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1
TheBalfourDeclaration,November1917
Introduction
OneofthemostimportantstatementsofBritishforeignpolicyofthetwentiethcentury,
the‘BalfourDeclaration’wasnomorethanashort,vagueletterthathadnolegalstatus.
IthadnotbeendebatedinParliament.Yetitwasoneofthemostsignificantevents
leadingultimatelytothecreationofthestateofIsraelandconflictbetweenJewsand
Arabs.
Inthisletterof2November1917,Britain’sForeignSecretary,ArthurBalfour,wroteto
LordLionelWalterRothschild,asafigureheadoftheJewishcommunityinBritain:
HisMajesty'sgovernmentviewwithfavourtheestablishmentin
PalestineofanationalhomefortheJewishpeople,andwillusetheir
bestendeavourstofacilitatetheachievementofthisobject,itbeing
clearlyunderstoodthatnothingshallbedonewhichmayprejudicethe
civilandreligiousrightsofexistingnon-JewishcommunitiesinPalestine,
ortherightsandpoliticalstatusenjoyedbyJewsinanyothercountry.
ThisletterwaslaterincorporatedwithinthetermsofBritain’sMandateforPalestine,
andsobecamealegalrequirementuponBritain.
Wheredidtheideaofthedeclarationcomefromoriginally?
In1903theBritishgovernmenthadofferedpartofEastAfricatotheJewishpeopleasa
homelandandrefugefrompersecution;thiswasknownasthe‘UgandaScheme’.Zionist
opinionwassplitbetweenthosewhowelcomedUgandaasatemporaryrefuge,and
thosedeterminedtoholdoutforahomelandinPalestine.TheZionistCongressof1905
declinedBritain’soffer.
Emergingfromthiscul-de-sac,ZionistscontinuedtolobbyforahomelandinPalestine,
(thenpartoftheOttomanEmpire)andmadesignificantinroadsintotheBritishpolitical
establishment.
OnceBritaindeclaredwaronTurkeyon5November1914,theideaofaJewishhomeland
inOttomanPalestinebegantoseemlessremote.PresumingthattheTurkswould
eventuallybedefeated,BritainbegantothinkintermsofcarvinguptheOttoman
Empire.On9November1914,LloydGeorgespokeinCabinetaboutthe‘ultimatedestiny
ofPalestine’which,hetoldHerbertSamuel,hesawasbecomingaJewishstate.1 Inearly
1915,Samuel,(himselfJewish),putforwardtotheCabinetamemorandum,‘TheFuture
ofPalestine’,whichadvocatedtheannexationofPalestinebyBritaintoallowforthe
ultimateself-governmentofJewishimmigrants.2 PrimeMinisterAsquiththoughtthe
ideaabsurd,butfromthenonthegovernmentbecameincreasinglysympatheticto
Zionistgoals.
1
Monroe,E,Britain’sMomentintheMiddleEast,1914-1956,(Methuen,London,1965),p.26;
Samuel,RtHonViscount,Memoirs,(TheCressetPress,London,1945),p.142.
2
Samuel,H,‘TheFutureofPalestine’,MemorandumtotheCabinet,January1915,TheNational
ArchivesoftheUK,hereafterTNA,CAB37/123/43.
2
InMarch1916theForeignOfficerespondedtoasuggestionfromLucienWolf,aJewish
opponentofZionism,thattheAlliesshouldmakeadeclarationsupportingthe
settlementofJewsinPalestineasarefugefrompersecution.ForeignSecretaryEdward
Greywaspreparedtogofurther,insupportinganautonomousJewishsettlementin
Palestine,andsawthisashavingthepotentialtowintheacclaimofworldJewryfor
Britain.3 ButWeizmannandtheZionistsfundamentallydisagreedwithWolfaboutthe
reasonsforsuchasettlement,whichtheyenvisionednotjustasarefugefrom
persecution,butasahomeforahomelesspeople,wheretheycouldstopbeingthe
assimilatedmembersofothercultures.
WhatwastheroleofWeizmann?
