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J After structure: Expression in built form S S Frederik Weissenborn Space Syntax Laboratory, The Bartlett School of Architecture University College London (UCL) Pages: 34-48 open syntaxes Image: AdHoCities © Athanasios Bampanelos The Journal of Space Syntax ISSN: 2044-7507 Year: http://joss.bartlett.ucl.ac.uk 2015 volume: 6 issue: 1 Online Publication Date: 26 October 2015 J O S S After structure: Expression in built form Frederik Weissenborn Space Syntax Laboratory, The Bartlett School of Architecture University College London (UCL) The concept of the ‘inverted genotype’ occupies an important place in the space syntax literature. Since its conception, however, this has been associated with a particular structuralist reading which - inasmuch as it contradicts central structuralist principles - is problematic. This paper puts forward a different reading of the inverted genotype, drawing on the expressive philosophy of Baruch Spinoza. It advances an expressionist approach to the problem of built form, effectively shifting from a structuralist towards a Spinozist perspective. Keywords: Typology, space syntax, inverted genotype, minimal initial system, expression. Introduction: The dual problem of morphology Architectural typology - the exercise of identifying, and so one needs an understanding of the latter analysing and taxonomising architectural form - is to comprehend the former. This is a principle that arguably one of the most important analytical tra- is shared by all morphological enquiries. However, jectories within the field of architecture. At its most the actual forces involved in the morphogenetic basic, the typological enquiry may be character- process vary greatly from field to field. Comparing ised as an attempt to devise a method for defining morphogenesis in biology with morphogenesis and classifying architectural form. The logic of this in architecture, for instance, one soon realises operation is to discern a set of more or less homolo- that these phenomena express entirely different gous (structurally similar) properties across a given morphogenetic logics. Whereas the scientist ana- sample of spatial arrangements, whether buildings, lysing a biological form may pursue the question compounds or cities. In this sense, the typological of formation via notions of genetics, lineage and analysis of architectural form may be seen as part environment, these concepts seem maladjusted of a wider exploration of ‘morphology’; the latter when transposed to architecture. The architectural being an umbrella term for enquiries analysing theoretician therefore must approach the question homologous properties in a range of phenomena of morphogenesis from a different angle. including botanical, biological, and artefactual One popular way of exploring architectural forms. The morphological enquiry turns on two morphogenesis is via sociologically or anthropo- fundamental problems: that of morphoanalysis and logically informed enquiries. Here, the imprints of that of morphogenesis. The former concerns the society are sought out in the structural makeup problem of identification in form and relates to the of a given spatial reality. Enquiries of this nature static properties particular to a given form. The latter tend to follow the procedures made popular in concerns the problem of formal ontogenesis, and the structural anthropology of Levi-Strauss (1963), therefore relates to the dynamic processes involved their concern with ‘society’ giving their analyses a in the production of forms. characteristically anthropocentric focus. Compared Whilst analytically discernible, the two problem- to the merits of biological analogy, such anthropo- atics are fundamentally interrelated. The question centric approaches appear to suit the architectural of form inevitably begs the question of formation enquiry well. Architectural form after all constitutes 34 J O S S After structure Weissenborn, F. a kind of artefact, and artefacts are by definition draw on the work of Hillier and Hanson on architec- human-made, so exploring the morphogenetic tural form and space syntax, reading this alongside logics of the architectural artefact through the lens the modal philosophy of Dutch philosopher, Baruch of society would seem to make sense. However, a Spinoza. The point of the exercise is to highlight a case may be made that the problem of architectural compatibility between these philosophies as re- morphogenesis is somewhat more complex than gards form and formation, and to thereby exhume that, and that crucial nuances concerning the logic a more suitable conceptualisation of architectural of architectural form are overlooked when adopting morphogenesis to that deployed in structuralism. this approach. This aim informs the structure of the paper which is The problems derive from the assumption divided into three major parts. The first part provides that the finished architectural entity be defined in an overview and critique of structural anthropol- accordance with some abstractly defined and on- ogy and space syntax’s relation to it. The second tologically anterior social template. This effectively discusses the key notions of Spinozism and their takes away any inherent principles of formation relevance to the question of form and formation. from the architectural artefact itself, reducing it, as Lastly, the third part discusses the overlaps between it were, to the reification of a form that precedes and the two theories and notes some implications for is foreign to it. The architectural artefact thus merely current space syntax research. represents the culture from which it is believed to be Central to the analysis is the syntactical concept derived, thereby expressing no logic of its own. For of ‘the inverted genotype’. This is a concept that the analysis of cities, this quickly reveals itself as Hillier and Hanson (1984) deploy against the models unsatisfactory. Cities constitute a group of artefacts of structural anthropology; it therefore constitutes whose morphogenetic process typically unfolds a useful starting point for the enquiry that this over centuries. Their form furthermore is rarely due paper carries out. The inverted genotype is often to a single recognised designer or artificer but the deployed on its own, but this paper will argue that result of a communal effort. One could, therefore, at least three other concepts must be introduced expect an individual city to be defined more or to adequately understand it. These include the less exclusively by the culture that it derives from. notions of ‘the minimal initial system’, ‘description Yet, as space syntax research shows, this is only retrieval’ and ‘morphic languages’. Taken together, rarely the case. In fact, a disproportionally large this group of concepts – which the paper will refer number of cities appear to converge towards to as ‘the genotype doctrine’ – presents a model for a similar formal principle irrespective of culture theorising form and formation that the paper finds (Hillier, 1996, p.262-264). Such empirical findings reminiscent of the modal philosophy of Spinoza. It indicate an insufficiency in anthropocentric models thus forms a crucial bridge between the critical first and provide evidence in support of the existence part of the paper and its model-building second of some inherent drive or principle operating within and third parts. the architectural entity. This paper outlines a model that aspires to de- 35 The problem with structuralism scribe the problem of architectural morphogenesis The relationship between anthropological structur- in more satisfactory terms. Providing a philosophical alism and space syntax is a vexed one, with Hillier rather than an anthropological perspective on the and Hanson sometimes critiquing