Download Evaluation of parties and coalitions with regard to party manifestos

Evaluation of parties and
coalitions with regard to
party manifestos
Andranik Tangian
Hans-Böckler Foundation D-40476 Düsseldorf
University of Karlsruhe D-76128
[email protected]
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Andranik Tangian. 10th Meeting of Society for SCW, Moscow, HSE
23.07.2010
Agenda
1 Introduction
2 Model for elections 2005
3 Evaluation of parties
4 Evaluation of coalitions
5 Summary
6 Extension of the model to elections 2009
7 Mathematical annex
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Andranik Tangian. 10th Meeting of Society for SCW, Moscow, HSE
23.07.2010
1.1 Introduction: Bundestagswahl
2005
SPD (social democrats)
CDU/CSU (conservators)
Green (ecologists)
FDP (neoliberals)
Left-Party (left social democrats
& communists)
19 minor parties
3
% Votes
34.2
35.2
8.1
9.8
8.7
4.0
Andranik Tangian. 10th Meeting of Society for SCW, Moscow, HSE
23.07.2010
1.2 Introduction: Data (2005 on
party manifestos)
Opinions of parties and unions
SPD CDU Green FDP
Weighting
LeftParty
Unions
Expert
Google
Relax the protection
against dismissals
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
5
25300
Sector-dependent
minimal wages
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
4
367
Statutory minimal
wage
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
3
32500
Combined wages
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
3
54000
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23.07.2010
1.3 Introduction: Methodology
Data like for the Wahl-O-Mat
representation of programs by Yes/No answers
Task is different
Wahl-O-Mat: fit single voters to parties
Our model: fit parties to the electorate
Method:
indicators of popularity and universality
Goal of the paper
to evaluateve leading parties and coalitions
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23.07.2010
2.1 Model: Representativeness
2.2 Model: Indicators
Popularity: % of the electorate
represented, averaged on 95 questions
 spatial aspect of representativeness
Universality: frequency of representing a
majority
 temporal aspect of representativeness
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23.07.2010
3.1 Evaluation of parties: Indices
3.4 Evaluation of parties:
Implications
SPD is the most popular and universal
party
 in spite of shortage of votes
High representativeness of trade unions
 no interrogation of public opinion
Weighting plays a negligible role
 henceforth, only unweighted indicators
are considered
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23.07.2010
4.1 Evaluation of coalitions:
Definitions
Unanimity of a coalition is the weight of
questions with unanimous opinions of
coalition members
Proportionality of impact to weight
 on non-unanimous questions, the impact of
coalition fractions (probability that the opinion
is decisive) is proportional to their size
 total uncertainty (equal chances of alternative
opinions)
 both factors are considered with weights
p and (1 - p),
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0≤p≤1
Andranik Tangian. 10th Meeting of Society for SCW, Moscow, HSE
23.07.2010
4.2 Evaluation of coalitions:
Definitions (continued)
Popularity of coalition is its expected
representativeness
Universality of a coalition is ist expected
rounded representativeness
Accuracy of prediction of the
indicators is the standard deviation of
representativeness and of rounded
representativeness
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Andranik Tangian. 10th Meeting of Society for SCW, Moscow, HSE
23.07.2010
4.3 Evaluation of coalitions:
Indices
4.4 Evaluation of coalitions:
Principal component analysis
Principal components
Popularity
First
axis
0.0568
Second
axis
-0.2327
Third
axis
-0.9709
Universality
0.2677
-0.9333
0.2394
0.9618
24.9417
0.2735
8.3166
-0.0093
3.3827
Unanimity
Std deviation of w.r.t.
axes
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Andranik Tangian. 10th Meeting of Society for SCW, Moscow, HSE
23.07.2010
4.5 Evaluation of coalitions:
Implications
Coalition SPD/CDU (now in power) has
high popularity but low unanimity and
mediocre universality
Coalition SPD/Green/Left-Party (much
discussed but not realized) has higher
unanimity, lower popularity but much
higher universality
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23.07.2010
4.6 Evaluation of coalitions:
Implications (continued)
Coalition CDU/FDP (held before the
elections) has a higher unanimity but
low indices of popularity and
universality
Coalition SPD/Green/Left-Party (failed
due to personal conicts between party
leaders) might be the best alternative
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23.07.2010
5
Summary
The indices of popularity and universality
are derived from votes and party
manifestos for parties, their coalitions,
and trade unions
The SPD was the most representative party,
although it was not the election winner
A better alternative to the actual coalition
CDU/SPD: SPD/ Green/Left-Party
Simple computing algorithms
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23.07.2010
6.1 Remake for elections 2009
(Matthias Hölzlein)
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23.07.2010
6.2 Evaluation of the remake 2009
The SPD is the most popular party (65%)
FDP the is most universal
The CDU/CSU as the strongest party in
parliament has only mediocre indicators
Contradiction to the shares of votes
received: Electors, seem to pay more
attention to the traditional image of parties
rather than to what they vote for
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23.07.2010
6.3 Electorate profile for
32 Wal-o-mat questions
Survey data on balance of opinions on each
question:
Opinion polls like of the Politbarometer by
institutes Wahlen or Forsa
6 of 38 Wal-o-mat questions 2009 are not
covered by the polls and are omitted
A few questions from the retained ones are
matched to survey questions
Equal weighting of questions
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23.07.2010
6.4 Model 2009 for directly
estimated electorate profiles
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23.07.2010
6.5 Evaluation 2009 for directly
estimated electorate profiles
Under the direct method, the three left/
socialist parties are most popular and
universal. The Left-Party is the strongest.
The two governing parties CDU/CSU and
FDP have the lowest indicators
Electors vote for the parties with whom they
disagree on most of issues:
Irrational behavior of the electorate?
Left-Parties are considered populist rather than
reliable for government work?
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23.07.2010
7.1 Mathematical annex
Notation
q dichotomous questions
μ  {q } weights of q (probabilitymeasure)
c candidates for election (parties)
B  {bqc }, bqc  1, matrix of candidate opinions
ξ  {c } candidate weights (probability votes received)
a  {aq }  Bξ balance of opinions in the society
a  1 abs(signa) vector of indicators of tie opinions
a . b element-by-element product of vectors
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23.07.2010
7.2 Mathematical annex
Definitions (parties)
Representativeness:

