Download Europe`s Neighbours : European neighbourhood policy and public

Europe’s Neighbours
Europe’s Neighbours
European neighbourhood policy and public opinion
on the European Union
European Outlook 6
Paul Dekker
Albert van der Horst
Suzanne Kok
Lonneke van Noije
Charlotte Wennekers
The Netherlands Institute for Social Research | SCP
CPB, Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis
The Hague, July 2008
© The Netherlands Institute for Social Research | scp, The Hague, Netherlands 2008
Typesetting and layout: Textcetera, The Hague, Netherlands
Figures: Mantext, Moerkapelle, Netherlands
Cover design: Bureau Stijlzorg, Utrecht, Netherlands
We would like to thank the following persons for their collaboration on the cover:
Arabic: Charlotte Huygens; Hebrew: Dr Yaniv Hagbi and Dr W. van Bekkum;
Ukrainian: Dr Janette Verrijzer.
The Arabic text is an excerpt from the Qur’an; sura 49, verse 13:
“We […] rendered you distinct peoples and tribes, that you may recognize one another.”
[Authorised Translation by Dr Rashad Khalifa]
The Hebrew text is an excerpt from the Hebrew Bible;
Genesis 28, verse 3: “[…] thou mayest be a multitude of people”
The Ukrainian text is an excerpt from the Ukrainian Bible, Genesis 28, verse 3:
“And God Almighty bless thee, and make thee fruitful, and multiply thee, that thou mayest be
a multitude of people.” [King James Bible]
isbn 978-90-377-0386-3
nur 740
This report is printed on chlorine-free paper.
Insofar as reprographic reproduction of parts of this publication is permitted under Article
16h of the Copyright Act 1912, the fees payable by law therefore should be remitted to the
Stichting Reprorecht (P.O. Box 3060, 2130 kb Hoofddorp, Netherlands, www.repro-recht.nl).
Permission for reproducing (a) selection(s) of this publication for anthologies, readers and
other compilations (Article 16 of the Copyright Act 1912) may be sought from Stichting pro
(Stichting Publicatie- en Reproductierechten Organisatie), P.O. Box 3060, 2130 kb Hoofddorp,
Netherlands, www.cedar.nl/pro.
The Netherlands Bureau for
Social Research | scp
Parnassusplein 5
2511 vx The Hague
netherlands
Telephone: +31 (0)70 340 70 00
Telefax +31 (0)70 340 70 44
Website: www.scp.nl
E-mail: [email protected]
Netherlands Bureau for Economic
Policy Analysis
Van Stolkweg 14
2585 jr The Hague
netherlands
Telephone: +31 (0)70 338 33 80
Telefax: +31 (0)70 338 33 50
Website: www.cpb.nl
E-mail: [email protected]
5
Content
Foreword
7
Part A Public opinion on the European Union
9
Outline and findings
9
A1
Public opinion in Europe
1.1
National differences
1.2
Attitudes towards the eu
1.3
Policy preferences
1.4
Differences within countries
1.5
In conclusion: The Netherlands in Europe
Appendix to chapter A1: Tables
12
12
15
18
21
24
25
A2
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
Europe in the press, an international comparison
Introduction
National attitudes towards the eu
Attention for Europe in the national press
Recent developments in the attention to Europe in the Dutch press
Conclusion
32
32
33
40
46
51
A3
3.1
3.2
3.3
Public opinion in the Netherlands
Developments in support for the eu
Backgrounds to involvement with the eu
Backgrounds to rejection of the eu
52
52
54
56
A4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
The changeability of views
Views in surveys
Insights from the literature
The follow-up questions survey
Conclusions
61
61
61
63
70
References for part A
72
Part B European neighbourhood policy
75
Findings
75
B1
Introduction
78
B2
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
The neighbours of the European Union
Geography, politics and institutions
Economic situation in the neighbouring countries
Relations with the neighbours
Conclusion: economic neighbours?
80
80
81
84
89
B3
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
Economic growth among the neighbours
Economic development since 1990
Direct causes of economic growth
Underlying causes of economic growth
Better institutions for higher growth rates
90
90
92
95
99
6
Europe’s Neighbours
B4 Trade with the neighbouring countries
4.1 Economic benefits of trade
4.2 What determines trade with the neighbouring countries?
4.3
Scope for more trade with neighbouring countries
4.4 What products do the neighbouring countries export?
Appendix to chapter B4: Gravity model
103
103
105
109
112
115
B5
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
117
117
120
127
130
Policy for the new neighbours
Existing policy
Strengthening relations with the neighbours
Institutions for better market operation
The limits of the eu
References for part B
132
Publications of the cpb and scp
135
7
Foreword
The 16 neighbours of the European Union are a very mixed bunch. They range
from the oil states of Algeria and Libya to wealthy Israel and impoverished
Moldova. Moreover, it is a group of countries which, owing to deep mutual
tensions (especially in the Middle East) and large geographical distances (from
Belarus to Morocco), do not or barely talk to each other.
The eu has launched a common policy for these countries, the European Neighbourhood Policy (enp), which aims to promote prosperity in and relations with
the neighbouring countries of the eu. The challenge taken on in part B of this
European Outlook is to conduct an analysis into the economic situations of this
very mixed group of neighbouring countries and into the scope for improving
their prosperity levels. The emphasis is on the importance of good trade relations and the supportive role of the European neighbourhood policy.
The thematic part B is preceded by part A, on public opinion on Europe. This
section examines differences among the 27 member states on a broad spectrum
of attitudes and preferences. For the Netherlands we also consider the latest
developments in and individual backgrounds to support for eu membership
(high) and involvement with the eu (limited). In a country comparison we also
pay attention to news reporting on the eu in several policy areas in the United
Kingdom, France and the Netherlands. This year we also include a chapter on
the changeability of opinions on Europe in the Netherlands. Experimental
survey data analysed for this Outlook reveal that basic attitudes towards Europe
are probably relatively stable, but many people are inclined to change their
opinions on specific issues when they are presented with counterarguments.
This sixth European Outlook, prepared jointly by the Netherlands Bureau
for Economic Policy Analysis (cpb) and the Netherlands Institute for Social
Research | scp, is published, like the fifth Outlook, on Europe Day, 9 May. The
scp is primarily responsible for part A (Paul Dekker, Lonneke van Noije and
Charlotte Wennekers), while the cpb is primarily responsible for part B (Albert
van der Horst and Suzanne Kok). The scp authors would like to thank Jan Kleinnijenhuis, Wouter van Atteveldt and Jouke Jacobi (vu University Amsterdam) for
their assistance with chapter A2. The cpb would like to thank Henri de Groot
and Jan Möhlmann for their contribution to chapter B4, and Arjan Lejour, Bas
Straathof and Bas ter Weel for their constructive comments.
On behalf of ourselves and the authors, we would also like to thank the members of the interdepartmental sounding board group for their useful suggestions, and the staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Forward Strategy Unit
(dg European Cooperation) for the support they have provided towards completing this publication. These words of thanks in no way detract from the fact
that the responsibility for the content of the Outlook is borne by the cpb and the
scp. This views expressed here therefore do not necessarily represent the views
of the Dutch government.
Prof. Dr. Paul Schnabel
Director of the Netherlands Institute for Social Research | scp
Prof. Dr. Coen Teulings
Director of the cpb, Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis
9
Part A
Public opinion on the
European Union
Outline and findings
In this part we set out in a country comparison and in greater detail for the
Netherlands a picture of public opinion on the European Union (eu). Last year,
due to the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, long-term developments took
centre stage. In addition to presenting statistics on public opinion, we tracked
the reporting of European issues in Dutch newspapers since the start of the
1950s. Following on from that, this year we consider the attention paid to the
eu in the press in France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands since 1990
(chapter A2). The second special topic of this Outlook is the changeability of
views on Europe, as measured in population surveys: how stable are opinions
over time, and how susceptible are they to counterarguments (chapter A4)?
In addition, we have the regular chapters with a broad comparison of public
opinion in the 27 member states (chapter A1) and a short description of developments of and differences in views in the Netherlands (chapter A3).
The comparison of the 27 member states in chapter A1 reveals major differences
with regard to people’s satisfaction with their own lives and with developments
in their own country. Denmark is again the most satisfied, and the Netherlands
also scores high. Depending on the measurement, at the other end of the spectrum are several new member states and sometimes also southern old member
states. In comparison with other countries, many Dutch people think that they
are well informed about the eu, even though their actual knowledge gives little
cause for such a view. Support for eu membership is strong in our country, but
the enthusiasm for further enlargements is limited. In the United Kingdom
and Austria the mood on Europe is negative across the board. As in previous
European Outlooks, the citizens of most eu member states are massive proponents of joint European policies in the fight against terrorism, technological
research and environmental protection, but they prefer to leave health, education, social security, taxation and pensions to national governments. As far the
European neighbourhood policy is concerned, the subject of part B, eu citizens
prove themselves ambivalent in the surveys: they acknowledge the importance
of good relations, but they are wary of the costs of assisting the neighbouring
countries.
In a recent letter to the Lower House of Parliament, the state secretary for European Affairs, Frans Timmermans, expressed the ambition that greater justice
is done to Europe in public debate. This debate should focus less on the rules
of European integration, such as the European constitution, and more on the
impact of the eu on citizens in their daily lives. The media have an active role to
play here.
In chapter A2 we examine to what extent the Dutch press paid and pays attention to the eu. Compared to two fellow member states, the United Kingdom
and France, Europe received strikingly little coverage in the Dutch daily
newspapers during the 1990s and around the turn of the century. Dutch news
about Europe concentrated much more on the activities of Dutch politicians at
European level. Between 1990 and 2003 this position of Europe in Dutch news
10
Europe’s Neighbours
coverage did not improve (nor did it in France and the United Kingdom), so that
the interest in Europe seems to be independent of the power of Europe, which
certainly did increase during these year. In 2004 and 2005, when the future of
Europe rose well up the political agenda after some years of relative neglect
(enlargement with new member states, referendum on the constitution), the
Dutch press took an interest in Europe. European news became far less hooked
on Dutch politicians: the previously strongly national perspective in the Dutch
coverage of Europe became more European. In 2006, a year without remarkable European events, there was a slight decline in attention for Europe, but it
remained above the level of the previous decade.
The state secretary’s wish seems to have been fulfilled to some extent at least.
­
Recently Europe has acquired a more prominent position in the Dutch news
papers. However, the press has still not fulfilled his wish to give greater recognition of the impact of Europe on people’s daily lives and to focus less on the
rules of integration. Apart from the larger organised events such as a treaty or
summit, it seems to be above all crises and rows which give Europe a place on
the media agenda. In short, it is not the eu’s actual power and its actual work,
but the rules and violations of those rules which lead the media agenda.
In late 2007, support for eu membership was not only high in the Netherlands
in comparison with other countries, but it also appears to have increased.
According to the Eurobarometer, in late 2007 three-quarters of the Dutch
population took the view that membership is a good thing and that our country
benefits from it. In other surveys the same questions generate less support,
however, which may be explained by differences in surveying methods and
the nature of the preceding questions. Nevertheless there seems little reason
to doubt the trend, which has been mapped with a virtually unchanged survey
instrument. Other research, presented in chapter A3, shows that support for
eu membership is also relatively stable at individual level. The acknowledgement of the importance of the eu for the Netherlands does not preclude a
limited involvement with what happens in Europe and a low satisfaction with
the functioning of the eu. We will trace the backgrounds to both attitudes.
Limited involvement is more common among women, young adults, the less
well-­educated, people who see themselves as neither left nor right politically,
and people who do not read a newspaper. While the percentage of all people
with limited involvement averages 25%, this figure reaches 39% among less
well-educated women and drops to 7% among highly educated men.
On the basis of the 21minuten.nl survey, a group of around 8% of the population can be identified as being strongly opposed to the eu. This group is
noticeably larger among men (12%) than among women (5%), larger among the
less well-educated (11%) than among the more highly educated (6%), and larger
among those who voted for the pvv (24%) and Eénnl (28%) at the Lower House
elections of 2006 than among those who voted for D66 (3%) and GroenLinks
(1%). Rejection of the eu is also embedded in a negative attitude towards Dutch
politics and society. Those who are dissatisfied with the country, who do not
trust fellow citizens and who do not feel represented in politics are more likely
to be opposed to the eu.
In previous Outlooks we observed a disjunction between the positive mood
towards the eu according to Eurobarometers and other population surveys
on the one hand, and the more negative and sometimes even cynical tone in
focus groups and in statements by the public in the media on the other. How
Outline and findings
11
stable are the surveyed opinions, how susceptible are they to counterarguments? To throw more light on this, we report in chapter A4 on a follow-up
survey conducted in early 2008, in which respondents gave their opinions on
certain European issues and were then presented with hypothetical advantages
and disadvantages. It emerges that in response to this many people change
their minds. How easy or difficult it is to persuade people to change their views
differs from person to person and from argument to argument. Generally
speaking, the more highly educated, people who say they are involved with the
eu, men, middle-aged people and people with a negative basic attitude towards
Europe tend to remain firmer. Arguments about the possible threat to cultural
identity are usually more persuasive than arguments about economic benefits.
However, which arguments appeal differs from group to group: thus the more
highly educated tend to be more easily swayed by arguments relating to peace
and security in Europe, while the less-well educated are more susceptible to
arguments about threats to their personal lives. When people were surveyed
again one month later, it emerged that most adhered to their original standpoint again. This applied more to people who remained firm under the influence of a counterargument than those who changed their minds.
The fact that opinions about European issues are susceptible to change does not
mean, however, that they are meaningless and that survey research into them
is pointless. There is nothing wrong with people changing their mind on the
basis of new information, nor with people subsequently reverting to their old
standpoint because they reject the hypothesis of the new information (“suppose that …”). Nor is there much wrong with people making their judgements
on European issues not on the basis of specific knowledge of matters, but more
intuitively from a diffuse attitude towards Europe, the similarity of the issue in
question with a domestic issue, sympathy for assumed political supporters and
opponents on a contentious issue, and so on. That is also how people come to
their views on Dutch issues, and how they come to a choice in the voting booth.
Opinions on specific issues often hide relatively stable basic attitudes (eu
membership is a good thing and benefits the country; see chapter A3). On the
basis of focus groups, survey experiments and deliberative polls (chapter A1),
we can also say more about what affects people and how they will change their
minds when they receive more information and participate in more discussion.
However, it makes little sense to present average citizens with detailed questions about matters of which most of them will have barely any knowledge. That
might well be the case with regard to the European neighbourhood policy, for
which a selection of questions in the Eurobarometer is included in appendix
table A1.B7. There is no point in dismissing survey data on Europe as meaningless, but there is a point in trying to look at the issues through the eyes of probably only moderately interested and informed citizens, and not to be swayed
by what fellow professionals know and what Brussels policy interests might
dictate.
12
A1 Public opinion in Europe
1.1
National differences
How satisfied are Europeans with their own lives and with their own countries?
What do they regard as serious social problems? Before we consider their views
on the European Union and European politics, we will first at look these more
fundamental and immediate issues. We will do so, as in previous European
Outlooks, with data from several eu-wide population surveys conducted by the
1
Eurobarometer in 2007. The data for all 27 eu member states are shown in the
appendix tables to this chapter; these tables also quote the actual questions
asked. In the main text we present the key findings in figures with national
patterns and by comparisons between the old and new member states. Furthermore, at several points we compare in tables the Netherlands, the 15 old and
the 12 new member states. After these presentations, we consider at the end of
the chapter the differences and similarities in the backgrounds to several basic
attitudes and views.
But first people’s satisfaction with their own lives and their own countries.
The question as to the how satisfied people are with their own lives elicits
very different answers in comparison with everything else that follows in this
chapter. Two-thirds of Danes say there are very satisfied, and more than 30%
say they are fairly satisfied; only 2% are not very satisfied or not at all satisfied.
How different from Bulgaria, where around 60% of the population gives one of
the latter answers, one-third is fairly satisfied and only 3% very satisfied. The
answers for all 27 member states can be found in appendix table A1.B1. This
table also shows what people think of the development of their own country and how optimistic they are about the situation in a number of areas: the
economy, employment, the environment and social security. There is a positive
correlation between these evaluations and the people’s evaluations of their own
2
lives and the development of their country. Countries are satisfied to a greater
or lesser extent across the board.
In figure A1.1 we restrict ourselves to the national combinations of the percentage of people who are very satisfied with their own lives and the percentage
who are satisfied with their own country (or rather, the direction in which
the country is developing), or who think that the country is going in the right
3
direction. At opposite ends of the spectrum on both dimensions are the satisfied Danes and the dissatisfied Hungarians.
1
2
3
With thanks to the European Commission, which gave us early access to the data of
Eurobarometer 68.1 of autumn 2007 for this Outlook. As always, we have to assume
that the questions and answers in the surveys are strictly comparable between
countries. This will never be entirely the case, however, if only because the translations
of the questions and answers may not always be equally fortuitous, but also because
the associations and emotional connotations of words may still differ even if they
are translated accurately. Another factor may be that countries respond more or less
moderately across the board.
Between the four areas ranging from r = 0.71 (social security – employment) to 0.89
(economy -employment), and for the average evaluation r = 0.84 with the percentage
of people who are very satisfied with their own lives and 0.67 with the percentage of
people who consider that the country is heading in the right direction (n = 27). The
significant positive correlations also dominate within countries at the individual level.
In several countries people’s satisfaction with one’s own lives is sometimes not related
to the other evaluations; only in the Netherlands is there no correlation between satisfaction with the environment and satisfaction with the economy and employment.
The figures are for people who are “very satisfied” with their own lives. Adding “satisfied” to this yields percentages of 90 upwards in many countries. The number of
people who say that they are “not very satisfied” or “not at all satisfied” is very small.
This may be because people are indeed contented, or it may be that an expression of
dissatisfaction is widely regarded as an inability to make something of their own lives.
We cannot uncover differences of this kind.
A1 Public opinion in Europe
Figure A1.1
People’s satisfaction with their own lives
and with the development of their own
countries, autumn 2007 (in percent)
13
thinks that the country is going in the right direction
DK
60
EE
FI
50
MT
LU
IE
SE
RO
FR AT
LT
40
EL
DE
ES
NL
SI
SK
PL
30
BE
UK
CZ
LV
BG
CY
20
PT
IT
HU
10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
is very satisfied with one’s own life
Source: Eurobarometer 68.1 (September-November 2007), weighted results; see appendix table A1.B1
(rows 1 and 3).
The line in the figure shows the connection between the national percentages
of people who are satisfied with their own lives and with their own countries
(r = 0.50). Above the line are the countries where people are relatively satisfied
with their country; below the line are the countries where people are relatively
satisfied with their life. In Estonia, people’s satisfaction with the development
of the country is almost as high as in Denmark, but their satisfaction with their
own lives is very low; the Netherlands comes in second in terms of personal
satisfaction, but satisfaction with the development of the country is no more
than average.
From the satisfaction level we move to the problems. Appendix table A1.B2
show what Europeans regard as the most important issues in their countries.
The top four in the average of national priorities are rising prices (18%), unemployment (12%), crime (12%) and healthcare (12%). There are appreciable differences within these four issues, however. Thus rising prices is rarely mentioned
in Northwestern Europe (Sweden 2%, Netherlands 7%), while they are a major
source of concern in the Baltic States (Estonia 30%, Latvia 41% and Lithuania
32%). In the Netherlands it is crime (18%) and healthcare (17%) which are most
often identified as the most serious problems. Among issues which tend to be
down the list of concerns in Europe as a whole, some countries sometimes leap
out, in particular the United Kingdom with immigration (20% of the British
regard this as the most serious problem, compared to a country average of 6%),
Spain with terrorism (20% versus 3%), Luxembourg with housing (17% versus
4%), and Sweden with the environment (14% versus 4%).
Appendix table A1.B3 contains several views on one’s own country and the
eu. These views are about the attachment to one’s town or village, one’s own
country and the eu, trust in the national parliament and the eu, and satisfaction with national and European democracy. Generally speaking, people are
14
Europe’s Neighbours
most attached to their country, closely followed by their town or village. The eu
comes a very distant third. This is no different in the Netherlands, except that
all scores are lower. It seems that it is “unDutch” to express a strong attachment to places and countries. This also tallies with the low score for Dutch
people on national pride (cpb/scp 2007: 44). Attachment to country and town
or village is very strong in Greece and Bulgaria. Attachment to the eu is strongest in Belgium and Luxembourg.
Trust in the national parliament is generally higher in the old eu member
states than in the new member states. Against this, people in the new member
states tend to have more trust in the eu. A similar pattern emerges with regard
to satisfaction with how democracy works in one’s own country and in the eu.
These two views are set against each other in figure A1.2. The diagonal line
does not present an empirical connection between the two values (there is no
linear correlation for the 27 countries), but it identifies countries with the highest appreciation of national democracy (below the diagonal) from countries
with the highest appreciation of European democracy.
The line marks a nearly perfect separation between the old and new member
states. Above the line we find the eu’s new member states, where satisfaction
with European democracy exceeds satisfaction with national democracy. Below
the line we find the old member states, where satisfaction with national democracy is greater. The three exceptions to this rule are Italy and Portugal, which
can be found among the new member states and are thus less satisfied with
national democracy than with European democracy, and Cyprus, where people
are more satisfied with national democracy.
Figure A1.2
People’s satisfaction with democracy in
their own country and in the EU, autumn
2007 (in percent)
is satisfied with democracy in the EU
100
80
PL
BE
ES
DK
SI
60
LV
HU
RO
LT
SK
PT
CZ
MT
IT
DE
LU
CY FR
BG
40
IE
EL
EE
FI
AT
SE
NL
UK
20
20
40
60
80
100
is satisfied with democracy in one’s own country
Source: Eurobarometer 68.1 (September-November 2007), weighted results; see appendix table A1.B3
(rows 6 and 7).
The Poles, Belgians, Spanish and Danes are most satisfied with European
democracy. In Denmark this is accompanied by an exceptionally high satisfac-
A1 Public opinion in Europe
15
tion with national democracy. Earlier in this chapter the Danes also caught
the eye with their satisfaction with their own lives and their own country. The
Dutch are also very satisfied with national democracy, but they are among the
most dissatisfied with European democracy (together with the British, Finns
and Bulgarians).
1.2
Attitudes towards the eu
Appendix table A1.B4 compares the member states in terms of involvement with
the eu and actual and perceived knowledge of the eu. Between 7% (Cyprus) and
44% (Bulgaria) of the population says it is “very involved” with European affairs
(average 19%, Netherlands 26%). Between 20% (Bulgaria) and 59% (Poland and
Slovenia) claims an understanding of how the eu works (average 42%, Netherlands 55%). The level of actual knowledge is measured with three knowledge
questions (see appendix table A1.B4). The Greeks, Luxembourgers and Austrians achieve the highest scores on these. The Poles and Slovenians think that
they have the greatest knowledge. With some justification in Slovenia, but not
in Poland. Like last year, the Dutch somewhat overestimate their actual knowledge, while the Portuguese and Slovakians are too modest. The two “winners”,
Greece and Luxembourg, were at the top of the actual knowledge league last
year as well, while the two “losers”, Italy and the United Kingdom, came bottom
then as well (cpb/scp 2007: 43-44). Figure A1.3 sets perceived and actual knowledge against each other. The line in the figure shows the connection between
the two (r = 0.48).
Figure A1.3
Actual and perceived knowledge of the
EU, autumn 2007 (in percent)
claims to be well-informed about the EU
PL
60
SI
CY
NL
EE
50
LU
BE
LV
EL
DE
DK
FI
SE
LT
AT
FR
40
MT
UK
ES
RO
IE
HU
CZ
PT
30
SK
IT
BG
20
20
30
40
50
60
70
has actual knowledge of the EU
Source: Eurobarometer 68.1 (September-November 2007), weighted results; see appendix table A1.B4
(rows 2 and 3).
That an average of 42% of the people say that they understand how the eu
works perhaps reveals a certain lack of self-knowledge. People seem more
conscious of their limited actual knowledge of the eu when they are asked
about how much others know: according to the final row of figures in appendix
16
Europe’s Neighbours
table A1.B4, on average only 23% of the people in the member states (13% in
the Netherlands) think that their compatriots are well-informed about what is
happening in European politics. In a country comparison that percentage is
not correlated with actual knowledge (r = 0.17) and only weakly correlated with
1
perceived knowledge (r = 0.37; n = 27).
The two most common measurements of support for the eu are the answers
to the questions whether people consider their country’s membership of the
eu a good thing and whether they think that their country has benefited from
eu membership. Figure A1.4 sets these measurements of support against each
other and reflects the correlation between these two views.
Figure A1.4
Two positive evaluations of one’s
own country’s membership of the EU,
autumn 2007
(in percent)
thinks that one’s own country has benefited from EU membership
90
IE
EE EL
80
PL
LT
DK
BE
NL
SI
LU
PT
SK
70
MT
RO
ES
CZ
60
LV
FR
BG
FI
50
IT
AT
40
UK
DE
SE
HU
CY
30
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
considers one’s own country’s EU membership a good thing
Source: Eurobarometer 68.1 (September-November 2007), weighted results; see appendix table A1.B5
(rows 1 and 2).
The line in the figure shows the link (r = 0.78): people who are positive about
eu membership are also likely to think that their own country benefits from
eu membership, and vice versa. The spread on both views is very wide: in the
­Netherlands and Luxembourg around 80% of the population considers eu
membership a good thing, whereas in the United Kingdom, Latvia and Austria only one-third or slightly more take this view. The figures for seeing eu
membership as beneficial range from 37% (Cyprus, United Kingdom) to 87%
(Ireland). People in the old member states tend to regard eu membership
slightly more often as a good thing but are less convinced of the benefits for
their own country, while the reverse applies in the new member states. The dif1
In terms of correlations at individual level within countries, people’s perceived
knowledge among others is usually not correlated with their own actual knowledge
(no link for 18 countries, a negative link for three countries, and a positive link for
six countries), but there is a correlation with self-claimed knowledge (positive for
23 countries, no link for four countries). This will often be a case of projection (“I don’t
know much about the eu, and the same is true for other normal people”). The Netherlands is one of the countries with no correlation between people’s own perceived
knowledge and that of others. In appendix table A1.B4 it is also the country with the
largest percentage point difference between the number of people who believe that
they are well-informed (no less than 55%) and those who believe that other people are
well-informed (only 13%).
A1 Public opinion in Europe
17
ferences with last year are small: country averages on these general views are
fairly stable. In chapter A3 we will examine whether this also applies at individual level.
Views on further enlargements and on the eu’s image are divided across the
member states. People in the new member states are significantly more in
favour of further enlargements than people in the old member states. As to the
backgrounds to this, we speculated as follows last year:
Possibly this could in part be due to feelings of solidarity owing to cultural proximity and an expectation, nonetheless, of economic (enlargement of internal market
in one’s own region) or political (more stability in one’s own region) benefits from
enlargement (cpb/scp 2007: 48).
The eu’s image cannot be explained along the lines of old and new member
states. The eu has a positive image in Ireland and Spain, but also in Romania
and Poland. The eu has a negative image in the United Kingdom, Finland and
Austria, but also in Latvia. Usually support for eu membership goes together
with a positive image (and lack of support with a negative image), but not in the
Netherlands: here support for eu membership is especially high, but the eu
does not have a very rosy image.
How firm are these kinds of views on Europe? The eu and European issues are
not matters which average citizens engage with strongly. Prompted opinions
in surveys will rarely be based on extensive information and deep convictions
and will rarely be tested in debate or discussion. Do survey views change when
people start discussing the issues and receive more information? This question
was investigated by the think tank Notre Europe (www.notre-europe.eu). In the
project Tomorrow’s Europe this think tank brought together a representative
sample of 362 citizens from all eu member states for a three-day meeting in
Brussels in October 2007. Prior to the deliberations, the researchers measured
what the participants thought of the eu. In small groups the participants discussed the organisation’s political and institutional future. Among the topics
discussed were social and economic reforms, enlargements of the eu, the role
of the eu in the world, and the desirability of a European approach to various
problems. Experts took part in the discussions and provided the participants
with information. Then another measurement was taken of what the participants thought of various eu issues. The aim of this deliberative poll was
to tell us what conclusions the public could reach, if people had the opportunity to get
together, to gain balanced information, and to become more engaged by the issues
(www.tomorrowseurope.eu).
Table A1.1 shows for a number of issues what the participants thought of them
before and after the deliberation. The issues presented here are concerned with
eu membership and further enlargements.
The discussion and information boosted support for eu membership of their
own countries, but the participants also became more wary of enlargements.
A striking feature was that participants from the new member states changed
their opinions more than participants from the old member states. After the
deliberation the differences in views between new and old member states were
smaller than before. The greater opposition to enlargements after the deliberation may be explained by the fear of political unmanageability: after the deliberation more participants thought that the eu would find it more difficult to make
decisions if additional countries were admitted. Participants also completed
18
Europe’s Neighbours
a knowledge test before and after the deliberation. This showed that people
knew far more about the eu afterwards. How long the effects on views and
knowledge were sustained was not investigated. In chapter A4 we will report on
a Dutch study into changes of views, and this will include an analysis of what
was left of these several weeks later.
15 old member states
Table A1.1
Results of the deliberation for views
on EU membership and further
enlargements, divided by people from
the old member states and from the
new member states (in percent)
12 new member states
before deliberation after deliberation before deliberation after deliberation
scores high (6-10) on the scale: EU membership [of one’s own country] is an extremely bad thing (= 0) – is an extremely good thing (= 10)
82
91
72
89
“additional countries that meet all the political and economic
conditions for membership should be admitted to the EU”
61
58
78
63
“if it meets all the political and economic conditions for
membership, Turkey should be admitted to the EU”
54
47
57
42
“if it meets all the political and economic conditions for
membership, Ukraine should be admitted to the EU”
66
58
78
50
“adding more countries to the EU would help our security”
35
36
45
34
“adding more countries to the EU would make it more
difficult for the EU to make decisions”
54
64
47
62
strongly agrees or tends to agree with the following statements:
Source: Tomorrow’s Europe, www.tomorrowseurope.eu
1.3
Policy preferences
First we will look at the preferences for joint European policies in a number
of policy areas and for a number of objectives. The preferences are listed in
the extensive appendix table A1.B6. The results are very similar to those of
previous years: there is stable support for joint approaches to cross-border
problems (such as terrorism and environmental protection) and for leaving the
traditional tasks of the welfare state (pensions, taxation, social security) to the
2
national governments (see also cpb/scp 2005-2007).
The average preference for joint European policy has only a weak correlation
3
with the share of the population which has a positive image of the eu. Substantial support for joint policy can be found in both a number of old member states
(Portugal, Belgium) and new member states (Cyprus, Lithuania), although generally speaking inhabitants of the new member states take a more positive view
on this. Opposition to joint policy is strong above all in the old member states,
in particular in the United Kingdom, Finland and Austria. People in those
countries do not have a very rosy image of the eu either. Incidentally, the most
recent accession countries, Romania and Bulgaria, are not (or not yet?) very keen
on joint policy, even though Romanians in particular have a very positive image
of the eu. The latter is also the case in Ireland and Poland. In the Netherlands
relatively few people have a positive image of the eu. It seems that the strong
support for Dutch eu membership is more an expression of what is deemed
necessary in the national interest rather than of the eu’s appeal.
2
3
This picture coincides with findings on the basis of slightly different questions in the 21
minuten.nl survey of 2007 (see chapter A3). This yielded high scores for a European or
joint (i.e. Dutch and European) approach to international affairs (81%), the environment (80%), development cooperation (75%) and technological development (72%),
and low scores for healthcare (23%), social security (26%) and labour market issues
(40%).
National differences in support for joint European policy can be explained for only
23% by differences in the share of the population with a positive image of the eu (the
regression line in figure A1.5). The other support indicators in table A1.B5 have even
less explanatory power.
A1 Public opinion in Europe
Figure A1.5
Support for the EU and for joint European policies, autumn 2007 (in percent)
19
supports joint European policy
CY
70
PT
LT
LV
60
EL
DE
HU
NL CZ
SK
BE
SI
IT
PL
MT
FR
EE
LU
50
IE
BG
DK
RO
ES
SE
AT
40
FI
UK
30
20
30
40
50
60
70
has a positive image of the EU
Source: Eurobarometer 68.1 (September-November 2007). weighted results; see appendix tables A1.B5
(row 4) and A1.B6 (row 21).
What can we say about public opinion on the European Neighbourhood Policy
(enp), the theme of this European Outlook? The views and feelings of eu
citizens were polled on this in Eurobarometer surveys in 2006 and 2007. The
Eurobarometers regularly include opinion polls on eu policy issues on which
many citizens are unlikely to have strong views and specific feelings. This does
not make the answers to such questions meaningless (see the final section of
chapter A4), but it does make sense to take a close look at the questions. We will
do this below with Eurobarometer 67.3 of May-June 2007.
After questions about potential eu member states and which countries the
respondent considers to be neighbours of the eu, the Eurobarometer asks
whether the respondent has ever heard of the neighbourhood policy. This
question is answered in the affirmative by a country average of 23% (14% in the
Netherlands). After the question whether the respondent has ever heard of the
enp, the questionnaire gives some background information:
A few years ago a separate policy called the “European Neighbourhood Policy” was
launched for countries which do not have an accession prospect. This policy aims at
creating an area of shared values, stability and prosperity, enhanced cooperation
and deeper economic integration with 16 different countries located to the South and
to the East of the European Union.
The respondents are also shown a map with only the 16 countries in question highlighted in colour (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestinian Territories, Jordan, Egypt, Libya,
Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco; see part B). If the questionnaire is conducted
properly, the interviewers should keep showing the map while asking further
questions about views on the neighbouring countries and policy preferences. A
selection of these questions is included in table A1.B7.
20
Europe’s Neighbours
More Luxembourgers, Finns, Latvians and Maltese claim to have heard of the
enp than the citizens of other countries. The enp is least known in the United
Kingdom and Ireland (or, following on from the minimal involvement with the
eu identified earlier, respondents are less embarrassed about admitting their
ignorance).
Support for financial assistance for enp countries suffering from internal conflicts with potential international consequences is highest in Cyprus (71%), followed by Malta (60%), Greece (55%) and, remarkably given the longer distance
to conflict areas, Denmark (55%). Support is lowest in Austria (17%), Italy (21%)
and Ireland (24%). There is more support for the idea to help the enp countries
by giving them easier access to the eu’s internal market: on average 64% of
the people are in favour, ranging from 48% in the United Kingdom to 77% in
Greece (72% in the Netherlands).
More people in the new member states (41% on average) than in the old (26%
on average) think that the enp countries share most of “our values”. This will
be due in part to the closer geographical and cultural proximity, which may
also be the reason for the stronger support in the new member states for further enlargements of the eu (cpb/scp 2007: 46).
Despite the limited awareness of the enp, the overwhelming majority of eu
citizens thinks that it is very important or fairly important that the eu cooperates with its neighbouring countries in such areas as (in order of importance)
fighting terrorism, energy and environment, economic development, promotion of democracy, education and immigration. In figure A1.6 we have set
average support for cooperation (the final row in appendix table A1.B7) against
the degree to which the population of the member states claims to have heard
of the enp.
Figure A1.6
Awareness of and support for the EU’s
neighbourhood policy, spring 2007
(in percent)
average support for special relationships in six policy areas
PL
90
EL
SE
CY
MT
DK
CZ HU
SK
ES
FI
SI
IT
85
BE
LV
LT
DE
AT
NL
IE
PT
FR
80
RO
BG
LU
UK
EE
75
70
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
has heard of the European neighbourhood policy
Source: Eurobarometer 67.3 (May-June 2007), weighted results; see appendix table A1.B7 (rows 1 and 11).
A1 Public opinion in Europe
21
There is no evidence of a link between awareness of the policy and support for
it. Support for special relationships is massive, but this probably has little to do
with views on the 16 enp countries and the conflicts which rage there. Earlier
in this chapter we already saw that eu citizens have a stable preference for joint
European policy for undeniably cross-border problems. It seems that people
realise that these problems do not end at the eu’s borders.
Given the results, it is probably not very sensible to talk of a public opinion on
the European neighbourhood policy. What was probably measured was a combination of very general preferences (such as being in favour of international
cooperation in principle) and of occasionally present views on specific enp
countries in the respondent’s own regions. The result probably has little predictive value for the public’s stance if the enp were to become a real political issue.
In chapter A4 we will consider a new Dutch study which includes a question on
cooperation with the eu’s neighbouring countries.
1.4
Differences within countries
In the previous sections we looked only at national data and did not pay any
attention to differences within countries. We will do that now. For perceived
and actual knowledge of the eu, the view that eu membership is a good thing
and the preference for joint European policy, we examine the differences by
gender, age, education, satisfaction with one’s own life and political preference.
To keep things manageable, we will do so for a small selection of countries: the
Netherlands, the old member states France and the United Kingdom (the next
chapter looks at these three countries), and the new member states Poland and
Bulgaria. To what extent do the backgrounds to differences of opinion coincide
in this selection of very disparate countries?
First perceived and actual knowledge of the eu. Tables A1.2 and A1.3 show
that with regard to both self-assessment of knowledge and actual knowledge,
women (taking account of the other characteristics) score less than men. Only
in Bulgaria is there no difference between the genders in terms of perceived
knowledge. In the other countries men not only believe that they know more,
they actually do know more. The same harmony can be found for the effect
of higher educational attainment: the more highly educated believe that they
know more, and they actually do know more. On age, something else is happening: older people sometimes have more knowledge, but they do not claim
any more than younger people.
There are fewer correspondences with regard to support for eu membership
(table A1.4) and the preference for joint European policy (table A1.5). Insofar
as women diverge from men and older people from the under-55s, they do so
in terms of lower support for eu membership and joint policy. But often there
are no discernible differences. With the exception of Bulgaria, more highly
educated people are consistently more positive about eu membership. In comparison with the less well-educated they are also always more in favour of joint
policy. With the exception of the Netherlands, dissatisfaction with one’s own
life is coupled with lower support for eu membership, and in three of the five
countries also with lower support for joint policy. Europe seems to be a political
left/right issue only in the United Kingdom and Bulgaria: in the former country
the left is more in favour of eu membership and joint policy, while in the latter
it is actually the right.
22
Europe’s Neighbours
Table A1.2
Backgrounds to perceived knowledge
(appendix table A1.B4, row 2), autumn
2007 (odds ratios a )
The Netherlands
Poland
Bulgaria
0.5***
0.5***
0.5***
0.8*
0.9
15-34 years compared to 35-54
0.7*
0,8
1.1
0.9
0.8
≥ 55 years compared to 35-54
1.0
0.7**
0.9
0.6**
0.7
lowest third per country compared to middle third
0.7*
0.9
0.8
0.6*
0.3**
highest third per country compared to middle third
1.6**
2.2***
1.7***
1.8***
2.8***
not very or not at all compared to fairly
0.8
1.2
0.8
0.7
0.7
very compared to fairly
1.1
0.9
1.2
1.7*
1.7
left compared to centre
1.1
1.3
0.7*
1.2
0.8
right compared to centre
1.3
1.9***
0.9
1.5*
1.0
0.10
0.11
0.07
0.13
0.15
gender: women
United Kingdom
France
age:
education:
satisfaction with one’s own life:
self-description in political terms:
Nagelkerke pseudo-R
2
a When the coefficient is 1, the characteristic has no effect on knowledge; the lower the coefficient, the more negative the effect, the higher the coefficient, the more
positive the effect; significance: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 and *** p < 0.001 (bivariate).
Source: Eurobarometer 68.1 (September-November 2007), weighted results
Table A1.3
Backgrounds to actual knowledge
(appendix table A1.B4, row 3), autumn 2007
(odds ratios a )
The Netherlands
gender: women
United Kingdom
France
Poland
Bulgaria
0.5***
0.4***
0.4***
0.5***
0.6***
15-34 years compared to 35-54
0.8
1.2
0.8
0.9
0.6*
≥ 55 year compared to 35-54
1.2
1.6**
1.5*
1.3
1.0
lowest third per country compared to middle third
0.8
0.8
0.6**
0.6*
0.4***
highest third per country compared to middle third
1.3
1.8***
1.6**
2.1***
1.9***
not very or not at all compared to fairly
0.8
1.1
1.0
0.7*
0.8
very compared to fairly
1.3*
1.0
1.2
1.3
2.1
left compared to centre
1.8***
1.4*
1.2
1.1
1.0
right compared to centre
1.5**
1.5*
1.2
1.5*
1.7**
0.08
0.09
0.09
0.12
0.14
age:
education:
satisfaction with one’s own life:
self-description in political terms:
Nagelkerke pseudo-R2
a See note to table A1.2.
Source: Eurobarometer 68.1 (September-November 2007), weighted results
Only the left/right results in the United Kingdom and Bulgaria point to a significant difference in the domestic backgrounds to European attitudes. For the
other countries there are similarities, above all in the lack of clear differences.
