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Introduction
In this paper I examine the conditions under which revolution is morally justified within a
state, and if there are any conditions under which revolution is morally obligatory. I will begin
by analyzing the nature of the obligations that exist between the state and the people. My
analysis will be from the perspective of social contract theory, focusing mainly on the works of
John Locke and Immanuel Kant. I use these works to framework my own conception of the
social contract. I do not completely adopt either social contract theory. Instead, I will propose a
new way of understanding the social contract which is heavily influenced by the aformentioned
philosophers. I hope to incorporate the strongest features of each theory while addressing
weaknesses.
Part I of this paper contains a detailed explanation and analysis of Lockean social
contract theory. The features of the Lockean social contract which influence my conception of
the social contract are the notion of strong natural rights and the necessity of a state to protect
those rights. Part I ends with a summary of David Hume’s objections to Lockean social contract
theory. Part II contains a detailed presentation of Kantian social contract theory, and
demonstrates how Kant successfully evades Hume’s objections through the use of an abstract
social contract. Part II concludes by showing that Kant’s theory does not provide desirable
protections from arbitrary state power as Locke’s theory does, and it appears overly restrictive on
the ability to justify revolution. Part III contains my proposal for a new way to approach the
social contract which incorporates strong, natural rights with an abstract social contract. The
social contract acts as a standard by which to judge the justness of states. If the contract is
breached, a state is determined to be some level of unjust. This is a necessary, but not a
sufficient, component of the moral justification for revolution. A state must be illegitimate as
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well as unjust before a sufficient moral justification for revolution exists. Five additional
considerations are introduced which pertain to judging the legitimacy of a state. The distinction
between the goodness, justness and legitimacy of a state is also discussed at length in Part III.
Part III concludes by examining the potential for a moral obligation to revolt in certain
circumstances.
It should be noted that the history of social contract theory includes much more than the
work of Locke and Kant. The conclusions drawn from other social contract theories have been
radically different from the conclusions that are drawn in this work. In Leviathan, Thomas
Hobbes uses the social contract as a way of escaping the miserable existence in the State of
Nature. The covenant made between the sovereign and the people ensures security that is not
present in the State of Nature. The covenant also results in the ultimate authority of the sovereign
to rule in whatever manner she deems necessary to maintain the security and stability (Hobbes
1994). In The Social Contract Jean-Jacques Rousseau introduces the concept of a general will of
the populace which guides state action. When following the general will, the state maintains
individuals’ liberty while legitimately acting as a governing body (Rousseau 2002). Though
these and other philosophers are prominent in the study of the social contract, the limitations of
this thesis are such that their work will not be addressed in detail. I will focus on laying out a
positive view of my conception of the social contract and how it relates to the moral justification
of revolution. I will not provide a detailed discussion on how this view, heavily drawn from
Locke and Kant, differs from other social contract theories. The reason for utilizing features of
Lockean and Kantian social contract theories is explained throughout the thesis. This essay will
focus mostly on the rights violations aspect of the moral justification of revolution, including a
detailed explanation of the role of the social contract. This is due to the fact that these rights
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violations are a consistent, necessary feature of the moral justification for revolution that is
presented.
I will provide one note concerning human rights as they are discussed in this essay. The
rights presupposed by the social contract in Part III are strong, natural rights extremely similar to
those presented in Lockean political theory. However, the rights differ in their ultimate origin.
The reasoning capability and inherent equality of individuals entitles them to a certain kind of
treatment that adequately respects and protects these qualities. Individual rights are the specific
content of the moral treatment to which each individual is entitled. It is not within the scope of
this thesis to provide a detailed, complete explanation for the origin of these rights. I imagine an
account of human rights grounded in an individual’s rationality or autonomy would be cohesive
with this thesis. This kind of grounding for human rights has been proposed by Alan Gerwirth in
The Basis and Content of Human Rights as well as James Griffin in On Human Rights (Gerwirth,
1978; Griffin 2008). This is not to say that either of these specific theories for human rights has
been adopted for this essay, I simply wish to broadly demonstrate the kind of grounding for
human rights that would fit naturally with this project.
Part I: Lockean Social Contract
Locke’s Social Contract
Locke’s work The Second Treatise of Government, is an early example of a political
theory which identified certain obligations that the state had to the people. These obligations
were formed out of the social contract, in which the people relinquished some of their natural
freedoms in order to form a body politic. The body politic created a government that provides
security, stability and protection of individual rights. The aspects of Lockean theory that are
especially important for this paper are the concept of natural rights, and the notion that the state
is necessary to ensure the protection of those rights. A necessary justification for revolution is a
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breach of the social contract, or a violation of individual rights by the state. To clarify, I am
using the term “state” to refer to the specific political institutions, organizations and leadership
which have governing power. This definition is used for the rest of the paper.
In order to examine the nature of political society and the necessity of a social contract
within Lockean political theory, I will begin by introducing Locke’s the state of nature. The state
of nature represents people acting outside of an established political structure, prior to the
formation of the body politic. The state of nature does not necessarily represent a physical time
and place, but is a rhetorical device used to examine the relations and rules among people
without political structure. Locke asserts that men in the state of nature are free and naturally
equal. By naturally equal, I mean that no one person has a natural right of rule or power over the
others. Locke refers to this as a “…state of equality…” that exists among people in the state of
nature (Locke 1993, 9). Though there is great freedom in the state of nature, people are still
beholden to the law of nature which Locke identifies as reason. Through reason it can be
determined that the state of equality results in a moral obligation to refrain from causing
“…harm to another in its life, health, liberty, or possessions” (Locke 1993, 9). Additionally, men
have an obligation towards self-preservation, which is the result of being made from a great,
omnipotent Creator. When this ability of self-preservation is not directly threatened, men are
obliged to “…preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice on an
offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty,
health, limb, or goods of another” (Locke 1993, 9).
Locke argues that there are serious obstacles to thriving in the state of nature. All people
within the state of nature have the right to punish those who break their moral obligations to one
another. The dispersal of the power to punish means that one objective appeal to authority does
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not exist in times of dispute. When a person uses force or violence on another, if the victim is
unable to enforce a fair punishment, then the victim remains in a “state of war” with the
aggressor. The state of war has no guarantee of deserved reparations or promises of peace (Locke
1993, 16). In addition, Locke notes that allowing all individuals the power to judge and enforce
punishment would often result in individuals being required to judge their own guilt. This allows
for the influence of personal biases which inhibit the ability to achieve objectively fair verdicts
or punishments. Locke asserts that the state of nature is unstable and ill-fitted to the long-term
preservation of mankind. When properly constructed, the state can remedy the problems present
in the state of nature. However, one cannot enter into the body politic and form the state without
consenting to relinquish some natural rights. The relinquishing of some natural rights for the
benefits provided by the state is the beginning of the social contract.
Locke states that “The great and chief end, thereof, of men’s uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property.” (Locke
1993, 66). In preserving one’s property, one is tending to their own self-preservation. This is
because Locke understands there to be two distinct kinds of property: property in one’s person,
and property in one’s possession. Property in one’s person includes an ownership over one’s own
body, but also extends to the labor produced by each person. It is the labor of each person that
can lead to additional property in one’s possession. When one uses their person to labor over
common property, they gain ownership of that property through their labor. Thus, private
property is created. Property in one’s possessions references objects that are under the ownership
of the person. The state provides the ability for all people to preserve their property, and creates
an environment that is best for the preservation of mankind. It should be noted that Locke’s duty
to preserve oneself may extend beyond even this broad notion of property. Self-preservation may
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include the duty to preserve a free, autonomous life as this is an essential feature of a rational,
moral agent. This is because one’s right to life does not just reference a right to be alive, but to
have a life befitting of moral agent. This is not necessarily a standard reading of Locke, but I
believe there is textual evidence which supports this interpretation. I will return to this point at
the end of the section on Locke.
