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Is Gender like Ethnicity? The Political Representation of Identity Groups Author(s): Mala Htun Source: Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Sep., 2004), pp. 439-458 Published by: American Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3688807 Accessed: 06/01/2009 11:50 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=apsa. 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American Political Science Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Perspectives on Politics. http://www.jstor.org Articles Is Gender like Ethnicity? of Identity Representation The Political Groups Mala Htun Some 50 countriesofficiallyallocateaccessto politicalpowerby gender,ethnicity,or both.Yetin theworld'selectoraldemocracies, fromthoseusedforethnicgroups.The formerreceivecandidatequotasin parties; the policiesusedforwomendiffersystematically the latter,reservedseatsin legislatures. Why?My explanationfocuseson thevaryingwaysthatgenderandethnicidentitiesintersect with partisancleavagesand on the distinct"work"performedby the differentremediesfor underrepresentation. Quotas,which which makespacewithin existingparties,areappropriatefor groupswhose boundariescrosscutpartisandivisions.Reservations, suit groupswhoseboundaries createincentivesfor the formationof group-specificpartiesand permitthem directrepresentation, coincidewith politicalcleavages.Sincegenderis crosscuttingwhileethnicitytendsto be coinciding,womenreceivecandidatequoClaimsforinclusionviaquotasposelessof a challengeto liberalinstitutionsthan taswhileethnicgroupsget legislativereservations. Casestudiesof representational claimsto differencethroughlegislativereservations. politicsin France,India,andPeruillustratethe argument. Political leaderstakeourmoney,leadus to war,andwrite the laws that govern our lives. Must their ranksinclude men and women, rich and poor, mastersand slaves?For most of world history,the answerwas no. Men ruled;women worked at home. Female interests were representedby husbands and fathers.The same was true for membersof subordinate ethnic groups:conquerorswould carefor colonialsubjects, the rich for the poor, whites for browns, and so on. As the twentieth century progressed,however,a consensus emerged in internationalsociety and within democraticpolities that one social segment should not monopolize political power.Specialeffortsweremade to includepreviouslyexcluded groups-generally defined in terms of gender and ethnicity. Today,some 50 countries officially allocate access to political power along the lines of gender,ethnicity,1or both: they have lawson the books reservinga fixednumberof electoralcandidacies or legislativeseats.Narrowingthe focus to electoraldemocracies revealsa fascinatingpattern:institutional remedies for the underrepresentationof women and ethnic minorities (or Mala Htun is assistantprofessorofpolitical scienceat the New Schoolfor Social Research([email protected]) and authorof Sex and the State:Abortion, Divorce, and the Familyunder LatinAmericanDictatorshipsand Democracies. Theauthorgratefullyacknowledges theassistanceand advice Kanchan Chandra, of JorgeDominguez,JenniferHochschild, MarkJones,Courtneyung,Jim Miller,VictoriaMurillo,JackSnyder,Donna Lee VanCott,MyraWaterbury, participantsin colat the New School and Columbia University,and loquia reviewers. anonymous majorities)assumedistinct forms.Women tend to receivecandidate quotas in political parties, whereas ethnic groups are grantedreservedseats in legislatures. How does gender differ from ethnicity?Why do democracies apply distinct policies to different previously excluded groups?What does this imply about the normativestatus of variousclaims to representationand the appropriateresponse of liberalstates? This article argues that different remedies for underrepresentation are logically appropriatefor differentgroups. Quotas, which make space within existing parties, suit groups whose boundaries crosscut partisan divisions. Reservations, which create incentives for the formation of group-specific parties and permit them direct legislative representation, suit groups whose boundaries coincide with political cleavages.Whereasgender tends to be crosscutting,ethnicity tends to be coinciding. Women and men belong to all political parties; members of ethnic groups, by contrast, frequently belong to one only. In countries where it is mobilized, ethnicity is a central, if not the central principle of political behavior;gender,though occasionallya consideration,almost never defines how individuals vote and what parties they affiliatewith. Of course, actual politics do not always conform to functional requirements.Historicallegaciesmay get in the way of with suitablepolicies.Thus counmatchinggroupcharacteristics tries with traditionsof ethnic reservationshave given reserved seats to women; one with a gender candidate quota applied similar quotas to ethnic minorities. Yet when it applies the "wrong"remedy, the state neglects the true causes of underrepresentationand fails to grant group membersrealaccessto power. As we see in the Indian and Peruviancases discussed September 2004 i Vol. 2/No. 3 439 Articles I Is Genderlike Ethnicity?The PoliticalRepresentationof IdentityGroups ' below, supposed beneficiariesof .. . these unwelcome remedies may iprotest them and demand alternative policies. Though the divergence between the modes of gender and !: ethnic representationcuts across many countries, it has received no scholarlyattention.We know a great deal about women's movements and women in pol_ itics, and a growing number of works focus on gender quotas. | Hundredsof scholarshave studied ethnicidentityformationand ,.:.. mobilization; the causes and consequences of conflict; and institutional solutions for i. dividedsocieties.Fewworksanalyze representational politics acrossidentities.2Such a comparison is needed, however, if we are to understandwhy policy solutions to women's underrepresentationdivergeso dramatically from those applied to ethnic groups. Comparing gender and ethnicity also revealsthat claims made on these differing bases have different implications for the liberalstate. Group Representation Policies Table 1 identifies countries with statutory gender quotas or reservations,ethnic quotas or reservations,or both. (For descriptions of these policies, see tables la and lb at the end of this article.)3As table 1 shows, about 50 countries use such mechanisms, including old and new democracies; rich and poor countries;Catholic, Protestant,Islamic, Confucian, and Hindu societies; federaland unitary systems;and presidential and parliamentaryregimes. Dozens of other countries without statutory measures uphold effective political arrangements to guarantee group representation, such as quotas used voluntarily by political parties in over 30 countries; the race-consciousdistricting practiced in the United States;and the applicationof lower electoralthresholdsfor minority political organizationsin Denmark, Germany,Poland, and Romania. Notwithstanding the importance of these voluntary arrangements,this paper is concerned exclusivelywith statutory mechanisms. Reliable cross-nationaldata on party statutes, their interpretation, and their enforcement were not available.This is a fertile area for future research,since additional data have the potential to change the findings reported here.4 Policiesto guaranteegroup representationgenerallyassume one of two forms: candidate nomination quotas in political partiesor legislativereservations.Quotas requirethat a minimum number of candidatesfielded by political partiesfor general election have certain demographic characteristics.The ArgentineLeyde Cupos(or Quota Law of 1991), for example, requiresthat women comprise a minimum of 30 percent of 440 Perspectives on Politics 8 0 4e Is 0. 0 political party lists. Reservationsor reservedseats set aside a fixed percentageof legislative seats for members of a certain group. These may be filled through competitive election in specially created districts (Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribesin India), through election by voters registeredon separate rolls (Maoris in New Zealand), by the group member receiving the most votes in general elections (constitutionally recognized ethnic groups in Mauritius), or through designation by political parties (minorities in Pakistan). Statesadopted these policies at differenthistoricalmoments. In some countries, collective representationalrights constitute part of the bargainstruck to ensure the viability of democracy in a plural society. In such "consociational"or "consensus" polities, each group is guaranteeda shareof power to preclude secession and civil war. Other countries introduced collective rights rather recently in response to the growth of identitybasedsocial movementsand their demandsfor the recognition of culturaldiversity.These claims have mobilized concern for the question of whether elites in power resemble,in their personal characteristicsand life experiences,the people they represent, thus transforminggroup representationfrom a matter of state survivalinto a question of democraticlegitimacy and social justice. Considerabledebate surroundsthese policies. Liberalcritics argue that granting rights to identity groups treats them as essential givens, failing to acknowledge their dynamism and fluidity, as well as internal injustices suffered by some members. Existing liberal institutions, moreover, can resolve the domination and oppression inflicted on social groups since these wrongs are ultimately suffered by individuals.5 Civic republicansclaim that group-differentiatedrights undermine common citizenship and rendersuspect a public good toward which society could be oriented,6 while libertarians allege