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PANOS ELIOPOULOS
STEREOTYPES AND THE STOIC PERSPECTIVE
Stereotypes, as false or misleading generalizations that homogenize our perception about certain customs, beliefs or people, emerge as a constant obstacle in the
progression of a universal dialogue among cultures. In this era stereotypes have a
tendency to be consolidated, since the creation of a “universal village” has not prevented them from growing or expanding as rapidly as ever, if not even more. In social
psychology it is maintained that stereotypes tend to be consolidated each time that
people or cultures come together and this is, in fact, an astonishing ascertainment.
The question then arises: on what epistemic and practical criteria can we focus the
effort against a stereotypical way of thinking? And secondly: do stereotypes mingle
with our moral responsibility to those that we call “others” and to ourselves?
Before we begin to even barely discern the way the Stoics can help decipher our
stereotypical way of thinking, it is vital to explore to a first extent the way in which stereotypes function or their proclivity to encumber our inner process of acceptance or
even tolerance. A first admission has to do with the use of attitudes or beliefs in every
day life and the way attitudes form stereotypes. It is important to remember that attitudes do not only have to do with other individuals but also with concepts, even very
abstract ones1. Two main characteristics that we must bear in mind are that attitudes
are characterized: A) by stability. This means that they are not prone to changing
easily and they usually resist change. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that those attitudes that are consolidated during childhood are even more resistant to change. B)
They can be learnt. This suggests that all theories of learning can explain this process and perhaps can shed some light of how something which is not positive can be
un-learnt.
According to Gordon Allport, an attitude is readiness for action2, meaning that it
can dynamically affect the reactions of a person towards the objects and conditions
which he is related with. Modern social psychology generally concludes that by the
term attitude we mean a constant system with a cognitive element, an emotional element and with some inclination for expressing behavior3. The cognitive element is
1
Dimitrios Georgas, Koinoniki Psychologia, vol. A, Athens 1995, p. 121.
2
Gordon Allport, “Attitudes”. In C. M. Murchison, Handbook of social psychology, Clark U., Worcester,
Massachusetts 1935.
3
Dimitrios Georgas, op. cit., p. 124.
1
based on the inherent human ability for categorization. However, this ability can turn
into a threat, as far as the issue discussed in this paper is concerned, since cognitive
categorization may be responsible for the oversimplification of things or of misinterpreting phenomena that may be substantially different. In this dimension we should
note even phenomena of a “subjective culture” that are responsible for deeply rooted
differences among societies or nations4. Another crucial point to be taken into consideration is that values and attitudes cannot be strictly separated or detached. According to the anthropologist C. Kluckhohn: “a value is a conception explicit or implicit, of the desirable, which influences the selection from available modes, means and
ends of action”5. When values are the fruit of social axiology infringement on them
may cause to the individual feelings of failure or guilt. An acute theoretical problem is
that of the potential inconsistency between attitudes and behavior. Much research on
the relation between attitude and behavior has shown that the latter is frequently not
reliably unswerving from the former. What makes them inconsistent is either the
characteristics of each person, the atomistic features that are connected with his interests and motives, his verbal and mental abilities etc., or current conditions that
may have occurred in a given situation6. These conditions may vary from the presence of people who agree or disagree with the person’s attitude to the social norms
that the person has to follow at a specific moment. These parameters, it must be noted, are not systematic yet but a corpus of hypotheses. Such results however render
this area of attitude and stereotyping quite problematic, as it is evident, and of course
they encumber its philosophical treatment.
What is relevant with our hypothesis today is that resistance to changing an attitude is correlated with the general context of someone’s beliefs due to the fact that
changing an attitude may signify the change for a series of other attitudes which are
associated with that one. Nonetheless, when a person forms an opinion by means of
his own free will and not under peer pressure then he is more dedicated to it and resists changing even more7. The fact remains that as regards our perception of other
people, our first impressions of people we are unfamiliar with, we tend to generalize
4
H. C. Triandis, “Cultural influences upon cognitive processes”. In L. Berkowitz, Advances in Experi-
mental Social Psychology, Academic, New York 1964.
5
C. Kluckhohn, “Values and value orientations is the theory of action”. In T. Parsons and E. A. Shilds,
