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Development Policy Review, 2003, 21 (3): 319-332 Markets, Institutions and Technology: Missing Links in Livelihoods Analysis Andrew Dorward, Nigel Poole, Jamie Morrison, Jonathan Kydd and Ian Urey∗ The benefits of livelihoods thinking and approaches are widely recognised. This article focuses on an important gap in much of the conceptualisation and application of ‘livelihood approaches’ – a lack of emphasis on markets and their roles in livelihood development and poverty reduction. The omission is important, as it can lead to failure to identify and act on a wider range of market, institutional and technological opportunities and constraints. An alternative conceptualisation is proposed, with markets as one particular set of institutional mechanisms for co-ordination and exchange in an economy. It is argued that more explicit attention to interactions between institutions, technology and assets in livelihood analysis may be valuable in conceptualising and managing programmes for livelihood development and poverty reduction. The benefits of livelihoods thinking and approaches are widely recognised, including, for example, their stress on the importance of people-centred change, a holistic approach, people’s access to different assets, poor people’s vulnerability, partnerships, sustainability, change, and the multi-faceted nature of livelihoods. In this article, however, we focus on what we argue is an important gap in much of the conceptualisation and application of ‘livelihood approaches’, namely, a lack of emphasis on markets and their roles in livelihood development and poverty reduction. Given that one of the roots of livelihoods thinking was Sen’s concept of entitlements, this is surprising. The omission is important. If the roles of markets and market relationships are not properly addressed in livelihoods analysis and action, it can lead to failure to identify and act on (i) livelihood opportunities and constraints arising from critical market processes and (ii) institutional issues that are important for pro-poor market development. These are intimately related to macro- and meso- processes of change in national and local economies. The article explores these arguments in more detail and suggests ways in which they may be addressed. The discussion focuses particularly on the sustainable livelihoods approach as developed and applied by the UK Department for International Development. ∗ Imperial College London, Centre for Development and Poverty Reduction, Wye Campus, Wye. UK ([email protected], www.wye.ic.ac.uk/AgEcon/ADU/CDPR). The work presented here was originally presented at a Seminar on ‘Supporting Institutions, Evolving Livelihoods’, at Bradford Centre for International Development, University of Bradford, 29-30 May 2002. The work described has been developed under various activities funded by the UK Department for International Development. However, the interpretations and conclusions expressed are entirely those of the authors and should not be attributed to DFID, which does not guarantee their accuracy and can accept no responsibility for any consequences of their use. Overseas Development Institute, 2003. Published by Blackwell Publishing, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. 320 Andrew Dorward, Nigel Poole, Jamie Morrison, Jonathan Kydd and Ian Urey We begin, however, by asserting the importance of markets and the private sector for pro-poor livelihood development and poverty reduction. This follows from four observations: first, that the livelihoods of most poor people are directly dependent on their involvement in a range of markets as private agents or as employees (and are indirectly dependent on the wider economy for the demand and supply of goods and services); second, that major current and historical poverty reduction processes have depended on equitable private sector economic growth (but we note later the importance of actions by other stakeholders – such as community-based organisations and the state – in market development); third, that poor people themselves often identify problems with markets as critical to their livelihoods (but these problems may concern both the absence of markets and the effects of markets); and fourth, that in support of such growth, markets can provide a highly efficient mechanism for exchange, co-ordination and allocation of many resources, goods and services, but they often fail. Recognition of the frequent failures of markets to serve the interests of the poor is critical to the arguments of this article: we examine some of the reasons for these failures and argue that conventional promotion of liberalised competitive markets is often misplaced. A more imaginative approach is needed, rooted in a stronger understanding of the importance and nature of institutional development in economic growth, with market development being one part of that institutional development. We stress that although we see improved market access as a critical driver of sustained and broad-based poverty-reducing development, it is neither a magic bullet nor a sufficient condition for such development: other social, political and technical processes