that collective rights benefit the already privileged, increase in-group inequality, and aggravatesocial divisions.7 Finally, Table 1 Statutory group representation policies For gender For ethnicity For both gender and ethnicity Bhutan Argentina Belgium Armenia Croatia Bosnia and Herzegovina Colombia Bangladesh Cyprus Bolivia India Ethiopia Brazil Jordan Fiji Costa Rica Kiribati Pakistan Lebanon Peru Djibouti DominicanRepublic Mauritius Serbia and Montenegro Ecuador New Zealand Taiwan France Niger Greece Samoa Guyana Singapore Macedonia Slovenia Mexico Switzerlanda Morocco Venezuela Namibia Nepal NorthKorea Panama Paraguay Peru Rwanda Sudan Tanzania Uganda NOTE:Electoral democraciesare in italics(FreedomHouse2003). aSwitzerland's cabinetseats by languagegroupis nottechnically practiceof distributing required by law,butis a deeplyentrenchedcustom(Steiner1990;Steiner2002). socialscientistshavefound that policiespromotingthe descriptive representationof minorities may actuallyend up harming their substantiverepresentation:for example, the creation of so-called majority-minoritydistrictshelps to put more blacks and Latinos in the U.S. House of Representatives,but it may also facilitatethe election of legislatorselsewherewho areideologically hostile to their interests.8 Defenders of quotas and reservationspoint out that group rights do not constitute a majordeparturefrom existing democratic practices.After all, some form of collective representation is inherent to the political process.As Justice Lewis E Powell put it in a 1968 voting rights opinion, "The concept of representationnecessarilyapplies to groups;groups of voters elect representatives;individualsdo not."9 Single-member district systems define such groups by territory;other electoral regimes, such as national-list proportional representation, accommodate non-geographicallybased constituencies. Liberal polities such as the United States and Canada have traditionallydrawn geographicaldistrict boundaries around "communitiesof interest,"be they regional, economic, environmental, or historical; by granting an equal number of seats to states regardlessof population, the U.S. and Australian Senatesoffer privilegesto residentsof smaller,potentially disadvantagedstates.10The point is that political institutions inevitablymake decisions about the types of groups that gain representation. Quotas and reserved seats differ in degree, but not in kind, from the everyday work states alreadyperform on politically-relevant social identities. Gender Quotas and Ethnic Reservations in Electoral Democracies When we consider only electoral democracies, the following pattern emerges:states give candidatequotasin politicalparties to women and reservedseats in legislatures to members of ethnic groups. As table 2 demonstrates, there are only four exceptions to this rule. The probability that a democracy with group rights for women will have candidate quotas is 0.86; in countries with measuresguaranteeingethnic representation,the probabilityis 0.94 that these take the form of legislative reservations. What accounts for this divergencein modalitiesof genderand ethnic representation?My argument can be summarizedin the following syllogism: (1) candidate quotas are more appropriatefor groups that crosscut partisancleavages,while reservationssuit groups that coincide with them; (2) gender identities tend to cut across parties, whereas ethnic identities often overlap with partisan affiliations; (3) consequently,disadvantagedgroups that aredefined by gender demand, and are granted,candidatequotas;ethnic groups prefer,and receive,legislativereservations. Quotasfor crosscuttinggroups; reservationsfor coinciding ones To understandthe differentuses of the two types of policies, we must first explore the distinct means they use to improve the representationof identitygroups.Quotas intervenein party nomination proceduresby requiringthat a certainpercentage of the candidatesfielded by a party be of a certaingroup. For example, the quota may demand that around one-third of positions on party lists be occupied by women and that they alternatewith men in the rankorderingof candidates,as is the casein Argentina,Costa Rica,Belgium,and Guyana.1'A quota policy may thereforeprovokesome changesin the ways parties go about nominating candidates,formulatinglists, and deciding who runs in what district. However, it does not alter the overallstructureof incentives governing the political system. Specifically,quotas do not affect issuessuch as counting rules, September 2004 1 Vol. 2/No. 3 441 Articles I Is Gender like Ethnicity?The PoliticalRepresentationof IdentityGroups Table 2 Group representation rights in electoral democraci Candidatequotas in parties Peru ~a as> ~a Legislativereservations Belgium Colombia Croatia Cyprus trast, guaranteegroup members shareof power independently, if need be, of existing parties. Their objective is to facilitate autonomy of political communities and electoral success of group-specificparties. Figure 1 depicts the location of crosscutting and coinciding Fdii India groups in the party system. We Kiribati see that members of a crosscutMauritius New Zealand ting group belong to all parties, whereas those of a coinciding Niger Samoa tend to belong to a single Serbia and Montenegro group party, a set of political organiSlovenia zations, or no party. Figure 2 Switzerland Taiwan illustratesthe "work"done by a Venezuela well-designed candidate quota. Gender The policy attacksthe discrimiArgentina Bangladesh Armenia India(local) nation sufferedby group memTaiwan Belgium in the party but permits ~bers Tai~wan Bolivia to continue militating in them Brazil it. Meanwhile, the party gains Costa Rica DominicanRepublic representation in legislatures Ecuador through regularelectoralproceFrance The demographiccharacdures. Greece (local) of its delegations may teristics Guyana Macedonia change, but the rules of interMexico party competition remain the Namibia(local) same. Panama Figure 1 helps us see why a Paraguay candidatequotawould makelitPeru tle sense for a coinciding group. Serbia and Montenegro is gained by makingspace What aAs identifiedby FreedomHouse in 2003. The table includesonly 1those countriesconsidered for group members within all electoraldemocracies. partieswhen they tend to cluster at one end of the political spectrum? In fact, a candidate a undermine the structure minority group'spolitical organizaquota might timing, the circumscriptionof electoraldistricts, tions as its partisanopponents snatch up groupleadersin order of the ballot, and so on that have been shown to exertthe most to complywith the quota. Finally,figure3 clarifiesthe mechanpowerfuleffectson voter behavior,the partysystem, and interics of legislativereservations.They permita group'sparty,organal party structure.12 nizations, or independent representativesto gain power on Reservationstakea differentapproach.They introducegrouptheir own and may furnishadditionalincentivesfor formation specific avenuesof representationthat circumventthe existing of minority parties. partysystemand createnew electoralincentives.These include In theory, a proportionalrepresentation(PR) electoralsysthe creation of: separateelectoral rolls, special electoral distem, particularlyone with low thresholds,would facilitatethe tricts that limit competition to group members,exceptions to representationof group-specificpartiesand organizations.PR counting rules, and provisions for direct appointment to the also avoidsa situation in which the state is compelled to assign legislature. individualsto specific groups (as requiredby the maintenance Candidate quotas thus presume a differentsort of problem of ethnic voter rolls or the reservationof certain districts for from that addressedby reservations.The goal of quotas is to take a categoryof people who belong to, but suffer from disgroup members), a practice that contradicts the fluidity and contextual nature of many ethnic identities. In addition, PR crimination in, mainstreamparties and propel them to posiis flexible, permitting the automatic adjustment of representions wherein they stand a chance of popularelection. Quotas tational relationshipsto changing demographicsand political thereforeprovidea means of assimilationand integrationinto interests. Divided legislatures and reserved seat ratios, by already existing political institutions. Reservations,by conEthnic 442 Perspectives on Politics Figure 1 Cross-cutting versus coinciding groups Cross-cutting groups 0Q QO 0? O@ @0 Party A @? Qo QO _ I *Q Party B Party C Coinciding groups P0 00 00 00 Party A Party B Party C contrast,often containno provisionfor periodicupdatingbased on new census data.13Some countries, however,may opt for reservedseatsin orderto preservean existingtwo-partysystem a minor(unlikelyto be maintainedunderPR), to overrepresent to offer access to as ity, privileged power compensation for historicaldisadvantage,or to name a particulargroupas deserving unique status.14 Crosscuttinggender versus coinciding ethnicity The next step is to examine variation in the extent to which gender and ethnic identities actually correspond to partisan cleavages. For much of world history, politics has been the exclusivedomain of men. Women gained the right to vote and stand for office only in the twentieth century.Since the early daysof genderintegrationin politics, however,politicalparties have counted on both men and women as supporters.There are few instancesof partiesdefined by gender, and none have consistently won elections. To be sure, different parties send men and women to office to varyingdegrees:women comprise a largerportion of legislativedelegationsof the Left than those of the Right. One reason is that the former have been more likely to adopt voluntarycandidatequotas than the latter. 