Download Individual Change is not enough!

Aff K Framework A2
Individual Change is not enough!
1. Public advocacy solutions key to change governmental policy---individual
change insufficient
Climate Change Communications Advisory Group 10—Climate Change Communication Advisory Group. Dr Adam Corner School
of Psychology, Cardiff University - Dr Tom Crompton Change Strategist, WWF-UK - Scott Davidson Programme Manager, Global Action Plan - Richard Hawkins Senior Researcher, Public
Interest Research Centre - Professor Tim Kasser, Psychology department, Knox College, Galesburg, Illinois, USA. - Dr Renee Lertzman, Center for Sustainable Processes & Practices, Portland
State University, US. - Peter Lipman, Policy Director, Sustrans. - Dr Irene Lorenzoni, Centre for Environmental Risk, University of East Anglia. - George Marshall, Founding Director, Climate
Outreach , Information Network - Dr Ciaran Mundy, Director, Transition Bristol - Dr Saffron O’Neil, Department of Resource Management and Geography, University of Melbourne, Australia. Professor Nick Pidgeon, Director, Understanding Risk Research Group, School of Psychology, Cardiff University. - Dr Anna Rabinovich, School of Psychology, University of Exeter - Rosemary
Randall, Founder and director of Cambridge Carbon Footprint - Dr Lorraine Whitmarsh, School of Psychology, Cardiff University & Visiting Fellow at the, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change
Research. (Communicating climate change to mass public audience, http://pirc.info/downloads/communicating_climate_mass_audiences.pdf)
This short advisory paper
collates a set of recommendations about how best to shape mass public communications aimed at increasing concern about climate change and motivating commensurate behavioural changes.¶ Its focus is not upon
marshals evidence about how best to motivate the ambitious and
systemic behavioural change that is necessary – including, crucially, greater public engagement with
the policy process
Political leaders themselves
have drawn attention to the imperative for more vocal public pressure to create the ‘political space’
for them to enact more ambitious policy interventions.
individuals making small
private-sphere behavioural changes
do not, in themselves,
represent a proportional response
Don’t be
distracted by the myth that ‘every little helps’. If everyone does a little, we’ll achieve only a little
motivating small private-sphere behavioural changes on a piece-meal basis. Rather, it
(through, for example, lobbying decision-makers and elected representatives, or participating in demonstrations), as well as major lifestyle changes. ¶
1 While this paper does not dismiss the value of
(for example, adopting simple domestic energy efficiency measures) it is clear that such behaviours
to the challenge of climate change. As David MacKay, Chief Scientific Advisor to the UK Department of Energy and Climate change writes: “
” (MacKay,
2008).¶ The task of campaigners and communicators from government, business and non-governmental organisations must therefore be to motivate both (i) widespread adoption of ambitious private-sphere behavioural changes; and (ii) widespread acceptance of – and indeed active
demand for – ambitious new policy interventions.¶ Current public communication campaigns, as orchestrated by government, business and non-governmental organisations, are not achieving these changes. This paper asks: how should such communications be designed if they are to
have optimal impact in motivating these changes? The response to this question will require fundamental changes in the ways t hat many climate change communication campaigns are currently devised and implemented. ¶ This advisory paper offers a list of principles that could be used
to enhance the quality of communication around climate change communications. The authors are each engaged in continuously sifting the evidence from a range of sub-disciplines within psychology, and reflecting on the implications of this for improving climate change
communications. Some of the organisations that we represent have themselves at times adopted approaches which we have both learnt from and critique in this paper – so some of us have first hand experience of the need for on-going improvement in the strategies that we deploy. ¶
The changes we advocate will be challenging to enact – and will require vision and leadership on the part of the organisations adopting them. But without such vision and leadership, we do not believe that public communication campaigns on climate change will create the necessary
behavioural changes – indeed, there is a profound risk that many of today’s campaigns will actually prove counter-productive. ¶ Seven Principles¶ 1. Move Beyond Social Marketing¶ We believe that too little attention is paid to the understanding that psychologists bring to strategies for
motivating change, whilst undue faith is often placed in the application of marketing strategies to ‘sell’ behavioural changes. Unfortunately, in the context of am bitious pro-environmental behaviour, such strategies seem unlikely to motivate systemic behavioural change.¶ Social
marketing is an effective way of achieving a particular behavioural goal – dozens of practical examples in the field of health behaviour attest to this. Social marketing is really more of a framework for designing behaviour change programmes than a behaviour change programme - it offers
a method of maximising the success of a specific behavioural goal. Darnton (2008) has described social marketing as ‘explicitly transtheoretical’, while Hastings (2007), in a recent overview of social marketing, claimed that there is no theory of social marketing. Rather, it is a ‘what works’
philosophy, based on previous experience of similar campaigns and programmes. Social marketing is flexible enough to be applied to a range of different social domains, and this is undoubtedly a fundamental part of its appeal.¶ However, social marketing’s 'what works' status also means
that it is agnostic about the longer term, theoretical merits of different behaviour change strategies, or the cultural values that specific campaigns serve to strengthen. Social marketing dictates that the most effective strategy should be chosen, where effective means ‘most likely to
achieve an immediate behavioural goal’. ¶ This means that elements of a behaviour change strategy designed according to the principles of social marketing may conflict with other, broader goals. What if the most effective way of promoting pro-environmental behaviour ‘A’ was to
pursue a strategy that was detrimental to the achievement of long term pro-environmental strategy ‘Z’? The principles of social marketing have no capacity to resolve this conflict – they are limited to maximising the success of the immediate behavioural programme. This is not a flaw of
social marketing – it was designed to provide tools to address specific behavioural problems on a piecemeal basis. But it is an important limitation, and one that has significant implications if social marketing techniques are used to promote systemic behavioural change and public
engagement on an issue like climate change. ¶ 2. Be honest and forthright about the probable impacts of climate change, and the scale of the challenge we confront in avoiding these. But avoid deliberate attempts to provoke fear or guilt. ¶ There is no merit in ‘dumbing down’ the
scientific evidence that the impacts of climate change are likely to be severe, and that some of these impacts are now almost certainly unavoidable. Accepting the impacts of climate change will be an important stage in motivating behavioural responses aimed at mitigating the problem.