It is relevant to clarify the role of unanimous consent after the coming together of the
body politic (Locke 1993). Locke argues that all must consent to form the body politic. Those
who do not consent to be part of the body politic are outside of the state formed by the body
politic. However, after the state has been formed, political power is delegated to political
associations which can create laws and actively govern (Locke 1993). The populace vote on
representatives and these representatives vote on the laws of the state. Majority rule has authority
in elections and in law-making (Locke 1993). This is because the individual has already
consented to live under the state and relinquish some of their liberties. The individual has also
consented to live under the majority rule within the state. Locke argues that those who form the
state clearly give express consent, however the following generations give tacit rather than
express consent. They do this by utilizing the benefits and resources that are provided in virtue of
the state’s existence (roads, sidewalks, etc) (Locke 1993).
Breaching the Social Contract
The social contract is meant to ensure that the state provides security and stability without
violating individual rights. Effective preservation of property and community stability involves
at least some level of interference on individual property rights. When the state does interfere on
another’s property, they must do so through just measures, arrived at through majority rule. A
necessary condition of revolution is unjust state interference. When justifying a revolution, it is
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important to establish the extent of state interference that is necessary to breach the social
contract.
There are conditions that must be met for justified property interference. First, if
property is taken from another individual, it must be a just decision that derives from the consent
of the governed. In this context, consent of the governed is considered to be the majority of the
populace. While the majority may not need to specifically vote on every tax or every code, these
property infringements should be put through some kind of democratic process and the people
should have the ability to appeal if the infringements are thought to be exorbitant. Second, the
state must not undermine the “…chief end…” that was discussed earlier in the paper, but
encourage greater stability and, in turn, a greater ability for individuals to meet obligations of
self-preservation. This excludes acts that would debilitate the people’s ability to labor or acts that
burden the populace solely for the personal well-being of the head of the state. Locke writes that
if the state is “…made use of to impoverish, harass, or subdue them [the populace] to the
arbitrary and irregular commands of those who have it; there presently becomes a tyranny…”
(Locke 1993, 102). When the state continues “…acting without authority, [the state] may be
opposed, as any other man, who by force invades the right of another” (Locke 1993,
102).Though every single unjust act may not warrant revolution, if the injustice is egregious
enough and one cannot seek an alternative, effective appeal for damages, a revolution is justified.
It is relevant to clarify what would be “egregious enough” to justify the costs of
revolution. The grievances against the government cannot be minor. If grievances can be
addressed by avoiding revolution, then it becomes irresponsible and harmful to the people to
undergo the pains of revolution (Locke 1993). Frequent acts of revolution cause rampant
instability, and ultimately inadequate protection of individual rights. However, the populace is
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justified in opposing especially abusive power. Both kings and legislatures can become abusive
if they commit excessive wrongs against the people. Under a state with a chief magistrate, the
chief magistrate becomes abusive when force is used against the people and no appeal exists for
the wronged. Locke writes “…for where the injured party may be relieved, and his damages
repaired by appeal to law, there can be no pretense for force…” (Locke 1993, 105). By engaging
in unlawful force against the people, where there is no appeal for grievances, the chief
magistrate, and therefore the government, is in a state of war with the people and resistance is
justified. Locke makes clear that this is not only true of the chief magistrate, but “whoever so in
authority exceeds the power given to him by law and makes use of the force he has under his
command…may be opposed…” (Locke 1993, 103).
In this context, Locke appears to reference the right of those mistreated persons to oppose
their aggressors. Each individual who is mistreated is justified in rebelling against the state in
virtue of their rights being violated. When defending against the claim that his theory will lead to
constant revolutions, one of Locke’s arguments is that small, isolated incidents of rights
violations could not destabilize the government. This is because the limited power and resources
of smaller groups whose rights have been violated will not threaten the stability of the state. It
will be infeasible for a successful revolution to occur if rights violations occur to only a few
(Locke 1993). This explanation further suggests that, under a strict Lockean view, those who are
justified in rebelling are those individuals whose rights have been violated.
A question may be raised regarding the ability to exploit a minority population so long as
this does not undermine the overall stability of the polity. The “…chief end…” of a state
includes the protection of property rights for all individuals. If a minority has their rights
violated, that minority would have reasons to advocate for better treatment, disobey certain state
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laws or rebel against the state. If the minority is a significant portion of the population, they may
be able to pressure the state to change its unjust behavior, if not undermine the unjust state. It is
important to note that the smaller the minority, the less power they would have against an unjust
state.
Using unjust force against the populace is not only reason to justify opposition. If either
the legislature or chief magistrates abuse their obligations to the people, then there may be cause
for revolution. The social contract is initially formed so that the people’s property rights can be
protected and the inconveniences of the state of nature can be addressed. The government has an
obligation to protect and respect these property rights and ensure the political community as a
whole thrives. Locke writes “…whenever the legislators endeavor to take away, and destroy the
property of the people, or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power, they put themselves
into a state of war with the people, who are thereupon absolved from any farther obedience…”
(Locke 1993, 111). It is not that every small injustice or abuse will warrant revolution, but if the
state fails to achieve the ends of the social contract, then revolution is justified. Locke further
elaborates that this kind of extensive damage could show itself in “…a long train of abuses,
prevarications and artifices all tending the same way…” (Locke 1993, 113). Extensive rights
violations by the state justify revolution. I will now closely examine Locke’s hoe Locke’s duty of
self-preservation relates to revolution.
Locke and Self-Preservation
Locke states that “Everyone as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his Station
willfully; so by the like reason when his own Preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as
much as he can, to preserve the rest of Mankind…” (Locke 1993, 271). When a person does not
have to sacrifice their own obligations towards self-preservation, they must do as much as is
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possible to tend to the preservation of mankind. Given this moral obligation, it may seem
difficult to justify revolution if there is a substantial risk one’s life. However, there is reason to
think that the duty to preserve one’s own life meant preserving a life that suited a moral agent.
This is a life free from arbitrary will, and one that respects the inherent equality and rights of an
individual. An individual could be justified, or even obliged, to risk a sub-optimal life to preserve
the kind of life a moral agent ought to have.
Understanding Locke’s duty of self-preservation in this way is not a standard reading,
though there is textual support for it. If it is against one’s moral duties to live under illegitimate
rule, then one would be justified in risking this sub-optimal existence to attain the morally
desired life worthy of preserving. It is worth asking what kind of treatment or quality of life that
Lockean rights guarantee individuals. Some Lockean scholars, such as A. John Simmons, have
written that Lockean rights are intended to provide individuals with an extremely large zone of
non-interference in order to effectively protect individual autonomy (Simmons 1992). I think
there is good reason to support an especially broad construal of an individual’s right to life given
Locke’s emphasis on freedom and autonomy.
Locke supported the notion that human beings attain a higher moral standing than that of
other beasts. This heightened moral standing is given by God, but is exemplified by an
individual’s natural reasoning capabilities. It entitles humans to a certain kind of treatment,
namely the freedom and autonomy to act, in accordance with their nature, as rational, moral
beings. It is plausible that restricting this fundamental aspect of human nature would conflict
with obligations towards self-preservation. The ability to act as a rational agent is essential to
human nature and a fundamental aspect of human life. In his essay entitled Enough and as Good
Left for Others? Rethinking Locke on Property, Sufficiency, and Freedom Daniel Layman argues
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for this broader conception of self-preservation. He claims that there are two aspects of selfpreservation, one relates to biological necessities described earlier and the other is a “…moral
dimension…” which “…pertains to the good of each person as a rational moral agent” (Layman
2014, 7). According to Layman, in order for individuals to fully engage in self-preservation,
they must preserve life that is “…appropriate for their moral status…” and includes “…social
freedom.” (Layman 2014, 7)
Locke’s condemnation of individuals being subjected to arbitrary will supports this
sentiment. He writes “…whenever the Legislators endeavor to take away, and destroy the
Property of the People, or to reduce them to Slavery under Arbitrary Power, they put themselves
into a state of War with the people, who are thereupon absolved from any farther Obedience”
(Locke 1993, 412). This point is even stronger when Locke describes the end (or purpose) of the
Magistrate. He writes that when Political Power is given to a Magistrate, the purpose of this
power must be “…to preserve the Members of Society in their Lives, Liberties, and Possessions;
and so cannot be an Absolute, Arbitrary Power over their Lives and Fortunes, which are as much
as possible to be preserved…” (Locke 1993, 382). Once political power has been given to the
state through the social contract, individuals have consented to be governed by the magistrate or
legislatures, and to be subject to majority rule. However, this political power must be used to
meet those fundamental obligations of self-preservation and the preservation of mankind. The
use of arbitrary power is presented as directly contrary to the preservation of mankind. Locke
does not specify that this arbitrary power is specifically used to execute citizens or directly
threaten them with death. Locke appears to believe that living under arbitrary power, and having
that power effect both “…lives and fortunes…” is in conflict with the preservation of mankind
(Locke 1993, 382). It is relevant that Locke uses the broad understanding of preservation when
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speaking of political power. This broad interpretation of the duty of self-preservation applies to
the individual (and mankind) whether in the state of nature or in political society. When this
power is transferred over to civil society, the purpose of civil society is established (namely, the
preservation of mankind), but the bounds within which the sovereign or magistrate can act are
also formed. Given the previously established obligation to self-preservation, and given this
broader interpretation of self-preservation, the governing powers that be cannot rule in a manner
that would lower the kind of life that a rational, autonomous ought to have. Under these
assumptions, revolution becomes easier to justify even in situations where death is a serious risk.