of change are also vital. With the very real difficulties that the poor face in accessing markets, ongoing actions to support livelihoods in the absence of market access are important in many instances. Expanded market access can also pose real threats to the livelihoods of poor people. The core of our argument here is an appeal to two different development communities. To ‘market sceptics’ we put forward what we suggest is a realistic understanding of markets’ potential and of their problems, and plead that action should be compatible with and complement the longer-term potentially powerful market processes for pro-poor growth. To ‘market fundamentalists’, we call for (and offer) a realistic, pragmatic and theoretical understanding of problems of market-based development, and suggest some of the ways that these may be addressed. Market opportunities and constraints in livelihood development A useful question to open up this topic is to ask what market and private sector thinking has to say about sustainable livelihoods and poverty reduction. This has to be related to wider dynamic processes of growth in local and national economies, to the two-edged sword of competition (both a force for increasing economic efficiency with lower prices for consumers, and a threat to particular stakeholders, poor and non-poor), to markets (their roles, their nature, the characteristics of pro-poor markets, the importance of, for example, labour markets), to institutions supporting markets and other means of exchange and co-ordination, and to the dynamics of livelihood change and of relations between the livelihoods of different poor and non-poor stakeholders. Perhaps the most Markets, Institutions and Technology: Missing Links in Livelihoods Analysis 321 important point is that development of livelihoods depends critically upon, among other things, demand for the outputs (goods and services) supplied by those livelihoods. Many of these issues are easily overlooked in livelihood approaches that (usefully) focus on the more immediate situations, opportunities and constraints facing particular groups of poor people. Such analysis can easily overlook the dynamic opportunities and constraints posed by wider market interactions. An important illustration of the importance of these issues is the ongoing debate about non-farm diversification in rural livelihoods. The growing extent and importance of rural livelihood diversification out of farming are increasingly recognised: typical observations in Africa are that (i) the less poor often have more effectively diversified incomes and (ii) the poor tend to be stuck either in low-return farm activities or in low-return non-farm activities (with difficulties in agriculture pushing them into the latter). Taken at face value, these observations can lead to simplistic policy responses to expand opportunities for higher-return non-farm enterprises. However, more nuanced analysis of the dynamics of livelihood and economic development and of market access tends to show that (i) many non-farm activities are dependent directly or indirectly on agriculture, and (ii) the poor often lack access to higher-return non-farm activities through lack of financial, social and human capital (see for example Barrett et al., 2001; Reardon et al., 2000). Policies that ignore agricultural growth and that support higher-return non-farm enterprises without addressing the factors constraining the access of the poor to these opportunities may then end up helping the better-off more than the poor. With regard to the first of these two points, a long-standing theoretical and empirical literature has examined the linkages between different activities within rural economies (for recent reviews see Delgado et al., 1998; Dorward et al., 2001). Examination of linkages allows exploration of the effects of exogenous change as they work through different elements of the rural economy. Figure 1 summarises the key linkages between processes of livelihood change and market access, on the one hand, and, on the other, wider processes of growth and a ‘virtuous cycle’ whereby production and consumption linkages allow the stimulus of some production or market opportunity to feed back into increased demand for labour and for locally produced goods and services. However, the ‘leakages’ from this virtuous circle also need to be recognised. Understanding of these linkages and leakages may help in understanding the markets and activities that will have wider positive impacts on 1 the livelihoods of the poor and on the opportunities available to them. An appreciation of linkages within local and national economies allows us then to examine how growth in the farm and non-farm sectors compares with regard to their supply, demand, and linkage characteristics and hence their likely poverty-reducing benefits. There are unlikely to be many tradable non-farm activities apart from mining that offer broadly-based employment opportunities in the poorest (relatively low2 income and isolated) rural areas. Only as links with urban areas develop will 1. DFID (2001) draws a distinction between markets that the poor participate in directly and markets that they benefit from indirectly as a result of such markets contributing to wider pro-poor economic growth. 