Survey
* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
1 TheBalfourDeclaration,November1917 Introduction OneofthemostimportantstatementsofBritishforeignpolicyofthetwentiethcentury, the‘BalfourDeclaration’wasnomorethanashort,vagueletterthathadnolegalstatus. IthadnotbeendebatedinParliament.Yetitwasoneofthemostsignificantevents leadingultimatelytothecreationofthestateofIsraelandconflictbetweenJewsand Arabs. Inthisletterof2November1917,Britain’sForeignSecretary,ArthurBalfour,wroteto LordLionelWalterRothschild,asafigureheadoftheJewishcommunityinBritain: HisMajesty'sgovernmentviewwithfavourtheestablishmentin PalestineofanationalhomefortheJewishpeople,andwillusetheir bestendeavourstofacilitatetheachievementofthisobject,itbeing clearlyunderstoodthatnothingshallbedonewhichmayprejudicethe civilandreligiousrightsofexistingnon-JewishcommunitiesinPalestine, ortherightsandpoliticalstatusenjoyedbyJewsinanyothercountry. ThisletterwaslaterincorporatedwithinthetermsofBritain’sMandateforPalestine, andsobecamealegalrequirementuponBritain. Wheredidtheideaofthedeclarationcomefromoriginally? In1903theBritishgovernmenthadofferedpartofEastAfricatotheJewishpeopleasa homelandandrefugefrompersecution;thiswasknownasthe‘UgandaScheme’.Zionist opinionwassplitbetweenthosewhowelcomedUgandaasatemporaryrefuge,and thosedeterminedtoholdoutforahomelandinPalestine.TheZionistCongressof1905 declinedBritain’soffer. Emergingfromthiscul-de-sac,ZionistscontinuedtolobbyforahomelandinPalestine, (thenpartoftheOttomanEmpire)andmadesignificantinroadsintotheBritishpolitical establishment. OnceBritaindeclaredwaronTurkeyon5November1914,theideaofaJewishhomeland inOttomanPalestinebegantoseemlessremote.PresumingthattheTurkswould eventuallybedefeated,BritainbegantothinkintermsofcarvinguptheOttoman Empire.On9November1914,LloydGeorgespokeinCabinetaboutthe‘ultimatedestiny ofPalestine’which,hetoldHerbertSamuel,hesawasbecomingaJewishstate.1 Inearly 1915,Samuel,(himselfJewish),putforwardtotheCabinetamemorandum,‘TheFuture ofPalestine’,whichadvocatedtheannexationofPalestinebyBritaintoallowforthe ultimateself-governmentofJewishimmigrants.2 PrimeMinisterAsquiththoughtthe ideaabsurd,butfromthenonthegovernmentbecameincreasinglysympatheticto Zionistgoals. 1 Monroe,E,Britain’sMomentintheMiddleEast,1914-1956,(Methuen,London,1965),p.26; Samuel,RtHonViscount,Memoirs,(TheCressetPress,London,1945),p.142. 2 Samuel,H,‘TheFutureofPalestine’,MemorandumtotheCabinet,January1915,TheNational ArchivesoftheUK,hereafterTNA,CAB37/123/43. 2 InMarch1916theForeignOfficerespondedtoasuggestionfromLucienWolf,aJewish opponentofZionism,thattheAlliesshouldmakeadeclarationsupportingthe settlementofJewsinPalestineasarefugefrompersecution.ForeignSecretaryEdward Greywaspreparedtogofurther,insupportinganautonomousJewishsettlementin Palestine,andsawthisashavingthepotentialtowintheacclaimofworldJewryfor Britain.3 ButWeizmannandtheZionistsfundamentallydisagreedwithWolfaboutthe reasonsforsuchasettlement,whichtheyenvisionednotjustasarefugefrom persecution,butasahomeforahomelesspeople,wheretheycouldstopbeingthe assimilatedmembersofothercultures. WhatwastheroleofWeizmann? ChaimWeizmannwasaRussianJewwhocametoBritainin1904toworkasLecturerin ChemistryatManchesterUniversity.HesoonbecamethechiefspokesmanoftheZionist causeinBritain,winningtheadherenceofsuchinfluentialfiguresasCPScott,editorof