5 To reduce the electoral advantagesuch policies may provide to their opponents, partiesof the Right in severalcountrieshave respondedby introducing, if not alwaysexplicit quotas, other forms of affirmativeaction to improve women's opportuni- ties.16Partypositions may differon women'srightsissuessuch as abortion, but are converging-at least in theory-on the goal of gender parityin representationalpolitics. What about the gender gap? In advanced democracies, women tend to vote for leftist partiesin greaternumbersthan men. A few decadesago (and in many partsof the developing world today) the opposite transpired:support for the Right was greateramong women.17Though analysesof these phenomena tend to center on women's views, there is evidence that men are the ones changing:in the United States at least, transpositionof the gender gap is due to majorshifts in men's The gap peakedin the U.S. presidential partisanpreferences.18 of when elections 1996, 54 percentof women voted for Democrat Bill Clinton, as opposed to 43 percent of men.19While significant for party strategy,these percentage point differences are small comparedto the overallvolume of female and male support for variouspartiesand candidates. The size of genderdifferencesin partysupportcontrastsvividly with the ethnicallyinflectedpoliticaldivisionscharacterizing manypluralsocieties.In patronagedemocraciessuchasIndia, politics is driven by ethnic head counting.20Linguistic divisions in heterogeneousEuropeancountriessuch as Belgiumand Switzerlandmap onto party-and party system-divisions.21 A largenumber of postcolonialsocieties in Africaand Asia are dominatedby partieswhose relianceon the supportof exclusive ethnicgroupslendsa "census-likequality"to elections.22In these contexts and in the post-communist world, progresstoward democratizationoften exacerbatedthe ethnic characterof politics, sometimeswith violent consequences.23Nine Israeliparties representingdistinct ethnic and religiousgroups came to occupy nearlyhalf of the Knessetseats in the 1990s.24African Americansin the United Statesidentify overwhelminglywith the DemocraticPartyand evidenceof the salienceof racein predicting voting behaviorlies behind U.S. federalcourts'validation of districtingarrangementsdesignedto permit all citizens to "electa candidateof their choice."25Even LatinAmericais witnessingthe growthof ethnicparties:in the 1990s, thosemobilizing indigenous voters successfullycontested national elections in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador,Guyana, and Venezuela and local contests in Argentinaand Nicaragua.26 Ethnic boundariesare not always politically loaded, however, and not everyonehas a communal experienceof ethnicity. Its coincidencewith partisanand ideologicalcleavagesand geographicconcentration is the effect of historical construction as well as political manipulation. Ethnic groups in some countries, such as Afro-descendentsin Brazil, have features usuallyassociatedwith genderidentity,such as low geographic segregationand little correlationwith voting behavioror party affiliation.Consequently,the affirmativeaction bill underconsideration in the BrazilianCongress calls for racialquotas in parties,not for reservedseats in the legislature.27The stacking of ethnicity on salient social divisions is the product, not the premise, of a political process, an outcome to which the allocation of specific representationalrights surelycontributes. For these reasons,there is an active debate among political scientists about which types of institutions can best mold September 2004 Vol. 2/No. 3 443 Articles I Is Gender like Ethnicity?The PoliticalRepresentation of IdentityGroups Figure 2 What quotas do ethnic boundariescorrespondto other salient cleavages.Gender identities, however, almost always cut across them. Step 1: Parties to lists Party lists > Party members - Q 6 O m Party Party A Q @? i receive quotas; ethnic rWomen ' groups receive reserved seats Finally, we must establish that , V1 -Q gender-baseddemandscenteron quotas and that this is relatedto the fact that women are spread * fi Q throughoutthe partysystem.We ^ need to show that the prefalso ?O, of ethnic groups for Jy (~erence reserved seats flows from their tendency to cluster in a single party or organization. Let us begin by analyzingcandidate quotas.Their diffusion is a relativelyrecent phenomenon resultingfromseveraltrends.The first is the growth of the secondwavefeminist movement,which identified male dominance in political life as a problem and questionedthe legitimacyof polities that tolerate it. Feminist activismhelped forge new international norms of genderequality.Majoragreements,suchasthe on the Elimination Convention ~ ? Q EJ~ Oof All Forms of Discrimination AgainstWomen (CEDAW) and the Platformfor Action adopted *e by governments at the 1995 Fourth World Conference on @ Women in Beijing,endorseaffirmativeaction. Internationaland (*) regionalorganizations,suchasthe * B Party B Step 2: Parties to legislature Legislature ^^??~ ^O (O? * Party A ethnicity to promote democratic stability.Arend Lijpharthas long advocated proportional representationand power sharing, policies that preservegroup identity but encouragecooperationamong ethnic elites. Donald Horowitz favorselectoral rules that encouragepoliticians to make appealsacrossethnic lines. And KanchanChandrahas found that when state institutions create incentives for politicians to mobilize different dimensions of ethnic identity-by authorizing positive discrimination by caste, granting access to government jobs by language, or recognition of statehood by tribe-ethnic parties will compete to occupy the center, thus avertingthe centrifugal spiral that undermines democracy.28Depending on these institutional configurationsand other factors, ethnicity is manifestin variedways in differentsocieties. Often enough, 444 Perspectives on Politics United Nations, the European Union, the Southern African Development Community, the Summitof the Americas,and the Associationof SoutheastAsian Nations, have declaredthat growth in women'sleadershipcontributesto democraticconsolidation and economic and social progress. Another factor was the development of normative arguments that identified the gender composition of legislaturesas an indicator of justice and the quality of democracy.Quota advocates reconceptualizedpolitical equality to include not just the right to vote and stand for office, but to bepresentin office. A homogeneous legislatureof men, they argued, violates this fundamentalright. Meanwhile, partisansof deliberative democracystressedthe need for representativesto share experienceswith their constituentsin orderto adequatelycommunicate citizen views in open-ended political deliberation. PartyC onist and Radical parties in Argentina; the Party of the Democratic Revolution and National Action Party in Mexico; and the socialists, Rally for the Republic,and the Union for French Democracy in France ~ joined together to defeat the Legislature *l 5^ arguments of male colleagues that quotas were undemocratic and unconstitutional."Although all women may not agree on the substance of specific policy outcomes, they do have a common interest in being present when policy is being made."31 These politicians did not seek ^ ,p\ to form a separate women's ~party. Rather, they united in '_~{} 0@ 0@ {? temporary alliances to maximize their leveragein demanding greater power within their respectiveparties. No Party Party B Party C Party A Second,mostpoliticiansregard quotas as a temporarymeasure. As morewomen gainpower,they feminists that more in maintained women )reak down the obstacles Finally, power having holding others back. Over time, would introduce additional perspectivesto decision making uota will become obsolete. and tailor policy outcomes to suit a broadervarietyof citizen nally,women'sactivismaroundquotas has been episodic. interests.Ann Phillips sums up these variousdevelopmentsas the adoption of quota laws, women'scoalitions have disa reorientationof democratictheory and practicefrom a "poled as their membersreturnedto their priorcommitments itics of ideas"to a "politicsof presence."29 )ecamereabsorbedinto their parties.In some countriesa law in Influcandidate 1991. Argentinapioneered quota bly Argentina, Costa Rica, Belgium, and Guyanaenced by the successof candidatequotas in the SpanishSocialen'spresencein power increasedsignificantlyas a resultof ist Party,Argentine female politicians from different parties uota. Yet the feminization of legislativedelegations has united behind the proposal.Though it was initially ridiculed roducedmajorchangesin whatpartiesactuallydo. Though women politicians have introducedfresh items to politby men, last-minute persuasionby PresidentCarlos Menem and his interior minister helped to overcome this resistance. igendas, their collective presence has thus far failed to uce major shifts in policy and practice.32 Subsequently, the policy snowballed across the region. By the end of the decade, ten other Latin American countries hnic demands for reservations have followed a quite had adopted legislative quotas, and an eleventh, Colombia, *entpolitical logic. Ratherthan improvingthe legitimacy introduced them for senior executiveappointments. Belgium ready existing democracies, the granting of reserved introduced a law in 1994 that states that a maximum of has tended to occur as part of a founding compromise two-thirdsof all candidatescould be of the same sex; in 1999 nsociational or consensus polities. In these countries, France modified its constitution to call for gender parity in legislatures, the allocation of ministerial portfolios office and enacted to political legislation requiring parties hnicity, or fixed ratios of parliamentaryseats form part field an