structuralism, question of architectural form and formation, it will sometimes appearing to endorse it. The structuralist J The Journal of Space Syntax O S S Volume 6 • Issue 1 principle that interests Hillier and Hanson is that ac- architectural entities are not necessarily devoid of cording to which the architectural entity may be said formal order. Indeed, some of these seem to con- to be informed by a prior anthropological blueprint, verge towards structurally similar forms without such or rule. They are obviously interested in circumvent- forms being grounded in a representationalist order; ing this principle, but before doing so, acknowledge see for instance, the discussions of configurational its explanatory value in certain, limited cases. These forms such as ‘the beady ring’ and the ‘deformed are cases where the spatial form may reasonably wheel’ (Hillier and Hanson, 1984, p.10; Hillier, 1996, be said to be defined more or less completely by p.262-282). This suggests a different process of an anterior social principle. To support this argu- morphogenesis to that imagined by structuralist ment Hillier and Hanson discuss the compound of anthropologists. Far from being imposed on the ar- the Bororo community – an Amerindian tribe that is chitectural artefact in a top-down manner, these are also the subject of a famous study by Levi-Strauss structures that grow into their morphological shape (1974) – finding the morphology of this compound by following certain ‘laws’ particular to the architec- to be a reflection of the complex social relations tural reality itself. ‘In some cases’, write Hillier and entrenched in the community (Hillier and Hanson, Hanson, ‘the question as to why a particular society 1984, p.213-222). adopts a particular settlement form is answered not This, then, is a spatial arrangement designed to in terms of some social or economic function, but express or rather reflect a prior social order. To the by saying that, given some initial conditions and a extent that its morphology is expressive of anything, consistent process of aggregation, the settlement it is therefore of an anterior anthropological principle; form is a product of autonomous spatial laws, not one that is detached from the architectural reality of human determination’ (Hillier and Hanson, 1984, that it is thought to impose itself upon. The problem p.200; emphasis added). This is an altogether differ- with the structuralist explanation arises when, leav- ent design principle to that proposed by structural ing such special cases aside, other architectural anthropology. It evokes an autopoietic principle artefacts are investigated. As Hillier and Hanson operating within the architectural entity itself rather point out, only in a few architectural arrangements than the imposition of a prior rule or form, and as may a clear and distinct representational principle such, it constitutes a completely different way of of the kind structuralist anthropology evokes be conceptualising the formation of the architectural discerned. Indeed, architectural artefacts seem artefact. to be distributed within a much wider spectrum of Hillier and Hanson’s critique of structuralism spatial solutions – one which ranges from the rep- hinges on its evocation of what might be termed a resentational to the non-representational – with the ‘cookie-cutter approach’ to morphogenesis, i.e. of particular instance of the Bororo compound being abstract structures determining in a ‘mechanical’ a case of extreme and statistically insignificant rep- way the morphological reality of the architectural resentationalism. As one departs further from this entity. Their solution, however, is not to discard representational end of the spectrum, it becomes structuralism but to find within structuralism another increasingly difficult to find a clearly defined prior principle of formal organisation that better tallies with design principle, and explaining spatial arrange- their findings. In so doing the authors take inspira- ments as direct reflections of society therefore tion from Levi-Strauss’ account of ‘mechanical’ and becomes untenable. ‘statistical’ systems; two archetypical forms of social It is important to note that non-representational morphogenesis found to operate in marital systems 36 J O S S After structure Weissenborn, F. Notes: (Hillier and Hanson, 1984, p. 202-206)1. They em- the notion of the inverted genotype and what this 1 ploy these two kinds of systems – of which one is paper refers to as ‘the genotype doctrine’, i.e. the constituted by a linear and identitarian principle of network of concepts formed by this concept with formation, whilst the other is constituted by a more the notions of the minimal initial system, description open-ended and non-linear principle – in what might retrieval and morphic language. The concept of the be seen as an attempt to reinvent structural anthro- inverted genotype designates a deep morphologi- pology from within. Their method is to first seize the cal tendency (or shape) in which a series of individu- stochastic principle of morphogenesis originally als participate. It is this relationship between deep developed with respect to social structures, then archetype and individual instance that leads Hillier transpose it to the discussion of structure in architec- and Hanson to the problematic territory of biologi- tural form. It is however less certain whether such a cal analogy, i.e. that the morphological tendency transposition is in fact compliant with the principles is a ‘genotype’ and the individual manifestation its of structural anthropology. If structural anthropology ‘phenotype’ (see Steadman, 1982, for a critique asserts a certain principle of stochasticity operating of biological analogy in architecture) 3. Unlike the within the genesis of marital relations, it crucially genotypes theorised in biology, however, the formal does not extend this to the world of material things. principle that Hillier and Hanson have in mind is not This omission has to do with the relationship that internal to the architectural object, at least not in the exists between social fact and artefact – between sense that a string of DNA may be said to be internal society and its material reifications – in structuralism. to a cell in the biological body. Neither, however, is it One of the fundamental tenets of the structuralist located on the outside of the object; if that were the model is that social fact and artefact stand in an case the explanatory models of structural anthropol- asymmetrical relationship to each other; the former ogy would be valid.4 Their original resolution to the inscribing itself, as it were, in the latter2. It is therefore problem points to a non-hereditary kind of internal not dynamical conditions or non-linearity that are principle; one that emerges from an ‘outside’ and foreign to structural anthropology, but the very idea is then internalised in an ‘inside’. See also Hillier (1996, chapter 7). 2 Hillier and Hanson (1984, p.203-205) themselves discuss this – see in particular their section on ‘abstract materialism’ – but without drawing the necessary conclusions. 3 See also Bafna (2012), Griffiths (2011) and Hanna (2011) for contrasting theoretical considerations of the syntactical concepts of genotype and inverted genotype. 