Download Dual-use governance in synthetic biology

Dual-use Governance in Synthetic
Biology
Promises, Hype and Security
Brett Edwards, University of Bath
Back ground
• PhD thesis
– Why do some aspects of Synthetic Biology attract
dual-use concern and not others?
• Case studies: US and UK
• Qualitative historical/ constructivist approach.
» Security Studies, Risk, STS
– National level focus
Overview
1) Studying ‘what isn’t there’
2) Synthetic Biology A Case in Point
3) Findings
Studying what isn’t there(1)
Which approach to adopt
for the purposes of the
research?
- Ethical ‘Gold Standard’?
- Existing risk assessment
frameworks?
- Contrast stated objectives
with actual achievements
in key institutions?
- Contrast experiences ‘on
the ground’ with
policy/academic
literature.
Studying what isn’t there(2)
• Key aim is to examine political processes
which have underpinned the emergence of
policy outcomes.
– Agency
– Institutions/ structures
– Ideas
• Want to examine changes in ‘the feasible ’
with regard policy as well as implementation.
Focus of analysis
Subject and
Scope
National
Approach
Politics
and
Practice
Studying what isn’t there(3)
Key Concepts
• Four Domains of Governance
Studying what isn’t there(3)
Key Concepts (2)
Primary and Secondary Securitization
- New channels/ forums
- Implementation politics
Fair Explanation?
Underlying causal
mechanisms
Unearthing norms:
S&T and risk
Provision of a theoretical
lens
Synthetic Biology A Case in Point
What is Synthetic Biology (1)?
• Defined initially by funding councils
– Fed into ethical framings in Both the US and UK
• EU Ethics reports and SynBerc.
•
•
•
•
Promissory
Interdisciplinary
Controllable Biology/ Controllable Risks
Applications of Engineering Principles?
What is Synthetic Biology (2)?
• Six subfields (Lam et al 2009)
– DNA circuits
• standard biological parts
– Synthetic metabolic pathways
• biological synthesis of chemicals
– Proto-cell creation
• model of a cell
– Unnatural components
• New proteins, with functions
– Synthetic Microbial Consortia
• Cells, working together
Dual-use concerns about synthetic
Biology (1)
• Spread of concern
– DNA Synthesis  Academic Field  Amateur
Community
• Key areas of concern.
– Scenarios/ and pre-existing concerns with
oversight.
Dual-use concerns about synthetic
Biology (1)
Key findings
• Roles and successes and failings of specific institutions
– NSABB/ ELSI dead zone
• Rhetoric belies little governmental interest
• Simularity of US and UK
– ELSI is king
• Role of concerns about ‘Top- down’ Securitization
• Externalisation of dual-use concerns about biodefense
• Patch-work of responses.
Further questions
• Risk and dual-use
• Generalizability
– Other fields/ other countries
• Future relevance of ELSI in Synbio?
• Militarization
Thank you!