Download The Influence of the Gehlen Organization on West German

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The Influence of the Gehlen Organization and the Klose Squadron on West German
Rearmament
Sigurd Hess, Vortrag IIHA Konferenz in Marburg, 18. Juni 2011
The origins of West German security policy are well researched. One exception is the
influence of intelligence organizations - with German personnel under British and American
control - on West German armament planning. The reason for this neglected research is due to
the scarcity of archival material.
This paper reveals the influence of the Gehlen organization and the Klose squadron on the
plans that created the new German Army and Navy. Archival material about the activities of
the ORG and the Klose Operation are very scarce during the time frame of 1946 - 1962. For
example, up until now the only available archival material about the ORG and the BND are
finished intelligence reports from the end of 1951 onwards plus some studies analysing the
events of 1953, 1956, 1961and 1962. This paper will therefore present only preliminary
results and discuss research in progress.
The critical year of 1948 for the formation of post-war Germany
Rearmament unthinkable in Germany at this time
- The disastrous end of the war created a sentiment among veterans and younger Germans
alike which can be characterized by expressions like “never again”, “without me”, or “he,
who takes up arms again, his hands will fall off”.1
- The Western allies didn’t want Germans to be rearmed either. The first ideas in that
direction, which were voiced during the 1948 Berlin blockade by the Soviets, were
immediately rejected.
The Western Allies did not know what was going on in the lands conquered by the Red
Army
- By personal orders of Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, during the Second
World War no spying was authorized against their Soviet ally. For example, spying on the
Soviet ambassador in Washington was terminated in 1944. Also, the Soviet codebooks,
which the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) had bought from the Finnish intelligence,
were returned to Soviet Ambassador Andrej Gromyko on 15 February 19452 as a gesture
of good will.
- There existed mainly military intelligence organisations after the Second World War.
They had little knowledge and much less understanding about what was really going on
beyond the Iron Curtain and inside the Soviet Union. Churchill complained to Truman:
“We do not know what is going on” in the land conquered by the Red Army3.
- British intelligence was only able to speculate about the strategic interests and intentions
of the Soviet Union.
- Quote from the British Joint Intelligence Committee in 1946: ”We have practically no
direct intelligence, of a detailed factual or statistical nature, on conditions in the different
parts of the Soviet Union, and none at all on the intentions, immediate or ultimate of the
Russian leaders”.4
Verbal expression by Franz Josef Strauß in 1949, depending on the author the sentence differs
Hess, Sigurd, Venona und die Folgen – der angelsächsische Einbruch in einen sowjetischen Schlüssel während
des Kalten Krieges (Venona and its Consequences – the anglo-saxon cracking of a soviet cipher during the Cold
War) , in: Klüver, Hartmut und Weis, Thomas (Hg.), Marinegeschichte – Seekrieg – Funkaufklärung, Beiträge
zur Schiffahrtsgeschichte Band 10, DGSM Verlag, Düsseldorf 2004, p. 50
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Grose, Peter, p. 22
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Madrell, Spying on Science, p. 16
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As a consequence the remains of German wartime intelligence organisations were called
into service under British and American oversight, the small maritime Klose-Group and
the most famous example being the large Organisation Gehlen (OG)5.
One could call it a clever business proposition of “demand and offer”, the western allies
demanded intelligence from the lands behind the Iron Curtain and Gehlen and Klose
offered the results.
