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Feeling Blue:
The question of a contributing UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC
By
Robbin C. Looije
Student Number
3689891
Course
Research Seminar III
Date
February 1, 2013
Word Count
8633
Feeling Blue: The question of a contributing UN mission in the DRC
1
In respect to the many who sacrifice their lives daily in order to improve the living and security conditions of many
millions.
Robbin Looije
Onderzoeksseminar III
3689891
Dhr G.J.C. van den Borgh
Bachelor Thesis
Feeling Blue: The question of a contributing UN mission in the DRC
2
“Whatsoever thereof is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man, the same
consquent to the time wherein men live without other security than what their own strenth and their own
invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit
thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities
that may be imported by sea; no commodious building, no instruments of moving and removing such things
as require mcuch force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no
society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary,
poor, nasty, brutish and short.”
-Thomas HobbesLeviathan, Chapter VI1
1
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter VI, 1651
Robbin Looije
Onderzoeksseminar III
3689891
Dhr G.J.C. van den Borgh
Bachelor Thesis
Feeling Blue: The question of a contributing UN mission in the DRC
3
Map 1: The DRC and it’s Central African neighbourgs
Robbin Looije
Onderzoeksseminar III
3689891
Dhr G.J.C. van den Borgh
Bachelor Thesis
Feeling Blue: The question of a contributing UN mission in the DRC
4
Maps 2: The Kivu Provinces in Eastern Congo, bordering Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi
Robbin Looije
Onderzoeksseminar III
3689891
Dhr G.J.C. van den Borgh
Bachelor Thesis
Feeling Blue: The question of a contributing UN mission in the DRC
5
Introduction
In November 2012, as the Movement du Mars-23 , a split-off from the former CNDP militia, occupied
the city of Goma, the world again was amazed about the continuous violence in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC). While engulfing the capital of one of the most tumultuous and violent
provinces in the Congo, M 23 added another chapter to the seemingly unsolvable conflict in one of
the most problematic African countries. The fear of violence, sexual intimidation and kidnapping
again turned many civilians into refugees while armed UN forces stood by sightlessly and
motionlessly. International public opinion again turned itself against the United Nations Organization
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo(MONUSCO), as it was unable to deter
or even retain the rebel movement.
Being the world’s most important and respected IGO, the United Nations over the years has
become the largest contributor in peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping however, has evolved
enormously over time. In Contemporary Conflict Resolution, Ramsbotham et al. argue that the
concept of peacekeeping has emerged in the mid-1950s in response to the Suez crisis. The concept of
peacekeeping was contestable however, as it was not defined in the UN Charter, with chapter VI
allowing peaceful settlements of dispute, and Chapter VII allowing such on a more coercive basis. The
key principles of UN peacekeeping as they were firstly practiced in its United Nations Emergency
Force I (UNEF I)in Egypt in 1956,were based on consent of the conflicting parties, political neutrality,
impartiality, non-use of force except for self-defence, and legitimacy.2 With this first peacekeeping
mission, the foundations were laid for first-generation peacekeeping. With the exception of the
mission in Congo from 1960-1964, all thirteen first-generation peacekeeping operations dealt with
interstate warfare during the Cold war era. Lightly armed contingents of small, neutral nations in the
conflict were assigned to monitor ceasefire agreements and secure buffer zones to keep the warring
parties isolated.3 Due to this impartiality, UN traditional peacekeeping was accepted as a refereeing
force, as long as the status quo of the major powers was being maintained, small countries were
allowed for military involvement in exotic countries’ wars and bring violence to an end. After the
Cold War however, the cry for reform in UN peacekeeping became prominent in order to adapt and
answer the explosive accretion in dynamic, civil warfare.4
Second-generation peacekeeping was introduced after the end of the Cold War, when
political interests of major powers in third world countries changed and as a result thereof, violent
intrastate violent conflicts erupted, often based on ethno-nationalist sentiments. UN response was
ambitious and the organization increased the number of missions and exalted its peacekeeping
budget drastically. Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace has played an important part in this UN
reply. The second-generation concept of peacekeeping was extended with post-conflict peacebuilding, and as a result of UN reforms, chapter VII military involvement without consent of the
parties was now possible, if peaceful means would fail.5
2
Oliver Ramsbotham et al., Contemporary Conflict Resolution, Polity Press, (Cambridge, 2011), p. 149
Ibid, p. 150
4
Peter J. Fromuth, The making of a security community: the United Nations after the Cold War, Journal of
international affairs, vol. 46, No. 2, January 1993, p. 341-367; M.E.K. Neuheus, The United Nations’ Security
role at fifty-- the need for realism, Australian Journal of International Relations, Vol. 49, No. 2, November 1995,
p. 267-283
5
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace Preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peacekeeping, Report
of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on
31 January 1992, 17 June 1992
3
Robbin Looije
Onderzoeksseminar III
3689891
Dhr G.J.C. van den Borgh
Bachelor Thesis
Feeling Blue: The question of a contributing UN mission in the DRC
6
As Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace had influenced UN peacekeeping policy in the 1990s, so
did the Brahimi Report a decade later. UN peacekeeping had failed in the 1990s, but in order to
remain active in achieving a sustainable peace, the focus was shifted to longer-term peace-building,
in combination with a higher level of military robustness, while staying committed to the existing
international norms of legalization and representation. The traditional values of impartiality,
neutrality and non-use of force however, were no longer evident in resolving violent civil conflicts.6
Instead, military enforcement of peace, no longer based on post-agreement consensus became a
prominent tool in UN peace operations. Also, UN missions became increasingly operational not
under an overarching UN flag, but by regional organizations or single nation military interventions,
operating on behalf of the United Nations (I shall refer to this as hybrid-missions).7
UN peacekeeping thus has changed enormously in both size and scope over the last half
century. At first sight, this shift has not only been necessary since violent conflicts have altered its
social, cultural, economic and territorial impact over the last decades globally, but the question also
arises, whether these modifications in UN peacekeeping have been effective. UN missions nowadays
last longer, utilize more resources and cost more than they did in the first phase of UN conflict
resolution, but do these more robust and financially heavy-handed tools work indubitably?
By analysing one of the most protracted, expansive and comprehensive UN missions in UN
peacekeeping history, I shall try to find out what makes peacekeeping missions in its current form a
success or a failure. By analysing several sorts of critique on both UN peacekeeping in general and
the mission in the DRC case, I hope to show that things have in facts been improving, and change in
mission’s character has been absolutely necessary.