equal number of men and women candidates.Meane elite bargainsnecessaryto make democracy possible. while, under the influence of the United Nations, the Orgagroup has a constitutional share of power, giving it an nization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), tive not to defect from the existing political regime and and the Stability Pact for South-CentralEurope, quota rules rmine the survival of the state. As opposed to quotas, were inserted into the electorallaws of most countries of the h improve the leadership prospects of group members former Yugoslavia,including Bosnia and Herzegovina,Macn existing parties, reservationspresume the existence of edonia, and Serbia, including Kosovo.30 p-specificparties or organizations. Groups demanding Three aspects of women's mobilization for gender quotas vationsdo not want to be integrated into mainstream stand out. First, multipartisanand ideologicallydiversecoalies. They want access to political power in their own tions have backed the new policies. Women from the Per- Figure 3 What reservations do September 2004 1Vol. 2/No, 3 445 Articles | Is Genderlike Ethnicity? The PoliticalRepresentationof IdentityGroups In Belgium, the constitution requiresthat there be an equal number of French- and Dutch-speakingministers in the federalgovernmentand in the governmentof the Brusselsregion, with the parliamentdivided between these two languagecommunities and their respectiveparty systems. In Switzerland, language group quotas are used not only in the federalcouncil,33 but in other areas of government (such as the armed forces) and in society as a whole (such as the executive committee of the Swiss soccer association).3 Lebanon is another classic story of how ethnic reservationshelped forge the state. The National Pact of 1943 reserved all major offices-the president was to be a Maronite; the prime minister a Sunni; the speakerof the house a Shiite; and so on-and fixed the ethnic composition of the parliamentat a 6:5 ratio of Christians to Muslims.35 Elsewhere,the ethnic allocation of political power was codified in peace agreementsfollowing civil wars. International mediators, with an eye toward establishing pluralist polities, helped installforms of powersharingin virtuallyall of the new statesformedafterthe breakupof Yugoslavia.Bosniaand Herzegovina has a three-memberpresidency comprised of a Bosniak, Serb,and Croat,aswell as a bicamerallegislativeassembly dividedbetweenthesethreecommunities.In Serbiaand Montenegro, the bicameralfederallegislatureis divided between Serbians and Montenegrans. In Kosovo, seats are reserved in parliamentfor Serbs, Roma, and other ethnic groups. (In less polarizedCroatia and Slovenia, a smallernumber of seats are reservedfor minorities.)36Other countries inherited powersharingfrom formercolonial rulers.In Fiji, the ethnic reservation of parliamentaryseats dates from colonial times, when the British authorities sought to separateindigenous Fijians from Indo-Fijiansand install themselves as mediators.After the country'sindependence,the vast majorityof parliamentary seats continued to be reservedby ethnicity.37 Some reservationspolicies reflect attempts to compensate victims of slavery,colonialism,or a castesystemfor pastoppression. India'sreservationsfor Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are intended to amelioratethe historic discrimination sufferedby those at the lowest rungs of the caste system. New Zealand'swhite rulersmade a similar attempt to compensate oppressed minorities: the Maori RepresentationAct of 1867 installed four representativesin a legislatureof over 70 members.The number of seats laterincreasedto seven (representatives areelected by voterswho voluntarilyregisterfor a separate Maori roll).38 In the late twentieth century, some disadvantagedethnic groups demanded rights during constitutional reforms. Respondingto indigenous mobilization, the Colombian Constitution (1991) createda two-seat senatorialdistrict for Indians and permitted the reservationof up to five seats in the lower house for ethnic groups and other political minorities. Venezuela had a similar experience:the 1999 constitutional reform establishedthree reservedseats for "indigenouscommunities"in the nationalassemblyand permittedsocial movement organizationsto contest them, thus eliminatingthe party registration barrier. In both countries, these seats granted 446 Perspectives on Politics resourcesand visibility to indigenous partiesand movements; as a result, they successfullycontested general elections and gained power in local governance.39With the exception of Peru, democratic states have always conferred ethnic group rights in the form of reservations. The Argument in Action France,India, and Peruillustratethe theoreticalpropositionsI haveadvanced.FranceandIndiashowus politicalactorsengaged in pragmaticdebates,ponderingthe differencebetweengender and ethnicity,though to opposite ends. Both honed in on the crosscuttingnatureofgender.In France,thissupportedwomen's claimsto representation;in India,it underminedit. Comparing Indiaand Peruemphasizesa differentpoint. Though the countriesseem like exceptionsto my argument(see their location in table 2), in fact they support it. India initially grantedreservationsto ethnicminorities,andPeruintroducedquotasforwomen. Both governmentslatertried to apply the same policy to a differenttype of group:Indianwomen got reservationsand Peruvian indigenouspeoples receivedquotas.The two policieswere subsequentlycriticizedby their alleged beneficiaries.By mismatching groupsand remedies,the Indian and Peruvianstates not only failedto addressthe underlyingcausesof disadvantage, but arguablyjeopardizedwomen'sand indigenouspeople'squest for political equality. Parite in France In June 2000 the Frenchparliamentapproveda law requiring that parties field an equal number of male and female candidates in legislativeelections. This turn of events is surprising in a country that has prided itself on a republicantraditionof an indivisible body politic and has long forbidden official distinctions among citizens in terms of sex, race, ethnicity, and religion. In fact, these nondiscriminationprincipleswere invoked by the SupremeCourt in a 1982 decision that struck down a quota law passed by Congress (the law would have banned one sex from occupying more than 75 percent of the places on lists of candidates for municipal elections). The French court claimed that gender preferencescontradicted republicanprinciplesof equalityand unity, which dictate that citizens representthe nation as a whole, not discrete groups or categories.40 Advocates of women's representationthus had to make a case that their preferredpolicies were compatiblewith republican universalism.This requireddemonstratingthat the existing model was flawed for failing to incorporatesex differences and that gender parity would not legitimize representational rightsfor other social groups.Gender,they argued,is a unique form of social difference. Unlike ethnicity, race, and religion, which are socially constructed and changeable categories, sex is universal and permanent: Women do not constitute a category analogous to minorities, but half of humanity, and their status is immutable. The young grow older, one can change one's religion, people of color can intermix with is widespread-,workersmayswitchprofesothers-miscegenation sions,andso on. Butonceoneis borna manorwoman,onedoesnot rarecaseof transsexuals).41 change(savein theextremely which stressesthe unity Both traditionalFrench"universalism," of men and women, and contemporaryAmerican"particularism," which collapses sex into other forms of difference, are thereforemisguided. PhilosopherSylviaAgacinski,wife of former Socialist PremierLionel Jospin, arguesthat both political traditionshave denied the real natureof sex: bothsexesinanabstract effacement The"French" byengulfing proceeds fromwhichonlythesingular modelof a sexually neutral humanism, effacementproceeds human being can surface.... The "American" in whichminoriwomenin a systematic by drowning particularism tiesof allsorts(ethnic,religious, cultural, etc.)aregroupedtogether, ... and bothsexesend up beingconsidered pure"constructions." boththese feminism simultaneously Today,thenewFrench challenges in affirming sexualdualityas the only typesof sexualneutralization Thisis whyit wasableto conwithinhumanity. universal difference ceiveof thepariteidealin politics.42 The fact of sexual differencedivides humanity in two. As a result, a republicanpolity that claims to include all citizens, but in which only men hold power,unjustlyprivilegesone half over the other. Parityfeminists did not want their arguments to be leveled againsta legislatureof white Catholics, however. Since sex is the only universalcategory,women arenot like any other social group. With this stance, parityadvocateswere able to anchor their movement within republican discourse and find allies from the mainstreamof Frenchpolitics.By denyingthat paritywould or should lead to a cascadeof demands for other representational rights, they made their case more palatable.What is more, they focused on the narrow objective of getting the paritybill passed,and not broaderconsiderations,such as socioeconomic equality and policy change. By avoiding questions aboutthe substantiverepresentation of women'sinterests,French feminists of diversepolitical and ideological stripeswere able to smooth over their differencesand unite in a nonpartisan movement. This also helped defray fears that right-wing and conservativewomen would be attackedor disqualified,and by the mid-1990s, most politicians had jumped on the parity bandwagon.When it came to a vote in the national assembly, the parityproposals-both the constitutionalamendmentand the implementing legislation-were