theManchesterGuardian.Weizmannusedhisremarkablecharmandaudacitytolobby fortheZionistcauseatthehighestlevels,representinghimselfasthemouthpieceofthe wholeJewishpeople.4 BytheFirstWorldWarWeizmann,thechemist,hadalsodiscoveredsomethingofcritical importancetothewareffort:ameansofproducingtheingredientsforlargequantities ofexplosivesthroughbacterialfermentation.Offeringhisprocessformakingacetoneto thegovernment,atatimewhentheneedformunitionshadneverbeengreater, undoubtedlyenhancedWeizmann’sreputationamongstthepoliticalestablishment, notleastwiththeMinisterofMunitions,LloydGeorge,whowasalreadysympatheticto Zionism.AlthoughLloydGeorgelatersuggestedthattheBalfourDeclarationhadbeena rewardforWeizmann’schemicalwork,thereisnoevidenceforthis,andWeizmann himselfdeniedtheidea.5 WhywereBritishpoliticianspredisposedtotheideaofZionism? LloydGeorgehadfirstbeenconnectedwiththeZionistcausein1903whenhislawfirm actedforHerzlconcerningthe‘UgandaScheme’, 6 aprojectwhichthethenPrime 3 TheForeignSecretarytoldBritain’sambassadorsinFranceandRussiainMarch1916thathiscolleagues believedthatWolf’sscheme‘mightbemadefarmoreattractivetothemajorityofJewsifitheldoutto themtheprospectthatwheninthecourseoftimetheJewishcolonistsinPalestinegrowstrongenough tocopewiththeArabpopulationtheymaybeallowedtotakethemanagementoftheinternalaffairsof Palestine(withtheexceptionofJerusalemandtheHolyPlaces)intotheirownhands.[…]oursoleobject istofindanarrangementwhichwouldbesoattractivetothemajorityofJewsastoenableustostrikea bargainforJewishsupport’;telegram,GreytoBertieandBuchanan,11March1916,TNA, FO371/2817/43776. 4 IsraelSieff,oneofWeizmann’scircleofalliesinManchester,commentedinhismemoirsonhow WeizmannbehavedasthoughhehadaJewishstatebehindhim,whenactuallyhehadnomorethana handfulofsupporters;Glancy,J,‘ChaimWeizmannandhowtheBalfourDeclarationwasmadein Manchester’,TheJC.com,1November2012,http://www.thejc.com/lifestyle/lifestyle- features/89026/chaim-weizmann-and-how-balfour-declaration-was-made-manchester[accessed September2015]. 5 Weizmann,C,TrialandError:TheAutobiographyofChaimWeizmann,(HarperandBrothers,NewYork, 1949),p.150. 6 Hamilton,J,God,GunsandIsrael:Britain,theFirstWorldWarandtheJewsintheHolyLand,(Sutton Publishing,Thrupp,2004),pp.86-7. 3 Minister,ArthurBalfour,alsoendorsed.BalfourhimselfmetWeizmannin1906.7 However,theactiveZionismofbothmenseemstohavegrownafterameetingbetween WeizmannandLloydGeorge,HerbertSamuelandJosiahWedgwood,arrangedbyScott inDecember1914.Weizmannwassurprisedtodiscoverthateveryonepresentseemed favourablydisposedtohisideas. 8 Sowhathadinclinedthesepoliticalfigurestothe Zionistcause? LloydGeorge’sZionistconvictionsstemmedfromaconvergenceofreligiousideals, romanticnotionsandimperialistobjectives:whattheZionistswantedinPalestine dovetailedwithbothhisreligiousformationandwhatwouldserveBritishinterests. ThroughhisWelshChapelupbringing,hehadbeenseepedinthehistoryoftheJewish peopleinitsbiblicalheyday.InPalestinehesaw‘ahistoricandsacredland,throbbing fromDantoBeershebawithimmortaltraditions’.9 Zionismoffered(thenowatheist) LloydGeorgetheromanticprospectofputtingIsraelbackonthemap,wheretohimit belonged,inthecourseofproviding‘anationalhearthandarefugeforthehunted childrenofIsrael’.10 Inhismemorandumonthe‘FutureofPalestine’in1915,HerbertSamuelhadreminded theBritishCabinetthat‘widespreadanddeep-rootedintheProtestantworldisa