Download Markets, Institutions and Technology: Missing Links in Livelihoods

Development Policy Review, 2003, 21 (3): 319-332
Markets, Institutions and Technology: Missing
Links in Livelihoods Analysis
Andrew Dorward, Nigel Poole, Jamie Morrison, Jonathan
Kydd and Ian Urey∗
The benefits of livelihoods thinking and approaches are widely recognised.
This article focuses on an important gap in much of the conceptualisation
and application of ‘livelihood approaches’ – a lack of emphasis on markets
and their roles in livelihood development and poverty reduction. The
omission is important, as it can lead to failure to identify and act on a wider
range of market, institutional and technological opportunities and
constraints. An alternative conceptualisation is proposed, with markets as
one particular set of institutional mechanisms for co-ordination and
exchange in an economy. It is argued that more explicit attention to
interactions between institutions, technology and assets in livelihood
analysis may be valuable in conceptualising and managing programmes for
livelihood development and poverty reduction.
The benefits of livelihoods thinking and approaches are widely recognised, including,
for example, their stress on the importance of people-centred change, a holistic
approach, people’s access to different assets, poor people’s vulnerability, partnerships,
sustainability, change, and the multi-faceted nature of livelihoods. In this article,
however, we focus on what we argue is an important gap in much of the
conceptualisation and application of ‘livelihood approaches’, namely, a lack of
emphasis on markets and their roles in livelihood development and poverty reduction.
Given that one of the roots of livelihoods thinking was Sen’s concept of entitlements,
this is surprising. The omission is important. If the roles of markets and market
relationships are not properly addressed in livelihoods analysis and action, it can lead to
failure to identify and act on (i) livelihood opportunities and constraints arising from
critical market processes and (ii) institutional issues that are important for pro-poor
market development. These are intimately related to macro- and meso- processes of
change in national and local economies. The article explores these arguments in more
detail and suggests ways in which they may be addressed. The discussion focuses
particularly on the sustainable livelihoods approach as developed and applied by the UK
Department for International Development.
∗
Imperial College London, Centre for Development and Poverty Reduction, Wye Campus, Wye. UK
([email protected], www.wye.ic.ac.uk/AgEcon/ADU/CDPR). The work presented here was originally
presented at a Seminar on ‘Supporting Institutions, Evolving Livelihoods’, at Bradford Centre for
International Development, University of Bradford, 29-30 May 2002. The work described has been
developed under various activities funded by the UK Department for International Development.
However, the interpretations and conclusions expressed are entirely those of the authors and should not be
attributed to DFID, which does not guarantee their accuracy and can accept no responsibility for any
consequences of their use.
 Overseas Development Institute, 2003.
Published by Blackwell Publishing, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
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Andrew Dorward, Nigel Poole, Jamie Morrison, Jonathan Kydd and Ian Urey
We begin, however, by asserting the importance of markets and the private sector
for pro-poor livelihood development and poverty reduction. This follows from four
observations: first, that the livelihoods of most poor people are directly dependent on
their involvement in a range of markets as private agents or as employees (and are
indirectly dependent on the wider economy for the demand and supply of goods and
services); second, that major current and historical poverty reduction processes have
depended on equitable private sector economic growth (but we note later the importance
of actions by other stakeholders – such as community-based organisations and the state
– in market development); third, that poor people themselves often identify problems
with markets as critical to their livelihoods (but these problems may concern both the
absence of markets and the effects of markets); and fourth, that in support of such
growth, markets can provide a highly efficient mechanism for exchange, co-ordination
and allocation of many resources, goods and services, but they often fail. Recognition of
the frequent failures of markets to serve the interests of the poor is critical to the
arguments of this article: we examine some of the reasons for these failures and argue
that conventional promotion of liberalised competitive markets is often misplaced. A
more imaginative approach is needed, rooted in a stronger understanding of the
importance and nature of institutional development in economic growth, with market
development being one part of that institutional development.
