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Nigeria 110526 Table of Contents 1. Political context (pp. 1) a. Zoning (pp. 2-3) 2. Government agenda (pp. 3-4) 3. Business practices in Nigeria, especially of Flour Mills of Nigeria PLC (pp. 4-6) 4. Respective roles of the central and local governments in Nigeria regarding foreign investors and business (pp. 6-7) 5. Protected industries (pp. 7- 9) a. Prohibited imports (pp. 8-9) b. Prohibited exports (pp. 9) 6. The sugar, vegetable oil, and grain industries (pp. 9-12) a. The sugar industry (pp. 9-10) b. The vegetable oil industry (pp. 10-11) c. The grain industry (pp. 11-12) 7. Overall assessment of the future of Nigeria (pp. 12-13) Nigeria Executive Summary The administration of President Goodluck Jonathan is very receptive to foreign and domestic investment, especially in non-oil and gas industries that can help the government achieve its goal of becoming a top 20 global economy by 2020. While oil and gas is Nigeria’s single most significant economic sector, these industries have a limited ability to achieve the socio-economic transformations Jonathan has campaigned on. As such, the diversification of the non-oil and gas sector is only one aim of the Jonathan administration; achieving self-sufficiency in food production and expanding electricity generation capacity are other high-profile initiatives that are receiving presidential-level attention. Political reforms and infrastructure reconstruction are other areas the Jonathan government has promoted. These initiatives include improving existing and constructing new road and rail infrastructure throughout the country to link up different areas of economic activity. Jonathan’s administration is focusing on these areas as means to overcome the legacy from Nigeria’s military dictatorship era that contributed to the country’s underperforming governance. Amid Nigeria’s overall yet ongoing transition to an entrenched and merit-based civilian system of governance are just a handful of powerful business conglomerates. Nigerians embrace a robust system of capitalism, and have arguably Africa’s liveliest media sector, but many enterprises see their market share limited to a small geographic area. Nigerians 1 from all walks of life and ethnic background are pragmatic and competitive in politics and business, leaving ideology aside to achieve advancement in their careers and pocketbooks. A few Nigerians have been able to combine political connections, hard work, and access to deep capital in order to establish groups of companies that would be considered national champions -- business conglomerates that have achieved a magnitude size and scope that the government is forced to treat them as legitimate actors in their own right, and even promote or protect these businesses as a way of promoting national interests. Flour Mills of Nigeria PLC (FMN) is one conglomerate arguably on its way to becoming a national champion, but it is not yet there. Conversely, The Dangote Group (FMN’s chief competitor) is an established national champion with diverse businesses throughout Nigeria, and Africa for that matter. Dangote’s advantages are the combination of decades-long business experience and access to deep capital that can shelter it from the vagaries of the incumbent government at any given time. FMN, while it certainly enjoys political connections across many political generations, does not have the same depth of market penetration that could put it beyond the reach of a particular government if the latter chooses to become intrusive. This means FMN stakeholders must be more politically sensitive than its top business rival. However, FMN stakeholders can use this as an advantage and be rewarded by embracing and participating in key sectors that the incumbent government is strongly encouraging the development of -- such as agriculture. But FMN stakeholders must be mindful that Nigerian politicians and businesspeople across the land are pragmatic, and thus be prepared for local commitments that shift or fall short of expectations. Political Context Nigeria is divided into six regions called geopolitical zones, plus the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) that encompasses the capital city of Abuja. The six regions are the South-West, South-South, South-East, North-West, North-Central and North-East. These zones are not entities with defined legal or constitutional obligations, unlike states or Local Government Areas (LGAs) but rather organizational means to distribute political and patronage offices around the country. These regions are useful tools to avoid a situation where all the country’s resources are consolidated by a single interest group or region, which could provoke reactionary violence by perceived “have-nots” and risk civil conflict and possible fragmentation of the country. The re-election of President Goodluck Jonathan is the focal point of Nigeria’s current political context. Jonathan, a member of the Ijaw ethnic group located in the country’s 2 oil-producing Niger Delta region, won the April 16 presidential election and will serve another four-year term after being inaugurated May 29. Nigeria’s newly-elected parliament, comprising a lower House of Representatives and an upper house Senate, will be inaugurated June 6. Aside