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Group Inequalities in Post-Conflict Societies Dr. Rajesh Venugopal London School of Economics Paper presented at SAPRI Conference, ‘Delivering Inclusive and Sustainable Development’, New Delhi, April 2012 Introduction What kinds of economic policies will help sustain a peace process and promote longer-tem stability and reconciliation in deeply divided post-conflict societies? Have post-conflict policies designed by aid agencies and national governments been sensitive to the issue of horizontal inequalities or group-based ethnic and regional differences, and what has been their impact? This presentation is based on a recently released book Horizontal Inequalities and Post-Conflict Development that I co-edited with Frances Stewart and Arnim Langer. In this book, we set out to evaluate the extent to which post-conflict reconstruction has addressed problems of horizontal inequalities by looking at the experiences of seven diverse post-conflict countries - Burundi, Rwanda, Nepal, Peru, Guatemala, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Afghanistan. These were then balanced with four cross-cutting thematic studies on macro-economic policies, privatisation, PRSP’s, and employment generation that broadened the country coverage of the book to Sierra Leone, Uganda, Kosovo, Liberia, Haiti, Mozambique and Cambodia. Papers Bosnia-Herzegovina Guatemala Burundi Rwanda Afghanistan Nepal Peru Macro-economic Policies Employment Privatization Authors Susan Woodward Corinne Caumartin & Diego Sanchez-Ancochea Janvier-Desire Nkurunziza Sebastian Silva Leander Jonathan Goodhand, C.Dennys, D.Mansfield Graham Brown Jose-Carlos Orihuela Frances Stewart & Arnim Langer Frances Stewart Rajesh Venugopal The findings from these studies are important because they reveal important types of gaps in the redressal of what are often deeply entrenched forms of group-based discrimination and deprivation and marginalisation, each of which have distinct implications for policy and further research. These are: recognition, policy design, effectiveness and paradigm shifts. Horizontal inequalities are group-based inequalities, and are distinct from the traditional economic concept of inequality on two counts. Firstly, they refer to 1 inequalities of specific groups rather than individuals. Secondly, they are multidimensional, and refer to inequalities in political, social, and cultural status. Research into the relationship between horizontal inequalities and conflict has demonstrated that violent conflict is most likely to arise in areas where economic, social, political and cultural status inequalities occur simultaneously, and where some groups are deprived across every dimension. In these situations, group leaders, who face political exclusion, and their political followers, who see themselves as experiencing unequal treatment with respect to assets, jobs and social services, are likely to be inspired to mobilise and possibly engage in violence. The global incidence of violent conflict, which increased substantially during the early 1990s, has been on the wane since the late-1990s, with a large number of war-torn countries such as Angola, Liberia, Guatemala, and Sri Lanka having entered a fragile and extended process of transition from war to peace. This in turn has spurred a necessary shift in the policy agenda from ‘conflict’ to ‘postconflict’, and an evolution in the development research agenda from the economic costs and causes of conflict towards the economics of post-conflict recovery and peace-building. This book as such represents a natural progression in the research agenda on horizontal inequalities from the pre-conflict to postconflict phase. Post-conflict countries are typically very fragile in the short-to-medium term, with high risk of return to conflict, or its transformation into other forms of social violence such as crime or domestic violence. It is therefore critical to understand whether and how horizontal inequalities are being addressed in the post-conflict setting, and what impact this has had. It is also important to recognize that post-conflict countries are very different, not just because of the very different historical and cultural background, but also because they have different levels of economic development, political stability, physical security and inter-community reconciliation. Burundi Income p. head Low Rwanda Low Low High Nepal Low Low Medium Peru Middle Medium High Guatemala Middle Low High Upper middle Low Medium Low Low Medium Country Bosnia Afghanistan High value natural resource availability HIs Low High The recognition of group and regional inequalities in conflict and post-conflict peace-building is perhaps most widespread and sophisticated in the design of political institutions, where the idea of power-sharing based on some form of consociationalism have gained broad acceptance. Indeed, since the end of the cold war, a number of novel institutional arrangements and constitutional forms 2 were innovated to distribute power across communal groups from Lebanon’s 1989 Ta’if Accords, the 1995 Dayton Agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the 1998 Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland. Since then, the new constitutions of Afghanistan in 2004 and Iraq in 2005 have similarly been carefully crafted to distribute calibrated amounts of representation