Humean Objections to Lockean Contracts
There are many strong features of the Lockean social contract which astutely capture the
nature of the relationship between the state and the governed. Strong natural rights, with an
emphasis on the importance of a right to life, provide strong protection against state abuse.
Locke also identifies the need for a just state structure for optimal protection and respect of these
rights. The social contract provides a method for the state to form and govern individuals who
are inherently equal and free, without denying them the moral treatment to which they are
entitled. However, there are some serious weaknesses to Lockean social contract theory that need
to be considered.
Hume famously raised a forceful critique against social contract theory, especially that
which is based in Lockean principles. I will briefly present some of Hume’s main objections.
These objections are: 1) that states do not actually form by contract; 2) that it is implausible to
gather and maintain the consent of the people to support the social contract; 3) that individuals
do not view their relations to the government in terms of a social contract; 4) that a social
contract is not necessary for a just state (Hume 1994).
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Hume argues that very few, if any, societies have actually formed through the kind of
social contract presented in Lockean theory. Hume writes “If we would say anything to the
purpose, we must assert, that every particular government which is lawful, and which imposes
any duty of allegiance on the subject, was, at first, founded on the consent and a voluntary
compact” (Hume 1994, 364). Hume notes that even societies which seem to exemplify this
principle, fail to meet the idealized description that Locke presents. Many societies are formed
by force in combat or conquest, which is decidedly opposed to the consensual signing of a
contract. Hume writes “By such acts as these, many governments have been established; and this
is all the original contract, which they have to boast of” (Hume 1994, 364). If no society has
formed in a way that resembles the social contract, there is reason to think the creation of a just
state is extremely rare. The implication of this would be that few, if any, states have been ruled
legitimately. Locke requires the consent of individuals through the social contract to legitimize
the state. Hume contends that many states considered legitimate are actually illegitimate on
Locke’s theory. This would be an unfortunate and negative outcome of Lockean social contract
theory, though it may not say anything about whether Locke is correct that truly legitimate
societies can only be formed by contract. However, this objection is claiming something even
stronger than just the implausibly of states forming through contract. Hume ultimately concludes
that the formation of states through contract is both implausible and unnecessary to attain a just
and legitimate state. It is not just the acknowledgement that formation by social contract does not
occur, but that many states that have formed without a social contract appear to be legitimate.
Hume’s second objection is in regards to the inability to gather and maintain consent
using a social contract. First, Hume conjectures that originally gaining full consent from the
people for the social contract to be enacted is implausible if not impossible. Hume writes “It is in
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vain to say that all governments are or should be…founded on popular consent” (Hume 1994,
366). Even the creation of the United States, which was heavily influenced by Lockean political
theory, did not meet the criteria of attaining the consent of each individual who was subject to
the American state. This requirement of consent undermines the creation of states in such a
manner that an extremely small minority could delegitimize even a minimalist state.
In addition to the two objections above, even if it is granted that the consent of those
originally entering into the contract could be attained, there is still the problem of continually
gaining that consent from future generations. Locke introduces a notion of tacit consent, whereby
any individuals who accept the benefits of living in state implicitly provide their consent to be
governed by the state (Locke 1993). Benefits of the state are wide ranging and include the
provision of roads, security, basic resources and other resources that one can imagine using on a
regular basis. Locke further explains that accepting these benefits shows consent because no
individual is forced to reside within a just state. At any point, an individual could choose to live
in another state. Their choice to remain within the original state (and accept the benefits of the
state) is an expression of tacit consent. (Locke 1993) Hume is skeptical that individuals,
especially the poor, truly have the capability to leave their state. He writes “Can we seriously
say, that a poor peasant or artisan has a free choice to leave his country, when he knows no
foreign language or manners and lives…by the small wages which he acquires” (Hume 1994,
367). There is a kind of dependency formed between the people and the state which undermines
the notion that consent is the true foundation of society. Therefore, any social contract which
claims to form society on the basis of consent seems impossible to enact and unnecessary for
creating legitimate states.
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Furthermore, even if it appears that individuals within state have given their consent to be
governed, Hume argues that this consent is not given in virtue of a mutual agreement between
the government and the people (Hume 1994). Individuals tend to obey the established authority
simply in virtue of standing in a subordinate relationship to that authority. Individuals within in a
state do not regularly challenge the legitimacy of their government, especially when they are not
facing particularly egregious demands from said government. Individuals obey the authority in
place because it is established and obeyed by others (Hume 1994). The implications of this are
that even when Lockean consent appears present in a state, there is reason to believe that
individuals are not thinking about their relation to the state in terms of a social contract.
Hume concludes his critique of the social contract by arguing that basing the legitimacy
of a state on the presence of consent is philosophically unnecessary. He argues that a theory of
consent is useful only to the extent that it encourages stability and security within the state
(Hume 1994). There is no need to base our obligation to obey the government on our obligation
to keep promises, or keep the social contract. Both acts are valued in virtue of the fact that
without them “…society could not otherwise subsist” (Hume 1994).
Though I do not take Hume’s objections to be devastating to social contract theory, they
ought to be seriously considered when moving forward with the social contract. The objections
that Hume presents have incredible force and for this reason they give an idea as to the
limitations of social contract theory. The next section introduces the developments that
Immanuel Kant added to the social contract. The social contract provided by Kant is better able
to address the concerns raised by Hume. This is partly due to the fact that Kant adopts a more
abstract social contract which does not presume to form the state, nor does it require expressed
consent. Given the earlier objections from Hume, this approach appears to be the most plausible
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when attempting a contemporary social contract theory. Part II examines the features of a
Kantian, abstract social contract.
Part II: Kantian Social Contract
Kant’s Social Contract
In the first section of the Metaphysics of Morals, entitled The Doctrine of Right, Kant
defines the concept of a contract and the necessary steps for its formation. A contract is formed
in two phases: negotiating and concluding (Kant 1996). The negotiating phase is made up of two
steps which are the offering and the ascent (Kant 1996). The offering is simply the initial
presentation of offers given by one party to the other. The ascent occurs when both parties
identify offers they find to be agreeable. Once this phase is complete the terms of the contract
may exist, but the contract has yet to be constituted. This occurs in the constitutive phase, which
also consists of two steps: promising and acceptance. (Kant 1996). It is through promising and
acceptance that the obligatory nature of the contract is formed. Each party is promising to fulfill
the previously agreed upon terms and accept being bound by the contract. Kant writes that the
two constitutive steps must occur simultaneously between the two individuals. A defining feature
of a contract is that it consists of “…the united choice between two persons by which anything at
all that belongs to one passes to the other…” (Kant 1996, 68). This simultaneous choice cannot
be understood as an empirical event because an empirical understanding would naturally entail a
conception of promising and acceptance happening as temporally separate declarations, but this
cannot be the case (Kant 1996). To show why the constitutive steps must be simultaneous, Kant
examines the nature of the transfer of objects through contractual agreements. Kant writes that
objects from one person to another must be transferred such that someone is always in
possession of that object, either the giver or the receiver Otherwise the object is temporarily
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outside of both the giver and receiver’s possession. However, if the object is not in anyone’s
possession, in that instance no one has the ability to give or receive the object. (Kant 1996) The
notion of simultaneous transfer is contrary to the idea that an object must be released or
abandoned in order for another to receive it. A stated above, the social contract differs from other
contracts made among individuals in that it is not event but a concept used to understand the
nature of the obligations between the government of the people. However, Kant’s understanding
of standard contracts has some implications for how one ought to think about the social contract.