approved unanimously. Following promulgation of the law, however, the large and diverse movement began to disperse.What had held participants togetherwas support for parity,not a more comprehensive policy agenda or a sharedhistory of activism.43 The parity law worked well in the 2001 municipal elections, since municipal councilorsare elected under a semiproportionalclosed-listsystemand partieswererequiredto include threewomen for every three men on the list. In cities of more than 3,500 inhabitants where the parity law was applied, women's presence on municipal councils rose to 48 percent. Yet at the national level, where deputies are elected by the first-past-the-postsystemin single-memberdistricts,the results weredisappointing.Preferringto sufferfinancialpenaltiesrather than comply with the quota, the center Right UMP nominated women to less than 20 percent of the districtswhere it rana candidate,and even the SocialistPartynominatedwomen to only 36 percent of districts.Most of these were losing districtsand the numberof women in the assemblybarelyincreased (from 62 to 71 out of 576, or to 12 percent of the total).44 Reservationspolicy in India Whereas the French state acknowledgedsocial difference in the law only at the end of the twentieth century,in India such recognition has a long tradition. Legislativereservationsfor minoritieswere introducedduring Britishrule. FirstMuslims (in 1909), then Christiansand Sikhs (in 1919) were granted separateelectorates;at the same time, nominated seats were granted to "untouchables"or dalits to offset inequities of the caste system. The British had originally proposed that these lower castes vote on separaterolls; a 21-day hunger strike by Mohandas Gandhi, however, led to compromise. The 1932 agreement,known as the Poona Pact, reservedseats for dalit candidatesto be elected by everyone.The Britishalso reserved a number for women within these communal seat allocations in provincial and national legislatures.Although favored by British feminist Eleanor Rathbone, such reservationswere opposed by the largestnationalIndianwomen'sassociationsas well as the Indian National Congress, which contested the introduction of any distinctions (whetherby gender,religion, or caste) among Indians. Both groupsviewed Britishpolicy as part of a divide-and-rule strategy against the nationalist movement.45 The constitution promulgatedin 1950 rejectedcommunal quotas as an organizingprinciple in favor of formal equality and individual rights, with two exceptions. Recognizing that equal treatment would be insufficient to amelioratehistoric discriminationsufferedby the lowest social groups, the constitution upheld the British legacy of legislative reservations for untouchables(ScheduledCastes)and introducedthem for indigenous groups (ScheduledTribes).Similarconsideration, however,was not extended to Muslims or women. Delimitation commissionsin each statedesignatedsingle-memberconstituencies in which only members of Scheduled Castes and ScheduledTribescould stand for office, even though the electorate as a whole would vote for them (the number was proportionalto their shareof the population).The text authorized a range of other policies to advance"backwardclasses"of citizens, including:reservedposts in governmentserviceand university admissions;scholarships,meals, supplies, and special schools;and preferencefor economic developmentassistance.46 The debateover women'srepresentationdied down for severaldecades,but it was revivedin the 1970s when the government of India formed the Committee on the Statusof Women to propose recommendationsfor improving their rights and opportunities.Its reportwas to be launched in time for International Women'sYearin 1975. One of the thorniest issues considered by the committee was gender reservations.After weighing arguments for and against, it declined to recommend such policies at the national or state level, though it September 2004 I Vol. 2/No. 3 447 Articles I| s Genderlike Ethnicity?The PoliticalRepresentationof IdentityGroups recognizedwomen's political underrepresentationas a serious problem. To justify its position, the committee drew a distinction betweenwomen, who area "category,"and minority "communities," including those based on caste and religion. "There can be no rationalbasisfor reservationsfor women," since "the minority argumentcannot be applied to women. Women are not a community, they area category.Though they have some realproblemsof their own, they sharewith men the problems of their groups, locality and community.Women are not concentrated in certain areas [or] confined to particularfields of activity."47"Women'sinterestsas such,"the committee wrote, "cannot be isolated from the economic, social, and political interestsof groups, strataand classesin the society."48 Anticipating arguments made by French feminists in the 1990s, Indian expertsstressedthe differencebetween women and ethnic minority communities, but as an argumentagainst women'srepresentation,not in favorof it. The Committee on the Status of Women did, however, borrow the institutional model the state had used for Scheduled Castes and Tribesand endorsed reservedseats for women in local governments.This appearsto havebeen a compromisebetweenthose who rejected women's representationaltogether and those who wanted to recommend reservationsat all levels.49Indeed, many features of the official reportarecontradictory,seeminglyreflectingthe amount of dissentoverthe issue.Forexample,though it declares that "the minority argument cannot be applied to women," the reportalso states that "thoughwomen do not numerically constitute a minority,they arebeginning to acquirefeaturesof a minority community"becauseof continued gender inequalities in class, status, and power.50The local-level recommendationswereadoptedin 1992 as the 73rd and 74th amendments to the Indian Constitution, reservingfor women one-third of the seats at the three tiers of the PanchayatiRaj institutions of ruralself-governance,as well as in elected urbancouncils.51 The debatewas revivedin 1996 when MP and formerMinister for Women MargaretAlva proposed to amend the constitution to extend the women's reservationssystem to the national and state legislatures.A lottery system would determine the single-memberdistrictsin which only women could run, and thesewould rotateeverytwo elections.The bill would also reserveone-thirdof the seatsallocatedto ScheduledCastes and Tribesfor women of those communities.Though virtually every political party supported the bill in their 1996 electoral platforms, the parliamentarydebates over it were ferocious, with some MPs almost coming to blows and others rushingto the podium to tear up copies of the text.52 One of the main parliamentaryconcerns was the relationship between women's reservationsand rights for membersof "otherbackwardclasses"(OBCs, a group the 1950 constitution had recognized as entitled to special protections). In a 1990 decision that provokedmassivecontroversy,the government had granted OBCs reservationsin its central bureaucracy,but not in nationaland statelegislatures.Entrepreneurial MPs from the Hindu nationalistBharatiyaJanataParty(BJP) demanded that the women's bill include subreservationsfor 448 Perspectives on Politics lowercastes,a move that allowedthem to appearas champions of the OBCs, but which mired the gender proposalin polemics surroundingcasterights.In addition, some legislatorscalled for specialprovisionsin the bill for Muslims.As LauraDudley Jenkins notes, "by endorsing the bill in party platforms and then failing to pass it out of a sudden concern for backward citizens or Muslims, politicians court the women's vote, the backwardsvote, and the Muslim vote and simultaneouslyprotect their own hopes of reelection."53 Popularviews of the elitist natureof the women'smovement also did not help the cause of the bill. Middle-classwomen had assumed visible roles in protests against the decision to grant OBCs central government reservationsand most feminist organizationshad failedto build ties to lowercastegroups. During the debate, a prominent OBC politician declaredthat the reservationbill was for "balkatiauraten"or short-haired women, a referenceto upperclassurbanfeminists.54The comment tapped an underlyingfearthat, without subreservations, the women's bill would end up benefiting only high-caste Hindus. As in France,political actorsin India highlighted the crosscutting nature of gender.Unlike ethnic groups, women transcend geographic, occupational, language, and religious categories.In France,this meant that, in theory,women'srepresentationwould not threatenthe republicanuniversalisttradition. In India, by contrast,women'scrosscuttingstatusmade it less likely that they would representthe caste and socioeconomic intereststhe reservationssystemwas supposedto advance. Meanwhile, a group of dissidents argued that rather than reservedseats,the bill shouldintroducea candidatequotawithin political parties.The Forum for Democratic Reforms argued that the reservationsproposal was seriously and inherently flawed. By mechanicallyprovidingfor the entranceof women into one-thirdof the seatsin the nationaland statelegislatures, the bill failed to addressthe main problem impeding women's effectiveparticipationin politics:genderdiscriminationin politThese activistsviewedasdisingenuousthoseIndian icalparties.55 who endorsed the bill while doing nothing for politicians women within their respectiveparties: The verysamemalepartyleaderswho competewitheachotherin forwomenhaveshown ofspecialreservations theirsupport announcing to includewomenin partydecisionmaking,oreven littlewillingness in forwomen'sparticipation to helpcreatea conduciveatmosphere isevenmore Infact,women's theirownorganizations. marginalization of almostallpoliticalparin