. The one thing we can agree on is the
importance of free will to society. Without the assumption of free will, society would be
fundamentally unable to operate like it does now. Technological advances will eventually lead
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us to an answer, but, in the meantime, society must go on under the presumption of human
free will.
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Works Cited
Andersen, Holly. "Two Causal Mistakes in Wegner’s Illusion of Conscious Will." Choice Reviews
Online 40.03 (2002): n. pag. University of Pittsburg - History and Philosophy of Science.
University of Pittsburg. Web. 20 Sept. 2016.
Baumeister, Roy. "Free Will in Scientific Psychology." Association for Psychological Sciences 3.1
(2008): 14-19. Print.
Bayne, Timothy. "Phenomenology and the Feeling of Doing: Wegner on the Conscious Will."
Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? (2006): 168-85. Web. 20 Sept. 2016.
Clark, Tom. "The Illusion of Conscious Will." Naturalism. Just Magic Designs, 2002. Web. 20
Sept. 2016.
Clarke, Peter G.H. "The Libet Experiment and Its Implications for Conscious Will." Bethinking.
UCCF: The Christian Unions, 05 Feb. 2013. Web. 19 Sept. 2016.
Conway, John, and Simon Kochen. "The Free Will Theorem." ArXiv (2006): 1-30. Print.
---. "The Strong Free Will Theorem." Notices of the American Mathematical Society 56.2 (2009):
226-232. Print.
Libet, Benjamin, et al. "Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral
Activity (Readiness-Potential)." Brain 106.3 (1983): 623-42. Web.
Nagra, Jasvir. "Conway's Proof of the Free Will Theorem." University of Auckland Department
of Computer Science. Jasvir Nagra, 27 Jan. 2005. Web. 20 Sept. 2016.
Shibasaki, Hiroshi, and Mark Hallett. "What Is the Bereitschaftspotential." Clinical
Neurophysiology 117 (2003): 2341-356. Elsevier. 28 July 2006. Web. 19 Sept. 2016.
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Wegner, Daniel M., and Thalia Wheatley. "Apparent Mental Causation: Sources of the
Experience of Will." American Psychologist 54.7 (1999): 480-92. UCSD Cognitive
Sciences. University of California, San Diego, July 1999. Web. 19 Sept. 2016.