and executive power to elites of all major ethnic/religious groups in order to reduce violence and resolve conflicts through institutionalised elite-bargaining. While this growing consciousness of the relevance of political power-sharing is to be applauded, there is however, no commensurate attention to the equally important issue of economic power-sharing. For example, in a review of 38 peace agreements from 1948-1998, Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) find that an explicit commitment to economic redistribution was the least common form of powersharing, compared to the more commonly addressed issues of sharing central powers, regional devolution and military integration. The lack of appropriate attention to economic factors in peace processes and agreements owes largely to three factors. Firstly, conflict resolution is still considered to be a largely political issue, separate from the economic content of reconstruction and recovery. Secondly, there is an assumption that political power-sharing will implicitly contains economic consequences and address group-based economic deprivation. This is indeed the case up to a point, particularly where there is substantial institutional reform incorporating enabling measures such as decentralisation, which can be a very important source of overcoming historical forms of discrimination and structural barriers (see the case study of Guatemala by Caumartin and Sanchez-Ancochea in our book). However, political power-sharing is by design based predominantly about the empowerment of ethnic elites, and on elite-level bargaining, which can create and enshrine systems of ethnocratic patrimonialism that can limit the distribution of the peace dividend to a very thin privileged layer. Thirdly, the redressal of historically deep-rooted group deprivations requires a sustained and committed medium-to-long-term policy effort that extends well beyond a single electoral cycle, and that must contend with the endemic shorttermism of post-conflict reconstruction. Much of the policy and academic agenda for post-conflict peace-building focuses on shorter term measures of stabilisation, security, institution-building, democratisation, demobilisation, and reconciliation. Furthermore, most aid donors have a time horizon of two to five years and focus on projects that have a rapid, measurable impact rather than the more challenging, longer-term commitment that is required to redress historic, structural deprivation. With these concerns in mind, we set out to investigate the extent to which postconflict economic policies have addressed the issue of horizontal inequalities along three parameters: (i) recognition; (ii) implementation; (iii) effectiveness. 1. Recognition: Have post-conflict countries and donor agencies recognised the role of horizontal inequalities in conflict, and have they made any commitments to tackling them? 3 2. Implementation: Has the rhetoric of recognition been translated into the reality of policy design, and have these policies been adequately funded, implemented and mainstreamed into policy? 3. Effectiveness: Once recognised and implemented, have these policies actually been effective in addressing HIs, and has this in turn, had an impact on violence and conflict? Country What happened to HIs Recognition Implementation Afghanistan Probably worse Unclear Inadvertently worsened His Nepal Worsened during conflict; too early to tell post-conflict Yes Yes Too early to tell Rwanda Probably worsened No. Ethnic categories not permitted. N/A Ineffective Yes In part Partial; inadequate resources A decade later In part in socal sectors Yes, but gaps remain. Improvement in public sector job allocation as required in the political agreement that brought an end to the war New market-based group inequalities In social sectors Yes, but gaps remain. New market-based group inequalities No Inadvertently worsened HIs New within region in equalities as well as marketbased group inequalities Burundi Peru Some improvements in social sectors and public sector jobs, not economy Social HIs improved; economic worsened Guatemala Social HIs improved; economic worsened BosniaHerzegovina Getting worse Yes by donors, less so by the state For political HIs but not economic Effectiveness Inadvertently worsened His HI dynamics War and drugs reduced HIs. State-building and counter narcotics worsen it. New inequalities from war economy Recognition: One of the most important findings of our book is that there is now widespread explicit recognition that ethnic and regional economic inequalities were at the root of conflict, and that they need to be addressed. In numerous post-conflict countries as well as in the policy and programming documents of donor agencies, there is a growing rhetorical commitment to the prioritisation of policies that address horizontal inequalities. Such explicit commitments were present in Guatemala, Peru, Nepal and Burundi, and is broadly present in the international policy discourse of employment policies and PRSP. This in itself is a significant accomplishment. Given that many post-conflict states were clearly discriminatory and practiced decades of rhetorical denial, recognition is an important and historic step forward and the legitimation of grievances and underlying socio-economic roots of conflict. While it is important to tread with caution on this issue due to the significant divergence in individual cases, the fact that most countries have some recognition of discrimination means that the policy debate of relevance has moved on towards issues of implementation and effectiveness. 