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Journal of Health Communication, 10:43–55, 2005
Copyright # Taylor & Francis Inc.
ISSN: 1081-0730 print/1087-0415 online
DOI: 10.1080/10810730590904571
Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication
as an Integrative Model
BARBARA REYNOLDS
Office of Communication, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
Atlanta, Georgia
MATTHEW W. SEEGER
Department of Communication, Wayne State University,
Detroit, Michigan, USA
This article describes a model of communication known as crisis and emergency risk
communication (CERC). The model is outlined as a merger of many traditional
notions of health and risk communication with work in crisis and disaster communication. The specific kinds of communication activities that should be called for at
various stages of disaster or crisis development are outlined. Although crises are
by definition uncertain, equivocal, and often chaotic situations, the CERC model
is presented as a tool health communicators can use to help manage these complex
events.
The anthrax attack of September 2001 was arguably one of the most public and disruptive public health emergencies of recent history. Although much larger and widespread health risks exist, such as the avian flu, the emergence of sudden acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS), the upswing in skin cancer, and the recent West Nile
virus outbreaks, anthrax was new in terms of the perceived threat and the intentional
nature of the attack. Moreover, because anthrax was connected in terms of time and
perception to the 9=11 World Trade Center disasters, it created heightened public
concern and widespread public outrage. The event placed significant pressure on
the public health community to communicate effectively within a context of immediacy, threat, and high uncertainty.
Health professionals, including those in the health communication domain,
often frame their messages regarding the possibility of serious public health harm
as risk communication (Covello, 1992; Freimuth, Linnan, & Potter, 2000; Heath,
1994; Sandman, 2002; Witte, Meyer, & Martel, 2000). In organizational settings,
including corporate contexts and disaster management, however, these perspectives
more often have been framed as crisis communication (Barton, 2001; Coombs, 1995;
Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 1998, 2001). In addition, the public health community
has engaged in issue management regarding health promotion and has sought to
An earlier version of this article was presented at the National Communication Association Convention, November 2002.
Address correspondence to Matthew W. Seeger, Department of Communication, Wayne
State University, 585 Manooqian Hall, Detroit, MI 48201, USA. E-mail: Matthew.Seeger
@Wayne.edu
43
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44
B. Reynolds and M. W. Seeger
influence public policy regarding health issues. The anthrax episode, however,
required new forms of public health communication. In this discussion, we identify
the distinguishing features of these forms of public health communication. We propose a comprehensive approach to emergency public health events that incorporates
both risk communication and crisis communication into a hybrid form known as
CERC.
Communication During Crises and Disasters
In general, the management of natural disasters and public health emergencies has
always included a significant communication component in the form of warnings,
risk messages, evacuation notifications, messages regarding self-efficacy, information regarding symptoms and medical treatment, among many others. Different
kinds of crises, however, manifest different forms of threat and different communication exigencies (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992; Seeger, Sellnow & Ulmer, 2003). Some
kinds of natural disasters, such as hurricanes, for example, may prompt recommendations that residents stockpile water and food or that that they evacuate. Hazardous chemical spills often result in recommendations that residents close windows,
shut off all outside ventilation, and shelter in place. Tornado warnings usually
include recommendations that residents seek shelter immediately. Floods usually
are accompanied by recommendations that residents drink bottled water or boil
water to avoid waterborne pathogens (Sellnow, Seeger, & Ulmer, 2002).
Public health emergencies, in contrast, generally concern the outbreak of particular diseases or the identification of specific risks from environmental or life-style
factors. Foodborne pathogens, such as ground beef contaminated with e.coli
157:H7, for example, create a risk to the general public health. In such cases, public
health agencies will track the sources of the disease, undertake actions to stop the
contamination, issue warnings and recalls, and provide the public with information
about symptoms, treatments, and ways to avoid exposure (Fischhoff & Downs,
2001; Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000). During the outbreak of West Nile virus, public health
agencies have disseminated information about the nature and frequency of the disease and the level of risk and have offered guidelines for how to avoid mosquito
bites. Typically, these activities rely on the mass media and general public education
campaigns to spread the word.