from the current elections, there are two broad themes that continue to shape the behavior of Nigerian politics since its reform process began in 1999. The first broad theme is the role of the geopolitical zones in distributing power and patronage. The second is the state-centric and security-oriented behavior of the Nigerian governments during the military dictatorships era in 1999, and certainly in the 1990s during the Sani Abacha-led junta. Nigeria was once a heavily restricted state fearful of external and internal threats but is now trying to liberalize and democratize. Combined, these issues directly affect the behavior of contemporary Nigerian governments, including the newly inaugurated Jonathan administration. Zoning As mentioned, zoning exists in Nigeria to ensure the distribution of political offices and patronage among the country’s six regions. It does not eliminate tensions but reduces them between the regions as they compete over scarce resources. The zoning agreement became the means to facilitate Nigeria’s transition from military to civilian rule. The military juntas that ruled Nigeria until 1999 needed political, economic and security guarantees amid the broader domestic and international push for liberalization and democratization. Nigeria was going to have to reform, and power would rest in the hands of a civilian administration. Zoning is not a constitutional mechanism, however, but rather a framework adopted by the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP). The PDP was and is the main national political party that the outgoing military junta elite in 1999 and the incoming civilian elite ever since could agree on to manage the transition and share power. In other words, the PDP did not emerge out of inspired ideological debate, but rather because what was needed was a consensus platform to manage diverse interests. As a result, the PDP does not embrace any particular political or economic ideology. 3 Olusegun Obasanjo oversaw the initial transitional era from junta to civilian rule. Both camps agreed upon Obasanjo in 1999 to run for president because of his diverse background that encompassed mutual interests. Obasanjo was a retired army general and former military junta leader (he governed the junta from 1976 to 1979), while he was also a southerner, a member of the Yoruba tribe from the South-West region and a Christian. Most in the military juntas, and most top elite in the armed forces were Muslim northerners from the Hausa Fulani tribe; Obasanjo was a unique and critical combination that both sides could secure confidence in. Obasanjo and his vice president, Atiku Abubakar (a Muslim from Adamawa state in the North-East region) served from 1999-2003 and from 2003-2007 after winning reelection. Obasanjo had considerable influence on the selection of his successor, and encouraged PDP delegates in late 2006 to choose Umaru Yaradua, a Muslim governor from Katsina state and a member of an aristocratic and influential family from northern Nigeria. Obasanjo also sought to win friends in the Niger Delta region by ensuring that Goodluck Jonathan, until then the governor of Bayelsa state, ran as the vice presidential candidate. Yaradua and Jonathan went on to win the 2007 national elections. Jonathan officially became president in May 2010, succeeding Yaradua after he died of heart-related complications. Jonathan had been serving as acting president since January 2010 while Yaradua was receiving medical care in Saudi Arabia. Jonathan had been the vice president since the 2007 national election until his appointment as Acting President. Initially, Jonathan’s presidency was controversial because it disrupted the current zoning distribution, which dictated that a northerner should hold the presidency for the 20072011 term (and with an unspoken expectation for the 2011-2015 term). Jonathan overcame these controversies by labeling himself as a reformer, a merit-based leader and one who represents Nigeria’s new generation of leaders (having perks of the incumbency also helped). Jonathan has tried to promote improvements in some fundamental areas touching the lives of everyday Nigerians, like infrastructure improvements and rehabilitating and expanding the country’s electricity power production grid. Jonathan has made some notable gains, especially in bringing peace and stability to the chronically violent Niger Delta region. Throughout most of the 2000s, particularly from 4 2005-2009, militants throughout the Niger Delta acted with impunity attacking energy infrastructure (pipelines and flow stations) and kidnapping foreign oil workers, causing disruptions to oil production. Jonathan’s patronage network in the Niger Delta has led to a significant reduction of the militant threat for the time being, at least. Government Agenda The Jonathan administration’s objective is to rehabilitate Nigeria after decades of poor governance, bad management, and unfulfilled reforms. It aims to achieve its stated objective of becoming a top 20 global economy by 2020 by rebranding Nigeria domestically and internationally through good governance and the delivery of public services, and expanding and diversifying the country’s economic sectors. The Jonathan administration has emphasized reforms in areas that can improve Nigeria’s