4 Hillier in fact disavows such ‘Lamarckian’ design principles on numerous occasions (e.g. Hillier and Leaman, 1973, p.507; Hillier, 1996, p.297-301). of extending these principles to non-anthropic enti- This ‘outside-to-inside’ process may only be ties. It follows that if an open-ended and dynamic explained when comprehending the notion of the principle may be introduced by structural anthropol- genotype alongside a series of other concepts with ogy in the realm of social relations, it cannot simply which it makes up a shared proposition or doctrine. be extended to artefacts since to do so necessarily The first of these is the notion of ‘morphic languages’ undermines this asymmetrical relationship. (Hillier et al., 1976, p.149-153; Hillier and Hanson, 1984, p.45-49); a concept which designates a 37 The genotype doctrine: Morphic languages, minimal initial systems and the open-ended exploration of spatial realities group of languages characterised by their more or If the reworked structuralist model deployed by passes any kind of system where such patterns Hillier and Hanson is contradictory, can another may be discerned. A morphic language thus may theoretical principle be found which better explains be a particular structure of social relationships, but the manifestation and perpetuation of formal order in it also may be a particular pattern of spatial rela- non-representational architectural entities? Answer- tions. The broadness of the notion may be seen as ing this question demands taking a closer look at problematic, but it also points to a crucial element less discernible structural or ‘syntactic’ patterns. The term is quite generic, and effectively encom- J The Journal of Space Syntax O S S Volume 6 • Issue 1 in space syntax theory inasmuch as it reflects the The concepts of the minimal initial system, the fundamental syntactic conjecture that society is morphic language and description retrieval make spatial just as (architectural) space is social. It there- up the preconditions for the establishment of the fore designates the common ground that society architectural genotype. Taken together, they define and space must be able to pass through in order a process of formation in which forms emerge spon- for space to have a social logic and vice versa. Sig- taneously from the stochastic encounters of bodies nificantly, morphic languages are of such a nature and are then selected or ignored by a given social that they may be ‘retrieved’ from a particular con- group. In this way, the desired movement from a figurational reality and then reinvested in another. preformal outside to a formal-architectural inside This process – known as ‘description retrieval’ – is is achieved in a manner that bypasses anthropo- important insofar as it allows a given pattern to be centric models of representation. Unlike structural- retrieved, redeployed and perpetuated thereby ism, where forms radiate from a social to a spatial engendering a new type. Description retrieval thus reality, the genotype doctrine thus affirms a kind of facilitates the movement from experimental pheno- expressive tendency inherent to the architectural type to obdurate genotype. reality itself. Space, as Hillier and Hanson write, is Morphic languages must not be thought of as not ‘a by-product of something else whose exist- representing a particular idea or form that comes ence is anterior to [...] and determinate of it’ (Hillier before them. Rather, they are emergent phenomena and Hanson, 1984, p.5; emphasis added). Rather, that constitute that particular reality. They therefore it is a profoundly productive material state-of-affairs draw on no prior model, expressing instead a series which carries within itself the principles of formal of material events whose otherwise heterogenous genesis, thereby making building types something logics they subsume and bring to order (if only mo- else and something more than the docile recipients mentarily). Such an emergent logic may be more or of a structural form. Crucially, the genotype doctrine less rule-bound, but according to Hillier and Hanson is no marriage structure. It is a morphic structure, a is ultimately guaranteed by a random process of concept that extends to both social and artefactual aggregation and subtraction operating from no prior reality while privileging neither. As such, it concerns guiding principle. This ‘random, ongoing process’ a problematic much wider in scope than the struc- (Hillier and Hanson, 1984, p.205) – sometimes re- turalist enquiry may support. ferred to as ‘the minimum setup’ (Hillier et al., 1976, p.150), sometimes as ‘the minimal initial system’ The question of form and matter in space syntax (Hillier and Hanson, 1984, p.49) – is imagined as This characterisation of architectural morpho- a pure state of formation in which material bodies genesis as the spontaneous emergence of form (both human and architectural) collide, with tentative from an open-ended process of formation opens formal arrangements arising from these collisions. a second front for space syntax: namely against The minimal initial system is, in this sense, a driver of end-governed design-principles. Such principles formal genesis even if the forms that it produces are are primarily known from Aristotle – and it is exclu- only solidified at a later stage, namely in the constitu- sively his formal philosophy that is discussed by tion and reproduction of a genotype. In this sense space syntax (cf. Hillier et al., 1976, p.151; Hillier it is likeable to an ideal ‘preformal state’ in which and Hanson, 1984, p.205-206; and Hillier, 1996, the random collision of bodies is the norm and the chapter 10) – yet the principle of end-governed emergence of metastable patterns the exception. creation is an integral part of the whole peripatetic 38 J O S S After structure Weissenborn, F. 39 tradition stretching from Aristotle via the Neoplaton- rationale behind it seems to be that the principle ists to medieval scholasticism. If end-governedness constitutes a kind of causal-mechanical interac- or ‘teleology’ forms a crucial counterpoint to the tion that is compatible with the design principle doctrine of the inverted genotype it is because it described by the genotype doctrine because it is invokes an ontology in which things strive towards not grounded in either a substantial form or a final a predetermined end – for example, the way the principle. Newton’s universe thus is not governed acorn strives for its realisation in a tree, or Man for by ends – i.e. metaphysical goals or purposes – coexistence in society – with this end effectively but by mechanical movement and the stochastic guiding the formation of the thing. The ‘end’, then, encounters to which these may give rise. is a dynamic but also immutable principle driving There are, however, at least two problems with individuation. Devoid of a principle of formal experi- using Newtonian inertia as a model for the design mentation, it invokes a ‘final cause’ that guides the principle that Hillier has in mind. Firstly, it is never ontogenetic process the way a blueprint guides a explained how the concept of inertia – a principle builder. Whilst a certain level of material efficacy is of movement – may be translated into a principle acknowledged in this process – a tree for instance of formation or design. At a push, mechanical col- cannot grow where there is no sun, or where the lisions may be employed in explaining the momen- soil is not fertile – it is as a reactive rather than ac- tary emergence of a form but this cannot explain tive principle. This demotes the efficacy of material its perpetuation over time. The principle of inertia causes, and the genera and species that Aristotle might thus explain how a given form materialises discusses are therefore locked in rigid schemas of from the random material collision of a series of development determined by their final causes (e.g. bodies at a time, t1, but not how this form retains its Aristotle, 1984, p.338-358). shape from t1 to t2 . In order to explain this, it would It is easy to see why space syntax finds itself in be necessary to introduce an emergent ordering opposition to this ontology. Aristotelian teleology is principle that could compel the different bodies to fundamentally incompatible with the open-ended retain the global shape over time, thereby bestowing