Toward a general theory of action, Harvard U., Cambridge Massachusetts, 1951, p. 395.
6
A. W. Wicker, “Attitudes versus action: The relationship of verbal and overt behavioral responses to
attitude objects”. In Journal of Social Issues, 1969, 25, pp. 41-78.
7
J. L. Freedman, D. O. Sears and J. M. Carlsmith, Social Psychology, 3rd edition, Prentice Hall, Eng-
lewood Cliffs, N. J. 1978, p. 338.
2
based usually on isolated elements. That means that we tend also to be more inexorably prone to fallacies or false judgment8. Research from social psychologists shows
that as regards nations, the less contact there is between them, the more oversimplified beliefs or stereotypes that concern them will be9. A principal mistake is that people or nations, human beings in general, are inclined to consider of the characteristics of others as categories and not as variables and this comes as an inevitable effect of cognitive categorization. This in turn steers ineluctably to prejudice. Contact
among people and nations does not seem to be the solution. According to Campbell:
a) in every stereotype there is a kernel of truth, b) the more nations or individuals
may come in contact the more their stereotypes are strengthened10. Therefore the
improvement of the stereotypical image must be based on other factors apart from
contact and bringing together distinct civilizations. And this precisely is the place
where there is room for the Stoic insight as we shall see later. Clearly, there is some
deterministic factor in this discussion about stereotypes. Stereotypes are the inescapable result of a chain of causes. There is a number of theories which support this
hypothesis of the productive causes of attitudes and behavior. Briefly it should be
brought to attention that they can be divided into inner causes and external causes.
When the individual behavior diverges from the socially desirable then the productive
causes of behavior are internal whereas when someone’s behavior is in accordance
with the socially desirable then the productive causes can be attributed to external
influences11. However, since this debate is not in our concern we should just proceed
to the interconnection of the stoic thought with this psychological substratum.
If we take a look at the theory of cognitive dissonance as expressed by Festinger
we shall see that what Festinger upholds can be related with the stoic view about
cognition and attitude. Festinger believes that there are times when there is some
serious imbalance between the cognitive elements of attitudes and also between attitude and behavior. A person who sees arguments in favor and arguments against a
belief will act according to what is graver or more significant in his thought. In other
words, if one thinks that smoking is good because it offers relaxation and some fast
relief from everyday routine then one will disregard the minor argument that smoking
8
Dimitrios Georgas, op. cit., p. 201.
9
Dimitrios Georgas, op. cit., p. 204.
10
D. T. Campbell, “Stereotypes and the Perception of Group Differences”. In American Psychologist,
1967, 22, pp. 817-829.
11
E. E. Jones, and K. E. Davis, “From Acts to Dispositions”. In L. Berkowitz, Advances in Experimental
Social Psychology, vol. II, Academic, New York 1965.
3
may be seriously pernicious to health. As this argument decreases its gravity or as
the opposite argument increases its own gravity the smoker will be urged to change
his mind and turn to a new decision. Thus, he reduces the dissonance created by the
contradiction of the arguments and he is at ease with his consciousness. Conflict can
be avoided when he realizes that he now is more convinced about the other view and
since this view is a necessity for him he is comforted and now prone to immediate or
gradual changing12. Studies on attitudes have further shown that attitudes can be
learnt through typical behavioristic mechanisms such as: connection, reinforcement
and imitation, a conclusion which directs us towards the philosophical precondition of
Paideia.
In this frame the theory of the Stoic thinkers emerges with an approach that can
help decipher such urgent but not solely current issues. In the hypothesis of the Stoa,
Logic and the right manner of syllogisms are parameters that can assist our world in
understanding the way to live outside the recurring tyranny of stereotypes. Initially we
must bring to mind that the Stoics, and especially Chrysippus, assert that the criterion
of truth is the “cognitive impression” (phantasia kataleptike)13. The Stoics’ cognitive
impression is an impression that “arises from that which is…and of such a kind as
could not arise from what is not”14. The cognitive impression guarantees that there is
some real object corresponding to it as far as there is not any obstacle. Among the
powers of the commanding faculty is the capacity to assent or withhold assent to impressions. This fact, that it is in our power to give or not give our assent to things,
means that we are capable of abstaining from the commission of mistakes. And such
mistakes certainly include stereotypes. As a matter of fact only the Stoic sage can
grant his assent to impressions and be sure that he speaks of the truth or of episteme, science. The others are prone to mistakes since they lack the necessary infallible discipline that will direct them correctly. Let us remember here the incident with