2. See Wiggins (2001) for a fuller discussion of these issues. Tourism and crafts may also offer opportunities for non-farm tradable activities, but, as with mining, areas with these opportunities are likely to be the exception rather than the rule. Migrant labour and remittances may also be considered a form of tradable, exporting labour to bring extra income into an area. 322 Andrew Dorward, Nigel Poole, Jamie Morrison, Jonathan Kydd and Ian Urey opportunities for non-farm tradable activities develop, but these will often be ‘high barrier to entry’ activities, limiting the benefits to the poor (Barrett et al., 2000). Farm activities, on the other hand, are more likely to offer opportunities for broadly-based expansion in tradable activities (whether cash crops or tradable food crops), with direct and indirect employment and income opportunities for the poor, again depending upon barriers to entry associated with, for example, the nature of the crop, marketing systems, access to land, etc.. Even here the poor are unlikely to gain much directly as selfemployed producers of tradable agricultural commodities, with limited access to land and capital and relatively low on-farm incomes. However, there is often considerable potential for them to benefit directly (from increased labour demand from significant numbers of less poor farmers producing tradables) and indirectly (through increased demand for non-tradables from these farmers). The challenge is then to improve the access of less poor farmers to the skills, capital, inputs and output markets to allow them to respond to opportunities in the production of farm tradables, and to improve access by the poor to linkage benefits. Figure 1: Linkages and leakages in a local economy Capital/import intensive production Competitive advantages in industrial or agricultural tradables Growth in productivity for high average budget share nontradables Increased employment Supply response Consumption and production linkages Rises in real wages Inelastic supply of non-tradables Demand for local nontradable goods and services (high marginal budget shares) Linkages Inequitable assets and incomes Demand for tradables Leakages Source: Dorward et al. (2002a). Growth and poverty reduction through increased productivity of non-tradables will be effective as a basic source of poverty-reducing growth where the non-tradable is widely consumed (i.e. has a high average budget share), either by the poor themselves or by a large non-poor population (with consumption linkage benefits for the poor). High average budget shares for food crops in rural areas in Africa (Delgado et al., 1998) Markets, Institutions and Technology: Missing Links in Livelihoods Analysis 323 suggest that farm activities are more likely to meet these criteria than non-farm activities. Growth and poverty reduction through increased productivity of non-farm non-tradables with high marginal budget shares are more likely to be important as a secondary growth process, supporting consumption linkages. Institutional or technological change in non-tradable production may also have important redistributive effects by bringing down barriers to entry for poor producers and allowing them to gain market and income shares from less poor producers, as well as lowering prices to poor consumers. We conclude that, in many poorer rural areas, increasing productivity of farm activities will have greater potential for stimulating poverty-reducing growth, whereas increased productivity of non-farm activities will play a more important role in supporting secondary, linkage-dependent poverty-reducing growth, particularly if the activities have low barriers to entry and high labour demands. It can be further argued, from historical experience and from examination of the linkage and budget share characteristics of different types of agricultural production, that, within agriculture, intensive cereal-based growth offers the best prospects for sustained poverty-reducing 3 growth (see, for example, Dorward and Morrison, 2000). The operation, extent and terms of access to different markets are then critical questions, which are rightly being given attention in ongoing studies of rural diversification. What we are arguing here is that these issues need to be given much more prominence in our ‘basic’ conceptualisations of livelihoods. We propose later in the article ways in which this may be achieved, but turn now to examine the question that immediately follows if we accept the importance of market development: how can pro-poor markets be developed? Here we need to consider the role of institutions, entering what, in the DFID framework, is sometimes considered the ‘black box’ of PIPs (Policies, Institutions and Processes). Institutional issues in pro-poor market development Following North (1990) and Hall and Soskice (2001), we define institutions as ‘rules of the game’ defining the incentives and sanctions affecting people’s behaviour. Key concepts are the distinction between the institutional environment and institutional (or contractual) arrangements (Davis and North, 1971); the interaction of these with property