Apart from its size, costs and length, MONUC is a very interesting case as it has also been
part of the evolvements itself. It has been extended and expanded for several times and has been
granted more enforcing powers in the last decade. Therefore it is interesting to see if critique on
mission strategies of several years ago have been tackled by new policies or tactical improvements.
Also, the MONUC is one of the most criticized missions, as the DRC is still witnessing lots of violent
affairs in several violent epicentres.
In this first chapter I shall resort to the question what makes a failure in (UN) peacekeeping
and how several authors have regarded this question in light of peacekeeping history. In the second
chapter I shall introduce the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC, its mandate and its evolvement
over time. In the third chapter I shall show important criticism on the MONUC mission and explain
why these authors regard UN involvement in the DRC as a failure. Following this path in research, I
shall end by stating that the there are many reasons to regard modern UN peacekeeping as a highly
contestable involvement and that the results of either success or failure hardly outrun one another
and that depending on difficult contextual complexities, which have been merely partially solved by
adapting UN mandate and resources, the dependants for success or failure are features of a
peacekeeping mission on which consensus is barely possible .
6
William J. Durch et al, The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations, The Henry L. Stimson
Center, (Washington D.C., 2003), 139 p.
7
Ramsbotham et al., p. 155
Robbin Looije
Onderzoeksseminar III
3689891
Dhr G.J.C. van den Borgh
Bachelor Thesis
Feeling Blue: The question of a contributing UN mission in the DRC
7
The added value of UN Peacekeeping
UN peacekeeping since the 1990s has become a highly contestable affair. The thespian events in
Somalia, Rwanda, and the Former Yugoslavia had shocked the world and had shown the
shortcomings of the UN Department of Peacekeeping (UNDPKO). Even though the UN has tried to
overcome many of its flaws by a more aggressive stance in the twenty-first century peacekeeping
missions, there are still many criticizers who advert the UN to its invalidities. But first, in order to
analyze UN peacekeeping, it is important to define it and explain the difference between
peacekeeping and the concept of humanitarian intervention and its relation with the concept of the
Responsibility to Protect.
Even though a peacekeeping mission is an intervention in a third country by an international
coalition, not every humanitarian intervention ends as a peacekeeping mission. Humanitarian
interventions are based on two core principles: providing necessary survival assistance and
respecting human rights.8 This can often be done in a non-military form by supplying food, water,
medicine, professional knowledge, through diplomatic means, or by using economic mechanisms in
order to realize human rights standards.9 Even though scholars have not reached consensus about
the relationship between political interests and the successfulness of military humanitarian
involvement,10 let’s assume that humanitarian interventions are essentially based on humanitarian
values, and the willingness to end suffering of populations. These are often based on ad-hoc
decisions and short-term engagement directed against a state’s government, while modern
peacekeeping missions are based on long-term involvement, with the intention of creating a selfsustaining peace by changing attitudes and behaviour of both government and local communities .
According to Hoffmann and Nollkaemper, the concepts of military humanitarian intervention and UN
peacekeeping have been jointed in the concept Responsibility to Protect (R2P). R2P gives an new
answer to the ethical question how the international community should deal with international law
not allowing interference in a state’s domestic affairs on the one hand, and how it should deal with
violent oppression, civil ethnic cleansing, and other forms of excessive violence against citizenries.11
Using these concepts, we can focus on those scholars who criticize UN peacekeeping. It is
important to get a good understanding in when missions are regarded as successive or as failing.
Several scholars have proposed a framework in how to do this. Some of these researchers have
focused mainly on UN missions, but the United Nations have not been the only IGO involved in
peacekeeping operations. Regional organizations like the European Union and the African Union
have invested in peacekeeping interventions as well. Interestingly, of the many IGO’s active in
peacekeeping, or humanitarian intervention, Magnus Lundgren has concluded that those IGO’s who
are “highly institutionalized in the military dimension”, perform much better during civil war
8
Theo Farrell, Humanitarian interventions and peace operations, in: Strategy in the Contemporary World, ed.
by John Baylis et al., Oxford Press, (Oxford, 2002), p. 309
9
David P. forsythe, Human Rights in International Relations, Cambridge University Press (New York, 2012), p.
198-205
10
For instance; Mohammed Ayoob, Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty, International Journal of
Human Rights, Vol. 6, No. 1, (March, 2002), p. 81-102; and Nicolas J. Wheeler Decision-making Rules and
Procedures for Humanitarian Intervention, International Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 6, No. 1, (March, 2002),
p. 127-138: Ayoob argues humanitarian interventions should be free from political and economic interests,
while Wheeler contends intervention is merely successful if intervening countries have demonstrably political
and/or economic interests in the invaded country
11
Julia Hoffman & André Nollkaemper, Responsibility to Protect: from principle to practice, Amsterdam
University Press, (Amsterdam, 2012), p. 13
Robbin Looije
Onderzoeksseminar III
3689891
Dhr G.J.C. van den Borgh
Bachelor Thesis
Feeling Blue: The question of a contributing UN mission in the DRC
8
mediation than those who do not. Also, within organizations in which the states themselves hold the
most control over military decision-making, success is more likely.12 Lundgren does not explicitly
mention any IGO as efficient or inefficient, but regarding his conclusion that seemingly ‘neutral’
IGO’s, relying on member states’ delegation decision-making and independent mandates do not
perform as likely as one might expect, UN peacekeeping in general seems to be less effective than
other IGO’s.