Sphaerus and his pomegranates that will help realize how knowledge and assent can
be uncertain situations and under what circumstances. Therefore assent and truth
are closely related in the sense that before assent is granted the truth of the cognitive
impression must have been assured and given priority. But is this what we practically
do when we yield to behaving in a stereotypical way? Or do we end up in a vicious
circle of rapid impressions which develop into deeply rooted beliefs? Isn’t it the case
12
L. Festinger, A theory of Cognitive Dissonance, Row, Peterson, Evanston Ill. 1957.
13
Arnim Ab, Ioannes, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, Vol. I-IV, Lipsiae in Aedibus, Teubner, MCMXXI.
SVF. 2. 105 & 108.
14
SVF 1. 59.
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that stereotypes are treacherously located in the area of general ignorance? It should
be noted that there is some sharp distinction between truth and ignorance in the Stoic theory. The Stoics seek to bring truth back in the field of the cognitive capability of
the person, almost in a Socratic way. Also to ascertain the existence of what is described by language so as to avoid any type of fallacy15. When this takes place successfully man does not only become good but also eudaimonistic, when reason is
infallible and governs man and his life.
Logical relations are causal relations in the thought of the Stoa. The relation between a cause and a result is a causal nexus, an absolutely necessary relation. Syllogisms and syllogistic forms are natural laws which apply to the elucidatory explanation of the relations between sentences16. Consequently, there must be a correspondence between the thing and its name. According to Chryssipus, words are ambivalent17. Therefore, we cannot know unerringly what one is saying simply based on
the analysis of the elements of his speech18. Personal belief differentiates one individual from another and is closely and casually related with attitude19. It could be
claimed then that in order to oppose to a stereotypical way of thinking it is not sufficient just to elaborate the meaning of words and the messages that language can
convey on a pragmatic level but, what is more, to expand our humanitarian scope by
means of the collaboration between virtues and right reason which, according to the
Stoics, is subjected to natural criteria. Man, as the energetic moral agent that he is,
must always be aware of his moral responsibility20. This responsibility is fruitful and
productive not only when man focuses on his inner situation but also when his moral
experience renders him socially active. For the Stoics every moral effort is to be orientated towards the general benefit.
The reason why people often behave in an irrational or unethical way, and thus
are led to prejudice, is not that “ratio recta” does not exist inside them. On the contrary, it is due to the fact that right reason is disregarded and ignored, and thus truth is
unnoticed or overlooked. Excluding reason from human things and daily life leads to
the formation of a bad “exis”, a bad habit, it could be said, a bad mental hygiene that
15
Diogenes Laertius, 7, 65.
16
A. A. Long, I Ellinistiki Philosophia (Hellenistic Philosophy), translated by Myrto Dragona-Monachou &
Stylianos Dimopoulos, MIET, Athens 2003, pp. 232-233.
17
SVF 2. 152.
18
SVF 2. 298.
19
B. Berofsky, Freedom from Necessity. The Metaphysical Basis of Responsibility , Routledge, London
1987, pp. 188-191.
20
F. H. Sandbach, The Stoics, Chatto & Windus Ltd, London 1975, p. 104.
5
is consolidated progressively and is responsible for the absence of right thinking and
right action. Passions inundate the “hegemonikon” and man is rendered vulnerable
and unable to return to the path of the right governance of the Nous. The system of
“proennoies”, pre-concepts, which is formed before the appearance of Logos, is
abandoned21. The common quality of men, the “hegemonikon”, which is located in
our animal body, brings up demands of cosmopolitism and of a universal community,
not a globalised community but a universal one, since men are not identified solely
as political entities or entities that belong to social classes but as cosmic and metaphysical entities altogether. The humanitarian stance of Stoicism is grounded on the
constant orientation for virtue and Good. Parallel with the four cardinal virtues, stoicism comes up with philanthropy which emerges as a central virtue among the many.
Virtues can be thought of and realised only in the wide frame of an open human
community. Therefore, man has to discern what is good, he must examine vigilantly
the nucleus of his actions and he must become acquainted with a logical approach
and conduct so that his actions are evidently characterised by harmony and coherence. Living with right reason is living “secundum naturam”, by certain principles and
in a certain way22. Provided that stereotypes are stable but wrongly judged perceptions, it can be deduced that they are simultaneously false cognitive impressions and
can steer a person to fallacy and error. Since stereotyping can be connected to moral