It is not the case that individual liberties are first relinquished and then the governing body
provides security and structure. The transfer of unrestrained liberty and security occurs
simultaneously between the sovereign and the populace and this simultaneous choice provides a
foundation for society. However, limitations on sovereign behavior arise when considering that
individuals would not reasonably agree to enter a contract which offends human dignity. A
simultaneous exchange of all individual rights could not occur.
Kant writes on the contract which constitutes society in his essay titled On the Common
Saying: This May be True in Theory but it Does not Apply in Practice. He writes “The basic law,
which can only come from the general, united will of the people, is called the original contract.”
(Kant 1793, 107). By “basic law”, Kant seems to be referring to those laws which both
enumerate the rights of the people and prohibit actions on the basis of rights. When Kant writes
that the basic law arises out of the general, united will he means that all people within the
society, if reasoning properly, would ascent and agree to the original contract. In addition, those
who are imperfectly rational still implicitly will to the social contract. Kant asserts that emotions
like guilt and moral offense, which arise when an immoral action is done, show that individuals
implicitly will to act morally even when they act immoral. Applying this to the social contract,
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there is an aversion and disgust that occurs when the government commits rights violation
against others. This original contract is the foundation for obligations within a political society.
As stated above, the social contract is not an actual document and does not have an empirical
account according to Kant. It is an abstract concept which explains the nature of the obligations
between the government and the people. When Kant describes the social contract as arising from
the general, united will of the people, he is not envisioning the entire populace coming together
to sign a constitution. Rather, when guided by reflective, informed reason, the people understand
their obligations to the government through the social contract.
According to Kant, there are three a priori principles for forming a civil society: 1)
Freedom; 2) Equality; 3) Independence (Kant 1793). People are naturally entitled to pursue a
certain lifestyle of their choosing, so long as they would not impose limitations on others that
they would not accept on themselves. In addition, the people have an equal standing with one
another, and any law within society ought to respect this equality. Finally, the people have an
independent will that is the result of their freedom and reasoning capability. It is the independent
wills that can unite to the form the united will that constitutes the original contract. The original
contract cannot violate the principles named above, but represents the sovereign ability to rule
within these principles. The original contract provides reasons to obey the governing power,
namely the formation of a secure, stable society. Reason dictates that the people ought to obey
the government to attain this security given that their basic human dignity (namely their freedom,
equality, and individuality) is protected and respected. In this way, the social contract can also be
understood as providing a standard for protecting the basic rights of the populace. The social
contract provides the standard for determining whether the laws in society are just. For example,
a law that would coerce citizens to join a certain religious organization is in violation of the
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social contract, because it does not respect the basic freedoms of persons. The social contract
gives reasons to obey legitimate governments that do not overstep their bounds. That being said,
in Perpetual Peace Kant discusses the idea that a gradual progression towards becoming a just
state may be required in some cases (Kant 1795).
Kant’s Objection to Revolution
As stated previously, Kant’s conception of the abstract social contract contains many
benefits that a strict Lockean social contract lacks. Presenting the social contract as a product of
reason which dictates the kind of state one ought to have is much better equipped to answer
Hume’s objections. However, there are reasons against adopting a strict Kantian theory as well,
especially in a paper justifying revolution. Kant seemingly rejected the idea that the people could
ever engage in a morally justified revolution against the state. He endorsed the view that people
have basic human dignity and that just governments have certain obligations to the people.
However, He did not explicitly endorse a moral right to revolt against the government, even
when the government has committed wrongs against the populace. Though the people could
advocate for a change through protest and other forms of expression, if they actively and
violently revolted against the state, they committed an immoral act. Adopting a theory in which
revolution is never justified, regardless of the justness or legitimacy of the state, seems
unsatisfying. There is something morally counterintuitive about condemning the oppressed who
rise against oppressors. Being committed to this condemnation would be reason enough to
rethink commitments to Kantian theory.
Kant’s theory appears contrary even to Kant’s actual reactions and comments regarding
the French and American revolutions. Kant seemed to approve of these revolutions because they
were motivated by a desire to defend the people’s basic rights. In the essay Questions About
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Kant’s Opposition to Revolution by Thomas Hill Jr., the nature of Kant’s objection to revolution
is reexamined.
Hill argues that Kant may have successfully shown that there is no coherent legal right to
revolution, but that Kant’s theory of justice does not necessarily entail that revolution is always
an immoral act (Hill 2002). The illegality of revolution arises from the claim that a constitution
of a civil society cannot coherently maintain a law that would call for the disbandment of civil
society. In another vein, a constitution of a civil society could not legally give revolutionaries the
authority to disband the ultimate source of authority. Briefly examining the beginnings of civil
society within Kantian political theory can help to clarify this idea. Kant believed that there is a
moral obligation to form a civil society. Similar to Locke, the motivation for forming civil
society is heavily influenced by the need for protection of property in rights. Kant claims that
freedom and equality are essential to rational, moral agents (and this is understood through
reason). In order for a person to fully realize their freedom, they must make use of resources
around them. This means that a just, coherent concept of private property must exist. Without a
civil society, this notion of private property is impossible to achieve. For an individual to claim a
resource, they must receive the consent from every other individual to relinquish their own
natural claims over the resource. The person who attempts to gain the resource also imposes an
obligation on all others to respect the claim over the resource and face penalty if they steal,
damage or otherwise violate the individual’s right to that resource. The act of receiving every
individual’s consent is impossible, the placement of an obligation on all others when they are
unaware of the obligation is unjust, and the ability to rightfully defend property rights is
nonexistent prior to civil society. In forming civil society, individuals relinquish their potential
claim on all property and agree to respect each other’s property rights. The government within
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the civil society is the source of authority, the arbiter of disputes and ultimate source of justice.
The people, for the sake of fully realizing their freedom and autonomy, are obligated to respect
the laws arising from the civil society. In his essay, Hill writes that dissent against certain unjust
laws within a society can clearly be justified and even legally acceptable within Kant’s theory,
but that there is ultimately a legal obligation to maintain the existence of the state. As stated
above, a legal right of revolution within a social contract or constitution is incoherent, because
this would authorize the destruction of what the constitution was meant to protect (Hill 2002).
Kant goes from this explanation to then conclude that revolution is immoral.
Hill questions whether establishing revolution is illegal would necessarily entail that it is
also immoral. He writes “Kant’s belief that revolution is morally impermissible in all conditions,
then, is a substantive moral claim, going beyond his conceptual point that legal systems cannot
allow a right to overturn forcibly the ultimate source of legal authority.” (Hill 2002, 290). Hill
examines multiple explanations behind this “…substantive moral claim…” (Hill 2002, 290).
First, Hill distinguishes between juridical and ethical duties within Kant’s moral theory. Juridical
duties are those which can be enforced by an outside party (the sovereign, laws, etc) and
generally pertain to respecting just laws. Hill writes that, for example, “We satisfy juridical
duties if we avoid behaving in prohibited ways, such as theft, murder, and breach of contract,
regardless of the motives behind our restraint” (Hill 2002, 290). Ethical duties cannot be enforced
by an outside party. These arrive from moral principle that one uses their own reason to discover.
