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German Prisoners of War in the United States Author(s): Arnold P. Krammer Source: Military Affairs, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Apr., 1976), pp. 68-73 Published by: Society for Military History Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1987148 . Accessed: 25/08/2011 23:00 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Society for Military History is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Military Affairs. http://www.jstor.org of War in the United Stte by Arnold P. Krammer Texas A&M University WH EN the United States entered GeneralJurgen vonArnim, Rommel'ssuc- levels,anyoneofwhichmighthavehad a causing orinterpretation, opinion WorldWarII, theproblemofmain- cessoras Commander Korps), different oftheAfrika and delay whichwouldnotbe taining enemyprisoners ofwarwasamong andbetweenMayandOctober1943,an av- confusion thelastconsiderations ofa country arrivedin eliminateduntilJune1945,whena final reeling erageof20,000 prisoners a month providedforthe Provost reorganization froma Japaneseattackandfeverishly tool- theUnitedStates.2 thefollow- MarshalGeneralto reportdirectlyto the FromDecember1943through ingup fora warinEurope.Yet,bytheend GeneraloftheASF as a full figuresdroppedto Commanding of the war, Americafounditselfholding ingJune,themonthly nearlya halfmillion AxisPOWsevacuated 2,000, theperiodfollowing the staffadvisor.5In 1942,however,General andalthough frombattle areas an ocean away, had Normandy Allies Bryan'sfirstjob was toestablishcampsto invasionsaw theWestern unending thesuddenandseemingly placed themin existingor hastilycon- takingprisoners at therateof 100,000 per contain enemyprisoners. structed campsacrossthecountry, andhad month,the liberationof France allowed delugeofarriving Followingtheircapture in the field, dealt witha tangledweb of problemsin- manyofthemto be maintained outsideof maze entereda confusing volvingfeeding, clothing, De- enemyprisoners securing,regis- theUnitedStates.FromJunethrough Theywereasprocedures. tering,interrogating, entertaining, and cember 1944,the numberof prisoners ofregistration photoevenre-educating theprisoners. statesideaveraged30,000per signed numbers,fingerprinted, transferred interroBecause theUnitedStateshad notheld month,witha surgeof morethan60,000 graphed,givenmedicalattention, givenrelargenumbers offoreign prisoners inwell prisonersarrivingduringApriland May gatedformilitaryinformation, personalproperty, over100years,whenBritishsoldierswere 1945alone. Despitethe growingdemand ceiptsfornonessential internedin 1812,past experiencescould froma numberofcongressional and gov- and placedaboardavailableoceantransdifprovidelittleguidance.The remaining al- ernmentofficialsto transfereven more porttotheUnitedStates- a normally bya lack processmademoredifficult ternative wastheGenevaAccordsof1929, a POWstohelprelievethefarmlaborshort- ficult G.I.s as plethoraof conventions which,although age in theUnitedStates,3theWarDepart- of Germanand Italian-speaking tohamper enemyefforts ratified by40 nationsby 1939,was stillan mentannouncedthatsuch shipmentsof wellas deliberate toAmericancampswouldcease accurateregistration.6 untried document whoseapplication hadto prisoners auofAxispris- TheProvostMarshalGeneral'soffice betestedat everystep.Thus,whenthewar onV-EDay. Thetotalnumber oftwotypesofcamps: thecreation brokeout, the War Department,acting onersintheUnitedStatesat theendofMay thorized throughthe Provost Marshal General, 1945was to be 371,683Germans,50,273 permanentcamps and branchcamps,7 by 141and 319,respectively, numbering the Geneva Convention into Italians,and3,915Japanese.4 synthesized emphasisonsecurity 1942, May1945.Thestrong periodthrough twofundamental whichformed Despitetheplanning principles boththelocationandconstruction to deal withso affected thefoundaton forall futuretreatment of Americanunpreparedness thatthe large a numberof foreignprisonerswas of the camps, forthe War Department ofwar.Theywere,first, prisoners thatthecamp sitesbe isolated at theonsetbythegovernment'sstipulated was a humanitarian reflected Geneva Convention divi- andeasilyguarded,andawayfrom'blackdivisionofresponsibility: documentintendedto preventindignities inefficient 150milesinfrom