However, deliberate attempts to instil fear or guilt carry considerable risk. ¶ Studies on fear appeals confirm the potential for fear to change attitudes or verbal expressions of concern, but often not actions or behaviour (Ruiter et al., 2001). The impact of fear appeals is context - and
audience - specific; for example, for those who do not yet realise the potentially ‘scary’ aspects of climate change, people need to first experience themselves as vulnerable to the risks in some way in order to feel moved or affected (Das et al, 2003; Hoog et al, 2005). As people move
towards contemplating action, fear appeals can help form a behavioural intent, providing an impetus or spark to ‘move’ from; however such appeals must be coupled with constructive information and support to reduce the sense of danger (Moser, 2007). The danger is that fear can also
be disempowering – producing feelings of helplessness, remoteness and lack of control (O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole, 2009). Fear is likely to trigger ‘barriers to engagement’, such as denial2 (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001; Weber, 2006; Moser and Dilling, 2007; Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole &
Whitmarsh, 2007). The location of fear in a message is also relevant; it works better when placed first for those who are inclined to follow the advice, but better second for those who aren't (Bier, 2001).¶ Similarly, studies have shown that guilt can play a role in motivating people to take
action but can also function to stimulate defensive mechanisms against the perceived threat or challenge to one’s sense of identity (as a good, moral person). In the latter case, behaviours may be left untouched (whether driving a SUV or taking a flight) as one defends against any feelings
of guilt or complicity through deployment of a range of justifications for the behaviour (Ferguson & Branscombe, 2010). ¶ Overall, there is a need for emotionally balanced representations of the issues at hand. This will involve acknowledging the ‘affective reality’ of the situation, e.g. “We
know this is scary and overwhelming, but many of us feel this way and we are doing something about it”.¶ 3. Be honest and forthright about the impacts of mitigating and adapting to climate change for current lifestyles, and the ‘l oss’ - as well as the benefits - that these will entail.
Narratives that focus exclusively on the ‘up-side’ of climate solutions are likely to be unconvincing. While narratives about the future impacts of climate change may highlight the loss of much that we currently hold to be dear, narratives about climate solutions frequently ignore the
question of loss. If the two are not addressed concurrently, fear of loss may be ‘split off’ and projected into the future, where it is all too easily denied. This can be dangerous, because accepting loss is an important step towards working through the associated emotions, and emerging
with the energy and creativity to respond positively to the new situation (Randall, 2009). However, there are plenty of benefits (besides the financial ones) of a low-carbon lifestyle e.g., health, community/social interaction - including the ‘intrinsic' goals mentioned below. It is important to
be honest about both the losses and the benefits that may be associated with lifestyle change, and not to seek to separate out one from the other.¶ 3a. Avoid emphasis upon painless, easy steps. ¶ Be honest about the limitations of voluntary private-sphere behavioural change, and the
need for ambitious new policy interventions that incentivise such changes, or that regulate for them. People know that the scope they have, as individuals, to help meet the challenge of climate change is extremely limited. For many people, it is perfectly sensible to continue to adopt
high-carbon lifestyle choices whilst simultaneously being supportive of government interventions that would make these choices more difficult for everyone. ¶ The adoption of small-scale private sphere behavioural changes is sometimes assumed to lead people to adopt ever more
difficult (and potentially significant) behavioural changes. The empirical evidence for this ‘foot-in-thedoor’ effect is highly equivocal. Some studies detect such an effect; others studies have found the reverse effect (whereby people tend to ‘rest on their laurels’ having adopted a few
simple behavioural changes - Thogersen and Crompton, 2009). Where attention is drawn to simple and painless privatesphere behavioural changes, these should be urged in pursuit of a set of intrinsic goals (that is, as a r esponse to people’s understanding about the contribution that such
behavioural change may make to benefiting their friends and family, their community, the wider world, or in contributing to their growth and development as individuals) rather than as a means to achieve social status or greater financial success. Adopting behaviour in pursuit of intrinsic
goals is more likely to lead to ‘spillover’ into other sustainable behaviours (De Young, 2000; Thogersen and Crompton, 2009).¶ People aren’t stupid: they know that if there are wholesale changes in the global climate underway, these will not be reversed merely through checking their
tyre pressures or switching their TV off standby. An emphasis upon simple and painless steps suppresses debate about those necessary responses that are less palatable – that will cost people money, or that will infringe on cherished freedoms (such as to fly). Recognising this will be a key
step in accepting the reality of loss of aspects of our current lifestyles, and in beginning to work through the powerful emotions that this will engender (Randall, 2009). ¶ 3b. Avoid over-emphasis on the economic opportunities that mitigating, and adapting to, climate change may provide.