We stress that although we see improved market access as a critical driver of
sustained and broad-based poverty-reducing development, it is neither a magic bullet
nor a sufficient condition for such development: other social, political and technical
processes of change are also vital. With the very real difficulties that the poor face in
accessing markets, ongoing actions to support livelihoods in the absence of market
access are important in many instances. Expanded market access can also pose real
threats to the livelihoods of poor people. The core of our argument here is an appeal to
two different development communities. To ‘market sceptics’ we put forward what we
suggest is a realistic understanding of markets’ potential and of their problems, and
plead that action should be compatible with and complement the longer-term potentially
powerful market processes for pro-poor growth. To ‘market fundamentalists’, we call
for (and offer) a realistic, pragmatic and theoretical understanding of problems of
market-based development, and suggest some of the ways that these may be addressed.
Market opportunities and constraints in livelihood
development
A useful question to open up this topic is to ask what market and private sector thinking
has to say about sustainable livelihoods and poverty reduction. This has to be related to
wider dynamic processes of growth in local and national economies, to the two-edged
sword of competition (both a force for increasing economic efficiency with lower prices
for consumers, and a threat to particular stakeholders, poor and non-poor), to markets
(their roles, their nature, the characteristics of pro-poor markets, the importance of, for
example, labour markets), to institutions supporting markets and other means of
exchange and co-ordination, and to the dynamics of livelihood change and of relations
between the livelihoods of different poor and non-poor stakeholders. Perhaps the most
Markets, Institutions and Technology: Missing Links in Livelihoods Analysis
321
important point is that development of livelihoods depends critically upon, among other
things, demand for the outputs (goods and services) supplied by those livelihoods.
Many of these issues are easily overlooked in livelihood approaches that (usefully)
focus on the more immediate situations, opportunities and constraints facing particular
groups of poor people. Such analysis can easily overlook the dynamic opportunities and
constraints posed by wider market interactions. An important illustration of the
importance of these issues is the ongoing debate about non-farm diversification in rural
livelihoods.
The growing extent and importance of rural livelihood diversification out of
farming are increasingly recognised: typical observations in Africa are that (i) the less
poor often have more effectively diversified incomes and (ii) the poor tend to be stuck
either in low-return farm activities or in low-return non-farm activities (with difficulties
in agriculture pushing them into the latter). Taken at face value, these observations can
lead to simplistic policy responses to expand opportunities for higher-return non-farm
enterprises. However, more nuanced analysis of the dynamics of livelihood and
economic development and of market access tends to show that (i) many non-farm
activities are dependent directly or indirectly on agriculture, and (ii) the poor often lack
access to higher-return non-farm activities through lack of financial, social and human
capital (see for example Barrett et al., 2001; Reardon et al., 2000). Policies that ignore
agricultural growth and that support higher-return non-farm enterprises without
addressing the factors constraining the access of the poor to these opportunities may
then end up helping the better-off more than the poor.
With regard to the first of these two points, a long-standing theoretical and
empirical literature has examined the linkages between different activities within rural
economies (for recent reviews see Delgado et al., 1998; Dorward et al., 2001).
Examination of linkages allows exploration of the effects of exogenous change as they
work through different elements of the rural economy.
Figure 1 summarises the key linkages between processes of livelihood change and
market access, on the one hand, and, on the other, wider processes of growth and a
‘virtuous cycle’ whereby production and consumption linkages allow the stimulus of
some production or market opportunity to feed back into increased demand for labour
and for locally produced goods and services. However, the ‘leakages’ from this virtuous
circle also need to be recognised. Understanding of these linkages and leakages may
help in understanding the markets and activities that will have wider positive impacts on
1
the livelihoods of the poor and on the opportunities available to them.
An appreciation of linkages within local and national economies allows us then to
examine how growth in the farm and non-farm sectors compares with regard to their
supply, demand, and linkage characteristics and hence their likely poverty-reducing
benefits. There are unlikely to be many tradable non-farm activities apart from mining
that offer broadly-based employment opportunities in the poorest (relatively low2
income and isolated) rural areas. Only as links with urban areas develop will
1. DFID (2001) draws a distinction between markets that the poor participate in directly and markets that
they benefit from indirectly as a result of such markets contributing to wider pro-poor economic growth.