All in all the background characteristics presented here do not provide much
explanatory power for differences in attitudes towards the eu in any of
A1 Public opinion in Europe
Table A1.4
Backgrounds to the view that EU membership
is a good thing (appendix table A1.B5, row 1),
autumn 2007 (odds ratios a )
The Netherlands
United Kingdom
Poland
Bulgaria
1.0
0.7**
0.6***
0.8
0.9
15-34 years compared to 35-54
1.4
1.3*
0.9
0.8
1.3
≥ 55 years compared to 35-54
1.1
0.7*
1.2
0.9
0.8
lowest third per country compared to middle third
0.6**
1.3
0.9
0.7*
0.7*
highest third per country compared to middle third
1.9**
3.0***
2.0***
1.9***
0.9
not very or not at all compared to fairly
0.7
0.5**
0.5***
0.4***
0.6**
very compared to fairly
1.1
1.5***
1.5*
1.5
1.9
left compared to centre
0.9
2.5***
1.0
1.1
1.1
right compared to centre
1.0
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.8**
0.06
0.17
0.08
0.12
0.08
United Kingdom
France
Poland
Bulgaria
–0.02
–0.10**
–0.03
–0.03
gender: women
France
age:
education:
satisfaction with one’s own life:
self-description in political terms:
Nagelkerke pseudo-R2
a See note to table A1.2.
Source: Eurobarometer 68.1 (September-November 2007), weighted results
Table A1.5
Backgrounds to the preference for joint policy
(appendix table A1.B6, row 21), autumn 2007
(standardised regression coefficients a )
The Netherlands
gender: women
–0.10***
age:
15-34 years compared to 35-54
–0.01
0.07*
–0.05
0.02
0.02
≥ 55 years compared to 35-54
0.02
–0.10**
–0.07*
–0.05
–0.05
–0.01
–0.12**
–0.13
–0.11**
education
lowest third per country compared to middle third
–0.10**
highest third per country compared to middle third
0.03
0.11***
0.07
0.07*
–0.02
satisfaction with one’s own life:
not very or not at all compared to fairly
–0.011***
very compared to fairly
0.01
–0.02
–0.13***
0.03
–0.14***
0.04
0.12***
0.00
–0.08*
0.12***
self-description in political terms:
left compared to centre
0.02
0.04
0.05
0.03
right compared to centre
–0.06
–0.01
0.00
0.00
0.07*
0.05
0.07
0.09
0.05
0.05
Nagelkerke pseudo-R2
a Significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 and *** p< 0.001 (bivariate).
Source: Eurobarometer 68.1 (September-November 2007), weighted results
the selected countries. On average they explain only around 10% of the variation
in individual differences. Perhaps there is little differentiation per country in
the selected attitudes, perhaps we did not look at the relevant individual background factors. In chapter A3 we further investigate individual backgrounds to
involvement with the eu and satisfaction with the way it works.
23
24
Europe’s Neighbours
1.5
In conclusion: The Netherlands in Europe
As a kind of summary of this chapter, table A1.6 shows for a selection of views
and attitudes the percentages for the Netherlands and the averages of the country percentages for the 15 old member states, the 12 new and all 27.
The Netherlands old 15 new 12 all 27
is very satisfied with one’s own life (B1, row 1)
52
30
13
22
is not very or not at all satisfied with one’s own life
(B1, row 2)
4
14
30
21
thinks that the country is going in the right direction
(B1, row 3)
38
39
34
36
thinks that the country is going in the wrong direction
(B1, row 4)
33
37
40
39
is involved with the EU (B4, row 1)
26
20
17
19
claims to be well-informed about the EU (B4, row 2)
55
42
42
42
has actual knowledge of the EU (B4, row 3)
46
50
46
48
considers EU membership a good thing (B5, row 1)
79
61
54
58
considers EU membership beneficial (B5, row 2)
74
62
64
63
has a positive image of the EU (B5, row 3)
43
48
53
50
is optimistic about the future of the EU (B5, row 4)
76
67
69
68
is in favour of further enlargements (B5, row 5)
49
42
61
51
average support for joint European policy (B6, row 21)
53
51
56
53
has heard of the neighbourhood policy (B7, row 1)
14
22
25
23
average support for special relationships with neighbours (B7, row 12)
82
83
84
84
Source: appendix tables
Many Dutch people are very satisfied with their own lives, but they are not satisfied with their own country. They score above average in terms of their own
involvement with and knowledge of the eu, but this does not translate itself
into an above-average score in the knowledge test. They are very positive about
eu membership, but they do not have a very positive image of the eu and they
are in the middle range on further enlargements and joint European policy.
Comparisons between the old and new member states again demonstrate the
clearly greater preference for further enlargements among the latter countries.
Furthermore, the differences are relatively limited with regard to eu affairs,
and what catches the eye is that people in the old member states are more satisfied with their personal situations.
Table A1.6
Selected views and attitudes (with
reference to appendix tables) in 2007
(in percent)
25
Appendix to chapter A1: Tables
In the following tables the 15 old and 12 new member states are listed more or
less from north to south.
Old: Finland (fi), Sweden (se), Denmark (dk), United Kingdom (uk), Ireland
(ie), Netherlands (nl), Belgium (be), Luxembourg (lu), Germany (de), Austria
(at), Italy (it), Greece (el), France (fr), Spain (es) and Portugal (pt).
New: Estonia (ee), Latvia (lv), Lithuania (lt), Poland (pl), Czech Republic (cz),
Slovakia (sk), Hungary (hu), Slovenia (si), Romania (ro), Bulgaria (bg), Cyprus
(cy) and Malta (mt).
10
IE
29
NL
10
BE
24
LU
–6
4 is going in the wrong direction
32
34
36
35
50
46
48
6 employment
7 the environment
8 the social security system
9 average of these four
8
22
24
18
10
35
34
34
26
17
49
45
–2 –11
–4
8
4
4
11
12
12
18
14
7
28
25
–5
10
0
31
31
8
47
37
–5
12
16
38
5
8
14
3
16
25
38
19
6
13
10
IT
EL
7
5
–2
11
0
5
–7
–5
FR
PT
35 –21 –24
22
30 –24 –26 –11
EE
LV
LT
24
–6 –39
4 –32
–4 –33
11
3
3
15
8
–6
–1
2
6 –10
–5
8
–5
2
–6
PL
HU
26
27
–6 –43
–8
–2 –24
10
–9 –18
SK
9 –16
–8
–9
RO
BG
38
2 –16 –23
–4 –16 –33
–7
9
CY
7 –25 –35
–4
2 –25 –32
–1 –26 –36
15 –24 –33
12
–5
0
MT
2
–1
4
–2
Source: Eurobarometer 68.1 (September-November 2007), weighted results
The average percentage per member state of people who consider that things are going in the right direction in their own country is 36. The Netherlands is in line with the average (36 + 0). Once again the Danes are the most optimistic (26 +22 = 58% consider that
things are going in the right direction in Denmark), and the Hungarians are again the most pessimistic (36 – 24 = 12% consider that things are going in the right direction in Hungary).
Examples:
The average of the country percentages of the people of the 27 member states who are in general very satisfied with their own lives is 22. The percentage in the Netherlands is 51 (22 + 29), which is lower than in Denmark (22 + 44 = 66%), but significantly higher
than in Hungary (22 – 18 = 4%).
4
1
10 –12
1
2
11 –10
8 –12 –14
28
1 –11
–1
–8
4 –17 –20
SI
3 –18 –37 –13 –24 –22
–9
8
–8
–3
–9
CZ
–8 –32 –18 –24 –11 –22 –28
12
18
15 –35 –21
11
20 –11
1
6 –17
–1 –42
–2
3 –18
–9
0 –18 –14 –13 –13
ES
33 –22 –21 –10 –13 –21
22 –25 –32 –28
31 –29 –28 –28
13
6 –20
–9
–2 –13 –13
AT
–6 –12
11 –13
30
8 –14
–5
–4
0
DE
a “Overall, would you say you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied, with the type of life you lead?” The figures show the frequencies of the answers as percentages of all answers, including “don’t know”.
b “Would you say that in general things are heading the right or the wrong direction [in your country]?”. The figures show the percentages of all answers, including “neither” and “don’t know”.
c “How would you judge the current situation in each of the following? … very good, rather good, rather bad, very bad”. The figures show the frequencies of the first two answers as percentages of all answers, including “don’t know”.
39
51
44
5 the economy
is positive about the following matters in own country: c
15
36
39
3 is going in the right direction
thinks that own country a
10
10
UK
–17 –17 –20 –12 –12 –17 –11 –15
44
DK
21
20
SE
22
FI
1 very satisfied
country average
2 not very satisfied or not at all satisfied
is in general … with own life: a
 
Table A1.B1
Views on life, population aged 15 years and above, autumn 2007 (country averages in percent and deviations from them in percentage points)
26
Europe’s Neighbours
 
unemployment
crime
healthcare
economic situation
immigration
pensions
taxation
education
housing
environmental protection
terrorism
energy-related issues
defence and foreign affairs
other (spontaneous)
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
DK
UK
–4
13
–6
–3
2
3
–3
–1
4
–2
6
0
–1
12
12
9
6
6
5
5
4
4
3
3
1
1
–1
0
3
–2
10
–3
5
–1
–3
0
–4
9
3
–2
0
3
0
6
6
–3
3
–1
–4
5
–6
9
6
–9
–1
1
–1
6
0
2
–1
–1
–2
14
–6
2
10
–7
–2
SE
12
FI
–7 –16 –14 –14
18
country average
IE
NL
0
–1
–1
–1
–2
2
–2
–3
–5
1
–5
11
17
1
3
0
2
4
–3
7
–1
–5
2
–1
6
5
–6 –10
–7 –11
1
–1
2
–1
1
1
–2
3
4
4
–3
–9
–4
2
0
BE
–1
–1
0
–1
0
13
7
–2
–2
0
–6
–8
–6
5
2
LU
–1
–1
0
3
0
–4
4
0
2
–3
–2
–3
–4
10
–1
DE
–1
0
0
2
0
–3
1
1
2
7
–4
–5
–4
2
3
AT
IT
–1
–1
–1
1
–2
–3
–4
8
–2
1
5
–8
6
3
–2
–1
0
–2
–2
1
–4
2
–1
2
–3
8
–4
–4
9
–1
EL
–2
0
–9
ES
–1
–1
–1
0
3
2
0
–3
4
1
1
2
–1
–2
17
–2
12
–2
–2
–3
7
–4
–4 –10
–3
8
–4
FR
0
–1
–2
–2
–3
–3
–1
3
–1
–5
5
0
–7
16
1
PT
0
3
5
–2
–1
–3
–1
0
–2
–5
0
–2
5
–8
12
EE
LV
–1
–1
–1
–3
–3
–1
–1
1
2
–4
3
–4
–4
–5
23
LT
–1
–1
0
–3
–3
0
–1
3
0
–3
1
–2
5
–8
14
0
0
–1
–2
–2
0
–3
0
2
–2
0
14
–4
5
–6
PL
0
–1
0
–1
–1
–1
–2
–1
3
–4
1
8
2
–5
4
CZ
0
0
–1
0
–2
–1
–1
–2
1
–5
5
4
–2
4
–1
SK
–1
–1
0
–2
–2
–2
–1
–1
0
–5
6
7
–5
9
–1
HU
SI
0
1
–1
–2
–2
2
–1
1
–1
–5
–2
–1
–4
–1
15
0
0
–2
–2
–2
1
–1
0
6
–4
7
0
0
–3
0
RO
0
–1
1
–2
–2
–4
2
–3
2
–4
6
–5
0
0
11
BG
6
1
0
–2
0
2
–1
–1
–2
–2
2
–9
5
–2
5
CY
Source: Eurobarometer 68.1 (September-November 2007), weighted results
Example: Unemployment is regarded as a serious national problem (more precisely: one of the two most serious problems) in Portugal (12 + 16 = 28%), but not in the Netherlands (12 – 10 = 2%). Dutch people regard healthcare (12 + 6 = 18),
crime (12 + 5 = 17) and education (5 + 7 = 12) as the most serious problems of the ones mentioned here.
a “What do you think are the two most important issues facing [your country] at the moment?” Respondents can give a maximum of two answers, and almost all do so. The answers of the 4% of respondents who on average name only one problem are
counted double; the 1% on average who do not name a problem are left out of consideration. The figures show the problems as percentages of the total.
rising prices / inflation
1
Table A1.B2
The most important problems in own country a, population aged 15 years and above, autumn 2007 (country averages in percent and deviations from them in percentage points)
2
–1
0
–2
2
1
–3
1
–1
15
–1
–8
–5
–3
4
MT
Appendix to chapter A1: Tables
27
 
7
–8
56
11
3 the European Union
7 the European Union
–7
–4
–7
–8
–6
UK
5
11 –19
38
5 –30
36
1
25
5
DK
NL
–2
BE
6
13
1
–5
–1
–9
24
–2
16
–5
14
10
10
11
10
2 –11 –14
5 –19
IE
–3
DE
3
2
2
16
0
9
–1 –15
18
10
–6 –13
–4
LU
3
–7
–3
IT
–5
–5
23 –17
–9 –12
16 –12
1
1
7
AT
5
6
10
14
–6
20
25
EL
–3
8
–3
2
5
0
–9
FR
PT
3
–4
–5
14
–6
20 –20
3
9
2
–7 –14
10 –10
ES
–1
2
3
LV
–3
–2
–6
LT
CZ
–5
5
4
3
–5
–4 –14 –32
13
–4
SK
2
–5
15
–9
8
3
6
6
–5
2
–6 –22 –32
3
6
13
9
HU
–1 –17
–2
7 –24 –15
7 –22
PL
8 –22 –25 –28 –22
–4
1
–8
EE
1
RO
8
–3
15
21
BG
13
4
8
–1 –12
–9 –21 –30
10
–7 –20 –27
2
10 –10
14
SI
–3
5
1
11
–6
9
5
CY
Source: Eurobarometer 68.1 (September-November 2007), weighted results
Example: In the Netherlands, as in nearly all EU member states, people are more attached to their own country (56 – 11 = 45%) than to their own town or village (50 –19 = 31%), but in Belgium the attachment to town and village (50 – 2 = 48%) is slightly
greater than the attachment to country (56 – 14 = 42%).
a People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country, or to the EU. The figures show the answer “very attached” as a percentage of “very attached”, “fairly attached”, “not very attached”, “not at all
attached” and “don’t know”.
b “I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it.” The figures show the answer “tend to trust” as a
percentage of “tend to trust”, “tend not to trust” and “don’t know”.
c “On the whole, are you very satisfied, satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [your country]?”, and “How about the way democracy works in the European Union?” The figures show
the answers “very satisfied” and “fairly satisfied” as a percentage of all answers, including “don’t know”.
20
–12
57
52
6 own country
23
–11 –14
54
5 the European Union
is satisfied with democracy in: c
27
38
19
–2
9
0
SE
4 the national parliament
tends to trust: b
–16
50
FI
2 own country
country average
1 own town or village
is very attached to: a
Table A1.B3
Comparisons between own country and the EU, population aged 15 years and above, autumn 2007 (country averages in percent and deviations from them in percentage points)
2
–4
2
4
8
10
1
MT
28
Europe’s Neighbours
FI
3
8
1
–8
–2
–1
1
–4
SE
UK
–5
18
–5
1 –21
4
6 –10
DK
IE
–2
13
7
NL
11 –10
–8
–7
–6
4
8
8
9
BE
19
18
12
8
LU
–6
4
5
9
DE
5
IT
4
22
7
–4
EL
–5 –14
16 –21
–1 –16
2
AT
–7
–3
PT
–6 –11
11
–8 –10
7
ES
–1 –11
–1
5
FR
6
–5
LV
LT
–1
–7
3
10
0
–2 –12 –14
9
5
EE
 
–2
0
17
–1
PL
SK
2
–5
2
–5
–6
HU
–3 –12
11
–7 –15
–5 –10
CZ
27
CY
–7 –14 –10
13
13
15 –12
BG
–9 –22
–8
RO
15 –15 –12
17
7
SI
Source: Eurobarometer 68.1 (September-November 2007), weighted results
68
51
4 is optimistic about the future of the EU d
5 is in favour of further enlargements e
–3
SE
UK
15 –26
11 –24
DK
–8
–7
3
0
–2 –14
13 –16
–22 –13 –10 –26
–11 –15
–13
FI
–6
6
19
24
16
IE
–2
9
–7
11
21
NL
2
3
6
24
LU
AT
–8
IT
2 –15
–1 –16
–8
–4
5
–5 –21 –16
9 –20
DE
–4 –26 –22 –27
8
8
12
16
BE
–8
3
–6
2
FR
2 –19
4
7
17
4
EL
Source: Eurobarometer 68.1 (September-November 2007), weighted results
Example: The Poles are most in favour of further enlargements of the EU (51 + 25 = 76%), the Austrians (51 – 27 = 24%) and Luxembourgers (51 – 26 = 25%) least.
“Generally speaking, do you think that [your country’s] membership of the European Union is a good thing”? (or “a bad thing”, “neither good nor bad”, “don’t know”).
“Taking everything into account, would you say that [your country] has on balance benefited … from being a member of the European Union? (or “not benefited”, “don’t know”).
“In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive [or] fairly positive … image?” (or “neutral”, “fairly negative”, “very negative”, “don’t know”).
“Would you say that you are very optimistic [or] fairly optimistic … about the future of the European Union?” (or “fairly pessimistic”, “very pessimistic”, “don’t know”).
“Are you in favour of further enlargement of the EU to include other countries in future years?” (or “against”, “don’t know”).
50
3 has a positive image of the EU c
58
63
1 considers EU membership a good thing
country average
2 considers EU membership beneficial b
a
8
1
8
1
10
ES
–3
–9
6
6
0
PT
LV
–6
4
6
1
–7
2 –14
17
3 –21
EE
16
8
7
18
7
LT
CZ
25
14
14
20
11
–1
–7
–2
13 –13
PL
HU
–9
8
13
1 –12
0
7 –21
0 –18
SK
15
5
11
8
–1
SI
CY
–6 –18
BG
13
7
18
4
–6
7
6
1
3
4 –11 –26
13
RO
Example: In Slovenia, 50% (23 + 27) of people think that their compatriots are well-informed about European political affairs; in Greece, only 9% (23 – 14) think so, even though the Greeks in fact have a greater actual knowledge of the EU (48 + 22 = 70%) than the
Slovenians (48 + 15 = 63%).
a
b
c
d
e
12
–4
–5
4
MT
10
–1
3
2
–4
MT
Tends to agree rather than disagree with (or has no view on) the statement “I feel very much involved in European affairs”.
Tends to agree rather than disagree with (or has no view on) the statement “I understand how the EU works”.
Gives at least two correct answers to three questions: “The EU currently consists of 15 countries” (incorrect), “A different member state assumes the presidency of the EU every six months” (correct), and “The euro zone currently consists of 12 countries” (incorrect).
Thinks that, overall, compatriots are well-informed about “European political affairs”.
23
a
b
c
d
4 believes that compatriots are well-informed about the EU d
42
48
b
19
country average
3 has actual knowledge of the EU c
2 claims to be well-informed about the EU
1 is involved with the EUa
Table A1.B5
Positive attitudes towards the EU, population aged 15 years and above, autumn 2007 (country averages in percent and deviations from them in percentage points)
 
Table A1.B4
Involvement with and knowledge of the EU, population aged 15 years and above, autumn 2007 (country averages in percent and deviations from them in percentage points)
Appendix to chapter A1: Tables
29
 
consumer protection
agriculture and fisheries
fighting inflation
economy
transport
fighting unemployment
healthcare
education
social security
taxation
pensions
average preference for joint European policy
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
3
–32
52
–1
–6
1
4
–6
–8
–12 –16 –20 –14
–19 –19 –21 –10
–14
30
28
54
–6
–23 –21 –22 –13 –10 –16
34
–4 –18
–9
–3
0
2 –19
2
–7 –15
–3
–16 –11 –11 –18
–8
34
–2 –16
–16 –11 –16 –18
1
3
12
15
–2
12
–23 –23
–1
2
2
39
3
–5
–4
3
7
1
–3
–7
4
14
16
–3
6
NL
42
10 –24
–18
22
–20 –26 –26 –27
1 –26
20 –14
3 –12
49
9 –11
4
–3
49
51
–14
5 –19
53
2
IE
–8
–3 –30 –16
–5
–9
58
8
–29 –11 –11 –21
62
64
–41 –21 –13 –27
8 –18
–5 –13
–9
0 –16
10
67
0
3
12
–9
–3
71
UK
7 –17
DK
–16
–8
76
6
SE
68
3
84
69
FI
country average
7
0
3
2
–6
6
–9
–4
10
6
11
–2
7
3
LU
0
–7
AT
7
–2
IT
–3
0
–8
–2
–9
–7
–8
0
–3
–1
–4
6
–6
–8
–2
–5 –17
–4
9
8
11
14 –11
9 –13
8
4 –21
16
13 –11
12 –22
5 –10
4
9
14
11
10
12
9
4
12
4
2
1
3
7
–9
12 –12
–8
–9
6 –15
9
6
13
10
1
–1
–3
0
–9
–5
5
–6
2
–7
–2
–6
4
0
–2
–1
–6
–2
9 –11
1
2
9
6
10 –12
19 –13
1
10
14
–5
5
4
–1
12
9
7
–5 –11 –17
–1
14
ES
2 –20
FR
13 –11
8
13
–2
EL
11 –12
2
6
6
1 –14 –17
17 –15
–1 –11
7 –11
DE
0 –18 –12 –11
3 –20
–3
0 –11
10
1 –12
20
15
17
14
7
12
11
5
10
9
3
7
2
4
BE
0
9
–2
–2
–6
6
6
EE
–5
10
26
23
21
22
17
20
3
15
13
8
0
9
–4
14
–1
13
–1
–6
1
–1
–8
5 –13
2
9 –14
10
3
–1
3
–1
–3
–4
PT
6
15
10
10
14
13
9
6
12
–1
–1
2
–2
7
10
8
8
5
–7
5
4
LV
7
14
13
19
12
12
8
1
19
–9
3
3
6
CZ
3
11
9
5
0
1
8
2
4
–5
–1
4
11
0
2
–1
–3
15
–1
4
–4
–5
–6
–2 –15
2
–4 –11
6
5
2
2 –14
0
–2
1
2
PL
4 –13
7
4
3
8
2
8
4
8
–7
3
3
LT
1
–2
–3
–2
5
–7
11
–9
–6
–3
–7
2
–3
6
10
16
–6
3
0
11
7
SK
4
–2
5
10
–5
–8
8
–6
2
–6
–2
1
4
9
12
14
9
4
8
5
8
HU
SI
–5
RO
–1
BG
–3
–1
4
–2
–2
8
0
3
–1
–1
3
–8
5
13
16
10
19
7
4
–6
1
–2
1
–3
–5
–5
–5
–1
–6
6
–9
–7
–4
4 –10 –16
5
1 –11
0 –14 –13
1 –13
4 –11 –16
7
9
8
1 –15 –14
–5
–2 –16 –10
1 –16 –10
–1
10
6
10
–4
3
3
MT
2
–3
1
–9
2
–1
2
–3
3
20
16
24
17
1
0
0
32 –10
13
34
16
16
16
15
18
21
12
6
8 –11
3
19
16
12
16
0
CY
Source: Eurobarometer 68.1 (September-November 2007), weighted results
Example: With a country average of 84%, fighting terrorism is the issue for which there is strongest support for joint policy in the EU member states. This is least the case in Spain and the United Kingdom, where respectively 64% (84 – 20) and 67% (84 – 17)
of the people are in favour of joint policy on fighting terrorism; in the Netherlands, 90% (84 + 6) are in favour.
a “For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the [national] government, or made jointly within the EU?” The 16 policy areas and topics were presented in random order. They are included here in order of decreasing support
for joint policy (as a percentage of all answers, including “don’t know”).
competition
defence and foreign affairs
6
9
energy
5
fighting crime
support for regions facing economic difficulties
4
immigration
protecting the environment
3
7
scientific and technological research
2
8
fighting terrorism
1
Table A1.B6
Preferences for joint European policy, population aged 15 years and above, autumn 2007 (country averages in percent and deviations from them in percentage points a )
30
Europe’s Neighbours
 
wants EU help to deal with conflicts n neighbouring
countries b
2
“in order to help these countries, we should give
them easier access to EU markets”
4
environment and energy
democracy
organised crime and terrorism
economic development
education and training
average support for special relationships in the six
areas above
6
7
8
9
10
11
FI
4
1
3
0
–1
82
88
86
82
2
4
4
78
84
1
–9
SE
4
–4
1
6
9
8
4
6
UK
IE
–9
–9
4
1
2
4
–8
–6
–9
–4
5 –13
7
6
3
–2
–1
–3
–3
–3
–6
–4
BE
–1
–3
–2
5
–1
1
–8
8
–6
13
LU
0
1
1
1
0
1
–7
–6
–5
–3
–7
–5
–5 –15
1 –10
5
AT
1
IT
–1
–5
–1
4
1
2
–4
–4
–1
–4
–2
–1
–1
–1
1
–3
0
1
1
1
–3
2
0
7
1
8
–9 –22 –18
9
DE
–6 –17 –14
3 –11
–9
NL
–9 –13
11 –16 –14
–9
16 –13 –15
2 –16 –12
DK
–6 –12 –16
0
13
86
64
33
39
23
country average
–5
FR
5
6
5
1
10
5
4
13
–4
–3
–4
–4
–2
–3
–6
–9
11 –12
17 –13
–8
EL
3
4
0
1
4
–1
10
–7
–6
7
–9
ES
–5
6
3
2
EE
–3
–2
–5
–8
–2
–9
–8
–8
–9
–9
–7 –10
4 –10
–4
4
–8
5
PT
LV
0
2
3
2
–6
1
–1
2
20
7
10
0
0
1
–1
0
–3
0
–1
20
4
1
LT
7
10
8
7
5
6
5
7
11
6
–5
PL
3
4
3
5
6
2
2
12
6
–3
–5
CZ
3
4
6
3
2
2
3
7
12
6
4
SK
4
2
2
5
3
7
3
–2
12
–8
–5
HU
2
4
4
1
–3
1
6
10
4
5
6
SI
–7
–6
–8
7
–5
3
BG
–4
0
–3
–9
–7
–7
–4
–5
–3 –11
–5
–6
4
13
5
2
RO
21
10
MT
4
8
5
1
9
5
0
5
6
5
–1
5
4
10
10 –14
2 –17
32
–1
CY
Source: Eurobarometer 67.3 (May-June 2007), weighted results
Example: In the Netherlands, 14% of interviewees (23 – 9) say that they have heard of the European neighbourhood policy. This is more than in the United Kingdom (23 – 16 = 7%), but appreciably fewer than in Finland (23 + 13 = 36%) and Latvia and Malta
(23 + 10 = 33%).
a “Have you ever heard of the European Union’s policy towards its neighbours, called the European Neighbourhood Policy?”
b “Some of our neighbours suffer from internal conflicts, which can also cause wider refugee or economic problems. According to you, should the European Union provide financial help to help deal with the internal conflicts of its neighbours?” The figures show
the percentage of affirmative answers as a percentage of all answers.
c “Totally agree” and “tend to agree” as a percentage of these answers, “totally disagree”, “tend to disagree” and “don’t know”.
d “For each of the following areas, please tell me if you think it is very important, fairly important, not very important or not at all important that the European Union develops specific relationships with these countries with respect to …” The figures show “very
important” and “fairly important” as a percentage of these answers, “not very important”, “not at all important” and “don’t know”.
immigration
5
considers it important that the EU develops specific
relationships with respect to: d
“these countries share most of our values”
3
agrees with the following statements: c
has heard of the European neighbourhood policy a
1
Table A1.B7
Views on the European neighbourhood policy, population aged 15 years and above, spring 2007 (country averages in percent and deviations from them in percentage points)
Appendix to chapter A1: Tables
31
32
A2 Europe in the press, an international comparison
2.1
Introduction
On 7 December 2007 the state secretary for European Affairs, Frans Timmermans, sent a letter to the Lower House of Parliament headed “Communication
on Europe: the Reform Treaty and the future of Europe”. This was intended to
herald a new direction in the national debate on the eu. According to Timmermans, in past years the debate on the eu has concentrated far too much on the
rules of unification. The core of the letter is that Europe’s importance in the
everyday political work and hence also in citizens’ daily lives is not or barely
discussed. It argues that without this information the value of the eu cannot be
assessed properly:
The cabinet takes the view that, in addition to being offered a detailed introduction
to the Reform Treaty, citizens should be more involved in and better informed about
the European Union in a broad sense. Europe is far more than the debate on its institutional structure. Europe must become more visible in terms of specific policy areas,
so that the debate can concentrate on substantive matters (tk 2007/2008: 4).
Taking up the notion that there is more to Brussels than politicking about the
rules of the game, we devote attention in this chapter to the role which Europe
plays in several policy areas according to the Dutch, British and French media.
Most scientific studies on media reporting on Europe have also tended to
concentrate on the big themes that touch on the future of European integration
itself. Thus there is by now a substantial collection of studies, relying on country comparisons or other methods, which deal with the coverage in national
media of the eu’s enlargement, the referendum on the European constitution,
a particular European summit or European elections (Semetko, De Vreese and
Peter 2000; Koopmans and Erbe 2004; Trenz 2004; Pfetsch 2005; Kleinnijenhuis, Takens and Van Atteveldt 2005; Adam 2007; De Vreese 2007). This seems
the right moment to turn the research more towards the importance of Europe
for everyday politics, for the “bread-and-butter” issues, as it were.
According to Timmermans, the new direction should not only be set out
through government communication and thus by ministers, it should also be
given shape through more intensive participation by members of the Lower
House, the media and civil society, in dialogue with citizens (tk 2007/2008).
This ambition is intriguing not least because it has emerged that our parliamentarians have been relatively passive players in the European debate,
certainly in comparison with their colleagues in other countries (Maurer and
Wessels 2001; Boerboom 2004; Van Noije 2007). In a vicious circle, modest
familiarity with European politics and a lack of interest and activity in this area
feed off each other, so that Dutch parliamentarians, with the exception of a few
specialists, systematically neglect Europe. From this corner the media receive
very little stimulation to devote attention to European affairs. By contrast, the
current political ambition is all the more urgent, since parliamentarians gear
their agenda more to the media’s as Europe’s visibility increases in the news
(Van Noije 2007). On the assumption that attention is a necessary condition for
knowledge and opinion formation, it is not the parliamentarians but the media
which for now pave the way for the political and public debate.
This finding confirms yet again that the media matter: the attention paid to
Europe by the media is to some extent indicative of the attention which Europe
A2 Europe in the press, an international comparison
33
enjoys in the political debate and of the extent to which citizens are given the
opportunity to familiarise themselves with the developments in and backgrounds to European themes. Building on the doctoral research by Van Noije
from 2007, we will examine here what, according to the media, is Europe’s
relevance in the policy areas of agriculture, environment, drugs and immigration. With the help of computerised content analysis we determine how much
coverage the eu or representatives of the eu member states receive on these
four issues in a number of national daily newspapers. We compare the Dutch
reporting with the British and French reporting during the period 1990-2003.
We then look at whether the Dutch press has shown a greater or a smaller
interest in Europe in recent years (2004-2006). But first we offer for the United
Kingdom, France and the Netherlands a general outline of national attitudes in
the political world, among the public and in the media.
2.2
National attitudes towards the eu
United Kingdom: the divisive power of Europe
The United Kingdom has had a turbulent relationship with the eu. The close
ties with the United States, the position within the Commonwealth and the
reluctance to accept the end of the British Empire explain the difficulty which
the British have in committing themselves to a continental body based on such
divergent traditions. When the United Kingdom sought closer relations, and
when it eventually joined the “Common Market” during the premiership of
Edward Heath in 1973, the motivations were purely of an economic and pragmatic nature. The desire to create an open market economy also at European
level has always been the driving force behind pro-European British policy
towards Europe. It is historical and political considerations which underlie the
great British reticence before and after accession to the then European Community (Geddes 2004). John Major, the prime minister who succeeded Margaret
Thatcher, secured some fundamental conditions during the negotiations on the
Treaty of Maastricht: the British opt-out from the Social Chapter, the right to
determine when to introduce the single currency, the principle of subsidiarity,
and the intergovernmental pillars of cooperation (instead of supranational
structures) in foreign affairs, defence, home affairs and justice.
Even after the United Kingdom’s accession in 1973, the conditions of membership as enshrined in the acquis communautaire – by that time it was a case of
having to lump it for the United Kingdom – were the subject of fierce arguments
with other member states, between the political parties, but above all also
within the parties. European integration is a constant source of conflict, especially within the Conservative Party (Cross and Golding 1997; Evans and Butt
2007; Geddes 2004). It took until 1997 before a prime minister came to office
who was determined to strengthen ties with the eu. Not only did Tony Blair
want to consolidate British leadership in the eu, he also wanted to reconcile the
British people with Europe. From the mid 1980s the Labour Party had undergone a process of modernisation and had moved closer to the political centre
ground. As part of this process, the British socialists acknowledged the benefits
of a single market, accepted the British leadership role in achieving this at
European level, and expressed their solidarity with Europe’s social democrats.
As part of this “third way” under New Labour, Europe was no longer a source
of tension within the British government (Geddes 2004). Yet there remain some
obstacles in the relationship between the United Kingdom and Europe. It is
one of only three old member states which have not introduced the euro. The
British vision for Europe is still intergovernmental rather than supranational.
34
Europe’s Neighbours
British commitment to the eu is still largely rooted in economic pragmatism
(Geddes 2004). Despite the United Kingdom’s more solid position within the
eu under New Labour, euroscepticism or at least reticence is still alive and well
in all layers of British society, among the public, in Parliament and in the media
(see cpb/scp 2007; Evans and Butt 2007; Geddes 2004).
The British political attitudes towards the eu have their origins in part in the
two-party system, which encourages polarisation. In a two-party system the
party which holds power does not have to strike many compromises. To prevent
parties falling apart, referendums have been called to settle internal disputes
and to overcome European deadlocks. This opened up the debate on European
integration, so that party leaders increasingly saw opinion formation shared
between themselves and journalists. Especially when the United Kingdom
lacked strong political leadership and John Major needed all his energy to keep
the Conservative Party and the government together, politicians worried about
the media’s increased influence on public opinion and also started to take
account of the preferences of various newspapers (Cross and Golding 1997;
Geddes 2004).
Brussels and British reporting
In general one can say that there are two types of journalists active in Brussels.
The first type is the “institutional” journalist. Most of these journalists are proEuropean and attach such importance to being part of the European circles that
they put less emphasis on scrutinising institutions and interpreting events.
They were the first journalists to arrive in Brussels. Friendly relations between
journalists and their news sources are just as important for them in Brussels as
they are in the national context.
The second type of journalist practices a more critical investigative journalism.
These journalists have a less ideological attitude towards the eu, keep a professional distance to their sources, and are therefore more willing to scoop big
stories and expose scandals (Baisnée 2000). These are the British Europe correspondents who came into contact with the Brussels culture at a relatively late
stage. Not only are they relative newcomers, but their editors at home do not
keep them in their posts for more than four to five years, to prevent them from
“going native” and thus losing their critical independence. Although these
journalists indeed keep a distance to their subjects, the other side of the coin is
that they receive only a brief introduction to European politics and all its technical complexity. This makes it more difficult for them to accumulate detailed
knowledge and then to make the events understandable for the British public.
Compared to their French colleagues, for instance, the knowledge of British
correspondents has remained superficial. Moreover, British correspondents are
also much more tightly controlled by their editors at home than most of their
foreign colleagues, with the result that reporting on Europe takes on the political hue of the newspaper in question and is presented more from a national
perspective and in the context of fierce national controversies (Baisnée 2000;
Pfetsch 2005). The very prominent British “tabloid” (i.e. populist) press, the
sharply national perspective on eu news, and a generally rather superficial
knowledge of European affairs could explain the plethora of oversimplified stories about the eu in the British press – stories which also appear in the quality
papers, it must be said.
A2 Europe in the press, an international comparison
35
During the 1970s and 1980s support for the eu increased in the British press,
not least on the back of the benefits which the single market was expected to
bring. But during the 1990s euroscepticism took a strong hold, both among the
(conservative) political elites and in the media, which was noticeable in particular in the more right-wing newspapers such as The Sun and The Times. British
critical investigative journalism regularly mutated into hostility or even xenophobia towards Europe (Cross and Golding 1997). Journalists actively sought
out scandals and rows between member states and within institutions. Cases
of fraud in Brussels were presented as structural features of the inefficient and
expensive European institutions. The term “f-word” cropped up now and again
in the tabloid headlines to highlight what was seen as the plague of federalism
(Cross and Golding 1997).
The European issues which have received most attention over the years are
clearly of an economic nature, although political and defence themes have also
been raised at times. Cultural themes are much more difficult to find. This
reflects the priorities of the political elite (Cross and Golding 1997; Trenz 2004).
European reporting in the United Kingdom is characterised by the same pragmatic cost/benefit analysis as the political debate (Geddes 2004). As said in the
previous paragraph, Europe receives extremely negative coverage in the British
media. A comparison among eu member states confirms the suspicion that
the British news is indeed the most negative of all (Pfetsch 2005). The various
studies come to contradictory results about the quantity of eu reporting in
the British media compared to other countries (Cross and Golding 1997; De
Vreese 2003; Pfetsch 2005; Trenz 2004).
France: Europe’s best friend and worst enemy
The centuries-old French desire for international grandeur is at the core of both
France’s early support for the European project in the 1950s and of its difficulties in sticking to the rules of the game. Consequently the relationship between
France and the eu is one of contradictions, of simultaneous repulsion and
attraction. President Charles de Gaulle realised all too well, albeit reluctantly,
that European integration was necessary to restore France’s position among
the major powers, and to protect it from future external threats. The French
reasons for transferring large slices of national sovereignty were wholly of a
political nature. The idea was that integration in the foreign policy and defence
sphere would create a European power bloc as a counterweight to us hegemony
(Drake 2005; Elgie and Griggs 2000). By contrast, harmonisation of economic
and social policy has encountered far more French opposition over the years.
The French willingness to limit national sovereignty is probably easier to
understand if one bears in mind that the leaders of the Fifth Republic have
always been convinced of France’s natural leadership qualities (Van Noije and
Hijmans 2005). Europe had to be moulded in France’s image, as a vehicle for its
national interests. Two Frenchmen, Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, sometimes called the “fathers of Europe”, did indeed play very decisive roles in the
Community’s intellectual design.
French nationalism reared its head whenever French leadership was questioned
or French plans were thwarted (Drake 2005; Van Noije and Hijmans 2005). This
led to quite a few collisions with other member states over the years. Repeatedly
with the eu institutions and the smaller member states, both of which France
has traditionally tried to keep on the sidelines. For a long time the French
regarded Germany as the only serious partner. The struggle has been fiercest
with the United Kingdom, a powerful pro-us ideological opposite. From the
36
Europe’s Neighbours
1990s French leaders seemed to realise that they had to rein themselves in, as
the United Kingdom and Germany become more willing to take on eu leadership roles and the French people became ever more sceptical. Policy in the
1990s was more consensus-based, both domestically and with the eu partners
(Costa and Daloz 2005).
A barrage of splits and new alliances in the French political party system
on European policy exposes the polarising effect which the eu has had on
domestic politics as well. But such grand gestures do not impress the French
people. This is because political parties and party politics enjoy only moderate respect in French society (Elgie and Griggs 2000). It seems that many
politicians are able to abandon supposedly deeply held convictions rather
easily when a coalition can be formed. This also applies to European integration (Elgie and Griggs 2000; Flood 2005). In contrast with the Netherlands,
for instance, France has always had explicitly eurosceptical political parties,
both on the left and the right, but also pro-European parties. And the French
presidents, regardless of their party political antecedents, have always stood
above the parties and have always participated willingly (albeit critically) in
the European adventure. This stance has always been supported by the French
people. According to the Eurobarometer, until the 1990s French support for
eu membership, although characterised by a steadily falling enthusiasm, was
consistently above the European average (cpb/scp 2007; Startin 2005). Whereas
opposition among the political parties declined around the turn of the century,
opposition among the people since the Treaty has actually increased. The great
leaps in the unification process around the turn of the century, with all the
potential risks this entailed for the country’s social achievements, were beginning to worry the French people. In 2005 this resulted in a “no” to the European constitution. Even so, the recent French euroscepticism is not comparable
to the British hostility. Thus later in 2005 it emerged that a majority of French
people was still “fully or partly” in favour of the constitution (cpb/scp 2007).
But the previous broad support for the eu seems to have turned into indifference, and despite repeated efforts by the political parties, the eu has only a very
marginal impact on voting ­behaviour.
Brussels and French reporting
The French eu correspondents are the opposites of their British colleagues.