local industry and social well-being. This includes the energy sector and supporting legislation like the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), which aims to reform the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). Proposed reforms would deregulate the supply and distribution of refined crude products such as gasoline, and raise taxes on international oil companies working in Nigeria. Jonathan also oversees the power ministry (electricity generation), pushing to expand the country’s electricity output from its current output of 3,000 MW to 10,000 MW. Other reform initiatives identified by the Jonathan administration include rehabilitating road and rail infrastructure, and facilitating financial incentives for domestic and foreign business to develop local industry as well as the agro-economic sector. Reforms in the agricultural sector have two primary benefits. The first is raising the country’s self-sufficiency in food production. The second is promoting development, which could significantly boost employment levels. Agriculture had been the backbone of the Nigerian economy prior to the discovery of oil on a commercially recoverable basis in 1956. Another advantage of agriculture is that it is located in regions throughout the country, unlike the oil and gas sector that is largely confined to the Niger Delta. Boosting agriculture production also increases products available for export to traditional trading partners in West and Central Africa. 5 Reforms within the agricultural sector have included the privatization of state-owned industries, whose production was awful; it had very little reinvestment, little professional management, little commercial know-how, all this combined to see once-lauded projects come to a grinding halt. In the sugar sector, the two government owned sugar companies, Savannah Sugar Company Ltd and The Nigerian Sugar Company Ltd were sold to private investors. Until privatization, domestic production levels essentially collapsed, with the result that to meet domestic sugar demand, a vast majority needed to be imported. STRATFOR sources in Nigeria indicate that the government is very supportive of efforts to invest in areas it believes are critical such as agriculture, power and road and rail infrastructure. These are high priority areas that a foreign investor will receive fast-track assistance from all levels of the Nigerian government. Business Practices, Especially of Flour Mills of Nigeria It is reported from previous due diligence that FMN was careful to develop good relations with the Yaradua administration (2007-2010). As well as its connections to the Yaradua administration, Alhaji Ahmed Joda, the Vice Chair of FMN is reportedly a part of former president Obasanjo’s inner circle. Obasanjo, who served as president from 1999 to 2007, and from 1976 to 1979 as military junta leader, remains a top member of the ruling PDP. Obasanjo is chairman of the PDP’s Board of Trustees, a member of Nigeria’s advisory Council of State (due to his position as a former president) and within political circles is still seen as a kingmaker. Due diligence also stated that Joda’s sympathies would likely lie with incumbent President Jonathan. Nigerian presidents command significant perks of patronage, and most Nigerians are very practical when it comes to their political and economic allegiances. As such, Jonathan has not been different from his predecessors in winning over the allegiance of various constituencies, including business and bureaucratic interest groups who were previously supportive of Yaradua. Joda, as with many other politicians and businesspeople, will likely support Jonathan. This does not mean they have to campaign for Jonathan or make contributions to his party, but they will not be seen as a hindrance or act in opposition to Jonathan. If they have political preferences other than 6 with the incumbent and the ruling party, most business and bureaucratic constituents will keep this quiet. Joda got involved in a recent political situation that could position himself favorable to Jonathan. Joda, in the capacity of an eminent statesman elder, was part of a delegation to the National Assembly in early 2010 to petition the government to grant Jonathan acting president authority. This happened when Jonathan was still vice president when President Yaradua was medically incapacitated in Saudi Arabia. Jonathan ultimately became Acting President, before formally becoming President in May 2010, even though he faced stiff opposition from Yaradua loyalists within the Federal Executive Council (the government’s cabinet) and Parliament. This is not to say that Joda’s role was singularly critical but he went against rival entrenched political interests, a move Jonathan is not likely to forget. Joda also has relations with both Obasanjo’s and Jonathan’s rivals. Joda chairs the board of directors of the American University of Nigeria (AUN), an institution started by former Vice President and presidential aspirant Atiku Abubakar (who fell out of favor with his boss, former President Obasanjo, in 2005). Atiku also ran against Jonathan in PDP presidential primaries in 2010. Also on the board of directors of AUN is Aminu Dantata, a relative of top FMN rival Alhaji Aliko Dangote of The Dangote Group (see