¶ There will, undoubtedly, be economic benefits to be accrued through investment in new technologies, but there will also be instances where the economic imperative and the climate change adaptation or mitigation imperative diverge, and periods of economic uncertainty for many
people as some sectors contract. It seems inevitable that some interventions will have negative economic impacts (Stern, 2007).¶ Undue emphasis upon economic imperatives serves to reinforce the dominance, in society, of a set of extrinsic goals (focussed, for example, on financial
benefit). A large body of empirical research demonstrates that these extrinsic goals are antagonistic to the emergence of pro-social and proenvironmental concern (Crompton and Kasser, 2009).¶ 3c. Avoid emphasis upon the opportunities of ‘green consumerism’ as a response to climate
change.¶ As mentioned above (3b), a large body of research points to the antagonism between goals directed towards the acquisition of material objects and the emergence of pro-environmental and pro-social concern (Crompton and Kasser, 2009). Campaigns to ‘buy green’ may be
effective in driving up sales of particular products, but in conveying the impression that climate change can be addressed by ‘buying the right things’, they risk undermining more difficult and systemic changes. A recent study found that people in an experiment who purchased ‘green’
products acted less altruistically on subsequent tasks (Mazar & Zhong, 2010) – suggesting that small ethical acts may act as a ‘moral offset’ and licence undesirable behaviours in other domains. This does not mean that private-sphere behaviour changes will always lead to a reduction in
subsequent pro-environmental behaviour, but it does suggest that the reasons used to motivate these changes are critically important. Better is to emphasise that ‘every little helps a little’ – but that these changes are only the beginning of a process that must also incorporate more
ambitious private-sphere change and significant collective action at a political level.¶ 4. Empathise with the emotional responses that will be engendered by a forthright presentation of the probable impacts of climate change. ¶ Belief in climate change and support for low-carbon policies
will remain fragile unless people are emotionally engaged. We should expect people to be sad or angry, to feel guilt or shame, to yearn for that which is lost or to search for more comforting answers (Randall, 2009). Providing support and empathy in working through the painful emotions
of 'grief' for a society that must undergo changes is a prerequisite for subsequent adaptation to new circumstances.¶ Without such support and empathy, it is more likely that people will begin to deploy a range of maladaptive ‘coping strategies’, such as denial of personal responsibility,
blaming others, or becoming apathetic (Lertzman, 2008). An audience should not be admonished for deploying such strategies – this would in itself be threatening, and could therefore harden resistance to positive behaviour change (Miller and Rolnick, 2002). The key is not to dismiss
people who exhibit maladaptive coping strategies, but to understand how they can be made more adaptive. People who feel socially supported will be more likely to adopt adaptive emotional responses - so facilitating social support for proenvironmental behaviour is crucial.¶ 5. Promote
pro-environmental social norms and harness the power of social networks¶ One way of bridging the gap between private-sphere behaviour changes and collective action is the promotion of pro-environmental social norms. Pictures and videos of ordinary people (‘like me’) engaging in
significant proenvironmental actions are a simple and effective way of generating a sense of social normality around pro-environmental behaviour (Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein and Griskevicius, 2007). There are different reasons that people adopt social norms, and encouraging
people to adopt a positive norm simply to ‘conform’, to avoid a feeling of guilt, or for fear of not ‘fitting in’ is likely to produce a relatively shallow level of motivation for beha viour change. Where social norms can be combined with ‘intrinsic’ motivations (e.g. a sense of social belonging),
they are likely to be more effective and persistent.¶ Too often, environmental communications are directed to the individual as a single unit in the larger social system of consum ption and political engagement. This can make the problems feel too overwhelming, and evoke unmanageable
levels of anxiety. Through the enhanced awareness of what other people are doing, a strong sense of collective purpose can be engendered. One factor that is likely to influence whether adaptive or maladaptive coping strategies are selected in response to fear about climate change is
whether people feel supported by a social network – that is, whether a sense of ‘sustainable citizenship’ is fostered. The efficacy of groupbased programmes at promoting pro-environmental behaviour change has been demonstrated on numerous occasions – and participants in these
projects consistently point to a sense of mutual learning and support as a key reason for making and maintaining changes in behaviour (Nye and Burgess, 2008). There are few influences more powerful than an individual’s social network. Networks are instrumental not just in terms of
providing social support, but also by creating specific content of social identity – defining what it means to be “us”. If environmental norms are incorporated at this level (become defining for the group) they can result in significant behavioural change (also reinforced through peer
pressure).¶ Of course, for the majority of people, this is unlikely to be a network that has climate change at its core. But social networks – Trade Unions, Rugby Clubs, Mother & Toddler groups – still perform a critical role in spreading change through society. Encouraging and supporting
pre-existing social networks to take ownership of climate change (rather than approach it as a problem for ‘green groups’) is a critical task. As well as representing a crucial bridge between individuals and broader society, peer-to-peer learning circumnavigates many of the problems
associated with more ‘top down’ models of communication – not least that government representatives are perceived as untrustworthy (Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003). Peer-to-peer learning is more easily achieved in group-based dialogue than in designing public information films: But
public information films can nonetheless help to establish social norms around community-based responses to the challenges of climate change, through clear visual portrayals of people engaging collectively in the pro-environmental behaviour.¶ The discourse should be shifted