2. See Wiggins (2001) for a fuller discussion of these issues. Tourism and crafts may also offer opportunities
for non-farm tradable activities, but, as with mining, areas with these opportunities are likely to be the
exception rather than the rule. Migrant labour and remittances may also be considered a form of tradable,
exporting labour to bring extra income into an area.
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Andrew Dorward, Nigel Poole, Jamie Morrison, Jonathan Kydd and Ian Urey
opportunities for non-farm tradable activities develop, but these will often be ‘high
barrier to entry’ activities, limiting the benefits to the poor (Barrett et al., 2000). Farm
activities, on the other hand, are more likely to offer opportunities for broadly-based
expansion in tradable activities (whether cash crops or tradable food crops), with direct
and indirect employment and income opportunities for the poor, again depending upon
barriers to entry associated with, for example, the nature of the crop, marketing systems,
access to land, etc.. Even here the poor are unlikely to gain much directly as selfemployed producers of tradable agricultural commodities, with limited access to land
and capital and relatively low on-farm incomes. However, there is often considerable
potential for them to benefit directly (from increased labour demand from significant
numbers of less poor farmers producing tradables) and indirectly (through increased
demand for non-tradables from these farmers). The challenge is then to improve the
access of less poor farmers to the skills, capital, inputs and output markets to allow them
to respond to opportunities in the production of farm tradables, and to improve access
by the poor to linkage benefits.
Figure 1: Linkages and leakages in a local economy
Capital/import intensive production
Competitive
advantages in
industrial or
agricultural
tradables
Growth in
productivity for
high average
budget share nontradables
Increased
employment
Supply
response
Consumption
and
production
linkages
Rises in
real wages
Inelastic supply
of non-tradables
Demand for local nontradable goods and services
(high marginal budget
shares)
Linkages
Inequitable assets and
incomes
Demand for
tradables
Leakages
Source: Dorward et al. (2002a).
Growth and poverty reduction through increased productivity of non-tradables will
be effective as a basic source of poverty-reducing growth where the non-tradable is
widely consumed (i.e. has a high average budget share), either by the poor themselves
or by a large non-poor population (with consumption linkage benefits for the poor).
High average budget shares for food crops in rural areas in Africa (Delgado et al., 1998)
Markets, Institutions and Technology: Missing Links in Livelihoods Analysis
323
suggest that farm activities are more likely to meet these criteria than non-farm
activities. Growth and poverty reduction through increased productivity of non-farm
non-tradables with high marginal budget shares are more likely to be important as a
secondary growth process, supporting consumption linkages. Institutional or
technological change in non-tradable production may also have important redistributive
effects by bringing down barriers to entry for poor producers and allowing them to gain
market and income shares from less poor producers, as well as lowering prices to poor
consumers.
We conclude that, in many poorer rural areas, increasing productivity of farm
activities will have greater potential for stimulating poverty-reducing growth, whereas
increased productivity of non-farm activities will play a more important role in
supporting secondary, linkage-dependent poverty-reducing growth, particularly if the
activities have low barriers to entry and high labour demands. It can be further argued,
from historical experience and from examination of the linkage and budget share
characteristics of different types of agricultural production, that, within agriculture,
intensive cereal-based growth offers the best prospects for sustained poverty-reducing
3
growth (see, for example, Dorward and Morrison, 2000).
The operation, extent and terms of access to different markets are then critical
questions, which are rightly being given attention in ongoing studies of rural
diversification. What we are arguing here is that these issues need to be given much
more prominence in our ‘basic’ conceptualisations of livelihoods. We propose later in
the article ways in which this may be achieved, but turn now to examine the question
that immediately follows if we accept the importance of market development: how can
pro-poor markets be developed? Here we need to consider the role of institutions,
entering what, in the DFID framework, is sometimes considered the ‘black box’ of PIPs
(Policies, Institutions and Processes).