theday-to-day functioning pronounced thatwe it is urgentlyrequired tiesthanin theLokSabha.Therefore, in to enhancewomen'spoliticalparticipation makespecialmeasures decisionmakingatalllevelsof our waysthatwillhelptheminfluence flawedif it will remainseriously societyandpolity.Ourdemocracy failsto yield adequatespaceto women.56 Furthermore,the Forum argued,a system of women'sreservations would enable patriarchalleaders to solidify their positions. At the local level, political bosses regularlycompel their wives, sisters,and daughtersto contest reservedseats.National politicianswould duplicatethis strategyand the women entering politics would be mere fronts for male power.57 Pointing out that those countrieswith the highest levels of women'srepresentationuse candidatequotas,not reservedseats, these critics proposedan alternativebill. It would requirethat one-third of candidatesnominated by political partiesfor general elections be women, though each party would be free to choosethe constituencieswherethesewomen would run. Rather than contesting women'sseats, female candidateswould compete against men and other women in general elections. To ensure their success, partieswould need to nurturethese candidates.Women might thereforebecome legitimateleadersand have a greaterpolitical base from which to advancewomen's interests in parliament.58The Indian government has not resolved these issues, so it is not yet clear whether quotas or reservationswill emerge as the preferredremedy. Quotas in Peru While some Indian authoritieshave sought to apply to women the samesystemthey had used for ScheduledCastesandTribes, Peruvianofficials have employed a women's policy for indigenous peoples. In 1997 the Congressapprovedan electorallaw requiringthat female candidatesmake up no less than 25 percent of the slots on party lists contesting national legislative elections (the quota was later increasedto 30 percent). Several years later, Peruvian leaders introduced the same remedyparty candidate quotas-for indigenous communities of the Amazon region. Though intended as a response to their demandsfor representation,the policy was criticizedby indigenous leaders for undermining their political organizations. Like their ethnic counterpartselsewherein the world, Peru's Amazonianand highlandIndianswanted reservedseatsin parliament, not quotas. In a process of coalition building similar to what occurred in France,Peruvianwomen politicians-representing both the governing and opposition parties-initially joined forces in the mid-90s to lobby for a quota law.Five congresswomenhad attendedthe 1995 FourthWorldConferenceon Women, where they debated the policy with delegates from other countries. Upon theirreturn,a specialcommissionon women was installed in parliament and quotas were the first item on its agenda. Although the proposalinitially met with overwhelmingskepticism from other legislators, it eventually received a boost from an unexpectedally: the President.Alberto Fujimori,the only head of state to have attended the 1995 conference, declaredhis support for quotas and the majorityin Congress immediatelyfell in line. As in France,the proposalwas approved unanimously.59Its effectson women'spresencein power,however, were more dramatic:in the first national election held after the quota, the percentageof congressionalseats held by women jumped from 11 to 20 percent. Meanwhile, the 1990s witnessed the growing ethnic politicization of indigenous peoples in various Andean countries, including Peru. Previously,a "peasant"or "poor"consciousness had tended to prevailover an indigenous one, and ethnic prejudicewas perceived-and disguised-as class discrimination. The decreasingviability of class affiliationslike peasant in the neoliberalera, combined with opportunitiesoffered by global discoursesof multiculturalism,helped spawn mobilization along ethnic lines.60In 1998, organizationsfrom the Amazon and highland regions formed the PermanentConference of PeruvianIndigenous Peoples, uniting previouslydisparate organizationsto forge a common political platformand lobby congressto recognizeIndian rights.61 After the 2001 election of PresidentAlejandroToledo, the state became increasingly receptive to indigenous claims. Though he frequentlydonned a poncho and espoused a populist discourse, former President Fujimori had undermined indigenousland rights,and his effortsto centralizepower-he canceled regionalelections-reduced Indian opportunitiesto participatein politics. Toledo pledged to expand the rights of indigenous peoples and createda high-level commission presided over by his wife, Belgian anthropologistElaine Karp,to representtheirinterestsin the state.Fulfillinga campaignpromise, he also reinstatedregionalelections.62 The law regulatingthese elections, approvedby Congressin early2002, declaredthatlistsof candidatesfor regionaland local councils compriseno less than 30 percentwomen and a minimum of 15 percentof representativesof "nativecommunities" or "originalpeoples"in those regionswherethey lived. According to the nationalelectiontribunal,the indigenousquotawould be appliedin 11 (ofa total of 25) regions.63The groupstargeted by the law include some 350,000 people speakingover40 languages,mostly residentsof the lowlandAmazon region. Peru'sethnic quotas apply only to those Indiansconsidered membersof "nativecommunities."What is the origin of this term? In 1969 military ruler General Juan Velasco declared that, "asan act of liberation,"the words indigenousand Indian be purgedfrom official discourseand all peoples incorporated into a "modern"class-basedsociety.64A 1974 law then reclassified the entireindigenouspopulationinto two groups:"native communities"and "peasantcommunities."The formerbenefit from the 2002 quota law, but the latter, who are far more numerous, do not. "Peasantcommunities," or those indigenous peoples inhabitingthe country'shighland regions,comprise over 40 percent of Peru's28 million people. Although it was designed to help them, severalAmazonian Indian organizationscriticizedthe way the 2002 electorallaw channeled their representationthrough existing political parties. These indigenous movements preferredinstead to form their own autonomous organizationsand political platforms. Emulating the success of similar organizationsin Bolivia and Ecuador,where ethnic partieshad made majorelectoralgains in the 1990s, representativesof various Peruviannative communities formed the Indigenous Movement of the Peruvian Amazon (MIAP) and attemptedto field candidatesfor several elections in the late 1990s and early2000s. The quota posed a threat to this group, however, since its leaders were being recruitedby mainstreamparties seeking to comply with the law.65 One activist complained that, though the intention behind the quota was good, the result was bad, for it would only cause Indians to become more divided.66 Indians from both the Amazon and the highlands want the Peruvianstate to guaranteetheir representationthrough September 2004 Vol. 2/No. 3 449 Articles I Is Gender like Ethnicity?The PoliticalRepresentationof IdentityGroups legislativereservations,not candidate quotas. The programfor constitutional reform advanced by indigenous organizationsin 2003 calls for the creation of special electoral districts, from which Indians would directly elect 30 percent of seats in the national congress and regional and municipal councils.67The reservation of seats conforms to the notions held by many indigenous organizations that political participationis not just an individual but a collective Table 3 Forms of gender representation in democracies and nondemocracies Gender quotas in parties ElectoralDemocracy Yes Argentina Armenia Belgium Bolivia Brazil Costa Rica DominicanRepublic Ecuador France Greece (local) Guyana Indonesia Macedonia Mexico Namibia(local) Panama Paraguay Peru Serbia and Montenegro Nepal (national5%) Women's legislative reservations Bangladesh India(local) Taiwan right.68 Reservationsare but one element in the broader agenda advanced by indigenous peoples in Peru. Indians want collectivepropertyrights,territorial and cultural autonomy, deferNo Djibouti ence to customary law, and Jordan Morocco bilingualeducation.These goals Nepal (local) contradict the model of the NorthKorea nation mestizo homogeneous, Pakistan and comprehensive legal order Rwanda installedin the AmericanrepubSudan Tanzania lics after their independence Uganda from Spain in the early nineteenth century. They challenge the liberal state and its traditions of individual rights, since mote the substantiverepresentationof the interestsof a disadcompleting the indigenous agendawould requirethe state to vantagedor excludedgroup.The agentsof such representation recognize multiple, collective forms of citizenship as well as should thereforeexercisenot just symbolicbut effectivepower. tolerate a pluralityof legal regimes.69 Partof the motive for choosing the right remedyis to reinforce The Peruviancase helps show how legislative reservations connections between leadersand the base that nourishesthem advance group rights and reinforcedifferencesin a way that candidate quotas do not. Quotas attack the discrimination politically.Quotas improvethe position of women within those suffered by individuals within parties to give them a better partiesthat get them elected and advancetheir agendas;reservations more seats reserved of A elected. of chance strengthenthose groupswhose very existenceis crucial regime getting for the choare whole When the promotion of the rightsand interestsof their members. legislators group. directlyempowers the created and districts, sen from separateelectorates Regimesthat lack a commitment to substantiverepresentaspecially have little incentive to promote the right remedy.In states tion to be the