increasingly from ‘you’ to ‘we’ and from ‘I’ to ‘us’. This is starting to take place in emerging forms of community-based activism, such as the Transition Movement and Cambridge Carbon Footprint’s ‘Carbon Conversations’ model – both of which recognize the power of groups to help
support and maintain lifestyle and identity changes. A nationwide climate change engagement project using a group-based behaviour change model with members of Trade Union networks is currently underway, led by the Climate Outreach and Information Network. These projects
represent a method of climate change communication and engagement radically different to that typically pursued by the government – and may offer a set of approaches that can go beyond the limited reach of social marketing techniques.¶ One potential risk with appeals based on
social norms is that they often contain a hidden message. So, for example, a campaign that focuses on the fact that too many people take internal flights actually contains two messages – that taking internal flights is bad for the environment, and that lots of people are taking internal
flights. This second message can give those who do not currently engage in that behaviour a perverse incentive to do so, and campaigns to promote behaviour change should be very careful to avoid this. The key is to ensure that information about what is happening (termed descriptive
norms), does not overshadow information about what should be happening (termed injunctive norms). ¶ 6. Think about the language you use, but don’t rely on language alone¶ A number of recent publications have highlighted the results of focus group research and talk-back tests in
order to ‘get the language right’ (Topos Partnership, 2009; Western Strategies & Lake Research Partners, 2009), culminating in a series of suggestions for framing climate-change communications. For example, these two studies led to the suggestions that communicators should use the
term ‘global warming’ or ‘our deteriorating atmosphere’, respectively, rather than ‘climate change’. Other research has identified systematic differences in the way that people interpret the terms ‘climate change’ and ‘global warming’, with ‘global warming’ perceived as more emotionally
engaging than ‘climate change’ (Whitmarsh, 2009).¶ Whilst ‘getting the language right’ is important, it can only play a small part in a communication strategy. More important than the language deployed (i.e. ‘conceptual frames') are what have been referred to by some cognitive linguists
as 'deep frames'. Conceptual framing refers to catchy slogans and clever spin (which may or may not be honest). At a deeper level, framing refers to forging the connections between a debate or public policy and a set of deeper values or principles. Conceptual framing (crafting particular
messages focussing on particular issues) cannot work unless these messages resonate with a set of long-term deep frames.¶ Policy proposals which may at the surface level seem similar (perhaps they both set out to achieve a reduction in environmental pollution) may differ importantly
in terms of their deep framing. For example, putting a financial value on an endangered species, and building an economic cas e for their conservation ‘commodifies’ them, and makes them equivalent (at the level of deep frames) to other assets of the same value (a hotel chain, perhaps).
This is a very different frame to one that attempts to achieve the same conservation goals through the ascription of intrinsic value to such species – as something that should be protected in its own right.
Embedding particular deep
frames requires concerted effort
Private-sphere behavioural change is not enough, and may even at times become a
diversion from the more important process of bringing political pressure to bear on policy-makers.
(Lakoff, 2009), but is the beginning of a process that can build a broad, coherent cross-departmental response to climate change from government.¶ 7. Encourage public demonstrations of
frustration at the limited pace of government action¶
The
importance of public demonstrations of frustration at both the lack of political progress on climate change and the barriers presented by vested interests is widely recognised – including by government itself. Climate change communications, including government communication
campaigns, should work to normalise public displays of frustration with the slow pace of political change. Ockwell et al (2009) argued that communications can play a role in fostering demand for - as well as acceptance of - policy change. Climate change communication could (and should)
be used to encourage people to demonstrate (for example through public demonstrations) about how they would like structural barriers to behavioural/societal change to be removed.
Policy Debate Creates Necessary Skills for Social
Change to Occur in the Real World
1. Debate itself never a site for social change, but a place to develop skills for
change—bucking the topic prevents coalitions and creates unproductive
tension
Atchison and Panetta, 09 (Jarrod Atchison, Phd Rhetoric University of Georgia, Assistant Professor
and Director of debate at Wake Forest University, and Edward Panetta, Phd Rhetoric Associate Professor
University of Pitt and Director of Debate at Georgia, Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication,
Historical Developments and Issues for the Future, “Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication:
Issues for the Future,” The Sage Handbook of Rhetorical Studies, Lunsford, Andrea, ed. (Los Angeles:
Sage Publications Inc., 2009) p. 317-334)
The final problem with an individual debate round focus is the role of competition. Creating
community change through individual
debate rounds sacrifices the "community" portion of the change. Many teams that promote activiststrategies in debates
profess that they are more interested in creating change than winning debates. What is clear, however, is that thevast majority of teams that are not promoting
community change are very interested in winning debates. The
tension that is generated from the clash of these opposing
forces is tremendous. Unfortunately, this is rarely a productive tension. Forcing teams to consider their purpose in
debating, their style in debates, and their approach to evidence are allcritical aspects of being participants in the community. However, the dismissal of
the proposed resolution that the debaters have spent countless hours preparing for, in the name of a
community problem that the debaters often have little control over, does little to engender coalitions
of the willing. Should a debate team lose because its director or coach has been ineffective at recruiting minority participants? Should a debate team lose
because its coach or director holds political positions that are in opposition to the activist program? Competition has been a critical
component of the interest in intercollegiate debate from the beginning, and it does not help further
the goals of the debate community to dismiss competition in the name of community change.