action and moral influence then stereotyping is morally weak and must be extirpated.
To use the stoic example of the cylinder23, it could be argued that the way people are
ensnared in stereotypes is the internal cause, the mental weakness that surfaces due
to categorization, while on the other hand it can play the role also of the external
cause, the one that begets injustice and disharmony and can therefore affect those
who are judged in a stereotypical manner.
As stated by Markus Aurelius, internal and external reality should be harmonised
and reconciled. With reference to this, it should be mentioned that according to modern psychology the lack of harmonization or accord between the two is not only a crisis that could lead to bad reasoning but also a field for neuroses, mental diseases
and conflicts or delusion, lack of contact with reality. Thus, the exhortation that the
Roman stoic gives is very important, to peruse reality with the right reading tools.
What is meant here is that there is an issue of right correspondence to reality, and
21
Jean- Baptiste Gourinat, Oi Stoikoi gia tin Psihi (Les Stoïciens et l’Ame), translated by K. Petropoulos,
Kardamitsas, Athens 1999, pp. 143-144.
22
SVF 3. 516.
23
See A. A. Long, op. cit., pp. 266-267.
6
that orientates us to the acceptance of the role of education or Paideia. With Paideia
we safeguard democracy; we safeguard the essential core of our world. Aurelius upholds that we must respect the universal Logos and the inner function of Nature24.
But at the same time he thinks it imperative that we are always free to change our
minds and thus maintain our free will25. Under these premises we must always bear
the essential freedom of being able to reject stereotypes, whether we are the recipients of a stereotypical attitude26 or those who produce it, and accept human diversity
for the benefit of common peace and stability. Hence, rejecting our stereotypes about
others is rendered both a political and an ethical decision. On this basis we can found
a new society which is mature for political decisions, but first we must by means of
the philosophical method mould and sustain a moral society. Philosophy can be the
embankment against the aggression of political and economic benefits which come
from the side of new world order or globalization. For Aurelius we are all citizens of
the same State. What makes us partners in a common case is Reason and the
shared sense of the law that lies inside in a natural way.
A parameter which is of great importance in the aurelian thought is that the Self is
a place where one can retire and find stability and inner peace27. The same idea exists in the epistles of the Roman Seneca. For Seneca “humanitas” springs from contact with one’s Self and apart from being a prominent virtue it is also the unique foundation of a generalised and impending social optimism28. In his thought every human
spirit is subjected to a prospective of enhancement and consolidation. And this can
be the cause of humanitarianism with a social as well as philanthropical outlook. According to the Roman senator the first thing that Philosophy provides is the feeling of
co-existence among men, the munificent presence of community29. The philosopher
can never be alone; he is a friend of humanity, “amicum omnibus”30. This brings to
24
Marcus Aurelius, Book D, 29.
25
Marcus Aurelius, Book D, 12.
26
What Marcus tells us works both ways: he equally stresses the fact that we should be independent of
what the others do or do not do. That means that stereotypes should be not be taken into consideration
by the sage when they are addressed to him. See Marcus Aurelius, Book B, 17.
27
Marcus Aurelius, Book D, 2-3. See also H. Gardner, Changing Minds, Harvard Business School
Press, Massachusetts 2004. Gardner clarifies that according to current psychological terminology we
can be speaking of some kind of “intrapersonal intelligence” which helps deepen interpersonal intelligence and communication with others.
28
Seneca, Epistulae Morales, XLIV.
29
Seneca, Epistulae Morales, V. 4: “Hoc primum philosophia promittit, sensum communem, humani-
tatem et congregationem”.
30
Seneca, Epistulae Morales, VI. 7.
7
mind the words of the English writer Thomas de Quincey31, in the 19th century, who
wrote: “A philosopher should not see with the eyes of the poor literary creature, calling himself a man of the world, and filled with narrow and self-regarding prejudices of
birth and education, but should look upon himself as a ecumenical creature, and as
standing in an equal relation to high and low- to educated and uneducated, to the
guilty and the innocent”. The inner place is a place where right thinking can be retrieved, where further peace can be established and in this inner environment we can
fight against all prejudice and all injustice before we actively participate in the social
case. The right use of the Self can guide us through to the right attitude towards the
social corpus. What the Stoics ask us to do is to dispose of the subjective perceptions and convictions and turn to the objective perception of Nature32. Leaving behind
false impressions and misleading notions one can overcome the way of their formation and thus reclaim the original connection with human truth33.
Another basic criterion in the Stoic thought is the one of the categories, especially