Institutional issues in pro-poor market development
Following North (1990) and Hall and Soskice (2001), we define institutions as ‘rules of
the game’ defining the incentives and sanctions affecting people’s behaviour. Key
concepts are the distinction between the institutional environment and institutional (or
contractual) arrangements (Davis and North, 1971); the interaction of these with
property rights, information flows, transaction costs, transaction risks, and market
access failures for different market participants (e.g. Williamson, 1985, 1991; Dorward,
2001a); and processes whereby institutions change (North, 1990). Use of these concepts
to examine institutional and economic development highlights high transaction costs
and risks, weak information flows, and a weak institutional environment in less
developed rural economies. Actors, particularly those with little power or financial and
social capital, thus face high costs in accessing information and property rights
enforcement, and this in turn constrains access to markets, market development and
3. The importance of oilseeds in India’s second (rainfed) green revolution (Smith and Urey, 2002) challenges
the argument that intensive cereal-based transformations have historically provided the most sustainable
and pro-poor pattern of growth. However, in the Indian context oilseed crops may have many
characteristics of cereals as regards their linkages within a large domestic market, and oilseed growth has
been associated with growth in cereals. This is a topic that needs further examination.
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Andrew Dorward, Nigel Poole, Jamie Morrison, Jonathan Kydd and Ian Urey
hence economic and technological development. Resultant low levels of economic
activity themselves lead to thin markets, high transaction costs and risks, and high unit
costs for infrastructural development. The result can easily be a ‘low level equilibrium
trap’ (see Figure 2). We are left with critical questions about (a) the processes by which
institutional, technological, social and economic development can break out of this and
(b) the roles of different stakeholders in promoting such development, particularly
development paths that will involve and benefit the poor.
Figure 2: Institutions and the low-level equilibrium trap
Inhibited economic and
technological development
Inhibited market
access and
development
Low economic activity, thin
markets, high transaction
costs and risks, and
high unit costs
Weak
institutional and
infrastructural
environment
High cost information access
and property rights
Current policy emphasis (as outlined, for example, in World Bank, 2000, 2002; IFAD,
2001) recognises the importance of institutions in economic development, but does not
explicitly recognise the problem of the low-level equilibrium trap as outlined above, nor
the fundamental co-ordination problem that underlies it: attempts to tackle market
failures will fail unless investors have confidence that all the failures in other markets
are addressed at the same time, in ways that will not make them hostages to
opportunistic behaviour by other economic agents or by state agencies (see Dorward
and Kydd, 2002 for a more detailed explanation of these arguments as applied to rural
Malawi). The current policy emphasis on the institutional environment and on the roles
of government and civil society (in improving communications, property rights, the
macroeconomic environment, and access to information to support neo-classical
competitive markets) is, we believe, very important, but unfortunately if it stops there
its principal output is a growing list of often unrealistic demands on governments.
How can we move beyond this impasse? We suggest that the institutional analysis
needs to be taken forward in a number of ways. Fundamentally, we need to
conceptualise markets as one institutional model (albeit a very important and effective
one) by which resources, production and consumption are allocated, co-ordinated and
exchanged in an economy. This opens up a number of important and pragmatic
questions. First, we may ask if competitive neo-classical markets are always the most
desirable institutional model, or if there are conditions where other forms of institutional
arrangement perform better. This leads on to the need for policy to recognise and
promote the development of institutional arrangements other than competitive markets,
Markets, Institutions and Technology: Missing Links in Livelihoods Analysis
325
and the implications of this for development of the institutional environment. For
example, we need to ask what institutional arrangements (market or non-market) will
best support development of particular livelihood opportunities under particular
circumstances, and what features of the institutional environment are needed to support
these institutional arrangements. These questions address an inherent contradiction in
the current conventional wisdom, with, on the one hand, strong emphasis on neoclassical competitive markets and, on the other, calls for support for bottom-up nonmarket organisations (in producer groups, CBOs, other stakeholder groups, microfinance groups, and common property resource management groups, for example).
These alternative institutional arrangements are not parts of a competitive market
structure, but they can work, and policy analysis needs to catch up with praxis and
4
integrate them into an overall conceptual framework.