ChaimWeizmannwasaRussianJewwhocametoBritainin1904toworkasLecturerin
ChemistryatManchesterUniversity.HesoonbecamethechiefspokesmanoftheZionist
causeinBritain,winningtheadherenceofsuchinfluentialfiguresasCPScott,editorof
theManchesterGuardian.Weizmannusedhisremarkablecharmandaudacitytolobby
fortheZionistcauseatthehighestlevels,representinghimselfasthemouthpieceofthe
wholeJewishpeople.4 BytheFirstWorldWarWeizmann,thechemist,hadalsodiscoveredsomethingofcritical
importancetothewareffort:ameansofproducingtheingredientsforlargequantities
ofexplosivesthroughbacterialfermentation.Offeringhisprocessformakingacetoneto
thegovernment,atatimewhentheneedformunitionshadneverbeengreater,
undoubtedlyenhancedWeizmann’sreputationamongstthepoliticalestablishment,
notleastwiththeMinisterofMunitions,LloydGeorge,whowasalreadysympatheticto
Zionism.AlthoughLloydGeorgelatersuggestedthattheBalfourDeclarationhadbeena
rewardforWeizmann’schemicalwork,thereisnoevidenceforthis,andWeizmann
himselfdeniedtheidea.5 WhywereBritishpoliticianspredisposedtotheideaofZionism?
LloydGeorgehadfirstbeenconnectedwiththeZionistcausein1903whenhislawfirm
actedforHerzlconcerningthe‘UgandaScheme’, 6 aprojectwhichthethenPrime
3
TheForeignSecretarytoldBritain’sambassadorsinFranceandRussiainMarch1916thathiscolleagues
believedthatWolf’sscheme‘mightbemadefarmoreattractivetothemajorityofJewsifitheldoutto
themtheprospectthatwheninthecourseoftimetheJewishcolonistsinPalestinegrowstrongenough
tocopewiththeArabpopulationtheymaybeallowedtotakethemanagementoftheinternalaffairsof
Palestine(withtheexceptionofJerusalemandtheHolyPlaces)intotheirownhands.[…]oursoleobject
istofindanarrangementwhichwouldbesoattractivetothemajorityofJewsastoenableustostrikea
bargainforJewishsupport’;telegram,GreytoBertieandBuchanan,11March1916,TNA,
FO371/2817/43776.
4
IsraelSieff,oneofWeizmann’scircleofalliesinManchester,commentedinhismemoirsonhow
WeizmannbehavedasthoughhehadaJewishstatebehindhim,whenactuallyhehadnomorethana
handfulofsupporters;Glancy,J,‘ChaimWeizmannandhowtheBalfourDeclarationwasmadein
Manchester’,TheJC.com,1November2012,http://www.thejc.com/lifestyle/lifestyle-
features/89026/chaim-weizmann-and-how-balfour-declaration-was-made-manchester[accessed
September2015].
5
Weizmann,C,TrialandError:TheAutobiographyofChaimWeizmann,(HarperandBrothers,NewYork,
1949),p.150.
6
Hamilton,J,God,GunsandIsrael:Britain,theFirstWorldWarandtheJewsintheHolyLand,(Sutton
Publishing,Thrupp,2004),pp.86-7.
3
Minister,ArthurBalfour,alsoendorsed.BalfourhimselfmetWeizmannin1906.7 However,theactiveZionismofbothmenseemstohavegrownafterameetingbetween
WeizmannandLloydGeorge,HerbertSamuelandJosiahWedgwood,arrangedbyScott
inDecember1914.Weizmannwassurprisedtodiscoverthateveryonepresentseemed
favourablydisposedtohisideas. 8 Sowhathadinclinedthesepoliticalfigurestothe
Zionistcause?
LloydGeorge’sZionistconvictionsstemmedfromaconvergenceofreligiousideals,
romanticnotionsandimperialistobjectives:whattheZionistswantedinPalestine
dovetailedwithbothhisreligiousformationandwhatwouldserveBritishinterests.