below). Joda thus can operate within the diverse business and political network that straddles the highest levels of political and business kingmakers. The due diligence also stated that FMN Managing Director Emmanuel Akwari Ukpabi does not appear to enjoy any significant personal connections in Nigeria. This lack of personal connections could actually be perceived as an advantage, especially as it would align with a stated value of the Jonathan administration, that it was merit and not cronyism that gave Ukpabi his position. FMN’s main business rival is Dangote Flour Mills (DFM). DFM is part of The Dangote Group, whose President, CEO and founder is Alhaji Aliko Dangote. Dangote Group is one of Nigeria’s largest companies, with involvement in a wide-ranging set of industries found not only in the country but also across Africa. Aliko Dangote is from arguably Nigeria’s richest family, the Dantata family, which is akin to the Rockefeller or 7 Vanderbilt families in the United States. It is possible that Dangote doesn’t use his family ancestral name because he wants to achieve his business on his own based on merit. Dangote is careful to stay out of the political limelight, though he is certainly aware of the political impact from projects and initiative he is involved in, such as the $3.9 billion cement factory initiative for Nigeria and several African countries. This initiative is significant for several reasons: the magnitude of the investment, it is an African success story, it should lower the price of an everyday commodity and it will generate good jobs. Because of the decades-long Dantata family business success, Dangote does not have the same need to cultivate crucial political relations, though he needs to maintain cordial relations with the Nigerian government. A STRATFOR Nigerian source says that Dangote Group is seen as the market leader in the areas it is involved in, whereas FMN, and its other rival BUA, are seen as followers. This means that FMN, more so than Dangote Group, would benefit from having a network of well-connected political supporters. Dangote, because of his family’s business history that pre-dates civilian and even independent government in Nigeria, can achieve success and economies of scale beyond that of FMN without needing to cultivate friendly interlocutors in any given administration. Interestingly, there are a couple of industries where both FMN and the Dangote Group or its relations (with the Dantata branch of Dangote’s ancestral family) share ownership stakes. FMN owns a 52.61% stake in Northern Nigeria Flour Mills (NNFM), and Dantata Investment and Securities Ltd., owned by Dangote’s relative Aminu Dantata, owns a 6.45% stake. Despite the smaller stake, Dantata is the chairman of NNFM, while George Stavros Coumantaros (chairman of the FMN) is the Vice Chairman of NNFM. A second industry of joint-ownership interest is cement. FMN owns a 22% stake in the United Cement Company of Nigeria Ltd (UNICEM). The Dangote Cement Company also owns a 22% stake in UNICEM; France’s Lafarge (28%) and Spain’s Holcim Trading (28%) hold the majority ownership stakes. Cement is an industry the Jonathan, Yaradua, and Obasanjo administrations have encouraged local development of. 8 As with Joda’s role as chairman of the board of directors of AUN, FMN has personal connections across a range of business interests that put them in direct contact with principals from their top rival, Dangote Group. Business on the scope and scale of FMN and Dangote Group in Nigeria involves a small number of peers, and it is advantageous to have available high-level lines of communication between these dominant conglomerates. Respective Role of the Central and Local Governments Regarding Foreign Investors and Companies There are three tiers of government in Nigeria: the federal government, the state governments, and the local government areas (LGAs). The federal government is seated in Abuja, also called the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). There are 36 states in the Nigerian federation. There are 749 LGAs; the number of LGAs varies by state, according to each state’s population and pressures at the state level to create new LGAs as a means of distributing patronage at the grassroots level. The federal government is the primary tier of government that interacts with foreign investors and companies. Federal government ministries, such as the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, regulate the political and economic environment for foreign investors and companies. At the micro level, the state governments are an important aspect of doing business in Nigeria. The state governments have a role in promoting investment and trade in their respective states, and can work in a close cooperative relationship with the federal government to achieve these promotions. State governments are relatively powerful actors in their own right, overseeing budgets and services that are larger than some African countries. They derive their revenues from a variety of sources, one of which is a distribution from the Federation Account, the mechanism that receives revenues owed to the federal government, and then disburses those revenues to the federal government, the state governments and the LGAs. Of revenues collected in the Federation