charged outareas' whichextended theWarDepartment, against enemysoldierssimplybecause sionbetween 75miles theyhadsuffered themisfortune ofhaving withguarding,feeding,and housingthe theMexicanandCanadianborder, beentakenprisoner;andsecond(andmore prisoners,and the State Department, inlandfrombothcoasts,or nearshipyards For thesereasons, fortheirrepatri- or vitalwarindustires. important), thatthe enemynationsheld chargedwithnegotiatons theirownshareofAmericansoldierswho ationvia neutralactions.TheWarDepart- as wellas a lackofavailablefundsfornew itwas necessarythatpermawereto be protected bytheUnitedStates ment,in turn,reassignedsome respon- construction, possible,wouldbe decenttreatment ofenemyprison- sibilitiesto the ArmyService Forces, nentcamps,whenever through bases, headedbyGen.BrehomSomervell, which, locatedat or nearexistingmilitary ers. of whichwere locatedin the theOffice oftheProvost two-thirds in inturn,controlled Otherthanbasic principles, however, thecapacityofeach 1941,Americawas in no waypreparedfor MarshalGeneral,underMaj. Gen. Allen SouthandSouthwest; themorethan425,000 Germanand Italian Gullion.The State Department,mean- camprangedbetween1,000and5,000men, prisonersof war thatwouldinundatethe while,establishedan InterneesSectionin averaging2,500.BecausetheGenevaConofprisrequiredthatthestructure countrybetweenthe springsof 1943and theOfficeofSpecial WarProblemsDivi- vention thosefor sion. To complicate the situationstill onercampsshouldapproximate 1945.1 theProvostMarshalGeneral'sOf- troopsat base camps of the retaining came further, America'ssingleyearofplanning fortheAliensDivision, power,the standardlayoutforthe conto a close as theAlliesopenedtheirNorth ficewasresponsible of nearly50 newcampswas as ofwhich,in June1943, struction Africancampaignin November1942,and thereorganization of follows: ledtothecreationofthePrisoner thesubsequentdefeatofRommel'sarmy finally oftheexsent the numbersof incomingprisoners WarDivision,underthedirection Thecampconsistsofoneor more soaring.The firstmassivegroupof Ger- tremely able new Assistant Provost bytwowire surrounded compounds man and Italian prisonerscapturedby MarshalGeneralBrig.Gen.BlackshearM. fences...andcompoundsare sepawere AmericanandBritishforcestotalledmore Bryan.Policydecisions,therefore, ratedfromeach otherby a single than150,000 men(including theprizecatch, reroutedthroughseveral administrative fence.Each compoundhousesfour 68 MILITARY AFFAIRS and Custer,Michigan,and prepareda refer- plants,as mechanics,forharvesting toa ironically and projects, clearance land ence manualon prisonerofwar adminishouse. Once set- New Jerseykoshermeat-packing tration(farmoresuccessful).13 andbusinessesquickly werereadyforwork. Local communities tled,theprisoners spectacleofcol"familiar to the adjusted perenemy captive of The forcedlabor practice, umns of gray or denim-clad POWs sonnelhas beena time-honored alongintheprecise,easyrhythm did swinging and althoughthe GenevaConvention it did re- achievedonlybymenfamiliarwithmarchnotpreventtheiremployment, strictthemtocertaingeneralareas.Placed ingsincechildhood."15 Moreover,the GenevaAccordsrequired underthedirection oftheWarManpower Despitetheapparentease withwhichthe thatfood,sanitary,and healthservices Commission acceptedtheirtasks,theofficial andtheWarFoodAdministra-prisoners werenotonlytobe adequate,butprisoners tionwithin theissue Handbook for Work Supervisors of PristheWarDepartment, were to receive the same treatmentas of prisoneremployment simplydirected oner of War Labor (ArmyServiceForces membersoftheAmericanarmedforces.9 thata prisonermustbe physicallyable, Manual,M 811,July1945)exhorted Ameriweremain- that the workin questionmust not be can worksupervisors To insurethatsuchconditions to "be aloof,forthe tained,inspectionteams were commis- dangerousor unhealthy, and thatnowork Germansrespectfirmleadership... Allow of the projectcouldbe directly sionedto reporton the conditions relatedtothewar them to rest only when necessary. POWs to the responsibleAmericanand effort. Pay scales wereadjustedto rank, DRIVE! (p. 15) By 5 April1945,theNew at regularintervals. Swissauthorities werenotobligatedto York Times was able to reportthatofthe officers andalthough heldin theUnited POWscurrently work,mostelectedtofillat