ThroughhisWelshChapelupbringing,hehadbeenseepedinthehistoryoftheJewish
peopleinitsbiblicalheyday.InPalestinehesaw‘ahistoricandsacredland,throbbing
fromDantoBeershebawithimmortaltraditions’.9 Zionismoffered(thenowatheist)
LloydGeorgetheromanticprospectofputtingIsraelbackonthemap,wheretohimit
belonged,inthecourseofproviding‘anationalhearthandarefugeforthehunted
childrenofIsrael’.10 Inhismemorandumonthe‘FutureofPalestine’in1915,HerbertSamuelhadreminded
theBritishCabinetthat‘widespreadanddeep-rootedintheProtestantworldisa
sympathywiththeideaofrestoringtheHebrewpeopletothelandwhichwastobetheir
inheritance’andthattherewasinBritain‘anintenseinterestinthefulfilmentofthe
prophecieswhichhaveforetoldit’.11 Fromhischildhood,ArthurBalfourhadbeen
steepedinpreciselythisBible-reading,evangelicalculture,andhisresultinginterestin
theJewishpeoplemadehislaterconversiontoZionismasimplematter.Longbeforehe
metWeizmann,hehadbelievedthatChristendom’sdebttoJudaismhadbeen
shamefullyrepaidbytheChristianworld.ToreturnthehomelessJewishpeopletoZion
wouldallowBritainthehonourofrightingthiswrong.12 OnceBalfourbecameForeign
Secretaryinlate1916,hismeetingswithWeizmannbecamemoreintense,onone
occasioncontinuingintoalongwalkinthesmallhours.ItwasafterthisthatBalfour
informedtheCabinet,inMarch1917,thathewasaZionist.13 7
Weizmann,pp.109-11.
8
Ibid,p.150.TheroleofC.P.Scottasahighlyconnectedfacilitatorcannotbeunderestimatedin
explaininghowWeizmanngainedthesympathyofkeyestablishmentfigures.Weizmannrecounts:‘It
becameapracticewithme,wheneverIhappenedtobeinLondon,andMrScottcameuponthenight
train,tomeethimatEustonStationforbreakfast.Hisusualgreetingtomewas:“Now,DrWeizmann,
tellmewhatyouwantmetodoforyou,”andbreakfastwouldpassinconversationonZionistaffairs’.
Ibid.
9
LloydGeorge,D,MemoirsofthePeaceConference,Vol.2,(YaleUniversityPress,NewHaven,1939),
p.721.
10
Ibid,p.722.
11
Samuel,H,‘ThefutureofPalestine’,MemorandumtotheCabinet,January1915,TNA,
CAB37/123/43.
12
Dugdale,B,ArthurJamesBalfour,1906-1930,(Hutchinson,London,c.1936),p.159-60.
13
Amery,L.S,MyPoliticalLife,Vol.2,(Hutchinson,London,1953),p.114.
4
TherapidconversionofSirMarkSykestoZionismtookplacein1916aftermeetingfirstDr
MosesGaster,theSephardicChiefRabbi,andthenaGentileZionist,JamesMalcolm,
andseemstohavestemmedfromhisdeephatredofinjusticeandsympathyfortheJews
asunderdogs.Sykes’conversiontothisviewwasalmostassignificantasBalfour’s;he
seemstohavegalvanisedtheCabinettoconsideraZionistdeclarationasakeyto
gainingAmericansupportinthewar.AlthoughnomorethanaPoliticalSecretarytothe
Cabinet,during1917Sykesassumedtheroleofinter-mediarybetweentheZionistsand
Whitehall,keepinguppersistentpressureonhispoliticalsuperiorstoachievea
declaration. 14 ItwasSykeswhoopenedtheeyesofLeopoldAmerytoZionism.Amerywasanother
SecretarytotheCabinet,andinfactasecretJew.Ameryexplainedhisnew-found
supportforZionisminstrategicterms:therewouldbegreatadvantagetoBritainin
havingagratefulJewishpopulationinPalestine.HealsoforesawareductioninantiSemitismoncethepositionoftheJewswasnormalisedandtheyhadalandoftheirown.
ItwouldbeAmerywhomadesignificantchangestothedraftoftheeventual
declaration. 15 LordAlfredMilner,GeneralJanSmutsandLordRobertCecilalsobecameconvertswho
broughttheir‘eagerandactiveinfluence’tobear.16 Whatisnoticeableaboutthepro-Zionistsentimentsofnon-JewslikeLloydGeorgeand
BalfouristhewaytheycombinedadeeplyemotionalsympathyfortheZionistdream–
BalfourcouldbemovedtotearslisteningtoWeizmann–withascarcely-veiledantiSemitism.LordRobertCecil,Under-SecretaryattheForeignOffice,usedlanguage
characteristicofthisattitudewhenhecommented:‘Idonotthinkitiseasyto
exaggeratetheinternationalpoweroftheJews’. 17 Itwaswidelybelievedthatsome
mysteriousbutwell-organisedJewishconspiracywasbentondeterminingtheoutcome
ofthewar;theirinfluenceand,aboveall,theirmoney,couldswayRussia,theUnited
StatesorGermany,toBritain’sgoodorill.TogaintheinternationalfavouroftheJews
wasthereforeinBritain’svitalinterest;tooffendcouldbefatal.SinceWeizmannimplied
thatZionismspokefortheJewsoftheworld,itfollowedthattheZionistsshouldbe
helped.Itwas,LloydGeorgewrotelater,aquestionofmaking‘acontractwithJewry’.18 HowdidthetidemoveinfavouroftheZionistidea?