Account, 56% are disbursed to the federal government, 24% are disbursed to the 36 states, and 20% are disbursed to the 749 LGAs. The disbursement amounts vary by state and LGA and depend on a series of variables including population, social development level (which in turn is defined by levels of 9 education, health and water services achieved), landmass and terrain, and efforts at generating its own revenues. There is an initial portion each unit receives equally before the additional variables are calculated to determine the final disbursement amount each state and LGA unit will receive. The LGAs are not critical government actors in terms of decision making that impacts foreign investors and companies. LGAs can play both a supportive role and an obstructive role. LGAs play a role in assisting the federal and state governments in managing issues at the grassroots level, and are essentially political bodies aimed at managing the populations spread out around the country. This is not an insignificant exercise, as Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country and managing the expectations and needs of 150 million people is no small task. One federal government comprised of some forty ministries will struggle to deliver government goods and services down to the street level. A foreign investor and business in the agricultural sector would need to develop an approach that combines elements and inputs from all three levels of the Nigerian government. It would need to work with the federal government on a macro level, particularly the Ministry of Commerce and Industry that oversees agriculture, to negotiate terms of investment to include incentives and subsidies. The state governments will be important partners in the selection and improvements to estate-sized plantations, if that is the interest of a foreign investor. Working with LGAs would be appropriate to negotiate supplies of the raw product from small-scale farmers. Are There any “Protected” Industries? The only legally protected industries that are off-limits to foreign investment are businesses involved in producing military or paramilitary equipment or attire, or businesses involved in the production of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances. Separately, there are restrictions imposed by the Nigerian government on a number of imported and exported goods. Of noteworthy interest are finished or refined products such as refined vegetable oils (bulk quantities of oils are not prohibited) and bagged cement (bulk quantities of cement are not prohibited). 10 These restrictions are aimed to aid the development of local, value-added industries. Tariffs are typically highest on finished as opposed to unfinished products (for example, refined versus raw sugar). The Nigerian government encourages the import of baseline inputs or unfinished goods that in turn can be used to enable local value-added production, and the government will provide incentives and subsidies in these areas. Despite legal prohibitions, there is extensive smuggling in Nigeria, across land borders and through its seaports. Practically any item can be smuggled, whether to take advantage of a tariff regime differential between Nigeria and a neighboring country or to take advantage of supply distortions in Nigeria or another country. Prohibited Imports Include: -live or dead birds including frozen poultry -pork and beef -bird eggs -refined vegetable oils and fats excluding linseed, castor, olive oils and crude vegetable oils -cocoa butter, powder and cakes -spaghetti noodles -fruit juice in retail packs -waters, including mineral waters and aerated waters containing sugar or sweetening matter, excluding energy or health drinks -bagged cement -a variety of medicaments -waste pharmaceuticals -soaps and detergents -mosquito repellent coils 11 -plastics sanitary wares excluding baby feeding bottles -rethreaded and used vehicle tires (except certain large sized tires for used trucks) -corrugated paper and paper boards -telephone recharge cards and vouchers -textile fabrics except lace, Georges and embroidered fabrics -shoes and bags except safety shoes, sports shoes, canvass shoes -hollow glass bottles exceeding 150ml capacity -used compressors -used vehicles older than 15 years from the year of manufacture -furniture except baby walkers, scientific and manufacturing equipment -ball point pens -air pistols -airmail photographic printing paper -counterfeit and pirated materials including coin -beans of an inflammable celluloid or similar substance -blank invoices -coupons for foreign football pools or other betting -cowries -exhausted (used) tea -implements to reload cartridges -indecent or obscene materials -manilas -white phosphorous matches -materials of any sort likely to create a breach of peace or to offend religious views in Nigeria 12 -meat, vegetables unfit for human consumption -goods or textiles bearing descriptions of the Koran -pistols in any form -second hand clothing -coins of not legal tender in Nigeria -nuclear waste -alcoholic spirits with exceptions -weapons that can discharge noxious liquids or gas or similar Prohibited Exports Include: -maize -timber (rough or sawn) -raw hides and skin -scrap metal -unprocessed rubber latex and rubber lumps -artifacts and antiques -endangered