Consolidation of Reinhard Gehlen’s ORG
- Even before the end of the war Reinhard Gehlen had anticipated the ideological clash
between Western democracies and Eastern communism, contrary to others he shaped his
plans for the future and intended to side with the Americans
- He consolidated his organisation, initially called Basket and Operation Rusty, when the
ORG moved in December 1947 to Camp Nicolas in Pullach
- In fall 1948 the control over the ORG was transferred from US Army to CIA (effective
date 1 April 1949), the liaison staff was lead by Col (US A) James Critchfield
- HQ organisation (Generaldirektion GD)
- Division I: intel collection in foreign countries (1948 lead by Hermann Baun)
- Division II: evaluation (1948 – 1950 lead by Adolf Heusinger (Dr. Horn) and about 20
team members, OTL aD Gerhard Wessel his deputy)
- Division III: intel collection domestic and counter-intelligence
- Former Army High Command (OKH) operations chief Adolf Heusinger arrived 13 March
1948 at Pullach and commenced his important work as Chief Evaluation
- The experienced general staff officer Gehlen followed two aims with his organisation, one
was intelligence, the other was the recruitment of Wehrmacht-officers as a basis for what
might form a General Staff of a future German Army
- Gehlen developed during the early years of the infant Federal Republic into a skilful
politician, building personal networks with government, industry and former Wehrmachtofficers
- He followed two aims, on the one hand to contribute to the reestablishment of the German
Military and on the other hand to shape his intelligence organisation in such a way that it
would be acceptable as a future national intelligence service of a sovereign Germany
The Klose Group is formed
- In May 1948 Cdr (UK N) Anthony Courtney, A2 of FOG in Minden, discussed with
Kriegsmarine naval officer Hans Helmut Klose the naval part of what was called
operation “Jungle”. The British had evaluated the wartime operations of the German Navy
in the Baltic and had stumbled onto LtCdr Klose, then squadron commander of German
MTB’s, who had conducted intelligence and sabotage operations behind Soviet front lines
in 1944
- Klose agreed to transport agents with the German war-time MTB “S 208” to the Baltic
shores and land them there
- The agents were to contact the so-called “Forest Brothers” in the former Baltic States, to
form a spying network and to report back via HF-communications to “Broadway”, which
was the nickname of the MI 6 HQ
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We have the intriguing situation that in post-war Germany without a government two
German intelligence organisations are formed, the large Gehlen ORG under American
CIA control and the small naval organisation of Hans Helmut Klose under British MI 6
control
Krieger, Wolfgang, US Patronage of German Postwar Intelligence, published in Johnson, Loch K. (ed.),
Handbook of Intelligence Studies, 2007
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The decisive year 1950 for West German Rearmament planning
Chancellor Adenauer’s decision about German rearmament
- The German constitution, called “Grundgesetz” didn’t address German Defence Forces
- The German Parliament, the “Bundestag” voted on 16 December 1949 unanimously
against German rearmament
- Public opinion polls showed that 70 – 80 % of the Germans were against rearmament6
- Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was of a different opinion without expressing it publicly
- The statesman Adenauer judged about the sovereign state, I quote: “A state without armed
forces is no state at all”7
- The catholic Rhinelander Adenauer had conflicting views about the military, being
suspicious about the dangers of Prussian militarism
- The shrewd politician Adenauer manoeuvred skilfully for five long years until West
Germany was accepted in 1955 as a member of NATO and the Armed Forces, the
“Bundeswehr” started their actual build-up in 1956
- Early 1949 Adenauer had read an Aide-Mémoire of General Hans Speidel, who painted a
very gloomy picture of the Soviet threat and stated for the case of an aggression that the
middle European theatre would be overrun by superior Soviet forces aiming towards the
Atlantic harbours and the Pyrenean mountains
- Speidel’s Aide-Mémoire was based on intelligence material from Gehlen’s ORG, more
precisely from Heusinger’s evaluation division8
- The shock of the Korean War changed the security policy discussion dramatically
- The discussion about a German contribution to the defence of Western Europe gained
momentum
Graf von Schwerin leads the “Heimatdienst”
- Adenauer needed an advisor for security policy in the chancellery
- Several names were mentioned
- The Americans who are pushing for German rearmament discussed the issues with
Gehlen, Heusinger and Speidel
- The British who watched from the sidelines discussed with General Gerhard Graf von
Schwerin
- The French stonewalled the whole idea
- The British succeeded with their personnel proposal and on 24 May 1950 General
Schwerin started as advisor in the chancellery and lead the “Center for Homeland
Services” (Zentrale für Heimatdienst)
- Adenauer directed to establish his own intelligence service under the roof of this center,
called the “Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz Service”
- Generals Speidel and Heusinger presented on 7 August 1950 to Adenauer their
comprehensive concept for rearmament, which differed considerably from the conceptual
ideas of General Schwerin
- Again the ORG had provided the detailed intelligence material about the Soviet threat and
the build-up of the East German military, called as an disguise “Barracked People’s
Police”
- Gehlen and Adenauer had casually met in 1948, in September 1950 Gehlen presented his
ideas about a Federal Intelligence Service and German rearmament personally to
Adenauer and in the following days to the leader of the opposition party Kurt Schumacher
and a group of MP’s
MGFA, Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945 – 1956, Band 1, S. 706/707
Schwarz, Adenauer: Der Staatsmann 1952-1967, S. 245
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Schwarz, Adenauer: Der Aufstieg 1876-1952, S. 731
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Which concept for rearmament should be chosen? Should it be an extension of the Federal
Police Force, favored by Schwerin, should it be based on the existing allied service groups
or should it be a regular Army, Navy and Air Force, favored by Speidel, Heusinger and
Gehlen?