represented right policy confers on group members with their of a candidate but not just by one of their kind, military governments, one-party states, no-party states, by other countriesthat fail to respectcivil liberties,legislative and between links the choice. This mechanism strengthens repreare while constituents sentatives and their ethnic kin subject to arbitrarydictatorialwill. Such polities distancing powers lack staa distinctive bestow thus them from others. Reservations competitive party politics and the links of accountability that contus on the group as a political community. Quotas, by they provide. Consequently, representationpatterns in authoritarian of rest polities differ from those observedin democratrast, collapse the group into the political society. cies. Women get reservedseats in legislatures,not candidate Authoritarian Exceptions quotas (see table 3), as do ethnic groups.Tolerationof democratic parties-which the quota remedy presumes-would another Peru illuminate and The storiesof France,India, aspect undermine the survivalof these regimes. to is not Their of quotas and reservations. merely purpose We could also speculate that in extremely oppressive into bodies or cultured insert differentlyconfigured, colored, societies-which to aim correlate,albeit imperfectly,to those without measures of these advocates prolegislatures.Rather, 450 Perspectives on Politics democratic governance-gender is not crosscutting enough for candidate quotas. With their roles limited exclusively to biologicalfunctions,women have not spreadout into the economy, society,and partysystemin ways characteristicof wealthy democraticstates.Theircommon experiencesand interestscause them to resemble a coinciding group more than a crosscutting category.This suggests there may be an inverse relationship between the collective identity of women and their degree of liberation: the greater the success of the feminist movement in pushing women in to the public sphere,the less they have in common. In any event, the introduction of women's reservationsin some nondemocracies shows that even these states are not immune to argumentsconnecting regimelegitimacywith gender diversity.In Morocco, partiesdecidedto reservethe 30-seat national list for women after a three-yearprocessof mobilization and consultation in which internationalorganizationsparticularlythe United Nations DevelopmentFundforWomen (UNIFEM)-played important roles.70 Subsequently,hundredsof delegatesattending the ArabWomen'sSummit in late 2002 approveda declarationcalling on Arab states to follow Morocco'slead. In Pakistan,feminist mobilization and international benchmarkshelped provoke an expansionof the reservationssysteminheritedfrom the colonial period. (Unlike in India,wherewomen'sseatswere abolishedafterindependence, Pakistanupheld reservationsof between 5 and 10 percent in national and provincial assemblies in various constitutions adopted into the 1980s.) In 2000 the militarygovernmentof GeneralPervezMusharrafexpandedthe reservationssystem to 17 percent at the national and provinciallevels and one-third at the local level.71 Granting reservedseats to women allows nondemocracies to respond to popular pressureand conform to international norms without ceding ground to the competitivepartypolitics presumed by candidate quotas. Yet the very nature of such regimes prevents female-and male-legislators from representing citizen interestsand wielding effectivepower. Conclusion Advocatesand criticsof group representationfrequentlyfail to distinguishbetweentypes of policies and the groupsthey apply to. Yetthesedistinctionsareconsequentialfor normativedebates about social differencein a liberalpolity. Gender- and ethnicbased demands present unique challengesto the liberaltradition. Becausethey areselfcanceling,quotasproducethe opposite effect on group differencethan the self-reinforcingremedyof reservations. As a first cut at disaggregatinggroup claims to representation, I suggest that gender quotas be seen as analogous to a class action and ethnic reservationsas a group right.72A class action is a legal suit initiated by some plaintiffson behalf of a largercollective of people in orderto vindicate a particularset of rights.The classis constituted by virtue of having suffereda similarwrong.The objectiveof the suit is to identifythis wrong and put the plaintiffsin a position to recoverfor the individual harms they have suffered.That is, a class action aims at the erasureof an externallyimposed disability.A class action is self-canceling:achievementof the claim extinguishesthe legal identity of the class. The logic of a class action correspondsclosely to that of women'smobilizationfor genderquotas.They unite to contest common experiences of political exclusion and discrimination. The quota remedyaims to transcendthese gender-based disabilities, thereby erasing the conditions giving rise to the claim in the firstplace. Once women enter political office, the reasonsmotivating the quota movement disappear.The logic of the quota is "toput the group out of businessas a group."73 As the Frenchcase shows, women from all partiesand ideologies united in the strugglefor quotas, but revertedto their priorideologicaland politicalcommitmentsonce this goal was achieved.This trajectoryparallelsthe cyclicalpatternsobserved in women'smovementsmore generally:they emergeto oppose problems(denialof voting rights,militaryrule, discriminatory legislation)but dissipateonce the situation has been resolved. Women may act like a group in order to get something, but realign themselves as a category once they have it. Being excludedfrom power makeswomen conscious of belonging to a group; once they have power, this group identity tends to weaken and dissipate.74 Ethnic reservations,by contrast,are a group right. Claimed in orderto guaranteethe continued existenceof the group,they areexercisedcollectivelyby groupmembers.Suchrightsareselfreinforcingratherthan self-canceling. Organizationsof Chinese in Mauritius, Croats in Bosnia, and Italian-speakersin Switzerlandwill not dissipateonce representationalrightshave been granted.On the contrary,sincelegislativereservationscreate incentivesfor the developmentof group-specificorganizations, their boundarieswill be strengthened. Self-cancelingclaims for political inclusion have the reverse effect of self-reinforcinggroup rights.Women seeking quotas aim to have their differentposition absorbedby universalistic institutions. Ethnic minorities demanding reservationswant theirparticularismrecognizedand legitimized.These areopposite trajectories:women sufferfrom too much difference;ethnic groups, from too little. Claims for inclusion pose less of a challenge to contemporaryliberal institutions than claims to difference.75 The distinction between a class action and a group right is an analyticalone I inferredfrom this study of representation policies in contemporarydemocracies.It does not describeall claims made on behalf of genderand ethnic identities. In fact, gender claims may on occasion be self-reinforcing: some women'smovementsaim at separatism;others arguethat their essentialdifferencesfrom men requiredissimilartreatmentover the long term. And ethnic claims may sometimes be selfcanceling:part of the rationalebehind reservationsin India is to help break down caste distinctions; likewise, affirmative action in the United States and Brazilseeks to make race less determining for political opportunities, occupational status, and social experience. Nevertheless,selecting one remedyfor underrepresentation over otherswill generallyshape the futuretrajectoryof a social September 2004 I Vol. 2/No. 3 451 Articles I Is Gender like Ethnicity?The PoliticalRepresentationof IdentityGroups group. A candidate quota promotes the integrationof group members into existing political parties. Beneficiariesof the quota may lateract to advancegroup interests,but they will do so-save at episodic moments-as individuals,not as a group. A legislativereservationproducesthe oppositeeffect:it strengthens ties among group members by connecting them through channels of representationdistinct from those used for everyone else.Though moreconduciveto continuedcollectiveaction, reservationshave the potential to magnify intergroupdifferences and impede development of the overlappingaffiliations that underliea successfuldemocracy.The choice betweensoftening or hardeningdifferenceinevitablyarisesin the quest for political justice. Policymakersdesigning institutions and the scholarsadvisingthem should take notice lest they unwittingly trade a legislatureof white men for a fragmented,even polarized political society. Table la Gender quotas and reservations Country National and local levels Argentina Armenia Bangladesh Belgium Bolivia Bosnia and Herzegovina Brazil Colombia Costa Rica Djibouti DominicanRepublic Ecuador France Guyana Jordan Kosovo Macedonia Mexico Morocco Nepal NorthKorea Pakistan Panama Paraguay Peru Philippines Rwanda Serbia and Montenegro Sudan Taiwan Tanzania Uganda Local level only Greece India Namibia Policy 30% of candidates 5% of partylists for PR elections 45 of 345 seats reserved forwomen in unicameralparliament;some seats reserved at local level 33% of candidates 30% of candidates for Chamber;25% for Senate; 30% for local councils 33% of candidates 30% of candidates 33% of executive appointments 40% of candidates 7 of 65 parliamentaryseats reserved 33% of candidates 35% of candidates 50% of candidates 33% of candidates 6 of 110 seats reserved in House of Representatives 33% of candidates 30% of candidates 30% of candidates 30 of 325 parliamentaryseats reserved 5% of candidates for lower house; 3 of 60 seats reserved in upper house; 20% of local seats reserved 20% of 687 parliamentaryseats reserved 17% of seats reserved in nationalassembly (60 of 342) and Senate (17 of 100); 33% at local level 30% of candidates 20% of candidates 30% of candidates 2 of 5 PR list seats reserved of a total of 220 in parliament;1 seat reserved on each local and provincialcouncila 24 of 80 seats reserved in Chamberof Deputies 30% of nationaland local candidates in Serbia 35 of 360 nationalassembly seats reserved Approximately10% of seats reserved in LegislativeYuan;25% at local level 48 of 295 (16%) of parliamentaryseats reserved; 25% of local councils 56 of 214 parliamentaryseats reserved; 33% of local councils 33% of candidates 33% of seats reserved 33% of candidates is excludedfromtables1, 2, and3 becauseof smallnumberof reservedseats. aPhilippines Sources: InternationalIDEA2003; Htunand Jones 2002; Electionworld2003; Republicof Rwanda2003; BBC News 2004. 