Hill writes “…we satisfy ethical duties… only if we act for morally good reasons” (Hill 2002,
290). Another difference between juridical duties and ethical duties that is acknowledged by
Hill is that juridical duties are more rigid, in that they are unequivocally required. Ethical duties
identify a general goal that must be satisfied, by have less rigid instructions than juridical duties.
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Because of this difference, juridical are known as perfect while ethical duties are imperfect. The
duty to abstain from revolution is categorized as a juridical duty according to Kant. As Hill
writes, one must prioritize the satisfaction of juridical over ethical duties because juridical are
“perfect.” (Hill 2002, 291). In addition, Kant believes there to be a moral obligation to obey
juridical duties. Due to this classification scheme, it becomes clear why showing the illegality
of revolution led Kant to believe that the act revolution was always immoral. Hill writes “to
assert that revolution is always contrary to a perfect juridical duty implies that it is always
immoral” (Hill 2002, 291).
Hill identifies multiple problems with the conclusion that revolution is always immoral
on this basis. First, Hill contends that Kant does not provide an adequate argument for why an
indirect ethical duty is connected to every juridical duty, or for the claim that juridical duties are
perfect but ethical duties are not (Hill 2002). However, even if these claims are granted as true,
Hill remains unconvinced that the act of revolting is always immoral. Hill proposes that an
indirect ethical duty could still exist in regards to obeying the law, but it is implausible that this
means one must unequivocally obey all laws or else they are doing something immoral (Hill
2002). For example, Hill writes that they may be an indirect moral obligation to “…give it [the
law] weight in our deliberations and to resist, if we must, respectfully,” but this need not entail
an unequivocal moral obligation to obey all laws (Hill 2002, 291).
Furthermore, Hill examines the possibility that, contrary to Kant’s explicit belief, that
revolution can be morally justified within Kantian political and moral theory. Hill reminds
readers that one of the basic elements of Kantian moral theory is abiding by the categorical
imperative (Hill 2002). As this is the basis for Kant’s moral theory, moral choices that an
individual makes should be informed by this maxim, and that includes the choice to engage in
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revolution. Where there is conflict between unequivocal juridical duties and the utilization of
the categorical imperative, Hill writes “Kant himself would no doubt have given priority to the
Categorical Imperative, even if this meant acknowledging a need to modify the perfect duties”
(Hill 2002). Hill concludes that it may be possible to put forth a maxim regarding revolution that
does not violate Kant’s categorical imperative. This maxim would have to ensure that revolution
is not a frequent occurrence that would threaten the stability of the state. Hill offers the following
as a maxim that meets these requirements: “When the ruler is clearly unjust, oppressive, and
utterly resistant to reform and revolution is almost certain to be successful, bloodless, and more
humane and respectful of human rights, then I will join in the revolution.” (Hill 2002, 295). This
maxim could be thought to maintain the stability and longevity of a state while also morally
justifying resistance to a state that is the source of gross injustice.
Respect of basic human rights and human dignity is at the center of Kantian moral theory.
This is a fact that Hill acknowledges in his essay. It seems unlikely to conclude that Kant would
have condemned as morally wrong acts of revolution that would restore the status of human
rights in states where they had been seriously threatened or rendered nonexistent. As I have
previously stated, I base my justifications for revolution on the grounds that a necessary
condition for revolution is a breach of the social contract, or a violation of basic rights. Based on
the work of the previous essay, it is not clear that Kant’s objection would always apply to
revolution with this necessary condition. Does this mean that one should completely adopt the
Kantian social contract theory when justifying revolution?
I still think there are important restrictions in Kantian social contract theory that are
unsatisfying when justifying revolution. It may be the case that only very egregious, widespread
rights violations could justify revolution. Even in those circumstances, revolution may require a
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high probability that it will succeed in order to be justified. One of the reasons for this is that
Kantian rights are derivative, and ultimately not as strong as natural rights that are found
Lockean political theory. Strong, natural rights provide more of basis for protecting individual
autonomy and freedom from abusive states. However, there are also good reasons to think that
an abstract social contract, similar to that in Kantian political philosophy, is a more plausible
theory, as well as more effective as a standard for measuring the justness of states.
The next section will go into more detail describing the benefits of natural rights as well
as abstract social contracts. It also proposes the outline of a social contract theory which
successfully incorporates these two ideas. In context of revolution, the social contract proposed
below is used as a tool for determining when states have unjustly infringed upon the people’s
rights, which is a necessary condition for revolution.
Part III: Social Contracts and Revolution
Lockean Versus Kantian Social Contract
Before moving into my positive account of the principles that could be adopted from the
Lockean and Kantian social contract, I will briefly give my negative account of the social
contract. The social contract is not a physical event or object that forms society; it is not a
birthing mechanism for the state. Given that there are many states that appear both legitimate
and just, but that were not formed by the expressed consent of the populace, the claim that states
must form this way seems dubious. Furthermore, the social contract can achieve the ends of
describing and justifying the obligations between the government and the people without being
the act that created the state. Additionally, I do not take the social contract to be primarily
concerned with attaining or displaying the expressed consent of the governed. Even liberal,
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expansive explanations of expressed consent, including notions of tacit consent put forth by
Locke, do not seem plausible for forming or maintaining the state.
I propose the social contract to be a standard to which judges the justness of states. When
the social contract is broken, the basic moral obligations required to constitute the state are not
being met. I intend to adopt a more abstract conception of the social contract, whose origin can
be deduced through proper reasoning. Unlike Kant, I argue that the type of social contract which
is the best standard for judging the justness states is one which presupposes strong, natural rights.
By “…best standard for judging the justness of states…” I mean that the social contract will
recognize as just only those states which provide the basic treatment required of rational, moral
agents. In other words, it will deem as just those states which protect basic individual rights.
States which are just according to the social contract will provide necessary security while
guaranteeing maximum freedom for the development of passions, pursuits, and character which
all rational, moral agents strive for. In addition, the standard will track with common intuitions
of how a just state ought to act.
This version of the social contract is much better equipped to address the first two of
Hume’s objections described earlier in the paper. It does not obviously conflict with empirical
accounts of the creation of states. However, it may be argued that my use of the social contract as
a standard for just states may not adequately address the last two of Hume’s objections that were
previously presented. One objection was that individuals do not intuitively think of their state as
being legitimate due to a social contract. They obey their state authorities in virtue of it being the
governing power. It may be asserted that the social contract I propose is equally as absent from
the minds of most individuals. Hume astutely identified that it is a weakness of Locke’s social
contract that the common individual does not think of the state as being legitimatized by a
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Lockean contract. Though expressed consent or acknowledgement is not a requirement for my
conception, it may still be considered a weakness if individuals have no intuitions regarding state
restrictions or basic rights. I would have to show why intuitions counter to my claims are a
product of some form of faulty reasoning.
However, I think individuals regularly think of states as justified in virtue of their respect
and protection of human rights. An extremely common notion is that the state has certain
restrictions on its behavior in virtue of the fact that individuals deserve a certain kind of
treatment. The idea that governments cannot overstep basic human rights is agreed upon on an
international scale. Historical and contemporary examples can be provided to support this fact.
During the 18th Century, the American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration
of the Rights of Man and Citizen exemplified this notion (Scholastic Inc, 2002; Jellinek 2010).
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly in 1948, recognizes the “…inherent dignity…” and “…equal inalienable rights of all
members of the human family…” (Roosevelt 2003). Tunisian and Egyptian constitutions arising
out of the Arab Spring also referenced the natural rights of citizens. The Egyptian Constitution
voted for in 2014 asserts that “Personal freedom is a natural right, shall be protected and may not
be infringed upon.” (Constitute 2014) Article 51, entitled Public Rights, Freedom, and Duties,
states that “Dignity is the right of every human being and may not be violated.” (Constitute
2014) The Tunisian Constitution sets to establish a state where “…the system of rule is governed
by the respect for human rights and freedoms…” (Woodrow Wilson Center 2013)
One has to put forth very little effort to find support of a notion of rights, and this
intuition appears to be spreading. There is a great literature emerging on establishing basic
human rights that restrict state behavior, and extend beyond individual state law. Both
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international law and political philosophy have become increasingly interested in the notion of
universal human rights supported on this international scale. Where lack of empirical examples
and common conceptions weakened the Lockean contract, the fact that many individuals think of
government as being restricted in the ways that I have described should strengthen the social
contract proposed.