As for those scholars who have focussed on defining success or failure, Taylor B. Seybolt
proposes probably the most simplistic argument in how to define success or failure. Based on the
number of lives saved by intervening in a conflict, related to the number of casualties that would
have been without intervention, one can easily conclude whether a mission has been a success or
not. 13 Of course, there are some obstructions to this argument. First, calculating the numbers of
casualties and the numbers of lives saved, is doubtful and hard to gain consensus about. Secondly,
Seybolt also suggests this parameter could be generally used by any IGO involved in peacekeeping or
humanitarian interventions. Thirdly, Seybolt argues that using this framework mission evaluation is
only useful for short-term evaluation.14 To define success in UN peacekeeping, Seybolt’s framework is
thus unfit, as the essential parameter is too hard to calculate, the differences between any actor’s
humanitarian intervention and UN peacekeeping are too evident, and this then also results in other
political requirements and set goals
Upgrading UNPKOs from traditional peacekeeping into peace enforcement missions through
extending mandates and resources – including firepower – may have created situations in which
more coercive UN forces have become a highly influential and potentially violent actor in the conflict,
Thakur and Schnabel argue. This evolution of peacekeeping would not have improved the UN’s ability
to resolve civil wars, let alone create sustainable peace.15 It is important to realize that
Thakur and Schnabel have introduced their arguments in 2001, right after the publication of the
Brahimi Report and when UN interventionism was on the brink of reforming into third-generation
peace-enforcement. Thakur and Schnabel however, had their doubts about the ongoing or
foreseeable processes of increase in military power deployment for regional organizations, the
abasement of state sovereignty and the amplification of major powers’ interests in IGO’s.16 Even
though these assumptions seem partially credible and in those days likely, they have not become a
total reality. Thakur and Schnabel did not oppose the growing concern within the international
community for conflict intervention and –prevention, but they were afraid that decision-making
would remain ad hocery and that the influence of daily politics and individual state’s interest would
predominate amongst the decisive organs of IGO’s.17
David M. Malone shared these concerns, as an enormous change in the complexity of
peacekeeping would be noticeable in the second- and third generation UN missions. As firstgeneration missions focused solely on military presence and refereeing, second and especially third12
Civil War Mediation by International Organizations: Institutional Design and Effectiveness, Stockholm
University Department of Political Science,(Stockholm, 2012), 26 p.
13
Taylor B. Seybolt’s Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure, Oxford
University Press, (New York, 2008), p. 7
14
Ibid, p. 15
15
Albert Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur, From an Agenda for Peace to the Brahimi Report: Towards a new era of
UN peace operations, in: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad hoc missions, Permanent engagement,
ed. By R.C. Thakur and A. Schnabel, United Nations University Press, (New York, 2001), p. 238-255
16
Ibid
17
Ibid
Robbin Looije
Onderzoeksseminar III
3689891
Dhr G.J.C. van den Borgh
Bachelor Thesis
Feeling Blue: The question of a contributing UN mission in the DRC
9
generation missions rely on large contingents of civil, humanitarian and medical personnel. The
combination of creating a mixed military-civilian force of professionals, combining peaceenforcement with peace-building, would simply be too composite for the UNSC to monitor,
administer, and control. Malone argued that the UNSC overestimated its possibilities, which in
combination with an underestimation of the conflict’s ravel, sometimes may prove lethal.18
In understanding peacekeeping Bellamy et al. also do not criticize the intentions of the
Brahimi Report, but the implementation of the changes was far from sufficient. As an improvement
was made in the authorization of more specific and clear mandates and rapid deployment of small
troop numbers, little progress was made in gathering sufficient numbers of trained forces in the highrisk missions and in maintaining good relationships with its member states, especially the Troop
Contributing Countries (TCC’s).19 Relating to this, Bellamy and Williams contend that the Brahimi
Report has however again caused to increase the number of TCC’s within the United Nations. Even
though the Western countries’ share in UNPKO’s has diminished enormously since, Bellamy and
Williams do not give a patent explanation for this, except for the increase in ‘hybrid’ missions,
involving more and more African and Asian states as suppliers of troops and civilian personnel. Even
though Bellamy and Williams believe this may in the long run become a problem for the UN’s
legitimacy to deploy missions, but also in securing and protecting peace in general, they see this
hybrid form as a realization of the UN’s ability to both operate within a global sphere, without
explicitly championing western ideals. Also, they do believe hybrid missions have many operational
benefits, making it currently the most appropriate and probable form of conflict containment.20
Criticism on UNPKO in general, does not focus much on the evolution of the concept of UNPKO’s.
Most critique comes from scholars, journalist or other sceptics who are well informed in a single
conflict in which the UN operates, or who criticize the legitimacy and ‘eurocentricism’ within UN
ranks. Less critique however, focuses on general UN peacekeeping policy in general and how to
define a successful mission. Exceptions of course, do exist. In the debate concerning the
successfulness of a mission, Call and Cousens have introduced a framework which shows a
maximalist, moderate and minimalist view on how to interpret success. To a maximalist, Call and
Cousens contend, a peacekeeping mission has been effective if the root causes of the conflict have
been tackled. This means that a relapse into war is no longer likely. The moderate version of
successfulness focuses on no renewed warfare, plus a moderate form of governance. Minimalists
belief that a mission has been serviceable only when there is no direct renewed warfare. War
recurrence is thus an important factor in the definition of success, but the views on how to achieve
this and for which period of time a mission should be held responsible, differs.21
Downs and Stedman for instance, argue that the best measurable way to regard
international intervention as a success is to observe the end of violence and the effectuation of a
self-sustainable peace. How this ought to be done depends on two variables: the willingness of the
international community to get involved, and the complexity of the conflict in question. The
international community’s interest depends mainly on the political and economic interests of the
18
Elizabeth M. Cousens, Conflict Prevention, in: The UN Security Council, from the Cold War to the 21 st Century,
ed. By David M. Malone, Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., (London, 2004), p. 101-116; and David M. Malone, ibid,
619-620
19
Alex J. Bellamy et al., Understanding Peacekeeping, Polity Press, (Cambridge, 2004), 133-136
20
Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, The West and Contemporary Peace Operations, Journal of Peace
Research, Vol. 46, No. 1, (2009), p. 39-57
21
Charles T. Call & Elizabeth M. Cousens, Ending wars and building peace, International Peace Acadamy, (New
York, March 2007), 21 p.
Robbin Looije
Onderzoeksseminar III
3689891
Dhr G.J.C. van den Borgh
Bachelor Thesis
Feeling Blue: The question of a contributing UN mission in the DRC
10
major powers in the conflict-shattered state. The complexity of the conflict can be evaluated by the
number of spoilers opposing peace(settlements), the concern of neighbouring countries regarding
peace in the state and the probability of the exploitation of valuable commodities.22 Downs and
Stedman make the distinction through these variables because they believe that other authors treat
any civil war as equally difficult to end. Contextual factors and how peacekeeping policymakers deal
with these, Downs and Stedman believe, can affect the process of peacekeeping and peace-building
enormously. For instance, in conflicts based on ethno-nationalist tempers, the question how to deal
with refugees during a ceasefire should be approached apparently differently than in conflicts based
on politically repressive violence.