 weight of protagonists if
rqc  

 weight of antagonists if
Pc   q rqc popularity of c
bqc  1
bqc  1
q
Uc 
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
qrqc 05
q   q round[rqc ] universality of c
q
Andranik Tangian. 10th Meeting of Society for SCW, Moscow, HSE
23.07.2010
7.3 Mathematical annex
Theorem 1 (indices of parties)
1 1
{Pc }   (μ. a)B
2 2
1 1
1
{Uc }   μ'  a  (μ  signa)B
2 2
2
Analogy with force vectors in physics:
The most popular (universal) candidate has
the largest projection of his opinion vector
bc on the µ-weighted social vector of
balance of opinions, respectively, of
majority opinion
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23.07.2010
7.4 Mathematical annex
Definitions (coalitions)
C
coalition (subset of candidates)
 C
ξ   c 

C
C
B  {bqc 
C

C

c
cC
c C}
matrix of member opinions
C C
b  bq  B ξ
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c


c  C  member weights

balance of coalition opinions
Andranik Tangian. 10th Meeting of Society for SCW, Moscow, HSE
23.07.2010
7.5 Mathematical annex
Theorem 2.1 (on coalitions)
C
Unanimity of C  1  μs
C C
1


PC  PC  (1  p)(μ  a)  s .b 
2


1
C C
UC  UC  (1  p)(μ  signa)'  s  b  
2


where
C
 C


 q








s  s  sign n 
PC 
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C

cC
c
Pc ,




cq  



b
cC
UC 

n is the number of members
Pc
weighted member indicators
C

cC
c
Andranik Tangian. 10th Meeting of Society for SCW, Moscow, HSE
23.07.2010
7.6 Mathematical annex
Theorem 2.2 (on coalitions)
If the coalition opinions on nonunanimous questions are
independent (= independent
negotiations on every question) then
C 
C

1

2
2
2 

V rC  μ  a  . '  s   1  p b   



4



C 
C

1

2
2
2 

V round[rC ] μ  signa  . '  s  1  p b   

  
4



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Andranik Tangian. 10th Meeting of Society for SCW, Moscow, HSE
23.07.2010