sympathywiththeideaofrestoringtheHebrewpeopletothelandwhichwastobetheir inheritance’andthattherewasinBritain‘anintenseinterestinthefulfilmentofthe prophecieswhichhaveforetoldit’.11 Fromhischildhood,ArthurBalfourhadbeen steepedinpreciselythisBible-reading,evangelicalculture,andhisresultinginterestin theJewishpeoplemadehislaterconversiontoZionismasimplematter.Longbeforehe metWeizmann,hehadbelievedthatChristendom’sdebttoJudaismhadbeen shamefullyrepaidbytheChristianworld.ToreturnthehomelessJewishpeopletoZion wouldallowBritainthehonourofrightingthiswrong.12 OnceBalfourbecameForeign Secretaryinlate1916,hismeetingswithWeizmannbecamemoreintense,onone occasioncontinuingintoalongwalkinthesmallhours.ItwasafterthisthatBalfour informedtheCabinet,inMarch1917,thathewasaZionist.13 7 Weizmann,pp.109-11. 8 Ibid,p.150.TheroleofC.P.Scottasahighlyconnectedfacilitatorcannotbeunderestimatedin explaininghowWeizmanngainedthesympathyofkeyestablishmentfigures.Weizmannrecounts:‘It becameapracticewithme,wheneverIhappenedtobeinLondon,andMrScottcameuponthenight train,tomeethimatEustonStationforbreakfast.Hisusualgreetingtomewas:“Now,DrWeizmann, tellmewhatyouwantmetodoforyou,”andbreakfastwouldpassinconversationonZionistaffairs’. Ibid. 9 LloydGeorge,D,MemoirsofthePeaceConference,Vol.2,(YaleUniversityPress,NewHaven,1939), p.721. 10 Ibid,p.722. 11 Samuel,H,‘ThefutureofPalestine’,MemorandumtotheCabinet,January1915,TNA, CAB37/123/43. 12 Dugdale,B,ArthurJamesBalfour,1906-1930,(Hutchinson,London,c.1936),p.159-60. 13 Amery,L.S,MyPoliticalLife,Vol.2,(Hutchinson,London,1953),p.114. 4 TherapidconversionofSirMarkSykestoZionismtookplacein1916aftermeetingfirstDr MosesGaster,theSephardicChiefRabbi,andthenaGentileZionist,JamesMalcolm, andseemstohavestemmedfromhisdeephatredofinjusticeandsympathyfortheJews asunderdogs.Sykes’conversiontothisviewwasalmostassignificantasBalfour’s;he seemstohavegalvanisedtheCabinettoconsideraZionistdeclarationasakeyto gainingAmericansupportinthewar.AlthoughnomorethanaPoliticalSecretarytothe Cabinet,during1917Sykesassumedtheroleofinter-mediarybetweentheZionistsand Whitehall,keepinguppersistentpressureonhispoliticalsuperiorstoachievea declaration. 14 ItwasSykeswhoopenedtheeyesofLeopoldAmerytoZionism.Amerywasanother SecretarytotheCabinet,andinfactasecretJew.Ameryexplainedhisnew-found supportforZionisminstrategicterms:therewouldbegreatadvantagetoBritainin havingagratefulJewishpopulationinPalestine.HealsoforesawareductioninantiSemitismoncethepositionoftheJewswasnormalisedandtheyhadalandoftheirown. ItwouldbeAmerywhomadesignificantchangestothedraftoftheeventual declaration. 15 LordAlfredMilner,GeneralJanSmutsandLordRobertCecilalsobecameconvertswho broughttheir‘eagerandactiveinfluence’tobear.16 Whatisnoticeableaboutthepro-Zionistsentimentsofnon-JewslikeLloydGeorgeand BalfouristhewaytheycombinedadeeplyemotionalsympathyfortheZionistdream– BalfourcouldbemovedtotearslisteningtoWeizmann–withascarcely-veiledantiSemitism.LordRobertCecil,Under-SecretaryattheForeignOffice,usedlanguage characteristicofthisattitudewhenhecommented:‘Idonotthinkitiseasyto exaggeratetheinternationalpoweroftheJews’. 