Switch Side Debate Good
1. The purpose of debate should be determined by the unique role this forum can
play—instrumental switch side debate generates unique critical thinking
benefits—err aff because the benefits of their advocacy could be achieved in
alternate forums
Muir 93 [Star Muir, communication studies at George Mason University, 1993, Philosophy and Rhetoric
26.4, p. 291-2]
Firm moral commitment to a value system, however, along with a sense of moral identity, is founded in reflexive assessments of multiple
perspectives. Switch-side
debate is not simply a matter of speaking persuasively or organizing ideas
clearly (although it does involve these), but of understanding and mobilizing arguments to make an effective
case. Proponents of debating both sides observe that the debaters should prepare the best possible
case they can, given the facts and information available to them. This process at its core, involves
critical assessment and evaluation of arguments; it is a process of critical thinking not available with
many traditional teaching methods. We must progressively learn to recognize how often the concepts
of others are discredited by the concepts we use to justify ourselves to ourselves. We must come to
see how often our claims are compelling only when expressed in our own egocentric view. We can do
this if we learn the art of using concepts without living in them. This is possible only when the
intellectual act of stepping outside our own systems of belief has become second nature, a routine
and ordinary responsibility of everyday living. Neither academic schooling nor socialization has yet addressed this moral
responsibility, but switch-side debating fosters this type of role playing and generates reasoned moral positions based in part on values of
tolerance and fairness.
2. Switch side debate creates conviction which emerges from discussion, not prior
to it – debate exists to establish and refine positions so that ideas may be
subsequently chosen
Galloway, 7 –professor of communication at Samford University (Ryan, “DINNER AND CONVERSATION
AT THE ARGUMENTATIVE TABLE: RECONCEPTUALIZING DEBATE AS AN ARGUMENTATIVE DIALOGUE”,
Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28 (2007), ebsco)
Those who worry that competitive academic debate will cause debaters to lose their convictions, as
Greene and Hicks do in their 2005 article, confuse the cart with the horse. Conviction is not a priori to discussion,
it flows from it. A. Craig Baird argued, “Sound conviction depends upon a thorough understanding of the
controversial problem under consideration (1955, p. 5). Debate encourages rigorous training and scrutiny
of arguments before debaters declare themselves an advocate for a given cause. Debate creates an
ethical obligation to interrogate ideas from a neutral position so that they may be freely chosen
subsequently.
3. Sound conviction can only happen after thoroughly researching and debating
both sides of an issue – it is hypocritical and immoral not to require debaters to
defend both sides
Muir, 93 – Department of Communications at George Mason (Star A., “A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate,” Philosophy and
Rhetoric, Vol. 26, No. 4. Gale Academic Onefile)
In a tolerant context, convictions can still be formed regarding the appropriateness and utility of
differing values. Responding to the charge that switch-side debaters are hypocritical and sophistical,
Windes responds with a series of propositions: Sound conviction depends upon a thorough understanding of the
controversial problem under consideration. . . . This thorough understanding of the problem depends upon
careful analysis of the issues and survey of the major arguments and supporting evidence. . . , This measured analysis and examination of the evidence and
argument can best be done by the careful testing of each argument pro and con. . . . The learner's sound
conviction covering controversial questions [therefore] depends partly upon his experience in defending and/or rejecting
tentative affirmative and negative positions.""* Sound conviction, a key element of an individual's
moral identity, is thus closely linked to a reasoned assessment of both sides. Some have even suggested
that it would be immoral not to require debaters to defend both sides of the issues."" It does seem hypocritical to accept the
basic premise of debate, that two opposing accounts are present on everything, and then to allow students the comfort of their own untested convictions. Debate might be rendering
students a disservice, insofar as moral education is concerned, if it did not provide them some knowledge of alternative views
and the concomitant strength of a reasoned moral conviction.