The specter of bioterrorism raised by the 9=11 attacks and the anthrax outbreak,
however, raised the possibility of intentional widespread harm to the public health.
Some scenarios involving agents such as botulism, plague, anthrax, smallpox, VX,
mustard and sarin gas, as well as radiological materials could cause widespread harm
to the public health Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ([CDC], 2002;
National Council on Radiation Protection & Measurement, 2001). Moreover,
emerging diseases such as SARS or avian flu HN51, although less malevolent in their
origins, create similarly frightening scenarios of widespread harm to the public
health. The technical assessment of hazard, then, suggests a high level of risk.
These risks are also new to the general public and, therefore, include low familiarity, are seen as unnatural and exotic, and create high levels of uncertainty. In most
cases, they involve organisms that cannot be seen and diseases and symptoms that
have not before been evident in the general population. This general lack of familiarity is likely to enhance the perceived risk by the general public (Sandman, 2002). In
the case of an intentional bioterrorism attack, the perceived outage surrounding the
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Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication
45
event also will be high, further enhancing the perceived risk. Bioterrorism is also
likely to create very high levels of uncertainty. Moreover, these emergent threats
require more cooperation between various governmental agencies, such as various
law enforcement groups; elected officials at local, state, and national levels; and
the emergency management and Homeland Security infrastructure. In some cases,
threats may become politicized, adding complexity. As with other forms of risk communication, these emergent threats create challenges for the medical and public
health community to communicate in accurate, credible, timely, and reassuring
ways.
Risk and Crisis Communication
Risk communication is a mature area of research and practice that informs many
public health campaigns. Heath (1994) suggests, ‘‘Risk communication deals with
risk elements, whether they are appropriately tolerable, and risk consequences’’
(p. 257). Covello (1992) defines risk communication as ‘‘the exchange of information
among interested parties about the nature, magnitude, significance, or control of a
risk’’ (p. 359). The National Research Council (1989) describes risk communication
as ‘‘an interactive process of exchange of information and opinion among individuals, groups, and institutions’’ (p. 2). Risk communication, then, is closely associated with threat sensing and assessment. In practice, risk communication most often
involves the production of public messages regarding health risks and environmental
hazards. Witte and colleagues (2000) observe that risk communication is most closely grounded in research on fear appeals as a persuasive device. These messages seek
to induce behavioral change by presenting a threat and describing a behavior or
behavioral change that may alleviate the threat. Efficacy is the effectiveness or feasibility of the behavioral change in alleviating the threat while self-efficacy refers to the
belief that the recommendation can be carried out (Egbert & Parrott, 2001; Witte
et al., 2000, p. 20). Risk communication is also grounded in an assumption that
the public has a generalized right to know about hazards and risks. The availability
of information allows the public to make informed choices regarding risk. In this
way risk communication facilitates decision making and risk sharing.
Sandman’s (1993, 2002) model of risk as a function of hazard (defined as technical assessment of risk) and outrage (defined as a cultural view of risk) has framed
many of the efforts to communicate about various public health risks. Moreover, his
detailing of the factors associated with outrage has provided a helpful framework for
assessing the public’s response to various risk factors. Other basic principles of effective communication also have informed the practice of risk communication. Audiences tend to simplify messages. Credibility is important to the believability and
effectiveness of messages. Risk messages should include some self-efficacy action
that can be taken to reduce the risk (Egbert & Parrott, 2001). Messages are more
effective when they are strategically matched to audience needs, values, background,
culture, and experience (Murray-Johnson, Witte, Liu, & Hubbel, 2001). Risk messages should be clear and simple, appeal to reason and emotion, and offer solutions
to problems (Friemuth et al., 2000). Much of risk communication as practiced in
public health incorporates these features in public messages, usually carried in the
mainstream media, as general persuasive campaigns. They seek to inform the public
and change behavior in ways that protect and improve the public health and safety.