The last objection from Hume presented was that a social contract is ultimately only as
valuable as it is useful in maintaining the state (Hume 1994). This inherently rejects the notion
that an individual starts out with basic rights that cannot be infringed upon by the state. I have
already stated that this view would go against common conceptions regarding the required
treatment of individuals within a state. I would add further that focusing only on securing state
stability and overall utility may end up categorizing intuitively unjust states as just. For
example, imagine a benevolent dictator who treats her people well enough so that they can
maintain at least an adequate quality of life. This dictator retains an unequivocal power to punish
those who act against the law. If the dictator decides that an individual may have broken the law,
then there is no trial. The dictator determines guilt or innocent, and then chooses a punishment
which could include a life imprisonment or even execution. There are no strict guidelines on how
to impose penalties; it is simply at the discretion of the dictator. There is always some mystery
involved for individuals determining what specific punishment would accompany each specific
crime. This unsureness combined with the fear of receiving a harsh penalty contributes to a low
crime rate. Remember that it was previously stated that most individuals have at least an
adequate quality of life. They are satisfied to the point that they are not especially motivated to
commit crimes. This state maintains stability and the utility of the individuals within the state is
relatively high. Revolting against the dictator risks the lives of the individuals and could result in
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a state where the quality of life is much lower. At the very least, revolution will cause a period of
hardship without a guarantee of restored stability. In this scenario, it is unlikely that Hume could
refer to the state as unjust or justify a revolution. However, this kind of state intuitively appears
unjust. The benevolent dictator infringes upon the right individuals have over their body and life
arbitrarily, and this should not occur even if the state maintains a certain level of utility for the
individuals.
The question may still be raised regarding the use of natural rights versus the “rights” that
seem to appear in Kantian political philosophy. Though, as previously stated, Kant
acknowledges basic freedom and equality in each individual, human dignity is not the source of
natural rights. The a priori principles for civil society that Kant provides do not result in the same
strong Lockean natural rights. I believe there are good reasons to argue for natural rights, very
similar to those found in Lockean political theory. As previously stated, these rights have a
strong intuitive appeal. In addition, by existing outside of government, they restrict government
action in a manner to protect individuals from being mistreated. They act to preserve the kind of
freedom and autonomy which rational agents require to thrive. Some scholars have attempted to
build a basis for basic human rights based on Kantian conceptions of human dignity (Donnelly
2014; Rorty 1993). While I have proposed an abstract social contract which is heavily influenced
by Kant, I have intended to show that natural rights similar to those in Lockean political theory
would work within an abstract contract, and are more desirable. Kantian rights are not selfevident or within the individual. Rights are ultimately derivative according to Kant. In his paper
Kant’s Conception of Human Dignity, Oliver Sensen aims to clarify what he takes to be common
misconceptions concerning human dignity in Kant. Contrary to some, Sensen does not take
Kantian human dignity to be an entity within the individual. Kantian dignity is not an “…inner
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value…” but “…refers to a relational property of being elevated” (Sensen 2009, 310). Sensen
distinguishes between a contemporary paradigm of dignity and a traditional paradigm. The
traditional paradigm refers to humans as having a significant standing in nature because of their
reasoning capacities, but this is a relational standing and creates “… a duty to use it [reason] in a
proper way.” (Sensen 2009, 313). This is different from stating that an individual has an
inalienable character which commands a certain kind of treatment. The contemporary paradigm
views human dignity as an inner part of the human being. It states that an individual is special
simply in virtue of the type of being she is (Sensen 2009). Sensen identifies multiple important
differences between the two conceptions. There are two main differences that are relevant for
this paper. The first is that the traditional paradigm is a description of a relational standing but
“…it does not yet imply anything about how human beings should treat one another.” (Sensen
2009, 313). The contemporary paradigm would likely have implications on the treatment
required of human beings. The second difference is that, according to the traditional conception,
“…dignity was said to be connected to duties and not rights.” (Sensen 2009, 314). Sensen goes
on to argue that Kant references human dignity using the traditional paradigm rather than the
contemporary paradigm. If Sensen is correct, then this is a good reason to think that the kind of
rights that would result in the desired restrictions on the state would not come out of Kantian
theory.
Another reason to adopt stronger, natural rights rather than weaker Kantian rights is that
Kantian rights may significantly restrict justifications for revolution. Though I have previously
written that revolution is plausible in Kantian theory, it is plausible only in those instances where
life as a rational, autonomous agent becomes nearly impossible. Instances where the law is
arbitrary but does not threaten the life of a rational, autonomous agent would not merit revolt
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against the state. Individuals may have an obligation, in some cases, to live under the arbitrary
will of the state. For any potential Kantian revolution, the state must degrade to a point where it
is very clearly unjust and oppressive, such that moral implications outweigh a strong obligation
to maintain the stability of the state. Kant’s juridical duty to obey the law is constantly weighed
against rights violations that may occur. The commitment to the stability of the state is such a
high priority, that one must be nearly assured of a victorious revolution and a successful
rebuilding of the state to justify the revolution. It is also a concern that Kant would have
difficulty justifying revolution against benevolent dictators like the one previously described.
Strong natural rights ensure the protection and maintenance of intuitively just states which
provide the basic treatment to which each individual is entitled. For this reason, and the inability
to arrive at strong protections based upon human dignity, I stipulate natural rights that are not
Kantian, but which still coincide with an abstract social contract.
One issue that may need to be addressed after adopting strong, natural rights, is the
relevance of providing consent to be governed in virtue of these rights. Locke held that expressed
consent was extremely important in legitimizing the state. Locke advocates that the only way to
form a state which will protect rights and ensure the preservation of property is through attaining
the consent of the governed. In this way, individuals demonstrate they are willing to freely
relinquish some of their liberties in order to receive the benefits of a state. This is an important
difference between the Kantian social contract and the Lockean social contract. However, the
near impossibility of attaining expressed consent as well as the apparent empirical absence of
expressed consent within states has been previously addressed. I argue there is a plausible
explanation of consent which still respects the notion of strong, natural rights.
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It is nearly impossible to attain basic protection of rights without the creation of a state.
Those who thrive in the state of nature would likely be forced to use intimidation, physical
violence, coercion and other morally questionable means simply to stay alive. In other words,
fulfilling basic biological requirements of life would likely require one to mistreat and violate the
rights of others. This environment does not ensure that the individual has the kind of life that a
rational, moral agent ought to have. The harm is two-fold in the sense that the state of nature
both actively requires one to commit rights violations to survive and fails to provide adequate
protection of rights for others, including those who thrive. Given that the state enables an
individual to preserve their property and protect their rights, where previously they could not
adequately do so, one who is reasoning properly can ascertain the necessity of the state. To form
this state, one must relinquish some of their liberties in manner that does not offend their
standing as an autonomous, free, moral agent. Instead of building in this protection with
expressed consent, one could adopt a standard of reasonably informed hypothetical consent. The
necessity of the state is clear, and the necessity of restricting certain liberties in order to maintain
the state is clear. It is also clear that a state can become abusive and undermine its own ends as
an entity which preserves and protects rights. Therefore, individuals’ liberties can be infringed
upon by the state only if they would, with an informed, rational will, reason that the state is
necessary to fulfill moral obligations to preserve and protect individual rights. It may be asked
how these individuals determine that the state meets this criterion. I would say that they use
principles within the social contract to determine whether the state meets the criteria. In other
words, if through proper reasoning an individual would determine that the state is in adherence
with the social contract, then the state is deemed necessary for the preservation and protection of
rights and hypothetical consent is given.