In addition to understanding the types of institutional change that may be required if
economies and communities are to climb out of the ‘low level equilibrium trap’
described above, we also need to look at the processes of institutional change. Our
analysis here draws strongly on seminal contributions by North on the relation between
different paths of institutional change and economic development (North, 1990; North,
1995; Davis and North, 1971; North and Weingast, 1989). North explains institutional
change in terms of powerful social groups that respond to perceived changes in relative
prices, technologies and transaction costs by modifying institutions to promote their
perceived interests. Institutional development therefore involves ‘path dependent’
processes influenced by different groups’ relative power and by their perceptions (of
possible opportunities and threats posed to their interests by alternative paths of
institutional and technological change or stagnation).
Implications for the livelihoods development agenda
Our analysis of markets and institutions has important implications for the livelihoods
development agenda as regards research, analysis, policy and local action.
We need to:
•
•
•
•
place our understanding of livelihoods and their development in a much more
explicit context of dynamic market and institutional change;
pay much more attention to understanding institutional arrangements and their
relationships with the institutional and political environment and with
technological change;
move away from preoccupation with neo-classical competitive markets;
look for viable incremental changes that benefit the poor, are ‘politically’
viable, and are consistent with longer-term processes of pro-poor institutional
and economic development.
4. Dorward et al. (2002a) present a fuller development of these arguments. Their analysis suggests that
investments in non-market institutional arrangements are likely to be more effective and efficient than
many investments in the wider institutional environment in situations of low density of economic activity,
and argue that major historical and current advances in economic growth and poverty reduction were
initiated by developments in institutional arrangement (for example, the East Asian Tigers, the Green
Revolution, and the Micro Finance Revolution).
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Andrew Dorward, Nigel Poole, Jamie Morrison, Jonathan Kydd and Ian Urey
In order to operationalise this agenda, these issues need to be made much more
explicit in formal livelihoods thinking. We have suggested elsewhere how goals and
principles of livelihood approaches should explicitly recognise the importance for
poverty reduction of sustained and equitable growth in the access of the poor to assets,
to economic opportunities, to rights, to health and education, and to technical and
institutional change (Dorward, 2001b). This requires less emphasis on service delivery
and provision (the ‘provider perspective’ (Shields, pers. comm.)) and more emphasis on
the economic and social workings of private activities and markets, from which the vast
majority of the poor gain their livelihoods as micro-entrepreneurs and workers. Service
delivery (whether it be infrastructure, health, education, or governance, for example)
should then be considered in terms of its support to and impact on these livelihoods.
For many, the ‘livelihoods approach’ is most simply encapsulated by the
sustainable livelihoods framework (Carney, 1998), and this can be amended to give
more explicit recognition to the importance and roles of markets, institutions and
technology in livelihood development (see Figure 3). This recasting of the ‘classical’
sustainable livelihoods framework introduces three main innovations.
First, it places demand for livelihood outputs at the centre of processes of
livelihood development. This requires a distinction between a livelihood strategy and its
component activities, which utilise inputs (assets) to produce outputs. The extent and
nature of demand for these outputs is critical in determining the immediate and longerterm micro-, meso- and macro- impacts and sustainability of development of livelihood
activities, as examined in our earlier discussion of linkages. The representation of this in
Figure 3 makes a number of points:
•
•
•
demand must be effective (that is, must be able to pay for the outputs in some
way, feeding into livelihood assets or outcomes) but this does not have to be
mediated through markets – there may be other institutional mechanisms that
achieve this, with a wide variety of intra- and inter-household social relations,
including interlocking arrangements, familial and clan-based ties, and
patronage, as well as different market relations;
demand may be embedded in the local or wider economy, and may therefore
have different linkage characteristics;
demand may itself be affected by livelihood outcomes.
The second set of innovations in Figure 3 is the location and content of the ‘policies and
5
institutions’ box. Its location emphasises (a) its interactions with the vulnerability
context, and (b) the way that policies and institutions and the vulnerability context
affect all livelihood components. The contents of the box give particular emphasis to
issues of access, specifically to interactions between access, markets, power, rights and
services. These policies and institutions may affect access to any livelihood component
– for example, access to demand, access to different assets, access to benefits from
livelihoods, and access to technologies – and structuring the framework this way may
make it easier to relate the livelihoods approach to health and education.
5. The term ‘processes’ is dropped from this as the whole framework is concerned with different types of
process and it seems unhelpful and confusing to highlight one particular (and ill defined) set of processes
here.