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46
B. Reynolds and M. W. Seeger
Communication, usually in the form of public relations (PR), is also a traditional activity following a crisis. (see Coombs, 1995; Seeger et al., 1998.) Organizational crises, such as a plant explosion, employee violence, toxic spill, or
transportation accident usually generate widespread public and media interest and
often criticism. This crisis communication role of PR derives from the need for
skilled communicators to strategically defend and explain the organization’s position
in the face of crisis-induced criticism, threat, and uncertainty. During crises, PR
practitioners typically face a hostile and inquisitive press and provide accounts of
what went wrong, why, and what is being done in response. Thus, historically, crisis
communication served as spokesperson, buffer, and disseminator of information
(Seeger et al., 1998). This perspective most often involved two defensive strategies:
‘‘deny that a crisis exists, refuse to answer media questions, and resist involvement
by appropriate government agencies’’ or ‘‘releasing partial, often inaccurate and
delayed information while concealing unfavorable facts’’ (Wilcox, Ault, & Agee,
1986, p. 310). This form of post-crisis PRs contributed to a cynical view of organizations and PR. In general, it served to reduce organizational credibility and often significantly enhanced the harm (see Guth, 1995; Small, 1991; Seeger & Bolz, 1996). As
the role of PRs has expanded and as crises have become more common, so too has
the notion of crisis communication. One fundamental change involves a cardinal
tenet among PRs practitioners that an honest, candid, prompt, accurate, and complete response to a crisis is always called for (Small, 1991).
Crisis communication, then, involves the sending and receiving of messages ‘‘to
prevent or lessen the negative outcomes of a crisis and thereby protect the organization, stakeholders, and=or industry from damage’’ (Coombs, 1999, p. 4). As such, it
is part of the larger crisis management function (Seeger et al., 1998). Fearn-Banks
(2002) suggests that ‘‘Crisis communication is verbal, visual, and=or written interaction between the organization and its stakeholders (often through the media) prior
to, during and after a negative occurrence’’ (p. 480). These communication processes
are designed to reduce and contain harm, provide specific information to stakeholders, initiate and enhance recovery, manage image and perceptions of blame
and responsibility, repair legitimacy, generate support and assistance, explain and
justify actions, apologize, and promote healing, learning, and change (Seeger et al.,
2003). Crisis communication seeks to explain the specific event, identify likely consequences and outcomes, and provide specific harm-reducing information to affected
communities in an honest, candid, prompt, accurate, and complete manner.
One of the principal distinctions between crisis communication and risk communication concerns their origins. Crisis communication typically is associated with
PRs and is grounded in efforts to strategically manage and frame public perceptions
of an event so that harm is reduced for both the organization and stakeholders. Public Relations has sought to ‘‘develop communication models and frameworks that
inform practice and which help limit and alleviate the damage to both the organization and other crisis stakeholders such as the community, victims, and their families’’
(Seeger et al., 1998, p. 66). Crisis communication also has begun to draw more heavily on the need to communicate during public emergencies, earthquakes, floods,
hurricanes, and so on (Auf Der Heide, 1989; Sellnow, Seeger, & Ulmer, 2002). This
may involve disseminating information about evacuations, about harm mitigation
resources and procedures, and about possibilities of additional harm (see Mileti &
Sorensen, 1990; Sorensen, 2000). Emergency public information, most often associated with natural disasters, is designed to ‘‘protect health, safety, and the environment
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Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication
47
by keeping the public informed’’ and ‘‘to restore public confidence in the organization’s ability to manage an incident’’ (Mileti & Sorensen, 1990, p. 4).