452 Perspectives on Politics Table lb Ethnic reservations Country Belgium Bhutan Bosnia and Herzegovina Colombia Croatia Cyprus Ethiopia Fiji India Jordan Kiribati Kosovo Lebanon Mauritius New Zealand Niger Pakistan Peru Samoa Serbia and Montenegro Singapore Slovenia Switzerland Taiwan Venezuela Policy Halfof cabinet ministriesreserved for Frenchspeakers and half for Dutchspeakers; parliament divides into Frenchand Dutchculturalcouncils when dealing withregionaland culturalissues. 10 of 150 seats reserved for representativesof Buddhistgroups 3 memberpresidency(Bosniak,Croat,Serb); in 42-memberNationalHouse of Representatives, 28 seats are allocated to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 14 seats to the RepublikaSrpska;the 15-memberHouse of Peoples consists of 5 Bosniaks, 5 Croats, and 5 Serbs 5 of 166 seats reserved for Afro-Colombians,indigenous peoples, and other politicalminorities in Chamber;2 of 102 seats reserved for indigenous peoples in Senate 5 of 153 seats in unicameralassembly reserved for ethnic minorities 24 seats reserved for Turks (unfilled)and 1 seat each for Maronite, Roman-Catholicand Goumenianminoritiesof 80 in nationalassembly 22 of 117 upperhouse seats (Councilof the Federation)reserved for representativesof minority nationalities 23 and 19 of 71 seats reserved for Fijiansand Indo-Fijians,respectively 79 seats reserved for Scheduled Castes and 41 for Scheduled Tribes of 543 in the LokSabha (lower house of parliament);Prime Ministerhas the rightto appoint up to 2 Anglo-Indiansto the same chamber 12 of 110 seats for Christiansand Chechens/Circassians 1 of 39 seats for Banabans 20 of 120 seats reserved for minoritycommunities Of 128 nationalassembly seats: Maronites(34), Sunnis (27), Shiites (27), Greek Orthodox(14), Greek Catholics(8), Druzes (8), ArmenianOrthodox(5), Alaouites(2), ArmenianCatholics(1), Protestants (1), ChristianMinorities(1) 8 of 70 seats are filled by the "best losers" representingthe four constitutionally-recognized ethnic communities(Hindus,Muslims,Chinese, and Franco-Mauritian/Creole Christians) 7 of 120 seats reserved for Maorisin unicameralparliament 8 of 83 seats reserved for nationalminoritiesin unicameralparliament 10 of 342 lower house seats reserved for minorities 15% of candidates in 11 (of 25) regions must be members of "nativecommunities" 2 of 49 seats in unicameralassembly (Fono) reserved for part-or non-Samoans 91 seats reserved for Serbs and 35 for Montenegrinsof 126 in unicameralassembly; 4 reserved seats for Albaniansin Montenegroelections Parties and alliances contesting the 14 multimemberGroup Representation Constituencies must includean ethnic minoritycandidateon the ticket;the policyguarantees that 9 seats will be occupied by Malays and 5 by Indiansor other minoritiesof a total of 93 in parliament 2 seats of 90 in unicameralassembly reserved for Hungariansand Italians 4 seats for Germanspeakers, 2 for Frenchspeakers, and one for Italian-speakersin 7-member Federal Cabinet 8 seats reserved for overseas Chinese and 8 for aboriginalgroups in 225-seat LegislativeYuan 3 of 165 seats in unicameralnationalassembly reserved for indigenous peoples Sources: Reynolds n.d.; Inter-Parliamentary Union 2003; CIA 2003; Electionworld 2003; Carr 2003; Republic of Singapore 2003. Notes 1 Ethnicity is used here as an all-encompassingterm referring to social groups differentiatedby kinship, tribe, skin color, religion, caste, language,race and other markers of communal identity.This broad definition of ethnicity, though somewhat at odds with the popular use of the term, is becoming more common in socialscience as scholarsseekexplanationsfor the causes-and consequences-of political phenomena motivated by ethnic identities. See Chandra2004; Varshney2001; Horowitz 1985. 2 An exception is Anne Phillips's ThePoliticsof Presence, which at severalpoints comparesthe pursuit of gender parityand ethnic minority representation.See Phillips 1995. 3 Most of the data come from IDEA 2003; Reynolds n.d.; Parline2003; Electionworld2003. I attempted to confirm each case in the country-specificscholarlyliterature and in governmentwebsites, and made adjustments accordingly.Some of these sources are mentioned in footnotes. 4 The availabilityof more dataon formaland informalpracticeswithin partiescould revealmorewidespreaduse of ethnic candidatequotas. Partiesin India, for instance, regularlyapply ethnic quotas for leadershipposts. See September 2004 1Vol. 2/No. 3 453 Articles | Is Gender like Ethnicity?The PoliticalRepresentationof IdentityGroups Chandra2004. For more information about gender quotas in parties,see IDEA 2003. 5 Kukathas1992; Okin 1999; Trebble2002; Miller 2002. 6 Elshtain 1995. 7 Sowell 1990. 8 Cameron, Epstein, and O'Halloran 1996. For a critique and response,see Lublin 1999 and Epsteinand O'Halloran 1999. 9 Quoted in Phillips 1995, 92. 10 Kymlicka 1995, 134-38. 11 Jones, forthcoming. 12 The literatureon how electoralrules affect the party system and political behaviorbegins with Duverger'slaw and is vast. See, for example,Cox 1997; Careyand Shugart 1992; Lijphart1990; Shugart 1995; Jones 1995; Ames 1995. ratherthan the "pre13 PR thus permits "self-determination" determination"of ethnic groups. See Lijphart1985. Lani Guinier also endorsesPR to allow for the representation of"voluntaryinterestconstituencies,"ethnic and otherwise. See Guinier 1994. 14 Lijphart1985. 15 Reynolds 1999; Caul 2001. 16 Baldez2004; Matland and Studlar 1996. 17 Inglehartand Norris 2003. 18 Kaufmannand Petrocik 1999. 19 Center for AmericanWomen and Politics 1997. 20 Chandra2004. 21 Deschouwer 2002; Heisler 1990; Steiner 2002. 22 Horowitz 1985, 332. 23 Snyder2000. 24 Yishai 2001. 25 Dawson 1994; Grofman, Handley, and Niemi 1992. 26 Van Cott, n.d. 27 Telles 1999; Htun 2004; Samuels, n.d. 28 Lijphart1977; Horowitz 1985, 1991; Chandran.d.. 29 Young 1990; Mansbridge1999; Williams 1998; Phillips 1995. 30 Htun andJones2002; Nordlund 2003; Carton 1999; Corrin 2002; StabilityPact 2002; Dahlerup 2002. 31 Friedman2000, 291. 32 Rodriguez2003; Jenson and Valiente 2003; Htun and Jones 2002. 33 The council is generallycomprisedof four Germanspeakers,two French-speakers,and one Italian-speaker. 34 Deschouwer 2002; Heisler 1990; Steiner 1990; Steiner 2002. 35 Horowitz 1985; Lijphart1986. 36 Birch 2002; Birch et al 2002; Darmanovic 2003; UNHCR and OSCE 2002; Embassyof Croatia,n.d.; Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, n.d. 37 Reilly 2001. 38 Galanter 1984; Walker 1992. 39 Van Cott 2003; EfrenAgudelo 2002. 40 Bird 2001; Sineau 2003. 41 Mossuz-Lavau1998, 83. 454 Perspectives on Politics 42 Agacinski2003, 18. 43 Giraud and Jenson 2001; Bird 2002; Jenson and Valiente 2003; Mazur 2001. 44 Bird 2002. 45 Galanter 1984; Jenkins 1999; Pedersen,forthcoming. 46 Galanter 1984; Wilkinson 2000. 47 Governmentof India 1974, 304. 48 Ibid. 49 The annex to the official reportcontains three notes of dissent written by four committee members.Two of the notes oppose reservationsaltogether;the other, signed by two membersand running eleven paragraphs,supports reservationsat the national and state levels. See Government of India 1974. 50 Ibid., 301. 51 The seatsmay be allocatedby rotationto differentconstituencies; one-third of council chairmanshipsmust also be reservedfor women. For analysisof the local reservations see Tekchandani,Jyoti, and Sharma 1997; Lakshmi, Jyoti, and Sharma2000. 52 Keating 2002; Jenkins 1999. 53 Jenkins2003, 169. See also: Nath 1996. 54 Jenkins2003, 170. 55 This is the case not just in India but more generally. Data from the United Statesshow that when they run, women have as good a chance as men to get elected.Their low numbersin power owe to the unwillingnessof parties to nominate women as candidates,not discrimination in the electorate. See Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994. 56 Forum for Democratic Reforms2000. 57 Kishwar1999, 126-27. 58 Forum for Democratic Reforms2000. 59 Promujer1998. 60 Yashar,forthcoming;Jung, n.d. 61 Van Cott, n.d. 62 Ibid. 63 JuradoNacional de Elecciones2002a; JuradoNacional de Elecciones2002b. 64 Chase Smith 1982. 65 Van Cott, n.d.; Rice, forthcoming. 66 WraysPerezof the Inter-EthnicDevelopment Association of the PeruvianForest (AIDESEP);interviewedby Donna Lee Van Cott, July 11, 2002. 67 Comisi6n Organizadorade la Consulta Indigena sobre la ReformaConstitucional 2003. 68 As mentioned earlier,Colombia and Venezuelahad grantedthem legislativereservationsin the early 1990s. 69 Stavenhagen2002; Van Cott 2003; Yashar1999. 70 Rachida2002. 71 Pakistanalso reserves7 percentof seatsfor technocrats.Various national plans for women had endorsed a 30 percent reservationsscheme, as did representativesof eleven political parties.See Reyes 2002; Weiss and Bari 2002. 72 I am gratefulto John Comaroff for helping me with this formulation. 73 Fraserarguesthat this logic characterizesredistributiveremedies for class-basedsocial injustice. 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