Download 6-147 Conversation with Ernest Bevin, December 4, 1947

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CONVERSATION WITH ERNEST BEVIN
December 4, 1947 London, England
MARSHALL met with British Foreign Secretary Bevin to discuss problems concerning
Austria, Germany, and Palestine.
Marshall was concerned that the Soviets were using the question of reparations
from Austria to maneuver the United States and Britain into accepting their claims to
reparations from Germany. “[I]f it became clear that a stalemate was going to be
reached” on Germany at the Conference of Foreign Ministers, “I should make a statement
listing the six or seven main points on which it was essential to reach agreement
regarding the economic position of Germany if the German economy was to be stabilized
and to declare that if no settlement could be reached between the four powers then the US
and Great Britain would have to take the necessary steps on their own.”
Britain would not tolerate economic chaos in Germany, Bevin stated; moreover,
the general feeling in his country was to be prepared for the London conference to break
down. “[Q]uite frankly,” Marshall responded, “what would be popular in the US would
be that I should break off and tell the Russians to go to the devil, but that this public
response would be temporary and would be followed later by a different one when the
implications were fully understood. I, however, tentatively thought that it might be wise
to indicate the differences on matters of real substance and to suggest that unless
agreement could be had on them we would have to proceed—always making it clear,
however, that we were not permanently breaking. It was important, of course, to choose
our ground carefully and to time it to the best possible advantage; we must at the same
time be careful to avoid allowing ourselves to be maneuvered by the Russians into a
situation where the break occurred on what would later appear to be an inconsequential
point which would not carry conviction with our public opinion. I felt that Molotov must
realize that we, for our part, would endeavor to end the discussion if it had to break down,
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in a way which would carry conviction with our public opinion; Molotov was thus
constantly maneuvering to guard himself against being put in that position.”
Bevin suspected that, after probing for soft spots in the Anglo-American position,
the Soviets might, if they found none, still agree to a settlement. “If the Communist
moves in France failed and the Interim Aid Bill went through Congress,” Marshall said,
“the western powers would enjoy a greatly increased momentum in this conference. . . .
[M]y present inclination was at some carefully timed stage in the conference to specify
certain steps which must be taken in order to adjust German economy, and if four power
agreement on these steps could not be reached, then we should be obliged to take them on
our own immediately. It was essential that the US and Great Britain should act together if
this course was decided on.”
The two men then discussed the Palestine problem. Bevin stressed that it was
important that Britain and America prevent further Jewish immigration into Palestine;
otherwise “the Arabs would undoubtedly be incited to massacre the Jews.” The United
States might then find itself required to provide forces to halt this, and the Soviet Union
might consequently demand that it also be allowed to send forces. Marshall “admitted that
the greatest fear of the US military authorities in regard to the question was the presence
of a Russian force in Palestine.” Moreover, Marshall “could not believe that the Jews
would any longer proceed with illegal immigration, since it must be a dead loss to them
and would be of no pressure value.” Bevin was not convinced and asked Marshall to urge
his government to restrain the activities of the Jewish Agency for Palestine and publicly
condemn the illegal immigration effort. Marshall said he would tell Washington of
Bevin’s ideas; a copy of his message was sent to President Truman on December 8.
(Secretary of State to Acting Secretary of State, December 6, 1947, Radio No. MARTEL
40 with handwritten note that a copy was sent to the president, NA/RG 59 [Central
Decimal File, 740.00119 Control/12–647].) *
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