Risk communication, in contrast, most often is associated with the identification
of risks to the public health and efforts to persuade the public to adopt more healthy,
less risky behaviors (Freimuth et al., 2000). Thus, public campaigns regarding the
hazards of cigarette smoking are the archetype for risk communication. Similar campaigns regarding HIV=AIDS and safe sex, drunk driving, binge drinking, vaccines,
drug abuse, infectious diseases, exercise, and various kinds of disease and health
screenings have sought to disseminate information about risk and persuade the public to modify their behaviors accordingly (see Murray-Johnson et al., 2001; Rogers &
Deckner, 1975; Smart & Fejer, 1974; Witte, 1992). Risk communication also involves
the dissemination of information about environmental hazards such as those associated with chemical and toxic contaminates, carcinogens, pathogens, and related
environmental hazards (Powell & Leiss, 1997). Lundgren (1994) also describes communication about chronic, endemic diseases with long induction times as care communication. This form of ongoing communication encourages long-term behavioral
and environmental changes. The underlying assumptions of these various perspectives is that informing the public may allow them to make choices to avoid or reduce
exposures, manage a condition or a risk, or both. Thus, federal and state environmental protection agencies provide fish consumption advisories detailing the level
of contamination in various species. In addition, more specific and detailed warnings
may be found in a variety of pamphlets and brochures disseminated by heath providers, social service agencies, and in schools. Finally, risk communication also is associated with natural disasters, principally in the form of preevent warnings, such as
evacuation advisories, and in postevent recommendations about avoiding additional
harm, such as boiling drinking water in the case of a flood.
One focus of risk communication might be loosely described as seeking to create
a rational understanding of risk. As Ropeik and Gray (2002) have recently suggested, often popular understandings of risk in the general public do not match
the scientific facts. Risk communication often seeks to identify persuasive strategies
so that the public can be convinced of a particular view regarding some risk. Among
the common strategies are the use of technical experts or others who have high credibility as well as the skill in translating scientific information to messages appropriate
for lay audiences. Thus, failure to accept this technical view of risk is framed as ineffective communication, poor trust, low credibility, or a case of misunderstanding. In
addition, much of risk communication is grounded in the use of fear appeals in persuasive messages (Witte et al., 2000). These risk communication messages introduce
a threat, such as the possibility of a health harm given a set of conditions. A change
in the conditions, such as the modification of some lifestyle behavior, is then proposed as a way to alleviate the threat. This problem–solution message structure is
well established as a basic form of persuasion (Witte et al., 2000).
Risk and crisis communication have much in common and intersect at a variety
of points. In fact, some suggest that crisis communication is a more limited form of
risk communication (Lundgren, 1994). Both forms of communication involve the
production of public messages designed to create specific responses by the public.
In both cases, the messages largely are mediated through mass communication channels, although they also have public communication and group communication
dimensions. Risk communication and crisis communication each rely on credibility
as a fundamental persuasive attribute, although they manifest in different ways.
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B. Reynolds and M. W. Seeger
Both share an essential purpose of seeking to limit, contain, mitigate, and reduce
public harm. Beyond these fundamental commonalties, risk and crisis communication diverge in important ways. These differences are outlined in Table 1.
The basic goals of risk and crisis communication, for example, differ. Risk messages concern the probabilities of some harm and associated methods for reducing
the probability of the harm. Risk messages often are grounded in both current scientific and technical understanding of a specific risk factor as well as cultural or social
beliefs regarding the risk. The risk messages seek to translate or operationalize technical understanding of risk into behaviors through persuasion. This often requires
addressing the cultural or social factors. Messages about crisis, in contrast, typically
concern both what is known and what is not known about a specific event. Often
such messages are phrased specifically as, ‘‘What we know at the present time,’’
and are tempered with discussions about what is being done to collect additional
information or mitigate against additional harm. Crisis messages often are focused
more directly on informing than persuading. Risk communication has expanded
as understandings of risk, particularly technical and scientific, have expanded and
with increased public pressure for more information. This form of communication
has become increasingly ubiquitous and almost routine as a form of public message.