leastsupervis- 365,437 LL camps were guarded,of course, ory positions.All enlistedpersonnelre- States,nearly200,000of themwere emsector. whichgrewto ceived100a day,plusan additional personnel, J Lby military 700per ployedinjobsoutsideofthemilitary anditwasdeemedvitalto day foranyworkabove and beyondtheir A numberof complicationsdid arise, innumber, 47,000 nottheleastofwhichwas theire con- requiredmaintenance thattheprisoners' oftheprisoncamp. however, interests American wereharnessedtoa slidingscale: of Americanlabor unions.The War DetactwithAmericanpersonneland wayof Officers quicklybecametheobjectofan Competent lieutenants permonth;cap- partment received$20.00 liferesultina positiveattitude. however,werein shortsupply tains, $30.00 per month; and majors organizedprotestafterGermanprisoners personnel, withor were detailedto workon the railroads. andtheArmy through generals,$40.00permonth, duetotheoverseaspriorities, railroadswere,andstillare,the made American labor.The strictdistinction Service Forces oftenutilized its least without inthenation,and industry thecare mostunionized between necessary(or qualified)personnel- re- bytheGenevaConvention itselfat logfound Department the War for remen destined or those and enlisted retired officers, officers cently of enemy of Brotherhood toprovide gerheadswiththepowerful authorities a terminalor "dead-end"appointment. quiredtheAmerican which,as official Germanofficers a situation Thisproduced thesamequalityquarters, RailwayClerks.GeorgeHarrison,Presias thecaptive dentoftheUnion,carriedon a vociferous ASF historianJohnMillettnoted,caused staff,andmilitary courtesy .. .tobe thedump- poweraccordedits ownofficers. German campaign,at onepointdeclaringofSecreprisoncampcommands who officers grade field .for rank of ingground.. captain,forex- taryStimson: abovethe officers werefoundto be unsatisfactory."l1 ample, were allowed an orderlyfrom MyGod,doeshe notknowthatRailThe shortageof qualifiedpersonnel, amongthe prisoners;all officersto the roading is a most delicate bedbythecriticallackofGerman rankofmajorwereallowedindividual complicated operation....We carryon nightand a rooms;majorsand above wereprovided and Italian-speakingadministrators, dayinsplitsecondschedules.I have enlistedper- withseparatelivingrooms;and generals byAmerican generalhostility notbeenabletogeta reasonforturnsonnel towardsthe prisoners,and the weregivenindividualhuts.The WarDeing loose Nazi soldiers,skilledin demolitionpractices,so thatthey werebeing partment sysover-allbeliefthattheirefforts evencreatedan accounting mayrunamuckontherailroads.16 werealandprisoners wastedstatesidewhile"the action"was temforthethrifty, theirsavingsat theend takingplaceoverseas,ledtoa moraleprob- lowedtowithdraw waryof The RooseveltAdministration, tothepublic oftheircaptivity. brought lemwhichwasfinally laborunrest,decidedagainstdeattentionin late 1944by the respected Paid laborexistedintwobasicforms:at further segto heavilyunionized JamesH. PowersoftheBostonGlobe. His Americaninstallationsand relatedsta- tailingprisoners and contracts front, a tions,and as labor contracted involved to private mentsoftheworking thatthesituation sharpcriticism considered. morecarefully Pris- werethereafter testof nationalwill forwhichAmerican business.Maj. MaxwellS. McKnight, was thatthe personnelwere "less thanproficient,"" onerofWarDivision,assuredtheanxious The netresultin retrospect, astonishinglybroughtagreementfrom Americanpublicthatsuchworkinvolved Germanprisonerswere generallyemlittleor notechniandthat"every ployedinjobs requiring BernardGuflerof the State Department nodangertothewareffort, whostated effort at work cal skill,a grosswasteofvaluable,cheap, is madetoemployprisoners SpecialWarProblemsDivision, seemstohavebeen in connection withmilitaryreservations and legallabor. that,indeed,"noeffort arosewiththefallof A seconddifficulty and made to traineitherthe officersor the because it is the mostsatisfactory shifttothe specialized economical means of utilizing their fascistItalyanditssubsequent fortheirhighly guardpersonnel work,"and thattheprisonersoftenwere labor... [and] prisonersare used to dis- Alliedside.In ordertoremedytheembarthe thenAllied exposedto themostcomicand least effi- place American troops whenever rassmentof imprisoning