Present in Brussels from the very first days of the European project, they
represent the institutional journalistic style. The word “europhile” seems to
have been coined for this early cohort of French journalists. They took it upon
themselves to gain support for Europe in France and to increase knowledge
of how it works. The subsequent generations of French correspondents have
been more critical than their predecessors, certainly after the Cresson affair in
1999 which brought down the Santer Commission (Döhmen 1999). Yet the ties
between the cohorts have always been close, so that the pro-European institutional conception of the work has survived over the years (Baisnée 2000). The
early French journalists in Brussels were highly respected by both civil servants
and their colleagues from the other member states. This was due in particular
to their dedication and the detailed knowledge they acquired of Europe during
their postings in Brussels, which often lasted more than 30 years. No other
group had access to such an extensive network of contacts. But the upshot was
the emergence of an “old boys network” with an absence of healthy journalistic
competition, which undermined the objective distance required for professional reporting.
A2 Europe in the press, an international comparison
37
Unlike in the case of the British journalists, the editors in Paris are less inclined
to interfere with the content of European reporting, and they accept that the
subject matter is complex and has to be presented as such. The correspondents
also have considerable freedom to decide whether an article is best approached
from a national or a European perspective. But this does not mean that French
Brussels correspondents have found it easy to get their contributions published.
The French media are also commercial enterprises (Chalaby 2004). European
news has to compete on a daily basis with mountains of international copy.
The indifference of the French public, together with the technical level of the
reports, has persuaded most editors, even in the quality papers, to place the eu
well down the agenda. But it is still true that over the past decade the French
media have devoted more attention to Europe than those in the other member
states (Pfetsch 2005; Trenz 2004).
French news on Europe is communicated to the French public from a decidedly
European perspective, certainly in comparison with the United Kingdom and
the Netherlands. The French newspapers are less inclined to make European
events relevant to the home public by placing them within a national reference framework (Baisnée 2000; Trenz 2004). As is to be expected from the way
French correspondents operate, over the years the tone of the news coverage has
been more markedly and uniformly positive than in any other old member state.
Even around the turn of the century the newspapers published barely any negative articles, a small number of neutral articles and an overwhelming majority
of articles in which the eu was evaluated positively (Pfetsch 2005). Of course
the extent of the support for Europe varies from paper to paper. The centre-left
or centrist Le Monde and the progressive Libération can be counted among the
most pro-European newspapers, while Le Figaro, a more conservative quality
paper, is ultimately also pro-European but expresses blunt opinions on matters such as the lack of transparency or the loss of French sovereignty. Recently
the French media seem to have undergone the same development process as
the French people. The ideological rhetoric of a desire for a strong and united
Europe has been replaced by a pragmatic and businesslike tone of necessity.
This pragmatism should not be confused with the British economic pragmatism, however. The French are still firmly committed to a political Europe, as is
also evident from the choice of topics in the French media. On the basis of all
the characteristics of European politics, the reporting and public opinion on
Europe described here, France and the United Kingdom emerge as true opposites, with the Netherlands in the moderate middle, as we shall see below.
Netherlands: a history of consensus at national and eu level
In accordance with the reputation of Dutch politics in general, the Dutch attitude towards European integration can best be described as uniformly sympathetic, but still pragmatic. From accession in the 1950s into the 1990s each
Dutch government, whether left- or right-of-centre, has wanted closer ties with
its European partners for the sake of economic growth. As a trading nation the
Netherlands realised that it depended on good relations with its neighbours, on
a common market and on the removal of trade barriers. Fear of loss of national
identity or sovereignty was never seen as a reason to resist political integration. It is true that the Netherlands objected to further integration in the area of
foreign affairs and defence (De Graaff 2003; Pijpers 2005), especially because of
its desire (shared with the United Kingdom) for close relations with the United
States. The ideal Dutch scenario for Europe, cherished by successive governments and the major parties, has always been characterised by economic and
monetary integration along supranational lines.
38
Europe’s Neighbours
The Netherlands is one of the six original member states of what is now the
eu: it was a signatory to the Treaty of Paris in 1951 and the Treaties of Rome
in 1957 which established the European Coal and Steel Community (ecsc),
the European Economic Community (eec) and the European Atomic Energy
Community (eaec or Euratom). This gave the small Netherlands a particularly
influential position, which even countries such as Germany and France had to
take account of. This changed with the first enlargement and the gradual accession of nine new countries, including the United Kingdom (De Graaff 2003).
The Netherlands increasingly found itself in the position of a small member
state. This explains in part why the Netherlands has been such a strong advocate of a supranational Europe: giving more power to the European institutions
restricts the power of the large member states in favour of the smaller member
states (De Graaff 2003). Generally speaking, the Netherlands maintained a
calm and sympathetic relationship with the eu for decades. Of course there
were occasional disputes with other member states. For instance, since the
establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union (emu) in 1999 the Netherlands has stuck rigidly to the Stability Pact, to the irritation of member states
which are not able or willing to fulfil the budgetary conditions.
Unlike in the United Kingdom, in the Netherlands the eu has never led to
serious divisions between parties, let alone within parties. In the 1950s there
was even a consensus from the centre-right to the centre-left on the principle
of further integration into a federal Europe (Voerman 2005). Although the
enthusiasm abated in subsequent decades, the ambition of an eu with strong
supranational institutions remained an element in the major parties’ election
programmes (Voerman 2005). But without disagreement there is nothing to
discuss. That is why the eu barely registered on the Dutch political agenda
during all those years. Moreover, parliamentarians did not take their scrutinising task in the European domain very seriously, daunted as they were by the
complexity of the subject matter and the technical details (Boerboom 2004).
Against this background, the Dutch government had a free hand during European negotiations and received very little criticism from parliament or society.
The Dutch people have always been regarded as among the most europhile in
Europe. Despite a drop in support for Europe in the 1990s, this is arguably still
the case (see also cpb/scp 2007, chapter A1; Pijpers 2005; Thomassen 2005).
The favourable silent consensus broke down in the 1990s. Dissatisfaction with
the country’s position within the eu increased in the government, among the
parties and eventually also among the public. A first explanation is that the
Netherlands changed from a net recipient of eu funds to a net contributor in
1992. The enlargements of the eu have also fuelled concern about the waning
influence of smaller member states (Boerboom 2004). At government level the
growing distance was expressed in ever more pragmatic, less consistent and
less idealistic policies towards the eu. Ad hoc alliances became more important, at the expense of the supranational ideal. At party level the sp, which has
been represented in the Lower House since 1994, is a convinced critic of European market thinking. The right-wing liberals of the vvd (People’s Party for
Freedom and Democracy) led by Frits Bolkestein also became ever more critical
of the financial costs of eu membership (Bakker 1997; Pijpers 2005; Voerman
2005). The Lower House stirred in particular whenever the ideological individual freedoms which the Netherlands had acquired in a tradition of consultation
and compromise were called into question.
A2 Europe in the press, an international comparison
39
The Dutch government also had to deal with an increasingly dissatisfied
population. There were complaints about the expensive euro and the relatively
unrepresentative nature of the eu, reflecting the broader trend in Dutch politics
characterised by loud accusations that politicians were out of touch with the
common people and by the emergence of populism, as personified by Pim Fortuyn (Pijpers 2005; Thomassen 2005). The pivotal event was the Dutch “no” in
the referendum on the European constitution in June 2005. Whether this result
can be explained completely by anti-eu sentiments is doubtful (it is clear that
some voters took the opportunity to protest against the government of the day),
but the further enlargements eastwards, the influx of cheap Polish workers, and
the possibility of Turkish membership certainly played a role (cpb/scp 2005;
Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2005). The rest of Europe was completely taken by surprise
by this vote of no confidence from a country which had for long been a model of
consensus, diplomacy and tolerance. Although the Dutch people had become
gradually more critical over the past 15 years, especially regarding the further
enlargement of Europe, the supposed euroscepticism towards the European
constitution proved to be short-lived. Six months after the referendum in June
2005 the views on Europe had softened again (cpb/scp 2007).
Brussels and Dutch reporting
Dutch correspondents, who have been in Brussels since the very beginning, are
most like the institutional type of journalist: the European project has never
really been called into question by Dutch journalists, certainly not by those
stationed in Brussels. But the Dutch Europe correspondents are not the most
typical example of the institutional journalist. The sometimes rather alarming interconnections between correspondents and officials are not that evident
in the Dutch delegation. A journalist who accepts payment from the European
Commission for an article is likely to be slightly restrained in expressing
criticism of this institution (Döhmen 1999). Dutch journalists have been less
prone to such practices than many foreign colleagues. While Dutch journalists reported on domestic affairs with appropriate distance and respect up to
the end of the 1980s, the approach has been more critical, more pragmatic and
more anticipatory since the 1990s (De Vreese 2003). This shift in the definition
of political journalism also spread to the European domain, where an institutional approach was exchanged for a mix of institutional and investigative
journalism in the 1990s. Thus the emergence of critical investigative journalism
coincided with the first signs of dissatisfaction in the political world.
The predominantly pro-European attitude of Dutch journalists has little impact
on the modest interest which editors take in European affairs. The absence of
the eu from both the political and the media agendas is thus the most typical situation for the Netherlands (De Vreese 2003; Pfetsch 2005). The lack of
transparency in European decision making, the lack of recognisable faces and
the complexity of the subject matter are seen as huge obstacles by Dutch editors. The number of correspondents permanently based in Brussels is small
(Döhmen 1999). Only a Dutch eu presidency seems able to spark a temporary
upswing in interest (Bevers 2000). The absence of a polarised opinion climate
on the eu in the Netherlands accounts for a large part of the explanation; after
all, it is conflict that makes news (Adam 2007; De Vreese 2003; Peter 2003a).
Even though the Dutch media have adopted a more pragmatic and more critical
attitude towards the eu, the tone of the news has never been as hostile as in the
British media. Nor has it ever been as uncritical as the French news. Compared
with these countries, the Netherlands has opted for the middle way. The Dutch
40
Europe’s Neighbours
press publishes the highest percentage of neutral stories of the six member
states studied by Pfetsch (2005) (France, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy,
Spain). Of the remaining stories, the positive ones outnumber the negative
ones. As in most countries, the eu news is usually written up from a national
perspective, and the number of stories with a European perspective is well
below the European average (De Vreese 2003; Pfetsch 2005). Most eu news is to
be found on the business pages, which confirms that the economic dimension
of European developments has always attracted most Dutch attention.
2.3
Attention for Europe in the national press
In this section we examine the level of attention given to Europe in a selection
of newspapers in the four policy areas of agriculture, environment, drugs and
immigration. These four topics were selected as average policy areas which
attract sufficient attention in public debate. The selection was made to include
both European policy areas (agriculture and environment) and largely national
policy areas (drugs and immigration). For each of the three countries we
selected three quality newspapers with different political stances. The British
newspapers were The Times (and The Sunday Times), The Guardian and The Independent (and The Independent on Sunday). The French selection consisted of Le Figaro, Le
Monde and Libération. And in the Netherlands we studied the nrc Handelsblad, de
Volkskrant and the Algemeen Dagblad.
We covered the attention given to Europe from 1990 to 2003 inclusive. We
distinguished between the Europe represented by eu institutions such as the
European Commission, the Council of Ministers and the associated officials in
Brussels and Strasbourg (i.e. the supranational level) and the Europe represented by the then 15 member states and their heads of government (i.e. the
intergovernmental level). We compared the attention to these two groups of
European actors with the attention to a third group, namely national institutions and national politicians.
We are primarily concerned with the relative attention to Europe, because
Europe will have a higher profile with one reference amid thee references to
1
national politics than with one reference amid 20 national references. The
relative attention gives a rough indication of the extent to which Europe is able
to compete for national media attention with national actors, and hence the
extent to which European actors play a significant role in the national public
arena. The change in attention over time shows whether the significance
awarded by the media to European actors increases in line with the increase
in the eu’s formal decision-making powers. For those years which stand out
because of their strong European or alternatively national character, we outline
the events which attracted most media attention in that year. This gives an
impression of the themes with which Europe hits the headlines when it hits the
headlines.
1
The articles were also selected on the basis of attention to one of the four policy areas.
For instance, if there is more coverage on the environment in France than in the Netherlands, there is also a higher probability that certain actors will make more appearances. A relative measure of the attention to Europe corrects for these differences in
the quantity of news.
A2 Europe in the press, an international comparison
Figure A2.1
Relative attention to Europe in the
­British press a
41
100
80
60
40
20
0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
national politicians
EU politicians
EU member states
a The relative attention is the attention for one group of actors as a proportion of the attention for all three
groups of actors together. Attention is calculated from all the news (local, national, European and other
international) reported in three national daily newspapers across four policy areas.
Source: Lexis Nexis, various years (Van Noije 2007)
Figure A2.2
Relative attention to Europe in the
French press
100
80
60
40
20
0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
national politicians
EU politicians
EU member states
Source: Lexis Nexis, various years (Van Noije 2007)
Extent of the attention in 1990-2003
It will not come as a great surprise that in each of the three countries national
politicians are at the centre of attention in the reporting on a mix of national
and European issues (see figures A2.1, A2.2 and A2.3). Very clearly this applies
even more to the Netherlands than to the other two countries. In the period
1990-2003 an average of 78% of the attention in the Dutch press is for Dutch
actors, while in the British and the French press the attention paid to their own
politicians is a modest 54%. The dominance of Dutch political players leaves
little room for the eu or the member states, far less (23 percentage points) than
in the United Kingdom or France. In all three countries the eu member states
consistently attract slightly more attention than the eu itself. This suggests, for
instance, that the former German chancellor Gerhard Schröder is considered
more newsworthy than the former European Commission president Romano
Prodi. The differences between the United Kingdom and France are negligible
in this respect: the balance between the three groups of actors is remarkably
similar.
42
Europe’s Neighbours
Figure A2.3
Relative attention to Europe in the
Dutch press
100
80
60
40
20
0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
national politicians
EU politicians
EU member states
Source: Lexis Nexis, various years (AMCAT toolbox treatment)
However, we should not mistake this relative dominance of national actors in
the Dutch news for an absolute dominance. Table A2.1 shows the share of articles mentioning the eu or the eu member states at least once out of the total
number of articles published on the four issues. These are the figures in the top
row. The other two rows show the average number of occasions that references
are made to European and national actors respectively within these articles.
Suddenly the Netherlands no longer brings up the rear.
British press
French press
Dutch press
share of European articles in total news coverage (%)
28
33
29
average number of European references per
European article
4.5
3.6
5.2
average number of national references per
European article
1.9
1.4
5.3
a While figures A2.1, A2.2 and A2.3 show the relative attention to Europe in the total news coverage of the four
policy areas, this table zooms in on the share of that news in which Europe is mentioned at least once.
Source: Lexis Nexis, various years (Van Noije 2007)
France has the most articles mentioning the eu or the member states, the
United Kingdom the fewest. Now how can these two outcomes be reconciled?
The explanation is that when a Dutch newspaper report refers to Europe, this
attention is offset in the same article with even more references to national
politics. In both the United Kingdom and France, news about Europe is actually
about Europe, and national politicians play at most a marginal role. It would
therefore be more accurate to say, not that Europe attracts little attention in the
Dutch press, but rather that the Dutch news about Europe is characterised by
an excessive national perspective. This perspective is also an indication of the
limited autonomous relevance which the Dutch media attribute to Europe.
Trends and events in the relative attention to Europe
Let us return to the relative attention paid to Europe in the total news coverage of the four policy areas in the national daily newspapers (see figures A2.1,
A2.2 and A2.3). There does not seem to be a clear pattern to the extent to which
Europe is able to gain the attention over the years. None of the countries shows
a clear downward or upward trend. But it is the case that Europe received more
Table A2.1
Shares of European and national
references in European articles,
1990-2003a
A2 Europe in the press, an international comparison
43
attention in the first half of the period 1990-2003 in the Dutch press than in the
second half of that period. The same was true in the British press, although
Europe became more prominent again in 2002 and 2003. In the Netherlands
the year 2003 was actually a low point for Europe. The situation in France was
different, with the attention to Europe dropping to a low in the second half of
the 1990s. The attention to Europe in the most recent years (from 1999) certainly matched that in the early 1990s. Because, overall, Europe became less
prominent in the news in both the Netherlands and the United Kingdom over
the years, we have to conclude that the extension of eu decision-making powers
into formerly national policy areas does not seem to have prompted the national
media to take a greater interest in this new political reality. Actual power and
perceived relevance thus seem to be two different things.
During the period in question the attention spikes for Europe in the three
countries rarely coincided. Sometimes the same year stood out, but as a European year in one country and as a national year in another. An exception was
1992, when Europe received exceptionally heavy attention in all countries. Not
coincidentally, of course, as this was the year when the member states signed
the Treaty of Maastricht. This was one of the most far-reaching treaties ever
(which turned the European Economic Community into the European Union),
on which referendums were held in several countries, including France. The referendum dominated the French news, but it was also covered in the British and
Dutch press. In addition to this key event concerning the future of Europe and
affecting all policy areas, there were some more policy-specific developments in
1992 which could explain part of the attention given to Europe during that year.
The United Kingdom, for instance, was hit by a record number of cases of “mad
cow disease” or bse, an agriculture theme with a strong European component.
Germany wanted to close its borders to British beef, upon which the British
agriculture minister, John Gummer, accused Germany of protectionism. But
the European Commission took Germany’s side and imposed an export restriction on British beef. A second event which had an impact on the British coverage
of environmental issues that year was the United Nations’ “Earth Summit” in
Rio de Janeiro, which addressed the issue of sustainable development for the
first time. Much coverage was given to the decision by the European environment commissioner, Carlo Ripa di Meana, not to attend the meeting, to signal
his criticism of the United States in particular for refusing to commit to binding targets. In addition to these themes, there was also ample coverage in the
Netherlands and France on the European disputes over agricultural policy and
the resulting dispute between the United States and Europe over the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (gatt).
In 1994 the French press paid exceptionally heavy attention to the European Parliament elections on 12 June and the presidencies of the European Commission
(Jacques Santer) and the European Parliament (Klaus Hänsch). It also closely
followed the planned accession of Sweden, Finland, Norway (which in the event
voted not to join) and Austria. It is striking how invisible the European Parliament elections were in the Dutch papers. The main reason was that they virtually coincided with the Dutch general election in August. European issues were
also overshadowed by the irt affair concerning illegal police operations, which
became the subject of a parliamentary inquiry. The Lower House also spent
months debating the future of the nuclear power plant in Borssele. The attention to Europe shown by the French press in 1994 disappeared in 1995. This was
due in part to the national elections that year. President François Mitterrand,
having been in office for 14 years, was succeeded by Jacques Chirac.
44
Europe’s Neighbours
In 1996 Europe received much attention in both the British and the Dutch
press, albeit for different reasons. In the United Kingdom a link was confirmed
between bse and the Creutzfeld-Jacob disease, which is fatal to humans. The
European Commission responded by imposing a complete export ban on British beef. A second issue in which not so much the eu as one of the member
states played a role was the debate in the House of Commons on drug taking
by young people. The Dutch policy of tolerance was widely criticised as reprehensible, and the Netherlands was described as the drugs distribution centre
of Europe. Of course, the bse crisis also played a prominent part in the Dutch
(and French) news, but on top of this there was also much attention for the
escalating row between France and the Netherlands on Dutch soft drugs policy.
France put forward a proposal for a harmonised European soft drugs policy.
The Netherlands refused to accept an encroachment on national policy in this
area. It required some robust exchanges between the French and Dutch permanent representatives at the eu before common ground was found.
In the following year, 1997, the Dutch press briefly continued the relatively
strong European focus in the news, while it was the relative attention on
national actors which caused a spike in the British and French coverage. Firstly,
the Dutch newspapers reported on the ticking-off received by the agriculture
minister, Jozias van Aartsen, from the European Commission following the
publication of the Beloli report. This report was highly critical of the Dutch
handling of the swine fever epidemic, which allegedly had fallen short in terms
of hygiene and registration and contributed to illegal transports. There was
a proposal to cut eu financial assistance to the Netherlands, which elicited
an indignant response from the minister. Secondly, the Dutch press devoted
attention to the rise of the far-right National Front (fn) led by Jean-Marie Le
Pen in France. And thirdly, the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam also preoccupied the Dutch press. The Dutch eu presidency doubtless had something to
do with the media interest. In the United Kingdom all eyes were on the suicide
of a Scottish Labour politician and the accusations of threats, assaults, drug
trafficking and even murder within the Scottish Labour Party. At the time there
were also several drugs-related shootings, one of which caused the death of a
five-year-old, Dillon Hull. In France the focus on national politics was a logical
consequence of the general election which led to a period of “cohabitation”
(i.e. a right-wing president and a left-wing government). Like the press in other
countries, the French press was also focused on the fn’s electoral success. All
this meant that the British and French media had too much national news to
deal with to concern themselves with Europe.
Europe enjoyed a high profile in the French news above all in the years from
1999 to 2001. In 1999 this also applied to the British news, and in 2000 to the
Dutch news. The events which drew attention partly overlapped across the
countries. In 1999 the war in Kosovo played a prominent role in the French
and British news. The two countries were also embroiled in a diplomatic row
over France’s refusal to lift the ban on British beef. The British press became
particularly exercised over this stance. French emotions were aroused above all
by the eu negotiations on the Common Agriculture Policy (cap). France was
fiercely opposed to European Commission proposals to open the cap more
to market principles and to reduce agriculture subsidies. France’s two major
agricultural unions (fnsea and cnja) staged mass demonstrations against the
reform of the cap.
A2 Europe in the press, an international comparison
45
In 2000 the bse crisis reared its head again, which this time generated European attention in the news in the Netherlands and France. The fears of Creutzfeld-Jacob disease reached a climax in both countries when new Dutch and
French cases of bse were diagnosed. The Netherlands considered an import
ban on French beef. Europe also found its way into the Dutch news when the
far-right Freedom Party (fpö) joined the Austrian government and when Jörg
Haider resigned as fpö leader after the European member states had imposed
sanctions on Austria.
The following year, 2001, was also a relatively European year in the French
press, while the British press was very firmly focused on domestic politics. The
main reason for the latter was the outbreak of foot and mouth disease in the
United Kingdom. Other European countries, including France and the Netherlands, would subsequently also be hard hit by the epidemic. British policy was
aimed primarily at fighting the epidemic at home, while France was committed to preventing its spread from the United Kingdom. The British press also
gave attention to the spiral of violence between asylum seekers and nationalist
youngsters in Glasgow, in response to severally racially motivated murders.
Another major theme was the overhaul of the British immigration system. By
contrast, the French press reported on drugs policy in Belgium and the Netherlands, following the Belgian decision to decriminalise the use of soft drugs. The
British accusation that the French authorities were not doing enough to prevent
illegal immigrants from entering the United Kingdom through the Channel
Tunnel was also extensively reported in the French news.
After the relatively national perspective in the British news in 2001, Europe
received considerable prominence in 2002. There were no fewer than four European events in the areas of agriculture and immigration which attracted heavy
attention. Firstly, the reform of European agriculture policy. The British government felt that the proposals tabled by the agriculture commissioner, Franz
Fischler, did not go far enough, while the French were determined to block the
plans to reduce agriculture subsidies. Secondly, the British and French interior ministers, David Blunkett and Nicolas Sarkozy, met to discuss the influx
of illegal immigrants into the United Kingdom through the Channel Tunnel.
Thirdly, there were detailed reports on the French presidential election, in
which the far-right Le Pen reached the second round. Fourthly, there was the eu
summit in Seville, which had immigration on the agenda. The British interior
and foreign ministers, David Blunkett and Jack Straw, put forward a proposal
for a European offensive on illegal immigration through stricter controls of the
external borders.
Finally, the year 2003 stood out because of the national perspective in the Dutch
press. This was due mainly to the fact that the Netherlands had been gripped
by immigration and integration problems since the rise of Pim Fortuyn in 2001.
So soon after Fortuyn’s murder in 2002 this debate was still very dominant, and
new leading players such as Abu Jahjah and Ayaan Hirsi Ali had come onto the
scene. In particular, problems with young Moroccans and the possible radicalisation of young Muslims would fill column inches for a long time, so that
themes such as Europe were pushed into the background.
Thus far, Europe’s relevance underestimated
Reviewing the events which brought Europe attention in the national newspapers between 1990 and 2004, we were struck by a number of aspects. Because
this chapter looked only at the attention to Europe in four specific policy areas,
46
Europe’s Neighbours
it was likely that we found less of the major overriding European themes which
normally attract most of the attention. Figures A2.1, A2.2 and A2.3 show that
key European events, such as the introduction of the euro (2002) or the Treaty
of Nice (2001), by no means automatically led to a lot of relative attention to
Europe; after all, in many of these cases we see that the relative attention for
national actors is not squeezed at all compared to earlier or later years. Even
so, despite the substantive distance to the four policy areas, the signing of the
Treaty of Maastricht dominated the news in the three countries and the treaty
did cause a spike in attention to Europe in 1992. The Treaty of Amsterdam also
gained much attention for Europe in the Dutch press. These decisive moments
in the European unification process constitute a first category of newsworthy
topics.
A second category of news events is made up of the “neighbourhood rows” in
Europe: disputes between France and the Netherlands on soft drugs policy,
between France and the United Kingdom on import bans and border controls,
or between France and the European Commission on agriculture policy. In a
third category Europe makes the headlines when it criticises a member state
(Dutch handling of swine fever, or the fpö joining the Austrian government) or
has to intervene because of a crisis (export ban on British beef during the bse
crisis). This reveals the influence which Europe has inside national borders, but
this only becomes evident under exceptional circumstances.
Invisible in the news is Europe’s political influence on a more everyday level in
the four policy areas in question. In the absence of a diplomatic row or a crisis,
Europe only receives attention when a European summit is held. Thus the eu
summit in Seville on the future of immigration policy and the meeting of the
European Agriculture Council (i.e. of agriculture ministers) on cap reform
contributed to a spike in the media agenda. With regard to drugs and immigration, Europe’s invisibility on the everyday level can be explained by the fact that
these areas do not fall under the competence of the European Commission. But
with regard to agriculture and environment, the invisibility is an indication of a
discrepancy between the eu’s actual relevance and its relevance as perceived by
the media. The fact that the relative attention to Europe between 1990 and 2004
declined in both the British and the Dutch press confirms this interpretation.
2.4
Recent developments in the attention to Europe in the Dutch press2
In section 2.3 we compared the attention to Europe in the Dutch press with
that in two other eu member states. We did this with data from 1990 until 2003
inclusive. Now we know that 2004 and 2005 were actually very lively years for
the eu, certainly also in the Netherlands. On 1 May 2004 no fewer than ten
countries joined the eu, taking the membership to 25. And on 1 June 2005 the
Netherlands held a referendum on the European constitution, which – after
an earlier rejection by France – was confined to the dustbin after a resounding “no” from Dutch voters. It is very plausible that these key European events
stimulated the newspapers to publish more European news, especially at the
time of the referendum. In this section we examine whether Europe did indeed
become more prominent in Dutch reporting on the policy areas of agriculture,
3
environment, drugs and immigration. We also examine whether any increase
2
3
This section was prepared with the cooperation of Prof. Jan Kleinnijenhuis, Wouter
van Atteveldt and Jouke Jacobi of the Communication Science Department of the VU
University Amsterdam.
To reiterate, the news was not selected on the basis of the references to the enlargement or the constitution, but here too on the basis of the four policy areas of agriculture, environment, drugs and immigration.
A2 Europe in the press, an international comparison
47
in attention can be traced back primarily to these two overriding European
events. We also see whether the attention to Europe was maintained or fell back
again in 2006, when European integration was no longer high on the national
political agenda.
Extent of the attention in 2004-2006
After 2003 there was a transformation in the attention which the Dutch press
paid to both the eu and all its institutions and the individual member states.
Once again we start with the attention which national political actors, eu actors
and member states received in relation to each other. Figure A2.4 shows the
relative attention which the Dutch newspapers paid every month in 2004, 2005
and 2006 to national politicians and institutions, the eu and the eu member
states. Whereas in the past national political actors received an average of
nearly 80% of the relative attention, this figure dropped to around 50% in 2004
and 2005. The situation in the Netherlands thus became much more similar to
the traditional one in the United Kingdom and France (see figures A2.1, A2.2
and A2.3). In 2006 the focus of newspaper reporting shifted back somewhat
towards the national politicians, who accounted for 57% of the relative attention. In short, then, Europe has clearly secured a more central position in the
Dutch newspapers in recent years. The figures are slightly misleading, though,
because the accession of ten new member states means that the category “eu
member states” now includes more countries which can generate news, so that
this category will quickly gain more relative attention. But this does not invalidate the conclusion about Europe’s more central role in the Dutch news. This is
also confirmed by the separate figures for the eu. Between 1990 and 2003 the
relative attention to the eu never exceeded 14% (in 1992), while 14% is now the
minimum (in 2006) and it actually climbed to 21% in 2004.
Figure A2.4
Relative attention to Europe in the Dutch
press per month, 2004-2006
(in percent)
2004
2005
2006
01 02 03 0405 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
01 02 03 0405 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
01 02 03 0405 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
national politicians
EU politicians
EU member states
Source: Lexis Nexis, various years (AMCAT toolbox treatment)
At first glance this result seems to be in line with the expectation that Europe
would dominate the news more in 2004 and 2005 than in many of the previous years, given the momentous steps which the eu made or tried to make at
this time. As figure A2.4 shows, precisely in and around the months of the
eu’s enlargement (May 2004) and the Dutch referendum (June 2005) the Dutch
press did indeed pay more attention to the eu and the member states. But it is
striking that the eu gained a higher profile during the enlargement with ten
new member states (in 2004, an average of 21% attention on the eu compared
to 29% on the member states), while during the referendum on the European
48
Europe’s Neighbours
constitution the attention was focused more on the member states (in 2005, an
average of 18% attention on the eu compared to 33% on the member states).
Because the enlargement involved the arrival of new member states and the referendum involved the arrival of a substantive constitution, the reverse outcome
might have seemed more likely. We will delve into the newspaper articles to test
the impression that the attention to Europe within the four policy areas can
largely be explained by these two events.
But let us first see whether Europe’s stronger relative position compared to
Dutch actors also means that more was published about the eu in absolute
terms. The answer must clearly be in the affirmative. Whereas the share of
articles on the eu or one of its member states averaged 29% between 1990 and
2003, this figure rose to 41% on average between 2004 and 2006. Contrary
to expectations, there were actually more news stories mentioning Europe
in 2006 than in 2004 or 2005. Just as we saw in the comparison between the
Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom in section 2.3, the relatively high
percentage of articles on Europe in 2006 was offset by the lower reference frequency within these articles. In other words, while there may have been slightly
fewer articles mentioning Europe at least once in 2004 and 2005, Europe was
more at the centre of attention in these articles than in 2006. For every reference to a national actor in 2004 and 2005, there were 2.5 European references,
whereas in 2006 there were only two European references. We should stress
again that it would therefore be more accurate to say that there was more news
with a national perspective in 2006 compared to 2004 and 2005 rather than less
European news in that year.
2004
2005
2006
share of European articles in total news coverage (%)
40
41
43
average number of European references per European article4
6.1
5.7
4.4
average number of national references per European article
2.4
2.2
2.1
Source: Lexis Nexis, various years (AMCAT toolbox treatment)
What was Dutch news about?
2004: The first month in which Europe gained a slightly higher profile, according to figure A2.4, was May 2004, when ten new member states joined the
eu. To what extent did this event account for this modest spike? During this
period the reporting was indeed strongly focused on the European enlargement. Attention was paid to this especially in relation to immigration, with a
constant theme the expected influx of cheap labour from Eastern Europe. To a
lesser extent the enlargement was also deemed relevant to agriculture policy,
because East European farmers would now be entitled to eu agricultural subsidies and because of the financial implications this would have on the
old member states. The European news on agriculture was not so much about
the enlargement, however, but more about the possible abolition of eu export
subsidies for agriculture products as part of the effort to rescue the Doha round
4
Because of the different measuring methods used for the periods 1990-2003 and
2004-2006, it is not possible to make a direct comparison between the average number
of European or national references with their equivalents in 1990-2003 as shown in
table A2.1. But for now there is no reason to assume that this would distort the balance
between the average numbers of European and national references, because these
are relative values. The changed method also does not have any implications for the
relative attention to Europe as shown in figures A2.1 to A2.4, which can therefore be
compared. Nor are there implications for the share of articles in the total news coverage (the first row in the tables), given that the selection method for the articles was the
same.
Table A2.2
Shares of European and national
references in European articles in the
Dutch press, 2004-2006
A2 Europe in the press, an international comparison
49
of the World Trade Organisation (wto) negotiations, whose aim is to liberalise
world trade for the benefit of developing countries.
The interest in Europe evident in May 2004 continued in the following month.
This was due mainly to the elections to the European Parliament in June 2004.
During these elections the European constitution also became a news topic for
the first time. It would of course be the subject of a referendum a year later. In
October 2004 Europe’s position in the news was strengthened by the European
Commission’s decision to initiate accession negotiations with Turkey, albeit
under strict conditions. The negotiations were due to start in December of that
year (which sparked another upswing in attention during that month). The
Turkish government objected to the fact that stricter conditions were imposed
on Turkey than on other candidate member states. In the Netherlands the
Christian Democrats were particularly vociferous in expressing their concerns
about human rights in Turkey. We can be brief about the spike in attention for
national actors in November 2004, during the Turkey debate: the murder of
Theo van Gogh on 2 November dominated the news coverage at this time.
2005: The question whether the attention to Europe from May 2005 onwards
can be attributed to the European constitution can also be answered in the
affirmative. It accounted for the overwhelming share of the attention. The
news coverage closely tracked the country’s mood, but it also kept a close eye
on the mood among the French, who voted in a referendum three days earlier.
We already pointed to the counterintuitive finding that it was above all the
eu institutions and politicians who drew attention at the time of the enlargement in 2004, and above all the member states at the time of the referendum
in 2005. It seems that in the run-up to the Dutch referendum on the constitution the press paid close attention to developments in the other member states,
especially France. The news about the constitution concentrated on the referendum itself and the campaign around it (see also Kleinnijenhuis, Takens and
Van Atteveldt 2005), at the expense of the content of the constitution and the
position of the institutions. On the other hand, the enlargement was actually
discussed in terms of the possible consequences for the old member states: the
implications for the labour market, the financial implications of agriculture
subsidies to new member states, and so on. The ten new member states were of
course also discussed separately, but they were often also lumped together.
The referendum was followed later in June by a European summit on the budget
for 2007-2013. After the rejection of the European constitution by France and
the Netherlands, there was widespread talk of crisis concerning the state of
Europe. This crisis was caused not only by the constitution debacle, but also by
the debate on the member states’ financial contributions to the eu. In particular the British insistence on retaining the “rebate” appeared to be an insurmountable obstacle between the United Kingdom and France, while France
firmly refused to consider cuts in the agriculture subsidies.
In October 2005 there was another spike in attention, caused this time by the
bird flu epidemic threatening the eu from the East. The agriculture minister,
Cees Veerman, was quick off the mark with a proposal to keep poultry indoors,
which the eu regarded as excessive in the first instance. The eu imposed
import bans on poultry from countries such as Greece, Turkey and Russia. On
another matter, the wto negotiations scheduled for December also generated
news again. The United States finally put forward a proposal to reduce import
50
Europe’s Neighbours
duties on agriculture products, to which the eu had to respond, but which went
too far for France.
2006: The year 2006 did not have any major European events. After the rejection of the European constitution, the Dutch government called for a “period
of reflection” on Europe. The year still had several European months, however,
especially July. In previous years the Doha round of the wto negotiations had
ended in failure each time, and this issue reappeared on the media agenda
in July 2006 after another failure in Geneva. Later that month the G8 met in
Saint Petersburg, not least to consider how the deadlock could be broken.
Another major item was the fate of the “wine lake”. The European Commission had ordered the conversion of millions of litres of South European wine
into biofuels and industrial alcohol. But this was not considered acceptable as a
long-term solution, so the decision was taken to buy up the vineyards and support growers with advertising campaigns and product improvements. Another
major news item in July was the crisis over the large numbers of African immigrants landing on European shores in Spain, Italy and Malta. A Spanish fishing
boat with 51 people rescued from the sea was kept outside Malta’s territorial
waters for five days. The Maltese government said it could no longer cope and
asked for eu assistance. On 10 July African and European ministers met in
Rabat, the Moroccan capital, to discuss an action plan to reduce illegal immigration and promote legal immigration. And finally, there was the renewed
tension between the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. In June Turkey’s
refusal to recognise the Cypriot government had already held up the negotiations on Turkey’s accession to the eu.
Thus far, a more visible Europe, but only thanks to the preoccupation with the rules
The two decisive moments in the European integration process in 2004 and
2005 – the accession of ten new member states and the referendum on the
European constitution – had great resonance in the news coverage on the four
policy areas considered here. These events explain why Europe received so
much more attention in the Dutch press in the years after 2003 than in many of
the years before. That these two events would potentially have major implications for two of the policy areas in question, namely agriculture and immigration, made it all the more inevitable that they would so strongly dominate the
issue-specific news.
Judging from the most prominent news items, it seems that, as during the
period 1990-2003, integration issues themselves and international summits
matter most. The most striking example was the wto negotiations, where
the eu countries do not act individually but the eu negotiates as a single bloc
with the other major powers. Other themes included the European elections,
Turkey’s accession and Cyprus, all of which were concerned with the eu institutions and integration itself rather than the eu’s “bread-and-butter” issues.
The news on the negotiations over the eu budget and international meetings
on the influx of illegal African immigrants concentrated on summit meetings.
Moreover, the budget negotiations were also dominated by the crisis triggered
by the rejection of the constitution and disagreements between the British and
the French. And the bird flu epidemic of course generated news about Europe in
an exceptional context of crisis.
The only issue where the eu’s more everyday political work with a policyspecific content came to the fore was the solution proposed by the European
Commission for the wine surplus. All in all, it may be true that the attention on
A2 Europe in the press, an international comparison
51
Europe has increased appreciably since 2004, but this is not thanks to the interest which the Dutch press shows for the policy-specific significance of the eu.
2.5
Conclusion
The attention paid to Europe in national reporting seems to be determined
by classic news values. Conflict, crisis, direct relevancy to the public (such as
referendums) and the concentration of authority (a prime minister is more
newsworthy than an official), supplied in clear narratives with tops and tails
always win out over technical analyses. This is a general rule of journalism with
regard to news selection (Galtung and Ruge 1965; Altheide and Snow 1979; Patterson 1993; Blumler and Gurevitch 1995).
Because of the still very complex, long-drawn-out and not very specific nature
of European politics, European news items quickly loose out to items which
score higher on news values (Gerhards 1993; Meyer 1999). Thus between 1990
and 2006 news items on the integration process, European summits, rows and
crises consistently win out over “bread-and-butter” policy decisions in Brussels.
The political work being carried out in Brussels and which by now determines
a considerable slice of national policy – certainly in two of the four policy areas
considered here – can be found in news reporting, but only in a fragmented,
unsystematic and inconspicuous way. It is doubtful whether on the basis of this
coverage the public can build up a realistic picture of European relevance or can
understand European processes. Europe’s real influence is not translated into
media attention.
This brings us back to the objective of the fourth Balkenende administration,
firstly, to demand more attention for Europe, and secondly, to demand besides
attention for the rules of the eu above all more attention for the everyday political importance of the eu. In the Netherlands, where for so long the news was
much more nationally oriented compared with the United Kingdom and France,
some catching up seems to have taken place recently in terms of attention to
Europe. But with regard to the type of news published about Europe, there is
still much room for improvement in the Netherlands.
52
A3 Public opinion in the Netherlands
In this chapter on Dutch attitudes towards the eu we devote attention to developments in support for the eu (A3.1), individual backgrounds to involvement or
lack of involvement with the eu (A3.2), and satisfaction or low satisfaction with
the eu (A3.3).
3.1
Developments in support for the eu
One year ago we observed that support for the eu was stabilising, and we
ventured the view that, under the influence of an improving economy and a
generally more positive sentiment, this support could increase further (cpb/scp
2007: 59 and 71). Figure A3.1 shows that support for eu membership did indeed
increase in 2007. The attitude towards future enlargements tends to fluctuate,
but it has remained in the same bandwidth since 2003.
Figure A3.1
Developments in support for EU
membership and future enlargements,
2001-2007 (in percent)
80
75
70
65
60
55
50
45
autumn 2007
spring 2007
autumn 2006
spring 2006
autumn 2005
spring 2005
autumn 2004
spring 2004
autumn 2003
spring 2003
autumn 2002
spring 2002
autumn 2001
40
EU membership is a good thing
The Netherlands benefits from EU membership
Support for future enlargements of the EU
The three indicators are the percentages of affirmative answers to the questions “Generally speaking, do you
think that the Netherlands’s membership of the European Union is a good thing?”; “Taking everything into account,
would you say that the Netherlands has benefited from being a member of the European Union?”; and “Are you
for further enlargement of the EU to include other countries in future years?”.