Figure 3: Modified sustainable livelihoods framework
Effective demand
Local
Wider
market/non-market
Physical, social,
natural, human,
financial
Livelihood strategies
Activities
Outputs
Vulnerability context
Shocks, trends
seasonality
Livelihood outcomes
Policies and Institutions
Markets
Power
Access
Services
Rights
Markets, Institutions and Technology: Missing Links in Livelihoods Analysis
Livelihood assets
Source: Dorward (2001b).
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Andrew Dorward, Nigel Poole, Jamie Morrison, Jonathan Kydd and Ian Urey
Finally, technology is largely ignored in the ‘classical’ sustainable livelihoods
framework and it is not easy to find a place to locate it, but institutional and
technological changes have together been the drivers and facilitators of most economic
and social development. Technology is not explicitly included in Figure 3 either, but the
revised framework offers two critical leverage points where technology’s impact on
livelihoods can be identified. First, the specific identification of activities and outputs
within the transformation of livelihood assets into livelihood outcomes allows us to
identify the critical micro-role of technology in changing input:output (or asset:output)
relations in livelihood activities, and to relate that to the role of institutions in changing
these relations. Second, the meso- and macro-roles of technology can be related to the
‘policies and institutions’ box, where the impacts of technology on services, markets,
power and rights can be explored (impacts of changes in health, education, or
communications technology might be traced from here, for example).
While livelihoods thinking and approaches need to escape from the ‘provider
perspective’, they must also clarify thinking about the processes and impacts of change
on poor people’s livelihoods, and identify ‘entry points’ for the promotion of beneficial
change. This is another area where conventional livelihoods thinking may be criticised.
It has provided an admirable checklist for thinking about the major elements affecting
livelihoods (as discussed in the introduction to this article), and in particular for
emphasising the importance and diversity of assets underlying livelihoods, but it has not
provided a unifying conceptual framework relating outside interventions to their
livelihood impacts. Given donors’ near-universal reliance on goal-oriented logical
frameworks in programme funding and management, this is a surprising omission. It
may be largely due to the SL framework’s lack of analysis of the role of institutions and
of technology (or productivity) in livelihoods and in the economies and societies of
which they are a part.
If, however, institutions and technology are related to livelihood assets, a simple
but powerful framework emerges to relate widely different kinds of intervention to
potential livelihood impacts. This is illustrated in Figure 4, which identifies four major
types of intervention: promoting technical innovation, asset building, an enabling
environment, and appropriate institutional arrangements. These should change
livelihood assets, either directly or indirectly (as shown by the vertical arrows). Three
important attributes of livelihood assets are highlighted (their productivity, the portfolio
6
of assets held, and access to them), and changes in these will, in turn, impact on
livelihood outcomes. While Figure 4 ignores the complexity of multiple processes
linking interventions and impacts, it nevertheless provides a unifying map of the main
pathways by which different health, education, enterprise development, agriculture,
governance and infrastructure programmes, for example, seek to improve livelihoods
and combat poverty.
6. See Dorward et al., 2001b for further discussion of asset roles in livelihoods.
Figure 4: Entry points and livelihood change
Livelihood/poverty
impacts
Livelihood changes
Technical innovation
Asset
productivity
Targeted asset building
Enabling environment
Improved and
sustainable well
being
Asset
portfolio
Institutional arrangements
feedbacks
Asset
access
Markets, Institutions and Technology: Missing Links in Livelihoods Analysis
Entry points
329
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Andrew Dorward, Nigel Poole, Jamie Morrison, Jonathan Kydd and Ian Urey
Conclusion
Increased emphasis on understanding livelihoods and on designing programmes to
support livelihood development has had many benefits, and represents a valuable
advance in development thinking and practice. However, its wider adoption and
contribution to programme design and implementation are limited by a lack of relatively
simple conceptualisations of the roles of markets, institutions and technology in
livelihoods and economic and social development. Such conceptualisations are
important, and can be built into conventional livelihood conceptualisations without
complicating them too much. These can offer significant benefits in increasing the
effectiveness and scope of livelihood analysis in the design of a wider variety of
programmes aimed at attacking poverty.
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