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In the next section I introduce principles for an abstract social contract which protects
natural human rights. The relevance of using the language of a “contract” may be questioned at
this juncture of the paper. I maintain the social contract language because I think it is beneficial
to understanding the function and purpose behind the principles named below. The social
contract, even in abstract form, is the best representation of why the state can restrict behavior
even though individuals are naturally free and equal. Every individual may not give their
expressed consent to be restricted, but hypothetical consent is meant to result in the type of
agreement every individual would consent to if properly considering their interests. Individuals
still respect obligations to the state, only to the extent that it provides some improved condition
for their lives. The social contract presented below represents a joint endeavor in which the state
and the people are bound together under the assumption that each is strengthened, assuming the
other abides by the contractual terms. The state is judged to be just, and is therefore likely to be
supported by the people, assuming it does not violate individual rights. The people receive
protection of their rights, assuming they restrict some of their liberties and accept necessary
property infringement. I think the notion of a contract, even one that is abstract and based upon
hypothetical consent, is befitting of this relationship between the state and the people.
Justified Revolution
I take the social contract to be a set of principles necessary for a just state, and therefore it
is the standard by which to judge the justness of states. It is not what forms the state, but it is a
tool which ensures that the state is just. If the social contract is breached, the state is unjust. This
is a necessary condition for the justification of revolution. Given this function, and the
presupposition of natural rights, I introduce three principles for a social contract theory. I do not
intend to suggest that these are the only three principles, but they are a framework for examining
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the moral justification for revolution. The principles are as follows: 1) The state must provide a
baseline of security and stability for the lives of the governed; 2) The state must act in a manner
that preserves, protects, and respects an individual’s natural rights; 3) The people must relinquish
some of their liberties, but only to the extent that it is required for the fulfillment of the first and
second principles.
Liberties refer to the actions one can rightfully take with their property free from
interference. By stipulating how the government ought to act in regards to the people, the social
contract ultimately works to restrain abusive, tyrannical or other unseemly government acts. The
social contract, construed in this way, can be understood as moral constraint on political action.
A breach of the social contract is a necessary condition for the moral justification of
revolution. At this point it is necessary to define revolution for my purposes. By revolution I
mean the active destruction of an unjust institution or political system with the intent to create
just institutions or systems in its place. To be considered revolution, the act must do more than
just challenge the specific persons who hold positions of power, it should challenge some larger
feature of the political system. My use of the term “revolution” for this paper is somewhat
specialized as it requires revolutionaries to have the intent to restore justice rather than simply
take over a state.
When the state violates this first principle, it both prevents individuals from fulfilling
their moral obligations and unjustifiably restricts individuals’ liberties. However, given the lack
of protection and rampant instability that accompanies life prior to the existence of the state; the
violation of this first principle cannot be the only necessary requirement for the moral
justification of revolution. This standard would be too high of a standard for revolution to be
practically useful. One can imagine most abusive regimes still provide basic security and
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stability that would be necessary for property institutions, but that these regimes appear
undesirable or unjust. For almost all states, even unjust ones, the structure and organization of
society creates significant improvements on security and stability. A state which provides these
property institutions through slave labor or mistreatment of the poor still seems unacceptable.
This is not the type of state which enables the fulfillment of moral obligations. This should be
some indication that a just state must do more than provide basic security and stability. If
revolution is to be a tool for destructing unjust states, then it must be justified even in
circumstances where the people gain some basic benefits from the state’s existence. However,
revolution can also be justified if basic rights violations occur, and this is exemplified in the
second and the third principle listed above.
When applying the principles to the moral justification of revolution, there are a few
important considerations to keep in mind. The standard to which just states are judged must be
able to accurately distinguish between justified and unjustified restriction on individual liberty.
At first glance, the incorporation of the third principle may seem to be overly restrictive of state
behavior. I argue that, while the third principle is meant to be the most restrictive of state
behavior, it still allows for an appropriate amount of state power and influence. The first and
second principles temper the power of the third. The rights which the government are bound to
protect and preserve are extremely similar to Lockean rights. Previously, I wrote that a natural
right to life in Locke includes one’s life specifically as a rational, moral agent. Under the
conception of the social contract above, I consider the natural right to life as including not just
biological necessities, but the basic necessities that respects one’s standing as a rational, moral
agent. As stated previously, individual freedom is necessary for the development of passions,
pursuits and character of a rational, moral agent. This freedom is absolutely part of the kind of
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life that a rational, moral agent ought to have. In addition to freedom, the life of rational moral
agents ought to include an important form of autonomy and preservation of dignity. It is justified
for the state to infringe upon individual liberties to ensure that this right to life is preserved and
protected for all. The third principle still ensures that the maximum amount of freedom is
enjoyed by individuals, but second principle (in conjunction with the third) ensures that this
freedom is not at the expense of robbing others of a certain desirable quality of life.
If the state restricts liberties without providing for the proper use and preservation of
property, then it violates rights to autonomy and property ownership. If the state acts in a manner
that fails to uphold or is in violation of an individual’s natural rights, then the state prevents the
individual from the kind of life to which they are entitled. When in violation of the principles
above, the state becomes an obstacle to fulfilling moral obligations. This is the reason that, when
rights are violated, the state is no longer considered just. An unjust state, failing to uphold an
individual’s basic natural rights inhibits individuals from realizing their moral obligations as they
could in a just state. The unjust state resigns individuals to live in a way that offends their moral
standing as free, autonomous, rational beings. The justifications for revolting are very similar
(though not identical to) the justifications for forming the state. Individuals are obliged to form a
just state that will enable them to fulfill moral obligations. Revolution is a mechanism for tearing
down unjust states which stand in the way of moral obligations.
The sufficient conditions for justifying revolution may include more than rights
violations. I have previously argued that an unjust state is a necessary condition for justifying
revolution. In order to reach sufficient conditions for justifying revolution, the state must also be
considered illegitimate. It is important to distinguish between three kinds of categories of states
which can exist. I have spent most of the paper discussing just states. A just state abides by the
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social contract. One assesses the justness of a state by using the social contract described above.
A state’s “goodness” can also be evaluated. The goodness of a state depends on the type of
benefits it offers individuals in their everyday lives. A good and just state, for example, would
abide by the social contract and also provide benefits to individuals extending beyond what the
social contract required. Finally, the legitimacy of a state can be assessed. A legitimate state is
owed the allegiance of the people in virtue of some baseline of protection or quality of life that it
provides. A state is illegitimate when there is no reason to give allegiance to it. A state could be
unjust but legitimate on my view. In this case, the state is in violation of the social contract, but
revolution against the state is not justified because additional considerations earn the state
allegiance.
There are at least five considerations one should take in to account when determining the
legitimacy of the state. The five considerations are: 1) The extent of the rights violations; 2) The
degree of the rights violations; 3) The harm caused by revolution; 4) The likelihood of a
successful revolution; 5) The existence of effective, legal appeal. I will briefly address each of
these considerations.
By extent of the violation, I mean to say the number of individuals whose rights are
violated by the government. I contend that a justification for revolution can arise for all
individuals in the state, even if rights violations occur only to a certain number. When people are
subjected to state’s laws and forced to surrender their liberties, their interests become bound
together. All sacrifice their liberties for the expectation that stability, security, and protection of
rights will be provided by the state. Within an unjust state, violations against even one individual
cheapen and undermine the state’s moral foundations to some extent. One reason for this is that
state’s ability to provide the basic property institutions which are of benefit to all are partially a
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result of the labor, energy or resources of the wronged group. This creates a situation where
every individual in the state benefits, to some degree, from the unjust, immoral treatment of
others within the state. Furthermore, the labor, energy and resources of those who remain
properly treated is at least partially used to sustain the mistreatment of the wronged group. The
state unjustly uses its power and places individuals in conflict with one another. This is similar to
being forced into a state of war with one another. Though indirectly doing so, some actions of
individuals are resulting in a violation of another’s rights, and there is no clear arbitrator or
method of addressing the violation (as it is caused by the state). In the state of nature, it may not
matter to one individual whether another is a victim of theft or murder. The violation of one
individual’s rights in the state of nature does not affect the moral standing of those uninvolved in
the rights violation. When the state commits rights violations, this has a significant impact on the
moral standing of each individual who is part of and supports the unjust state. Because the state
forces individuals in to this oppositional relationship with one another, exposing all to a certain
level of insecurity and aggression, all have an additional reason to revolt against the state. It
should be noted that as the number of those mistreated increases, the more this consideration
contributes to the justification of revolution.