Source: Eurobarometer 56.2, 57.1, 58.1, 59.1, 60.1, 61.0, 62.0, 63.4, 64.2, 65.2, 66.1, 67.2 and 68.1
(weighted results)
Support for Dutch membership of the eu is at its highest since 1994 (not
evident in the figure; see cpb/scp 2007: 33). These outcomes again put into
perspective the idea that since the referendum on the eu constitution the Dutch
have become more critical of and more negative about the eu.
Judging from the Eurobarometer figures, people are exceptionally positive
about Europe: in late 2007 nearly 80% of Dutch people considered eu membership to be a good thing. But what about other surveys? There have been
instances in the past where the Eurobarometer results were probably too
upbeat (see e.g. cpb/scp 2006: 33). Examples of other surveys which have asked
the “good thing” question are “Cultural Changes in the Netherlands 2006”
(in which 64% considered eu membership a good thing), the “Netherlands in
A3 Public opinion in the Netherlands
53
Europe” internet survey from 2006 (65%), the accompanying validation study1
(57%), and a special follow-up questions survey on the eu conducted by the
2
scp in early 2008 (58%). All of these figures are lower than the figures in the
corresponding Eurobarometers. Several explanations can be adduced for these
differences. The Eurobarometer survey is a long interview which concentrates
exclusively on Europe. In that context the importance of Europe may well
impress itself more strongly on the respondents; as the interview progresses,
Europe becomes more important and the respondents may be pulled along.
Most of the other surveys devote only a few questions to Europe, without any
introduction. Moreover, in these instances the “good thing” question is often
the first to be asked (“Netherlands in Europe”, validation study, scp follow-up
questions survey). Furthermore, the Eurobarometer survey is conducted faceto-face, while a number of other surveys (“Netherlands in Europe”, validation
study, scp follow-up questions survey) are internet-based. In these situations,
in the absence of an interviewer awaiting a response, people can dwell on the
question for longer. And the anonymity of the internet also makes it easier to
express negative opinions. And finally, the selection of respondents differs
from survey to survey. Thus the Eurobarometer survey is based in principle on
a representative sample, the “Netherlands in Europe” survey relies on respondents signing up. It is true that with such a self-selection process the results
can be made representative by reweighting them for a number of demographic
characteristics, but it remains an open question whether this also corrects for
any bias in the views to be studied. Results depend on the research design and
the context in which questions are posed. This implies that the Eurobarometer
figures – as well as those from other surveys – should be treated with some cau3
tion. We use the Eurobarometer mainly for comparisons between countries,
between groups of people and over time. To determine the value of these kinds
of comparisons it is important above all to know how stable such “basic views”
are: do people have a settled opinion on the eu, or do they say one thing one day
and something else the next? The scp follow-up questions survey provides some
insight into this, because the same people were asked the “good thing” and
“benefit” questions again four weeks after the initial survey (see the Eurobarometer questions in figure A3.1). Table A3.1 summarises the results.
Table A3.1
Individual stability of views on the EU,
2008, views as percentages of the
population aged 15 years and above,
and unchanged views as percentages of
the preference groups in January
January
2008
February
2008
unchanged
in February
a good thing
58
55
82
neither good nor bad, or don’t know
34
38
76
9
7
60
considers the Netherlands’s EU membership
a bad thing
thinks that the Netherlands has … from EU membership
benefited
54
52
80
don’t know
18
19
53
not benefited
27
29
74
Source: SCP Europe follow-up questions survey 2008 (weighted results)
1
2
3
Conducted among the internet panel of nss/Interview, at the same time as the “Netherlands in Europe” survey based on self-selection.
The follow-up questions survey is considered and analysed in greater detail in chapter
A4.
See chapter A1 and the reservations made in note 1.
54
Europe’s Neighbours
Table A3.1 shows that the overwhelming majority of respondents still holds
the same view four weeks later. This stability is greatest among people who
see eu membership as positive (82% stable) and among people who think that
the Netherlands benefits from eu membership (80% stable). People who take a
negative view of eu membership in the first instance change their standpoint
more easily: four weeks later 40% are neutral or positive about eu membership.
And of the people who cannot decide whether the Netherlands benefits from
4
eu membership, nearly half do have a view four weeks later.
3.2
Backgrounds to involvement with the eu
This section examines the backgrounds to involvement. Which groups score
high on involvement and which groups low? Does involvement go together with
support for European cooperation, or also with criticism? To this end we again
use the data from the scp follow-up questions survey on Europe from early
2008. Table A3.2 shows which groups score high on involvement and which
groups low. The measure of involvement is compiled on the basis of four questions: interest in the eu, perceived level of information, attention to reporting
on the eu, and discussions about the eu in daily life. Most people demonstrate
a moderate involvement with the eu. A quarter of the population scores low on
involvement, 12% scores high.
Men, the over-55s and the more highly educated are markedly more strongly
involved with the eu than women, the under-55s and the less well-educated.
Left-wing and right-wing people score equally high on involvement, while
people who place themselves in the political centre score appreciably lower.
What seems to matter is having a clear political conviction, regardless of
whether that conviction is left-wing or right-wing. Among newspaper readers, nrc Handelsblad and nrc.next readers are the most involved with the eu,
and Telegraaf readers the least. But Telegraaf readers still score twice as high on
involvement as people who do not read a newspaper at all. In short, the involvement with the eu or the lack of it goes together with a more general interest in
society or lack of it.
Finally, people with a definite view on Dutch eu membership (“good thing”
or “bad thing”) score markedly higher on involvement than people who have
no view on membership (“neither good nor bad”). Involvement seems to be
coupled both with support and criticism, although the former is more common
than the latter. Involvement thus contains a certain positive bias, but the main
difference arises from having or not having an opinion on the eu.
Let us look in more detail at the people with a slight involvement with the eu.
We suspect that their stance towards Europe is less stable and more susceptible
to sudden politicisation with unpredictable consequences (cpb/scp 2005: 39).
To reduce the risks of this happening or simply motivated by an ideal of
involved and informed citizens, much information policy will be aimed at
reaching these people in particular. Where are these people to be found, and
4
Despite the slight fall in the number of proponents (from 58% to 55% for “a good
thing”), which means that some proponents changed their minds, the proponents
prove the most stable. In view of the macro trend, people with a neutral or negative
attitude towards eu membership often change their views unnecessarily, they are
“trading places”, as it were. The total changeability is 2.5 times higher than required
on the basis of the small macro shifts.
A3 Public opinion in the Netherlands
55
where not? Figure A3.2 reveals striking differences between groups by combin5
ing the characteristics from table A3.2.
Slight involvement with the eu is most common among women with intermediate education who are younger than 46 years and have no definite view on eu
membership. Some 58% of these women score low on involvement. Among
highly educated men who have a positive view of eu membership, this figure
is only 4%. Strikingly, among men involvement goes together with support.
Involvement thus has a positive bias among men. This is not the case among
women: here involvement goes together with having an opinion on the eu,
regardless of whether this opinion is positive or negative.
Table A3.2
Involvement a by background
characteristics, 2008, population
aged 15 years and above (in percent,
percentaged horizontally)
slight
moderate
strong
involvement involvement involvement
total
gender
age
education
political preference
newspaper readership
view on EU membership
25
63
12
man
18
65
18
woman
32
61
7
15-24 years
28
63
10
25-34 years
34
56
10
35-44 years
25
67
8
45-54 years
25
64
11
55-64 years
19
62
19
≥ 65 years
19
63
18
low
33
58
9
intermediate
23
65
12
high
13
66
20
left
19
65
16
centre
33
59
8
right
19
65
16
reads Algemeen Dagblad
18
66
16
reads NRC Handelsblad
8
62
30
reads De Telegraaf
22
65
13
reads Trouw
12
63
25
reads de Volkskrant
14
65
21
reads Financieel Dagblad
11
61
28
reads nrc.next
13
55
32
reads Nederlands Dagblad
27
54
19
does not read a newspaper
41
53
6
good thing
15
69
16
neither good nor bad
42
52
6
bad thing
24
62
13
a Involvement is a scale composed of four indicators (interest in the EU, perceived level of information,
attention to reporting on the EU, discussions about the EU in daily life). Scalability: Crohnbach’s alpha is
0.84.
b Reads the newspaper in question at least one day per week.
Source: SCP Europe follow-up questions survey 2008 (weighted results)
5
The figure is the result of a chi-squared automatic interaction detection analysis
(chaid). All the variables in table A3.2 are successively divided along the line that
most strongly distinguishes between groups with many and with few people with
low involvement. Personal characteristics were given preference; only when these no
longer made a significant difference did it become possible for the view on “a good
thing” to become distinctive.
56
Europe’s Neighbours
< 36 years:
56%
woman:
39%
37-63 years:
39%
> 63 years:
27%
bad thing /
neither good
nor bad
50%
good/bad
thing:
25%
bad thing /
neither good
nor bad:
42%
good/bad
thing:
25%
low education:
32%
bad thing /
neither good
nor bad:
34%
man:
25%
good thing:
16%
< 46 years:
36%
good/bad
thing:
25%
woman:
29%
all:
24%
intermediate
education:
22%
bad thing /
neither good
nor bad
58%
> 46 years:
17%
man:
16%
woman:
19%
high education:
13%
bad thing /
neither good
nor bad
21%
man:
7%
good thing:
4%
Example: Some 24% of all respondents have a low involvement with the EU. Among the less well-educated, 32% has a
low involvement. Among less well-educated women, 39% has a low involvement. And among less well-educated women
under the age of 36, 56% has a low involvement.
Source: SCP Europe follow-up questions survey 2008 (weighted results)
3.3
Backgrounds to rejection of the eu
In chapter A1 (section 1.4) we looked at, for the Netherlands and four other
countries, individual backgrounds to knowledge of and support for the eu.
This showed that more highly educated people who are relatively more satisfied with their own lives are more likely to consider eu membership a good
thing. The European Outlook from 2007 showed that people with a positive
view of developments in their own country also have a more positive view of
the eu (cpb/scp 2007: 48-49). We now want to concentrate on groups in Dutch
society which are very antagonistic towards the eu. We will do so on the basis
6
of the 21minuten.nl survey of 2007. It should be noted, however, that this
survey is not based on a representative sample, but on self-selection, and it
may therefore not offer a reliable indication of people’s opinions. But with a
socio-demographic reweighting and above all a reweighting on voting behav6
See www.21minuten.nl; with thanks to McKinsey, which made the data available to us.
Figure A3.2
Low involvement with the EU
in contrast groups, population
groups aged 15 years and above,
2008 (in percent)
A3 Public opinion in the Netherlands
57
iour at the November 2006 general election, it is possible to offer a reasonable
approximation of the population figures. In any case there is little reason to
assume that any distortion will differ between population groups. We want to
make comparisons between population groups, and for that the 21minuten.
nl survey, because of the large number of respondents, offers advantages over
7
many smaller surveys relying on representative samples.
Before we turn to a general measure of rejection of the eu, let us first examine
table A3.3, which offers insight into support for a number of statements about
Europe. These statements differ from the Eurobarometer questions and may
give a different idea of what the Dutch public considers important. The statements were presented at random to selections of respondents, and they have
been ordered here by topic: involvement, benefits of a strong Europe, the eu’s
internal balance of power and size, and the advantages and disadvantages of eu
membership for the Netherlands.
Table A3.3
Views on Dutch EU membership,
population aged 15-69 years, 2007
(in percent)
strongly
disagree or
disagree
neither
agree nor
disagree
Dutch citizens are sufficiently involved in major
­d ecisions by the European Parliament.
agree or
strongly
agree
don’t
know
62
19
11
8
The decisions of the European Parliament are
­insufficiently known among Dutch citizens.
7
10
77
6
A strong Europe is important for competition with
new economic powers such as India and China.
9
17
67
7
A strong Europe is good for the balance of power in
the world.
10
19
64
7
A strong Europe is a good counterweight to the
power of the United States.
14
18
60
7
The big countries have too much power within
Europe.
8
19
65
8
The European Union has become too large.
18
25
49
8
The European Union must let more countries join.
59
23
11
7
Dutch identity is threatened by European ­unification.
30
18
46
6
European cooperation gives a boost to the Dutch
economy.
21
27
43
9
Europe costs the Netherlands more than it brings in.
16
20
51
13
Close cooperation with other European countries
offers the Netherlands more advantages than
disadvantages.
18
25
48
8
The arrival of workers from other EU countries offers
the Netherlands more advantages than disadvantages.
45
24
22
9
Source: 21minuten.nl 2007 (weighted results) (n = 16,387–16,492)
Majorities take the view that the Dutch population is insufficiently involved
with the European Parliament and insufficiently familiar with its decisions.
The three stated advantages of a strong Europe are also endorsed by majorities,
as is the statement that the big countries have too much power. Around half
the respondents think that the eu has now become too large, and there is little
support for further enlargements (11% of interviewees). The final statements on
the advantages and disadvantages of eu membership for the Netherlands reveal
7
As far as the selective mobilisation of respondents is concerned, the 21minuten.nl
survey is comparable to the “Netherlands in Europe” internet survey used in a previous
European Outlook (cpb/scp 2006: 33-34). Incidentally, it should be borne in mind that
the problem of self-selection also occurs in samples compiled on a random basis.
58
Europe’s Neighbours
a certain ambivalence in public opinion. There are substantially more people
who believe that membership costs us more than it brings in, but also substantially more people who believe that the advantages of membership outweigh
the disadvantages. The threat to Dutch identity and the arrival of workers from
other eu countries in the Netherlands are sources of concern for large groups.
A larger group of respondents in the survey was asked for two general evaluations of the eu, namely with questions on trust and satisfaction. Table A3.4
shows the questions and the combinations of answers, with the 15% “don’t
know” answers added to the “neither satisfied nor dissatisfied” answers. More
than half of interviewees are then “neither satisfied nor dissatisfied”, and onethird cannot decide between “little trust” and “no trust” on the one hand and
“some trust” and “much trust” on the other. Although it is possible in principle
for someone to have trust in the eu but be critical of how it works in practice,
or conversely to believe that the organisation works well but not to trust it
because it pursues reprehensible objectives, it is in fact the case that trust and
satisfaction are strongly correlated (r = 0.72).
Table A3.4
Trust in the EU and satisfaction
with how it works, population aged
15-69 years, 2007 (in percent)
How satisfied are you with how the European Union works?
very
How much trust do you have dissatisin the European Union?
fied
dis­­satisfied
8
4
no trust
neither satisfied
nor dissatisfied,
very
don’t know
satisfied satisfied
2
0
0
total
14
little trust
1
15
12
0
0
29
neither trust nor distrust, or
don’t know
0
3
28
1
0
32
some trust
0
2
10
9
0
21
much trust
0
0
1
3
0
4
10
24
53
13
1
100
total
Source: 21minuten.nl 2007 (weighted results) (n = 44,388)
Let us take a closer look at the 8% of people who through the combination
of “very dissatisfied” and “no trust” reveal a strong rejection of the existing
eu. Who are these people? Needless to say, they diverge in their judgements
on the statements in table A3.3. Of the 8% strong opponents, 80% agree with
the statement that Dutch identity is being threatened by European unification
(compared to 46% of all interviewees in table A3.3); 83% agree with the statement that Europe costs the Netherlands more than it brings in (compared to
51% of all people); 18% agree with the statement that European cooperation
boosts the Dutch economy (compared to 43% of all people); and 27% agree
with the statement that a strong Europe is good for the balance of power in
the world (compared to 64% of all people). These specific views on Europe may
provide an explanation for the general rejectionist attitude, but the reverse may
also be the case: on the basis of a very negative attitude these people will be
inclined to reject advantages and emphasise disadvantages.
Table A3.5 shows in percentage terms the share of strong opponents in the various population groups, and it then shows how strongly the statistical effects of
belonging or not belonging to these population groups influence the chances
of being a strong opponent of the eu. These are effects which take account of
A3 Public opinion in the Netherlands
Table A3.5
Backgrounds to strong opposition to
the EU and effects, population aged
15-69 years (in percent and odds
ratios)
59
effectsa
strong
opposition
8
all
social
position
+ political
preferences
gender:
male (reference category)
female
12
–
–
5
0.39***
0.42***
age:
15-29 years
6
0.50***
0.52***
30-49 years (reference category)
9
–
–
50-69 years
9
0.87**
0.98
education:
1.14
1.10
intermediate (reference category)
11
9
–
–
high (HAVO or higher)
6
0.56***
0.81***
pupil or student
5
0.83
1.01
self-employed
9
1.00
0.87*
private-sector employee (reference category)
8
–
–
public-sector employee
8
0.81***
0.94
low (up to LBO)
social position:
unemployed or occupationally disabled
housewife or -husband
14
1.11
0.90
7
0.80**
0.76***
10
1.17**
1.07
net monthly household income:
low (< EUR 2,000)
medium (reference category)
8
–
–
high (≥ EUR 3,500)
7
0.70***
0.91
party choice at 2006 general election:
CDA (Christian Democratic Appeal) (reference category)
6
PvdA (Labour Party)
5
0.65***
SP (Socialist Party)
10
1.36***
VVD (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy)
–
7
0.96
PVV (Party for Freedom)
24
2.63***
GroenLinks (Green Left)
1
0.26***
10
1.42**
ChristenUnie (Christian Union)
D66 (Democrats 66)
3
0.40***
Partij voor de Dieren (Party for the Animals)
15
1.43**
SGP (Political Calvinist Party)
13
2.23***
EénNL (One Netherlands)
28
2.26***
“I feel insufficiently represented in politics”:
strongly disagree or disagree
13
2.33***
neither disagree nor agree (reference category)
3
–
agree or strongly agree
3
0.99
satisfaction with Dutch society:
very dissatisfied or dissatisfied
18
2.15***
neither dissatisfied nor satisfied (reference category)
6
–
satisfied or very satisfied
4
0.77***
19
1.47***
trust in fellow citizens:
no or little
neither trust nor distrust (reference category)
6
–
some or much
5
0.76***
Nagelkerke pseudo-R
2
0.06
0.23
a Effects are odds ratios; there is no effect if the coefficient is 1, the effect is more negative as the coefficient
approaches 0 and more positive as it increases. * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01 and *** = p < 0.001 (bivariate).
Source: 21minuten.nl 2007 (weighted results) (n = 33,382)
60
Europe’s Neighbours
the fact that people belong to different population groups at the same time, in
the first column only socio-demographic groups, and in the second column
including groups with corresponding views and political preferences.
The table shows a remarkable divergence on gender lines. The share of strong
opponents of the eu is appreciably higher among men than among women,
12% compared to 5%. The share of strong opponents is also notably high
among the unemployed and occupationally disabled (14%), among voters for
the sgp (13%), the Partij voor de Dieren (15%) and above all the pvv (24%) and
EénNL (28%), and also among people who do not feel represented in politics (13%), who are not satisfied with Dutch society (18%) and who say they
have little or no trust in their fellow citizens (19%). Allowing for the overlaps
between groups, it remains the case that women are appreciably less inclined
towards strong opposition. The more highly educated are also less inclined
towards strong opposition, as are young people compared to 30-49-year-olds,
and older people compared to that age group as long as no correction is made
for differences in political preferences. With regard to social position, correction for the other characteristics ensures that unemployment and occupational
8
disability no longer have an effect.
The major differences among people with different party preferences and
different views on their representation in politics and on Dutch society are
not “explained away” by other differences. These results confirm the idea that
opposition to the eu is closely linked to dissatisfaction with Dutch politics and
society.
Opposition to the eu also differs widely by party preference at the general election in November 2006. Against a small number of opponents among voters for
GroenLinks (1%) and D66 (3%), there are large numbers of opponents among
those who voted for Eénnl (28%) and the pvv (24%). These differences are not
“explained away” by the other characteristics either. This also applies for the
effects of the characteristics included at the end of table A3.5. People are much
more likely to be opposed to the eu if they have a negative attitude towards
Dutch politics and society. Those who do not feel represented in politics, are
dissatisfied with the country and have little or no trust in their fellow citizens,
and are also likely to be dissatisfied with or distrustful of Europe.
8
As far as working people are concerned, the size of the 21minuten.nl survey also offers
an opportunity to give an indication of sectoral differences. For 29,101 respondents
the industry in which they work is known (at least 248 respondents per industry). In
order of a rising percentage of strong opponents: legal services 1%; healthcare 4%;
catering and hospitality 5%; education 5%; retail trade 5%; business services 8%;
other services 8%; wholesale and intermediary trade 8%; information technology and
automation 9%; financial services 10%; public administration (excl. police and armed
forces) 10%; journalism 11%; transport and logistics 11%; manufacturing 11%; agriculture and fisheries 12%; armed forces 12%; police 13%; construction 15%; and utilities
15%.
61
A4 The changeability of views
4.1
Views in surveys
In chapters A1 and A3 we showed that views on the eu as expressed in surveys
are very positive in the Netherlands. The Dutch compare favourably with other
Europeans in this respect, and support for the eu has only increased further
in the past year. At the same time the media present a rather different picture:
since the referendum on the European constitution on 1 June 2005 the Dutch are
supposed to have become more critical and more negative about European unification. Focus groups, on which we reported in previous European Outlooks
(e.g. cpb/scp 2005: 34-38 and 2006: 28-30), also reveal a more negative picture.
The argument goes that support in the abstract, as measured in surveys, is
offset by many specific irritations about the eu. This raises the question as to
the value of views on the eu expressed in surveys. To what extent do these measure what people actually think of the eu? Chapter A1 showed that even though
only a (very) small number of people are aware of the European Neighbourhood
Policy (enp) – 14% in the Netherlands, 23% on average across the member
states – a large majority supports the policy’s objectives. Something similar has
been observed by the nrc Handelsblad (28 January 2008: “Eurobarometer zegt:
ja” (“Eurobarometer says yes”)):
The European Commission likes to poll the views of Europeans. And these views are
often supportive of eu policy. […] A huge majority of 80% of Europeans agreed that
Europe should set up its own satellite system (Galileo). More remarkably, support
for the project was strongest in Bulgaria, Romania and Cyprus. In those countries
Galileo was also the least known: 71% to 82% of the respondents there had never
heard of it.
The writer seems to assume that surveyed views on matters that people are not
familiar with are meaningless. But that is not necessarily the case. In real life
people are often in favour of a proposal by party A and opposed to a proposal
by party B because of their sympathy with A and antipathy towards B, not
because they have studied the proposals. People might want to see a European
satellite system because they dislike the Americans, because they are in favour
of new technology on principle, because they are generally in favour of European projects, and so on. It may be that the views expressed in a survey on an
unknown European satellite system reflect a basic attitude, and therefore are
significant after all. In section 4.2 we discuss insights from the literature. It
is often suggested in the literature that the more stable the views, the more
significant they are. To throw more light on the value of survey views on Europe,
we examine in section 4.3 how changeable views in surveys are: how stable
over time and how firmly held when confronted with counterarguments? Of
course, changing one’s mind under the influence of counterarguments does not
mean that the initial view was meaningless. But it is of interest to see how many
people change their minds and how population groups differ in this respect.
4.2
Insights from the literature
It is not only journalists and politicians who take different views of survey
results on Europe, researchers do as well. Often they simply assume that the
available measurements are “real” views, and they try to explain differences
and developments in them in terms of personal backgrounds, political preferences or specific events. But some researchers cast serious doubt on whether
it is even possible to poll opinions on this topic. They point out that views on
62
Europe’s Neighbours
political issues in general, and on the eu in particular, are highly unstructured
and unfounded, and that “non-attitudes” would be a more appropriate description in this context. In this section we look briefly at the various approaches to
surveyed opinions on Europe.
The question as to which factors determine citizens’ attitudes on European
integration has been a subject of research for decades. Research into explanations for support for European integration has been conducted since the
start of European cooperation in the 1950s, but it has clearly accelerated in
the past two decades. At the same time the focus of research into support for
European integration has shifted. The key explanations seem to be affected by
fashion to some extent. Political values, cognitive mobilisation, rational cost/
benefit analyses, domestic political preferences and cultural identity have all
1
done the rounds as possible explanations. Although the explanations differ
substantively, the studies share an implicit assumption that people actually
have views on European integration which can be measured and explained in
a meaningful way. Scheuer (2006) draws this conclusion explicitly on the basis
of her research into the underlying structures of views on the eu. She shows
that people’s views at a single measuring moment (within a single survey) are
logically coherent and consistent. From this she concludes that people have real
and coherent views on the eu. But her research does not consider to what extent
a person’s views remains coherent over time.
Other researchers have their doubts about whether these views are “real”.
While some researchers concentrate on the question how we can explain
support for European integration, other researchers argue that there is really
nothing to explain, because views on political issues are highly unstructured
and unstable. It is in this context that Converse (1962, 1974) introduced the term
“non-attitudes”. He assumed that the answers to survey questions hide many
such non-attitudes: people have never given any thought to a particular political issue, but when asked they still offer an opinion. He based this assumption
on the low statistical correlation between answers to the same survey question
at different times. According to Converse, non-attitudes are linked to a poor
level of information and lack of involvement.
Zaller (1992) built on Converse’s work. He also argued that the opinion formation on political themes depends on the extent of a person’s political knowledge. According to Zaller, people form an opinion on the spot when they are
confronted with a survey question. For this they use the ideas which are most
easily accessible, which are “top of mind”, as it were. These ideas are determined by the “elite discourse” which people absorb through the media. The
reason for the instability in response patterns is that different ideas are “top of
mind” at different times. One of Zaller’s key assumptions is that people who
are more politically aware are more selective with regard to the information
which they internalise. This is reflected in their answers to closed survey questions, which give evidence of much greater stability and ideological consistency
over time.
The literature on non-attitudes suggests that it is very important that people
have relevant knowledge on the eu. Only well-informed citizens who are
interested in the issues will have “real” views, the argument goes. In the next
1
See e.g. Inglehart (1970, 1977, 1997); Gabel (1998); Eichenberg and Dalton (1993);
Anderson (1998), McLaren (2002); Hooghe and Marks (2004); De Vreese (2004); De
Vreese and Boomgaarden (2005).
A4 The changeability of views
63
section of this chapter we examine how changeable views on the eu are, and
whether changeability is indeed linked to a lack of knowledge and involvement.
4.3
The follow-up questions survey
In section 4.1 we argued that there is a disjunction between the positive sentiment towards the eu as expressed in surveys and the often somewhat more
negative and sometimes even cynical tone of the public in focus groups and the
media. Moreover, it is unclear how “real” and how changeable views on the eu
are. To throw more light on both aspects, we introduce a new research method
2
here: the “follow-up questions survey” (“doorvraagenquête”). In a follow-up
questions survey, interactive elements are added to a traditional survey with
the aim of imitating a “normal” conversation. Depending on a respondent’s
view, he or she is presented with a counterargument, and a follow-up question
is then posed. The use of counterarguments is intended to persuade people of
the opposite, as it were. Respondents are then asked whether they have changed
their view on the basis of this counterargument, or whether they are sticking to
their standpoint. A follow-up questions survey offers insight not only into the
changeability of views, but also into the arguments which influence people in
their opinion formation and the “durability” of changes of view (how long do
they last, in other words).
In early 2008 the scp conducted a follow-up questions survey on the eu among
3
2,000 respondents. Each respondent answered a total of 17 questions: nine
background questions, and four decision problems with four accompanying
counterarguments. The background questions were concerned with general
views on, knowledge of and interest in Europe. The decision problems dealt
with more specific European issues, such as preferences for joint European
policy in various areas and the accession of Turkey. The decision problems were
chosen in part for their topicality, so that people could be expected to have some
idea of what was involved. Depending on whether a respondent expressed a view
for or against on a particular issue, a follow-up question was posed. Proponents
were presented with an argument against, opponents with an argument for.
Respondents were then asked whether this argument had prompted them to
change their minds or whether they stuck to their original standpoint. Eight
4
decision problems were tested in this way.
To clarify, a sample question with counterarguments. Firstly, all respondents
were presented with an introductory question:
Are you for or against a joint European asylum policy?
Proponents were then asked the question:
Would you still be for a joint asylum policy if such a policy means that the Netherlands has to accept more asylum seekers, or would you then change your mind?
And opponents were asked:
Would you still be against a joint asylum policy if such a policy means that asylum
seekers will be distributed fairly across European countries, so that the Netherlands
2
3
4
Also called a “survey experiment” in the scientific literature (Gaines et al. 2007).
The fieldwork was financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for which a more detailed
research report was prepared (Wennekers 2008).
Whether people were presented with the first four decision problems or the second
four decision problems was determined at random. Each respondent was only presented with four decision problems in order to prevent “decision fatigue”. For each
respondent the questions were posed in random order, to ensure that the sequence
could not affect the results.
64
Europe’s Neighbours
does not have to accept as many asylum seekers, or would you then change your
mind?
People had the opportunity to stick to their view, to change their view, or to
indicate that they had begun to doubt their view. One month after the first
measurement the participants were again asked to give their views on the same
issues. This was aimed at testing how long changes of view last. In addition,
two general questions (whether eu membership is a good thing and whether
the Netherlands benefits from membership) were again put to the participants.
We discussed the results in chapter A3.
In this section we show how changeable views on the eu are, which arguments
are persuasive, and whether changes of view last. Where possible we look at the
5
differences between groups of people. Table A4.1 gives an initial indication of
changeability on the various issues. The first column states the initial question. The second and third columns show how many people are for and against
in the first instance. Together these two columns add up to 100%. The fourth
column states the counterargument for proponents and opponents respectively. The fifth, sixth and seventh columns show how many people, having
been presented with the counterargument, stick to their view, begin to have
doubts and change their view. Together these columns also add up to 100%.
To clarify with an example: 71% of the people are in favour of a joint European
asylum policy (column 2); these people are then asked whether they would still
be in favour of a joint asylum policy if the Netherlands would have to accept
more asylum seekers; in that case 41% are still in favour of a joint European
asylum policy (column 5), 18% begin to have doubts (column 6), and 41%
change their view (column 7).
A striking feature of the results in table A4.1 is the considerable degree of
changeability: a substantial number of people change their minds after being
presented with a counterargument. The changeability ranges from 10% (opponents of Turkey’s accession who were persuaded by an economic argument)
to 65% (proponents of a joint European drugs policy who were persuaded by a
consequent rise in drugs-related crime). On balance it turns out to be easier to
6
turn proponents into opponents than the other way around.
5
6
Because of the small numbers involved, the “durability” of changes of view could not
be broken down by background characteristics.
The total sum of changeability (column 7) is 318 percentage points among proponents,
compared to 193 percentage points among opponents.
A4 The changeability of views
Table A4.1
Views on the EU and their changeability,
population aged 15 years and above,
2008 (in percent)
reactionb
initial questiona
Are you for or against a joint European
asylum policy?
is
is
sticks to
for against counterargument
view
Would you still be for a joint asylum policy if such a policy
71
means that the Netherlands has to accept more asylum
seekers?
41
29
Are you for or against a joint European
drugs policy?
77
23
Are you for or against more intensive
cooperation with 16 neighbouring
countries of the EU, such as Morocco
and Ukraine?
46
54
Are you for or against Turkey’s accession to the EU?
34
66
Are you for or against Turkey’s accession to the EU?d
reactionc
31
69
At the moment major European decisi58
ons can only be taken if all EU countries
agree. If one country does not agree
with a decision, it will not be adopted.
This is the “right of veto”. Are you for or
against the abolition of this veto right?
Are you for or against the immediate
admission of workers from newly acceded EU countries to the Dutch labour
market?
31
Are you for or against a joint European
immigration policy?
67
42
69
33
begins
to have
doubts
changes
view
18
41
Would you still be against a joint asylum policy if such a
policy means that asylum seekers will be distributed fairly
across European countries, so that the Netherlands does
not have to accept as many asylum seekers?
27
27
46
Would you still be for a joint drugs policy if such a policy
leads to more drugs-related crime in the Netherlands?
20
15
65
Would you still be against a joint drugs policy if such a
policy reduces the drugs problem in the Netherlands?
50
24
27
Would you still be for more intensive cooperation with
neighbouring countries if such a policy creates hostility
towards the EU from other neighbouring countries (e.g.
Russia or Iran)?
Would you still be against more intensive cooperation
with neighbouring countries if such a policy makes
Europe more secure and more stable?
47
27
25
26
38
36
Would you still be for Turkey’s accession if many Turks
come to look for work in the Netherlands, so that some
Dutch workers will lose their jobs?
42
25
33
60
30
10
Would you still be against Turkey’s accession if it boosts
Dutch people’s incomes by EUR 300 per year on average?
Would you still be for Turkey’s accession if increased
Turkish immigration to the Netherlands makes Islam more
dominant in the country’s streets?
33
24
43
Would you still be against Turkey’s accession if this eases
tensions between the West and the Islamic world?
52
28
20
Would you still be for abolition of the veto right if this
means that a majority of EU countries takes decisions
which are highly disadvantageous to the Netherlands?
36
31
33
39
43
18
43
28
29
46
37
17
35
16
49
50
37
13
Would you still be against abolition of the veto right if this
means that other member states use their veto rights to
block EU decision making in many areas?
Would you still be for the immediate admission of foreign
workers if this puts greater pressure on the Dutch social
security system?
Would you still be against the immediate admission of
foreign workers if this boosts economic growth in the
Netherlands?
Would you still be for a joint immigration policy if such a
policy means that the Netherlands can no longer insist on
admission and integration tests for immigrants?
Would you still be against a joint immigration policy if
such a policy saves the Dutch government large amounts
of money?
a One half (n = 1,000) of the respondents were presented with the first four questions, the other half with the second four questions. The questions were posed to the
respondents in random order.
b The proponents (“definitely for” and “inclined to be for”) and opponents (“definitely against” and “inclined to be against”) add up to 100%.
c The categories “sticks to view”, “begins to have doubts” and “changes view” add up to 100%.
d The question on Turkey’s accession was posed in both subgroups in order to test both an economic and an identity argument.
Source: SCP Europe follow-up questions survey 2008
65
66
Europe’s Neighbours
Which groups change their minds easily and which do not? Table A4.2 gives an
overview of the overall changeability by background characteristics. Changeability has been calculated here as the sum score of the number of times a
person changed his or her view (2 points) or began to have doubts (1 point). On
the basis of this sum score, respondents were then divided into three groups:
a group with low changeability, a group with moderate changeability, and a
group with high changeability. The table shows which groups score high on
changeability and which groups low.
low changeability
moderate changeability
high changeability
33
45
22
man
38
43
19
woman
27
48
25
15-25 years
30
44
26
25-35 years
30
47
23
35-45 years
33
47
20
45-55 years
36
42
21
55-65 years
42
43
15
≥ 65 years
27
47
27
low
27
49
24
intermediate
31
44
25
high
46
40
14
not involved
24
49
27
somewhat involved
33
45
22
involved
50
38
12
all
gender
age
education
involvement with EU b
self-definition in political terms
view on EU membership
Table A4.2
Changeabilitya by background
characteristics and one attitude,
population aged 15 years and above
(in percent)
left
42
42
17
centre
24
49
27
right
38
43
20
good thing
35
43
22
neither good nor bad
25
51
24
bad thing
47
38
15
a Changeability is the sum score of the number of times a person changed his or her view. Each respondent was presented with four counterarguments. People who
stuck to their view were given a score of 0, people who began to have doubts were given a score of 1, and people who changed their view were given a score of 2. This
means that people can score between 0 and 8 on the variable “changeability” (0 = stuck to view four times, 8 = changed view four times). In this table, people with a
low changeability have a score of 0, 1 or 2; people with a moderate changeability have a score of 3, 4 or 5; and people with a high changeability have a score of 6, 7
or 8.
b Involvement is on a scale composed of four indicators (interest in the EU, perceived level of information, attention to reporting on the EU, discussions about the EU in
daily life). Scalability: Crohnbach’s alpha is 0.84.
Source: SCP Europe follow-up questions survey 2008 (weighted results)
Of the total group, 33% scores low on changeability, 45% moderate and 22%
high. Women, younger people (under-35s) and older people (over-65s) are generally easier to persuade than men and middle-aged people (35-64-year-olds).
People aged between 55 and 65 years in particular remain firm in their views.
Educational attainment and involvement with the eu make a big difference:
people who score high on involvement are twice as firm as people who score
low on involvement. Similarly, more highly educated people are firmer than less
well-educated people, although the effects are slightly smaller in this case. Furthermore, left-wing people are somewhat firmer than right-wing people, but
this may be explained at least in part by the nature of the arguments (more typically “right-wing” arguments). But the most changeable are people who place
themselves in the political centre. Finally, table A4.2 shows that people with a
negative basic attitude towards Europe (“eu membership is a bad thing”) are
A4 The changeability of views
67
staunchly committed to their original view. People who have no definite view on
7
eu membership are most easily persuaded to change their minds.
To gain more insight into the mechanisms which play a role in high changeability, we present a figure here which combines background characteristics. What
happens when personal characteristics cumulate? We are looking here at the
people with high changeability, set against all other people. The technique used
is the same as in section 3.2.
Figure A4.1
High changeability in contrast groups
left/right:
18%
highly
educated:
16%
less welleducated:
21%
betrokken:
12%
not involved:
19%
all:
22%
involved:
20%
central
26%
not involved:
30%
Example: Some 22% of all respondents score high on changeability. Of the people who place themselves in the political
centre, 26% score high on changeability. Of the people who place themselves on the left or right of the political spectrum,
18% score high on changeability. Of the people who place themselves on the left or right of the political spectrum and
who are highly educated, 16% score high on changeability.
Source: SCP Europe follow-up questions survey 2008 (weighted results)
People who place themselves in the political centre and are not involved with
the eu score highest on changeability (30%). Among the highly educated with
a clear political preference (left or right) and high involvement with the eu,
this figure is only 12%. So, as predicted by the theory, involvement is indeed a
relevant factor. But when we make another analysis, which breaks changeability
down into three rather than two categories (low, moderate and high), it turns
out that involvement does not explain everything. This analysis shows that men
with a negative basic attitude towards the eu and a low involvement with the eu
are the least changeable group. Only 6% of these men score high on changeability. So a lack of involvement can also go together with firmness.
Which arguments do people find the most persuasive? Table A4.3 shows the
four strongest and the four weakest arguments. The persuasiveness of an argument depends not only on its substance, but also on all kinds of other factors,
such as the way the argument is formulated and the issue to which the argument applies. Some arguments are formulated in such a way that they will win
over a majority of respondents (no one wants more drugs-related crime, for
instance). For that reason it is difficult to decide what makes an argument a
strong argument: is the argument formulated so forcefully that it persuades
many people regardless of its substance, or does the substance touch on a
theme that is a strong determinant of views on the eu? We cannot say this with
any certainty. However, when we set the strongest and weakest arguments
7
The differences mentioned here remain in a multivariate analysis. Also checked for
effects of gender, age, education and general attitudes towards the eu, the people in
the political centre remain the most changeable, and so on (for further details, see
Wennekers 2008).
68
Europe’s Neighbours
against each other, it is striking that three of the four strongest arguments
are concerned with the threat to national identity, while three of the four
weakest arguments are concerned with economic benefits. This may suggest
that views on the eu are more strongly determined by cultural identity and
fears of threats to it than by rational cost/benefit considerations. This finding
certainly meshes with recent literature, which argues that feelings of identity
are stronger determinants of views on the eu than economic considerations
(see e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2004). Incidentally, in European Outlook 5 from
2007 we found little support for the idea that views on the eu are more strongly
determined by cultural identity than by economic benefit. But in that case identity was operationalised as national pride. What we now see is that the issue is
specifically xenophobia. This may not be that surprising given the way in which
immigrants and minorities have been portrayed in the Netherlands in recent
years. Moreover, recent literature also argues that anti-immigration feelings in
particular have a strong effect on views on the eu (De Vreese 2004; De Vreese
and Boomgaarden 2005).
change of
argument
view
strongest: Would you still be for a joint drugs policy if such a policy leads to
more drugs-related crime in the Netherlands, or would you then
change your mind?
65
Would you still be for a joint immigration policy if such a policy means
that the Netherlands can no longer insist on admission and integration tests for immigrants, or would you then change your mind?
49
Would you still be against a joint asylum policy if such a policy
means that asylum seekers will be distributed fairly across European
countries, so that the Netherlands does not have to accept as many
asylum seekers, or would you then change your mind?
46
Would you still be for accession if increased Turkish immigration to
the Netherlands makes Islam more dominant in the country’s streets,
or would you then change your mind?
43
weakest: Would you still be against Turkey’s accession if it boosts Dutch
people’s incomes by EUR 300 per year on average, or would you then
change your mind?
10
Would you still be against a joint immigration policy if such a policy
saves the Dutch government large amounts of money, or would you
then change your mind?
13
Would you still be against the immediate admission of foreign workers
if this boosts economic growth in the Netherlands, or would you then
change your mind?