Formostof1916therewasnocriticaldesireintheCabinettopursuetheZionistgoal:
PrimeMinisterAsquithwasscepticalandLloydGeorgewastakenupwithIrelandand
14
Sykes,C,TwoStudiesinVirtue,(Collins,London,1953),pp.180ff;Amery,p.115.
15
Ibid;seealsoRubinstein,W,‘TheSecretofLeopoldAmery’,HistoryToday,1February1999,
http://www.balfourproject.org/the-secret-of-leopold-amery/[accessedSeptember2015].
16
LloydGeorge,p.723.
17
LordRobertCecil,ParliamentaryUnder-SecretaryattheForeignOffice,minutingadespatch,
11February1916,fromMcMahoninCairo,whohadreceivedsuggestionsfromtheheadoftheJewish
communityinAlexandriathatBritainshouldsupportZionistaspirationsinPalestine;TNA,
FO371/2671/35433.
18
LloydGeorge,p.726.
5
Munitions.However,inDecember1916therewasachangeofgovernment,withLloyd
GeorgebecomingPrimeMinisterofanadministrationthatincludedMilner,Balfourand
Cecil–allconvincedZionists–supportedbyasecretariatthatincludedthenewZionists,
SykesandAmery.
InFebruary1917SykesbegandiscussionswithWeizmann,(whosestatusinLondonwas
nowsemi-official,sincetheZionistshadbeengrantedtheirrequesttouseofficial
channelsfortheirinternationalcommunications).19 TheZionistswereagainstanyidea
ofanAnglo-FrenchcondominiumoverPalestine(asimpliedbytheSykes-Picot
agreement).TheyhadurgedBritaintoannexPalestinesothatshecouldactasthesole
protectoroftheJewishcause. 20 TheCabinetwaspersuadedtojettisonSykes-Picot’s
plansforaninternationaladministrationinPalestine,andmovetowardsexclusive
Britishcontrol.WhenAllenbytookovercommandoftheExpeditionaryForceinPalestine
inJune1917,hewasinstructedtocaptureJerusalembyChristmas.Forthefirsttimeit
begantolookapracticalpossibilitythatBritaincouldchampionaJewishNational
Home.
MeanwhiletherehadbeenrevolutioninRussiainFebruary1917.Afterwidespread
mutiniesintheRussianarmy,therewasdoubtthatRussiawouldcontinuetofightonthe
Alliedside.TheBritishgovernmentwasconvincedthatRussianJewsweremainlyproZionist,andthataBritishpronouncementinfavourofZionismwouldthereforehelpto
keepRussiainthewar.
ForeignSecretaryBalfourreturnedfromtheUnitedStatesinApril1917withthesupport
ofPresidentWilsonforaBritishdeclarationconcerningPalestine.InJunetheFrench
ForeignSecretary,JulesCambon,alsogavehissupportto‘Jewishcolonisationin
Palestine’. 21 Thesamemonth,WeizmannwarnedLondonthattheGermangovernmentwasplanning
totakeuptheZionistcause,andthatJewishopinioncouldswingagainstBritainandin
favourofherenemy.Whateverthetruthofthisclaim,the‘Germanthreat’remaineda
potentinfluenceontheCabinetrightthroughtoOctober,whentheDeclarationwas
approved.22 WeizmannalsoimpliedthatthemajorityofJewsworldwidewereZionists,
whowouldapplaudBritain’sactions.Infact,Zionistsremainedaverysmallminority
amongstJewsforsometimetocome.23 UnderthispressurefromWeizmann,Balfour
invitedLordRothschildtosubmitaformulaforadeclarationsupportingaJewish
NationalHome.
19
Sykes’sonbelievedthatthegrantingofofficialfacilitiesforcommunicationsin1916wasacrucial
moment,afterwhichtheBritishGovernmentwasessentiallyobligatedtoaccedetoZionistrequests;
Sykes(1953),pp.187-88.