17 Itwaswidelybelievedthatsome mysteriousbutwell-organisedJewishconspiracywasbentondeterminingtheoutcome ofthewar;theirinfluenceand,aboveall,theirmoney,couldswayRussia,theUnited StatesorGermany,toBritain’sgoodorill.TogaintheinternationalfavouroftheJews wasthereforeinBritain’svitalinterest;tooffendcouldbefatal.SinceWeizmannimplied thatZionismspokefortheJewsoftheworld,itfollowedthattheZionistsshouldbe helped.Itwas,LloydGeorgewrotelater,aquestionofmaking‘acontractwithJewry’.18 HowdidthetidemoveinfavouroftheZionistidea? Formostof1916therewasnocriticaldesireintheCabinettopursuetheZionistgoal: PrimeMinisterAsquithwasscepticalandLloydGeorgewastakenupwithIrelandand 14 Sykes,C,TwoStudiesinVirtue,(Collins,London,1953),pp.180ff;Amery,p.115. 15 Ibid;seealsoRubinstein,W,‘TheSecretofLeopoldAmery’,HistoryToday,1February1999, http://www.balfourproject.org/the-secret-of-leopold-amery/[accessedSeptember2015]. 16 LloydGeorge,p.723. 17 LordRobertCecil,ParliamentaryUnder-SecretaryattheForeignOffice,minutingadespatch, 11February1916,fromMcMahoninCairo,whohadreceivedsuggestionsfromtheheadoftheJewish communityinAlexandriathatBritainshouldsupportZionistaspirationsinPalestine;TNA, FO371/2671/35433. 18 LloydGeorge,p.726. 5 Munitions.However,inDecember1916therewasachangeofgovernment,withLloyd GeorgebecomingPrimeMinisterofanadministrationthatincludedMilner,Balfourand Cecil–allconvincedZionists–supportedbyasecretariatthatincludedthenewZionists, SykesandAmery. InFebruary1917SykesbegandiscussionswithWeizmann,(whosestatusinLondonwas nowsemi-official,sincetheZionistshadbeengrantedtheirrequesttouseofficial channelsfortheirinternationalcommunications).19 TheZionistswereagainstanyidea ofanAnglo-FrenchcondominiumoverPalestine(asimpliedbytheSykes-Picot agreement).TheyhadurgedBritaintoannexPalestinesothatshecouldactasthesole protectoroftheJewishcause. 20 TheCabinetwaspersuadedtojettisonSykes-Picot’s plansforaninternationaladministrationinPalestine,andmovetowardsexclusive Britishcontrol.WhenAllenbytookovercommandoftheExpeditionaryForceinPalestine inJune1917,hewasinstructedtocaptureJerusalembyChristmas.Forthefirsttimeit begantolookapracticalpossibilitythatBritaincouldchampionaJewishNational Home. MeanwhiletherehadbeenrevolutioninRussiainFebruary1917.Afterwidespread mutiniesintheRussianarmy,therewasdoubtthatRussiawouldcontinuetofightonthe Alliedside.TheBritishgovernmentwasconvincedthatRussianJewsweremainlyproZionist,andthataBritishpronouncementinfavourofZionismwouldthereforehelpto keepRussiainthewar. ForeignSecretaryBalfourreturnedfromtheUnitedStatesinApril1917withthesupport ofPresidentWilsonforaBritishdeclarationconcerningPalestine.InJunetheFrench ForeignSecretary,JulesCambon,alsogavehissupportto‘Jewishcolonisationin Palestine’. 21 Thesamemonth,WeizmannwarnedLondonthattheGermangovernmentwasplanning totakeuptheZionistcause,andthatJewishopinioncouldswingagainstBritainandin favourofherenemy.Whateverthetruthofthisclaim,the‘Germanthreat’remaineda potentinfluenceontheCabinetrightthroughtoOctober,whentheDeclarationwas approved.22 WeizmannalsoimpliedthatthemajorityofJewsworldwidewereZionists, whowouldapplaudBritain’sactions.Infact,Zionistsremainedaverysmallminority amongstJewsforsometimetocome.23 UnderthispressurefromWeizmann,Balfour invitedLordRothschildtosubmitaformulaforadeclarationsupportingaJewish NationalHome. 19 Sykes’sonbelievedthatthegrantingofofficialfacilitiesforcommunicationsin1916wasacrucial moment,afterwhichtheBritishGovernmentwasessentiallyobligatedtoaccedetoZionistrequests; Sykes(1953),pp.187-88. 