17
Would you still be against abolition of the veto right if this means that
other member states use their veto rights to block EU decision making
in many areas, or would you then change your mind?
18
Source: SCP Europe follow-up questions survey 2008 (weighted results)
The general differences in changeability between groups were shown in
table A4.2. The question now is whether, given the general differences in
changeability, there are differences in the arguments which influence groups
8
in forming their opinions. Which people are receptive to which arguments?
The general pattern is that women and the less well-educated are more receptive to arguments which refer to threats to the personal situation and to
national interests (“crime”, “social problems”, “islamisation”, “job losses”,
“disadvantageous to the Netherlands”), and men and the more highly educated are more receptive to international arguments (“security and stability in
8
Here we restrict ourselves to a summary of striking differences. The research report
on the follow-up questions survey includes a detailed table in which changeability per
argument is broken down by various groups (Wennekers 2008).
Table A4.3
Strongest and weakest arguments,
with changes in views (in percent)
A4 The changeability of views
69
Europe”, “easing tensions between the West and the Islamic world”, “effective
decision making in the eu”). Older people are also more sensitive to references
to security and stability in Europe and tensions with the Islamic world; younger
people are more easily persuaded by immigration arguments (“islamisation”,
9
“job losses”, “integration test”). People who place themselves on the right of
the political spectrum are far more easily persuaded by “foreigners” arguments
than left-wing people. But left- and right-wing people react virtually identically
to classic “right-wing” arguments on economic growth and financial gain. It
should be noted, however, that in all these cases we are considering receptiveness to hypothetical advantages and disadvantages, put as counterarguments to
the respondent’s initial preference. Financial expectations and fears of war or
job losses and such like may of course have played a role consciously or unconsciously in that initial preference.
The SCP’s Europe follow-up questions survey is concerned with reactions to counter­
arguments, not with all kinds of other factors which may affect individual opinion
formation. But the survey does include an open question on this aspect. What does the
respondent regard as the main guide or source in the formation of his or her views on the
EU? Most people say that they base their views on what they see, hear and read in the
media (“on what I see on television and read in the paper”). Friends, family, colleagues
and experts are frequently mentioned (“I base my view often on statements made by
people in my immediate surroundings.”). Some people refer to their own experiences
with Brussels, in their work situation for instance (“on the daily practice of our company,
where we regularly have to deal with EU regulations”). Political parties, the government,
the prime minister, the state secretary for European Affairs, or the respondent’s political
ideology are mentioned less frequently.
Other people answer the open question with a substantive explanation for their attitude
towards the EU. Negative explanations (which were considerably more frequent than
positive explanations) refer to the costs of European cooperation (“Brussels throwing
money down the drain”), or, more often, the supposed influx of immigrants (“the Poles
who come here to take jobs which could be done by Dutch workers”; “I am against
Turkey’s accession and the unlimited influx of East Europeans”). The loss of national
sovereignty is mentioned less frequently (“too much is decided in Brussels”). Positive
explanations refer to the benefits of cooperation: unity is strength, the Netherlands
needs a larger framework, the EU can be a counterweight to other major powers
(“the Netherlands is too small on its own”). Some people give solidarity as their
motivation (“on my sense of humanity”). Very occasionally people say that they base
their views on their religion. It is also worth noting that a substantial group has no views
on the EU at all and is not very concerned with it either (“there is little interest here in
discussions on Europe”).
How, then, should we interpret the changeability of views? Changing one’s
mind in itself need not point to “non-attitudes”. The counterargument provides
new information, outlines a new situation, and this may prompt a change of
view or swing the pendulum in the other direction. More indicative of nonattitudes is the durability of changes of view and firmness. With non-attitudes,
answers are arbitrary and not based on a deeper basic attitude. In that case
there would be little connection between a person’s view at time X and at time Y.
9
These differences mesh with the earlier finding that older people are more likely than
younger people to place European cooperation within the framework of peace and
security (cpb/scp 2007: 36).
70
Europe’s Neighbours
In chapter A3 we showed that basic attitudes towards the eu usually do not
change within the space of a month. But what about views on the specific issues
mentioned in table A4.1? The research report on the follow-up questions survey
includes an extensive table which details the opinions of the same people on
the same issues one month after the first measurement (Wennekers 2008). Here
we restrict ourselves to a description of the most striking results. As we showed
earlier in this chapter, people regularly change their minds under the influence
of counterarguments. But in most cases these changes do not last. There are
major differences between people who stick to their view after a counterargument and those who change their view. Within the first group, the overwhelming majority (83% on average) holds the same view a month later. These are the
people who would not be expected to change their minds anyway: they have
declared themselves for or against something, and they could not be persuaded
to reconsider on the basis of a counterargument. However, in respect of two
questions a substantial number of these people did in fact change their view a
month later. Thus 39% of the opponents of a joint European asylum policy are
in favour a month later. On the question of the veto right too, both proponents
and opponents turn out to be flexible a month later: respectively 33% and 39%
of respondents changed their minds after all. In this case this is probably due
in part to the complex wording of the question.
The pattern is different among those people who are swayed by the counterargument. In most cases most people have returned to the initial attitude a
month later. But there are some exceptions to this rule. On five questions nearly
half or more than half of the respondents have still changed their view a month
10
later. The “durability” of changes of view ranges from 12% (opponents of
Turkey’s accession who became proponents on the basis of an economic argument) to 56% (opponents of a joint European drugs policy who became proponents after a reference to drugs problems). All in all the response patterns do
not seem entirely random. In the “suppose that” situations posited by the counterarguments, people regularly adopt another view; but on the theme as such
they tend to stick to their original view. The randomness does seem to increase
as the question becomes more complex and the theme is further removed from
the person’s experience. This is evident, for instance, in the complex question
on the right of veto: both those who had a firm view and those who changed
their view initially changed in large numbers a month later. This seems to be
evidence of non-attitudes: people do not understand the question well and offer
an arbitrary opinion.
4.4
Conclusions
Under the influence of additional information or considerations, many people
change their minds on specific European issues. How easy or hard it is to
persuade people to change their minds differs from person to person and from
argument to argument. On balance it is difficult to make general statements
about changeability. As predicted by the theory, involvement with the eu is
a relevant factor, but a low involvement does not automatically mean a high
changeability. Men with a negative basic attitude towards the eu, for instance,
are still very firm in their views despite a low involvement.
10
Opponents of a joint European asylum policy who became proponents, opponents of
a joint European drugs policy who became proponents, proponents of the immediate
admission of foreign workers who became opponents, proponents and opponents of
the abolition of the right of veto.
A4 The changeability of views
71
The results reflect a certain distrust of the eu, something which is also evident
in the media and in focus groups. On specific issues it turns out that proponents are more likely to change their minds than opponents. We also found that
people with a negative basic attitude towards Europe are firmer on the issues
than people with a neutral or positive basic attitude. Specific arguments which
put Europe in a bad light are apparently more plausible or persuasive than arguments which give Europe a star role. A more general mechanism may be at play
here:
In a political debate, negative factualities often win out over vague benefits and
ideals. If they have any doubts, most people prefer to be realistic or cynical rather
than naive (Dekker and Wennekers 2005: 630).
However, there is an essential difference between changeability prompted by
counterarguments on specific policy issues, and changeability of the basic
attitude towards Europe, without counterarguments but over the passage of
time. In the latter case it is actually the people with negative basic attitudes who
are somewhat more changeable, as we showed in chapter A3. A positive basic
attitude towards Europe thus seems to be somewhat more strongly anchored
than a negative basic attitude, although within the latter group the majority is
also stable.
So are we dealing with non-attitudes or not? In chapter A3 we showed that basic
attitudes towards the eu are generally not very changeable. Most people seem
to have a kind of internalised basic attitude towards the eu. This is an encouraging result for researchers and policymakers who use surveys. The fact that
specific opinions are susceptible to change does not render survey data meaningless. Surveys say something about the general climate of opinion and give
expression to basic attitudes. Even so, when preparing and interpreting surveys
it is worth remembering that for many people Europe is far away, and that most
people will never have given any thought to the objectives of the European
neighbourhood policy, for instance. As survey questions become more complex
and move further way from people’s experiences (such as our complicated veto
question), the probability of non-attitudes increases (see Tiemeijer 2008). Even
so, most people are still able to give a meaningful answer to a survey question.
They fall back on their basic attitude towards the eu and on fundamental ideas
of what they want and do not want. Against this background it is understandable that people are willing to be influenced by additional considerations. As
the nrc Handelsblad quoted at the start of this chapter says in an advert for itself:
“People who never change their minds rarely learn anything”.
72
References for part A
Adam, S. (2007). Symbolische Netzwerke in Europa: der Einfluss der nationalen Ebene auf
europäische Öffentlichkeit. Cologne: Halem.
Altheide, D.L. and R.P. Snow (1979). Media logic. Beverly Hills, ca: Sage.
Anderson, C.J. (1998). When in doubt, use proxies: attitudes to domestic politics
and support for the eu. In: Comparative Political Studies, no. 31, p. 569-601.
Baisnée, O. (2000). Can political journalism exist at the eu level ? Paper presented at the
joint sessions of the European Consortium for Political Research, Kopenhagen.
Bakker, P. (1997). The Netherlands; the Euro: unification or separation. In: The
European Union in the media 1996 (aej Annual Report, p. 205-209). Madrid:
Fundesco.
Blumler, J.G. and M. Gurevitch (1995). The crisis of public communication. London:
Routledge.
Boerboom, J. (2004). Controle op Brussel door Kamer kan beter: samenwerking
voorkomt achterhoedegevechten. In: Internationale Spectator, vol. 58, p. 430-434.
Chalaby, J.K. (2004). Scandal and the rise of investigative reporting in France.
In: American Behavioral Scientist, vol. 47, p. 1194-1207.
Converse, P.E. (1962). Information flow and the stability of partisan attitudes.
In: Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 26, p. 578-599.
Converse, P.E. (1974). Comment on Burnham’s “Theory of voting research”.
In: American Political Science Review, vol. 68, p. 1024-1027.
Costa, O. and J. Daloz (2005). How French policy-makers see themselves.
In: H. Drake (ed.), French relations with the European Union (p. 21-41). London:
Routledge.
cpb/scp (2005). European Times. Public opinion on Europe & Working hours, compared
and explained (European Outlook 3). The Hague: cpb Netherlands Bureau for
Economic Policy Analysis / The Netherlands Institute for Social Research | scp.
cpb/scp (2006). Diverse Europe. Public opinion on the European Union & Cultural diversity,
economics and policy (European Outlook 4). The Hague: cpb Netherlands Bureau
for Economic Policy Analysis / The Netherlands Institute for Social Research |
scp.
cpb/scp (2007). Market Place Europe. Fifty years of public opinion and market integration
in the European Union (European Outlook 5). The Hague: cpb Netherlands Bureau
for Economic Policy Analysis / The Netherlands Institute for Social Research |
scp.
Cross, S. and P. Golding (1997). United Kingdom: Europe through the looking
glass. In: The European Union in the media 1996 (aej Annual Report, p. 233-246).
Madrid: Fundesco.
De Vreese, C.H. (2003). Framing Europe: Television news and European integration.
Amsterdam: Aksant.
De Vreese, C. H. (2004). Why European citizens will reject the eu constitution.
Cambridge, ma: Harvard University, Center for European Studies (Working
Paper no. 116).
De Vreese, C.H. and H.G. Boomgaarden (2005). Projecting eu referendums. Fear of
immigration and support for European integration. In: European Union Politics,
vol. 6, p. 59-82.
De Vreese, C.H. (2007). A spiral of Euroscepticism: the media’s fault? In: L. Hooghe
and G. Marks (ed.), Understanding Euroscepticism (special issue). Acta Politica,
vol. 42, p. 271-286.
Dekker, P. and C. Wennekers (2005). Publieke opinies over Europa. Tussen
abstracte steun and concrete ergernissen. In: Internationale Spectator, vol. 59,
p. 627-630.
Drake, H. (2005). Perspectives on French relations with the European Union: An
introduction. In: H. Drake (ed.), French relations with the European Union (p. 1-20).
London: Routledge.
ec (2007). The eu’s relations with its neighbours (eb 67.3). Brussels: European
Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_special_en.htm).
Eichenberg, R. and R. Dalton (1993). Europeans and the European Community:
The Dynamics of Public Support for European Integration. In: International
Organization, vol. 47, no. 4, p. 507-534.
Elgie, R. and S. Griggs (2000). French politics: debates and controversies. London:
Routledge.
References for part A
Flood, D. (2005). French Euroscepticism and the politics of indifference.
In: H. Drake (ed.), French relations with the European Union, p. 42-63. London:
Routledge.
Gabel, M. (1998). Public Support for European Integration: An Empirical Test of
Five Theories. In: The Journal of Politics, vol. 60, no. 2, p. 333-354.
Gaines, J., J. Kuklinksi and P. Quirk (2007). The logic of the survey experiment
reexamined. In: Political Analysis, vol. 15, p. 1-20.
Galtung, J. and M.H. Ruge (1965). The structure of foreign news: the presentation
of the Congo, Cuba and Cyprus crises in four Norwegian newspapers. In: Journal
of Peace Research, vol. 2, p. 64-91.
Gerhards, J. (1993). Westeuropäische Integration und die Schwierigkeiten der
Entstehung einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit. In: Zeitschrift für Soziologie,
vol. 22, p. 96-110.
Geddes, A. (2004). The European Union and British politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Graaff, B. de (2003). Nederland in de wereld van de 20e eeuw: steeds meer te klein
voor het tafellaken. In: Internationale Spectator, vol. 57, p. 360-366.
Hooghe, L. and G. Marks (2004). Does identity or economic rationality drive public
opinion on European integration? In: ps: Political Science and Politics, vol. 37,
p. 415-420.
Inglehart, R. (1970). Cognitive Mobilisation and European Identity. In: Comparative
Politics, vol. 3, no. 1, p. 45-70.
Inglehart, R. (1977). Long term trends in mass support for European unification.
In: Government and Opposition, vol. 12, no. 2, p. 150-177.
Inglehart, R. (1997). Modernization and Postmodernization. Cultural, Economic and
Political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kleinnijenhuis, J., J. Takens and W.H. van Atteveldt (2005). Toen Europa de
dagbladen ging vullen. In: K. Aarts and H. van der Kolk (ed.), Nederlanders en
Europa: het referendum over de Europese Grondwet (p. 123-144). Amsterdam: Bert
Bakker.
Koopmans, R. and J. Erbe (2004). Towards a European public sphere? In: Innovation:
The European Journal of Social Science Research, vol. 17, p. 127-132.
Maurer, A. and W. Wessels (ed.) (2001). National parliaments on their ways to Europe:
losers or latecomers? Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.
McLaren, L. (2002). Public Support for the European Union: Cost/Benefit Analysis
or Perceived Cultural Threat? In: The Journal of Politics, vol. 64, no. 2, p. 551-566.
Meyer, C. (1999). Political legitimacy and the invisibility of politics: exploring the
European Union’s communication deficit. In: Journal of Common Market Studies,
vol. 37, p. 617-639.
Patterson, T.E. (1993). Out of order. New York: Knopf.
Peter, J. (2003). Country characteristics as contingent conditions of agenda setting:
the moderating influence of polarized elite opinion. In: Communication Research,
vol. 30, p. 683-712.
Pfetsch, B. (2005). Media opinion in the European public debate: an empirical study
of newspapers editorials in seven countries. Paper presented at the International
Communication Association, New York.
Pijpers, A. (2005). Europese politiek in Nederlands vaarwater. Assen: Koninklijke Van
Gorcum.
Scheuer, A. (2005). How Europeans see Europe – Structure and Dynamics of European
Legitimacy Beliefs (dissertation). Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam.
Semetko, H.A., C.H. de Vreese and J. Peter (2000). Europeanised politics –
Europeanised media? European integration and political communication.
In: West European Politics, vol. 23, p. 121-141.
Sniderman, P., R. Brody and P. Tetlock (1991). Reasoning and Choice, Explorations in
Political Psychology. Cambridge: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge.
Thomassen, J.J.A. (2005). Nederlanders en Europa: een bekoelde liefde? In: K. Aarts
and H. van der Kolk (ed.), Nederlanders en Europa: het referendum over de Europese
Grondwet, p. 64-86. Amsterdam: Bert Bakker.
Tiemeijer, W.L. (2008). Wat 93,7 procent van de Nederlanders moet weten over
opiniepeilingen. Amsterdam: Aksant.
Trenz, H. (2004). Media coverage on European governance: exploring the
European public sphere in national quality newspapers. In: European Journal of
Communication, vol. 19, p. 291-319.
tk (2007). Staat van de Europese Unie: “Communicatie over Europa: het Hervormingsverdrag
en de toekomst van Europa”. Letter to House of Parliament, session 2007/2008,
31 202, no. 9.
73
74
Europe’s Neighbours
Van Noije, L. (2007). The democratic deficit closer to home: agenda-building relations
between parliament and the press, in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and France
(dissertation). Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.
Van Noije, L., and E. Hijmans (2005). National identity and nationalism in New
Year’s speeches of French presidents. In: Communication: The European Journal of
Communication Research, vol. 30, p. 23-54.
Wennekers, C. (2008). Veranderlijkheid van opvattingen over de eu. The Hague:
The Netherlands Institute for Social Research | scp (research report).
Zaller, J.R. (1992). The nature and origins of mass opinion. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
75
Part B
European neighbourhood policy
Findings
The eu wants to strengthen ties with its neighbouring countries on its eastern
border and around the Mediterranean Sea. It aims at prosperity, stability and
security, and to that end it has launched the European Neighbourhood Policy
(enp). This neighbourhood policy contains political, cultural, social and other
elements which are intended to improve the relationship with the neighbouring
countries. In part B of this European Outlook we concentrate on the enp’s economic aspect. This is about increasing prosperity in the neighbouring countries
and creating stronger economic ties. The underlying idea is that this will benefit
economic and political stability on the eu’s borders.
The neighbours ...
The eastern neighbours are former Soviet republics. Ukraine, Moldova and
Belarus border directly on eu countries, while Armenia, Azerbaijan and
Georgia are located in the South Caucasus region. The neighbouring countries around the Mediterranean are in the Middle East (Syria, Jordan, Lebanon,
Israel, Egypt and the Palestinian Authority) and in North Africa (Libya, Tunisia,
Algeria and Morocco). In many ways these 16 countries form an exceedingly
heterogeneous collection.
The political and institutional differences between the neighbouring countries
are pronounced. These are very important determinants for historical and
future economic developments and for economic relations with the eu. In political terms the neighbouring countries include both former Soviet republics,
some of which are striving towards democracy according to the western model,
as well as a number of undemocratic countries around the Mediterranean and
Israel as a mature democracy. In institutional terms there exists a very large gap
with the eu. Institutions constitute the rules within which organisations such
as governments, businesses and employees operate. The gap is evident from
standards used by the World Bank: only Israel, Tunisia and Jordan are in the
top-100 of countries with the best institutions. Countries such as Belarus, Syria
and Libya are very far down this list.
In economic terms, there are major differences among the neighbouring countries themselves and in comparison with the eu. In Israel the income per capita
is at West European levels, and in an oil-rich country such as Libya it is higher
than the average for the new eu member states. In Moldova people earn less
than 2 euros per day, and income transfers from emigrated Moldovans constitute a major source of income.
The economies of many neighbouring countries are strongly based on agriculture and/or commodities, although in a country such as Jordan services and
manufacturing dominate. In short, this group of countries is very heterogeneous in economic terms as well.
The North African neighbouring countries in particular are heavily oriented on
the eu for their trade. Morocco leads the way in this respect, with around 80%
of its exports destined for the eu; Tunisia comes a good second, with more than
70%. This contrasts sharply with the countries in the Middle East, which trade
76
Europe’s Neighbours
heavily with other countries in the region and with the United States, and in the
case of Jordan actually barely with the eu. For the eastern neighbours, Russia is
the main trade partner besides the eu.
For the eu member states the neighbouring countries are relatively small
trade partners: on average 3% of eu exports go to the neighbouring countries.
However, the neighbouring countries are important suppliers of oil and gas:
more than 10% of oil imports and 25% of gas imports originate from Algeria
and Libya in particular; and Ukraine and Georgia are major transit countries
for Russian oil and gas.
... can grow faster ...
The neighbouring countries around the Mediterranean posted broadly similar
growth rates as the eu countries over the past years (1990-2005). So the income
gap with the eu did not widen during this period, but it did not narrow either.
The most salient factors for this modest growth are the poor property rights
and unclear regulation, especially in the area of the financial markets. The
absence of good institutions hinders employment, investment and innovation,
and acts as a brake on economic growth. It also hinders a restructuring of the
economy, from a dependence on agriculture and commodities towards services
and manufacturing.
In the past years the eastern neighbours have recovered from the deep recession they were thrown into after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Restructuring
of macroeconomic policy (lower government expenditure and taxation) has
been one of the key factors in this recovery.
The gap with the eu can be narrowed if the institutions improve, corruption is
reduced and trade relations with the eu become more intensive. If the neighbouring countries are able to reach the current institutional level of Poland,
then their national incomes could increase by 15% (in the case of Tunisia) to
85% (Belarus).
… can trade more with the eu …
The neighbouring countries often export other products than the eu. The
neighbouring countries’ trade profile thus complements that of the eu member
states. This offers opportunities for the neighbouring countries and the eu to
consolidate good relations and to invest in new trade relations. Major export
products are commodities such as oil, gas, metal ores and diamonds, various
agricultural products, but also manufactured products such as clothing and
electrical equipment.
The potential offered by these complementary trade patterns is only partly
exploited at the moment. Because of their location on the edge of the eu, the
neighbouring countries are well placed for an intensive trade relationship with
the eu. However, trade is impeded by direct and indirect trade barriers, such as
import duties which range from 3% in trade with Armenia to more than 25%
for Morocco and Tunisia. Moreover, cross-border trade to and from the neighbouring countries is relatively time-consuming and expensive. The eu in turn
erects indirect barriers in particular: average duties at 5% are low, but imported
goods and services must meet strict standards.
Institutions constitute another impediment to trade, because it is difficult to
trade with neighbouring countries where property rights are poorly protected
and where other institutions (such as the regulation of markets and the fight
against corruption) deviate sharply from the European institutional setting.
Findings
77
Trade between the eu and its neighbouring countries could increase significantly through a liberalisation of trade, within the framework of the World
Trade Organisation (wto) or regional trade agreements, and through an
improvement in institutions. Many neighbouring countries are members of
or observers at international organisations, which will make demands on the
regulation of markets and the fight against corruption. In the economic sphere
some major trade barriers could thus be removed in the near future.
... with good policies
The enp thus rightly and strongly emphasises the need for trade liberalisation
and the improvement of a number of significant institutional factors. Practice
often proves wayward, however, and the bilateral action plans are not easy to
execute. A positive example is the current negotiation with Ukraine on a deep
free trade agreement. This example deserves emulation by other neighbouring
countries, so that trade can increase.
More trade in oil and gas is high on the eu’s wish list. It aims for an extension
of the internal market in an easterly direction, in the first instance to the candidate member states and over the somewhat longer term to the eastern neighbours. A similar treaty with the other neighbours in the Middle East and the
South may benefit trade with and investment in these neighbouring countries
and stimulate the supply of oil and gas to the eu member states.
Migration from the neighbouring countries to the eu is a controversial issue.
The eu labour market needs highly educated and trained workers, but the eu
also keeps its borders quite closed. For people from the neighbouring countries, migration offers opportunities to secure a good income, but permanent
emigration of highly educated workers is undesirable, because human capital is
an important engine for prosperity.
Institutions are dealt with in nearly all action plans, but every time the key
question is what precisely the eu can do to improve the institutions in the
neighbouring countries. Or rather, how can the eu stimulate its neighbouring
countries, and the citizens in those neighbouring countries, to improve their
institutions? As a first option we come back to trade liberalisation: if citizens
see opportunities for international trade, they will aim to improve their institutions in order to maximise the benefit from this. What is more, trade liberalisation is one of the eu’s most useful instruments. The second option is to support
initiatives launched by the neighbouring countries: if neighbouring countries
want to remodel their property rights, then the eu can assist them with this. A
third option is financial aid, currently more than eur 1 billion (of which onethird goes to the Palestinian Authority). But good institutions are needed to
allow this assistance to contribute to economic development. It is not possible
to demonstrate that financial aid contributes to the improvement of institutions.
The neighbouring countries are very heterogeneous in nearly all dimensions.
This requires a tailored approach, for which the bilateral action plans offer
good opportunities. But it is the case for nearly all neighbouring countries that
trade barriers are high and institutions are weak. The eu can provide assistance
to neighbouring countries which want to improve both, while at the same time
it can reduce the impediments to international trade. In this way the eu can
make a contribution to prosperity, stability and security in the neighbouring
countries.
78
B1
Introduction
Old neighbours become members; new countries become neighbours of the
European Union. With the enlargements of the eu in 2004 and 2007 the borders were moved eastwards to Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. Everyone
would like to have good neighbours, so too the eu. Neighbours we can trade
with, neighbours we can import oil and gas from, in short, neighbours we
can cooperate with. Good neighbours, also in terms of political stability and
economic prosperity. To achieve this, the eu gives additional privileges to its
neighbouring countries through the European Neighbourhood Policy (enp).
Launched in 2003 with the Wider Europe report, this policy is aimed at 15 neighbouring countries and the Palestinian Authority to the east and south of the
eu. These neighbours are coloured yellow in figure B1.1. Three neighbouring
countries in Eastern Europe border directly on the eu: Belarus, Ukraine and
Moldova. Three neighbouring countries are located in the South Caucasus
region and border on Turkey: Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The other
neighbours are located around the Mediterranean Sea: Syria, Lebanon, Israel,
Jordan, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt in the Middle East, and Libya,
Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco in North Africa.
The neighbourhood policy is not aimed at countries which are candidate
member states (Turkey, Macedonia and Croatia) or potential candidate member
1
states (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo).
Furthermore, a special position has been reserved for Russia, with which the
Figure B1.1
eu deals in terms of a “strategic partnership”. And finally, Norway, SwitzerThe European Union and agreements
land, Iceland and Liechtenstein fall outside the neighbourhood policy: the
with its various neighbours
1
Although the neighbouring countries were deemed to have no prospect of membership in the first instance, the door has recently been opened ever so slightly to
Ukraine, for instance.
ENP countries
Russia
EFTA
potential candidate member states
candidate member states
(15)
(1)
(3)
(3)
(2)
EU member states
(28)
B1 Introduction
79
economic and political relations with these countries are already intensive
2
through the European Economic Area (eea) and other arrangements.
The great diversity in the neighbouring countries runs like a thread through
this study. On the one hand this diversity makes it possible to identify differences: thus there is a close correspondence between effective institutions and
high prosperity. On the other hand this diversity makes it difficult to draw clear
conclusions for neighbourhood policy: good policy has to build on the existing,
rather divergent, conditions. Quite rightly, therefore, the neighbourhood policy
is operationalised in bilateral action plans, which were agreed in 2008 with
12 of the 16 neighbouring countries. These action plans are expressions of a
common goal: the neighbourhood policy aims at prosperity, stability and security based on human rights, democracy and the rule of law (European Council
3
2007). The eu’s objective is to promote the economic development of and integration with the neighbouring countries by stimulating education, supporting
healthcare, enhancing the living environment and liberalising trade. This unity
in the objective also justifies a certain degree of unity in the instruments, as we
will show in this study.
Part B of this European Outlook examines the mutual economic interests of
the eu and its neighbouring countries, and deals with the question what the
neighbourhood policy can contribute in this respect. Other factors, such as
diplomatic relations, security in the neighbouring countries, human rights and
democracy, will not be considered in this study.
The emphasis will be on an analysis of the deeper causes of prosperity in the
neighbouring countries and of the economic relations between the eu and
its neighbouring countries. This analysis is our “unique selling point” over
the existing literature on the neighbourhood policy. Milcher and Slay (2005)
stress the limited implementation of the action plans and conclude that the
neighbourhood policy still has to prove itself. Dodoni and Fantini (2006) take
the other tack, and assume that many of the intentions will be realised; on that
basis they conclude that the neighbourhood policy has the potential to promote
economic growth in the neighbouring countries. Emerson et al. (2007) make
specific proposals to improve the neighbourhood policy, but they do not stretch
to an analysis of the projected economic effects.
The first questions raised in chapter B2 is how intensive are the ties with the
neighbouring countries already, and how wide is the economic gap between the
two groups of countries. In chapter B3 we raise the question how the economic
situation in the neighbouring countries can improve, and what role economic
policy can perform in this context. In chapter B4 we concentrate on the relationship with the neighbouring countries. We pay close attention to trade and
the question what determines or impedes trade with the neighbouring countries. We also consider the economic consequences of freer trade: does the
eu have to worry about competition from the neighbours, or can the eu and
the neighbouring countries actually benefit from each other? This economic
analysis provides the basis for the discussion of the neighbourhood policy in
chapter B5. The key question is how policy can contribute to prosperity in and
economic integration with the neighbouring countries.
2
3
The European Outlook from 2007 dealt in detail with the European Economic Area
(eea), through which the named countries are effectively part of the internal market.
Switzerland is not formally a member of the eea, but it has de facto adopted large parts
of the internal market acquis.
For an overview of the academic studies on the enp, please see http://ec.europa.eu/world/
enp/pdf/background_material.pdf. The studies by Emerson (2004), Emerson et al. (2007)
and the overview study by Cremona and Meloni (2007) deserve a special mention.
80
B2 The neighbours of the European Union
The eu wants to improve the economic ties with the neighbouring countries.
Most neighbouring countries are rather unknown for Europeans (see part A).
Who are the European neighbouring countries, what kind of economies do
they have, and what economic relations does the eu have with them? These
1
three questions will be discussed in succession in this chapter.
2.1
Geography, politics and institutions
The neighbouring countries are located to the east and south of the eu. We can
2
distinguish four regional clusters:
– Eastern Europe: Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova (located between the eu and
Russia);
– South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia (bordering on Russia
near the Black Sea and Turkey);
– Middle East: Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Palestinian Authority and
3
Egypt;
– Maghreb: Morocco, Algeria, Libya and Tunisia (in North Africa, bordering
on the Mediterranean Sea).
The neighbouring countries differ sharply from each other and from the eu in
many respects (see table B2.1). The populations range from 3 million (Armenia)
to 74 million (Egypt). All neighbouring countries were ruled by other countries
in the past. The neighbours in Eastern Europe and the South Caucuses region
were part of the Soviet Union, and the countries of the Middle East and North
Africa (the mena countries) were colonised by western powers (United Kingdom, France and Italy). The former rulers had a major impact on the development of these countries and hence on their economies (see chapter B3). At the
moment most neighbouring countries are republics, although the quality of
democracy is not undisputed in a number of them. For instance, Belarus still
has an undemocratic communist system, and in Libya and Syria the state is very
powerful. And countries such as Egypt and Georgia are also associated with
restrictions in democracy and voting rights. The economic effects of limited
or no democracy are not clear-cut. The undemocratic form of government in
Belarus for instance, induces international isolation and with that negative
economic effects, whereas the Chinese economy is booming.
Many neighbouring countries are beset by political unrest. Presidential elections in Ukraine and Georgia, for instance, often require intervention from
the international community to ensure freedom of expression and a fair result.
Moreover, many countries, especially in the Middle East, have serious security
problems. These factors of course have a major impact on a country’s economy,
because they undermine the business climate.
Freedom of expression and the legal system are also sharply at odds with western standards. Table B2.1 shows the average of six measures of institutional
1
2
3
For detailed information, please see the sources for this chapter: the World Bank, the
World Trade Organisation (wto) and the International Monetary Fund (imf).
This cluster is set against the old eu member states (eu-15) and the new eu member
states (eu-12, members since 2004 or 2007).
The Palestinian Authority is treated separately in the neighbourhood policy. However,
not enough data are available for a detailed economic description and analysis of
these territories.
B2 The neighbours of the European Union
81
quality,4 which leaves no doubt that the neighbouring countries score appreciably lower than the eu (the Netherlands is in ninth place, the eu-15 average in
22nd, and the eu-12 average in 53rd). Only the institutional quality of Israel
approaches that of the eu-12.
Table B2.1
Geography, politics and institutions in
the neighbouring countries
The macroeconomic situation is strongly determined by the institutional
context. Institutions provide the written and unwritten rules of society; they
provide the behavioural framework for citizens, the authorities and other economic actors. Economic transactions are often accompanied by incomplete and
complex information, and the moments of payment and transfer usually do not
coincide. Good institutions can offer solutions to these problems and facilitate
transactions by providing transparency, certainty and trust. For instance, a
sound legal system ensures that contracts are honoured. However, poor institutions can hamper the economy. For instance, poor protection of ownership
rights will act as a brake on investment. Chapter B3 will consider in greater
detail the relationship between institutions and economic development.
country
Belarus
abbreviation
BLR
population
(millions)
10
religion
Orthodox Christianity
form of government
Republic
former ruler, year
of independence
Soviet Union, 1991
institutions
(world ranking)
186
Ukraine
UKR
47
Orthodox Christianity
Republic
Soviet Union, 1991
138
Moldova
MDA
4
Orthodox Christianity
Republic
Soviet Union, 1991
149
Georgia
GEO
4
Orthodox Christianity
Republic
Soviet Union, 1991
130
Armenia
ARM
3
Orthodox Christianity
Republic
Soviet Union, 1991
124
Azerbaijan
AZE
8
Islam
Republic
Soviet Union, 1991
170
Syria
SYR
19
Islam
Republic
France, 1946
183
Lebanon
LBN
4
Islam
Republic
France, 1943
160
Israel
ISR
7
Judaism
Republic
United Kingdom, 1948
Jordan
JOR
5
Islam
Parliamentary monarchy
United Kingdom, 1946
96
Egypt
EGY
74
Islam
Republic
United Kingdom, 1922
145
Libya
LBY
6
Islam
Republic (dictatorship)
Italy, 1951
177
Tunisia
TUN
10
Islam
Republic
France, 1956
94
Algeria
DZA
33
Islam
Republic
France, 1962
158
Morocco
MAR
30
Islam
Parliamentary monarchy
France, 1956
111
70
Source: World Bank (2007); World Development Indicators; CIA Factbook (2008); Kauffman et al. (2007)
2.2
Economic situations in the neighbouring countries
The macroeconomic situations of the neighbouring countries differ sharply at
the moment, both among themselves and in comparison with the eu member
states (see table B2.2). Besides having much lower figures for gross domestic
product (gdp) per capita of population (see figure B2.1), the neighbouring
countries also have different economic structures. The agriculture sector is
economically important or relatively important in many neighbouring countries, and a number of neighbouring countries are very dependent on oil and gas
exports. Furthermore, some neighbouring countries have high foreign investment levels and high economic growth rates. We will consider these aspects in
greater detail in section 2.3.
4
The World Bank measures institutional quality on the basis of scores between -2.5 and
+2.5 in six institutional spheres: voice & accountability, political stability, government
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption (Kauffman et al.
2007). This table shows the world ranking of the country in question.
82
Europe’s Neighbours
Figure B2.1
Incomes in the neighbouring countries, 2005 (GDP per capita in EUR)
EUR 20,000 to EUR 45,000
EUR 10,000 to EUR 20,000
EUR 5,000 to EUR 10,000
EUR 3,000 to EUR 5,000
EUR 1,500 to EUR 3,000
EUR 300 to EUR 1,500
Table B2.2
Economic situations in the neighbouring countries, 2005
income
inequality
(Gini index)
unem­
ployment
(in %)
GDP
(EUR)
GDP growth,
1996-2005
(average in %)
EU-15
18,172
3
EU-12
3,621
4
19,916
2
33
4.7
Netherlands
inflation
(in %)
agriculture
(% of GDP)
industry
(% of GDP)
2
26
72
5
31
64
1.5
2
24
74
8.1
services
(% of GDP)
Belarus
1,506
7
30
1.5
10.3
10
41
49
Ukraine
774
3
29
7.2
13.5
11
34
55
Moldova
347
2
36
7.1
11.9
17
24
58
Georgia
783
7
37
13.8
8.3
17
27
56
Armenia
910
9
38
8.1
0.6
21
44
35
Azerbaijan
953
10
37
1.4
9.7
10
62
28
Syria
948
3
35
8
7.2
23
35
41
4,574
3
40
-0.7
6
22
71
Lebanon
Israel
14,812
3
36
9
1.3
Jordan
1,682
5
36
14.8
3.5
3
30
68
11
9.7
15
36
49
Egypt
1,310
5
34
Libya
6,062
4
50
Tunisia
1,945
5
40
14.2
2
12
29
60
Algeria
1,710
4
35
15.3
1.6
8
61
30
Morocco
1,094
4
40
11
1
14
30
56
Source: World Bank (2007); World Development Indicators; Peridy (2005); European Commission (2007a)
B2 The neighbours of the European Union
83
The differences among the neighbouring countries are, however, considerable. Moreover, the economies of the former Soviet republics are still heavily
influenced by the transition to a market economy, and the political turmoil in
the Middle East adversely affects a number of neighbours. Below we give a brief
description of the economies in the four regions.
Eastern Europe
The East European neighbouring countries of Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova
are recovering from the deep economic recession which followed the collapse of
the Soviet Union. But gdp per capita has still not returned to its 1990 level, and
despite recent improvements the quality of the institutions remains unfavourable. Fighting corruption and economic deregulation remain far below the eu
level. The market and state are closely linked; unemployment and inflation are
high, as is the dependence on the Russian economy.
However, there are also significant differences between the three countries.
Belarus remains closely entwined with Russia, is less advanced in the transition
process, and (with the exception of political stability) has impeding economic
institutions. Yet despite these factors, gdp per capita (eur 1,506) is higher than
in Ukraine (eur 774) and in particular in impoverished Moldova (eur 347).
Then again, the Ukrainian economy has potential because of its natural
resources, a relatively high education level, a relatively strong industrial base,
and its political and economic opening to the eu. But the unstable political
situation in Ukraine has a major impact on this convergence effort. Moldova’s
economy is more agricultural (the agriculture sector accounts for 17% of gdp),
while Belarus and Ukraine rely more on manufacturing and oil and gas revenues.
South Caucasus
The economic transition is also in full flow in the former Soviet republics of
the South Caucasus region. Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan are now posting
substantial growth rates, and they have also made huge improvements in the
areas of deregulation and governance. The institutions in Armenia and Georgia
are among the best of all the neighbouring countries, but Azerbaijan lags well
behind in this respect (see table B2.1).
However, the strong economic performances of the past years are vulnerable
because of the focus on oil, gas and agriculture. All three countries are still
struggling with a low gdp per capita and with high unemployment. Many
inhabitants live below the poverty line (29% in Azerbaijan, 15% on average in
Armenia and Georgia). The Armenian economy is dominated by construction
and agriculture (21% of gdp), while the Azerbaijani economy relies mainly on
oil and gas revenues (62% of gdp), and the Georgian economy relies mainly
on services (56% of gdp) surrounding the oil and gas industry (pipelines) and
partly on agriculture. The approach to the West also differs: Georgia is strongly
committed to close relations with the eu, while Azerbaijan is not that interested.
Middle East
It goes without saying that the economies in the Middle East differ markedly
from each other. This is evident most clearly from the range in gdp per capita:
in Israel this is nearly ten times higher than in Jordan and 15 times higher than
in Syria. The focus of the economies also differs sharply: Israel and Jordan, with
their highly educated populations, concentrate mainly on services and indus-
84
Europe’s Neighbours
try, while Syria, Egypt and Lebanon are largely dependent on agriculture and
oil revenues. Thus in Syria 23% of gdp originates in the agricultural sector,
compared to only 3% in Jordan. What is more, Israel and Jordan are more
oriented on western economies, while the other countries have a more regional
orientation. Israel and Jordan have lower inflation rates and better institutions.
The Israeli institutions are at a European level, while the institutions in Jordan
are comparable with those of the candidate member states. Syria, by contrast,
scores far below the average of the neighbouring countries. In economic terms,
then, it is virtually impossible to regard these countries as a cluster. That is
why it has been selected as a cluster primarily on geographical and political
grounds.
Maghreb
Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco constitute the Maghreb countries,
together with Mauritania (which is left out of consideration here). In comparison with the other neighbouring countries these countries enjoy stable growth
rates and quite respectable income levels. Libya’s gdp per capita is actually
comparable with that of the eu member states, although this income is very
unevenly distributed, as shown in table B2.2. There is evidence of convergence
with the eu and stabilisation of the economy, but as with all neighbouring countries the gap with the eu economies remains considerable. Despite
many reform proposals and European action plans, there has been relatively
little change in institutional quality in recent years. Even so, the quality of the
institutions in Morocco and Tunisia is at the same level as that of the candidate
member states. Only Libya has very poor institutions.
The sectoral composition of the countries’ economies differs sharply: Algeria
and Libya depend on oil and gas, while tourism and industry are important in
Tunisia and Morocco.