wildlife -all goods imported The Sugar, Vegetable Oil, and Grain Industries The Sugar Industry The Nigerian government has a goal of becoming 70% self-sufficient in the supply of refined sugar. It is trying to achieve this by several means including adopting a national sugar policy, which led to the creation of the National Sugar Development Council, 13 falling under the authority of the Ministry for Commerce and Industry, and implementing a 20% tariff (in addition to other duties and taxies) on imported refined sugar and a 5% tariff on imported raw sugar. An estimated 1.4 million tons of unrefined (raw) sugar is imported yearly, mostly from Brazil. Household consumption of sugar in Nigeria is estimated at 1.3 million tons per year and is growing due to population growth and industrial demand growth. The government is encouraging investment in the domestic sugar industry in general as well as its refining component. Sugar industry incentives available from the Nigerian government include infrastructure support such as roads, electricity and water supply; no foreign ownership restrictions; low to zero duties in equipment and chemicals used in the industry, and credit support to sugarcane farmers. There are four main sugar companies in Nigeria. These include the Dangote Sugar Refinery (which includes the Savannah Sugar Company it initially bought and operated separately, then later absorbed), the Josepdam Sugar Company (which bought the previous Nigeria Sugar Company) and BUA Sugar Refinery (which bought the defunct Lafiaji Sugar Company). The fourth, FMN, bought the Sunti Sugar Company in Niger state in 2009. It now operates as the Golden Sugar Company Ltd. Domestic sugarcane production is limited but the federal government is encouraging its development. Estimates of raw sugar production are 60,000 tonnes per year, all of which is operated by Dangote Group. Dangote-owned plantation fields operated by its unit Savannah Sugar Ltd. comprise an estimated 6,700 hectares. Another FMN rival, BUA Group, aims to establish domestic sugarcane production by rehabilitating plantations it acquired when it bought the former state-owned Lafiaji Sugar Company Ltd. States conducive to sugarcane farming include Taraba, Niger, Kogi and Kwara states. Estimates of domestic sugar milling capacity range are 1.2 million metric tons (MT) per year. Dangote has an existing mill factory capacity of 100,000 MT and is adding a new factory with a projected capacity of 800,000 MT. Small-scale operators fulfill the rest of milling capacity. 14 Dangote has a sugar refinery complex at the Apapa port in Lagos with a capacity estimated at 1.44 million MT per year. Dangote aims to expand its refining capacity at Apapa to 2.5 million MT. BUA Sugar Refinery has a capacity of approximately 650,000 MT per year, and it aims to boost this to 1 million MT per year. FMN proposed plans in November 2010 to build a sugar refinery in Lagos with a capacity of 750,000 MT. At the same time it would develop a 37,000-acre (15,000 hectare) sugar plantation in the country. The Vegetable Oil Industry A variety of vegetable oils are produced in Nigeria: cotton seed, soya bean, groundnut, palm and palm kernel oils. Palm oil dominates the market. It is the largest locally produced vegetable oil, with approximately half of the overall oils market, followed by groundnut oil. Oil palm cultivation is especially conducive in the country’s South-South and South-East regions. Demand for vegetable oils is estimated at approximately 1.6 million metric tons (MT) per year. Local production is estimated to total approximately 1.3 million MT per year, of which palm oil contributes about 750,000 MT. Vegetable oils are imported from a small number of foreign countries, particularly from East Asia (notably Indonesia and Malaysia) and South America. There is also a robust black market in smuggled vegetable oils from neighboring African countries. Palm oil is the largest vegetable oil import, worth approximately 250,000 MT per year. There is a government ban on the import of refined vegetable cooking oil, but enforcing this ban is a challenge for the government. Production of oil palms in Nigeria is largely done at the small holder and grown-in-thewild basis. Farming on small plots ranging in size from one to five hectares, and when added to oil palms cultivated from wild groves, these farmers generate output from about 15 96% of the hectarage under oil palm in Nigeria. Large-scale plantation estates farm approximately 100,000 hectares in Nigeria. A STRATFOR source states that oil palm industry development especially in the South-East states of Akwa Ibom and Cross Rivers would receive prominent government attention. The Grain Industry Wheat, rice, sorghum, and corn are produced in Nigeria, and the goal of the Nigerian government is to promote self-sufficiency in food production and are encouraging foreign investment. Grains in Nigeria are mostly grown in northern states of the country, contrary to oil palms. Nigeria is a significant market for wheat flour to fulfill demand for bread, cookies, noodles and pasta. The U.S. is Nigeria’s top supplier of wheat, supplying 3.5 million tons, almost 90% of the import market in the country. Total imports are estimated at around 4 million tons per year. Local production of wheat in Nigeria is estimated at 100,000 tons, and is grown commercially under irrigation schemes in a handful of states in northern Nigeria. Milling capacity in Nigeria is estimated at 6.5 million tons, while capacity utilization is estimated at about 60%. FMN is reported to be the market leader by capacity, but, like in the other agriculture sectors, its rivals are Dangote Group, BUA, and Honeywell. Nigeria also exports some wheat flour to neighboring African countries. An estimated 400,000 MT of wheat flour is exported to neighboring countries from production facilities in Nigeria. Most Nigerian flour mills are located in Lagos or Port Harcourt. Wheat flour (finished product) and cookie imports are not banned but face sizeable tariffs. 