rights, information flows, transaction costs, transaction risks, and market access failures for different market participants (e.g. Williamson, 1985, 1991; Dorward, 2001a); and processes whereby institutions change (North, 1990). Use of these concepts to examine institutional and economic development highlights high transaction costs and risks, weak information flows, and a weak institutional environment in less developed rural economies. Actors, particularly those with little power or financial and social capital, thus face high costs in accessing information and property rights enforcement, and this in turn constrains access to markets, market development and 3. The importance of oilseeds in India’s second (rainfed) green revolution (Smith and Urey, 2002) challenges the argument that intensive cereal-based transformations have historically provided the most sustainable and pro-poor pattern of growth. However, in the Indian context oilseed crops may have many characteristics of cereals as regards their linkages within a large domestic market, and oilseed growth has been associated with growth in cereals. This is a topic that needs further examination. 324 Andrew Dorward, Nigel Poole, Jamie Morrison, Jonathan Kydd and Ian Urey hence economic and technological development. Resultant low levels of economic activity themselves lead to thin markets, high transaction costs and risks, and high unit costs for infrastructural development. The result can easily be a ‘low level equilibrium trap’ (see Figure 2). We are left with critical questions about (a) the processes by which institutional, technological, social and economic development can break out of this and (b) the roles of different stakeholders in promoting such development, particularly development paths that will involve and benefit the poor. Figure 2: Institutions and the low-level equilibrium trap Inhibited economic and technological development Inhibited market access and development Low economic activity, thin markets, high transaction costs and risks, and high unit costs Weak institutional and infrastructural environment High cost information access and property rights Current policy emphasis (as outlined, for example, in World Bank, 2000, 2002; IFAD, 2001) recognises the importance of institutions in economic development, but does not explicitly recognise the problem of the low-level equilibrium trap as outlined above, nor the fundamental co-ordination problem that underlies it: attempts to tackle market failures will fail unless investors have confidence that all the failures in other markets are addressed at the same time, in ways that will not make them hostages to opportunistic behaviour by other economic agents or by state agencies (see Dorward and Kydd, 2002 for a more detailed explanation of these arguments as applied to rural Malawi). The current policy emphasis on the institutional environment and on the roles of government and civil society (in improving communications, property rights, the macroeconomic environment, and access to information to support neo-classical competitive markets) is, we believe, very important, but unfortunately if it stops there its principal output is a growing list of often unrealistic demands on governments. How can we move beyond this impasse? We suggest that the institutional analysis needs to be taken forward in a number of ways. Fundamentally, we need to conceptualise markets as one institutional model (albeit a very important and effective one) by which resources, production and consumption are allocated, co-ordinated and exchanged in an economy. This opens up a number of important and pragmatic questions. First, we may ask if competitive neo-classical markets are always the most desirable institutional model, or if there are conditions where other forms of institutional arrangement perform better. This leads on to the need for policy to recognise and promote the development of institutional arrangements other than competitive markets, Markets, Institutions and Technology: Missing Links in Livelihoods Analysis 325 and the implications of this for development of the institutional environment. For example, we need to ask what institutional arrangements (market or non-market) will best support development of particular livelihood opportunities under particular circumstances, and what features of the institutional environment are needed to support these institutional arrangements. These questions address an inherent contradiction in the current conventional wisdom, with, on the one hand, strong emphasis on neoclassical competitive markets and, on the other, calls for support for bottom-up nonmarket organisations (in producer groups, CBOs, other stakeholder groups, microfinance groups, and common property resource management groups, for example). These alternative institutional arrangements are not parts of a competitive market structure, but they can work, and policy analysis needs to catch up with praxis and 4 integrate them into an overall conceptual framework. In addition to understanding the types of institutional change that may be required if economies and communities are to climb out of the ‘low level equilibrium trap’ described above, we