2.3
Relations with the neighbours
Trade
Trade, especially export, is increasingly important to all eu and neighbouring
country economies. But the eu countries export far more than the neighbouring countries, and hence the share of trade in their economies is far higher.
Then again, the export growth figures of the neighbouring countries, around
10%, are significantly higher than those for the eu member states (around 4%).
The trade profiles of most neighbouring countries are very vulnerable, however,
because they are skewed towards natural resources and primary products.
The eu is a major trade partner for nearly all neighbouring countries, with
exports to the eu exceeding imports. The Maghreb countries in particular are
strongly oriented on the eu. Italy and France are major trade partners of many
neighbouring countries in volume terms, both for exports and imports. For the
neighbouring countries the adjoining eu countries are the main trade partners: for instance, Romania is important for Moldova, and Spain for Morocco.
Conversely, the neighbouring countries are only minor trade partners for the
5
eu: they account for 3% of eu imports and exports. There are also few extensive bilateral relations. Exceptions are Israel’s 7% share of Cyprus’s imports,
and Ukraine’s 6% share of Lithuania’s exports. None of the neighbouring
countries is a major trade partner for the Netherlands: together they account
5
This percentage is an average for the years 1995-2005. The neighbouring countries
are slightly more important for the eu-12 (3.7% of exports) than for the eu-15 (3% of
exports).
B2 The neighbours of the European Union
85
for only 2% of total imports and exports. But the Netherlands is a major trade
partner for Algeria (12% of exports), Israel (9% of both exports and imports)
and Egypt (7% of imports).
Table B2.3
International economic relations of the
neighbouring countries, 2004 and 2005
(in percent)
EU-15
share of
GDP, 2005
42
exports
share of EU in
exports, 2004
foreign direct
investment
share of oil and gas inward, share
exports, 2005
of GDP, 2005
5
2
EU-12
61
8
7
Netherlands
71
12
7
remittances
share of
GDP, 2005
Belarus
61
44
35
1
1
Ukraine
54
27
17
9
1
Moldova
53
30
2
7
32
Georgia
42
19
20
7
5
Armenia
27
47
13
5
19
Azerbaijan
57
47
86
13
6
Syria
37
54
72
2
3
22
Lebanon
19
11
21
12
Israel
46
29
2
5
1
Jordan
52
0
12
12
20
Egypt
30
35
43
6
Libya
96
6
0
Tunisia
48
72
14
3
5
Algeria
48
54
99
1
2
Morocco
36
80
14
3
9
Source: World Trade Organisation (http://www.wto.org, consulted in January 2008); World Bank (2007); World Development Indicators
Regional trade is important especially for the former Soviet republics. Thus
Ukraine supplies a substantial share of the imports of the other former Soviet
republics. Furthermore, 15% of Syria’s trade is with the East European neighbouring countries.
Oil and gas
Oil is a major export product for a number of neighbouring countries (see
table B4.4), although Algeria is the only significant player on the world market,
with an export share of 3% (see table B2.4). Oil is also a major import product
for the eu: 5% of eu imports are directly related to oil (and 1% to gas). Of these
oil imports, around 10% originate in the neighbouring countries and nearly a
quarter in Russia.
The only serious gas suppliers to the eu are Algeria, which accounts for nearly
50% of the eu-15’s gas imports, and Libya, which has good export opportunities to Italy since the completion of the Greenstream pipeline in 2004. Russia,
Ukraine and Belarus are major suppliers of oil and gas to East European
member states, but they supply very little to the eu-15.
86
Europe’s Neighbours
share of
world market
share of EU market
EU-27
EU-15
EU-12
share of
Dutch market
oil
ENP countries a
5.1
8.5
8.9
6.3
10.1
Belarus
0.5
1.7
1.4
2.9
2.3
Ukraine
0.3
0.6
0.3
2.2
0.1
Azerbaijan
0.4
1.0
1.0
0.6
0.0
Syria
0.5
0.9
1.0
0.1
0.3
Egypt
0.4
0.6
0.6
0.4
0.9
2.8
3.5
4.1
0.1
6.3
Libya
Algeria
Libyaa
2.3
Russia
10.2
26.7
20.5
62.0
30.8
10.6
25.2
26.1
11.1
0.3
Belarus
0.1
0.2
0.0
3.4
0.0
Ukraine
0.4
1.2
0.8
7.6
0.0
Egypt
0.2
0.4
0.4
0.0
0.0
Algeria
9.9
23.4
24.9
0.0
0.2
Russia
11.4
0.9
0.1
12.4
0.7
7.7
gas
ENP countries
a For Libya’s oil exports we have supplementary calculations based on figures from the US Energy Information
Administration (EIA) (www.eia.doe.gov). These are not included in the total for the neighbouring countries.
Source: own calculations based on the OECD/ITCS database (consulted in January 2008). Neighbouring countries
with oil exports worth less than EUR 1 billion per year are not listed.
Foreign direct investment
Over the last few decades businesses have invested more and more abroad.
In this way they gain a better understanding of foreign markets and they can
exploit local production factors. For the eu member states, the neighbouring countries offer benefits above all in production factors which they lack
themselves (oil and gas) or which are cheaper (labour). For the neighbouring
countries, the eu’s knowledge is of particular interest as a production factor.
Investment flows between the eu and its neighbouring countries remain very
small, however. Unfortunately we do not have detailed figures of mutual investments.
Migration and remittances
Remittances are money transfers from migrant workers to their home or
former home country. Over the past decades remittances have been a major
source of income for a number of neighbouring countries. Remittances have
had a major impact on the stabilisation of the economy and the alleviation of
poverty. The positive impact of remittances is mainly due to the wide price
differentials between the country where the emigrants have gone to work and
their country of origin: the money they transfer goes much further in the country of origin. But despite the positive and stabilising influence of remittances,
the economic implications of migration are not only positive (see chapter B5).
Migration is often accompanied by a brain drain, and the contribution of workers to their own economy may be more beneficial over the long term than the
value of their economic performances in other countries.
Table B2.4
Oil exports of neighbouring countries
and Russia, 2005 (in percent)
B2 The neighbours of the European Union
87
Since remittances are essentially relatively small and informal money transfers, they are difficult to identify and quantify. The World Bank estimates that
these income transfers exceed official development assistance and are nearly
equal to foreign direct investment. Remittances are very important in economic
terms for many neighbouring countries of the eu. In this respect the relationship between the eu and its neighbouring countries is a strong one. The money
flows from Southern Europe to North Africa are particularly substantial. The
flows from France and Spain to Morocco are among the largest in Europe, for
instance. For Morocco these remittances have a major impact on the economy,
6
since they account for around 5% of gdp.
Remittances are of course linked to migration flows. Both the eu member
states and the neighbouring countries operate strict migration policies. For
the neighbouring countries the eu member states are the main destination
countries for emigration. Emigration from the eu to the neighbouring countries is very limited and consists mainly of remigration. But migrants from
the neighbouring countries are important for the eu member states, where
they often constitute a large share of all immigrants. Thus Moroccans are the
largest immigrant group in the Netherlands, Spain and Italy. In the eastern eu
member states migrants from the eastern neighbouring countries are among
the largest immigrant groups. Table B2.5 shows the main migration flows (in
absolute numbers) between the eu and its neighbouring countries. In this list
the destination country is always an eu member state and the origin country is
a neighbouring country. The table shows the two largest immigrant flows from
neighbouring countries (if these are among the 15 largest immigrant flows
for the destination country in question). Ukraine and Morocco in particular
account for large emigrant flows to the eu member states. In the Netherlands,
only the Moroccan immigrants are included in the 15 largest immigrant flows;
they are the third-largest group after British and German migrants.
Table B2.5
Major migration flows between EU
member states and the neighbouring
countries, 2005 (in numbers)
destination country
origin country
Belgium
Morocco
flow
Germany
Ukraine
Finland
Ukraine
France
Morocco
Greece
Ukraine
1,200
Hungary
Ukraine
2,400
Italy
Morocco
17,800
Netherlands
Morocco
4,900
Czech Republic
Ukraine
2,800
origin country
flow
7,100
20,500
200
18,700
Algeria
Syria
15,100
200
Tunisia
6,500
Belarus
300
Source: OECD (2006)
Eastern Europe
Exports are very important for the eu’s East European neighbours, but they
are showing little or no growth. Foreign investors are investing quite heavily
in Ukraine and to a lesser extent in Moldova. Belarus is far less popular among
foreign investors because of its restrictive policies. The Moldovan economy is
very dependent on remittances: 25% of the labour force has left the country to
work elsewhere (mainly Russia and Romania), and the emigrants send part of
their incomes back to the home country. Large numbers of Ukrainians are also
working in Eastern Europe; in some European countries they account for a large
share of the total number of migrants.
6
Jiménez-Martin et al. (2007); Rapaport and Docquiet (2005).
88
Europe’s Neighbours
In their external economic relations the East European neighbouring countries
orient themselves on both the eu and on Russia and other former Soviet republics. Belarus is particularly dependent on favourable energy supply arrangements with Russia. The East European neighbouring countries are only minor
trade partners for the eu. They are only important for the Baltic States, Poland
and Slovakia.
South Caucasus
The external economic relations of the countries in the South Caucasus region
are limited and not very diverse, and in that they are no exception among the
neighbouring countries. But they are experiencing strong growth in these
external relations (for instance, an average of 21% export growth per year
for Azerbaijan between 2003 and 2005), probably in part thanks to economic
reforms, improvements in institutions, and oil. In the sphere of external
economic relations, as in other parts of the economy, the differences between
these countries seem to be linked mainly to differences in oil and gas revenues.
Thus the Azerbaijani economy is characterised by high oil and gas exports
(accounting for 86% of total exports) and high foreign investment (equivalent
to 13% of gdp). A striking feature is that the South Caucasus countries have
remained less dependent on Russia in their trade relations than the East European countries, especially given their less favourable geographical location in
relation to Europe. Even so, Armenia is heavily dependent on remittances from
Russia in particular. The other countries in the South Caucasus also supply
many labour migrants to Russia. The eu is a less popular destination.
Middle East
The external economic relations vary widely among the neighbouring countries
in the Middle East. Despite the limited institutional improvements and high
import tariffs, the share and volume of their foreign trade is soaring, except in
Syria. Egyptian exports increased by 21% per year on average between 2003 and
2005, while Syrian exports fell by 0.2% per year on average. Many trade relations are influenced by political relations: Israel and Jordan trade mainly with
the United States, while Iraq is a major trade partner for Syria and Lebanon.
Jordan and Lebanon attract substantial foreign investment (equivalent to 12%
of gdp); the other countries are less popular among foreign investors. These
are also the countries which are heavily dependent on remittances. The share of
oil in the export profile also varies widely, ranging from 72% of Syrian exports
to 2% of Israeli exports.
Remittances are of varying importance to the neighbouring countries in the
Middle East. Jordan and Lebanon are particularly dependent on remittances.
Migrant flows consist mainly of refugees, both political refugees and war
refugees.
Maghreb
Over the past years the share of exports in their total economies has soared in
the Maghreb countries, despite modest institutional improvements and high
import tariffs (also for the neighbouring countries). The volume of exports is
also very high, mainly because of the exports of oil and gas, which account for
98% of Libyan exports and 96% of Algerian exports. Tunisia and Morocco have
a more manufacturing-based trade profile. Foreign investment levels, at around
3% of gdp, remain very low. The eu plays a major role in the external economic
relations of all Maghreb countries, in part because of the colonial past, the
B2 The neighbours of the European Union
89
favourable geographical location, and existing trade agreements (with the
exception of Libya).
Migrants from the Maghreb region, especially from Morocco, are strongly represented in various European countries.
2.4
Conclusion: economic neighbours?
The main reason for the eu to maintain good relations with the neighbouring
countries is their geographical proximity: a number of countries border on the
eu; many countries have a coastline on the Mediterranean Sea, and the South
Caucasus regions opens to the Black Sea. However, the economic situation of
the neighbouring countries differs sharply from that in the eu: gdp per capita
is significantly lower in the neighbouring countries than in both the old and the
new eu member states; the structures of their economies are also very different
from the eu, with large shares for agriculture and natural resources; and the
institutional quality is lower.
Economic relations with the neighbours vary widely. The North African neighbouring countries in particular export heavily to the eu and have large migrant
populations in the eu. The former Soviet republics are located between Russia
and the eu not only geographically but also economically: they trade with both
and are major transit countries for Russian oil and gas. Relations with the
countries in the Middle East are relatively weak; in addition to the eu, these
countries are also strongly oriented on the United States and the Arab countries.
For the eu, the neighbouring countries are relatively insignificant partners.
90
B3 Economic growth among the neighbours
Promoting prosperity in the neighbouring countries is a major objective of the
European neighbourhood policy. Chapter B2 showed that the challenges are
daunting: gdp per capita in the neighbouring countries is lagging well behind
the income level of the new member states (eu-12), and it is only one-tenth
of the average level in the old member states (eu-15). This chapter looks at
economic growth in the neighbouring countries and its determinants. The key
question for the future is: how can the neighbouring countries stimulate their
economic development?
3.1
Economic development since 1990
As evident from figures B3.1 and B3.2, there is a divide between east and south
in the economic development of the neighbouring countries. The economies of
the former Soviet republics and Russia contracted sharply between 1991-1998,
and then recovered from 1998-2005. In some countries the recession was very
sharp indeed: Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova experienced seven lean years
1
during which gdp fell by 10% per year. In all the eastern neighbouring countries the economic situation deteriorated more than in the new member states
of the eu (eu-12). The turning point came around 1998 in Russia, Ukraine and
Moldova. Since then, impressive growth rates of more than 5% per year have
been no exception. The turning point had been reached earlier in the other
eastern neighbouring countries. Thus Armenia had only two years of contraction, albeit of unprecedented vehemence (-40% in 1992). After 1998 the eastern
neighbouring countries significantly outperformed the new member states,
which achieved growth rates of 2% per year on average.
The countries of the Middle East and North Africa (mena countries) display a
more stable pattern with lower growth rates. Syria is the exception here, with
high growth in the early 1990s, a deep recession in 1999 and moderate growth
at the start of the current decade. Some countries in this region grew faster
than the eu (e.g. Tunisia), but others grew more slowly (e.g. Morocco).
The gap between the eu and the neighbouring countries has not narrowed over
the past 15 years. In economic terms many eastern neighbouring countries have
still not recovered to their 1991 levels, and the mena countries have not or only
barely outperformed the eu member states.
1
These figures should be treated with some caution, because the transition from a
centrally planned economy to more market-oriented economy is difficult to measure.
In this chapter we rely on official statistics, but we realise that many neighbouring
country economies have large informal sectors.
B3 Economic growth among the neighbours
Figure B3.1
GDP per capita, 1991-1998 2 (in EUR)
91
GDP growth 1991-’98 (%)
4
SYR
EGY
2
TUN
LBN
JOR
ISR
EU10
EU15
MAR
DZA
0
BLR
-2
ARM
-4
RUS
-6
-8
GEO
-10
MDA
UKR
AZE
-12
100
1,000
10,000
100,000
GDP per capita 1991 (logarithm)
Source: Wereldbank (2007)
Figure B3.2
GDP per capita, 1998-2005 (in EUR)
GDP growth 1998-’05 (%)
10
AZE
ARM
8
UKR
GEO
6
BLR RUS
MDA
4
TUN
EGY
2
JOR
DZA
MAR
EU15
EU10
LBN
ISR
SYR
0
100
1,000
10,000
100,000
GDP per capita 1998 (logarithm)
Source: Wereldbank (2007)
2
Employment and productivity are the determining factors of economic growth
(measured as growth of gdp per capita). Unfortunately we cannot illustrate the
development of these factors over time, but have to restrict ourselves to giving
an impression of the levels of employment and productivity in 2005.
2
For an explanation of the abbreviations, see table B2.1.
92
Europe’s Neighbours
Table B3.1 shows clearly that low labour productivity is the main factor holding back output growth in the neighbouring countries. This is particularly true
for the former Soviet republics, where productivity per employee is appreciably
lower than in the mena countries, which in turn cannot match productivity
in the new member states. A striking positive exception is Israel, which has a
productivity level comparable with the eu-15.
GDP per capita
labour productivity (GDP/ labour participation
employees)
(employees/population)
EU-15
22,445
51,513
EU-12
4,713
11,418
0.41
25,190
53,969
0.47
Belarus
1,868
4,198
0.44
Ukraine
960
2,170
0.43
Moldova
430
4,265
0.32
Georgia
971
2,489
0.39
Armenia
1,129
3,102
0.36
Azerbaijan
1,182
2,062
0.46
Syria
1,175
4,179
0.27
Lebanon
5,672
51,009
0.36
6,206
0.26
8,260
0.29
Netherlands
Israel
18,367
Jordan
2,086
Egypt
1,624
Libya
7,517
Tunisia
2,412
0.44
Algeria
2,121
8,214
0.26
Morocco
1,356
1,373
0.31
Source: own calculations based on World Bank (2007), World Development Indicators and Datastream of Thomson
Financial (2008)
In terms of labour market participation (defined here as the number of work3
ing people divided by the total population ), there is once again a clear divide
between east and south. The former Soviet republics have a high participation
rate, comparable with the eu, while participation in the mena countries is
sharply lower. By measuring labour market participation in terms of the total
population, rather than as a proportion of the labour force, we cannot rule out
that this low participation is partly due to demographic factors; after all, the
mena countries have high population growth rates and hence relatively young
populations.
3.2
Direct causes of economic growth
Economic growth has a number of direct causes. Two of these were discussed
in section 3.1: more employment and higher productivity. This growth in
output per employee can in turn be caused by better education and training,
investment in machines, factories and other capital goods, or by technological
advances. As a final cause, which is certainly important for a number of neighbouring countries, output per employee can increase on the back of increased
consumption or export of natural resources. This section discusses the causes
of productivity growth.
3
The standard measure of labour market participation, i.e. people in work as a proportion of the population aged between 15 and 64 years, cannot be used here because of
the limited availability of data.
Table B3.1
Labour productivity and labour market
participation in the neighbouring
countries, 2005 (in EUR)
B3 Economic growth among the neighbours
93
Investment or innovation
Acemoglu et al. (2006) identify two strategies for achieving stronger growth:
an investment strategy and an innovation strategy. Other factors being equal,
investment (which boosts the stock of capital goods) will be effective above all
in countries with capital shortages and labour surpluses, many of the neigh4
bouring countries in other words. Through these investments, especially if
some originate in technologically advanced countries, these countries also
adopt new technologies. In capital-intensive countries, such as many West
European eu member states, additional growth per employee has to be found
mainly through innovation. According to this theory, the development of a
low-income country starts with high investment, followed by a switch at a later
stage from an investment strategy to an innovation strategy.
In terms of their economic development the neighbouring countries are less
advanced than the eu member states, as was shown in chapter B2. Their gdp
per capita levels are appreciably lower, and on top of that their economies are
based more on agriculture and mining (in most case, oil and gas extraction).
We can assume that investment is very important for the economic development
of these countries. An investment strategy thus seems the best way to engineer
economic growth.
What about investment levels in the neighbouring countries: is investment as
a percentage of gdp indeed higher than in the eu? Table B3.2 shows that this
is not the case for many neighbouring countries. The former Soviet republics
offer a very diverse and fluctuating picture, from extremely low but increasing
investment in Georgia to high but declining investment in Ukraine and Belarus.
These changes reflect the transition from a centrally planned to a market-oriented economy: existing plant and machinery proves obsolete, but the procurement of new plant and machinery requires a stable investment climate and
sufficient financing.
The investment ratio in the mena countries is more stable, at a comparable
level with the eu. Abu-Qarn and Abu-Bader (2001) show that this increase in
the capital stock was the key factor for economic growth in these countries
between 1960 and 2000. This applied in particular to the 1970s, when investments could be financed from a large inflow of petrodollars. This effect could
be repeated in recent years (2001-2005), but although investment has risen
sharply in oil-rich Azerbaijan, this has not happened in the oil-rich mena countries, Algeria, Libya, Egypt and Syria. So investment is important for the mena
countries, but at the same time the average investment ratio of 20% shows that
the accumulation of capital – the most obvious source of economic growth – is
not yet sufficiently exploited.
4
This follows directly from classical growth theory, given the declining return on capital.
94
Europe’s Neighbours
1991-1995
1996-2000
EU-15
20
20
2001-2005
21
EU-12
22
24
24
Belarus
28
25
25
Ukraine
24
20
20
Moldova
17
19
19
Georgia
9
20
24
Armenia
19
17
23
Azerbaijan
19
31
40
Syria
25
21
21
Lebanon
29
27
20
Israel
24
22
18
Jordan
30
24
21
Egypt
20
19
17
Libya
13
12
13
Tunisia
26
25
24
Algeria
27
24
24
Morocco
22
22
24
Source: World Bank (2007); World Development Indicators
Knowledge and demography
It goes more or less without saying that a well-educated population contributes
5
to economic growth. Measured as the percentage of the labour force with
an intermediate education, the education level in a number of neighbouring
countries (around 90% in Israel and the East European neighbours, except for
Moldova) is comparable with the eu. In countries such as Syria and Algeria the
education level is lower (respectively 58% and 66% of the labour force). We have
no data for a number of other mena countries.
A rise in the education level is determined by the opportunities for better
education and training and the prospects which this education and training
then offers. The opportunities are created to a large extent by the state: in most
countries the state is the main provider of primary and secondary and intermediate education. The labour market is the determinant of the prospects offered
by higher education: these will be better in neighbouring countries with large
service sectors (Lebanon and Jordan leading the way here, see table B2.2) than
in countries whose economies are dominated by agriculture and mining.
A shift of production and employment from agriculture to industry and the
services can make a major contribution to economic growth. But such a
restructuring is difficult in countries with high population growth, as is the
case in a number of mena countries (Fargues 2005).
Natural resources
Economic growth can be achieved relatively simply by boosting the production
and export of natural resources and other commodities. This option is available to neighbouring countries such as Algeria, Libya, Azerbaijan, Egypt and
Syria, all of which have large oil and gas reserves, but also to Armenia, which
has large reserves of diamonds.
5
One of the key papers on this point is Mankiw et al. (1992).
Table B3.2
Investment ratios in the EU and in
neighbouring countries, gross capital
investment, 1991-2005 (in percent of
GDP)
B3 Economic growth among the neighbours
95
Even so, countries which are well-endowed with natural resources, such as
Russia and Algeria, achieved only moderate to low growth rates over the
past decades. And Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) show that natural resources
actually have a negative effect on economic growth. The distinction between
a direct effect and indirect effects is crucial here. The direct effect of natural
resources on growth is positive, but this is overshadowed by a depressing effect
on investment and education and an increase in corruption. The availability of
natural resources reduces the need for investment. Moreover, these countries
are also vulnerable to fluctuations in commodity prices. These uncertainties
create a relatively unfavourable investment climate and thus hamper investment. And the mining and extraction of natural resources are less knowledgeintensive than other industries. This means that the return on education in
countries which rely heavily on natural resources is relatively low. And finally,
corruption is a problem in many resource-rich countries, because the economy
surrounding these resources is more often based on power and force than on
fair competition.
3.3
Underlying causes of economic growth
Why is one country better than another at capital accumulation, knowledge
development or productivity growth? Major reasons are a favourable geographical location, efficient institutions, open relations with the world economy, and
income inequality.
Geography
Geographical factors are important for the economic development of countries
(Gallup et al. 1999). Both location and climate play a role in various ways in
the level and development of economic growth. An economy’s location affects
transport costs to other markets. A location close to a large economy (in gdp
terms) will help, for instance. For the North African countries the eu is their
major neighbour, separated only by the Mediterranean. Across this sea and via
the open route to the ocean, as well as with Egypt’s location on the Red Sea,
the rest of the world is within easy reach. For the eastern neighbours, Russia
and the eu are important. But their maritime links are less favourable: Ukraine
and Georgia border on the Black Sea and Azerbaijan on the Caspian Sea, while
Belarus, Moldova and Armenia have no coastline at all.
Another geographical factor is the climate, which affects the economy through
the fertility of the soil and which affects productivity through the transmission
of infectious diseases and temperature levels. In the past, geography was also a
major factor in the establishment of colonies, which were chosen on the basis of
available natural resources, strategic location and favourable climate (western
rulers avoided areas where tropical infectious diseases were widespread). The
colonial powers had a major impact on development in their colonies, not least
by introducing their own institutions. And they still have a major impact today
because they maintain close economic ties with their now former colonies. All
mena countries were ruled by European powers in the past. Jordan, Egypt and
Israel were controlled by the United Kingdom; Syria, Lebanon, Tunisia, Algeria
and Morocco by France; and Libya by Italy. These historical links are still visible
in the remittance flows (see chapter B2).
A third factor, important for the mena countries in particular, is population
density and population growth. The analysis by Gallup et al. (1999) shows that
high population density is conducive to economic growth in coastal regions
96
Europe’s Neighbours
with good access to domestic and foreign trade. It is true that the North African countries have high population concentrations in the coastal areas, but
the infrastructure connections with their hinterlands are poor and their access
to international trade is hampered by political and institutional factors (see
chapter B4). The link between economic growth and population growth is very
negative. The mena countries have high population growth rates, for instance
2.0% in Egypt and 1.3% in Morocco (Fargues 2005).
Institutions
Investing is never risk-free. First of all there are economic risks: it is uncertain
how the market will develop, whether a product will be successful, and how the
implementation of new technologies will pan out. Of a quite different order is
the uncertainty which businesses may experience in securing future returns.
This uncertainty may be considerable if property rights are poorly defined
and regulation is very bureaucratic. According to the Nobel Prize laureate
Douglas North (1994), institutions are pivotal. Defined by him as the “rules of
the game”, institutions provide the rules under which not only governments,
businesses and employees, but also social organisations (such as trade unions,
schools, churches, mosques or synagogues) operate. In addition to the rules,
the players, or “organisations” in North’s terminology, are also important.
Businesses face great uncertainty if property rights are poorly protected, if
contracts are difficult to enforce, if governments are corrupt or if they can arbitrarily jack up taxes on profits. In short, uncertainty can be reduced with welldesigned and efficiently run institutions. The reduction of uncertainty helps to
improve the investment climate and can thus promote economic growth.
Figure B3.3
Relationship between the quality of
institutions and GDP per capita, 2005
(in EUR)
GDP per capita
100,000
LUX
ISR
FRA
ITA
GRC
10,000
LBY
ESP
CYP
SVK
CZE
LBN
POL
LVA
LTU
BLR
DZA
EGY
SYR AZE
1,000
TUN
MAR JOR
ARM
PRT
HUN
DNK
IRL SWE
GBR AUT
BEL DEU NLD FIN
MLT
EST
SVN
ROM
BGR
UKR GEO
MDA
100
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
quality of institutions
Source: Wereldbank (2007); Kauffman et al. (2007)
2
B3 Economic growth among the neighbours
97
Figure B3.3 confirms this connection between institutional quality and economic development. The figure sets gdp per capita (in eur) against the quality
of institutions (measured on a scale of -2.5 to +2.5) for the eu countries (not
6
labelled) and the neighbouring countries. The figure shows that countries with
good institutions have higher productivity. Efficient institutions offer both
national and international players an incentive to invest in the economy; and
they stimulate investments in the future, thus also in education, training and
development. Many studies have demonstrated that efficient institutions go
7
together with economic growth (see Easterly et al. 2006; Rodrik et al. 2004).
The relationship between institutions and output in figure B3.3 says something
about the long term in particular: a high productivity level has been preceded
by a long period of high economic growth. However, it is difficult to demonstrate how important institutions have been for economic development in the
neighbouring countries over the past 15 years. In the eastern neighbouring
countries so much has changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union that it is
not possible to establish a simple connection with the quality of institutions.
There are indications, though, that changes in institutions and changes in
macroeconomic policy have been decisive for economic development. Åsland
and Jenish (2006) show that the turnaround in the economic fortunes of Russia,
Ukraine and Moldova can be explained by the slashing of government spending
and taxation in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 1998. To a lesser extent
a reduction in corruption and improvement in regulation have contributed to
economic growth in more recent years.
Openness
In addition to institutions, the openness of a country also plays a major role in
economic growth (Winters 2004). Openness provides access to other commodities and products, a larger sales market, greater efficiency, and easier transfer
of knowledge and technologies from other economies. According to estimates
by Dollar and Kraay (2003), the openness of the Dutch economy (in which trade
accounts for 71% of gdp, see table B2.3) yields an annual growth rate that is
around 0.4% higher than in Ukraine (which has a trade/gdp ratio of 54%). On
average, however, the neighbouring countries are not any more or less open
than the eu. They too range from closed (Lebanon, with trade accounting for
19% of gdp) to reasonably open (Belarus, 61%, trading mainly with Russia).
This openness does not stand alone, however, but also depends on the quality of
institutions. The literature in this area, although still in its infancy, shows that
the growth effect of trade liberalisation is greatest in countries with marketbased institutions (Dollar and Kraay 2003, Rodrik 2000, Winters 2004). Or to
put it differently, a country has to be able to handle not only the new opportunities but also the new risks which greater openness entails. Chapter B4 will
consider the importance of openness in detail.
6
7
This measure of institutional quality has been constructed by Kauffman et al. (2005) of
the World Bank (see chapter B2). It comprises both the rules of the game (rule of law,
regulatory quality) and the way in which the authorities deal with these rules (voice &
accountability, government effectiveness, political stability and control of corruption).
It must be said though that these six indicators overlap to a large extent.
Figure B3.3 confirms the link between institutions and income, but it cannot demonstrate a causal link between the two. Easterly et al. (2006), Rodrik et al. (2004) focus
on causality and show that institutional quality is a major determinant of income per
capita.
98
Europe’s Neighbours
Inequality
Unequal income distribution affects economic growth, but neither the theory
nor the empirical evidence is conclusive as to how. Some very unequal countries
achieve high growth, others only low growth. A positive effect arises because
inequality is coupled with higher investment and greater efficiency: the rich
elite has a high savings rate, so that domestic investment can be high. A negative effect arises because inequality is coupled with a larger illegal market and
low investment in education and knowledge (Dominicis et al. 2008; Helpman
2004).
Galor and Moav (2004) show that the effects of inequality on economic growth
depend on a country’s stage of development. They endorse the investment
strategy and innovation strategy model put forward by Acemoglu et al. (2006),
which we discussed in section 3.2. During the investment phase, inequality
generates economic growth because of high investment; but during the innovation phase, inequality acts as a brake on investment in knowledge and education and thus has a negative effect on economic growth.
Figure B3.4
The relationship between income and
inequality in neighbouring countries,
2005 (in EUR)
GDP per capita
100,000
ISR
NLD
10,000
LBY
LBN
DZA JOR
BLR
1,000
UKR
EGY
SYR AZE ARM
TUN
MAR
GEO
MDA
100
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
inequality
Note: The EU member states are shown unlabelled.
Source: World Bank (2007); World Development Indicators; Peridy (2005)
Figure B3.4 illustrates this line of argument for the situation of the eu and its
neighbouring countries. The eu member states, which are deemed to be in the
innovation phase, combine a low rate of inequality (horizontal axis) with a high
income level (vertical axis); by contrast, in the neighbouring countries income
is low but inequality is high.
B3 Economic growth among the neighbours
3.4
99
Better institutions for higher growth rates
Improvement of institutions is one of the spearheads of the European neighbourhood policy. What kind of institutions are involved? We have drawn up a
list of three institutions which are essential for an efficient economy and which
are poorly developed in many neighbouring countries. These institutions are
changeable and measurable, albeit with some reservations. Our top-three is
inspired by the economic literature on institutions, and we will show that these
institutions are also relevant for the European neighbouring countries.
1 Property rights
Imagine a country where no one can decide who owns what, where possessions
cannot be converted into money, where share certificates are not standardised,
and where the enforcement of property rights differs from city to city. According to De Soto (2003), 80% of the world population, including the inhabitants of
the former Soviet republics, find themselves in this situation.
Top of the list of institutions is therefore the right to appropriate the fruits
of one’s own efforts (in addition to De Soto 2003, see also Rodrik 2000 and
Helpman 2004). Citizens will only want to invest in their own knowledge and
development if they can enjoy the benefits. Businesses will only want to conduct
research into new technologies if they can profit from new inventions. And as
Adam Smith pointed out more than two centuries ago, property rights provide
security for the accumulation of capital. For these reasons Helpman (2004)
concludes that a sound legal system, protection of contracts, and restraints on
the authorities are important for economic progress.
Table B3.3
Factors which influence business
operation 2005 (index)
Table B3.3 shows that Libya, Algeria and the former Soviet republics in particular score low on property rights (or the rule of law). For the former Soviet republics this picture is confirmed in the Global Competitiveness Report 2007-2008 (gcr)
published by the World Economic Forum. High on the list of factors which are
conductive to efficient business operation are an independent judiciary, protection of minority shareholders and protection of property rights.
problematic factors
property rights
Belarus
regulation
–1.2
-1.6
–0.5
Ukraine
regulation of foreign investments
protection of shareholders
–0.7
Moldova
protection of shareholders
effectiveness of competition policy
–0.6
–0.4
Georgia
protection of shareholders
property rights
–0.6
–0.2
Armenia
effectiveness of competition policy
ease of access to loans
–0.5
0.3
Azerbaijan
protection of shareholders
intensity of local competition
–0.9
–0.4
Syria
restrictions on foreign ownership
laws relating on ICT
–0.5
–0.1
Israel
business costs of terrorism
government debt
0.7
0.9
Jordan
protection of investors
0.5
0.4
Egypt
government deficit
0.0
–0.4
Libya
sophistication of financial markets
prevalence of trade barriers
–0.7
–1.4
Tunisia
prevalence of trade barriers
protection of investors
0.4
0,2
Algeria
soundness of banks
administrative costs of trade
–0.6
–0.6
Morocco
prevalence of trade barriers
restrictions on capital transfers
0.0
–0.2
Lebanon
Source: World Economic Forum; Global Competitiveness Report 2007-2008 (GCR); Kaufman et al. (2007)
100
Europe’s Neighbours
2 Regulation
Regulation is necessary to allow an economy to function well. It is necessary to
protect consumers from fraud, employees from exploitation, employers from
corrupt government, the environment from pollution, and so on. But regulation can also suffocate an economy: traders will think twice about marketing
their product, employers will not take on any new staff, and businesses will
have to spend more time on bribes and tax forms than on production. Finding a
balance between effective and stifling regulation is the overriding challenge for
all governments, and certainly the governments in the neighbouring countries.
In their transition to market economies the eastern neighbouring countries
have not yet found the right balance, while most mena countries are not
known as market-based economies. The World Bank indicators confirm this: in
the index on regulation (“regulatory quality”), all neighbouring countries with
the exception of Israel score lower than the eu member states; only Jordan and
Tunisia approach Romania and Bulgaria.
A striking feature in the gcr is the poor quality of financial regulation and
financial institutions in both the North African and the East European neighbouring countries. Specifically mentioned are the regulation of the insurance
industry, the soundness of banks (especially in the North African countries)
and the availability of venture capital (East European countries). This poor
quality is a serious impediment to economic integration, in particular for
activities which require a physical presence, such as much of the trade in services and foreign direct investment.
3 Macroeconomic policy
Our third priority is macroeconomic policy, by which we mean the matrix of
taxation, government spending and monetary policy. The key words here are
stability and balance. Stable policy is almost invariably preferable to sharp
fluctuations and sudden policy shifts. The timing of cyclical policy measures
is already extremely difficult in well-regulated economies; it becomes virtually
impossible when the information on the state of the economy is less reliable.
Stability is also desirable for the exchange rate: a high degree of uncertainty in
this sphere will act as a brake on international trade.
Macroeconomic policy should not only be stable, but also balanced. It must
dovetail with the state of the economy. A familiar example is the exchange rate.
A stable currency provides clarity, but structural adjustments are sometimes
unavoidable. After all, the exchange rate should secure the balance of payments over the long term. Thus in the run-up to Economic and Monetary Union
(emu), exchange rates could fluctuate within certain bandwidths, but sometimes adjustments had to be made to the central rates.
Besides a sound monetary policy, a sound fiscal policy is also important for
stable economic growth. If government spending and tax rates are too high,
private initiative will be squeezed. These factors may, together with a loose
monetary policy, lead to high inflation and low economic growth. Åsland and
Jenish (2006) show for the former Soviet republics that the recent period of
strong economic growth (1998-2007) was preceded by sharp cuts in government spending and taxation levels.
B3 Economic growth among the neighbours
Table B3.4
Indicators of fiscal policy and monetary
policy, 2005
inflation
(in %)
tax burden
(% of GDP)
debt ratio
(% of GDP)
current account balance
(% of GDP)
Belarus
10.3
33
4
1.6
Ukraine
13.5
35
23
2.9
Moldova
11.9
32
41
–10.3
Georgia
8.3
18
25
–9.8
Armenia
0.6
19
28
–3.9
Azerbaijan
9.7
39
12
1.3
Syria
7.2
32
20
–4.1
–0.7
22
88
–13.6
Lebanon
101
Israel
1.3
42
107
3.3
Jordan
3.5
28
54
–17.9
Egypt
8.8
28
31
Libya
2.0
Tunisia
2.0
30
51
–1.1
Algeria
1.6
38
16
20.7
Morocco
1.0
29
31
2.4
3.2
41.6
Source: IMF (2007); World Economic Outlook; World Bank (2007); World Development Indicators; European Commission (2007a)
Table B3.4 gives an impression of the fiscal and monetary policies pursued in
the neighbouring countries. Notable exceptions in terms of fiscal policy are
Azerbaijan and Israel, with their tax burdens (tax as a percentage of gdp) of
around 40%, and the Middle Eastern countries with their high debt ratios.
Inflation is a good indicator for monetary policy. A number of East European
neighbours, but also Egypt and Syria, are struggling with high inflation. For
the East European countries the current inflation levels are actually reasonably
encouraging, given the period of hyperinflation they experienced in the mid
1990s. By contrast, inflation in Egypt and Syria is higher now than in previous
years: between 1998 and 2002, inflation in all mena countries was below 5%.
The current account balance provides an indication of a country’s income and
8
expenditure. A deficit on the current account is not sustainable over the long
term and will lead to a sharp depreciation of the currency. This deficit is alarmingly large in Lebanon in particular, because this country is trying to peg its
currency to the us dollar.
Strikingly, the gcr identifies high taxation together with inefficient bureaucracy as the main obstacles to doing business in Israel and Jordan in particular.
This is due partly to the high tax rates (Israel) and partly to the fact that in most
other neighbouring countries macroeconomic policy is less of a problem than
regulation and the protection of property rights.
8
The current account of the balance of payments consists of a number of subaccounts
and gives a summary of all international transactions in any one year. The current
account is made up of the following:
– the balance of trade, i.e. the amount by which exports of goods and services exceed
imports;
– the balance of income from abroad;
– the balance of transfers from abroad, including remittances.
102
Europe’s Neighbours
Concluding remarks
Suppose that the neighbouring countries succeed in improving their institutions. What might be the implications for economic growth? Jalilian et al.
(2007) studied the effects of institutional improvements on economic growth
in 117 countries, including the eu member states and the neighbouring countries. They used the World Bank’s measure of “institutional quality” referred to
above. On the basis of their findings, figure B3.5 shows the effect on economic
growth in the neighbouring countries if the quality of their institutions were
to improve to the level of Poland (the eu member state with the lowest score).
For most neighbouring countries this is a realistic (or perhaps already overambitious) target. The effect of institutional improvements on economic growth
is considerable. Depending on the current level of institutional quality, the
increase in gdp ranges from around 15% (Jordan and Tunisia) to nearly 85%
9
(Belarus).
In communications on the neighbouring countries the eu stresses the importance of good institutions. In bilateral action plans with the neighbouring
countries these words are turned into specific policy measures. In chapter B5
we will consider these action plans in greater detail, and we raise the question as to what extent these plans contribute to the realisation of the potential
which better institutions offer for the economic development of the neighbouring countries.
Figure B3.5
Effects of institutional improvement on
economic growth in the neighbouring
countries (in percentage points)
80% to 90%
70% to 80%
50% to 70%
30% to 50%
0% to 30%
9
The map shows a minimal growth effect for Israel, which has a similar institutional
level to Poland. Hence the target for Israel would not be the level of Poland, but that of
the West European economies.
103
B4 Trade with the neighbouring countries
Crucial to economic integration between the eu member states and their neighbouring countries is an expansion of bilateral trade. Section 4.1 examines the
economic benefits which trade will bring to both sides. There are several factors
which impede or stimulate trade flows, however. In section 4.2 we describe the
factors which determine the volume of trade with the neighbouring countries
and which economic effects are likely to transpire. Some factors can be influenced by policy, in particular the quality of institutions and the level of import
tariffs. This will be discussed in section 4.3. But what are the effects of more
trade with the neighbouring countries? Does their trade profile constitute a welcome supplement to that of the eu, or are the neighbouring countries competitors for the eu member states? We will examine these questions in section 4.4.