AT FW about Prioritization of
Methodologies/Ontologies
1. Prioritization claims are counter-productive—a plurality of (methods /
ontologies), such as that of the affirmative
Andrew Bennett 13, government prof at Georgetown, The mother of all isms: Causal mechanisms and
structured pluralism in International Relations theory, European Journal of International Relations 2013
19:459
The political science subfield of International Relations (IR) continues to undergo debates on whether and in what sense it is a 'science,1 how it
should organize its inquiry into international politics, and how it should build and justify its theories. On one level, an
'inter-paradigm'
debate, while less prominent than during the 1990s, has continued to limp along among researchers who identify
their work as fitting within the research agenda of a grand school of thought, or 'ism,' and the scholar most closely associated with it,
including neorealism (Waltz, 1979), neoliberalism (Keohane, 1984), constructivism (Wendt, 1992), or occasionally Marxism (Wallerstein, 1974)
or feminism (Tickner, 1992). Scholars participating in this debate have often acted as if their preferred 4 ism' and its competitors were either
"paradigms" (following Kuhn, 1962) or "research programs' (as defined by Lakatos, 19701. and some have explicitly framed their approach as
paradigmatic or programmatic (Hopf, 1998).¶ A second level of the debate involves post-positivist critiques of IR as a "scientific' enterprise
(Lapid, 1989). While the vague label "post-positivist, encompasses a diverse group of scholars, frequent post-positivist themes include
arguments that observation
is theory-laden (Kuhn, 1962), that knowledge claims are always part of mechanisms
of power and that meaning is always social (Foucault, 1978), and that individual agents and social structures
are mutually constitutive (Wendt, 1992). Taken together, these arguments indicate that the social sciences face even more daunting
challenges than the physical sciences.¶ A third axis of contestation has been methodological, involving claims regarding the strengths and limits
of statistical, formal, experimental, qualitative case study, narrative, and other methods. In the last two decades the argument that there is
'one logic of inference1 and that this logic is 'explicated and formalized clearly in discussions of quantitative research methods' (King et al.,
1994: 3) has generated a useful debate that has clarified the similarities, differences, uses, and limits of alternative methods ( Brady and Collier,
2010; George and Bennett, 2005; Goertz and Mahoney, 2006).¶ These debates have each in their own way proved fruitful, increasing the
theoretical, epistemological, and methodological diversity of the field (Jordan el al., 2009). The IR subfield has also achieved considerable
progress in the last few decades in its theoretical and empirical understanding of important policy-relevant issues, including the interdemocratic peace, terrorism, peacekeeping, international trade, human rights, international law, international organizations, global
environmental politics, economic sanctions, nuclear proliteration, military intervention, civil and ethnic conflicts, and many other topics.¶ Yet
there is a widespread sense that this progress has arisen in spite of interparadigmatic debates rather than because of them. Several prominent
scholars, including Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein, have argued that although research cast within the framework of paradigmatic debates has
contributed useful concepts and findings, framing the IR field around inter-paradigmatic debates is ultimately distracting and even
counterproductive (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010; see also David Lake, 2011, and in this special issue, and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel
Nexon, 2009, and in this special issue). These scholars agree that IR researchers have misapplied Kuhn's notion of paradigms in ways that imply
that grand theories of tightly connected ideas — the isms — are the central focus of IR theorizing, and that such isms should compete until one
wins general consensus. Sil and Katzenstein argue that the remedy for this is to draw on pragmatist philosophers and build upon an 'eclectic'
mix of theories and methods to better understand the world (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010). In this view, no
single grand theory can
capture the complexities of political life, and the real explanatory weight is carried by more fine-grained theories about 'causal
mechanisms."¶ In this article I argue that those urging a pragmatic turn in IR are correct in their diagnosis of the drawbacks of paradigms and
their prescription tor using theories about causal mechanisms as the basis for explanatory progress in IR. Yet scholars are understandably
reluctant to jettison the "isms' and the inter-paradigmatic debate not only because they fear losing the theoretical and empirical contributions
made in the name of the isms, but because framing the field around the isms has proven a useful shorthand for classroom teaching and fieldwide discourse. The 'eclectic' label that Sil and Katzenstein propose can easily be misinterpreted in this regard, as the Merriam-Webster online
dictionary defines 'eclectic* as 'selecting what appears to be best in various doctrines, methods, or styles,' as Sil and Katzenstein clearly intend,
but it also includes as synonyms "indiscriminate" and 'ragtag.'1 By using the term 'eclecticism' and eschewing any analytic structure for
situating and translating among different examples of IR research, Sil and Katzenstein miss an opportunity to enable a discourse that is
structured as well as pluralistic, and that reaches beyond IR to the rest of the social sciences.¶ I maintain that in order to sustain the genuine
contributions made under the guise of the inter-paradigmatic debate and at the same time get beyond it to focus on causal mechanisms rather
than grand theoretical isms, four additional moves are necessary. First, given
that mechanism-based approaches are
generally embedded within a scientific realist philosophy of science, it is essential to clarify the
philosophical and definitional issues associated with scientific realism, as well as the benefits — and
costs — of making hypothesized causal mechanisms the locus of explanatory theories. As Christian Reus-Smit
argues in this special issue, IR theory cannot sidestep metatheoretical debates. Second, it is important to take post-positivist critiques seriously
and to articulate standards for theoretical progress, other than paradigmatic revolutions, that are defensible even if they are fallible. Third,
achieving a shift toward mechanismic explanations requires outlining the contributions that diverse methods can make to the study of causal
mechanisms. Finally, it is vital
to demonstrate that a focus on mechanisms can serve two key functional
roles that paradigms played for the IR subfield: first, providing a framework for cumulative theoretical progress;
and, second, constituting a useful, vivid, and structured vocabulary for communicating findings to
fellow scholars, students, political actors, and the public (see also Stefano Guzzini's article in this special issue). I argue
that the term 'structured pluralism' best captures this last move, as it conveys the sense that IR scholars can borrow the best ideas from
different theoretical traditions and social science disciplines in ways that allow both intelligible discourse and cumulative progress.¶ Alter briefly
outlining the problems associated with organizing the IR field around the "isms/ this article addresses each of these four tasks in turn. First, it
takes on the challenges of defining "causal mechanisms' and using them as the basis of theoretical explanations. Second, it acknowledges the
relevance and importance of post-positivist critiques of causal explanation, yet it argues that scientific realism and some approaches to
interpretivism are compatible, and that there are standards upon which they can agree for judging explanatory progress. Third, it very briefly
clarifies the complementary roles that alternative methods can play in elucidating theories about causal mechanisms. Finally, the article
presents a taxonomy of theories about social mechanisms to provide a pluralistic but structured framework for cumulative theorizing about
politics. This taxonomy provides a platform for developing typological theories — or what others in this special issue, following Robert Merton,
have called middle-range theories — on the ways in which combinations of mechanisms interact to produce outcomes. Here, I join Lake in this
special issue in urging that IR theorizing be centered around middle-range theories, and I take issue with Jackson and Nexon's suggestion herein
that such theorizing privileges correlational evidence, and their assertion that statistical evidence is inherently associated with Humean notions
of causation. I argue that my taxonomy of mechanisms offers a conceptual bridge to the paradigmatic isms in IR. adopting and organizing their
theoretical insights while leaving behind their paradigmatic pretensions. The article concludes that, among its other virtues, this
taxonomy can help reinvigorate dialogues between IR theory and the fields of comparative and
American politics, economics, sociology, psychology, and history, stimulating cross-disciplinary
discourses that have been inhibited by the scholasticism of IR's ingrown 'isms.'