also need to look at the processes of institutional change. Our analysis here draws strongly on seminal contributions by North on the relation between different paths of institutional change and economic development (North, 1990; North, 1995; Davis and North, 1971; North and Weingast, 1989). North explains institutional change in terms of powerful social groups that respond to perceived changes in relative prices, technologies and transaction costs by modifying institutions to promote their perceived interests. Institutional development therefore involves ‘path dependent’ processes influenced by different groups’ relative power and by their perceptions (of possible opportunities and threats posed to their interests by alternative paths of institutional and technological change or stagnation). Implications for the livelihoods development agenda Our analysis of markets and institutions has important implications for the livelihoods development agenda as regards research, analysis, policy and local action. We need to: • • • • place our understanding of livelihoods and their development in a much more explicit context of dynamic market and institutional change; pay much more attention to understanding institutional arrangements and their relationships with the institutional and political environment and with technological change; move away from preoccupation with neo-classical competitive markets; look for viable incremental changes that benefit the poor, are ‘politically’ viable, and are consistent with longer-term processes of pro-poor institutional and economic development. 4. Dorward et al. (2002a) present a fuller development of these arguments. Their analysis suggests that investments in non-market institutional arrangements are likely to be more effective and efficient than many investments in the wider institutional environment in situations of low density of economic activity, and argue that major historical and current advances in economic growth and poverty reduction were initiated by developments in institutional arrangement (for example, the East Asian Tigers, the Green Revolution, and the Micro Finance Revolution). 326 Andrew Dorward, Nigel Poole, Jamie Morrison, Jonathan Kydd and Ian Urey In order to operationalise this agenda, these issues need to be made much more explicit in formal livelihoods thinking. We have suggested elsewhere how goals and principles of livelihood approaches should explicitly recognise the importance for poverty reduction of sustained and equitable growth in the access of the poor to assets, to economic opportunities, to rights, to health and education, and to technical and institutional change (Dorward, 2001b). This requires less emphasis on service delivery and provision (the ‘provider perspective’ (Shields, pers. comm.)) and more emphasis on the economic and social workings of private activities and markets, from which the vast majority of the poor gain their livelihoods as micro-entrepreneurs and workers. Service delivery (whether it be infrastructure, health, education, or governance, for example) should then be considered in terms of its support to and impact on these livelihoods. For many, the ‘livelihoods approach’ is most simply encapsulated by the sustainable livelihoods framework (Carney, 1998), and this can be amended to give more explicit recognition to the importance and roles of markets, institutions and technology in livelihood development (see Figure 3). This recasting of the ‘classical’ sustainable livelihoods framework introduces three main innovations. First, it places demand for livelihood outputs at the centre of processes of livelihood development. This requires a distinction between a livelihood strategy and its component activities, which utilise inputs (assets) to produce outputs. The extent and nature of demand for these outputs is critical in determining the immediate and longerterm micro-, meso- and macro- impacts and sustainability of development of livelihood activities, as examined in our earlier discussion of linkages. The representation of this in Figure 3 makes a number of points: • • • demand must be effective (that is, must be able to pay for the outputs in some way, feeding into livelihood assets or outcomes) but this does not have to be mediated through markets – there may be other institutional mechanisms that achieve this, with a wide variety of intra- and inter-household social relations, including interlocking arrangements, familial and clan-based ties, and patronage, as well as different market relations; demand may be embedded in the local or wider economy, and may therefore have different linkage characteristics; demand may itself be affected by livelihood outcomes. The second set of innovations in Figure 3 is the location and content of the ‘policies and 5 institutions’ box. Its location emphasises (a) its interactions with the vulnerability context, and (b) the way that policies and institutions and the vulnerability context affect all livelihood components. The contents of the box give particular emphasis to issues of access, specifically to interactions between access, markets, power, rights and services. These policies and institutions may affect access to any livelihood component – for example, access to demand, access to different assets, access to benefits from livelihoods, and access to technologies – and structuring the framework this way may make it easier to relate the livelihoods approach to health and education. 