4.1
Economic benefits of trade
International trade theory (Brakman et al. 2006; Krugman and Obstfeld 2003)
suggests that bilateral trade delivers benefits to both sides. More intensive
trade between the eu and the neighbouring countries would therefore be
advantageous to both the economies of the eu countries and the economies of
the neighbouring countries. First and foremost, international trade provides
access to resources, commodities, products and parts which are not available
in the domestic market. But the economic benefits go further than that (cpb/
scp 2007).
Countries mainly export goods in which they have a comparative advantage.
Examples are the large share of the knowledge-intensive service industry in
Dutch exports and the importance of oil and gas in Algeria’s exports. Comparative advantages arise because countries differ in such aspects as labour
types, capital stocks and natural resources. Suppose that country A has a
relatively higher productivity level in industry X and a lower productivity level
in industry Y compared to country B. Making products in industry Y is therefore relatively more expensive in country A. International trade can ensure that
country A concentrates on exporting industry X products, and imports industry Y products relatively more cheaply from country B, and vice versa.
When countries specialise in export products in which they enjoy a comparative
advantage, they will change their production structure, so that they can maximise the benefit from the opportunities for international trade. The scope for
expanding production in this way is wide for a knowledge-intensive country like
the Netherlands, but much more limited for an energy-rich country like Algeria.
The larger market created by international trade offers scale advantages for
businesses and consumers. For businesses, market growth is accompanied by
an increase in competition. Stronger competition forces businesses to operate
more efficiently and to concentrate more on innovation. For consumers, a larger
market offers a wider choice of products, which as a result of the competition
will also be keenly priced.
Openness of the economy is an essential element in attracting foreign investment, and it is even a major ingredient for successful domestic investment
(Winters 2004). To make investments worthwhile, it is important that products can be sold on a large market. After all, on a small market an increase in
104
Europe’s Neighbours
production – a logical consequence of the additional investments – will quickly
lead to a fall in selling prices, which will put the return on investment under
pressure. Openness may therefore stimulate investment and hence economic
growth.
International trade offers opportunities to find out what is going in other economies, which can lead to knowledge transfer. Trade in goods provides access
to the knowledge of the trade partners. Combining other people’s knowledge
with one’s own can lead to new knowledge and innovations, new products and
productivity gains.
The empirical literature confirms these benefits of international trade. Open
countries have stronger economic growth, and for that reason international
trade is a well-known determinant for explaining differences in income and
growth between countries (Dollar and Kraay 2003; Frankel and Romer 1999).
This suggests that the expansion of trade between the eu and neighbouring
countries will have positive economic effects for both sides.
Despite the widely recognised benefits of international trade, governments
often keep their economies partly closed and protect them with import tariffs
and the like. Brakman et al. (2006) point out five clear reasons for this protection. For one thing, the duties levied on imports are a major source of revenue
for many governments. In this way they can also influence income distribution
in their own country, and they can try to protect an industry in order to save
jobs. But the economic benefits of trade are not enjoyed by everyone. There will
be winners and losers. Some industries (with comparative disadvantages) will
contract in the face of increased competition. The problem is that it is difficult
to work out in advance who will be the winners and who the losers. Protecting
domestic products and businesses from international competition is a major
reason for the strategic behaviour surrounding import tariffs and other trade
policies. And finally, governments try to use tariffs too give infant industries
a chance to develop before they have to face competition on the world market.
Premature opening of the economy can force a country to concentrate on trade
in commodities and other products with little added value, because the emerging industrial sector is outcompeted by foreign players.
The main beneficiaries of international trade are developed countries with
diverse trade profiles. But the consequences of openness can pan out rather
differently for countries with a less diverse trade profile. An unbalanced trade
pattern can make a country very vulnerable, because any unfavourable development on the market it depends on will have major effects on the general
economic situation. Trade in primary goods does not generate much added
value, because it requires few workers and little additional processing. For the
eu’s neighbouring countries the effects of foreign trade have been mixed over
the past decade. For the southern neighbours it has been demonstrated that
economic growth is stimulated above all by a diverse trade profile including
manufacturing exports (Abu-Qarn and Abu-Bader 2001). Exports of natural
resources and other commodities have barely any effect on economic growth.
But in the former Soviet republics, oil exports actually do contribute to economic growth (Åsland and Jenish 2006).
International trade thus brings benefits, but not always for everyone. On balance both countries may benefit, but within countries there are economic
winners and losers: one industry will expand while another will contract,
B4 Trade with the neighbouring countries
105
one region will benefit, another will not.1 The upshot is that trade has a major
impact on income distribution. Especially in oil-rich countries there is a risk
that only a small elite will benefit.
4.2
What determines trade with the neighbouring countries?
Over the past decades international trade has undergone a huge expansion. Yet
trade flows are still surprisingly small: given the economic benefits of international trade outlined above, the volume of trade is far smaller than expected
(Trefler 1995). International trade flows are disproportionately divided between
countries and country groups, and both trade barriers and trade incentives
seem to play a major role here. We want to investigate which effects occur when
the trade barriers between the eu and its neighbouring countries are lowered.
We estimate the impact of trade barriers with gravity equations. Because of its
excellent explanatory value, the gravity equation is the most commonly used
model for analysing international trade flows. The gravity equation has its
origin in natural science, where the attraction between two bodies is explained
in terms of their respective masses and distance to each other. The Nobel Prize
laureate Jan Tinbergen was the first to use this formula to explain economic
interaction. In the economic version, the mass of the body is interpreted as the
2
size of the economy, with gdp as the standard indicator. Two large economies
will tend to trade more than two small economies. The distance between two
economies is the number of kilometres between the two capital cities. A great
geographical distance will impede bilateral trade. This leads to the standard
economic gravity equation to explain international trade flows.
In addition to the roles of economy size and geographical distance in bilateral
trade, other effects are likely as a result of cultural, historical, institutional and
political factors. Below we will discuss the various factors involved in international trade flows in goods. The quantitative influences are set out in two boxes.
The methodology is explained in the appendix to this chapter.
Economy size
It follows that a larger economy is likely to trade more in absolute terms. As
mentioned, this correlation has a second dimension: open economies achieve
stronger economic growth.
Geographical distance
Even in the current digital age, with its huge advances in technology and transport, “the world is still not flat”. Geographical distance has a negative impact
on international trade. In short, the further away two economies are located
from each other, the less they will trade with each other. The simple explanation is transport costs. A 1% increase in distance leads to a 1% decline in trade
on average. This means that Ukraine and Austria (distance 1,050 kilometres)
will trade around 40% more than Ukraine and the Netherlands (distance nearly
1,800 kilometres).
1
2
Regions with large shares in the export sector will grow faster than other regions.
These are often capital regions or other major urban regions, which attract more
domestic and foreign investment. The upshot is regional divergence. For instance, East
European capital regions such as Prague and Budapest post higher growth rates than
their hinterlands (Frenken and Hoekman 2006).
For the economic foundations of the gravity equation, see Anderson and Van Wincoop
(2003) and Feenstra (2004).
106
Europe’s Neighbours
Gravity equation: impact of exogenous factors on trade
The impact of exogenous factors on international trade is considerable: together they
explain 72% of international trade. A substantial part of international trade therefore
cannot or can only barely be influenced through policy measures. Table B4.1 shows the
results of a regression of bilateral trade on a number of exogenous factors. These results
are based on data from 120 countries, all of which trade with each other. Because data
are not available in some cases, this provides a sample of 18,174 trade flows.
The first column reflects the basic gravity equation which Tinbergen used to explain
economic interaction. The gdp coefficient of the importing country indicates that an
exporting country on average trades twice as much with a large country than with a small
country (half the size). By contrast, a doubling of the distance between two countries more
or less halves the trade between them.
The second and third columns show the importance of a number of exogenous trade
barriers. The second column shows the estimated coefficients, which have been converted
into percentage effects in the third column. Two adjoining countries trade more than twice
as much with each other on average (an increase of 127%) than two countries without a
common border. A common language and a shared history have similar impacts.
Table B4.1
Exogenous factors of international trade, 1996-2005
size of importing country’s economy (GDP)
coefficient
0.85
coefficient
0.88
size of exporting country’s economy (GDP)
1.03
1.06
–1.23
–1.07
geographical distance (kilometres
between capital cities)
marginal
effect (in %)
common border
0.82
127
same official language
0.68
97
colonial relationship
0.99
169
same colonial power
0.77
116
once part of the same country
0.70
101
explained variance (R2)
0.70
0.72
number of observations
18,174
18,174
Common borders
In addition to geographical distance, common borders also matter in international trade. On average, adjoining countries will trade more than twice as
much with each other than with other countries. Crossing a border involves
customs controls and administration costs, so the more borders are crossed,
the higher the costs. Because of their common border, Poland and Lithuania
are likely to trade more than, say, Poland and Latvia.
Culture and history
In international trade the payment and transaction usually do not occur at the
same time. The choice of partner to trade with is influenced by the information on, familiarity with and trust in the potential partner. A lack of trust in
or information on a potential trade partner hinders transactions. Conversely,
mutual trust and reliable information have a positive impact (cpb/scp 2006).
B4 Trade with the neighbouring countries
107
Trade is larger between countries with a similar culture, the same language
and/or a shared history. The same language or majority religion translates into
greater familiarity thanks to known standards and values. An old bilateral relationship such as a colonial and national past translates into greater knowledge
of each and often also greater involvement. Familiarity has a positive effect on
trust, understanding and information provision (De Groot et al. 2004). Thus
countries with the same official language tend to trade nearly twice as much
with each other, and countries which once had a colonial relationship even 2.5
times as much. These links give Russia a head start over the eu in trade with
Ukraine, to give only one example.
Trade policy
Trade policy can have a stimulating or an impeding influence. International
trade flows are affected by import tariffs, quotas and free trade zones. Not
surprisingly, import tariffs and quotas are regarded as barriers and free trade
zones as incentives. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) show that ten years after the
launch of a free trade zone, two countries trade twice as much with each other
on average. Extending the eu’s free trade zone to the neighbouring countries
3
could therefore yield significant benefits.
Free trade zones are not the only available policy option; another is to reduce
import tariffs. Countries levy import tariffs which often differ from industry to
industry or from product group to product group. This adversely affects international trade in general, because it makes national products relatively cheaper.
Moreover, it gives an advantage to countries in a free trade zone. Countries with
different comparative advantages are hampered to different degrees by import
tariffs. Thus the eu’s import tariffs on agricultural products are much higher
than those on non-agricultural products. This implies a relatively high trade
barrier for exporters of agricultural products. The effect of import tariffs is of
course negative: a 10% import tariff reduces trade by 0.2% on average.
Institutional quality
Informal and often veiled trade barriers also play a major role. Despite the
surge in international trade, countries continue to trade less than predicted by
economic theory. This is due to the “home bias” effect, when national products
play a more prominent role than expected. One reason for this discrepancy
frequently cited in the recent literature is institutional differences between
countries (see De Groot et al. 2004). Inefficient institutions hamper economic
transactions and raise transaction costs, which has negative effects on both
national growth and international trade. The example of property rights makes
this clear: trading becomes a very tricky business if there is no certainty that
the partner is the legal and sole owner of the traded goods, or if there is no
certainty that the newly acquired rights over these goods will be respected (De
Soto 2003). eu policy for candidate member states, potential candidate member
states and neighbouring countries devotes much attention to the importance of
good institutions.
In chapter B3 we highlighted the economic benefits of good institutions. They
offer transparency, trust and security to offset the disadvantages of incomplete
and complex information in economic transactions. It goes without saying
that the information is more complex and less complete in international trade
than in national transactions. In short, efficient institutions are of crucial
3
The European Outlook from 2007, “Market Place Europe”, outlines the benefits of
market integration. The cpb will publish an update of this study in 2008.
108
Europe’s Neighbours
importance in international trade. We are thinking here primarily of effective
protection of property rights and a clear regulatory framework; but political
institutions, including the effectiveness and stability of policy, are also impor4
tant for international trade. And finally, the extent of corruption obviously
matter in international trade and foreign investment.
Efficient institutions (see chapter B2 for the World Bank’s indicators and
scores) have a positive impact on a country’s imports as well as its exports,
although the effect on exports is nearly three times as large. A 1-point increase
on the score for institutions (equivalent to the difference between Poland and
the Netherlands, but also between Poland and Armenia) boosts imports by 9%
and exports by 27%.
Institutional differences
Institutional differences, or “institutional distance”, between countries also
play a role. Transactions with a country at a different institutional level entail
adjustment costs, since exporters will not be used to dealing under such institutions. Thus the conclusion of a contract with a counterparty in another country requires information on that country’s legal system. Institutional distance
raises adjustment costs and diminishes bilateral understanding and trust, and
thus has a negative impact on trade flows (De Groot et al. 2004). In comparison
with the effects of economic growth and geographical distance, this effect
is small, however: a 10% reduction in institutional distance translates into
around 0.5% more trade.
4
Guidolin and La Ferrare (2007) consider the economic effects of conflicts, and as part
of their analysis they also point to parties (such as the arms industry) which have an
interest in political instability.
B4 Trade with the neighbouring countries
109
Gravity equation: impact of institutions and tariffs on trade
Table B4.2 shows the impact of institutional quality and import tariffs on international
trade. The first and third columns show the estimated coefficients. The impact of economic
size, institutional distance and the other exogenous factors are included in the estimate
but not reported in this table.
The institutional quality of both the importing country and the exporting country have
a positive effect on the volume of bilateral trade. Institutional quality is measured with
indicators such as regulatory quality and government effectiveness. These indicators are
strongly correlated, which is why we have opted for an average of all these indicators.
The second column shows that if the quality of a country’s institutions improves by 1 point,
imports from all other countries will increase by around 9%. The impact on the country’s
exports will be even greater, around three times as much.
In addition to institutional quality, institutional distance also plays a major role: a 1-point
narrowing of the difference in institutions between the EU and neighbouring countries
translates into a 12% increase in bilateral trade.
The third and fourth columns show the importance of import tariffs for trade. Data on
import tariffs are not as readily available, however, so that the number of observations
comes to less than half. The import tariffs are mainly those levied by developed countries
(see the appendix to this chapter for further details). The fourth column shows that a
10-percentage-point reduction in an import tariff can boost trade by 11%.
Table B4.2
Impact of institutional quality and import tariffs on international trade
additional effects
institutional quality of importing
country
institutional quality of exporting
country
institutional distance
coefficient
marginal
effect (%)
0.09
9
0.26
27
–0.13
–12
import tariffs
explained variance (R2) (in %)
number of observations
4.3
coefficient
–0.012
0.72
0.72
17,613
6,612
marginal
effect (%)
–1.1
Scope for more trade with the neighbouring countries
Many trade flows are determined by exogenous factors (such as geographical
location, history and official language), which cannot readily be influenced
through policy measures, certainly not over the short term. However, the fact
that many neighbouring countries border directly on the European Union does
give them a good starting position for trade with the eu. Other factors such as
institutional quality and import tariffs are more susceptible to policy measures.
We will now consider what influence policy can have on trade with the neigh5
bouring countries.
Suppose that the institutional quality of the neighbouring countries improves.
This will affect both the exports and the imports of the neighbouring countries.
It will also reduce the institutional distance between the eu and the neigh5
Peridy (2005) analyses the trade potential for the various neighbouring regions; this is
substantial especially for the East European neighbours with few trade agreements.
110
Europe’s Neighbours
bouring countries, which will also have a positive effect on trade. The possible
effects of an institutional improvement over the longer term can be estimated
by comparison with another country. Suppose that all neighbouring countries
achieve an institutional level equal to the lowest-scoring eu member state,
Poland. Figure B4.1 shows, for each neighbouring country, the percentage
growth in exports thanks to the increase in trade with the eu and vice versa.
The percentage growth in exports indicates a growth in percentage points in
exports, thanks to improvements in the institutions. For instance, Georgia’s
exports to the eu will expand by around 25% if the country’s institutions
improve and the institutional distance to the eu countries narrows.
Two factors are important for the extent of the increase in trade. First the
current quality of institutions. In our scenario the quality of institutions in
countries such as Libya and Algeria will improve significantly (to Poland’s
level), which will have a strong positive effect on their trade. Israel and Jordan
will have the smallest effects.
Furthermore, the eu’s relative position as an export partner is important. For
this reason Algeria’s trade will expand more than Belarus’s in our scenario,
even though institutional quality in Belarus will improve more than in Algeria.
This is because the eu is a more important trade partner for Algeria than for
Belarus. Oil-rich neighbouring countries such as Algeria, Azerbaijan, Libya
and Syria will experience huge growth rates in their exports. The effects on the
eu countries’ trade will be far smaller (between 0-4 percentage points). The
main beneficiaries will be several nearby eu countries: Cyprus, Greece, Latvia,
Lithuania, Spain and Italy. The effect on the Netherlands, for instance, is nil.
The differences in the effects of this institutional improvement can be attributed to both to the differences in current institutional quality and differences
in trade patterns.
Figure B4.1
Export growth thanks to institutional
improvement (in percentage points)
30 to 40
20 to 30
10 to 20
0 to 5
B4 Trade with the neighbouring countries
111
Trade barriers, such as import tariffs and quotas, can also be influenced
through policy measures. A familiar example in the eu is the abolition of
import quotas on textiles and clothing at the start of 2005. The main reason
behind these quotas was to protect the domestic market from imports from
low-wage countries, especially in Asia. But these quotas also restricted imports
from neighbouring countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Syria.
Import restrictions continue to apply on a number of other products, for
instance coal, steel and various agricultural products.
Table B4.3 gives an impression of the time and effort involved in trading with
the neighbouring countries and the eu member states, as measured by import
tariffs, procedural requirements and import of containers. All the neighbouring countries, with the exception of Israel, score low on all these indicators.
This is confirmed in the final column, which gives the country’s ranking in the
World Bank’s “ease of doing business” index. Israel is in the top-ten and Tunisia
in the top-50, but many neighbouring countries are found well down the list.
Table B4.3
Barriers to imports in the neighbouring
countries
Algeria
import tariff
(%)
18.7
“ease of doing
procedural import requirementsa
documents
business”
(numbers)
time (days) cost (dollars) ranking
9
22
1,886
122
Armenia
3.0
6
37
1,750
Azerbaijan
9.6
14
56
2,945
170
Belarus
10.1
8
29
1,672
132
Egypt
19.9
8
25
1,049
86
7.0
7
14
1,105
59
Georgia
133
Israel
5.6
4
12
560
8
Jordan
13,1
7
22
1,065
51
Lebanon
7,0
11
34
752
83
Moldova
4.9
7
35
1,545
118
Morocco
30.2
11
30
1,500
89
Syria
19.6
9
23
1,900
119
Tunisia
28.3
7
29
600
36
Ukraine
7.1
10
39
1,065
116
6
40
995
68
11.4
13
36
2,050
155
Netherlands
5.4
5
6
1,005
13
EU-15
5.4
5
11
991
24
EU-12
5.4
7
18
963
44
Palestinian Authority
Russia
a The procedural import requirements cover the number of documents required, the time required and the cost
involved in the importation of a standardised load.
Source: World Bank, Doing Business (2007)
Table B4.3 offers a representative overview of the import barriers which the
neighbouring countries impose on all their trade partners. A similar table can
be prepared for the export of goods. In addition there are many indirect barriers
which make importing expensive. Not visible in table B4.3, but very relevant for
imports to the eu, are the quality requirements for imported goods, such as
environmental standards, hygiene-related regulations and so on. For exporters
6
from outside the eu these constitute a major barrier to trade.
6
European Outlook 5 (cpb/scp 2007) considers this in greater detail.
112
Europe’s Neighbours
A reduction of these barriers could bring about a significant increase in trade
between the eu and its neighbouring countries.
From table B4.2 it follows that a reduction of import tariffs by 10 percentage
points will increase trade between the eu and its neighbouring countries by an
average of 3.5 percentage points. A reduction of import tariffs between the eu
and the neighbouring countries will make both sides relatively more attractive
to each other as trade partners (an effect known as “trade creation”); after all,
the barriers caused by import tariffs with other countries will not be reduced
(“trade diversion”). In this way the neighbouring countries’ trade can shift in
the direction of the eu.
4.4
What products do the neighbouring countries export?
If the borders are opened, will the neighbouring countries become competitors of the eu, or will their exports actually provide a welcome supplement to
the eu’s trade? In recent studies the cpb examined Dutch trade with China and
7
India in detail. The conclusion was that these two countries’ trade patterns
supplement the Netherlands’ trade pattern. In short, more trade will probably
benefit imports in particular, but will barely affect Dutch exports. Does this
conclusion also apply to trade between the eu member states and their neighbours?
main export product
share
second-largest export product
share
Algeria
crude oil and oil products
64
natural gas and manufactured gas
34
Armenia
non-metallic minerals
32
metal ores and scrap
12
Azerbaijan
crude oil and oil products
82
other transport equipment
4
Belarus
crude oil and oil products
27
road vehicles
9
Egypt
crude oil and oil products
39
non-metallic minerals
Georgia
metal ores and scrap
24
beverages
Israel
non-metallic minerals
37
electrical equipment
Jordan
clothing and accessories
26
crude fertilisers and crude minerals
11
Lebanon
non-monetary gold
10
non-metallic minerals
10
Moldova
beverages
28
clothing and accessories
16
Morocco
clothing and accessories
30
electrical equipment
12
Syria
crude oil and oil products
68
live animals (excl. fish, crustaceans)
Tunisia
clothing and accessories
34
electrical equipment
Ukraine
iron and steel
35
crude oil and oil products
Source: own calculations based on the OECD/ITCS database, consulted in January 2008
Table B4.4 shows the main export products of the neighbouring countries. The
importance of oil and gas for a number of neighbouring countries is all too
clear, accounting for as much as 98% of Algeria’s exports, for instance. The
export products of these countries are a welcome supplement to the eu’s trade.
Raw materials and commodities are also the main export products of other
neighbouring countries, such as iron and steel from Ukraine, gold from Lebanon, metal ores from Georgia, and diamonds from Armenia and Israel. Again,
these are not important export products for the eu member states: somewhat
surprisingly, only Luxembourg has coal and steel as its main export category.
7
Table B4.4
Main export products of the
neighbouring countries, 2004
(percentage shares of total exports)
Suyker and De Groot (2006); Suyker et al. (2007).
7
16
8
5
12
6
B4 Trade with the neighbouring countries
113
A product group which is likely to generate more competition is the export of
clothing and clothing accessories. Textiles are not only important export products for Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan, but also for eu member states such as
Romania, Bulgaria and Greece.
The small overlap between the exports of the neighbouring countries and those
of the eu countries is also evident from a breakdown by what is called “factor
intensity”. This refers to the main production factors required to produce
certain goods. For oil this is clear enough, it is a primary product. By contrast,
the production of textiles is labour-intensive, and the production of office and
data-processing equipment (12% of Dutch exports) is knowledge-intensive.
Table B4.5
Factor intensity of the exports of the
neighbouring countries and a selection
of EU member states, 2004 (in percent)
natural
resources
primary
products
unskilled
labour
Algeria
0
99
0
Armenia
technology
knowledge
1
0
Gini
0.92
48
28
6
4
8
0.86
Azerbaijan
1
89
4
3
2
0.88
Belarus
4
40
11
24
21
0.55
Egypt
8
62
8
6
10
0.75
Georgia
8
61
1
23
5
0.86
Israel
37
5
4
47
7
0.69
Jordan
2
27
28
27
14
0.72
Lebanon
12
24
9
25
18
0.70
Moldova
2
64
22
7
5
0.85
Morocco
3
32
35
26
3
0.80
Syria
1
87
6
2
3
0.86
Tunisia
3
22
41
26
7
0.72
Ukraine
6
27
5
20
41
0.66
Poland
7
16
18
27
32
0.45
Czech Republic
3
9
11
40
34
0.35
Romania
7
15
35
23
19
0.57
EU-15
5
11
8
52
24
0.28
Netherlands
2
27
6
49
16
0.17
Source: own calculations based on the OECD/ITCS database, consulted in January 2008
The classification by factor intensity is based on Hinloopen and Van Marrewijk
(2006), “Factor intensity classification”, available on http://people.few.eur.nl/
vanmarrewijk/eta/intensity.htm.
Table B4.5 shows the factor intensity of the exports of the neighbouring
countries and a selection of eu member states. The table confirms that many
neighbouring countries are heavily dependent on commodities and natural
resources. The textile-exporting countries make heavy use of unskilled labour.
Technology and knowledge (or “human capital”) are relatively unimportant
production factors. Only in Belarus, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Ukraine does
the share of technology- and knowledge-intensive exports exceed 40%. By way
of comparison, technology- and knowledge-intensive exports account for more
than 50% of the exports of all eu member states with the exception of Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic States.
114
Europe’s Neighbours
The neighbouring countries can be divided into two clusters with similar
8
export profiles. The first cluster consists of Algeria, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Moldova and Syria, all heavily dependent on the export of primary products. The second cluster consists of Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan, but also the
eu member states of Bulgaria, Romania and Greece. These countries have a
similar distribution of exports across primary, technology- and labour-intensive products. The other neighbouring countries (Armenia, Lebanon, Israel,
Ukraine and Belarus) have no obvious similarities.
A striking feature of both tables is the uniformity of the export patterns of
many neighbouring countries. Exports are dominated by oil and gas, or have
large shares of clothing or alcoholic beverages (Moldova). This picture is
9
confirmed by the Gini coefficient in the final column of table B4.5. The Gini
coefficient is widely used as a measure of income inequality, with a high Gini
indicating that a small part of the population receives a large part the national
income. Similarly a high Gini coefficient for exports indicates that one or a few
products account for a large share of total exports. Table B4.5 shows that 11 of
the 14 listed neighbouring countries have a very high Gini coefficient (above
0.70), while this is true for only two of the 27 eu member states (Ireland and
Malta).
Two conclusions follow from this analysis. The first is that the eu does not
need to worry about competitive imports from the new neighbouring countries. On the contrary, exports from the neighbouring countries supplement
the available production in the eu. The second conclusion is that the export
profiles of many neighbouring countries are very unbalanced. This makes these
countries very vulnerable to fluctuations on the world market. A low oil price
will trigger a recession in the oil-exporting countries, for instance. A broadening of the export base to include technology- and knowledge-intensive products
can reduce this imbalance. But it is doubtful whether open borders with the eu
will benefit the neighbouring countries in this respect. Their technology- and
knowledge-intensive products will then have to compete with exports from the
eu. It will not be easy for the neighbouring countries to secure a good return
on their investments in knowledge and technology. Temporary protection of
developing industries may be necessary to narrow the gap with the eu.
8
9
These clusters have been compiled on the basis of comparable factor intensity. This
can be measured with a high correlation (above 0.9) with the percentages in table
B4.5. This picture is confirmed by a detailed analysis of comparative advantages which
will be published later in 2008.
The calculation of the Gini coefficient is based on the sitc 2-digit product groups. The
Gini measures the distance between a country’s specialisation pattern with the average pattern in the rest of the world. A country which is extremely specialised in a single
product will have a high Gini.
115
Appendix to chapter B4: Gravity model
Model and data
The gravity model explains international trade flows (T) in terms of the size of
both economies (Y), measured as the gdp, the distance between the two economies (D) and a constant (C). The equation has been turned into a logarithmic
equation, so that the connections can be easily interpreted. The equation is as
follows:
In(Tij) = 1n C + a1 1n Yi + a2 1n Yj + a3 1n Dij + eij
In this equation the relationship between the impact of the autonomous variables on trade is expressed in terms of elasticities (the alphas). For instance,
if the gdp of the exporting country (Yi) increases by 1%, then its trade will
increase by a1%. The trade flows in goods (source: itcs) and the gdp (source:
imf) of both countries are measured in us dollars, and the distance is the
number of kilometres between the capital cities.
We added a number of other trade barriers and trade incentives to the equation:
– a border dummy to correct for the existence or otherwise of a common
border. This variable is 1 if the two countries share a common border, and 0
if they do not.
– dummy variables to correct for cultural and historical similarities. These
include the same main language, the same colonial power after 1945, having
had a colonial relationship in the past, having been part of the same country
10
in the past.
– institutional quality of the importing country and the exporting country.
We used six indicators: voice & accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption
(Kauffman et al. 2007). All countries are given separate institutional indicator scores between –2.5 and +2.5. Because of the strong correlations between
the scores for the various institutions, we used an average institutional score.
– institutional distance between the importing country and the exporting
country. Institutional distance between two countries is measured in terms
of the difference in the level of the institutions in the two countries.
– the import tariffs levied by the importing country. We used the percentage
rates for 1999 (source: wits, unctad train data).
The above data was gathered for all countries in the world for the period
1995-2005. The countries with few trade flows (fewer than 120 trade partners)
were disregarded. The institutional and policy data change very little over time.
That is why we also took averages of trade and gdp, so that the estimations
are based on a cross-section. A beneficial side effect is that incidental peaks or
troughs have few effects on the outcomes.
Specification and robustness
The recent literature on the gravity model draws attention to several econometric problems. Some of these are important for this analysis, which is why we
checked the robustness of the outcomes:
– The overall robustness of the model was checked with the help of several
country and year samples. These all yielded similar patterns.
10
cepii, http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm, consulted in January 2008.
116
Europe’s Neighbours
– Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) point out the effects of price indexation
on international trade. To correct for this, we carried out regressions with
country dummies for the importers and exporters. This also yielded similar
patterns for the effects of institutions, institutional distance and import
tariffs on trade.
– Heteroskedasticity (i.e. the link between ignored factors and included factors) can affect the coefficients (Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2006). We used
robust standard errors to correct for this.
– Import tariff data are only available for a limited sample of countries,
mainly developed countries. Hence a deviation in country selection is likely.
To check for this, we ran regressions with this limited sample without
import tariffs. This showed that the connections still apply, although they
are stronger in the smaller sample.
117
B5 Policy for the new neighbours
The European Council reaffirms the paramount importance of the European Neighbourhood Policy, which aims at consolidating a ring of prosperity, stability and
security based on human rights, democracy and the rule of law, as well as supporting
the process of reform and modernisation of partners in the Union’s neighbourhood.
1
(European Council, 2007)
The main aims of the neighbourhood policy are to promote prosperity in and
relations with the neighbouring countries of the eu. In section 5.1 we set out
how this policy is fleshed out in specific action plans. Two spearheads of the
policy are strengthening economic relations with and improving the institutions in the neighbouring countries. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 consider the problems
in both areas and the question how European neighbourhood policy can make a
difference here. We draw some conclusions in section 5.4.
5.1
Existing policy
The neighbouring countries’ relations with the eu member states are diverse.
Some relations have been traditionally intensive, for instance those of France
with Algeria and Morocco, or those of Romania with Moldova. But many other
relations are recent and weak, such as those of the West European countries
with the former Soviet republics.
The European neighbourhood policy aims to strengthen these relations and
to stimulate economic growth in the neighbouring countries. But the eu is
not exactly unique in this. Table B5.1 presents a selection of the international
organisations, partnerships and treaties which the neighbouring countries have
joined or signed. All neighbouring countries, with the exception of the Palestinian Authority, are members of the International Monetary Fund (imf). Many
are members of or observers at the World Trade Organisation (wto). Most
neighbouring countries are also members of regional organisations. The North
African neighbouring countries are members of the African Union (au) (except
for Morocco), the Arab Maghreb Union (amu) (except for Egypt) and the Agadir
Agreement, which aims to establish a free trade zone in North Africa and the
Middle East. Most eastern neighbours are members of or observers at the Eurasian Economic Community (eaec), which aims to establish a customs union
among the former Soviet republics. And the countries around the Black Sea are
affiliated to the Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (bsec).
1
Presidency conclusions of the Brussels European Council, 21-22 June 2007.
118
Europe’s Neighbours
WTO
Algeria
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
IMF
OPEC BSEC EAEC AMU
o
m
2003
m
m
m
m
o
m
m
o
m
o
Egypt
1995
m
o
Georgia
2000
m
m
Israel
1995
m
o
Jordan
2000
m
Lebanon
o
m
m
Libya
o
m
m
Moldova
2001
m
Morocco
1995
m
m
m
1995
m
o
Ukraine
2008
m
m
PCA
p
EMAA
ENP
2005
m
1999
2006
1999
2006
1995ª
m
1977
2004
1999
1975
2006
2007
m
2002
2005
p
2003
2007
2000
2005
p
1997
2007
p
2004b
p
m
m
o
1998
m
2007
2000
m
i
Tunisia
CA
o
Palestinian Authority
Syria
AA
1976
m
o
2005
1998
1998
2005
2005
a Signed, but not yet in force.
b Not yet in force.
m = member; i = invited; o = observer; p = potential
WTO: World Trade Organisation
IMF: International Monetary Fund
OPEC: Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
BSEC: Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
EAEC: Eurasian Economic Community
AMU: Arab Maghreb Union
AA: Agadir Agreement
CA: Cooperation Agreement
PCA: Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
EMAA: Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement
ENP: European Neighbourhood Policy
The eu’s neighbourhood policy has a number of forerunners. Already in the
1970s “cooperation agreements” were signed with many mena countries
(except for Libya and the Palestinian Authority). A major sequel to these treaties
is the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Euromed, also called the “Barcelona
2
process”), launched in 1995 with ten countries around the Mediterranean.
The eu concludes bilateral treaties with these countries, “Euro-Mediterranean
association agreements” (emaas), and conducts multilateral consultations
with them. The objectives of Euromed are ambitious: a region of peace and stability, gradual establishment of a free trade area, and rapprochement between
peoples. As for the eastern neighbours, at the end of the last century the eu
signed “partnership and cooperation agreements” (pcas) with them (except for
Belarus). These countries’ ties with each other and with Russia are very important both economically and politically.
In the document “Wider Europe” the European Commission (2003) set out
its vision of relations with the countries which would become the eu’s new
neighbours after the eastward enlargement. The new European Neighbourhood Policy (enp) was elaborated in a strategy paper in 2004 as the successor to
the existing agreements with the East European neighbouring countries (pcas)
and those with the North African and the Middle Eastern neighbours (emaas).
2
Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia
and Turkey. Libya has observer status.
Table B5.1
Selection of neighbouring
countries’ international
affiliations
B5 Policy for the new neighbours
119
In the recent document “Working Together” the European Commission (2007b)
formulates the objective of the enp as follows:
The policy aims to create a virtuous circle by promoting good governance, economic
and social development, modernisation and reform, through a new intensified relationship based on shared or common interests and values such as good governance,
prosperity, stability and security; democracy, human rights and rule of law; market
economy and sustainable development and reforms in key sectors.
Table B5.2
Financial assistance under the ENP per
country (in EUR millions) and per
person (in EUR), and priorities in ENP
action plans, 2007
In the next sentence this objective is translated into economic policy:
By benefiting from economic integration with the eu, neighbouring countries can
more successfully implement their reform programmes and economic development
policies.
Thus the key concepts of the enp are economic integration, institutional
reform and economic development.
assistance
assistance
per person
Armenia
21
6
v
v
v
Azerbaijan
19
2
v
v
v
137
2
institutions education
poverty,
health
trade
investment
migration
climate,
environment
energy
Algeria
v
v
v
Belarus
Egypt
Georgia
v
v
24
5
v
Israel
2
0
v
v
v
Jordan
62
11
v
v
Lebanon
50
14
v
v
v
v
v
v
v
v
v
Libya
Moldova
40
9
v
Morocco
162
5
v
Palestinian
Authority
330
85
v
Tunisia
72
7
Ukraine
120
2
v
v
v
v
v
v
v
v
Syria
v
v
v
v
v
v
In 2008 bilateral action plans were agreed with 11 of the 15 countries and the
3
Palestinian Authority. Table B5.2 shows the priorities in these action plans.
A striking feature is the attention to institutional reforms, ranging from the
improvement of human rights, assistance in the democratisation process and
development of the legal system to improvements in public administration and
the tax system. This attention to institutional reforms is a direct elaboration of
the neighbourhood policy’s objective.
The pillar of economic integration is also elaborated in a number of action
plans. Two action plans refer to reform of the customs service (Egypt) and to
negotiations on free trade (Ukraine). The action plan agreed with Morocco
goes a step further, because it endorses a further reduction of trade barriers.
3
Emerson et al. (2007) draw a distinction within the group of countries with an action
plan between “willing partners” (Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia, Morocco, Tunisia, Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority) and “passive partners” (Azerbaijan,
Lebanon and Egypt). The willing partners in Eastern Europe in particular want more.
They believe that over the longer term the eu will not be able to sustain its rejection of
future membership for them.
120
Europe’s Neighbours
The ­special relationship with Israel is highlighted by agreements on trade in
services. The most far-reaching are the agreements with Moldova and Tunisia,
which explicitly deal with free trade. But perhaps most striking is the absence
of, or only minimal attention to, trade policy in the other action plans.
The action plans are far more reticent about migration, which is only mentioned in the agreements with Moldova (visa facilitation) and Morocco (border
management).
The actions plans agreed with Israel and Jordan pay attention to the improvement of primary education and higher education.
The attention to energy, and more specifically oil, is limited, mainly because no
specific agreements have yet been concluded with Algeria and Libya. There are
plans for integrating energy markets in Ukraine, improving safety at nuclear
power stations in Armenia, and restructuring large state-owned oil companies
in Azerbaijan. Agreements have been made with Georgia on the development of
infrastructure for the transport of Caspian oil and gas to the eu.
Economic development is given specific form in poverty alleviation (including
in the Palestinian Authority), improvement of living conditions (Azerbaijan),
food safety (Armenia and Georgia) and healthcare (Tunisia).
The neighbourhood policy introduces a financial policy instrument, the New
Neighbourhood Instrument (nni), which is intended to simplify the financing
4
of projects in the neighbouring countries. Each of these plans is accompanied with financial assistance from the eu, ranging from eur 0.30 per person
in Israel to eur 85 per person in the Palestinian Authority. The total amount
involved was around eur 1 billion in 2007.
The neighbourhood policy’s objective is wide-ranging, and the action plans
are diverse. Given the economic focus in this study, we will look at two major
themes: economic integration and institutional reform. We will concentrate on
the following questions:
– Should the enp pay more attention to economic integration in the form of
freer trade and migration?
– How can institutions be improved, and what role can the eu play here?
5.2
Strengthening relations with the neighbours
The eu aims for economic integration with the neighbouring countries. In a
paper on a “Neighbourhood Economic Community” (nec) published in 2006,
the European Commission even talks of far-reaching free trade agreements:
The next step will be deep and comprehensive free trade agreements, which will
liberalise substantially all trade and codify regulatory alignment through binding
5
commitments and a dispute settlement mechanism.
Chapter B4 made clear that this is a vision of the future and not yet reality.
Exporting to (and also from) the neighbouring countries is a time-consuming
and expensive business. That is why the limited attention to trade liberalisation in the action plans is so striking. Is this justified, because trade policy
should be left to the wto? Is it understandable, because the positive effects on
4
5
ceps (2004); Marchetti (2006).
European Commission (2006).
B5 Policy for the new neighbours
121
economic growth do not weigh up against the negative effects of trade liberalisation?
Trade agreements: global or regional
There is no doubt that global trade liberalisation under the auspices of the wto
is the first-best option. Economic theory states that the most efficient situation
is free trade between all countries. The cpb (2006) concludes in a study on the
Doha round, the wto negotiations which started in 2001, that from a prosperity perspective a multilateral agreement with flanking restructuring assistance
to the least developed countries is a better option than a further expansion of
preferential trade agreements. Such a multilateral agreement would abolish not
only trade tariffs between the eu and its neighbouring countries but also all the
eu’s and the neighbouring countries’ tariffs with the rest of the world. Over the
past decades the wto and its predecessor, the gatt, have succeeded in reducing tariffs and other trade barriers between a growing number of countries.
Crowley (2003) shows that that tariffs on industrial products came down from
an average of 35% in 1946 to 15% in the 1960s and 5% at the start of this century.
But she also shows that this global trade liberalisation has not yet been completed; non-tariff barriers remain important, especially for agricultural prod6
ucts. This affects agriculture-intensive countries such as Azerbaijan, Morocco
and Moldova in particular.
So are regional or bilateral trade agreements a good alternative if global liberalisation is not possible? It is a characteristic of regional trade agreements
that they lead not only to an increase in trade within the free trade zone (trade
creation), but also possibly to a decrease in trade with third countries (trade
diversion). Ukraine’s trade with the eu and Russia can serve as an example.
Removing tariffs will boost trade between the eu and Ukraine, but this may
occur at the expense of trade with Russia. Especially if the goods in question are
produced more efficiently in Russia than in the eu, this would be tantamount
to a shift from trade in efficiently produced goods (in Russia) to less efficiently
produced goods (in the eu).