Crisis communication, in contrast, has remained largely event specific, although precrisis planning has encouraged emergency managers to move beyond the confines of
a specific event. Crisis communication is essentially nonroutine and much more time
Table 1. Distinguishing features of risk and crisis communication
Risk communication
Messages regarding known
probabilities of negative
consequences and how they
may be reduced; addressing
technical understandings
(hazards) and cultural beliefs
(outrage)
Principally persuasive, i.e.,
advertising and public
education campaigns
Frequent=routine
Sender=message centered
Based on what is currently
known, i.e., scientific projections
Long-term (precrisis) Message
preparation, i.e., campaign
Technical expert, scientist
Personal scope
Mediated; commercials, ads
brochures, pamphlets
Controlled and structured
Crisis communication
Messages regarding current state or
conditions regarding a specific
event; magnitude, immediacy
duration and control=remediation;
cause, blame, consequences
Principally informative, i.e., news
disseminated through media or
broadcast through warning system
Infrequent=nonroutine
Receiver=situation centered
Based on what is known and
what is not known
Short-term (crisis) Less preparation,
i.e., responsive
Authority figures=emergency manager,
technical experts
Personal, community, or regional scope
Mediated; press conferences, press releases,
speeches, websites
Spontaneous and reactive
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Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication
49
and event bound to the specific conditions of a particular crisis. Risk communication
is largely sender=message centered in the sense that time is available to carefully craft
a message, identify and test appeals, and disseminate the message through targeted
media channels. Crisis communication is more sender=event oriented in that it seeks
to respond to immediate public needs for information in what is often a much more
spontaneous, and less controlled, manner. Because they are more spontaneous, crisis
messages typically are less polished and more often take the form of news conferences or announcements covered in print and broadcast news outlets. Crisis messages also take advantage of whatever channel of communication is available at
the time of the event. Radio, for example, given its flexibility and very wide availability, is a particularly important medium for crisis communication. A significant
proportion of the public learned about the 9=11 attacks, for example, by radio
(Seeger, Vennette, Ulmer, & Sellnow, 2002).
Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication
Recently, efforts have been made to combine notions of risk communication and crisis communication into a practice described as crisis and emergency risk communication (Reynolds, 2002). These efforts have been lead by the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention and are in response to a recognition that health communication in an era of bioterrorism as well as other emerging global threats to public
health must be strategic, broad based, responsive, and highly contingent. This
blended form of communication emphasizes the developmental features of crisis
and the various communication needs and exigencies of audiences at various points
in the ongoing development of an event. As such, it embraces a process view of crisis
as beginning with preevent stages of risk and risk development, moving through the
eruption of some triggering event during crisis stages and into postmortem and clean
up phases (see Coombs, 1995; Seeger et al., 1998).1 The scope and nature of these
communication efforts is broader than many traditional models of risk or crisis communication. For example, during the precrisis stage, traditional notions of health
promotion and risk communication are appropriate to both educate the public
regarding potential threats and to encourage appropriate preparation and riskreducing behaviors. Recent efforts to educate the public more broadly about small
pox, communicate the risk of vaccinations, and generally promote vaccination to
specific publics could be understood as a kind of health promotion and education.
This public education campaign, however, was framed within the larger backdrop
of a potential bioterrorism threat that, if manifest, would result in a widespread public health and national security crisis. In addition, specific advice from the federal
Department of Homeland Security regarding family disaster plans and kits, for
example, is a broad-based campaign designed to persuade the general public to
undertake specific activities in preparation for possible attacks (Department of
Homeland Security, 2003).
1
A variety of developmental stages of crisis have been described in communication
research and disaster studies. In general, these developmental approaches are called models
of crisis development although they also might be describe as frameworks. Although
Reynolds’s (2002) CERC model uses five stages, others have six-stage (Turner, 1976) and
three-stage models of crisis development (Coombs, 1995; Ray, 1999; Seeger et al., 1998).
Regardless of the specific stages or phases described, there is a general recognition that crises
have developmental features.
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B. Reynolds and M. W. Seeger
It is important to point out that at some level these kinds of precrisis promotions
and warnings have occurred in other, albeit much more limited, contexts with regard
to more familiar and routine risks. Regions of the country that regularly experience
severe weather, such as hurricanes or blizzards, routinely have employed preevent
promotions through local or state emergency management offices to increase preparation. These typically include encouraging residents to stockpile disaster supplies
such as flashlights, batteries, water, food, and critical medications, and to monitor
weather conditions. In addition, residents frequently are advised to evacuate in the
cases of an extreme hurricane threat (see Quarantelli, 1980). Prior to influenza season, public health campaigns frequently are mounted by state departments of public
health to encourage vaccinations. The American Red Cross, with its emphasis on
disaster relief, also has been a traditional proponent of this emergency preparation
(American Red Cross, 2002).