The study period at the monastery Himmerod and the „Himmerod Memorandum“
- To resolve the issues Adenauer directed a clandestine meeting of military experts at the
monastery Himmerod secluded in the Eifel mountains
- The group of 15 experts (10 flag officers, 5 staff officers, 4 of the participants came from
the Gehlen organization, Heusinger, Hermann Foertsch, Alfred Schulze-Hinrichs,
Eberhard Graf von Nostitz) met 5 – 9 October 1950
- Highlight of the first day was the situation briefing provided by Heusinger, who had
prepared himself for months with the help of his staff and the intelligence material of the
evaluation division of the ORG
- Their independent “Himmerod Memorandum” has been called by some the “Magna
Charta of German Rearmament”
- Despite some time-limited thoughts it describes in clear language the new type of German
Armed Forces as part of a democratic state, embedded in a Western treaty organization on
the basis of equality with the aim to guarantee peace through deterrence9
The establishment of the Blank bureau
- End of October 1950 Schwerin is dismissed and the “Center of Homeland Services” is
reorganized under new leadership, the Christian Democratic politician and labor leader
Theodor Blank
- Adenauer directs the establishment of the new department in the chancellery effective 26
October 1950 with the ominous title “Office of the Chancellor for Questions Related to
the Increase of Allied Troops” (Beauftragter/Büro des Bundeskanzlers für die mit der
Vermehrung der allierten Truppen zusammenhängenden Fragen)
- This clandestine and cryptic title was necessary because allied regulations officially
forbade that Germans would plan or work towards rearmament, unofficially the allies not
only tolerated but advanced rearmament planning
- Heusinger left the Gehlen organization after completion of the “Petersberg Talks”, which
were the first official talks with the Allies in early 1951
- He advanced to Adenauer’s Chief Military Advisor
- Adenauer could not have found a better man, who as evaluation chief of the ORG was
best informed about the military situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
- The Blank Bureau is the forerunner of the German Ministry of Defense, which was
officially established 7 June 1956 with Blank as the first Minister of Defense
The ORG and its influence on West German Rearmament planning
Organisational aims
- American support for Gehlen and his organisation was to some degree motivated by the
thought to assemble those qualified and able general staff officers, which might be useful
for future employment
- Gehlen entertained the same idea and invited willing staff officers into the ORG forming
in essence the largest personnel pool of general staff officers at the ORG HQ in Pullach
- These officers were most able with planning and organisational tasks and less so with
intelligence collection tasks
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Georg Meyer, Adolf Heusinger, S. 416 ff.
