Download October 22, 2012 Welcome to Berlin, Europe`s new capital By

October 22, 2012
Welcome to Berlin, Europe’s new capital
By Gideon Rachman
©Ingram Pinn
Berlin does not feel like an imperial city. The new government buildings – the
chancellor’s office, the Bundestag and the foreign ministry – have all been designed
with plenty of glass and natural light, to emphasise transparency and democracy. The
finance ministry is, admittedly, housed in the old headquarters of the Luftwaffe. But
most of the grandest architecture – Unter den Linden and the Brandenburg gate – is
a legacy of the Prussian kings. Modern Berlin presents a more welcoming face, and
has become a magnet for tourists and teenagers.
Yet while the German capital has deliberately eschewed the trappings of imperial
power, the fact is that Berlin is increasingly the de facto capital of the EU. Of course
the EU’s main institutions – the commission and the council – are still based in
Brussels. But the key decisions are increasingly made in Berlin.
Will Greece have to leave the euro? Ultimately, it will be Germany’s call. Will
politicians support further bailouts for southern Europe? The vital debates will take
place in the Bundestag in Berlin – not in the European parliament. Who does the
International Monetary Fund call about the euro crisis? The most important
conversations take place with the German government and the European Central
Bank in Frankfurt – not the European Commission.
This shift in power from Brussels to Berlin has been accelerated by the euro crisis.
Naturally, the German chancellor Angela Merkel still has to go to summits in Brussels
and strike deals. She was there only last week. But the euro crisis means that Ms
Merkel is now incomparably the most important leader at the table.
For different reasons, the leaders of all the other big EU nations arrive in Brussels in
a weak position. Spain and Italy are struggling with their debt crises – and so have
become supplicants. The British have opted out of the single currency and the new
structures that the eurozone is putting together – so they are marginalised. The Poles
are also not in the euro, and have a relatively small economy.
That leaves France. By tradition, a Franco-German partnership is at the heart of any
EU deal. For many years, summits were preceded by a separate Franco-German
meeting and a joint letter from the two nations. When Nicolas Sarkozy was still in the
Elysée, his relationship with Chancellor Merkel was so close that “Merkozy” became a
journalistic shorthand for Europe’s dominant duo.
Even then, many were sceptical. One top EU official scoffed that – “France needs
Germany to disguise how weak it is. Germany needs France to disguise how strong it
is.” Now even the disguises have dropped away. There was no Franco-German letter
before the most recent EU summit. Instead, President François Hollande gave an
interview to the European press to try to pressurise Ms Merkel to give ground on the
mutualisation of European debt and the creation of a banking union. But at the
summit it became clear that the Germans will not be hurried.
Some argue that the Franco-German partnership has always gone through rough
patches – and that the two nations will inevitably get together again. This time,
however, it could be different. The power gap between France and Germany has
become too obvious; and the issues that divide them are too fundamental.
France’s various proposals for eurozone bonds, banking unions, EU-wide
infrastructure spending and common social programmes are all greeted with deep
suspicion in Berlin. The Germans suspect that the bottom line uniting these ideas is a
desire to get German taxpayers to subsidise France. But Germany’s counterproposal
– that the national budgets of EU nations be subject to control by a European
commissioner – is dismissed as an unacceptable infringement of national sovereignty
in Paris.
By tradition, a Franco-German compromise would be hammered out. But the issues
involved are so basic that a deal may not be easily found. In that case, the relative
economic strength of Germany could prove decisive – particularly if, as many in
Berlin suspect, France is heading for a profound economic crisis.
This steady accretion of power to Germany is greeted with ambivalence in Berlin. For
obvious historical reasons, postwar Germany has never sought a dominant role
within Europe. After reunification, the goal was always said to be “a European
Germany, not a German Europe”. That instinct to try to submerge German interests
within a general European identity remains powerful. But exasperation with rulebreaking and fiscal incontinence elsewhere in Europe is making the Germans less shy
about insisting on the need for a more “German” Europe. The price of German
financial assistance is, increasingly, going to be the acceptance of rules and laws
designed in Berlin.
That kind of power can lead to arrogance. In Berlin last week I heard occasional
exasperated references to arrogant Spaniards, haughty Brits, delusional Frenchmen
and corrupt Greeks. But the general tone of discussion is serious, patient and
responsible. The Germans insist that they are completely committed to the euro and
to the EU – and they are determined to make them work.
The problem – if there is a problem – is that life is too sweet in Berlin. Germany is
prosperous and Berlin is a pleasant and fashionable city. The struggles of Greece or
Spain seem a very long way away. That detachment from the rest of the eurozone –
rather than any “will to power” – is why Berlin remains a peculiar capital for Europe