Regional trade agreements are beneficial if existing tariffs and other trade barriers are high, if trade with the rest of the world is small, if production prices
in the free trade zone do not diverge much from world market prices, and if the
zone includes a large number of countries (Pelkmans 2006). Under these conditions trade creation within the free trade zone is relatively substantial and the
loss of trade with third countries small.
Regional trade liberalisation will benefit the North African countries in particular. This is because they have high import tariffs and high indirect barriers
(see table B4.3) and because already nearly 70% of their exports are destined
for the eu (see figure B2.3). Every reason, then, for the eu to intensify its trade
links with the North African neighbours, also in the form of regional trade
agreements.
Any agreements with the East European and Middle Eastern neighbours will
have to take greater account of the detrimental effect. Figure B2.3 shows clearly
that most of their exports (65-75%) are destined for non-eu countries, including
Russia and the United States.
6
See also table B4.3.
122
Europe’s Neighbours
In light of the above it is understandable that the action plans agreed with the
North African neighbouring countries (including Egypt) pay more attention to
trade liberalisation than the action plans agreed with the neighbours in East7
ern Europe (with the exception of Ukraine and Moldova) and the Middle East.
Trade agreements: deep or light
Regional trade agreements may thus provide a useful supplement to the global
reduction of trade barriers, certainly for the North African neighbouring countries. But how “deep” should these agreements be? Should the neighbouring
countries be allowed to join the internal market or a “light” version of it?
It is clear from the economic literature that the main gains of trade agreements
are to be found not so much in the reduction of tariffs but in the lowering of
indirect barriers. Thus Hoekman and Konan (1999) use a simulation study for
Egypt to show that tariff reduction on its own can even lead to a loss of prosperity. They found that trade between the eu and Egypt did indeed increase
(trade creation), but that trade with other countries declined (trade diversion).
The Egyptian government also lost revenues from import duties. But there
were gains to be made if Egypt and the eu commit to reducing regulation and
bureaucracy. This conclusion also follows from studies on Turkey and Croatia
(Lejour and De Mooij 2005; Lejour et al. 2007) and can be generalised for the
other neighbouring countries.
What springs to mind first in the context of reducing regulation and bureaucracy are administrative barriers such as customs controls. A second aspect is
lowering the technical trade barriers, through a mutual recognition of quality
and safety standards, for instance. Furthermore, participation in the internal
market can boost mutual trust and the stability of the political relationship
between the eu and its neighbouring countries. European Outlook 4 (cpb/scp
2006) showed that a strengthening of mutual trust stimulates both international trade and foreign investment. And finally, a significant improvement of
the institutions will be necessary if the neighbouring countries are to meet the
admission conditions.
In a recent communication on a “Neighbourhood Economic Community”
(nec) the European Commission (2006) raises the possibility of further steps
8
9
towards a deep free trade agreement, for Ukraine and Moldova in the first
instance, but also for the other neighbouring countries. The Commission thus
supports the lowering of indirect trade barriers. However, practice proves wayward, partly because some neighbouring countries are reticent (Emerson et al.
2007), and partly because the eu itself is reticent about opening its borders to
trade in goods and services.
Trade agreements: advantages and disadvantages
Fears of adverse economic effects may be a second reason for the limited attention paid to trade liberalisation in the bilateral action plans. These fears arise
not least because the disadvantages of trade liberalisation are all too apparent
(such as the closure of factories which cannot compete on the world market),
while the advantages are less tangible. Are these fears justified?
7
8
9
An exception is Israel, which aims for improved trade relations with both the eu and
the United States.
“Deep free trade” goes beyond abolishing tariffs (simple free trade) to removing nontariff barriers to trade in goods and complete liberalisation of the service industries.
The negotiations with Ukraine started in 2008.
B5 Policy for the new neighbours
123
In chapter B4 we showed that a lowering of trade barriers will lead to an
increase in trade between all countries directly involved, and hence to additional economic growth. The neighbouring countries with strong ties to the
eu (such as the North African countries) should therefore benefit from further
trade liberalisation.
But in that chapter we also pointed out the possible disadvantages of an open
economy, which would hit specific industries and which could hold back future
development. How important are these disadvantages in the eu’s relations
with its neighbouring countries, and hence for the question as to whether trade
should be liberalised further?
Openness can lead to cheap imports crowding out domestic production, at the
expense of industries (or businesses) which lose this competitive battle. This
implies that the effects of trade are unequally distributed. But not only that, the
effect may be so strong that domestic production will actually decline instead of
increase (Santos-Paulino and Thirlwall 2004). This effect is a major reason why
various countries (including China, Thailand and Mauritius) have resorted to
gradual trade liberalisation, combining freer exports with heavy import protection (Rodrik 2008).
In the relationship between the eu and its neighbouring countries this effect
is probably not very important, because the trade patterns of both groups of
countries differ widely. Chapter B4 showed that the greatest increase in competition will take place between the East European neighbours (Ukraine, Moldova
and Georgia in particular) and Bulgaria, Romania and the Baltic States. Some
mena countries (Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco) have similar trade profiles, but
owing to the longer distance this competition will be less intensive.
What about the trend in specialisation patterns? Will the neighbouring countries remain caught in their production of low-knowledge and low-technology
goods? It is a basic tenet of international trade theory (Stolper-Samuelson)
that countries will specialise: oil-rich countries will export oil, countries with
low-skilled populations will export simple goods, and countries with highly
educated populations will export knowledge-intensive goods. The upshot is
that knowledge is profitable in knowledge-intensive countries (such as many
eu countries), but that the return on knowledge investments will be relatively
10
low in countries with less well-educated populations. As we already indicated
in chapter B3, this is a common effect in oil-rich countries with relatively low
education levels, such as Syria and Algeria. In many other countries the knowledge and technology levels are such that knowledge-intensive production is a
possibility or already a reality (more than 50% of Israel’s and Ukraine’s exports
are knowledge- and technology-intensive, for instance).
Because of the differences in trade patterns, neither the citizens of the eu nor
the inhabitants of the neighbouring countries have to worry about the adverse
effects of trade liberalisation. The key exception is the danger that neighbouring countries will remain caught in their current specialisation patterns, which
in a number of countries means specifically a predominance of commodity
exports. Trade agreements could bear in mind the economic development needs
of the neighbouring countries, for instance by allowing temporary import
restrictions and establishing free trade zones. For the oil-exporting countries it
10
According to the analysis in chapter B4, this will apply in particular to Tunisia, Morocco
and Jordan, which have knowledge-intensive export patterns.
124
Europe’s Neighbours
is imperative that they invest their oil revenues in knowledge and technology, in
order to broaden their export base in the future (see chapter B3).
Special policy for oil and gas?
The economies of a number of neighbouring countries rely almost entirely on
the export of oil and gas. By contrast, most eu member states are importers
of oil and gas. The rise in the oil price, the dangers of overdependence on oil
and gas exports, and the complex infrastructure required for oil and gas suggest the importance of a special policy for oil and gas with the neighbouring
countries.
How vulnerable are the eu member states, and the Netherlands in particular,
to fluctuations in the oil price? The Dutch economy’s vulnerability to an oil
price hike has diminished considerably since the first oil crisis in the early
11
1970s. In 2004 the cpb estimated that the oil price sensitivity of the Dutch
economy had halved over the past 25 years. In 2005, after a 45% surge in the oil
price in two years, output fell by 0.75 percentage points, unemployment rose by
0.25 percentage points and inflation rose by 1.25 percentage points.
The main reason for this lower sensitivity is the halving of oil consumption
over the past decades, as oil consumption per unit of gdp fell by more than half
in the Netherlands between 1973-2002. A similar development occurred in the
eu-15 and the United States, so that a higher oil price has a smaller knock-on
effect on world trade these days. By this indirect means too the oil price sensitivity of the Dutch economy has diminished.
In short, then, the West European economies are well placed to cope with
fluctuations in the oil price. But this is far more difficult for a number of East
European member states and energy-importing neighbouring countries which
are dependent on a single oil and gas supplier, Russia. For them a diversification of suppliers, for instance by strengthening relations with neighbouring
countries, could offer a solution.
A number of neighbouring countries are economically very dependent on oil
and exports. Certainly with the current high oil price, investments in production capacity and the distribution network are very remunerative. But an
overdependence on oil and gas exports is not without risk, as we indicated in
chapter B3. The dominance of commodities in an economy often has a braking effect on economic growth because it creates an unfavourable investment
climate, reduces incentives for knowledge accumulation and heightens the
opportunities for corruption. Moreover, it makes these countries extremely vulnerable to fluctuations in the oil price. In order to ensure a stable development
for these countries (based on balanced income distribution and a reduced vulnerability to oil price fluctuations), it is very important to develop the industrial
and service sectors. This is difficult, however, because energy exports tend to
push up the exchange rate. As the currency appreciates, the country becomes
12
less competitive and exports decline. Consequently economic output will fall
and unemployment will rise, a phenomenon which both Algeria and Libya are
struggling with.
11
12
This section is based on cpb (2004), Macro Economische Verkenning 2005 and cpb
(2005), Macro Economische Verkenning 2006, two studies on the macroeconomic
outlook for the world economy and the Dutch economy.
This effect is known as the “Dutch disease”, because it occurred in the Netherlands in
the 1970s.
B5 Policy for the new neighbours
125
What are the main barriers to trade in oil and gas with the neighbouring countries? The most likely candidate is infrastructure (case and Istanbul Economics
2006; Emerson 2004). For the East European oil producers (Russia, Belarus and
Azerbaijan) in particular, the presence of pipelines largely determines their
capacity for exporting oil and gas. Not surprisingly, then, that heavy investments are being made to improve, and above all to extend, the network. A
second means of stimulating the supply of oil and gas is to invest in production
capacity.
The quality of institutions is also a significant factor in the trade in oil and gas.
Foreign direct investments in production capacity and distribution networks are
made primarily by private oil companies, but these are hampered by the ownership structure, regulatory framework and political situation in the countries in
question (case and Istanbul Economics 2006). First the ownership structure.
Many energy companies in the neighbouring countries have not been privatised
and are strongly vertically integrated (i.e. the whole process from extraction to
export is controlled by a single state-owned company). An additional problem
for foreign private investors is that market operation is not regulated by independent authorities but by the state.
The third factor of importance is the political situation in the neighbouring
countries. Two newspaper stories over a single week illustrate some of the
issues. One report described how, after years of sanctions, Libya has been able
to focus more on the international market since 2003, and the petrodollars now
flowing into the country are being eagerly used for prestigious property developments (nrc Handelsblad, 26 February 2008). And another report described
how Ukraine’s efforts to secure the supply and transit of Russian gas have failed
time and again because the two countries cannot agree terms (Financieele Dagblad, 27 February 2008).
Privatisation and independent regulation are spearheads of the eu’s external
energy policy. A major agreement in this context is the Energy Charter Treaty,
which has been signed by the eu member states, the candidate member states,
the potential candidate member states, Russia and the eastern neighbouring
countries, while Algeria, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia have observer status.
Covering the regulation of trade and investment in energy, this treaty constitutes a major step towards a single energy market with the eastern neighbours
(Emerson et al. 2007). The eu together with the candidate member states and
potential candidate member states are committed to establishing a European
energy community. Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are observers, but they may
join this single energy market in the future. A similar treaty with the mena
countries may benefit trade with and investment in these neighbouring countries and promote the supply of oil and gas to the eu member states.
Borders for people
Fortress Europe is characterised by free movement of people within the eu (or
the Schengen Area) and strict controls at the external borders. This is clearly
illustrated by the recent accession of nine Central and East European member
13
states to the Schengen Agreement. According to European commissioner
Franco Frattini, “the extension of Schengen demonstrates the eu’s commitment
to facilitating legitimate travelling within and into the eu whilst at the same
13
The Schengen Area consists of 22 eu member states (all except the United Kingdom,
Ireland, Romania, Bulgaria and Cyprus), Norway and Iceland. When Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia and Malta joined in
2007, the eastern border of the Schengen Area was extended to 4,278 kilometres.
126
Europe’s Neighbours
time reinforcing the security of our external borders and thereby strengthening
14
the safety of all eu citizens”. Other, and to some extent related, reasons for the
strict control of cross-border movements of people are the prevention of large
asylum seeker flows, the fight against illegal immigration, and protection of
the labour market. Within Fortress Europe it is possible to maintain a welfare
state.
It is not only the eu which keeps its borders closed. Some neighbouring countries, particularly in the Middle East, also have restrictive migration and visa
policies. By contrast, other countries pursue active emigration policies, under
which low-skilled workers in particular are encouraged to emigrate, either
temporarily or permanently (Fargues 2005). For all these countries, security
and the freedom to organise their own society as they see fit are also prominent
reasons for controlling their external borders. The fear of a brain drain, in
which the most talented people leave for other countries, also plays a role.
There are sound economic arguments for simplifying visa procedures (for
instance by making visas available on location), or even for abolishing visa
requirements (as is already the case with Israel at the moment). Visa requirements, especially if they go together with high charges for visas and readmission, pose a serious obstacle to the integration of the eu with its neighbouring
countries. They constitute a major trade barrier, because they make it difficult to establish contacts. They hamper foreign investments, because these
require a brief or more extended presence of staff from the foreign company
making the investment. A major reason for pursuing a restrictive visa policy is
to counter illegal immigration. But according to Emerson et al. (2007), many
studies show that visa policy has little impact on curbing illegal immigration.
It is much simpler to issue visas by opening consulates in the neighbouring
countries and vice versa, by reducing the costs and reducing or simplifying the
15
documents, as the European Commission recently suggests.
The story becomes more complex when the issue is migration, temporary or
permanent. As long as the eu is much wealthier than its neighbouring countries, migrants will try to get work in the eu. Demographical patterns accentuate this effect: the eu is struggling with an ageing population, while the North
African neighbouring countries in particular are experiencing strong population growth (Zimmermann 1995). Immigration is thus certainly not just a
burden for the eu; it also provides a welcome supplement to the existing labour
supply. In the 1960s this led to a large influx of migrants from North Africa (see
table B2.5). In the past decade the focus has shifted eastwards, with large-scale
labour migration by Poles to Western Europe and by Ukrainians and Moldovans
to the eastern eu member states. The latter migration is now severely restricted
following the accession of Poland, Hungary and Slovakia (all of which border
on Ukraine) to the Schengen Agreement.
Drawing from recent cpb studies, we want to touch on some aspects of migration policy. First of all the importance of a coherent policy to counter illegal
immigration. Without opportunities to work or live in the eu legally, immigrants will try out illegal means. cpb/scp (2004) showed that this illegal
immigration depends not only on the income differentials between the eu and
14
15
European Commission, “Enlargement of the Schengen area: achieving the European
goal of free movement of persons”, ip/07/1968, press release, Brussels, 20 December
2007.
European Commission (2006), “enp – Visa facilitation”, non-paper, com (2006) 726
final.
B5 Policy for the new neighbours
127
neighbouring countries, but also on the size of the eu’s informal economy.
Cracking down on this “black market” may well prove the most effective instrument to counter illegal immigration.
Then there is the role of selection. Highly educated labour migrants strengthen
the knowledge infrastructure of the European economy, which they can provide
with a generic growth impulse. This justifies on economic grounds the granting
of permanent work permits to highly educated immigrants. But for their home
countries it means that their most talented people leave and may not return.
Migration of unskilled and semi-skilled workers may in the future ease specific
and local bottlenecks in the labour market (such as vacancies in the construction industry and in the health service). The cpb (2007) concludes that labour
immigration for people with low earning capacity should be directed above all
at temporary bottlenecks in the labour market, so that temporary work permits are an obvious solution. In the context of the relationship between the eu
and its neighbouring countries this means that both sides have to open their
borders: the eu for temporary labour migrants and the neighbouring countries
for their return.
And finally, there is the role of migration in relation to the welfare state. The
existing immigrant population on balance does not contribute to the sustainability of the welfare state in the Netherlands and a number of other West
European countries (cpb/scp 2004; Roodenburg et al. 2003). In the future
large-scale immigration will not be an effective means of improving the financial positions of West European governments either. Through selective labour
migration it should be possible to target labour migrants who are likely to
have a high earning capacity, such as young highly skilled immigrants. Those
migrants will on balance contribute more to than they will use the public services in the eu. But for the mena countries this implies a major shift: Fargues
(2005) shows that of the five largest emigration countries (Morocco, Egypt,
Algeria, Tunisia and Lebanon), only Lebanon has a high percentage (more than
50%) of highly skilled emigrants (i.e. higher vocational or academic level).
For the neighbouring countries, emigration offers their people an opportunity
to earn a good income. The home country profits in the form of remittances,
see table B2.3. This income flow is often used for investments in buildings
(homes etc.) rather than new businesses (Fargues 2005). Here lies a major
opportunity for the neighbouring countries: by improving the business climate
they can ensure a productive application of these income transfers. Over the
longer term this will also tempt emigrants to return to the home country and
use their accumulated knowledge and capital to develop its economy.
5.3
Institutions for better market operation
In chapter B3 we showed that better institutions are important for economic
growth. If the institutions in the neighbouring countries improve to the level
of Poland, their gdps can increase by up to 85%. We drew up a top-three of
institutions for promoting growth: protection of property rights, market-based
regulation, and stable macroeconomic policy. What role can the eu play in the
improvement of these institutions in its neighbouring countries? Before we can
answer this question, we first have to look at what determines institutions and
how they can be changed.
128
Europe’s Neighbours
Indeed, is it even possible to change institutions? Institutions often have long
histories. Thus the institutions of the Islamic mena countries have developed
along different lines from West European institutions for centuries. History
also shows that institutions do not change much. And when they change, they
usually do so very gradually. Sweeping changes only take place in exceptional
circumstances, such as a revolution or foreign domination (North 1990). Moreover, many other factors are also involved, such as economic growth, migration
flows, education levels, technological changes (such as ict), and so on. Politics
only has a limited span of control here.
Furthermore, institutions must fit in with local preferences and conditions.
Thus an independent central bank may work well in a democratic country with
an efficient tax system, but it is doubtful whether it will also work well in a centrally managed economy with weak fiscal institutions. Rodrik (2000) expresses
this dilemma in adopting institutions as a trade-off, a choice between applying
a blueprint and local experimentation. Applying a blueprint saves the costs of
“reinventing the wheel”, as it were, but local conditions sometimes require new
solutions or a thorough adjustment of the blueprint. Moreover, there is not just
one blueprint. There are also major institutional differences among the rich
16
countries, and the differences with an emerging economy such as China are
even greater.
Does this leave any scope for changing institutions effectively? Can the neighbouring countries change their institutions and thus over time their economic
situations? Of course, but in the light of the above comments, the room for
manoeuvre should not be overestimated. A good strategy is to start with the
users of institutions (what North calls organisations). These users must have
an interest in better institutions. They can exert pressure on their governments
to change institutions in the desired direction. More openness can provide a
major stimulus here. Businesses which see opportunities on the international
market but are held back by weak domestic institutions, will seek to bring
about changes in these institutions (Easterly 2006).
Greater economic integration can lead to an improvement in the neighbouring
countries’ institutions, and thus to clearer property rights, better regulation
and sound macroeconomic policy. Why is this the case? A first reason is that
trade liberalisation can encourage the improvement of institutions. That is to
say, better institutions are needed to deal with the risks (which are there as well
as the opportunities) in the world market. And good institutions can contribute to efficient production, so that a country’s exports can gradually shift from
being dominated by primary commodities to a more balanced mix of sophisticated products. A second reason is that openness helps to fight corruption
(Winters 2004). Market players prefer to deal with reliable partners, and lower
trade barriers will reduce illicit trade. From here we are not yet at our top-three
institutions, but the empirical literature can provide some backing here: an
open economy is a major determinant of good institutions (Rodrik 2000).
However, an open economy does not automatically lead to good institutions, as
figure B5.1 clearly shows. This figure suggests that openness helps, but it has
to be openness to countries with good institutions. The former Soviet republics
are open, but above all towards Russia. And some mena country economies
are open (Syria, Algeria and Libya), but almost wholly dependent on oil exports.
16
An example from European Outlook 1 (cpb/scp 2003) is the difference in labour market
regulation within the eu and in comparison with the United States. This shows that
both a liberal system and a social system can yield high productivity levels
B5 Policy for the new neighbours
129
And as attested by the oil exporters in the Gulf region, oil exports bring huge
wealth but little institutional change. Moreover, a high endowment in natural
resources and other commodities often leads to more corruption (see chapter B3).
The eu can make a contribution to more openness, not only by liberalising
trade but also by providing access to the internal market and – the ultimate
step – by admitting the neighbouring countries to the eu. In the case of Turkey,
Lejour and De Mooij (2005) argue that eu membership can work as a catalyst
for institutional reforms. After all, accession requires a country to comply with
eu legislation and European Court of Justice rulings. To a lesser extent access to
the internal market can lead to institutional reforms: regulations in participating countries are harmonised with each other before export products are mutually recognised. What applied to the recent 12 new member states and what
applies to the candidate member states can also apply to the new neighbours.
The eu has an instrument at its disposal: but does it want to use this instrument?
Figure B5.1
The relationship between quality
of institutions and openness of the
economy, 2005 (in percent of GDP)
quality of institutions
2
NLD
EU15
1
EU12
ISR
TUN JOR
0
MAR
ARM
LBN
GEO
EGY
DZA MDA
UKR
AZE
SYR
-1
BLR
-2
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
openness of the economy
Source: Kauffman et al. (2007); World Trade Organisation (www.wto.org, consulted in January 2008)
Development aid is another, relatively easily applied policy instrument. But does
this instrument contribute to prosperity in the neighbouring countries, or to
put it differently, to a structural improvement of the economy? We are talking
here about financial support for productive investments, aimed at expanding a
17
country’s production capacity.
Financial aid is most effective when the lack of financial resources is a major
obstacle to economic development and when the recipient society is able to use
these resources effectively. An example is debt relief. We know that this benefits
17
Here we will disregard a quite different application of aid, in the form of food and
medicines supplied in emergency situations.
130
Europe’s Neighbours
above all countries with extremely high debts, or debt overhang, countries
which because of their debt levels cannot borrow any more. These are countries, then, where a lack of cash acts as the most direct brake on economic
growth (Easterly 2002; Sachs 1998). Thus debt relief sparked economic development in the “Brady countries” of Central America, which had reasonably
efficient institutions. Their huge debt burdens had become the main obstacle
to economic development (Arslanalp and Henry 2006). Fortunately there are
only a few countries with huge debt overhangs, and the eu’s neighbours are not
among them.
For direct financial aid and debt relief to be effective, good institutions need
to be in place – the same ones we have focused on in this Outlook. In the least
developed countries the biggest problem for the effectiveness of aid is the
absence of economic institutions which provide the foundations for successful
investment and growth. The eu’s neighbours are not among the least developed counties. But in the case of the Palestinian Authority, the destination of
one-third of the enp budget, the unstable political situation and the unclear
institutional context constitute serious impediments to the effectiveness of aid
for economic development over the longer term.
Does financial aid help to improve the quality of institutions? This brings us
back to the question as to how improvements of institutions come about. The
recipient society has to recognise the point of better institutions; it has to
benefit from them, in other words. And the institutions have to be based on
existing (and partly unwritten) rules and customs and fit in with the culture.
Institutional improvements need support from below, from businesses and
citizens on the ground (Easterly 2006).
It is difficult to see how financial aid directed at national governments can
contribute to this change process. Nor is it very effective to link aid to institutional improvements. This carries the risk that improvements are implemented
which will not fit in with the recipient society and which will be reversed just
as quickly after a period of time. But aid can be effective in the form of practical assistance for institutional reforms which the neighbouring countries are
undertaking themselves, such as the reform of the tax system in Moldova and
the reform of the legal system in Georgia.
5.4
The limits of the eu
[…] the enp has the potential to foster economic growth in neighbouring countries,18
19
but […] it seems clear that incentives seem likely to be the enp’s weak point.
These two quotes put the message of this chapter in a nutshell. Take the key
theme of poverty, which has been playing in the background throughout. The
best remedy for poverty is economic growth, as long as this growth is distributed relatively evenly (Winters et al. 2004). And the best instruments to boost
growth are an effective trade policy and improvement of property rights, the
regulatory framework and macroeconomic policy. The eu pays close attention
to both instruments, at least in its communications on neighbourhood policy.
It is much more difficult to turn these words into deeds, however, especially
because the neighbouring countries will have to do most of the work themselves.
18
19
Dodoni and Fantini (2006).
Milcher and Slay (2005).
B5 Policy for the new neighbours
131
The challenge lies with the neighbouring countries, then. They will also benefit
the most in economic terms. More openness between the eu and its neighbouring countries will benefit above all the trade performance of the neighbouring
countries; the impact on the eu will be small. And better institutions are an
economic necessity above all for the neighbouring countries themselves; the
eu’s interest lies in the greater stability on its external borders.
But the eu can certainly help its neighbouring countries to take up the challenge. Firstly by identifying and then giving practical support to good initiatives
launched by the neighbouring countries. There is some scope for providing
financial assistance for changes in institutions, but its effect will be limited.
The eu applies the most efficient instrument, trade liberalisation, very cautiously, however. It is offering the neighbouring countries only very limited
access to the internal market for goods, services, capital and people. And it is
certainly not offering the neighbouring countries the prospect of membership
at this stage. With its neighbourhood policy the eu looks beyond its borders,
but it still wants to maintain these borders or even reinforce them, as is evident
from the restriction of migration from Ukraine following the recent enlargement of the Schengen Area and the restriction of trade with Moldova following
Romania’s accession to the eu.
Because the economic gap between the eu and its neighbouring countries is so
large, the eu’s external borders remain a significant factor: trade faces many
barriers and migration is virtually impossible. At the same time these borders
deprive the neighbouring countries of good opportunities to develop. That is
the eu’s dilemma in its relations with its eastern and southern neighbours. The
neighbourhood policy is strongly moulded by the economic gap: first the gap
has to narrow, then the borders can become more transparent. This policy is
not very effective, because the benefits lie too far in the future. If the eu is willing to open its borders sooner and wider, it will be able to contribute effectively
to prosperity and stability in its neighbouring countries.
132
References for part B
Abu-Qarn, A. S. and S. Abu-Bader (2007), Sources of Growth Revisited: Evidence
from Selected mena Countries. In: World Development, vol. 35, no. 5, p. 752-771.
Acemoglu, D., P. Aghion and Zilibotti (2006). Distance to Frontier, Selection and
Economic Growth. In: Journal of European Economic Association, vol. 4, p. 37-74.
Anderson, J. E. and E. van Wincoop (2003). Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the
Border Puzzle. In: American Economic Review, vol. 93, no. 1, p. 170-192.
Arslanalp, S. and P.B. Henry (2006). Debt Relief. In: Journal of Economic Perspectives,
vol. 20, no. 1, p. 207-220.
Åsland, A. and N. Jenish (2006). The Eurasian growth paradox. Washington: Institute
for International Economics (Working Paper 06-5).
Baier, S. L. and J.H. Bergstrand (2007). Do free trade agreements actually increase
members’ international trade? In: Journal of International Economics, vol. 71, no. 1.,
p. 72-95.
Brakman, S., H. Garretsen, C. van Marrewijk and C. van Witteloostuijn (2006).
Nations and firms in the global economy; an introduction to international economics and
business. Cambridge, ma: Cambridge University Press.
case and Istanbul Economics (2006). Countries bordering the eu and enhanced economic
integration (Final report for the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs). The
Hague: Ministry of Economic Affairs (ep/eis 5048195).
ceps (2004). Two cheers for the European Neighbourhood Policy. In: European Voice.
Consulted in march 2008 at www.ceps.be.
cpb (2006). De Doha-ronde: trage onderhandelingen over handelsliberalisatie. The Hague:
cpb Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (cep 2006).
cpb (2007). Selectief arbeidsmigratiebeleid: Europees of nationaal? Het Beleidsplan Legale
Migratie van de European Commission onder de loep. The Hague: cpb Netherlands
Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (cpb Notitie 27 februari 2007).
cpb/scp (2003). Social Europe (European Outlook 1). The Hague: cpb Netherlands
Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis / The Netherlands Institute for Social
Research | scp.
cpb/scp (2004). Destination Europe. Immigration and integration in the European Union.
(European Outlook 2). The Hague: cpb Netherlands Bureau for Economic
Policy Analysis / The Netherlands Institute for Social Research | scp.
cpb/scp (2006). Diverse Europe. Public opinion on the European Union & Cultural diversity,
economics and policy (European Outlook 4). The Hague: cpb Netherlands Bureau
for Economic Policy Analysis / The Netherlands Institute for Social Research |
scp.
cpb/scp (2007). Market Place Europe. Fifty years of public opinion and market integration
in the European Union (European Outlook 5). The Hague: cpb Netherlands Bureau
for Economic Policy Analysis / The Netherlands Institute for Social Research |
scp.
Cremona, M. and G. Meloni (2007). The European Neighbourhood Policy: A Framework
for Modernisation? San Domenico di Fiesole: eui (Working Papers 21).
Crowley, M.A. (2003). An introduction to the wto and gatt. Chicago: Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago Economic Perspectives.
De Groot, H., G. Linders, P. Rietveld and U. Subramanian (2004). The Institutional
Determinants of Bilateral Trade Patterns. In: Kyklos, vol. 57, p. 103-124.
De Soto, H. (2003). Listening to the barking dogs: property law against poverty in
the non-West. In: European Journal of Anthropology, vol. 41, p. 179-185.
Dodoni, M. and M. Fantini (2006). The eu Neighbourhood Policy: implications
for economic growth and stability. In: Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 44,
no. 3, p. 507-532.
Dollar, D. and A. Kraay (2003). Institutions, trade and growth. In: Journal of
Monetary Economics, vol. 50, p. 133-162.
Dominicis, L., R. Florax and H. De Groot (2008). A Meta-Analysis on the
Relationship between Income Inequality and Economic Growth. In: Scottish
Journal of Political Economy (to be published).
Easterly, W. (2002). How Did Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Become Heavily
Indebted? Reviewing Two Decades of Debt Relief. In: World Development, vol. 30,
no. 10, p. 1677-1696.
Easterly, W. (2006). The White Man’s Burden. Why the west’s efforts to aid the rest have
done so much ill and so little good. New York: Penguin Press.
References for part B
Easterly, W., J. Ritzen and M. Woolcock (2006). Social Cohesion, Institutions, and
Growth. In: Economics and Politics, vol. 18, no. 2, p. 103-120.
Emerson, M. (2004). European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy or Placebo? Brussels: ceps
(Working Document 215).
Emerson, M., G. Noutcheva and N. Popescu (2007). European Neighbourhood Policy two
years on: time indeed for an ‘enp plus’. Brussels: ceps (Policy Brief 126).
European Commission (2003). Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework
for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours. Brussels: European
Commission Communication (Communication com (2003) 104 final).
European Commission (2006). enp – A path towards further economic integration.
Brussels: European Commission Communication (Communication com (2006)
726 final).
European Commission (2007a). European Neighbourhood Policy: Economic Review of eu
Neighbour Countries. Brussels: dg ecfin (Occasion Papers 30).
European Commission (2007b). Working together; The European Neighbourhood Policy.
Brussels: European Commission.
Fargues, Ph., J-P. Cassarino and A. Latreche (2005). Mediterranean Migration: an
Overview. Florence: European University Institute (carim 2005 Report).
Feenstra, R. C. (2004). Advanced international trade: theory and evidence. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Frankel, J. and D. Romer (1999). Does trade cause growth? In: American Economic
Review, vol. 89, p. 379-399.
Frenken, K. and J. Hoekman (2006). Convergence in an enlarged Europe: The role
of Network Cities. In: Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie, vol. 97, no. 3,
p. 321-326.
Gallup, J.L., J.D. Sachs and A.D. Mellinger (1999). Geography and economic
development. In: International Regional Science Review, vol. 22, no. 2, p. 179-232.
Galor, O. and O. Moav (2004). From Physical to Human Capital Accumulation:
Inequality and the Process of Development. In: Review of Economic Studies, vol. 71,
p. 1001-1026.
Guidolin, M. and E. La Ferrare (2007). Diamonds Are Forever, Wars Are Not:
Is Conflict Bad for Private Firms? In: American Economic Review, vol. 97, no. 5,
p. 1978-1993.
Helpman, E. (2004). The mystery of economic growth, Cambridge, ma: Harvard
University Press.
Hoekman, B. and D. Konan (1999). Deep Integration, Non-Discrimination and EuroMediterranean Free Trade. London: cepr (Discussion Paper 2095).
Jalilian, H., C. Kirkpatrick and D. Parker (2007). The Impact of Regulation on
Economic Growth in Developing Countries: a Cross-Country Analysis. In: World
Development, vol. 35, no. 1, p. 87-103.
Jiménez-Martin, S., N. Jorgensen and J. Labeaga (2007). The Volume and Geography of
Remittances from the eu. Brussels: European Commission.
Kauffman, D., A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi (2005). Governance matters iv: Governance
indicators for 1996-2004. Washington: World Bank.
Kauffman, D., A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi (2007). Governance matters vi: Governance
indicators for 1996-2006. Washington: World Bank (Policy Research Working
Paper 4280).
Krugman, P. and M. Obstfeld (2003). International Economics: Theory and Policy.
Boston: Addison Wesley.
Lejour, A.M. and R.A. de Mooij (2005). Turkish Delight: Does Turkey’s Accession to
the eu Bring Economic Benefits? In: Kyklos, vol. 58, no. 1, p. 87-120.
Lejour, A.M., A. Mervar and G. Verweij (2007). The economic effects of Croatia’s accession
to the European Union. The Hague: cpb Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy
Analysis (cpb Document 154).
Mankiw, N.G., D. Romer and N.G. Weil (1992). A Contribution to the Empirics of
Economic Growth. In: Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 107, no. 2, p. 407-437.
Marchetti, A. (2006). The European Neighbourhood Policy; Foreign Policy at the eu’s
Periphery. Bonn: Center for European Integration Studies (Discussion Paper 158).
Milcher, S. and B. Slay (2005). The economics of the “European Neighbourhood Policy”: an
initial assessment (Conference Paper for Europe after the Enlargement, Warsaw,
8-9 April 2005). Consulted in march 2008 at www.case.com.pl.
North, D.C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance.
Cambridge, ma: Cambridge University Press.
North, D.C. (1994). Economic Performance through time. In: American Economic
Review, vol. 84, no. 3, p. 359-368.
133
134
Europe’s Neighbours
Papyrakis, E. and R. Gerlagh (2004). The resource curse hypothesis and its
transmission channels. In: Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 32, p. 181-193.
Pelkmans, J. (2006). European integration: Methods and economic analysis. Harlow:
Prentice-Hall.
Peridy, N. (2005). Towards a New Trade Policy Between the usa and Middle-East Countries:
Estimating Trade Resistance and Export Potential. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Rapaport, H. and F. Docquiet (2005). The Economics of Migrants’ Remittances. Bonn:
Institute for the Study of Labour (iza Discussion Paper 1531).
Rodrik, D. (2000). Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They Are and How
to Acquire Them. New York: National Bureau for Economic Research (nber
Working Paper 7540).
Rodrik, D. (2008). Second-best institutions. Cambridge, ma: Harvard University.
Rodrik, D., A. Subramanian and F. Trebbi (2004). Institutions rule: the primacy of
institutions over geography and integration in economic development.
In: Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 9, p. 131-165.
Roodenburg, H., R. Euwals and H. Ter Rele (2003). Immigration and the Dutch
economy. The Hague: cpb Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis
(cpb Special Publication 47).
Sachs, J.D. (1998). External Debt, Structural Adjustment and Economic Growth.
In: unctad (ed.), International Monetary and Financial Issues for the 1990s, vol. ix,
p. 45-56.
Santos Silva, J. and S. Tenreyro (2006). The Log of Gravity. In: Review of Economics
and Statistics, vol. 88, no. 4, p. 641-658.
Santos-Paulino, A. and A.P. Thirlwall (2004). The impact of trade liberalisation
on exports, imports and the balance of payments of developing countries. In:
Economic Journal, vol. 114, p. F50-F72.
Suyker, W. and H. de Groot (2006). China and the Dutch economy; Stylised facts and
prospects. The Hague: cpb Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis
(cpb Document 127).
Suyker, W., H. de Groot and P. Buitelaar (2007). India and the Dutch economy: Stylised
facts and prospects. The Hague: cpb Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy
Analysis (cpb Document 155).
Trefler, D. (1995). The Case of the Missing Trade and other Mysteries. In: American
Economic Review, vol. 85, p. 1029-1046.
Winters, L. A. (2004). Trade liberalisation and economic performance: an
overview. In: Economic Journal, vol. 114, p. F4-F21.
Winters, L. A., N. McCulloch and A. McKay (2004). Trade liberalisation and
poverty: The evidence so far. In: Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 42, p. 72-115.
Zimmermann, K.F. (1995). Tackling the European migration problem. In: Journal of
Economic Perspectives, vol. 9, no. 2, p. 45-62.
135
Publications of the cpb and the scp
The following list contains the previous European Outlooks and a selection of
recent publications of the cpb Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis
and the Netherlands Institute for Social Research | scp concerning Europe and
the theme of these European Outlooks. A complete list and the pdf versions of
publications can be found on the websites of the cpb (www.cpb.nl) and the scp
(www.scp.nl).
European Outlooks (by cpb en scp)
cpb/scp (2003). Social Europe. European Outlook 1. Paul Dekker, Sjef Ederveen, Gerda
Jehoel-Gijsbers, Ruud de Mooij, Arjan Soede and Jean Marie Wildeboer Schut.
The Hague: Netherlands Institute for Social Research | scp. isbn 90-377-0155-8
cpb/scp (2004). Destination Europe. Immigration and Integration in the European Union.
European Outlook 2. Sjef Ederveen, Paul Dekker, Albert van der Horst, Wink
Joosten, Tom van der Meer, Paul Tang, Marcel Coenders, Marcel Lubbers, Han
Nicolaas, Peer Scheepers, Arno Sprangers and Johan van der Valk. The Hague:
Netherlands Institute for Social Research | scp. isbn 90-377-0198-1
cpb/scp (2005). European Times. Public opinion on Europe & Working hours, compared and
explained. European Outlook 3. Paul Dekker and Sjef Ederveen (ed.). The Hague:
Sdu/Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
cpb/scp (2006). Diverse Europe. European Outlook 4. Paul Dekker, Sjef Ederveen, Henri
de Groot, Albert van der Horst, Arjan Lejour, Bas Straathof, Henk Vinken and
Charlotte Wennekers. The Hague: Sdu/Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
cpb/scp (2007). Market Place Europe. Fifty years of public opinion and market integration
in the European Union. European Outlook 5. Paul Dekker, Albert van der Horst,
Henk Kox, Arjan Lejour, Bas Straathof, Peter Tammes and Charlotte
Wennekers. The Hague: Netherlands Institute for Social Research | scp.
isbn 978-90-377-0306-1.
cpb publications
cpb/zew (2006). Liberalisation of European energy markets: challenges and policy options
(cpb Document 138).
Ederveen, J.P., G.M.M. Gelauff and J.L.M. Pelkmans (2006). Assessing subsidiarity
(cpb Document 133).
Gelauff, G., I. Grilo en A. Lejour (red.) (2008). Subsidiarity and Economic Reform in
Europe. Berlijn: Springer.
Lejour, A.M., A. Mervar en G. Verweij (2007). The economic effects Croatia’s accession to
the eu (cpb Document 154).
Lejour, A.M., H. Rojas-Romagosa and G. Verweij (2007). Opening services markets
within Europe; modelling foreign establishments in a cge framework (cpb Discussion
Paper 80).
Lejour, A.M., V. Solanic and P.J.G. Tang (2006). eu accession and income growth: an
empirical approach (cpb Discussion Paper 72).
Suyker, W.B.C., H.L.F. de Groot en P. Buitelaar (2007). India and the Dutch economy;
stylised facts and prospects (cpb Document 155).
Van der Horst, A., L. Bettendorf and H. Rojas-Romagosa (2007). Will corporate tax
consolidation improve efficiency in the eu? (cpb Document 141).
Van der Horst, A., A.M. Lejour and S.M. Straathof (2006). Innovation policy: Europe or
the member states? (cpb Document 132).
scp publications
De Boer, Alice (ed.) (2006). Report on the Elderly 2006. isbn 90-377-0271-6
De Haan, Jos, Renée Mast, Marleen Varekamp and Susanne Janssen (2006). Visit our
site. isbn 90-377-0296-1
Gijsberts, Mérove (2005). Ethnic Minorities and Integration. Outlook for the Future.
isbn 90-377-0197-3
Roes, Theo (ed.) (2008). Facts & Figures of the Netherlands. Social & Cultural Trends
1995-2006. isbn 978-90-377-0211-8
Steenbekkers, A., C. Simon and V. Veldheer (2006). At Home in the Countryside
(Summary) . isbn 90-377-0292-9
Tiessen-Raaphorst, Annet, and Koen Breedveld (2007). Sport in the Netherlands.
isbn 978-90-377-0302-3