Predicating a mission’s successfulness upon whether violence has been stopped and a selfsustaining peace has been established seems logical. But contemplating their own beliefs in a
contextual approach per mission strategically, rejecting a one-size-fits all approach, one wonders
why the authors do not believe in factors of success depending upon the mission’s contextual
factors. It seems logical using Downs and Stedman’s approach, that a mission’s successfulness would
best be measured by specific contextual parameters. Still, they do give us a realistic and measurable
framework in which the dependants of achievements can be gauged.
According to Lise Morjé Howard, UN Peacekeeping missions have been more successful
when certain “preconceived notions about how the mission should unfold”23 were absent. She
contends that success is much more likely when mission personnel on the grounds implements its
mandate based on analyses of local dynamics. Involvement and input from local communities will
help UN forces – both civilian and military – to understand the problems and use the resources
provided better and more efficient. She interprets the missions in El Salvador and Mozambique as
demonstrably successful because UN staff has based less on UN headquarters’ information and has
taken more initiative itself.24 This is a resourceful hypothesis, and her arguments are consistent, but
not very staunch. It sounds plausible that some cultures are more fruitful for peacekeeping missions,
but by believing that the initiative of ground forces has been the predominate factor is a little farfetched, as she eludes contextual factors like the conflict complexity, local cultural factors and their
reaction to UN forces, and the varying nationalities and cultures within UN forces.
In the extension of Howard’s explanation for success stands Roland Paris’ argument that
peacekeeping has focused too much on the creation of democratization and marketization of states
that have been prone to civil war. The dominant ‘liberal peace thesis’ that exists especially amongst
the North-American and European democracies, but also amongst United Nations’ policymakers, is
too focused on transforming war-torn countries into functioning nations with an efficient state
apparatuses, that the question how to do this is being neglected. Core argument in Paris’ statement
is that countries undergoing this transition are especially vulnerable to the relapse of conflict and
that within the existing peacekeeping culture, organizations know too little about the
(re)construction of state institutions and functioning organs. Peace-building as it has acted during the
1990s, was too focused on the transition of a civil war state into a westernized democracy.
Opportunist Westerners, Paris believes, have blurred “the distinction between liberalism and
22
Georg Downs & Stephen John Stedman, Evaluating Implementation Strategies, in: Ending civil War, ed. by
Stephen John Stedman, Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., (Colorado, 2002), p 43-71
23
Lise Morjé Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars, Cambridge University Press, (Cambridge, 2008), p.3
24
Ibid,,p. 327
Robbin Looije
Onderzoeksseminar III
3689891
Dhr G.J.C. van den Borgh
Bachelor Thesis
Feeling Blue: The question of a contributing UN mission in the DRC
11
liberalization”25. He does not stride with the concept that democracies have hardly been known to
declare war to both each other and within their own territories, but that the strife to create
democratization is not as easy a task as some might realize. Parallel to the Western political realm
demanding democratization is the economic demand to marketize former civil war states into active
actors in global market capitalism. These two interests demand the recreation functioning states too
soon and too swiftly.
Peacekeeping in the DRC
The UN have experienced the involvement in peacekeeping with mixed success. Every single mission
has had its unique surroundings, actors, preferable outcome and other specific contextual factors. So
in order to analyze any single mission’s critique, background information about the research case
needs to be introduced.
MONUC was constituted in 1999 through United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution
1258, originally named the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Following the Second Congo War which started in August 1998, MONUC was allowed to act as
contact liaisons for the different parties negotiating in the Lusaka Peace Accords, providing detailed
security information in Congolese territory and planning the expected monitoring ceasefire mission,
MONUC started as a small non-armed mission of 90 UN officers.26 In April 2000 however, under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the first military forces were deployed in the DRC, acting as a
monitoring force for the ceasefire and observing the withdrawal of foreign troops.27
Despite the presence of MONUC – and later MONUSCO – the violent conflict in the DRC was
anything but resolved. The Second Congo War came to an official end in Summer 2002 with the
signing of the Pretoria and Luanda Accords and the proclamation of the Transitional Government,
which had given a temporary administrative function until the 2006 election would take place. Even
though many formerly armed groups were allowed political representation in the Transitional
Government of the DRC, armed conflict prevailed. Rwandan and Ugandan forces, who had seized half
of Congolese territory during the war, had retracted under the eyes of MONUC. Still, the Rwandese
government re-engaged in the DRC by stimulating and arming militias.28 The new government was
unable to control the huge territory of the DRC and incapable of securing its borders for both foreign
interventions and precious mineral extraction and smuggling. In the eastern district of Ituri, the Kivu
provinces and Katanga region, more than 3000 kilometers away from the capital Kinshasa, the
undisciplined and untrained governmental Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
(FARDC) were unable to secure its own population from ethnic lashing, dissipate foreign armed
groups like the FDLR (Forces Democratic for the Liberation of Rwanda), RCD-Goma (Rally for
Congolese Democracy – Goma section), and LRA (Lord’s Resistance Army) or tackle the illegal
exploitation of its natural resources. As the DRC transited from the epicenter of the ‘Great African’
25
Roland Paris, At War’s End:Building Peace after Civil Conflict, Cambridge University Press, (Cambridge, 2004),
p. 51
26
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1258, August 6, 1999
27
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1291, February 24, 2000
28
Author unknown, The Kivus: The forgotten Crucible of the Congo Conflict, International Crisis Group,
(Brussels/Nairobi, 24 January 2003)
Robbin Looije
Onderzoeksseminar III
3689891
Dhr G.J.C. van den Borgh
Bachelor Thesis
Feeling Blue: The question of a contributing UN mission in the DRC
12
interstate war into a dramatically complex intrastate conflict, MONUC had to adapt to these
dynamics in order to guarantee a success in peacekeeping.
Peace still seemed afar by October 2005, three years after the peace settlements.