20 Sokolov,MemorandumfortheForeignOffice,12April1916,TNA,FO371/2817/63314. 21 CambontoSokolov,4June1917,TNA,FO371/3058/123458. 22 Forexample,GrahamtoLordHardinge,13June1917,ibid,describingWeizmann’swarningsthatthe GermansmighttakeuptheZionistcausefortheirownpropagandapurposes. 23 DavidFromkincalculatesthatin1913,thelastdateforwhichtherewerefigures,onlyaboutone percentoftheworld’sJewshadsignifiedtheiradherencetoZionism.Fromkin,D,APeacetoEndAll Peace:CreatingtheModernMiddleEast,1914-1922,(Penguin,London,1991),p.294. 6 Howwasthedeclarationfirstdrafted? JewishZionistsandgovernmentofficialsworkedtogetheronthefirstdraftofa declarationthatwaseventuallyproposedtoBalfourbyLordWalterRothschildinJuly 1917. 24 Thewordingrepresentedavictoryforthosewhothoughtthatamoderate wordingwasmorelikelytogainofficialapprovaloverthosewhowantedtodemanda Jewishstatefromtheoutset.EventhismoderatewordingrequiredBritaintoacceptthat PalestineshouldbereconstitutedasthenationalhomeoftheJewishpeople,implying noplacefortheexistingmajorityArabpopulation. Whatkindofoppositionwastheretotheidea? Fromtheoutset,almostalltheoppositiontoadeclarationcamefromwithintheJewish communityitself.VeryfewArabswereawarethatsuchaproposalwasintheoffing,and sotheirvoicewaslargelysilentinthedebatethatragedthroughthesummerand autumnof1917.SherifHusseinandFeisalhadbeeninformedoftheplanviaJames Malcolm,SykesandLawrence,andhadgiventheirreluctantassent.25 However,the ArabsinPalestineitselfcouldnotbeconsulted(LloydGeorgelaterargued)astheywere inenemyterritory,andwerethereforedeemedtobefightingagainstBritain.26 Onlya fewEuropeanvoiceswereraisedontheirbehalf. ThedisagreementbetweenWolfandWeizmannwhichwasdevelopingin1917erupted inpubliccontroversyon24MaywhentheConjointCommitteeoftheJewishBoardof DeputiesandtheAnglo-JewishAssociationwrotetoTheTimes,advocatingtheirmore limitedobjectiveforJewishsettlementinPalestine.27 Theirlettercondemnedthe Zionistplanasnotonlywrong,butdangerous,inclaimingspecialrightsforJewsoverthe localmajority.TheletterrejectedtheZionistconceptoftheJewsasahomeless nationalitythatneededahomeinPalestine.Inwhatamountedtoapowerstruggle withintheEnglishJewishcommunity,theZionistfactionnarrowlydefeatedtheConjoint Committeethefollowingmonth.28 However,thiswasnottheendoftheprotestfrom withintheJewishcommunity. 24 Foradescriptionofthejointdraftingofadeclaration,seeLewis,G,BalfourandWeizmann:theZionist, theZealotandtheEmergenceofIsrael,(Continuum,London,2009),p.145.Onceawordinghadbeen agreed,RothschildwrotetoBalfouron18July1917:‘AtlastIamabletosendtoyoutheformulayou askedmefor.IfHMGwillsendmeamessageonthelinesofthisformula,ifthey&youapproveofit, IwillhanditontotheZionistFederation&alsoannounceitatameetingcalledforthatpurpose’. TothisBalfourapologeticallyrepliedthefollowingday:‘MydearWalter…Iwillhavetheformulawhich yousentmecarefullyconsideredbutthematterisofcourseofthehighestimportanceandIfearitmay benecessarytoreferittotheCabinet.Ishallnotthereforebeabletoletyouhaveananswerassoonas Ishouldotherwisehavewishedtodo’;BalfourtoRothschild,19July1917,Private,TNA, FO371/3083/143082. 25 JamesMalcolmtoLordPeel,17August1936,TNA,CO733/319/5. 26 LloydGeorge,p.737. 27 SeeLewis,pp.138-9. 