4 In other words, the emerging challenge is one of translating rhetoric into effective policy design by theorising appropriate ways in which HI's can be addressed. This in turn requires engagement and research on the ways in which contentious HI-reducing policies have been negotiated, sequenced, and prioritised through post-conflict political institutions. As the case studies in our book demonstrate, this has proven to be an extremely challenging task in which the circumstances are rarely conducive and the mechanisms can be very counter-intuitive. Implementation: The key comparative conclusion we arrived at was that important progress has been made in implementation, but there remain significant gaps. Post-conflict states from Peru to Burundi have made substantial progress in translating the recognition of HI's into policy design. But this process has followed unusual, unintended, and frequently very illiberal pathways that are frequently based on political economies of elite capture, patrimonialism, illicit crops or violence. Indeed, the real-world trajectories of post-conflict reconstruction are fragile, inconsistent, uneven, and prone to violence, rarely resembling the idealised discourse and linear transitions implicit in the liberal peace-building project. As the experiences from Burundi, Guatemala and Peru demonstrate, the political economy of policy reform and the implementation of HI-sensitive policies took place in institutional circumstances of elite capture, ethnocracy, and counterinsurgency. As our case study of Burundi demonstrates, elite capture of the state by Bururi Tutsis caused decades of ethnic and regional favouritism that are slowly being undone following the 2007 peace agreement. However, the political economy of redressing these inequalities was in turn based on making unrealistic, unfunded promises of widespread social spending, and is limited by elite capture of the state by other previously excluded groups. One very important point that distinguishes the presence and absence of recognition and implementation is the nature of conflict termination. Negotiated settlements were much more likely to result in recognition and implementation, whereas a one-sided military victory did not as it placed much less pressure on the government to do the needful. Effectiveness: Compared to the progress made in recognition and implementation, the effectiveness of policies was far more uneven, weak, and gap-ridden. Successful outcomes required strong recognition and commitment to HIs, adequate funding, the presence of reasonably strong institutions, and sustained policy attention to a comprehensive range of ancillary social-political interventions. In contrast, negative outcomes were caused by inadequate recognition and commitment to HIs by the states and international actors, the presence of countervailing policies, weaknesses in institutional design and state capacity, and the growth of sources of economic prosperity that directly or indirectly benefited some (usually richer) parts of society disproportionately. 5 On enabling legislation, let me draw on the case of Guatemala, where important advances were made in extending public education to historically deprived indigenous communities, and this was facilitated by the process of administrative decentralization. However, the ability to achieve a more broadbased improvement in economic welfare to these groups was limited by the absence of land reform. In Burundi, there have been some ambitious plans to redress the historic domination of the country by one region since 2007, but the effectiveness of these programmes has been limited by resource constraints and inadequate planning. In Peru, a great deal of state resources were devoted to addressing historic deprivations in the insurgency-hit areas during the 1990s. However, these policies, which were often quite effective, came without explicit recognition that they were addressing conflict grievances, and were delivered at the cost of political and civil freedoms. No attention was also paid to improving economic inequalities. The existence of countervailing policies were often found to diminish the effectiveness of even very well meaning and sustained policies by the state. In many cases, these were caused by the parallel rise of new forms of inequalities generated through market-reform and globalization-led growth. In some respects, the state attention to HIs dealt with an older form of inequality whereas new elites and widening disparities were being generated in other sectors of the economy. Conclusion This paper sought to provide evidence for the extent to which horizontal inequalities have been addressed in post-conflict countries. It concludes broadly that there have been important advances in the recognition and implementation of such policies. While it is important to maintain vigilance on these two areas, the policy agenda has shifted and it is important to recognize that the pending agenda now is largely one of ensuring better effectiveness. Many well-meaning policies lack effectiveness because of a lack of institutional capacity, sustained commitment in the long-run, and the reproduction of inequalities by the market. 6