there possible."114 cientsideoftheircaptors. Although notemployed troops,the United States declared all Thoseprisoners is noaccuratemeasureoftheseciticisms, at militarypostswere contractedout to Italian POWs,53,607in number,as "cowhichstipulated a definition the privatebusiness,farms,and smallindus- belligerents," and,inparticular, theWarDepartment theItaliancaptivescouldnot launched tries.Prompted ProvostMarshalGeneral'sOffice bythespectreofdomestic thatalthough forASF laborshortagesin late 1943,Secretaryof be released,at thesame timetheUnited seriesofconferences animmediate custodialcare withservice commandsin 1943and 1944(of WarStimsonarrangedforlocalindustries Statescouldcontinue oftheGenevaConvenmili- outtherestrictions questionablevalue), createdthree-week toapplyforPOWworkdetailsthrough wouldbe Italianprisoners trainingprogramsbeginningin October tarychannels,and laborbattalionswere tion.Henceforth, proTexas,andFort farmedout to brickplants,drycleaning utilizedforjobswhichwereotherwise at FortSamHouston, 1944, or approxicompaniesofprisoners, conmately1,000men.Thefacilities a mess sistoffivebarracks,a latrine, building hall,andan administration each foreach company.In addition, companyis providedwitha recreaa workan infirmary, tionbuilding, shop,a canteenbuilding...a chapel, and a stationhospital.8 A 12 APRIL 1976 69 at largewasobligatedtoappointrepresen- Seavey'sproposedinvestigaton ofthesitutativesto deal withcamp administratorsation,theWarDepartment, inresponse toa and inspection teamson its behalf,an op- Germanmemorandum via Switzerland, portunity seizedmostoften bythemoreag- reintroduced theNazisaluteas anaccepted gressiveNazis.Insteadofinterfering with greetingwithinPOW camps. The War the workprogram,the Nazi-dominated ProblemsDivisionmemorandum tocamp camps,infact,wereusuallymodelsofeffi- commanders explainedthat ciency.TheNazisrealizedthatan orderly The labor of prisonersof war to Thenewsalutehas,ofcourse,disand well-runcamp wouldgive themthe date on militaryestablishments is tinctNazi implications butso have continuedbackingof the Americanauvaluedat above$80,000,000. In addiuniforms the Swastika on German thorities, and, the real therefore, control tion,contractors have paid intothe whichtheprisoners and decorations over the As a camp. were result, they given UnitedStatesTreasury$22,000,000 in ofwarare allowedtodisplay.... an almostfreehand,andwithout an effeccold cash. This moneyhas been Wemightbe able togainsomeadtive intelligencesystemand adequate depositedin the miscellaneousrecanendeavorto vantages:personnel ceiptsfundintheTreasury.Ineffect, keep carefultrackof theprisoners guidelines,the War Departmentmoved thisrepresents a deduction fromthe aboutthe whoseemtobeenthusiastic slowlytocountertheirinfluence.20 costofmaintaining andguarding the Nazi salute...a countofNazi noses The success obtained by the Nazis within prisoners ofwar.17 couldthusbecomepossible.... thecampsoften createda totalitarian enviTheNazisaluteshouldnotbemade in ronment the prisoner system, a conclufunoforcommented onbyAmerican Oncetheprocessofcamplifeandthedivibya HarvardUniversity guardpersonnel within ofthe hearing sion of labor had been settled,attention sionsubstantiated prisonersof war. The best way of turnedto the political and ideological study,headedbyProf.WarrenA. Seavey, it wouldseemto be theold treating whichwarnedthat"UnitedStatespolicyin framework within thecamp. fashionedAmerican poker-faced prisoner's camps was only servingto method.In thecourseoftimemany strengthen Nazismamongthecaptives.'"21 prisonerswill tendto get tiredof RTICLE 4 of the Geneva Conven- Similarsentiments wereechoed,interest- it ....25 tionsolemnlydeclaredthat "differ- ingly,by an anti-Naziprisonerin Camp encesintreatment is law- Campbell,Kentucky, amongprisoners in a November1944 The finalcomplicationregardingthe fulonlywhenit is based on themilitary memototheExecutiveOfficer ofthecamp. politicalleadershipwithin thecamps,and rank,stateofphysicalor mentalhealth," "I takethisunusualstepofwriting thislet- perhapsthemostsignificant, concernsthe therebymakingno distinctionbetween ter,as itwas impossible tosee you,"wrote factthatthefirstlargebodyofprisoners to ideologically hardenedprisoners andthose one Pvt. FriedrichSchiltz,8WG-25509. "I arrive in