28 RonaldGrahamdrewLordHardinge’sattentiontoanextractfromTheTimeson18June1917,reporting ‘themeetingoftheJewishBoardofDeputies[which]resultedinatriumphfortheZionists,althoughthis Boardhashithertobeenregardedasastrongholdofanti-Zionism,andthemostthattheZionists expectedwasthatasubstantialminorityofvoteswouldbecastinfavouroftheirpolicy.MrLucien 7 InAugust,EdwinMontagu,the(Jewish)SecretaryofStateforIndia,launchedavehement protestintheCabinetentitled‘TheAnti-SemitismofthePresentGovernment’. Montagu’soppositiontoZionism,whichhecalled‘amischievouspoliticalcreed’,was basedonafearthatJewslikehimself,whowerethoroughlyassimilatedinanother country,wouldbeexpectedtouproottoPalestine,andthuslosethecitizenshipthey covetedsohighly.MontagualsoaskedwhethertheZionistplanintendedtomove PalestinianArabsoutofthewayforJews.29 Montagucontinuedhisattackonadeclarationtotheveryend.TheninOctober1917 therecameanotherlastminuteprotest,thistimefromLordCurzon,LeaderoftheHouse ofLords.IgnoringtheinternalJewishfeud,theformerViceroyofIndiaoutlinedthe impracticalitiesandambiguities,ashesawthem,intheZionistplanforPalestine.Were alltheJewsoftheworldsupposedtofitinthissmallcountry?DidtheZionistsreally intendtoestablishaJewishstate,ornot?Andwhatwastohappentotheindigenous Arabpopulation,whowouldneveracceptasubordinaterole?TheideaofaJewish NationalHomewas,hecautioned,arecipeforfailure.30 Howdidthedraftsofthedeclarationchangeduring1917? ThedraftsofthedeclarationwerediscussedatthreemeetingsoftheWarCabinet,on 3September,4Octoberand31October,1917.31 The3SeptemberCabinetmeetingconsideredamoreconciliatorydraftofthe declarationfromLordMilner,whichproposedPalestineasahomefortheJewish people,ratherthanthehomeofthepreviousdraft.UndertheforceofMontagu’sattack, theCabinetdeferredadecisiononthedeclaration,anddecidedtoseektheopinionof PresidentWilsononthematter. DuringSeptemberWeizmannandRothschildcontinuedtopressurethegovernmentto issueitsdeclaration,sayingthatMontaguonlyrepresentedaminority‘assimilationist’ view,whilsttheZionistsrepresentedthe‘non-assimilated’masses. Wolfwashowleddowneachtimethatheattemptedtospeakandwasnotallowedtosayaword.Had notacertainnumberofDeputiesvotedagainsttheinstructionsgiventothembytheirelectors,the Zionistmajoritywouldhavebeenlarger.InanycasethisvotemeansthedissolutionoftheConjoint Committeeanditwillnolongerbenecessarytoconsultthatbody...’GrahamtoHardinge, Confidential,18June1917,TNA,FO371/3058/123458. 29 Montagu,Memorandum,‘TheAnti-SemitismofthePresentGovernment’,submittedtotheBritish Cabinet,23August1917,TNA,CAB24/24/71.Montaguobservedthatwhateverthe‘JewishNational Home’meant,heassumed‘thatitmeansthatMahommedansandChristiansaretomakewayforthe JewsandthattheJewsshouldbeputinallpositionsofpreference’.Montaguwasalsoextremely nervousthatZionismwouldcallinquestionhiscredentialsasapatrioticEnglishgentleman,observing: ‘“IhavebeenstrivingallmylifetoescapefromtheGhetto”’;LloydGeorge,p.733. 30 LordCurzon,MemorandumsubmittedtotheCabinet,‘TheFutureofPalestine’,26October1917,TNA, FO371/3083/207407. 31 TherelevantCabinetminutescanbefoundinTNA,CO733/347/7. 