No Such Thing as a Root Cause
1. The aff accesses the best explanation of violence, reject their root cause claims
Boucher 3 (Geoff, interdisciplinary PhD from U of Melbourne, lecturer in literary studies at Deakin
University, Australia, The Theory of Structuration & the Politics of the Third Way Reflexive Modernity,
http://ethicalpolitics.org/geoff-boucher/2001/politics8.htm)
Giddens theory is a theory of the uniqueness of modernity. The foundations of Giddens’ theory (structuration, the historical and political alternatives to historical
materialism) are employed in The Consequences of Modernity (1990) and Beyond Left and Right (1994) to theorise the contemporary social world. The main
difference between modernity and traditional social formations is the dynamism of the modern. A second feature is the existence of modern institutions: the nation
state, modern political systems, mechanised and technological production, wage labour, commodification and urbanisation. Three processes generate the
dynamism of modernity: the separation of time and space (“space-time distanciation”); the “disembedding” mechanism of modern culture; modernity’s selfreflexive character. organisational form of process of modernity Modernity begins in Europe at the start of the 1600s. The organisational
forms of
modernity are conditioned by a four dimensional process (already seen in the analysis of the nation state): surveillance
potential, military power, capitalism and industrialisation. The diagram below represents the institutional dimensions of
modernity: The precondition for the efficient operation of a modern enterprise or institution is “space-time distanciation,” that is, the ability to coordinate the
actions of persons distributed through time and space, and not necessarily present for face-to-face interactions. Time is standardised and globalised, while space is
reconfigured politically and mapped as an abstract terrain. Technological processes “shrink” time and space, creating a global social environment, while at the same
time making these autonomous domains of human experience: the instant of the “here and now” is potentially separable and transmissible. In modernity, social
relations are lifted from their context and “disembedded” on the basis of space-time distanciation. Two mechanisms create disembedding: symbolic tokens and
expert systems. Symbolic tokens are independent media of exchange which create abstract mediations between individuals - money being the paradigm. Symbolic
tokens transpose standardised social and political relations from their original context into new contexts and thereby function as intensifiers of space-time
distanciation and forms of disembedding or decontextualisation. Expert systems similarly work to shift social relations between contexts, this time by the
employment of abstract knowledge systems. Expert systems are constituted by transport and communications networks, social and political institutions, media and
economic networks, banks, and so forth. They enable agents to locate themselves and operate within technological and social systems environments that the agent
cannot comprehend or reproduce. Therefore they work to disembed agents from the context of the local community and lifeworld. Reflexivity exists, for Giddens, in
two forms: the reflexive monitoring of action is characteristic of all forms of practical consciousness, but the second form of reflexivity, the regular and constant
deployment of knowledge as a condition for agency (and therefore for social continuity, institutional duration and the maintenance of actors) is characteristic of
modernity alone. This means that social practices in modernity are reflexive practices, continuously modified on the basis of what another tradition would call “the
dialectic of theory and practice”. It is the profoundly self-reflexive character of the social practices of modernity that invest history with its decisive meaning:
modernity and history as a concept and as a category of social life are intertwined. As Marx emphasised, world
history is the creation of a
determinate moment in the history of social formations - it did not always exist. Indeed, this historical knowledge
entails historicism, that is, the relativisation of the truth claims of knowledge because of the fundamental uncertainty as to the truthfulness of a knowledge which
we can be reasonably sure will be shortly superseded. Moreover, the reflexive character of social practice means that social agents in modernity “make history” (as
opposed to being affected by history) and they do so on the basis of knowledges relating to the “meaning of history” or the “lessons of history”. While increased
reflexivity does not automatically entail better knowledge, complete control of social processes or higher intelligence, it leads in Giddens’ term to the emergence of
“clever people": social agents whose capacities are fundamentally constituted not by manual skills but by technical knowledges. The reflexivity of modernity and the
plurality of the institutional dimensions of modernity are, for Giddens, related. Where for Marx, Weber and Durkheim, society could be explained with reference to
a single explanatory principle and the dominance of one factor in history and society (the productive forces and capitalism, rationalisation, industrialisation,
respectively), Giddens believes that the monocausality of classical social theory rendered it profoundly reductionist and therefore prone to over-simplification. In
opposition to classical social theory, Giddens proposes are four-dimensional,
multi-causal model of explanation of the
institutional dimensions of modernity. This represents a synthesis of the positions of classical social theory with Giddens’ emphasis on the
external relations of social formations in the form of war and international relations. This is Giddens’ central thesis in social theory - fundamental even to
structuration theory - that the
institutions of modernity contain four independent but inter-related dimensions:
surveillance and control, military power and the monopoly of violence, industrialisation and
capitalism. I reproduce the diagram referred to earlier once again: Industrialism means the deployment of nature as raw materials and as an inanimate
source of power in the production or circulation of goods and services. The mechanisation of production and the industrialisation of warfare are consequences of
industrialism, which transforms the workplace, transport and communications and affects domestic life. Capitalism is regarded as a system of generalised
commodity production centred on the relations between private ownership of capital and the propertyless wage labourer. Capitalism means a competitive market
system and the drive towards technological innovation in the endless quest for profit.[43] The institutional separation between economics and politics is
constitutive of private property rights and also serves to prevent economic democracy from being anything more than a slogan. Capitalism
is vital for
the expansion of industrialism, since the process of the accumulation of capital and the development
of technology are intertwined. Surveillance explains the necessity of the national state form for the
inherently transnational processes of capitalism and industrialism: capitalism and industrialism are
rooted not in the national territory but in the national state. This is regarded by Giddens as an independent entity and not
fundamentally a capitalist state (or a technocratic state). This effectively means that bureaucracy and the growth in the power and efficiency of the administrative
apparatus represents an autonomous dynamic in modernity. The supervision and control of administered and docile populations is essential for capitalism (the
management of class conflict through its institutionalisation). Military
force is an extension of the dimension of surveillance.