process of the minimal initial system which, for its on the form a principle of endurance. It is effectively part, explores a principle of formation closer in logic the emergence of such an ordering principle that to those found in various ‘materialist’ enquiries, characterises the movement from outside to inside e.g. the materialist philosophy of ancient Atomists described earlier, yet one searches in vain for such (e.g. Lucretius, 2007), the expressive philosophy a principle in the Principia. What is more, Newton’s of Spinoza (1996) and the more recent philosophy discussion of the problem of design surely would of difference associated with Gilles Deleuze (1968) disappoint Hillier. A ‘Natural Philosopher’, Newton and Gilbert Simondon (1964). It would have been subscribes to a deist cosmology which ultimately interesting if space syntax had drawn on these phi- sees the order of the universe guaranteed by a losophies in contextualising the genotype doctrine, divine and benevolent agent (see for instance his but Hillier prefers a much less obvious source of in- correspondence with Bentley (1756)). This squares spiration: Newtonian physics, more specifically, the rather awkwardly with Hillier’s random genesis of principle of inertia (Hillier et al., 1976, p.151; Hillier form and his disavowal of the ‘unmoved mover’ and Hanson, 1984, p.205; Hillier, 1996, p.296-305). evoked by Aristotle (Hillier, 1996, p.294-297). Sec- This is an odd choice seeing as the principle of ondly, it is uncertain why the principle of inertia is inertia concerns movement rather than form. The deemed to be better suited for the job than other J The Journal of Space Syntax O S S Volume 6 • Issue 1 similar principles. Newton, in fact, is not the first resolution exists to this problem and that it is to be Notes: to describe a universe of mechanical collisions. A found in the writings of Spinoza. 5 whole series of philosophers and scientists pre- More specifically, it will try to show that the in- dating him have described similar scenarios – in verted genotype may be likened to a ‘mode’ in the physics: Buridan, Benedetti, Kepler, Galileo; in Spinozist sense of the term, and that the particular philosophy: Democritus, Epicurus, Lucretius – yet form of modal individuation that Spinoza discusses these are neither mentioned nor discussed by Hillier. in Parts I and II of the Ethics5 offers a satisfactory model for the description of the movement from Spinozism and architectural form: The genotype as mode outside (minimal initial system) to inside (genotype) Taking stock of the theoretical landscape in which these points, the paper will first have to introduce the genotype doctrine is situated, several paradoxes and mobilise certain key terms from the Spinozist thus emerge. There is the paradox of the designa- lexicon – substance, attributes, modes – even if tion itself, with the principle stipulated by the doc- such an introduction can only be cursory. This is trine in fact going against the biological definition of a necessary exercise as it is impossible to under- genotypes. There is then the unsatisfactory discus- stand modal individuation without first grasping sion that space syntax engages in with structuralism how substance relates to the attributes and the and the meagre results that this engagement yields. attributes to the modes. Only once the relationship Lastly, there is the problem of defining a credible between these concepts has been defined can the anti-Aristotelian position; one which may account paper establish in more detail their relevance to the for the emergence and perpetuation of forms from particular problem of form and formation. This task mechanical encounters. It is clear that what Hillier is undertaken in the sections that follow. that the genotype doctrine implies. In order to make and Hanson have in mind is a formal principle that ing random process. ‘Without the anteriority of an De Deo: From the infinite power of God or Nature to the partial power of his modal expressions unordered reality,’ they write, ‘we would be forced The first part of the Ethics is entitled de Deo. It into an Aristotelian stance, assuming as natural that discusses God – an infinitely powerful being that which needs to be explained’ (Hillier and Hanson, Spinoza equates with ‘substance’ (EId6; EIp11) 1984, p.205). But the claim that the principle of – and prepares the ground for the detailed ex- inertia ‘allows a formal theory to emerge unencum- plication of modal individuation and interaction bered by the metaphysics of ultimate causes and that follows in the subsequent parts. Substance is unmoved movers’ (Hillier and Hanson, 1984, p.205) characterised by its uniqueness (there can only be is unconvincing. one substance), its absolute infinity, and its eternal can describe the emergence of forms from an ongo- Ultimately, this is the central problematic around nature (EIp11-14). Significantly, substance also which the whole of the genotype doctrine turns: how exists necessarily (EIp11dem; EIp17corol1), which can the process of formation give rise to certain is to say that it cannot be created or extinguished forms without taking these forms away from the by any other thing (EIp6). As nothing can cause random variations of the minimal initial system? substance to exist or to cease existing, it is said that How can one have both formal variation and per- the essence of substance involves existence (EIp7; petuation, difference and repetition, without the one EIp7dem). This being so, substance must be the compromising the other? This paper believes that a cause of itself or causa sui (EId1), and it therefore is The Ethics consists of five parts, each divided into ‘Definitions’, ’Axioms’, ‘Propositions’, ‘Demonstrations’, ‘Corollaries’ and ‘Scholia’. In what follows, I will reference the various sections of the Ethics using the format followed by most Spinoza scholars. This format first identifies the part of the Ethics under consideration by adding a roman numeral to the letter ‘E’ (e.g. ‘EI’ for Part I; ‘EII’ for Part II, etc.). Following this, the Definition/ Axiom/Proposition is identified with a non-capitalised letter along with an arabic numeral (e.g. ‘d1’ for definition 1; ‘a2’ for axiom 2; ‘p15’ for proposition 15, etc.). An accompanying Demonstration/Corollary/Scholium may sometimes also be referenced. When this is the case, it is identified with a non-capitalised abbreviation and an arabic numeral (e.g. ‘dem1’ for demonstration 1; ‘schol2’ for scholium 2, etc.). To the extent that Spinoza’s correspondence is referenced, it will be referenced as ‘Ep.’ with the number of the letter provided in roman numerals. Spinoza’s fourth letter (to Oldenburg) thus is referenced as ‘Ep. IV’. All citations and references from the Ethics are taken from Curley’s translation (Spinoza, 1996). All references to Spinoza’s letters are from Shirley’s translation (Spinoza, 2002). 40 J O S S After structure Weissenborn, F. Notes: understood to cause or produce itself. God’s ability perspectives. In this sense, a mode expressed in 6 The question of essential causality is a contentious issue in Spinozism. Spinoza in fact seems to contradict himself on the matter. From EIp21-23 it is clear that essences cannot stand in a causal relationship to each other. The same is affirmed in Spinoza’s letter to Schuller (Ep. LXIV). However, in EIIp9dem Spinoza states that ‘[…] the cause of one singular idea is another idea, or God, insofar as he is considered to be affected by another idea; and of this also [God is the cause], insofar as he is affected by another, and so on, to infinity, q.e.d.’ The demonstration underscores the parallelism between essential and corporeal reality but squares awkwardly with the characteristics of essential reality and represents something of an unresolved – even paradoxical – issue in Spinoza’s philosophy. This paper will maintain that essences do not sensu stricto stand in a causal relationship to each other. This is also the reading of Deleuze who asserts that ‘if all essences agree, this is just because they are not causes one of another, but all have God as their cause’ (Deleuze, 1968, p.194; emphasis added). to cause himself may be seen as an expression of the attribute of Extension (a body) will have a mode his infinite power (EIp11dem). Indeed, the essence that corresponds to it in the attribute of Thought (an of God, Spinoza writes at the end of de Deo, is essence), and indeed in every other attribute. Whilst identical to his power (EIp34). This has led some, the attributes express the same thing, the way they e.g. Matheron, to theorise Spinoza’s philosophy as express themselves – their modi operandi – differ 7 Note here that what Spinoza calls ‘the mind of God’ is caused just like everything else in Nature. The necessity of God’s production thus precedes his intellection. God produces before he understands. This is important as it prevents Spinozism from relapsing into a teleological discourse like the one found in Aristotelianism. See Gueroult (1968, p.269-85). 41 ‘an ontology of power’ (Matheron, 2000, p.197) and fundamentally. God thus produces differently in the notion of power is indeed central to the treatise. the different attributes. The attribute of Extension Above all, this power is a causal or productive expresses itself in an infinite causal chain where power and God or substance in a sense becomes extended bodies collide with and recoil from each a byword for pure productivity. Participating in God other; this is sometimes referred to as ‘the common or substance therefore means participating in an order of Nature’ (e.g. EIIp29corol). The attribute of ongoing process of production; a process which, Thought, on the other hand, is expressed in a non- according to Spinoza (Ep. XII), has no starting point causal noetic reality in which an infinity of thoughts or end point (it is an infinite series), something which are implicated with one another in what constitutes subverts the idea that God – or anything else – may the mind of God6. be a first mover. ‘All the things’, writes Gueroult, If an attribute is something that expresses God ‘are in God which is to say in a state of productive or substance in a distinct but nevertheless infinite causality [cause productrice]’ (Gueroult, 1968, way, the ‘finite modes’ express the power of God p.341; this author’s translation; cf. Carraud, 2002, in a finite and determinate form (EIId1; EIId7). The p.472-473; Lærke, 2008, p.642-650). limitation of its nature means that the mode is differ- Attributes express a particular and distinct as- ent to God or substance on several counts. Unlike pect of substance (EId6; EIp10schol). By EId6, there God or substance, the essence of a mode does not is an infinity of attributes, yet Man only has access to imply existence (EIp24). Existence therefore does phenomena unfolding in two of these: the attribute not pertain to the essence of the mode as it does to of Extension and the attribute of Thought. The latter substance. Rather, the mode must be determined expresses all the ‘thoughts’ in nature (the notion of into existence by another force. Ultimately, this thought referring to both a cognitive phenomenon determination comes from God or substance who and a modal essence) and outside of it there can is the principal (but not ‘primary’ in the aristotelian be no thoughts or essences; the attribute therefore sense) cause of all things (EIp16corrol.3). Yet the is said to be infinite in its own kind. Similarly, the at- way the mode is determined differs from attribute tribute of Extension expresses all bodies in nature, to attribute. A mode expressed by the attribute of as well designating a phenomenon infinite in its own Thought is determined immediately, that is, with- kind. Whilst the attributes are distinct, they explicate out a mediating cause. Substance simply causes or express the same thing: God’s power. For this it to appear in the infinite mind of God through a reason, the attributes may be said to express paral- process that involves no intermodal causation7. lel realities in which the power of God is explicated A mode expressed by the attribute of Extension, in distinct but corresponding ways, e.g. as bodies however, is very much involved in a causal reality. and thoughts. That the realities that they express are Unlike a thought, the existing mode is determined parallel simply means that the attributes explicate into existence by the infinite series of causal events the same cause from different but corresponding unfolding in the common order of Nature. It is thus J The Journal of Space Syntax O S S Volume 6 • Issue 1 brought into existence by another mode, which itself in the ‘little physics’ inserted in Part II of the Ethics, was brought into existence by another mode, and a body is characterised by a particular relationship so on to infinity (see EIp28). As such, it is produced of ‘movement and rest’ that it imposes on certain mediately – by way of an infinity of other extensive other bodies (EIIp13lemma1). This relationship modes – rather than immediately. corresponds to its essence insofar as it constitutes The means of production is not the only difference between the modes. Modal existences ‘that without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived’ (EIId2; emphasis added). or bodies ‘endure’ which is to say that they have An existing mode will aspire to express to the duration and are finite. More specifically, they are fullest extent possible its own essence as if it were engendered in the common order of Nature in which unaffected by other bodies. This, however, is not they exist until they are annihilated. Modal essences always possible. The existing mode is constantly are not involved in such a causal reality and thus brought into contact with other modes which influ- are characterised not by transience but by eternity ence and destabilise it. Insofar as such changes or ‘sempiternity’ (cf. Gueroult, 1968, p.309). to the mode are not brought about by its proper essence, they are qualified as ‘passions’, i.e. as Essence and existence: Thought, body and conatus something the mode must suffer. Broadly put, a Having provided a brief overview of the most passion designates an alteration of the relation- important concepts of the Ethics, it is necessary ship between modal essence and modal existence to further explicate the relationship between the brought on by a corporeal encounter. When two essential mode and the existing mode. As was just existing modes collide in the common order of Na- shown, the two are parallel – expressing the same ture their bodies may either agree or disagree with thing (God’s power) under different attributes – but each other. If the latter is the case, they will reject, how do they relate to each other? Spinoza explains impair or consume each other causing sadness in that essences are thoughts or ideas that an exist- the modes or outright annihilation. But a mode does ing mode or body has of its own being (EIIp13; not just suffer; it also has a capacity for rejoicing. EIIp13dem.; EIIp13schol.). Following the principle Joy occurs when the body manages to subsume of parallelism, one may say that an idea implies within itself other bodies, or when it manages to noetically what the body expresses corporeally. But engage in mutually beneficial relations with other this is still too abstract. A better way to conceptu- modes (IIP7). When the latter occurs, new modal alise the relationship is to reaffirm that the modal relationships are explored. When the former hap- thought is in fact an essence that corresponds to pens, the mode brings external bodies under its the modal body. More