Download Semantic Underdetermination and the Cognitive Uses of Language

Semantic Underdetermination and the Cognitive Uses of
Language
Fernando Martínez-Manrique (Univ. del País Vasco) [email protected]
Agustín Vicente (Universidad de Valladolid) [email protected]
The “communicative view” of language is arguably the prevailing position in cognitive
science. According to it, language expresses thought but it is not to be confused with
thought itself: thought has its own representational resources. Challenging this account,
Peter Carruthers has been defending a “cognitive view” of language that holds that it is
possible to think in one’s natural language. The starting point of his argument is that our
own introspection reveals that we do use language when we think. He has recently
strengthened his case by means of modularist considerations regarding the nature of
linguistic processing mechanisms as an input/output system. His conclusion is that nondomain-specific thinking operates by accessing and manipulating the representations in
logical form of the language faculty.
In this paper we will argue that the phenomenon of semantic underdetermination
poses a threat to the cognitive view. Drawing upon an argument by Fodor, we will show
how the link between semantic underdetermination and non-compositionality
undermines Carruthers’s project. Yet, we will identify two different arguments, arguing
that one of them (Fodor’s) cannot be correct. Having identified the right argument
(Recanati’s), we will explore two possible ways out for the cognitive view. One of them
exploits the possibilities of explicitation that natural language itself offers. Apart from
being weak, we will contend that it runs counter to the introspectivist evidence on which
Carruthers bases his proposal. The second way out is stronger, allowing a distinction of
levels in the mind that parallels the pragmatic distinction of meanings. Yet, we will
show that, in taking this move, Carruthers would reverse the direction of the evidence
on which he intends to ground his theory. Finally, we will sketch a (milder) view of the
role of language in thought that, while allowing a limited use of language in cognition,
as a specialized tool, does not have to face the consequences of semantic
underdetermination.