of the fourth category (pros ti pos echon)34 which reveals the ontological relation of
one being to another. The utility of this category is to classify attributes that one thing
has in relation with another. The reasons why the Stoics employ this category are
perhaps more metaphysical than logical35. All universal parts are interconnected and
permeated with spirit, pneuma; therefore this category actually describes the function
of the cosmic “sympathy” and interdependence. The psychological need of the connection with the Self, society and the world is of paramount importance for Stoicism.
The stoic philosophy of Nature gives a cosmic orientation to personal identity as a
system of relations according to Logos36. The concept of these relations is fundamental in the stoic theory: if we are really defined or categorized by the fourth stoic
category then we should become conscious of how important heterogeny and alterity
31
Thomas de Quincey (1785-1859), Confessions of an English Opium-Eater [Preliminary Confessions].
32
Marcus Aurelius, Book IB, 23-26.
33
Accordingly in psychology H. Gardner identifies seven specific “levers” that can have a significant
impact on the process of mind change: a) Reason (making logical arguments), b) Research (presenting
factual data), c) Resonance (connecting with an individual’s or group’s emotional or spiritual core), d)
Representational redescriptions (presenting the same idea in multiple formats, reflecting our various
intelligences), e) Resources and rewards (offering positive or negative reinforcement), f) Real world
events (leveraging happenings that are out of your control), g) Resistances (identifying and countering
longstanding, contrary beliefs). See H. Gardner, Changing Minds, Harvard Business School Press,
Massachusetts 2004
34
SVF 2. 402-404.
35
A. A. Long, op. cit., p. 261.
36
Marcus Aurelius, Book E, 16.
8
are and how useful it would be that somebody else always exists since his existence
is a semantic gnomon for ours. Through the presence of some other person we are
led to the most elemental ontological perception and also to the potential of a wider
cultural comprehension. Thus facilitated, our knowledge of things and concepts can
guide us through to the extinction of all stereotyping process via the mutual understanding which is based on the common and objective element of Logos. The stoic
Logos is the basis of all human action and all human responsibility, therefore wisdom
(Sophia) is a necessary and indispensable condition (officium) at the foothill of every
social attempt. Education and “Paideia” constitute the foundation of such a high potential, by means of which all people, irrespective of race, colour, social or national
origin, contribute to the formation and further development of a “nova civitas universalis”, which now should be based on the principles of virtue and toleration.
Right Reason is the distinctive parameter which unites all under a social perspective and, simultaneously, under a moral perspective, since there is an intrinsic connection between rationality and morality37. Stereotyping is rendered not reasonable
due to the impact of right thinking, which is tuned in accordance with natural thinking.
Reason or Logos is the integral and structural power of Nature, a power which should
not be mistaken for axiology or opinion. Thus, the perspective of the Stoics becomes
contemporary, not through some philosophical revival ritual but in the course of a collective need, the need for uninterrupted and unimpeded co-existence inside the ample limits of the Cosmo-polis. Nations can be the teachers of one another by means
of the philosophical principle of toleration. Peace can be not only a universal political
parameter but also a continuous psychological consideration. The way for world
peace goes directly through the narrow path of individual peace. It’s a prerequisite for
a society of justice and mutual acceptance. Philosophers should seize the initiative in
order to militate against stereotypes and terminate their influence upon people and
nations, as such influence is wholly anti-scientific and anti-humanitarian. But this
should happen without refuting or diminishing the validity of terms and values. Great
respect comes from great justice so what has to be avoided is to choose one culture
at the cost of another. Natural reason, declares the Stoa, guarantees that there is a
unique parameter that will help converge all ideas to some natural law and justice but
not at the cost of individuality. The same is applicable for nations as well. Empathy
and right governance, governance based on right reason and on the extinction of all
stereotypes will relieve history from the war-orientated conventions of our evolution. It
37
In the case of stereotypes there is evidently a moral distance between the dominant group and the
group which is stigmatized.
9
will bring peace in a polemical tradition, in nature, in scientific advance; it will also
offer ecological and inner psychological equilibrium. Thus, life will discard what is
worthless, redundant and nugatory.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allport Gordon, “Attitudes”. In C. M. Murchison, Handbook of social psycholo-
gy, Clark U., Worcester, Massachusetts 1935.