Continuous violence in the eastern regions still obstructed a peaceful existence to many, causing
approximately 1000 deadly casualties a day to war and war-related diseases and malnourishment.29
Even though in 2005, the MONUC force was 16,000 strong, 2006 is seen as the year in which UNSC
strengthened and increased MONUC mandate. In the year of the first elections since 1960, the DRC
was an uncontrolled, ungoverned and violent territory in which the availability of arms and security
sector incapability and corruption required the UN to take different measures. With EUFOR RD
Congo, the second EU-UN operation was deployed in order to assist MONUC during the election
periods and to not let political violence explode during election days, or after communication of the
results.30 Apart from this operation, several troop redeployments from the ONUB (United Nations
Operation in Burundi) were mandated,31 plus another 916 military personnel in 2006.32
After a relative calmly electoral process, Joseph Kabila, former president of the Transitional
Government, was declared officially elected president of the Democratic Republic of Congo on
December 6, 2006. With a 58% vote in the first round and his coalition having achieved majority in
both houses of representatives, it seemed like the DRC could finally profit from a politically stable
environment and work towards peace-building and reconstruction from thereon. 2007 in this case
was a decisive year and patience and determination finally seemed to be rewarded. The UNSC
extended MONUC’s mandate and even though it did not increase its powers or numbers, MONUC
seemed to be dealing with the situation well, because the amounts of violence reported waned.33
Large parts of the DRC were becoming more peaceful, but especially in North Kivu there was still no
reason to be optimistic, as fights resumed in Summer 2007.
Since 2007, large parts of Congo have been free from open fighting and are being secured by
MONUC. Due to international pressure the DRC government and rebel leaders have started peace
talks several times, with mixed results. Also, due to increasing bilateral agreements and better
contacts between Kinshasa and the Rwandan capital Kigali, military campaigns to detect and
neutralize illegally armed forces have increased. Again, because of international investments, these
have had some, however faulty results.34 The number of forces since 2007 have hardly increased and
while Kinshasa denies its reliance on MONUSCO louder and louder by the day, and as critics on
MONUSCO increase, its continuation in June 2013 is far from certain.35
29
Author unknown, A Congo Action Plan, International Crisis Group, (Brussels/Nairobi, 19 October 2005)
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1654, January 31, 2006
31
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1669, April 10, 2006; and UNSC Resolution 1711, September 29,
2006
32
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1736, December 22, 2006
33
Author unknown, Congo: Staying engaged after the elections, International Crisis Group, (Brussels/Nairobi,
January 9, 2007); and Author unknown, Congo: Consolidating the Peace, International Crisis Group,
(Brussels/Nairobi, July 5, 2007)
34
UN Reports on MONUC, Twenty-fourt report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization
Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, November 14, 2007
35
Theo Neethling, Toward the End of UN peacekeeping in the DRC, Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice,
Vol. 23, No. 1, p. 191-198
30
Robbin Looije
Onderzoeksseminar III
3689891
Dhr G.J.C. van den Borgh
Bachelor Thesis
Feeling Blue: The question of a contributing UN mission in the DRC
13
Critique on MONUC
Many scholars have criticized MONUC over the years of its operation. For several reasons,
researchers, scholars and journalists have used varying arguments and commented why MONUC
should be regarded as a failure. Some of these are based on performances by MONUC in its field of
operation, some are based on internal UN dynamics, which have caused MONUC difficulties through
the UN’s organizational structures. All the criticizers I will present in the next chapter however, all
have dedicated the core of their research on MONUC’s performances or results. Of course, there are
numerous problems that the DRC has to overcome in order to become a peaceful country and many
of these are not entirely within MONUC’s sphere of influence. But I would like to focus mainly on the
critiques for which MONUC or UN organs providing MONUC with information or instructions can be
deemed responsible. Therefore, questions about the legitimacy of MONUC have not been taken into
account. Also, discussions about other western-based institutions like the IMF, the ICC, or numerous
Western donors in the form of individual governments or NGOs and their influence on the DRC’s
peace- and state building process, have been overlooked deliberately. These actors may affect the
process of sustainable peace and even civil and political attitudes towards UN peacekeepers.
However, these actors do not sojourn within MONUC’s domain of responsibility and the UNPKO in
the DRC should therefore not be discredited on any factors beyond their reach.
The first critique I would like to show comes from July Rynaert. She has written a report on
MONUC’s protection of civilians in the DRC. Even though she has focused only on the Kivu provinces
– the region which has been subject to violence the most -, she does emphasize the difficulties of
MONUC in the larger Congolese area in general. Having interviewed both civilians and UN personnel,
to her it becomes clear that MONUC is no up to the task of securing innocent civilians and refugees
from ongoing violence in the area.36 Reynaert imputes the failure of MONUC due to a combination of
factors; the size of the country and the lack of infrastructure, the enormous gap in resources
available and needed, the petulant attitude of the DRC government, and the vagueness of the
mandate. Despite these shortcomings she also emphasizes the enormous efforts taken by MONUC
forces in the Congolese territory, and the importance of their presence on the ground even as a
deterring factor for militias interested in harming civilians. According to Reynaert, several strategic
security mechanisms have been developed over the years, improving civilian security efficiency. In
contrast with others, Reynaert thereby rejects MONUC’s total failure due to its lack of attitude, vision
or willpower.37 She is not the only one however, who enacts MONUC’s failure in securing Congolese
civilians and its internally displaced persons from mass violence, looting and rape. Others have
determined MONUC’s inability to prevent ethic violence, its impotence in forestalling foreign militias
to cross the Congolese borders, and MONUC’s dysfunctional and inconsistent cooperation with the
FARDC.38 Others emphasize the Congo’s vastly large territory with continental proportions, its
impenetrable jungles and other conflict-specific aspects as to why MONUC should be labelled a
36
Julie Reynaert, MONUC/MONUSCO and civilian protection in the Kivus, IPIS interns and volunteers series,
(Antwerp, 2011), 48 p
37
For example Kisangani N.F. Emizet, The massacre of Refugees in Congo: A Case of UN Peacekeeping failure
and International law, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 38, No. 2, (July 2000), p. 163-202; and Anna
Ridout, Peacekeeping forces fail to protect Congolese, New Internationalist, Vol. 0, No. 443, (June 2011), p. 1215
38
For example Erin Weir & Peter Orr, Refugee International report on the United Nations Organization in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo MONUC DR Congo: Local Communities on the Front Line, Refuguees
International, April 25, 2012
Robbin Looije
Onderzoeksseminar III
3689891
Dhr G.J.C. van den Borgh
Bachelor Thesis
Feeling Blue: The question of a contributing UN mission in the DRC
14
failure. These also include the important roles neighbouring states play, their reliance on illegal trade
in gold, diamonds and minerals, and their support to armed rebel groups, an inevitable result of the
porous state borders.39 In short, many perceive the complexity of the DRC’s conflict as the reason
that MONUC is unable to make a difference - neither as a neutral mediator, nor as a coercive
peacemaker and therefore a failure. Some researchers even blame the mentality of UN personnel.