20
Sokolov,MemorandumfortheForeignOffice,12April1916,TNA,FO371/2817/63314.
21
CambontoSokolov,4June1917,TNA,FO371/3058/123458.
22
Forexample,GrahamtoLordHardinge,13June1917,ibid,describingWeizmann’swarningsthatthe
GermansmighttakeuptheZionistcausefortheirownpropagandapurposes.
23
DavidFromkincalculatesthatin1913,thelastdateforwhichtherewerefigures,onlyaboutone
percentoftheworld’sJewshadsignifiedtheiradherencetoZionism.Fromkin,D,APeacetoEndAll
Peace:CreatingtheModernMiddleEast,1914-1922,(Penguin,London,1991),p.294.
6
Howwasthedeclarationfirstdrafted?
JewishZionistsandgovernmentofficialsworkedtogetheronthefirstdraftofa
declarationthatwaseventuallyproposedtoBalfourbyLordWalterRothschildinJuly
1917. 24 Thewordingrepresentedavictoryforthosewhothoughtthatamoderate
wordingwasmorelikelytogainofficialapprovaloverthosewhowantedtodemanda
Jewishstatefromtheoutset.EventhismoderatewordingrequiredBritaintoacceptthat
PalestineshouldbereconstitutedasthenationalhomeoftheJewishpeople,implying
noplacefortheexistingmajorityArabpopulation.
Whatkindofoppositionwastheretotheidea?
Fromtheoutset,almostalltheoppositiontoadeclarationcamefromwithintheJewish
communityitself.VeryfewArabswereawarethatsuchaproposalwasintheoffing,and
sotheirvoicewaslargelysilentinthedebatethatragedthroughthesummerand
autumnof1917.SherifHusseinandFeisalhadbeeninformedoftheplanviaJames
Malcolm,SykesandLawrence,andhadgiventheirreluctantassent.25 However,the
ArabsinPalestineitselfcouldnotbeconsulted(LloydGeorgelaterargued)astheywere
inenemyterritory,andwerethereforedeemedtobefightingagainstBritain.26 Onlya
fewEuropeanvoiceswereraisedontheirbehalf.
ThedisagreementbetweenWolfandWeizmannwhichwasdevelopingin1917erupted
inpubliccontroversyon24MaywhentheConjointCommitteeoftheJewishBoardof
DeputiesandtheAnglo-JewishAssociationwrotetoTheTimes,advocatingtheirmore
limitedobjectiveforJewishsettlementinPalestine.27 Theirlettercondemnedthe
Zionistplanasnotonlywrong,butdangerous,inclaimingspecialrightsforJewsoverthe
localmajority.TheletterrejectedtheZionistconceptoftheJewsasahomeless
nationalitythatneededahomeinPalestine.Inwhatamountedtoapowerstruggle
withintheEnglishJewishcommunity,theZionistfactionnarrowlydefeatedtheConjoint
Committeethefollowingmonth.28 However,thiswasnottheendoftheprotestfrom
withintheJewishcommunity.
24
Foradescriptionofthejointdraftingofadeclaration,seeLewis,G,BalfourandWeizmann:theZionist,
theZealotandtheEmergenceofIsrael,(Continuum,London,2009),p.145.Onceawordinghadbeen
agreed,RothschildwrotetoBalfouron18July1917:‘AtlastIamabletosendtoyoutheformulayou
askedmefor.IfHMGwillsendmeamessageonthelinesofthisformula,ifthey&youapproveofit,
IwillhanditontotheZionistFederation&alsoannounceitatameetingcalledforthatpurpose’.
TothisBalfourapologeticallyrepliedthefollowingday:‘MydearWalter…Iwillhavetheformulawhich
yousentmecarefullyconsideredbutthematterisofcourseofthehighestimportanceandIfearitmay
benecessarytoreferittotheCabinet.Ishallnotthereforebeabletoletyouhaveananswerassoonas
Ishouldotherwisehavewishedtodo’;BalfourtoRothschild,19July1917,Private,TNA,
FO371/3083/143082.
25
JamesMalcolmtoLordPeel,17August1936,TNA,CO733/319/5.
26
LloydGeorge,p.737.
27
SeeLewis,pp.138-9.