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They found themselves in the evaluation division, the most famous example being its
chief 1948 – 1950, General Heusinger
Personnel selection
- The BND archives are so far not open concerning organisation and personnel selection of
the very early years
- I can only offer some prominent names of officers who worked for Gehlen and then
transferred to the Blank office from 1951 and to the Bundeswehr from 1956 onwards
- Adolf Heusinger, later Chief of Defence and Chairman of the NATO Military Committee
- Ernst Ferber, later Chief of the Army and COMAFCENT
- Heinz Günter Guderian, later General
- Armin Eck, later General and Chief of the MAD
- Josef Selmayr, later General and Chief of the MAD
- Gerhard Wessel, later General and Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence
- Albrecht Obermaier, later Admiral and COMNAVBALTAP
- Trummel, later Navy Captain and Cdr Naval Communications School
Studies and finished intelligence reporting
- From summer 1950 Gehlen liaised regularly with the State Secretary of the Chancellery
Hans Globke, through him the chancellor was briefed about important intelligence results
- September 1950 Gehlen reported to the chancellor for the first time and thereafter in
irregular sequences depending on the situation
- One example of many are briefings by Gehlen in October and November 1957 concerning
the Soviet missiles and nuclear weapons in the aftermath of the “Sputnik shock”10
- Adenauer had high confidence in Gehlen and angrily charged the Americans and the
German Defense Ministry that they had slept through these developments
- Commencing in January 1953 the chancellery and other concerned ministries received,
and I quote from a BND source: “the intelligence overview, a weekly written report of
finished intelligence based on its own source material”11
- Reading the available reports of finished intelligence there can be no doubt that these
reinforced Adenauer’s convictions about the dangers of the Cold War and the Soviet
military potential as well as the potential of the East German “People’s Army” and its
accelerated build-up at a time when West Germany was kept defenseless
Gehlen uses his political influence to shape West German security policy
- Gehlen utilized his political network from 1950 onwards to assure that his organisation
would be transferred into the Federal Service
- He schemed against everybody, whom he perceived as opponent, amongst them Otto
John, the first Chief of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, the
domestic counter-intelligence agency
- Another opponent was Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz, his small intelligence service was
disestablished on 29 September 1953
- It took a while and with cabinet decision on 11 July 1955 the ORG was scheduled to
transfer into the German Federal Service being subordinated to the chancellery
- Adenauer held Gehlen in high esteem for many years
- This changed dramatically with the Felfe-case 1961 and even more so during the so-called
Spiegel-affair in 1962, when Adenauer wanted Gehlen to be arrested for treason
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Schwarz, Adenauer: Der Staatsmann 1952 – 1967, S. 386/387
BArch, B 206/1974, p. 2
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The Klose squadron and the build-up of the FPB flotilla and the naval SIGINT
organisation
Operation Red Sox (CIA) and Jungle (MI 6) 1949 – 1955
- With the Operation Red Sox, the CIA air transported agents deep into the USSR and
parachuted them there. Many of the agents were selected and trained by the ORG.
However the operation was unsuccessful. The KGB counter-intelligence caught all agents,
sentenced them or in some cases returned them as “moles” to the West
- British MI 6 had fewer resources at their disposal and chose the cheaper sea transport to
land their agents in Courland. They established the Operation Jungle with the help of
German naval officer Hans Helmut Klose with the first agent transport and landing in
May 1949
- During phase one of Operation Jungle the improvised agent transport was executed with
the former German Fast Patrol Boat (FPB) S 208
- During phase two the second FPB S 130 was added in 1951. The now permanent
organisation was called British Baltic Fishery Protection Service12 as cover name
- During phase three new landing methods were developed utilizing balloons and Zodiac
landing boats with sophisticated electronic equipment for identification and direction
finding
- During phase four three newly built FPB’s, named Silvergull, Stormgull and Wild Swan,
replaced the old FPB’s. To secure the success of the operations detailed intelligence of the
landing sites was required. Initially the boats conducted optical reconnaissance, later on
COMINT/ELINT13 with US equipment and British and Gehlen organisation operators14
- All in all 13 landings of agents happened at the shores of Courland and Saarema during
the period 1949 - 1955. For two of these landings in 1950/51 Swedish intelligence
supplied the agents. Two groups of Polish agents were landed near Ustka (Stolpmünde) in
1952/53 with balloons. Klose’s FPB’s S 208 and Silvergull were never caught by the
Soviets, only one shooting incidence occurred with the FPB Wild Swan in 1955
- The maritime and intelligence operations of Hans Helmut Klose were very successful. In