specifically, the essence or control, enslaving these according to a principle thought may be said to designate an abstract pat- that agrees with its proper nature or essence. The tern or structure [fabrica] that the body strives to mode may thus enslave other modes – something realise and stabilise in the common order of Nature. which amounts to exerting a kind of force or power Given that a body will be made up of other bodies, [vis] on its immediate surroundings. the essence of the body may thus be defined as The identification of essence and power points a particular relationship [ratio] between bodies. to a central truth in the philosophy of Spinoza, This resembles a morphological syntax of sorts, if one to which both mode and substance adhere. by ‘syntax’ one understands a particular relational An essence – whether substantial or modal – ex- state. This is an apt comparison. As Spinoza asserts presses a power, and more specifically, a power 42 J O S S After structure Weissenborn, F. of causation. In this there is no difference between derstand the different kinds of knowledge that the the essence of God and the essence of things and Ethics mobilises. In EIIp40schol.2, Spinoza defines Spinozism thus takes on a ‘fractal’ characteristic. three kinds of knowledge which he calls Imagination However, while substance cannot be caused by (knowledge of the first kind), Reason (knowledge anything but itself, the existing mode – submerged of the second kind) and Intuition (knowledge of the in the common order of Nature – can and is. In this third kind). As Deleuze has forcefully shown (1969, the two differ radically. What the essence of God p.273-288; 1988, p.54-58), it is in comprehending expresses is a necessary existence – a power that the relationship between these different kinds of is infinite and eternal. Conversely, what the modal knowledge that the modal affirmation of a new es- essence expresses is a power of existence that is sence (or ‘thought’) must be understood. not necessary and that is finite and transient. Its Imagination designates the cognitive outcome power, rather, designates a form of perseverance of the more or less random encounters that might (conatus) that pertains to the finite existing mode befall the existing mode, these encounters cor- as long as it endures in existence (EIIIp3-6). This responding to passions or ‘images’ in its mind. finite modal power might express little more than a Whether they provoke sadness or joy in the mode, small part of God’s infinite power and it might have such imaginations do not provide the mode with received the vital impulse that brought it into exist- an accurate comprehension of the mode that it ence from another mode (and ultimately from God). encounters, nor do they express its own essence But in the end its essence is its own. It is a power in a clear and distinct way. They therefore do not that derives from its own nature and it continues to constitute an adequate form of knowledge, either of order the bodies that it subsumes according to this the mode encountered or of the mode itself, and so nature as long as it endures. a more permanent relationship between the modes is excluded (by EIIp25; EIIp25dem; EIIp26corol.). 43 Beatitude: Modal individuation and the three kinds of knowledge Reason operates in a radically different way. It Modal power is thus central to the understanding principle – known as a ‘common notion’ [notione of the mode’s persistence in duration. But it is also communes] (EIIp37-40) – that these bodies may what enables the mode to engage in constructive agree in. One may think of the common notion as the encounters with other modes should their es- platform on which the premises for an ordered rela- sences agree. This second aspect of modal power tion can be tentatively established between modes. concerns not the perpetuation of already existing It thus constitutes a zone of modal experimentation. corporeal relationships but the spontaneous crea- A common notion may be simply that the two bodies tion of new ones. How does this occur? Perhaps agree in the fact that both are existing modes and surprisingly, the answer to this seemingly ontological therefore are i) extended things, and ii) subsume question is epistemological, that is to say, it involves within themselves other bodies. But a common different orders of knowledge. This in fact should notion also may be more specific, thereby making not be surprising inasmuch as the thing that is be- possible a less general (and more durable) kind of ing affirmed is a thought, yet the complexity of this agreement between the modes. When this is the phenomenon necessitates a closer examination. In case, the bodies will begin to adapt themselves to order to adequately comprehend the way a modal one another, thereby gradually entering into a rela- essence is affirmed in existence, one must first un- tion of composition which will be more or less stable establishes between bodies a common ground or J The Journal of Space Syntax O S S Volume 6 • Issue 1 depending on the agreement between the modes In this way, the transition from an external state to and other local variations in the common order of an internal state is facilitated. This is a beatific or joy- Nature. In this way, an embryonic form of modal ful moment, but the joy that the mode experiences relationality is explored. However, at this moment is not a passive joy as this may be experienced in it still is a matter of discrete bodies standing in an the passions. It is – to the extent that it ensures the external if beneficial relation to each other and so expression of a new mode – an active joy; one that an essential mode still is not actualised. proceeds from and corresponds to that mode’s es- The moment a new mode is actualised only sence or power. Crucially, such an active joy is not occurs with the transition to the third kind of knowl- imposed from without but radiates from within the edge, Intuition. Like Reason, Intuition concerns mode itself. Action thereby amounts to the spon- adequate ideas but unlike Reason these ideas are taneous affirmation of a new essential relation in not general nor are they submerged in the common duration. The journey from Imagination via Reason order of Nature. Where Reason concerns bodies, to Intuition, then, is a journey of comprehension but intuition concerns an essence, i.e. a powerful also of modal individuation and affirmation. It de- relational schema particular to an existing mode. scribes a movement from passions to actions; that The affirmation of an intuition signals the actualisa- is, from affections that are still imposed from without tion of an essence in duration; that is, the passing (passion) to joys that radiate from within the essential into existence of particular relational schema. The nature of a mode (action). But it also describes the common notion paves the way for this actualisation, moment a new modal relation is realised in duration. but it is only with an intuition that an experimental If this is said to constitute a ‘beatific’ or ‘blessed’ external relation is solidified in an essential and thing, it is because it manifests a link between the internal principle. When this occurs, the powers temporality of the common order of Nature and the that pertain to the essences of the modes converge eternity of Divine thought. ‘The word blessedness’, spontaneously and a new essence is actualised. as Deleuze writes, ‘should be reserved for these At this particular moment, the modes cease be- active joys: they appear to conquer and extend ing external to each other and they are subsumed themselves within duration, like the passive joys, but in a communal body which integrates them like in fact they are eternal and are no longer explained parts in a whole. It is Deleuze who has described by duration; they no longer