Arnim Ab, Ioannes, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, Vol. I-IV, Lipsiae in
Aedibus, Teubner, MCMXXI.

Berofsky B., Freedom from Necessity: the metaphysical basis of Responsibil-
ity, Routledge, London 1987.

Campbell D. T., “Stereotypes and the perception of group differences”. In
American Psychologist, 1967, 22, pp. 817-829.

Diogenes Laertius, Vioi Philosophon (Vitae Philosophorum), vol. I-IV, Kaktos,
Athens 1994.

Edelstein L., O Stoikos Sofos (The meaning of Stoicism), translated by Rozina Burkner, Thyrathen, Thessaloniki 2002.

Festinger Leon, A theory of cognitive dissonance, Row, Peterson, Evanston
Ill. 1957.

Freedman J. L., Sears D. O. and Carlsmith J. M., Social Psychology, 3rd edition, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N. J. 1978.

Gardner Howard, Changing Minds, Harvard Business School Press, Massachusetts 2004.

Georgas Dimitris, Koinoniki Psychologia (Social Psychology), vol. A-B,
Athens 1995.

Gourinat Jean-Baptiste, Oi Stoikoi gia tin psihi (Les Stoïciens et l’Ame), translated by K. Petropoulos, Kardamitsas, Athens 1999.

Jones E. E., and Davis K. E., “From acts to dispositions”. In L. Berkowitz, Ad-
vances in experimental social psychology, vol. II, Academic, New York 1965.

Kluckhohn C., “Values and value orientations is the theory of action”. In T.
Parsons and E. A. Shilds, Toward a general theory of action, Harvard U.,
Cambridge Massachusetts, 1951.
10

Long A. A., I Ellinistiki Philosophia (Hellenistic Philosophy), translated by Myrto Dragona-Monachou & Stylianos Dimopoulos, MIET, Athens 2003.

Long A. A., Stoic Studies, Cambridge University Press 1996.

Marcus Aurelius, Ta eis eafton (Meditations), translated by Felix de Giorgio,
Zaharopoulos, Athens XX.

Sandbach F. H., The Stoics, Chatto & Windus Ltd, London 1975.

Seneca Lucius Annaeus, Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, translated by Richard Gummere, Vol. I-III, Harvard University Press (Loeb) 1962.

Triandis H. C., “Cultural influences upon cognitive processes”. In L. Berkowitz, Advances in experimental social psychology, Academic, New York 1964.

Wicker A. W., “Attitudes versus action: The relationship of verbal and overt
behavioral responses to attitude objects”. In Journal of Social Issues, 1969,
25, pp. 41-78.
Panos Eliopoulos
MA History of Philosophy
PhD candidate in Philosophy
University of Athens
11