contrast, the spying of the agents in Courland did not deliver the desired results. The KGB
caught all of the agents in the successful counter-intelligence operation “Lursen-S”
- The Organisation Gehlen had its own maritime intelligence group and planned its own
FPB-group with boats from the American LSU (B) for Baltic and Black Sea agent
transports, but despite tests and studies these operations did not materialize
- In 1956 all of the Klose-boats changed their ensign and formed the 1st FPB Squadron of
the German Navy, the Bundesmarine
- The squadron formed the core of the first surface warfare force of the German Navy,
which enlarged until 1968 to 52 FPB’s, the flotilla commanded by Hans Helmut Klose,
who ended his career as Vice Admiral and Commander of the German Fleet
- Most boat captains of the initial squadron reached flag rank in the German Navy
- German Naval SIGINT started as a volunteer organisation of former Kriegsmarine
intelligence personnel (B-Dienst) after the 1953 GDR-uprising, which together with the
Korean War accelerated West German efforts towards rearmament. Shortly after these
events former Kriegsmarine Admirals Friedrich Ruge and Gerhard Wagner from the
American Naval Historical Team negotiated the organisation of this volunteer SIGINT
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Hess, Sigurd, The British Baltic Fishery Protection Service (BBFPS) and the Clandestine Operations of Hans
Helmut Klose, International Journal of Intelligence History, Vol. 1, No. 2, LIT Verlag, Hamburg 2001
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COMINT, communications intelligence; ELINT, electronic intelligence for radar and telemetry signals; both
are summarized under SIGINT, signal intelligence
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Detailed records of their observations were hand pencilled on an Admiralty chart 1951 – 1954 for radars,
search lights, artillery, airports, and fishery areas for hiding and exercise areas, chart in the possession of the
author
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with the US Navy. With their assistance the US Naval Intelligence Detachment No 3 was
1955 established at Flensburg with German B-Dienst personnel15
The COMINT/ELINT operations of the Klose squadron as well as the volunteer group of
the former Kriegsmarine personnel formed the core of the new naval intelligence
organisation
Reinhard Gehlen constantly intervened with the now Chief of the Navy, Vice Admiral
Friedrich Ruge about responsibility for and execution of naval intelligence operations.
Whilst Gehlen considered all intelligence his responsibility, Ruge insisted on an
independent naval intelligence organisation
This service was established in 1957, enlarged over the years and found its final form in
1970 as Naval Communications Staff 7016
Conclusions and summary
- My thesis states that the large Gehlen ORG and the small Klose group influenced West
German rearmament considerably
- The small Klose group developed into the forerunner of the naval surface force, called
FPB Flotilla
- Through its SIGINT activities it assisted the foundation of the Naval Intelligence
Command
- These activities happened on the working level and accelerated naval material
procurement
- The Gehlen ORG operated from its beginning on the political level
- During his best days Gehlen was a skilful network builder who had excellent contacts
with the Americans as well with the slowly developing West German political
establishment
- From the personnel pool of general staff officers in the ORG, especially in the evaluation
division, transferred many to the Blank office and to the later Ministry of Defence
- The studies, aide-mémoires and memoranda of Generals Heusinger, Speidel, Foertsch and
others influenced West German rearmament planning as well as its integration into the
failed “West European Defence Union” and into NATO in a long drawn-out but in the end
successful process
- The detailed intelligence material for these study efforts came solely from the ORG
- Beginning in 1953 the weekly intelligence reports of the ORG were distributed to the
chancellery
- The Chancellor, who from the very beginning of his government, made sure that the
forerunners of the Foreign Office, the Defence Ministry and the Intelligence Agency were
part of his chancellery held Gehlen and his ORG in high esteem
- It was for this reason that Gehlen’s ORG converted to the Federal Intelligence Service at
the time when the Federal Republic regained its sovereignty, still with limitations but now
as an equal and accepted partner in NATO
- It is an intriguing facet of history, that a nearly complete division of the German Army
High Command and a small naval crew shortly after the end of the war joined their former
American and British enemies
- CIA and MI 6 financed, well looked after and protected them, however their emphasis
was working for the German post-war interests.
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Hess, Sigurd, The British Baltic Fishery Protection Service
Chronik Marinefernmeldestab 70 1956 – 1996, Leupelt KG, Jarplund-Weding 1996 (Naval Intelligence was
called Marine Funkaufklärungsgruppe, in 1960 Marine Fernmeldeabschnitt 7 and finally Marine Fernmeldestab
70)
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