When a threat does erupt into the crisis stages, different communication exigencies and audiences emerge. This includes an immediate threat and compressed timeframe requiring a more direct response. There is, for example, an immediate audience
of those affected by the crisis. This includes victims, potential victims, close family
members, emergency workers, first responders, and others directly affected by the
event. Timely communication with this group may help mitigate or contain harm.
A much larger audience, usually represented through the media, involves the general
public. The immediate communication needs are to reduce the uncertainty, allowing
audiences to create a basic understanding of what happened so that they may act
appropriately. Without such basic information, both the general public and affected
groups may not be able to make sense of the event and may engage in activities that
actually increase the relative level of harm. It is not uncommon, for example, for
volunteers to rush to the scene of a disaster and actually impede the emergency
response. Beyond this, the crisis stage may require that public health communicators
issue specific recommendations about how to avoid or reduce harm, what symptoms
might indicate concern, and where to go for treatment. Messages recommending
evacuation or sheltering in place, for example, often accompany large-scale crisis
events. Public health officials struggled during the anthrax episode to provide sufficiently precise information about the symptoms of inhalation anthrax to allow the
lay public to assess whether they needed to seek medical attention. This problem
was compounded by the similarity of symptoms to other common respiratory illnesses. In addition, crisis communication also seeks to reduce generalized anxiety
and concern among the larger public. Those who are not directly affected but have
high levels of anxiety are sometimes described as the ‘‘worried well.’’ Without
adequate information regarding the nature of the event and the risk they face, these
‘‘worried well’’ may overwhelm existing medical capacity. Many emergency crisis
plans, therefore, include provisions for secondary assessment centers for those who
were not directly or immediately affected. Communicating timely information to
the public regarding these kinds of centers is a core function of crisis communication.
The final elements of an emergency or crisis generally are described as postcrisis stages (Coombs, 1995; Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 1998). Postcrisis is most often
characterized as a period of postmortem, assessment, learning, and constitution of
new understandings of risk and risk avoidance (see Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, in
press; Turner, 1976). In many instances, postcrisis is also a period when the media
and the public become more critical and questioning regarding the cause of the
crisis, the appropriateness of responses and who should take the, blame and
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Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication
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responsibility. In several states, for example, the outbreak of West Nile Virus has
been followed by accusations that public health officials and municipal and state
governments had not taken sufficient action or did not respond quickly enough.
These critiques and criticism have resulted in new policies and procedures regarding
monitoring, spraying for mosquitoes, and disseminating larvacide. The recent episode of anthrax-contaminated mail resulted in similar public critiques and second
guessing of official response. The postcrisis stages, while no longer including a sense
of immediate threat, require ongoing communication regarding new understandings
of risk and amended procedures and policies for risk avoidance.
A Working Model of CERC
The blended form of crisis and risk communication, then, incorporates principles of
effective risk communication and crisis communication throughout the evolution of
a risk factor into a crisis event and on through the clean-up and recovery phase.
A preliminary model of this process is presented in Table 2.
The five-stage CERC model assumes that crises will develop in largely predictable
and systematic ways: from risk, to eruption, to clean-up and recovery on into evaluation. One important value to this systematic approach is that it reduces uncertainty
and allows crisis managers to look ahead and anticipate subsequent communication
needs and problems. Some potential crises and emergencies may not follow this
sequence due to a variety or factors including effective risk during the early stages,
the emergence of secondary shocks, or unanticipated interactions. Some observers
have, for example, described a kind of chronic crisis that develops into crisis stages
for longer periods of time. Some infectious diseases and epidemics may more typically
follow this pattern. In addition, it is important to recognize that all crises can be
expected to have unforeseen, nonlinear dimensions and interactions that preclude
managers from making precise predications (Seeger, 2002b). Unanticipated audiences
and audience needs may emerge. New unforeseen threats may compound the risk and
require a new set of communication exigencies and strategies. In some disasters, channels of public communication are compromised, requiring that risks and warnings be
disseminated in alternative ways. Important crisis management personnel may be
injured or unavailable. Crises are inherently equivocal situations, and crisis managers
should avoid approaching these events or communicating about them in unequivocal
ways.2 Regardless of these limitations, the CERC model offers a comprehensive
approach within which risk and warning messages and crisis communication activities
can be connected into a more encompassing communication form.