The state’s development of a national territory with demarcated borders and the surveillance of the
population parallel the growth of military power. With the complete monopoly over the means of violence, inter-state warfare
assumes the dimensions of total war and the industrialisation of the military becomes the critical determinant of
military success. The claim that modernity represents a radical historical break with traditional social formations is the effect - according to
Giddens - of a unique interaction between the four institutional dimensions of modernity during the
1600s and subsequently. The individual dimensions all possess independent logics and their own dynamics,
which cannot be reduced to that of any of the others. None of the four conditions determines the
others nor the social totality. They form a dense and interconnected network where they mutually
affect and reinforce each other.[44] For Giddens, the core definition of modernity is exactly this interrelation between capitalism, industrialism,
and the nation state (surveillance and violence) - this is historically unique and constitutive of the dynamics of modernity, especially self-reflexivity.
2. Problems are not black and white but have complex, uncertain interactions. By
declaring that _____ is always bad, they prevent us from understanding the
nuances of an incredibly important and complex issue. This is the epitome of
dogmatism
Keller, et. al,– Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago - 2001
(Thomas E., James K., and Tracly K., Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago,
professor of Social Work, and doctoral student School of Social Work, “Student debates in policy
courses: promoting policy practice skills and knowledge through active learning,” Journal of Social Work
Education, Spr/Summer 2001, EBSCOhost)
John Dewey, the philosopher and educational reformer, suggested that the
initial advance in the development of reflective
thought occurs in the transition from holding fixed, static ideas to an attitude of doubt and
questioning engendered by exposure to alternative views in social discourse (Baker, 1955, pp. 36-40). Doubt,
confusion, and conflict resulting from discussion of diverse perspectives "force comparison, selection, and reformulation of ideas and
meanings" (Baker, 1955, p. 45). Subsequent educational
theorists have contended that learning requires openness
to divergent ideas in combination with the ability to synthesize disparate views into a purposeful
resolution (Kolb, 1984; Perry, 1970). On the one hand, clinging to the certainty of one's beliefs risks dogmatism,
rigidity, and the inability to learn from new experiences. On the other hand, if one's opinion is altered by every new
experience, the result is insecurity, paralysis, and the inability to take effective action. The educator's role is to help students develop the
capacity to incorporate new and sometimes conflicting ideas and experiences into a coherent cognitive framework. Kolb suggests that, "if the
education process begins by bringing out the learner's beliefs and theories, examining and testing them, and then integrating the new, more
refined ideas in the person's belief systems, the learning process will be facilitated" (p. 28). The authors believe that involving students in
substantive debates challenges them to learn and grow in the fashion described by Dewey and Kolb. Participation
in a debate
stimulates clarification and critical evaluation of the evidence, logic, and values underlying one's own
policy position. In addition, to debate effectively students must understand and accurately evaluate the
opposing perspective. The ensuing tension between two distinct but legitimate views is designed to
yield a reevaluation and reconstruction of knowledge and beliefs pertaining to the issue.
Kritiks distract from the defined controversy area
and water down debates
A limited topic of discussion that provides for equitable ground is key to productive
inculcation of decision-making and advocacy skills in every and all facets of life---even
if their position is contestable that’s distinct from it being valuably debatable---this
still provides room for flexibility, creativity, and innovation, but targets the discussion
to avoid mere statements of fact
Steinberg & Freeley 8 *Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal,
personal injury and civil rights law, AND **David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U
Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of
interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is
no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate
"Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential
prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In
addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or
questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal
immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our
communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a
problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented
workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal
immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are
they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and
philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national
identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of
many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be
emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line
demarcating sides in the controversy. To
be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated
clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and
emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the
summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might
observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the
best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of
issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal
with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger,
disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of
education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as
"What can be done to improve public education?"—then a
more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by
placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate
propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government
should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher
program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They
provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To
have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on
the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about
"homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting
discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is
mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the
written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing
or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too
loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents,
website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—
fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our
fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition
such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this
proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This
is not to say that debates should completely
avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over
competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging.
The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of
difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.