Non-western ground forces would not be suited as peacekeepers, because training and humanitarian
idealism is not understood amongst troops from Latin American or Asian countries as well as by their
European or North-American equivalents. This has resulted in MONUC peace-enforcers becoming
violators of their own, as MONUC soldiers have been known for looting, pillaging and even raping
themselves.40
Still, in light of this inability, research amongst Congolese civilians has shown that in the most
parts of the DRC, the Congolese population did appreciate the presence of MONUC. Despite the
many limitations of the MONUC forces, in the volatile East Congolese were incredibly thrilled with
the presence of UN forces, in stark contrast to some West-Congolese urban areas. Especially in the
Kinshasa region, foreign interference in ‘their’ conflict has been conceived as a neo-imperial form of
maintain the West-periphery dichotomy in governmental and economic restrictions. But as said,
those vulnerable to random atrocities in the violent regions, believe the presence of UN
peacekeeping forces can make a difference.41
Still, criticizing the MONUC force based on an accumulation of external conditions and
isolated incidents does not show us the grassroots problem of the missions and when or where its
implementation may have went wrong. Articles such as those by Reynaert do show us that the
MONUC mission in the DRC is far from succeeding, but it does not provide us relevant insights in
which structural improvements should be made operationally, technically or logistically.
Of course much critique is also given on UN-provided mandates. These come apparent in
two sorts. On the one hand it focuses on the unclear procuring responsibilities for the forces on the
ground in their goals. The comments on MONUC’s mandate are highly understandable due to the
ever expanding UN mandate, simply adapting its goals, strategies, personnel and resources to the
situation of conflict, territorial occupation by violent actors and the degree of violence. Since MONUC
has officially been established in 1999, it has transformed from a neutral monitoring force in an
interstate war into a highly coercive, peace-enforcing mission, with a series of new tasks attributed,
including prioritizing civilian and refugee protection, election monitoring42, securing Congolese
politicians, Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration (DDR) of armed militiamen, and Security
Sector Reform (SSR) of the Congolese army.43 With a constant change in mandate and goals, also the
number of troops increased drastically. The 5,537 military personnel who arrived in the DRC in 2000,
have gradually been reinforced, resulting into a current strength of 19,154 uniformed personnel.
39
For example: Gerrie Swart, No War, No Peace in the Volatile East, Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice,
Vol. 0, No. 123, p. 144-153; and Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo, International Interventionism, Democacy, and
peace-buidling in the Great Lakes of Africa: A regional Perspective to the Challenges, African and Asian Studies,
Vol. 4, No. 1-2, (December 2005), 29 p
40
Nathalie Gilliard, Peacekeepers or perpetrators? An analysis of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) by UN
Personnel in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mapping Politics, Vol. 3, No. 0, (2010-2011), p. 26-34
41
Emeric Rogier, MONUC and the challenges of peace implementation of the DRC A participants perspective,
in: The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ed. By: Mark Malan and João Gomes Porto, ISS
Research, (2011), 290 p.
42
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1565, October 1, 2004
43
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1533, March 12, 2004
Robbin Looije
Onderzoeksseminar III
3689891
Dhr G.J.C. van den Borgh
Bachelor Thesis
Feeling Blue: The question of a contributing UN mission in the DRC
15
Uncertainty, confusion and contradictions about interpreting mandates amongst UN forces however,
make the mission to some a deemed failure. 44
The other critique relating to MONUC’s mandate is due to what I call, its ‘paradox of power’.
MONUC has been given so much enforcing power that it is allowed to subvert the DRC’s state
sovereignty. In military action, humanitarian and medical care, and peace building, the DRC is reliant
on the UN and the UN can simply enforce its will on the DRC in some aspects. By enforcing the DRC
and by taking actions seemingly necessary to the international community, MONUC may execute
actions obliging its own short-term goals, which may eventually backfire the DRC’s national long-term
interests. 45
Victotoria K. Holt and Thomas C. Berkman have written a book about UN mandates and
criticize the mandate provided for MONUC by the UNSC. In an impervious exposition about how the
concept of R2P has been (mis)used by UNPKO’s, they also focus on howR2P has been incorrectly
implemented in the MONUC mandate and that the attitudes of officials were too diverse to allow the
concept of R2P to be effective. Also, the mandates’ focus on R2P were insufficient in taking into
account the enormous geographical implications of the mission, its required firepower and training
of UN servicemen.46
“MONUC (…) demonstrates issues of protection when peacekeepers operate with differing
understandings of their mandate and ROE [Rules of Engagement], with national caveats and
varying preparation, with dissimilar views on the use of force, and with mandates that shift from
Chapter VI to Chapter VII.”47
Even though Holt and Berkman agree that MONUC is a perfect example of the UN’s
willingness to protect, in its deficiency in performance thereof, the UN seems to be learning too
slowly and has not been able to adapt its resources and attitudes in manners which will increase the
mission’s productivity. In addition to the ‘paradox of power’, they believe that MONUC is trapped in
a problem case concerning ethical questions like state sovereignty and the responsibility to protect
civilians. Holt and Berkman explain it as followed:
“When a state is on the verge of failure or recovering from a conflict, like the DRC, the division
between its responsibilities and those of a UN peace operation are blurred. The UN must
continuously balance between taking responsibility for protecting the Congolese populace,
offering support to the political process, and cooperating with the government.”48
Holt and Berkman conclude that the ineffectiveness in civilian security is only partially to be blamed
on lack of strategic vision. The real problems lie deeper and are caused by unclear mandates and
interpretative grey areas of ordinance, emphasized by the internationally hailed concept of R2P, but
residing on little concrete mechanisms or parameters.
44
For example Clifford Bernath & Anne Hedgerton, Refugee International report on the United Nations
Organization in the Democratic Republic of the Congo MONUC: Flawed Mandate Limits Success, Refugee
International, (London, 2003), 29 p.; and Victoria K. Holt, the military and civilian protection: developing roles
and capacities, Humanitarian Policy Group, (London, 2006), 4 p.
45
For example Zareen Iqbal, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): MONUC’s impending withdrawal,
international institute for justice and development, (Boston, 2010), 4p.