28
RonaldGrahamdrewLordHardinge’sattentiontoanextractfromTheTimeson18June1917,reporting
‘themeetingoftheJewishBoardofDeputies[which]resultedinatriumphfortheZionists,althoughthis
Boardhashithertobeenregardedasastrongholdofanti-Zionism,andthemostthattheZionists
expectedwasthatasubstantialminorityofvoteswouldbecastinfavouroftheirpolicy.MrLucien
7
InAugust,EdwinMontagu,the(Jewish)SecretaryofStateforIndia,launchedavehement
protestintheCabinetentitled‘TheAnti-SemitismofthePresentGovernment’.
Montagu’soppositiontoZionism,whichhecalled‘amischievouspoliticalcreed’,was
basedonafearthatJewslikehimself,whowerethoroughlyassimilatedinanother
country,wouldbeexpectedtouproottoPalestine,andthuslosethecitizenshipthey
covetedsohighly.MontagualsoaskedwhethertheZionistplanintendedtomove
PalestinianArabsoutofthewayforJews.29 Montagucontinuedhisattackonadeclarationtotheveryend.TheninOctober1917
therecameanotherlastminuteprotest,thistimefromLordCurzon,LeaderoftheHouse
ofLords.IgnoringtheinternalJewishfeud,theformerViceroyofIndiaoutlinedthe
impracticalitiesandambiguities,ashesawthem,intheZionistplanforPalestine.Were
alltheJewsoftheworldsupposedtofitinthissmallcountry?DidtheZionistsreally
intendtoestablishaJewishstate,ornot?Andwhatwastohappentotheindigenous
Arabpopulation,whowouldneveracceptasubordinaterole?TheideaofaJewish
NationalHomewas,hecautioned,arecipeforfailure.30 Howdidthedraftsofthedeclarationchangeduring1917?
ThedraftsofthedeclarationwerediscussedatthreemeetingsoftheWarCabinet,on
3September,4Octoberand31October,1917.31 The3SeptemberCabinetmeetingconsideredamoreconciliatorydraftofthe
declarationfromLordMilner,whichproposedPalestineasahomefortheJewish
people,ratherthanthehomeofthepreviousdraft.UndertheforceofMontagu’sattack,
theCabinetdeferredadecisiononthedeclaration,anddecidedtoseektheopinionof
PresidentWilsononthematter.
DuringSeptemberWeizmannandRothschildcontinuedtopressurethegovernmentto
issueitsdeclaration,sayingthatMontaguonlyrepresentedaminority‘assimilationist’
view,whilsttheZionistsrepresentedthe‘non-assimilated’masses.
Wolfwashowleddowneachtimethatheattemptedtospeakandwasnotallowedtosayaword.Had
notacertainnumberofDeputiesvotedagainsttheinstructionsgiventothembytheirelectors,the
Zionistmajoritywouldhavebeenlarger.InanycasethisvotemeansthedissolutionoftheConjoint
Committeeanditwillnolongerbenecessarytoconsultthatbody...’GrahamtoHardinge,
Confidential,18June1917,TNA,FO371/3058/123458.
29
Montagu,Memorandum,‘TheAnti-SemitismofthePresentGovernment’,submittedtotheBritish
Cabinet,23August1917,TNA,CAB24/24/71.Montaguobservedthatwhateverthe‘JewishNational
Home’meant,heassumed‘thatitmeansthatMahommedansandChristiansaretomakewayforthe
JewsandthattheJewsshouldbeputinallpositionsofpreference’.Montaguwasalsoextremely
nervousthatZionismwouldcallinquestionhiscredentialsasapatrioticEnglishgentleman,observing:
‘“IhavebeenstrivingallmylifetoescapefromtheGhetto”’;LloydGeorge,p.733.
30
LordCurzon,MemorandumsubmittedtotheCabinet,‘TheFutureofPalestine’,26October1917,TNA,
FO371/3083/207407.
31
TherelevantCabinetminutescanbefoundinTNA,CO733/347/7.
8
BecauseofthedelayscreatedbyMontagu’sobjections,therewasdoubtastowhether
thedeclarationwouldbeapprovedattheCabinetmeetingon4October.LeopoldAmery
relateshow,halfanhourbeforethemeeting,Milneraskedhimtodraftadditional
clauseswhichwouldhelpmeettheconcernsaboutthedeclaration,bothpro-Araband
Jewish,withoutchangingitssubstance.32 ThenewAmery-Milnerdraftread:
HisMajesty’sGovernmentviewswithfavourtheestablishmentin
PalestineofanationalhomefortheJewishraceandwilluseitsbest
endeavourstofacilitatetheachievementofthisobject,itbeingclearly
understoodthatnothingshallbedonewhichmayprejudicetheciviland
religiousrightsofexistingnon-JewishcommunitiesinPalestineorthe
rightsandpoliticalstatusenjoyedinanyothercountrybysuchJewswho
arefullycontentedwiththeirexistingnationality.