imply transitions and this process of spontaneous modal individuation passages, but express themselves and one another the most accurately. ‘When the mode passes into in an eternal mode, together with the adequate ideas existence,’ he writes, ‘an infinity of extensive parts from which they issue’ (Deleuze, 1988, p.51). are determined from without to come under the This, then, is the significance of beatitude in relation corresponding to [the mode’s] essence Spinozism: from the more or less random material or its degree of power’ (Deleuze, 1998, p.98). The collisions unfolding in the common order of Nature phase ‘from without’ here refers to the modes that – animated as they are by the pervasive productiv- are being subjugated; to them it is indeed accurate ity that characterises Spinoza’s God – an ordering to speak of an external force that dominates them. principle spontaneously emerges between a series Yet for the existing mode itself – composed as it is of existing modes. This ordering principle is an es- of these modes or parts – it is a force from within: a sence, and it expresses the infinite power of God in force of corporeal subjugation that corresponds to a finite and determinate way. Whilst qualified as an its incorporeal essence. essence, the ordering principle in fact does not refer 44 J O S S After structure Weissenborn, F. to a prior principle or ‘end’ but rather to a principle designated as the ‘morphic language/phenotype’; in that emerges from the collective work of the modes Spinozism, it is known as the ‘common notion’. From themselves. Nevertheless, it enslaves these modes such probing attempts, a ‘form’ is finally affirmed, in a mutual relation until some material event causes the latter thereby beginning to act in existence as this relationship to break down thereby bringing to an active principle of individuation. In space syntax, an end the existence of the mode. Individuation this occurs when the syntactic logic is retrieved therefore occurs when an eternal essence begins and perpetuated first in a phenotype, then across to express itself in duration, thereby actualising a a series of phenotypes thus engendering a geno- new relation of movement and rest between bodies. type; in Spinozism, it is when an eternal essence affirms and expresses itself in existence, thereby 45 Expression and built form actualising a metaphysical principle (the essence, Having discussed the processes involved in modal understood here as a power) in the physical world individuation and perpetuation, the paper may (the extended body). Strictly speaking, there thus now return to its initial problem; that of outlining a are two aspects of expression. There is an indi- conceptual framework for form and formation more viduating aspect, whereby a relationship between congruent with the genotype doctrine. This frame- bodies emerges. And there is a ‘conatic’ aspect, work needs to demonstrate that its explanatory po- whereby that relationship is perpetuated in dura- tential exceeds that of structural anthropology and tion. Both of these aspects are relevant to space anthropocentric models of representation. It also syntax. Together, they ensure that the movement must allow for the emergence of a formal principle from an experimental outside (the minimal initial from a random series of corporeal collisions and system) to an expressive inside (the genotypical provide an explanation for corporeal perpetuation drive expressed in the phenotype) is accomplished once a form has been actualised. Lastly, this must and consolidated so that the bodies that once were be achieved without inventing new formal principles external to each other come together in a relation or appropriating such principles from doctrines that both endures and is entirely the architectural that in fact are not amenable to a discussion of mode’s own. form and formation. The argument advanced here To say that this formal relation is the mode’s own is that the Spinozistic doctrine of modal expres- – that in fact it arises with it and pertains to it – is to sion provides exactly such a framework. Indeed, I say that the mode does not receive its form from an believe it describes the formative process defined outside agent, whether that agent be ‘society’ or in the genotype doctrine more clearly than other some other force. In fact, if there is any force at stake, doctrines in the philosophy of form. The contours it is the mode’s own; this force being identical to its of an expressive logic of architectural form and essence and corresponding to a particular way of formation may thus be outlined. ordering material relations that emerges in the actuali- This logic begins with the random collisions of sation of the mode itself. A Spinozist essence then is bodies. In space syntax, this is the activity known an autopoietic essence: it arises from a material pro- from the ‘minimal initial system’; in Spinozism, it cess that – spontaneously – it comes to dominate and constitutes ‘the common order of Nature’. From order. Of course, this does not mean that the mode is these collisions, the tentative (but still unfulfilled) not influenced by other forces. Being immersed in the formation of a relationship between a series of common order of Nature, it is in a perpetual struggle bodies then takes place. In space syntax, this is with other modes – each of which expresses a force J The Journal of Space Syntax O S S Volume 6 • Issue 1 of their own – and it only is able to exist as long as that constantly unfolds within it. Not directly, but by Notes: its existence is not in some way contradicted either influencing patterns of movement and interaction 8 by the network of modes that surrounds it or by the which in themselves hold a sociogenetic potential. one that it subsumes. Ultimately, this is a question A dual form of expressivity thus takes place: that of of distributed modal power-struggles and the emer- the urban spatial system, and that of the urban social gent material resolutions to which these give rise. In system. Ultimately, these are systems gravitating the individual mode, such struggles may manifest around each other without the one being reducible themselves internally (disintegration or corruption) to the other, and foregrounding either therefore con- or externally (consumption or annihilation), and its stitutes an analytical error. This complex relationship continued existence depends on its ability to resolve between society and space perhaps constitutes such issues. the key insight of space syntax; one that this author Whilst the Spinozist notion of modality may be finds conveyed neatly in the expressive logic of employed with respect to a variety of syntactic no- Spinozism where modes adapt to each other in an tions (e.g. genotypes in housing, the beady ring), open-ended process. it is in fact a particularly apt analogy for cities as It is debatable whether this complex expressive space syntax conceptualises them. According to logic is pursued in a satisfactory manner in the Hillier, the ‘fundamental settlement process’ that is Durkheimian brand of sociology currently being manifested in cities results from the implementation revived by space syntax scholars (e.g. Marcus, of a formal principle that emerges in and begins 2015) 8. Durkheim, of course, holds an important to express itself through the formal process itself place in the space syntax pantheon, his ideas be- (Hillier, 1996, p.264). Urban structures thus emerge ing discussed by Hillier and Hanson with respect to from an ‘aggregative process in which built forms encounter patterns and social organisation. There progressively construct patterns of open space’ even are sections in his manuscripts that discuss (Hillier, 1996, p.282). In this sense, the actualisation ‘the geographical space that society appropriates’ of a global urban