46
Victoria K. Holt and Thomas C. Berkman, The impossible mandate? Military preparedness, the responsibility
to protect and modern peace operations, the Henry L. Stimson Center, (Washington DC, 2006), p. 155-178
47
Ibid, p. 155
48
Ibid, p. 178
Robbin Looije
Onderzoeksseminar III
3689891
Dhr G.J.C. van den Borgh
Bachelor Thesis
Feeling Blue: The question of a contributing UN mission in the DRC
16
In The Trouble with the Congo, Séverine Autesserre explains the continuing problems in the
DRC and MONUC’s ineffectiveness due to the existing international community’s peacekeeping
culture. She explains that within this international community, which embraces national
governments, but also IGO- and NGO officials, the existing ‘culture’ within this domain of
international interventionism is the problem. Since all these diplomats, ambassadors, secretaries,
ministers and military officers do not understand the dynamics of local culture, politics and justice,
the focus of officials has been mainly on macro-level factors. She argues that due to the experience
in interstate warfare and peacekeeping, training of officials and focus of reconciliation has hardly
been based on how to achieve local-level settlements and agreements. As tribal warfare, ethnic
conflicts and other forms of intrastate wars will eventually jeopardize peace on a national or even
regional level, it is important to understand them. To secure a sustainable peace on a national level,
local conflicts should be addressed and avoided before macro-level conflicts can be dealt with.49
Just like Autesserre, another author has dug deep into the Congo’s culture and society, trying
to reveal how this state has modified under influence and under pressure of the international
alliance, parallelizing the modern peacekeeping mission with Congo’s colonial and post-colonial era.
Alex Veit states in his ethnographical work, encompassing many districts in the DRC, that longexisting, local power-relations are hardly being affected by the international endeavour to alter these
systems. He claims that even though the Belgian colonial administration is mainly to blame for
creating administrative systems in which ethnic divergence was emphasized, the Congo also had a
culture of ethnic violence and tribal warfare in the pre-colonial era, intercommunicated through
these power-related traditions. The remnants of pre-colonial African culture, combined with the
leftovers from the Belgian legacy, have created a climate in which the accent is overwhelmingly on
the local power-relations, making the subordination to an overarching, modern ‘nation-state’ extra
difficult. 50
In addition to the matter of reconstruction of state institutions, MONUC has not been
efficiently mutating DRC’s state institutions as well, some critics say. Reforming the security sector
for instance, has been ineffective and unsustainable because of ongoing violence and state
corruption, making the FARDC an undisciplined and non-feared opponent for militias, but an anxiety
for local populations.51 Also concerning DDR, MONUC has not achieved up to its expectations.52 The
process of DDR, in which trained rebels are modified into small scale farmers, craftsmen, or even
disciplined FARDC military servicemen, was initiated by the UN and mandated to MONUC. It has been
however, partially taken over by other actors, who did not turn it into a glorifying success. Despite its
numbers – around 185,000 combatants took part in the process, an estimated 65% of the total
number of rebels – and more than 100,000 were disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated, practical
problems regarding finance, facilitation and logistics did not turn it into a smooth process. Also, the
first phase of DDR, which started in November 2004, had to be terminated before it officially ended,
due to fierce fighting and unwillingness of rebel movements to continue cooperation by December
49
Séverine Autesserre, Trouble with the Congo, Cambridge University Press, (Cambridge, 2010), p. 10
Alex Veit, Intervention as indirect Rule: Civil War and Statebuilding in the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Campus Verlag GMBH, (Frankfurt am Main, 2010), p. 240-244
51
For example Chantal Daniels, MONUC remains to be actively seized on the matter? MONUC and SSR in the
Kivu Provinces, Master thesis Radboud University Nijmegen, (Nijmegen, 2009), 165 p.
52
For example Tatiana Carayannis, The Challenge of Building Sustainable Peace in the DRC, Centre for
Humanitarian Dialogue, (Geneve, 2009), 15 p.
50
Robbin Looije
Onderzoeksseminar III
3689891
Dhr G.J.C. van den Borgh
Bachelor Thesis
Feeling Blue: The question of a contributing UN mission in the DRC
17
2006.53 But the biggest problem concerning the reintegration of former rebels, lies within the
communities. Being frightened of continuous fighting and violence, Congolese civilians did not have
much trust in former rebels, nor FARDC forces, for long. The DDR process, critics argue, unfortunately
also abated the confidence in the MONUC peacekeepers, as both policy makers and MONUC’s DDR
executives have hardly considered or taken into account the cultural and social implications of
reintegration and the identity process for individuals and the community. Local traditions and
western liberal solutions seem to collide in the context of reintegration and conflict reconciliation
when used in this specific form.54
SSR is another tool used by MONUC in order to rebuild state organs, in this case the FARDC.
SSR does not only go hand in hand with DDR, but is also dependent on a well executed DDR process.
In the DRC, an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 ex-combatants were to be trained and redeployed as part
of the FARDC. However, as rebel movements have negotiated and demanded that their excombatants ought to be deployed in their former areas of combat, FARDC recruits were likely to be
under enormous pressure to return to their former rebel leaders. SSR also struggles with many
practical concerns, like construction of mixed battalions including former antagonists, individual
bilateral agreements with Western countries who all want their own influence – especially the USA,
France and Belgium-, and therefore, lack of coordination.55 This haziness in which role MONUC has to
play is exactly one the largest flaws in SSR. We should remember that SSR is not a task assigned to
MONUC per se, but that MONUC only is partially responsible for the execution. Roles however, have
to be underlined more clearly and MONUC should assign itself the tasks for which it is suited, namely
catalyst and facilitator, critics argue.56
Same accounts for the political role that MONUC has to play. Ingrid Samset, researcher for
the Norwegian Chr. Michelsen Institute, writes that the Congolese government believes it is time for
MONUC to vacate the country as soon as possible and leave the construction of national institutions
and a non-violent tradition to the national authorities. UN officials are doubtful about the Congolese
willingness and ability thereof. While Kinshasa is already busy ‘building’ peace, MONUC is still trying
to ‘make’ one. Here lie different understandings in what ought to be done and logically also about
the usefulness of a UNPKO constantly violating Kinshasa’s sovereignty.57
As I have tried to show, there are many sorts of critique on MONUC and why the UN mission
in the DRC should be regarded as a failure. We should not forget however, that MONUC was
definitely no instant failure, as it had secured the Pretoria and Luanda Peace Accords in Summer
2002, which ended the Second Congo War. MONUC observed and guided the Ugandan and Rwandan
armies on their withdrawal in a rather sophisticated, valuable and safe manner. 58 As we have seen
however, the problems of the intrastate war in the DRC, causing- and affected by spillovers from
53
Henri Boshoff, Completing the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration process of armed groups in the
Democratic Republic of Congo and the link to security sector reform of FARDC, Intsitute for Security Studies
Situation Report, (ISSAfrica, 2010), 12 p.