Nevertheless,theOctober4Cabinetmeetingcontinuedtodeferadecisiononthe
declarationbecauseofanotherpleafromMontagu;itwasdecidedtosubmitthenew
Amery-MilnerdrafttoPresidentWilsonandtorepresentativeJewishleadersinBritain.
ThedeclarationwouldnowonlybemodifiedinveryminorwaysatthefinalCabinet
meetingof31OctoberbeforeitwassenttoLordRothschild,whohadbeenoneofits
originalauthorsthreemonthsbefore.
Whatwasthesignificanceoftheadditionalsafeguardingclauses?
ItwouldseemthatAmeryhastilytackedonthetwosafeguardingclauses(firstly,
protectingtherightsofthenon-JewishcommunitiesinPalestine,andsecondly,the
rightsofJewsinothercountries)thefirsttosatisfyLordCurzon,andthesecondto
mollifyMontagu.
Thecomplaintsof‘assimilatedJews’likeMontaguhadbeenattheforefrontofpublic
debateformonthsduetotheirfearthattheveryexistenceofa‘JewishNationalHome’
wouldcallintoquestionthepatrioticloyaltyofJewsinothercountries–thisbeing
wartime-andcouldthusbeacauseofanti-Semitism.Thenewclause,safeguardingthe
statusofJewsinothercountries,addressedthisfear.Thisadditiontothedeclarationis
notentirelysurprising,givenwhathadgonebefore.
Bycontrast,therehadbeenverylittletosuggestthattheconcernsoftheArab
populationofPalestinewerelikelytobeheededatthisjuncture.UnlikeJews,their
voiceswererarelyheardinthedebate,andsoitwasuptootherstospeakontheir
behalf.WhenchallengedabouttheArabpopulation,ZionistslikeLordWalterRothschild
insistedtherewasnoquestionthattheJewishNationalHomewouldeverencroachon
therightsofthelocalmajority.33 Butthe‘assimilationists’werenotsosure.Howcould
thisapparentfairnessbereconciledwiththeZionistinsistencethattheJewswerean
exceptionalcase,whomustgetspecialtreatmentwhenitcametounfettered
immigration,forexample?
32
Amery,p.116.
33
Forexample,LordRothschild,quotedinTheTimes,18June1917.
9
Infact,theZionistshadcomeupwithwhattheydeemedasolutiontothe‘Arab
problem’.SinceitwasplainlyunrealistictoimposeasmallJewishpopulationonanArab
majority,theanswerwasforBritaintorunPalestine,andwhileshekeptorder,for
JewishimmigrationtoincreasetothepointthattherewasaJewishmajority.Atthat
momenttheJewswouldbestrongenoughtogovernthemselves.Beyondthisplanfor
eventualdomination,andassurancesthatArabswouldnotsufferasaresultofthe
declaration,ZionistsseemedunwillingorunabletoengagewiththeissueofhowArabs
wouldreactwhenaJewishNationalHomewasplantedintheirmidst.
Norwasthereanyseriousattempttodealwiththisissueatgovernmentalleveluntil
Curzonintervenedattheeleventhhour.SomelonevoiceshadspokenoutfromtheEast.
Britain’sChiefPoliticalOfficerinEgypt,GilbertClayton,hadcautionedagainstanypublic
pronouncementinAugust1917,observingthatitwouldnothelpmattersiftheArabs
weretobeprovokedatthistimebyZionism. 34 GertrudeBell,whocriticisedtheZionists
fortalkingasthoughPalestinewasemptyofpeople,conveyedherviewstotheCabinet
viaEdwinMontagu.35 Howeverthesewarningsweretoolittle,toolate,tohaveanyfundamentaleffect.The
clauseprotectingtherightsofthe‘non-Jewishcommunities’wasnottheresultof
seriousdiscussionaboutwhatwouldhappentotheArabs.IftheCabinethadbeen
deeplyconcernedaboutthefuturestatusofArabsinPalestine,itmighthavebeen
expectedthatthisnewclausewouldmakementionoftheirpoliticalrights.However,by
referringonlytotheircivilandreligiousrights,itseemsthattheCabinetbelievedthat
PalestinianArabshadnopoliticalrights.When,attheSanRemoconferenceof1920,the
Frenchtriedtoinserttheword‘political’intothelistof‘non-Jewish’rightsthatthe
BritishwouldberequiredtoprotectundertheMandate,thesuggestionwasrejected.36 Whywasthedeclarationfinallyadopted?
