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FIN 324 Financial Institutions in Hong Kong and Global Banking Week 1 Introduction: Financial System and Financial Intermediation Mishkin (2012): Chapter 2 Overview of the Financial System Additional notes: Asymmetric Information Copyright © 2009 Pearson Prentice Hall. All rights reserved. 2-1 Additional notes: Asymmetric Information: A situation where one party to a market transaction has much more information about a product or service than the other. Copyright © 2009 Pearson Prentice Hall. All rights reserved. 2-2 Moral Hazard Problem: There is a tendency of one party to a contract to alter his/her behaviour in ways that are costly to the other party. Adverse Selection Problem: Information known by the first party to a contract is unknown to the second and, as a result, the second party incurs major costs. Copyright © 2009 Pearson Prentice Hall. All rights reserved. 2-3 Used Cars: The Market for “Lemons” A new car loses much of its market value as the buyers drives it off the sales lot. The question is, why? Copyright © 2009 Pearson Prentice Hall. All rights reserved. 2-4 One explanation relates to inadequate information about used cars, some are good and some are “lemons” of poor quality. Copyright © 2009 Pearson Prentice Hall. All rights reserved. 2-5 Consumers cannot distinguish the good from the defective, so a single price emerges for used cars, which roughly reflects the average-quality car. Copyright © 2009 Pearson Prentice Hall. All rights reserved. 2-6 This leads to an adverse selection problem. Owner of lemons have an incentive to sell their cars because the average price is above that for the low-quality car they own. Copyright © 2009 Pearson Prentice Hall. All rights reserved. 2-7 Therefore, there will be proportionately more low-quality cars offered than good-quality cars whose owners hold onto them rather than offer them at the average-quality price. Copyright © 2009 Pearson Prentice Hall. All rights reserved. 2-8 At the extreme, only lemons would appear on the used-car market, but even without the extreme, this theory offers one explanation of the pricing of used cars. Copyright © 2009 Pearson Prentice Hall. All rights reserved. 2-9