Conclusion
Changes in the nature and scope of crises and emergencies, in the levels and kinds of
threats faced by the public and in the ubiquitous nature of media coverage, require
2
This issue frames part of an ongoing debate in crisis and risk communication (Seeger,
2002a). Risk communication typically would suggest that public messages be unequivocal
regarding the risks and associated actions. Crisis communication typically would suggest
acknowledging the general uncertainty in a crisis as part of the public statements made about
the crisis. Sandman (2003) acknowledged the need to be equivocal in his critique of the CDC’s
communication efforts regarding SARS.
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B. Reynolds and M. W. Seeger
Table 2. A working model of CERC
I. Precrisis (Risk Messages; Warnings; Preparations)
Communication and education campaigns targeted to both the public and
the response community to facilitate:
. Monitoring and recognition of emerging risks
. General public understanding of risk
. Public preparation for the possibility of an adverse event
. Changes in behavior to reduce the likelihood of harm (self-efficacy)
. Specific warning messages regarding some eminent threat
. Alliances and cooperation with agencies, organizations, and groups
. Development of consensual recommendations by experts and first
responders
. Message development and testing for subsequent stages
II. Initial Event (Uncertainty Reduction; Self-efficacy; Reassurance)
Rapid communication to the general public and to affected groups seeking
to establish:
. Empathy, reassurance, and reduction in emotional turmoil
. Designated crisis=agency spokespersons and formal channels and
methods of communication
. General and broad-based understanding of the crisis circumstances,
consequences, and anticipated outcomes based on available
information
. Reduction of crisis-related uncertainty
. Specific understanding of emergency management and medical
community responses
. Understanding of self-efficacy and personal response activities
(how=where to get more information)
III. Maintenance (Ongoing Uncertainty Reduction; Self-efficacy; Reassurance)
Communication to the general public and to affected groups seeking to
facilitate:
. More accurate public understandings of ongoing risks
. Understanding of background factors and issues
. Broad-based support and cooperation with response and recovery
efforts
. Feedback from affected publics and correction of any
misunderstandings=rumors
. Ongoing explanation and reiteration of self-efficacy and personal
response activities (how=where to get more information) begun in
Stage II.
. Informed decision making by the public based on understanding of
risks=benefits
IV. Resolution (Updates Regarding Resolution; Discussions about Cause and New
Risks/New Understandings of Risk)
Public communication and campaigns directed toward the general public
and affected groups seeking to:
. Inform and persuade about ongoing clean-up, remediation, recovery,
and rebuilding efforts
(Continued)
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Table 2. (Continued)
. Facilitate broad-based, honest, and open discussion and resolution of
issues regarding cause, blame, responsibility, and adequacy of
response.
. Improve=create public understanding of new risks and new
understandings of risk as well as new risk avoidance behaviors and
response procedures
. Promote the activities and capabilities of agencies and organizations to
reinforce positive corporate identity and image
V. Evaluation (Discussions of Adequacy of Response; Consensus About Lessons
and New Understandings of Risks)
Communication directed toward agencies and the response community to:
. Evaluate and assess responses, including communication effectiveness
. Document, formalize, and communicate lessons learned
. Determine specific actions to improve crisis communication and crisis
response capability
. Create linkages to precrisis activities (Stage I)
more comprehensive approaches to communication. The CERC model merges many
existing activities into more comprehensive systems of communication and grounded
in a recognition of the broad developmental features of crisis. This approach also
acknowledges that effective communication regarding crises and emergencies must
begin long before an event erupts and continue after the immediate threat has
subsided. In many ways, then, CERC is an acknowledgment that risks are ubiquitous and that emergencies and crises that threaten the public health and well-being
are likely to be increasingly common.
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