8 BecauseofthedelayscreatedbyMontagu’sobjections,therewasdoubtastowhether thedeclarationwouldbeapprovedattheCabinetmeetingon4October.LeopoldAmery relateshow,halfanhourbeforethemeeting,Milneraskedhimtodraftadditional clauseswhichwouldhelpmeettheconcernsaboutthedeclaration,bothpro-Araband Jewish,withoutchangingitssubstance.32 ThenewAmery-Milnerdraftread: HisMajesty’sGovernmentviewswithfavourtheestablishmentin PalestineofanationalhomefortheJewishraceandwilluseitsbest endeavourstofacilitatetheachievementofthisobject,itbeingclearly understoodthatnothingshallbedonewhichmayprejudicetheciviland religiousrightsofexistingnon-JewishcommunitiesinPalestineorthe rightsandpoliticalstatusenjoyedinanyothercountrybysuchJewswho arefullycontentedwiththeirexistingnationality. Nevertheless,theOctober4Cabinetmeetingcontinuedtodeferadecisiononthe declarationbecauseofanotherpleafromMontagu;itwasdecidedtosubmitthenew Amery-MilnerdrafttoPresidentWilsonandtorepresentativeJewishleadersinBritain. ThedeclarationwouldnowonlybemodifiedinveryminorwaysatthefinalCabinet meetingof31OctoberbeforeitwassenttoLordRothschild,whohadbeenoneofits originalauthorsthreemonthsbefore. Whatwasthesignificanceoftheadditionalsafeguardingclauses? ItwouldseemthatAmeryhastilytackedonthetwosafeguardingclauses(firstly, protectingtherightsofthenon-JewishcommunitiesinPalestine,andsecondly,the rightsofJewsinothercountries)thefirsttosatisfyLordCurzon,andthesecondto mollifyMontagu. Thecomplaintsof‘assimilatedJews’likeMontaguhadbeenattheforefrontofpublic debateformonthsduetotheirfearthattheveryexistenceofa‘JewishNationalHome’ wouldcallintoquestionthepatrioticloyaltyofJewsinothercountries–thisbeing wartime-andcouldthusbeacauseofanti-Semitism.Thenewclause,safeguardingthe statusofJewsinothercountries,addressedthisfear.Thisadditiontothedeclarationis notentirelysurprising,givenwhathadgonebefore. Bycontrast,therehadbeenverylittletosuggestthattheconcernsoftheArab populationofPalestinewerelikelytobeheededatthisjuncture.UnlikeJews,their voiceswererarelyheardinthedebate,andsoitwasuptootherstospeakontheir behalf.WhenchallengedabouttheArabpopulation,ZionistslikeLordWalterRothschild insistedtherewasnoquestionthattheJewishNationalHomewouldeverencroachon therightsofthelocalmajority.33 Butthe‘assimilationists’werenotsosure.Howcould thisapparentfairnessbereconciledwiththeZionistinsistencethattheJewswerean exceptionalcase,whomustgetspecialtreatmentwhenitcametounfettered immigration,forexample? 32 Amery,p.116. 33 Forexample,LordRothschild,quotedinTheTimes,18June1917. 9 Infact,theZionistshadcomeupwithwhattheydeemedasolutiontothe‘Arab problem’.SinceitwasplainlyunrealistictoimposeasmallJewishpopulationonanArab majority,theanswerwasforBritaintorunPalestine,andwhileshekeptorder,for JewishimmigrationtoincreasetothepointthattherewasaJewishmajority.Atthat momenttheJewswouldbestrongenoughtogovernthemselves.Beyondthisplanfor eventualdomination,andassurancesthatArabswouldnotsufferasaresultofthe declaration,ZionistsseemedunwillingorunabletoengagewiththeissueofhowArabs wouldreactwhenaJewishNationalHomewasplantedintheirmidst. Norwasthereanyseriousattempttodealwiththisissueatgovernmentalleveluntil Curzonintervenedattheeleventhhour.SomelonevoiceshadspokenoutfromtheEast. Britain’sChiefPoliticalOfficerinEgypt,GilbertClayton,hadcautionedagainstanypublic pronouncementinAugust1917,observingthatitwouldnothelpmattersiftheArabs weretobeprovokedatthistimebyZionism. 