5. The term ‘processes’ is dropped from this as the whole framework is concerned with different types of process and it seems unhelpful and confusing to highlight one particular (and ill defined) set of processes here. Figure 3: Modified sustainable livelihoods framework Effective demand Local Wider market/non-market Physical, social, natural, human, financial Livelihood strategies Activities Outputs Vulnerability context Shocks, trends seasonality Livelihood outcomes Policies and Institutions Markets Power Access Services Rights Markets, Institutions and Technology: Missing Links in Livelihoods Analysis Livelihood assets Source: Dorward (2001b). 327 328 Andrew Dorward, Nigel Poole, Jamie Morrison, Jonathan Kydd and Ian Urey Finally, technology is largely ignored in the ‘classical’ sustainable livelihoods framework and it is not easy to find a place to locate it, but institutional and technological changes have together been the drivers and facilitators of most economic and social development. Technology is not explicitly included in Figure 3 either, but the revised framework offers two critical leverage points where technology’s impact on livelihoods can be identified. First, the specific identification of activities and outputs within the transformation of livelihood assets into livelihood outcomes allows us to identify the critical micro-role of technology in changing input:output (or asset:output) relations in livelihood activities, and to relate that to the role of institutions in changing these relations. Second, the meso- and macro-roles of technology can be related to the ‘policies and institutions’ box, where the impacts of technology on services, markets, power and rights can be explored (impacts of changes in health, education, or communications technology might be traced from here, for example). While livelihoods thinking and approaches need to escape from the ‘provider perspective’, they must also clarify thinking about the processes and impacts of change on poor people’s livelihoods, and identify ‘entry points’ for the promotion of beneficial change. This is another area where conventional livelihoods thinking may be criticised. It has provided an admirable checklist for thinking about the major elements affecting livelihoods (as discussed in the introduction to this article), and in particular for emphasising the importance and diversity of assets underlying livelihoods, but it has not provided a unifying conceptual framework relating outside interventions to their livelihood impacts. Given donors’ near-universal reliance on goal-oriented logical frameworks in programme funding and management, this is a surprising omission. It may be largely due to the SL framework’s lack of analysis of the role of institutions and of technology (or productivity) in livelihoods and in the economies and societies of which they are a part. If, however, institutions and technology are related to livelihood assets, a simple but powerful framework emerges to relate widely different kinds of intervention to potential livelihood impacts. This is illustrated in Figure 4, which identifies four major types of intervention: promoting technical innovation, asset building, an enabling environment, and appropriate institutional arrangements. These should change livelihood assets, either directly or indirectly (as shown by the vertical arrows). Three important attributes of livelihood assets are highlighted (their productivity, the portfolio 6 of assets held, and access to them), and changes in these will, in turn, impact on livelihood outcomes. While Figure 4 ignores the complexity of multiple processes linking interventions and impacts, it nevertheless provides a unifying map of the main pathways by which different health, education, enterprise development, agriculture, governance and infrastructure programmes, for example, seek to improve livelihoods and combat poverty. 6. See Dorward et al., 2001b for further discussion of asset roles in livelihoods. Figure 4: Entry points and livelihood change Livelihood/poverty impacts Livelihood changes Technical innovation Asset productivity Targeted asset building Enabling environment Improved and sustainable well being Asset portfolio Institutional arrangements feedbacks Asset access Markets, Institutions and Technology: Missing Links in Livelihoods Analysis Entry points 329 330 Andrew Dorward, Nigel Poole, Jamie Morrison, Jonathan Kydd and Ian Urey Conclusion Increased emphasis on understanding livelihoods and on designing programmes to support livelihood development has had many benefits, and represents a valuable advance in development thinking and practice. However, its wider adoption and contribution to programme design and implementation are limited by a lack of relatively simple conceptualisations of the roles of markets, institutions and technology in livelihoods and economic and social development. 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