form may be said to arise sponta- (Durkheim, quoted in Marcus, 2015, p.4). But there neously from an explorative formal process which are also limitations to the Durkheimian approach it comes to dominate. Such systems are not stable to space. Most problematically, there seems to be and must constantly adapt to changes arising either no concepts for describing the open-ended formal internally in the configuration of their street-systems process that leads to the establishment of different or in their external environment (e.g. the regional morphological types. One therefore ends up ex- hinterland). The resilience that cities show to such ploring the morphological influence on encounter challenges is a demonstration of their essential patterns without an understanding of the morpho- power; that is, of their ability to sustain a relation genetic process that informs it. Durkheim’s habitual of corporeal movement and rest that corresponds foregrounding of what is known as the ‘social fact’ to their essence. Local changes will be influenced makes the affirmation of such a spontaneous arte- by local and regional planning policies – that is, factual principle difficult, and one searches in vain to measures implemented by society – but the for principles of artefactual autopoiesis in his oeuvre. way the city resolves such issues is not reducible The argument advanced in this paper is consistent to a social logic, sensu stricto. What is more, the with the position of Leroi-Gourhan – one of the great way the city resolves local problems will have an thinkers of the relationship between technology and impact on the ongoing formation of social relations society – in his critique of the way technology is See also Liebst, L. (forthcoming) ‘Reassembling the Durkheimian sociology of space’ in S. Griffiths and A. von Lünen, Spatial Cultures: Towards a New Social Morphology of Cities Past and Present. Farnham, Ashgate. 46 J O S S After structure Weissenborn, F. Notes: perceived in conventional sociology. With explicit of built form impossible, provided that architectural 9 reference to Durkheim and Mauss, he writes: ‘While forms are treated as artefacts and not social facts. Durkheim and Mauss cavalierly [luxueusement] Such a thought may even have been on Hillier and defend “the total social fact” they have merely as- Hanson’s (collaborative) mind when they wrote The sumed the existing techno-economic infra-structure’ Social Logic of Space, the epigraph of which is a (Leroi-Gourhan, 1964, p.210; this author’s transla- quote by Leroi-Gourhan9. I am of the opinion that tion). I would expand on this statement by asserting considerable rewards may be reaped from further that theoreticians of the social fact tend to ignore exploration of the link between space syntax and the theorisation of the artefact – i.e. the particular Leroi-Gourhan (see Weissenborn, forthcoming). So logic that it expresses – with a tendency to make far, however, this epigraph remains the only refer- their analyses one-dimensional and unsatisfactory. ence to this important philosopher of artefacts in The quote, rendered in the original French by Hillier and Hanson (1984), reads: ‘The foremost human trait is perhaps less the creation of tools than the domestication of time and space, which is to say, the creation of a human time and a human space’ (Hillier and Hanson, 1984, p.i; this author’s translation). To those interested in exploring the complex 47 the space syntax literature. relationship between artefact and social fact, Leroi- This paper has pointed out some of the deficien- Gourhan’s own Gesture and Speech I & II (1964; cies concerning the theoretical context in which 1965) provides a contrasting perspective to that of the notion of the inverted genotype is developed Durkheim. In this two-volume work, Leroi-Gourhan by Hillier and Hanson (1984), and it has tried to describes the many material and technological establish whether a more satisfactory conceptual processes involved in the production of an artefact framework could be found in Spinoza’s doctrine of (Tome I: Technics and Language), and the way ar- modal expressivity. The paper found that the for- tefacts act back onto the ongoing formation of the mal principle of modal expression accommodates social group without its proper logic being in any the genotype doctrine better than the theoretical way reducible to it (Tome II: Memory and Rhythm). architecture currently associated with it (e.g. struc- There are in fact many commonalities between his turalism, Newtonian physics), thereby highlighting account and that of Hillier and Hanson (1984) as aspects of this concept that are often neglected. regards the theory of the architectural artefact. In More specifically, the process of architectural mor- Leroi-Gourhan, each technology or artefact is thus phogenesis was found to be congruent with the said to pertain to a given ‘technical lineage’ whose beatific process of modal individuation as this is logic they express, just like Hillier and Hanson’s imagined by Spinoza. The problem of morphogen- architectural phenotypes are said to participate in esis, however, only constitutes one of several fronts a genotype. Technical lineages furthermore express where space syntax and Spinozism may engage in a certain ‘rhythmic potential’, a concept which is fruitful dialogue. Putting processes of architectural congruent with the space syntax concern for ‘natural formation to one side, Spinozism also has much to movement’ (Hillier et al., 1993). Given the uncom- say regarding the effect that the architectural entity mon nature of his account, it is no small irony that asserts on human movement and sociogenesis. Leroi-Gourhan’s description of urban artefacts – i.e. This is significant inasmuch as it constitutes the settlements, cities – is in alignment with the most other aspect of the problematic that space syntax representative accounts available. Indeed, the only deals with, viz. the social logic that space exerts kinds of built form that Leroi-Gourhan investigates on society. Spinozism thus offers a fully-fledged are those that represent a prior cosmological or a alternative to the theoretical models currently in social fact. However, this does not make an exten- space syntax theory whether those be structuralist, sion of his artefactual philosophy to the philosophy Newtonian or Durkheimian. J The Journal of Space Syntax O S S Volume 6 • Issue 1 References Aristotle (1984), Complete Works (transl. Barnes), Princeton: Princeton University Press. Bafna, S. (2012), ‘Rethinking genotypes: Comments on the sources of typology in architecture’. 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(ed.), Intelligent Environments, Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing. Hillier, B. and Leaman, A. (1973), ‘The man-environment paradigm and its paradoxes’. In: Architectural Design, Vol. 78 (8), p.507-511. (frederik.weissenborn.09@ ucl.ac.uk) is is a completing research student with the Bartlett School of Architecture. His research concerns the philosophy of built form and takes space syntax theory as its point of departure. Frederik holds degrees from the Bartlett, University of the Arts London, Sciences Po Paris and Copenhagen Business School. Marcus, L. (2015), ‘Interaction rituals and co-presence: Griffiths, S. (2011), ‘Temporality in Hillier and Hanson’s Gueroult, M. (1968), Spinoza, Tôme 1: Dieu, Paris: Edi- Frederik Weissenborn Lærke, M. (2008), Leibniz Lecteur de Spinoza: La Genèse Deleuze, G. (1969/1992), Expressionism in Philosophy: Durkheim, E. (1895), The Rules of Sociological Method, About the author: Space Syntax Laboratory. Lucretius (2007), The Nature of Things (transl. 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Hillier, B., Penn, A., Hanson, J., Grajewski, T. and Xu, J. (1993), ‘Natural movement or, configuration and 48