54
A. White, Liberalism and Constructivism: Peace and DDR in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Xavier Journal
of Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1, (2010), p. 13-23
55
Henri Boshoff, p. 9
56
Nicola Dahrendorf, MONUC and the Relevance of Coherent Mandates: the case of the DRC, in A beginner’s
guide to Security Sector Reform, ed. By H. Hanggi and V. Scherrer, (Geneve, 2008), p. 67-112
57
Ingrid Samset, UN Peacekeeping in the Congo: when is the job done?, Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre, (June,
2010), 7 p.
58
Filip Reyntjes, The great African war, Cambridge University Press, (2010), p. 278
Robbin Looije
Onderzoeksseminar III
3689891
Dhr G.J.C. van den Borgh
Bachelor Thesis
Feeling Blue: The question of a contributing UN mission in the DRC
18
neighboring countries’ conflicts59, require different resources, tools, mechanisms and methods in
order to establish peace. And in the case of the DRC, in which the number of violent actors and the
areas of conflict are territorially various and highly dynamic, ascertaining peace is a tough task.
Conclusion
As I have tried to show, getting involved in peacekeeping missions, the United Nations have come
across several obstructions during its six decades of intervening experience. UN peacekeeping
missions have transited from a typical Cold War traditional form of peacekeeping, through more
complex second-generation peacekeeping missions into an even more blanket form of thirdgeneration peacekeeping missions. This newest form of peacekeeping is not solely focused on
keeping warring parties apart, but also focuses on peace-building, disarmament, coercive peaceenforcement and state-building.
Criticizers have been harsh on United Nations’ functioning in the terrain of peacekeeping,
and have shown where and how the UN is still exposed to some huge challenges. Even though there
is little consensus on what is the best way to deal with the political and military risks of peacekeeping
in wars like those in the DRC, it seems obvious to many criticizers that the UN still has lots of changes
to make in its internal dynamics. For instance, mandate provisioning has not always resorted in
providing UN forces with the needed resources and powers. Also, UN officials are too unaware of
how local conflict dynamics, culture and traditions will react to the presence of peacekeepers.
In addition, the UN has proven to have learnt from some of the defaults which have led to
the disastrous performances in the 1990s debacles. UN Security Council has committed itself to the
peacekeeping missions in the longer term, as it has realized that peace-building requires a longer
presence of UN forces, especially if no treaties are signed, or if the negotiation of treaties has
become much harder because of the increase in civil wars. Concepts like R2P have facilitated the UN
in decision-making, by bridging both the globally realized moral duties in idealism, and the objections
of international law often obstructing peacekeeping. In the DRC, the UN has learnt to commit to
work towards a self-sustaining peace, as it had not abandoned the DRC after the withdrawal of state
armies, but it remained extant to encounter the following violence. Even though MONUC has not
been able clear the larger Congolese area from violence, the DRC has in a relatively short period
created a stable government through comparatively acceptable elections. Without the presence of
such a large MONUC force, this probably would not have been the case. Also, after the elections
MONUC remained afoot and as many feared the UN would leave the country, the UN did not forsake
Congo to its fate.
Despite the many critiques, UN has tried to prioritize the security of civilians and it has shown
the willingness and the commitment to make peace in the DRC. But of course many things can still be
improved and the UN will need a long time to self-reflect on what went wrong in the DRC and in
many other missions. But with the long-term investments and by contracting outside forces like EUorganized operations Artemis and EUFOR DRC, it has certainly taken steps in understanding how to
react to dynamics inside its own operational territory.
With the change in mission character, there has also been a shift noticeable amongst
scholars and critics who believe that a higher commitment and deployment of more resources, the
59
Filip Reyntjes, The great African war, Cambridge University Press, (2010), .320 p.
Robbin Looije
Onderzoeksseminar III
3689891
Dhr G.J.C. van den Borgh
Bachelor Thesis
Feeling Blue: The question of a contributing UN mission in the DRC
19
indicators for success should be uplifted, thus making a larger intervention definitely not necessarily
a guarantee for success. As we have seen, the parameters for success are diverse and depend on the
one hand on conflict contextual factors, but on the other hand has remained to focus on the core
task of peacekeeping missions. According to many, success is measured by ending conflict, or is often
related to ending protracted violence. By extending its array of tasks, tools, mechanisms and its
deeper involvement in conflicts like the DRC, one might wonder if the UN is not neglecting its core
task of peacekeeping. Long-term strategies do not show direct results, as mission tend to take much
more time than during Cold war conflicts and the explicit result (which is no relapse of conflict) will
only be noticeable after several years of disengagement. Meanwhile, critics continue to blame
MONUC, which is now called MONUSCO, for its defensive stance. During the M23 attacks in Fall 2012
it was chanceless against ruthless and superior numbers of rebels. The French minister of foreign
affairs was astonished and ferocious about the passivity of MONUSCO troops during the occupation
of Goma. MONUSCO however, is not a fighting force. It reacted that it did not inhibit the rebels iout
of fear creating civilians casualties. A wise decision if you ask me, especially when realizing that M 23
attacks in civilians were incredibly low in areas around MONUSCO compounds. Still, MONUSCO was
again prognosticated to its lack of resources and numbers, and UNSC must again decide if it shall
extend its costly mandate. Whether or not instigated by Kigali’s funding, M 23 seems to be holding
MONUSCO in a chokehold as other militias have done before them, showing their incapability of
large scale civilian protection. Leaving however, might cause even bigger problems, leaving the DRC
into an unprotected Hobbesian state.
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Onderzoeksseminar III
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Dhr G.J.C. van den Borgh
Bachelor Thesis
Feeling Blue: The question of a contributing UN mission in the DRC
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Robbin Looije
Onderzoeksseminar III
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Dhr G.J.C. van den Borgh
Bachelor Thesis
Feeling Blue: The question of a contributing UN mission in the DRC
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Robbin Looije
Onderzoeksseminar III
3689891
Dhr G.J.C. van den Borgh
Bachelor Thesis