DespitetheconcernsofLordCurzon,theCabinetmeetingof31Octoberwaspersuaded
byBalfour’sargumentsthattherewasavitalpropagandaassettobegainedbymaking
34
Stein,L,TheBalfourDeclaration,(ValentineMitchell,London,1961)p.523.
35
Howell,G,DaughteroftheDesert:TheRemarkableLifeofGertrudeBell,(Pan,London,2007)p.383.
Republishedin2015asHowell,G,QueenoftheDesert:theExtraordinaryLifeofGertrudeBell,(Pan,
London,2015).
36
ThiswasdiscussedatSanRemoon24April1920.Inarguingforpoliticalrightstobegrantedtothenon-
Jewishcommunity,theFrenchwereactuallyseekingtoprotectwhattheyregardedasthetraditional
rightsoftheCatholicreligiouscommunityinPalestine.TheyfearedthatifthewordingoftheBalfour
Declarationwasinsertedintothepeacetreaty,onlytheJewswouldhavepoliticalrights.Millerand
explainedthattheywereonlyseekingelectoralrightsformembersofthereligiouscommunity,not
collectivepoliticalrightsfortheArabs.Nevertheless,Curzoninsistedthatthefirstprovisoofthe
declarationcouldnotbechangedbecausethewordingofthedeclarationinitsentiretywasregardedas
acharterofrightsfortheJewishpeople.HehadmetwithZionistrepresentativesjustpriortothe
ConferenceandhadpersonallyundertakentopreservetheoriginaltextoftheDeclaration.
TheproceedingsatSanRemocanbefoundatMinutes,MeetingNumber12,24April1920inTNA,
FO371/5244/E5636.However,itwouldseemthatCurzonknewhishandsweretiedandsohesaid
whatheknewhewasobligatedtosay.Inprivateheminuted,‘Iamquitewillingtowater(sic)the
PalestinianMandatewhichIcordiallydistrust’;referredtobyHubertYounginhislettertoRobert
Vansittart,30June1920,TNA,FO371/5244/7369.
10
thedeclaration,becauseworldJewishopinionwouldthenswingbehindBritainandthe
Allies,andnotagainstthem,especiallyinrevolutionaryRussia,andtheUnitedStates,
wherethemajorityofJews,(orsotheyhadbeenconvincedbyWeizmann),wereproZionist.BalfourgatheredthatalltheCabinetwere‘nowagreedthatfromapurely
diplomaticandpoliticalpointofviewitwasdesirablethatsomedeclarationfavourable
totheaspirationsoftheJewishnationalistsshouldnowbemade’.Ifsuchanassurance
couldbegiventhen‘weshouldbeabletocarryonanextremelyusefulpropagandaboth
inRussiaandAmerica’.37 ThemotivesarticulatedbytheWarCabinetforfinallyapprovingtheDeclarationwere
thereforepragmaticones,relatedtoanassessmentofBritain’swarinterests.Butthis
‘propagandaasset’explanationshouldnotobscurewhyBalfourandLloydGeorgewere
disposedtotheZionistcauseinthefirstplace.OnanumberoflateroccasionsBalfour
explainedthathisheartfeltdesirehadbeentogivetheJewishpeoplewhatheregarded
astheirrightfulhome.38 LeonardStein,thehighlyplacedZionisthistorianoftheDeclaration,observesthatthis
sympathyforthehomelessnessoftheJewsmight‘havelittletodowiththeWar
Cabinet’sconsciousmotivesforapprovingtheDeclaration,butwithoutthisbackground
neitheritsoriginsnoritssignificancecanbeunderstood’.39 37
Cabinetminutes,31October1917,TNA,CO733/347/7.
38
See,forexample,Meinertzhagen,R,MiddleEastDiary,1917-1956,(TheCressetPress,London,1959),
p.8.
39
Stein,p.552.