34 GertrudeBell,whocriticisedtheZionists fortalkingasthoughPalestinewasemptyofpeople,conveyedherviewstotheCabinet viaEdwinMontagu.35 Howeverthesewarningsweretoolittle,toolate,tohaveanyfundamentaleffect.The clauseprotectingtherightsofthe‘non-Jewishcommunities’wasnottheresultof seriousdiscussionaboutwhatwouldhappentotheArabs.IftheCabinethadbeen deeplyconcernedaboutthefuturestatusofArabsinPalestine,itmighthavebeen expectedthatthisnewclausewouldmakementionoftheirpoliticalrights.However,by referringonlytotheircivilandreligiousrights,itseemsthattheCabinetbelievedthat PalestinianArabshadnopoliticalrights.When,attheSanRemoconferenceof1920,the Frenchtriedtoinserttheword‘political’intothelistof‘non-Jewish’rightsthatthe BritishwouldberequiredtoprotectundertheMandate,thesuggestionwasrejected.36 Whywasthedeclarationfinallyadopted? DespitetheconcernsofLordCurzon,theCabinetmeetingof31Octoberwaspersuaded byBalfour’sargumentsthattherewasavitalpropagandaassettobegainedbymaking 34 Stein,L,TheBalfourDeclaration,(ValentineMitchell,London,1961)p.523. 35 Howell,G,DaughteroftheDesert:TheRemarkableLifeofGertrudeBell,(Pan,London,2007)p.383. Republishedin2015asHowell,G,QueenoftheDesert:theExtraordinaryLifeofGertrudeBell,(Pan, London,2015). 36 ThiswasdiscussedatSanRemoon24April1920.Inarguingforpoliticalrightstobegrantedtothenon- Jewishcommunity,theFrenchwereactuallyseekingtoprotectwhattheyregardedasthetraditional rightsoftheCatholicreligiouscommunityinPalestine.TheyfearedthatifthewordingoftheBalfour Declarationwasinsertedintothepeacetreaty,onlytheJewswouldhavepoliticalrights.Millerand explainedthattheywereonlyseekingelectoralrightsformembersofthereligiouscommunity,not collectivepoliticalrightsfortheArabs.Nevertheless,Curzoninsistedthatthefirstprovisoofthe declarationcouldnotbechangedbecausethewordingofthedeclarationinitsentiretywasregardedas acharterofrightsfortheJewishpeople.HehadmetwithZionistrepresentativesjustpriortothe ConferenceandhadpersonallyundertakentopreservetheoriginaltextoftheDeclaration. TheproceedingsatSanRemocanbefoundatMinutes,MeetingNumber12,24April1920inTNA, FO371/5244/E5636.However,itwouldseemthatCurzonknewhishandsweretiedandsohesaid whatheknewhewasobligatedtosay.Inprivateheminuted,‘Iamquitewillingtowater(sic)the PalestinianMandatewhichIcordiallydistrust’;referredtobyHubertYounginhislettertoRobert Vansittart,30June1920,TNA,FO371/5244/7369. 10 thedeclaration,becauseworldJewishopinionwouldthenswingbehindBritainandthe Allies,andnotagainstthem,especiallyinrevolutionaryRussia,andtheUnitedStates, wherethemajorityofJews,(orsotheyhadbeenconvincedbyWeizmann),wereproZionist.BalfourgatheredthatalltheCabinetwere‘nowagreedthatfromapurely diplomaticandpoliticalpointofviewitwasdesirablethatsomedeclarationfavourable totheaspirationsoftheJewishnationalistsshouldnowbemade’.Ifsuchanassurance couldbegiventhen‘weshouldbeabletocarryonanextremelyusefulpropagandaboth inRussiaandAmerica’.37 ThemotivesarticulatedbytheWarCabinetforfinallyapprovingtheDeclarationwere thereforepragmaticones,relatedtoanassessmentofBritain’swarinterests.Butthis ‘propagandaasset’explanationshouldnotobscurewhyBalfourandLloydGeorgewere disposedtotheZionistcauseinthefirstplace.OnanumberoflateroccasionsBalfour explainedthathisheartfeltdesirehadbeentogivetheJewishpeoplewhatheregarded astheirrightfulhome.38 LeonardStein,thehighlyplacedZionisthistorianoftheDeclaration,observesthatthis sympathyforthehomelessnessoftheJewsmight‘havelittletodowiththeWar Cabinet’sconsciousmotivesforapprovingtheDeclaration,butwithoutthisbackground neitheritsoriginsnoritssignificancecanbeunderstood’.39 37 Cabinetminutes,31October1917,TNA,CO733/347/7. 38 See,forexample,Meinertzhagen,R,MiddleEastDiary,1917-1956,(TheCressetPress,London,1959), p.8. 39 Stein,p.552.