16 Nigerian corn output is approximately 9 million tons per year. Nigerians are significant consumers of corn as a basic food staple, and poultry producers also use corn for feed purposes (demand for poultry feed is approximately 1.2 million tons per year, with the balance of domestic production for human consumption purposes). Nigerian corn imports are relatively small at about 100,000 tons per year, and these supplies are mostly imported from neighboring African countries. Sorghum is produced in northern Nigeria and is used in the brewery industry. Production is estimated at approximately 6.7 million tons per year and practically all is domestically produced. Nigeria is a significant importer of rice. Domestic rice production is estimated at approximately 2.6 million tons, out of a total demand of an estimated 4.5 million tons per year. Government initiatives are encouraging the expansion of the rice sector to 6 million tons per year. Rice imports are estimated at 1.9 million tons per year. U.S. rice exports to Nigeria are relatively small, at some 52,000 tons per year. There is a higher tariff (30%) regime for milled rice than there is for seed, paddy and brown rice (5%). The lower tariff on unmilled rice is to encourage local milling industry. There are several millers in Nigeria who obtain rice inputs from growers in the country as well as from import supplies. Overall Assessment of the Future of Nigeria Jonathan will serve as president of Nigeria until 2015. During his campaign he promised to serve just one term, motivated to reduce tensions and hostilities to his campaign be because of the controversy it generated when he succeeded Yaradua as president and disrupted the zone (power rotation) agreement. 17 Political calculations are already being made in Nigeria as to who will succeed Jonathan in 2015. The frontrunner at this point will be Jonathan’s vice president, Namadi Sambo, a Muslim from Kaduna state in the North-West region. Sambo will look to serve as president for the terms in 2015-2019 and 2019-2023. While the northerner elite might have been cut short during the 2007-2011 term in their control of the presidency, with the death of Yaradua, in the medium term northerner elite will have more years in the presidency. Had Yaradua served the remainder of the 2007-2011 and 2011-2015 terms, the presidency in 2015 would have been expected to be zoned to the South-East region. For whatever concerns the North had with Jonathan’s ascendancy into the presidency, this region of Nigeria can look forward to recovering Nigeria’s top political prize for the 2015-2023 terms. To compensate the South-East region for the likely loss of the 2015 presidential term, the Jonathan government and ruling PDP party have already reached out to the elite from this region. The top government and party positions are the presidency, the vice presidency, the Senate president, the Speaker of the House, the PDP National Chairman, the Secretary to the Government of the Federation (SGF), and the Deputy Senate president. There is a proposal that the South-East will be zoned for three of these positions, the National Chairman, the SGF, and the Deputy Senate president. Jonathan will oversee a couple of significant ministries during his presidency, as a way to try to ensure reforms are actually carried out. Jonathan will oversee the power (electricity generation) ministry, and Jonathan will also chair the government’s National Economic Council. Jonathan is staking his name on being able to bring about necessary reforms, and he is aided by a new generation of leaders and politicians who did not come from the old guard of military elite. The Jonathan government hopes that these reforms will help propel Nigeria into becoming a top 20 global economy by 2020. The oil sector will likely see fresh investment and thanks to stability among the militants, production could rise from a current output level of some 2.3 million barrels per day to closer to its installed capacity of some 3.5 million bpd. It will need to hit this target as well as its local industry targets and reforms to achieve that political goal of being a top 20 global economy. 18 Internationally, Nigeria is always interested to boost its presence. It is currently serving a two-year term as a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council (UNSC). It would likely aim to win a permanent seat on the UNSC if the permanent membership on the council ever expands although it would have to compete with South Africa, Nigeria’s top rival for influence in Sub Saharan Africa. 19