The degree of the rights violation refers to the gravity of the rights violations. Not all
actions which violate rights contain the same kind of gravity. There is a difference between the
enslavement of a person and enforcing a tax rate that is slightly above a rate that is justified. The
gravity of the rights violation is extremely significant in determining whether revolution is
justified, taking precedent over the extent of the rights violations. For example, there may be
times when the extent of a rights violation is extremely large, but the gravity is such that a
revolution may not be justified. For example, censorship of information by the government is
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usually an obvious example of a rights violation. Censorship is unnecessarily coercive, infringing
on the people’s liberties without being necessary for the continued existence of the state. It also
fails to respect the autonomy of the individual. Suppose a government within a state enforced a
ban on all Shakespearian plays. All other plays were accessible to the public, but Shakespearian
plays were burned on site, without exception. Everyone in the state is oppressed by censorship
and all contribute to one another’s oppression. If this is the only rights violation committed by
the state, it is not clear that this would merit revolution. This is especially true if the revolution is
violent and has no guarantee of success. This is an example where a large extent but minor
gravity would fail to provide circumstances sufficient for the justification of revolution. The state
may still be legitimate, though it is unjust.
There are also situations where the extent is extremely small, but the gravity is high
enough that revolution may still be justified. Imagine living in the town described by Shirley
Jackson in her short story The Lottery. In this fictional town there is a lottery which occurs once
a year. The purpose of the lottery is unclear, but it is enforced by the town mayor, and generally
approved of by the populace. At the end of each lottery the “winner” is stoned to death by the
townspeople (Jackson 1949). Other than this dark incident, the town seems stable and secure.
The people seem to have a decent quality of life. Let’s assume that this one instance, once a year,
is the only rights violation which occurs. In addition, let’s assume that the state has mandated the
lottery. The state enforces the tradition and is unresponsive to requests that it be stopped. One
might think the arbitrary execution of an individual, overseen and enforced by the state, would
be a high gravity rights violation, but not an extensive rights violation. The gravity of this rights
violation is very high, and significantly threatens the individual autonomy and freedom of the
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victims. One might conclude that this state has lost its legitimacy die to the grave rights
violations.
Considerations three and four are fairly straightforward and work together. They involve
the cost of the revolution and its likelihood of success. It is important to remember that
individuals require a state because it ensures the most effective preservation and protection of
basic rights. The period of revolution will create temporary instability which directly affects the
ability of individuals to protect and preserve their rights. As previously discussed in the section
on Locke, it may be morally justifiable to risk a sub-optimal life, lacking in basic dignity in order
to attain a life free from unjust state oppression. Individuals must weigh the certainty of
oppression (living in an unjust state) versus the chance of attaining an optimal or better life.
While it is true that no revolution is guaranteed to be successful, the kind of gamble that is
morally justified will be influenced by both the extent and the gravity of the rights violations.
Beyond their own lives, individuals will need to consider the casualties that a successful
revolution will likely cause. It may the case that violent uprisings against the state would occur
in areas populated with families or others who abstain from fighting. Revolution always involves
those who are not directly in combat with state. It must be the case that a majority of those
oppressed are willing to bear the costs of the revolution.
Finally, one ought to consider the alternative methods of addressing the rights violations
that do not involve revolution. If there are institutions which are responsive protests, petitions, or
other requests by the populace, then this provides a moral reason to abstain from revolution. This
is due to the fact that revolution comes with the high cost of instability, which can undermine
ultimate moral goals. Given the cost of revolution, it should be considered a method of last resort
for addressing rights violations. Both Locke and Kant agree on this point, though I think Kantian
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theory is much more restrictive regarding the justification for revolution. The mere institutional
capability of addressing a rights violation does not preclude a moral justification for revolution.
If legal requests for change are continually denied, or if the process of changing laws through
legal measures is so long that the extent or gravity of the rights violations increase significantly,
then a moral justification for revolution could arise.
Obligatory Revolution
I think it could be case that revolution is morally obligatory given the moral import of
protecting and preserving one’s rights. Locke writes that there is a duty to preserve one’s own
life, but also to preserve others if preserving others does not conflict with duties of selfpreservation (Locke 1993). I have argued that a just state is necessary for the protection and
preservation of rights, including the right to life (broadly construed). Unjust states prevent the
preservation and protection of rights. If Locke is correct in asserting that there is a duty to both
preserve one’s own life and the lives of others, and if the creation if a just state is necessary to do
this, I argue that revolution against unjust states could be obligatory for some members of the
populace. Those individuals in positions of power who have greater protection and resources,
and who can resist state powers without fear of immediate failure or harm, may have an
obligation to revolt against certain unjust states. The principle behind this notion is that one
ought to remove obstacles which prevent the fulfillment of moral duties if the cost of doing so
does not require the neglect of other moral duties. It may be asked whether any individual or
group of individuals could stand in this relation to the state ruling power. A potential example of
a group having this kind of relation to the government is the military. Though it is often the case
that the military is a tool of oppressive governments, there could be a moral obligation for the
Wilson 41
military to resist the orders of an unjust state. The power, resources, and protection of military
institutions give them an inherent advantage in conflict with unjust rulers.
This is not a completely obscure notion. The Egyptian military has historically played
this role within Egypt. During the overthrow of Hosni Mubarack in 2011, the Egyptian military
played a prominent role the success of the revolution. Protests from the Egyptian people began
on January 25, 2011. The protests, inspired by a successful revolution in Tunisia, demanded an
end to “….government corruption and the autocratic governance of President Hosni Mubarak…”
(Perks 2011) Many young people in Egypt used social media sites like Facebook and Twitter to
criticize government activity and organize the resistance. The government responded by shutting
down these media sites which further aggravated protesters. (Perks 2011) Though the military
was initially asked to maintain security by the state, this was “…a move that was welcomed by
the protesters…” (Perks 2011) Eventually, the military declared “…that its duty was above all to
the people of Egypt…” (Kordunsky and Lokesson 2013). The military backed the protestors and
were a major factor in the success of the revolution (Kordunsky and Lokesson 2013). This would
not be the end of conflict in Egypt. First, the military seemed hesitant to withdraw power and
began to lose the approval of the populace (Salem 2013). Second, when the military did release
power, the new President, Mohamed Morsi, would also face angry protesters in 2013. Though
the people had become disillusioned with the military after they seized power in 2011, their
intervention in 2013 once again came with “…much public support.” (Salem 2013). In both 2011
and 2013 the military contained “...an immense revolutionary energy…” (Salem 2013). This
played a significant role in ousting leaders accused of overstepping their boundaries.
To clarify, I am not arguing that the Egyptian military has always acted with the noble
intentions of securing individual rights. It may be the case that the main motivating factor behind
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Egyptian military action is the security of political power or other selfish motives (Salem 2013).
The example demonstrates the influential role the military can have in deposing unjust
governments, with relatively low cost to those involved. Given the previous considerations
regarding the social contract and the nature of natural rights, this example shows the potential for
a moral obligation to revolt against unjust governments.
Conclusion
By beginning with Lockean and Kantian social contract theory, I argued that a necessary
condition for the moral justification of revolution is a breach of the social contract. The social
contract that I have presented protects strong, natural rights while retaining the abstract features
of a Kantian social contract. The social contract that I have outlined acts as a standard by which
to judge the justness of states. A breach of the social contract results in an unjust state, incapable
of preserving and protecting human rights. I listed several other considerations that would
contribute to a sufficient justification of revolution. These considerations pertain to the
legitimacy of the state. When a state is both unjust and illegitimate, a sufficient justification for
revolution exists. I end by arguing for the possibility of a moral obligation to revolt based upon
previous principles that were introduced.
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