the UnitedStates,and consewhoare "re-educated."Although neither am toldthatyoudon'tlikeanti-Nazis, butI quently,those aroundwhomthe camp theSovietUnionnorGreatBritaintookthe appealtoyourfairness.. He wentonto structureswere designedand those to Geneva Conventionseriouslyenoughto say: whomall laterarrivalswouldbe forcedto handicaptheirownprograms,theUnited werethemostthoroughly indoctrisubmit, I acknowledge that a snappy beStatesappliedits provisions wholesaleto natedNazis."Thefirst North captivesfrom haviorlooksnice,machine-like. You all situations.The central probleminSidAfrica,"wrotetheHarvardhistorian, feelit is likea goodrunning motor, volvedtheAmerican failuretotakeadvansmoothanddependable.Butitis all neyFay, facade... .Those who are your foltageofthecriticalperiodimmediately enemiesare respected.Those who lowingthe prisoners'capture.The first ofany werea toughlot- thetoughest had to fightagainst you as theyhad - partly severalweeksare critical,because miligroupofGermanprisoners nootherchoice,andwhoflocktoyou becausetheyhadwageda remarkaand taryprisonersare dazed, disrupted, forprotection, whoworkforyourvicheroic though unsuccessful bly It is at displaya universalvulnerability. tory,whichmeans theirvictory, campaign... while the quality of thismoment thattheprisonermustbe intheseare contempted. Why?22 Germanprisonerstaken later in terrogated, segregated bypoliticalpersuamiddleFrance is verydifferent, To these,and a numberofothercharges sion,processed,andassignedtoa campNazi ....26 agedandnotsofanatically yet it was precisely at this pointthat thatthe UnitedStates was encouraging American concern withtheprisoner's men- Nazism rather than eliminatingit,23 TheseelitemembersoftheAfrikaKorps, andadmiredbytheirfeltalandpoliticalcondition disciplined ceased.Onlythe Secretary ofWarHenryL. Stimsonadmit- rigidly low prisoners and Americanguardsalike mostbasic divisionofcaptivestookplace. tedthat as the cream of the German military wereseparatedfrom First,Navyprisoners Occasionally, groupsofNazi prisonmachine, doggedly maintained theirbelief, Armyprisoners,and thenofficerswere ershaveattempted their todominate to thelastdaysofthewar,thatGermany segregatedfromenlistedmen.The most fellowprisoners,but..,there has wouldemergevictorious. Although thereis visiblyrabidNazis,4,500by 1945,wereinbeensubstantialsuccess in curtailsufficient evidence to indicate that such ternedat Alva,Oklahoma,and the most ingtheactivitiesofsuchminorities prisonerattitudeswereby no meansunivisibly dedicated anti-Nazis, 3,300 in andinpreventing coercionofprisonversal,thepoliticalatmosphere within the ers by Nazi extremists... .The War number,were shippedto Fort Devens, is cognizant Department oftheprobcampswouldmakelaterplansto"democMassachusetts, and Camp Campbell, inour lemscreatedbyNazielements ratize"theprisoners thatmuchmoredifa massiveprogram Kentucky.'8 Although is and effort camps, every being ficult. The authorities werenotoblivious to was later initiatedto "democratize"the made... .I therefore feelthatthereis the degree of Nazi activityflourishing thebestopportunity tosegregate prisoners, no necessity for an investigawithinthecamps,ofcourse,yetlittlerethevariousshadesofpoliticalideology had tion....24 coursewas takenunlessa captivevolunreinforcement was passed,andtotalitarian tobe placedina speSecretary Stimson's optimism aside,there teeredandpetitioned allowedtotakeplace.'9 As aninitialresult,theinfluence overthe is no doubtthatNazi elementscontrolled cial purgedcamp -admission to which slowanddangerously pubaffairs ofmanyprisoner ofwar wasexceedingly Germanprisonerswas wieldedin large theinternal partbyhard-core Nazis.According toArti- camps,and it appearsironicthatexactly lic. Oneoftheresultsofthislackofcommon cle 43oftheGenevaConvention, thecamp fourmonthsafterStimson'srejectionof hibited toGermanandJapaneseprisoners. BetweenJune 1943and 31 March 1944, POWsputin10,300,321 man-days ofwork, of which12,298,165 man-dayswereinprivate business.In June1945,BrigadierGeneral Bryanwas able to announceto theHouse Committee ofMilitary Affairs that: A 70 MILITARY AFFAIRS senseindealingwithGermanPOWswas a dentofsabotagebyan escapedprisoneris tionsoffailure,morethan23,142"whites" reignof violencewhichlasted approxi- onrecord,GeneralBryanwas calledtoac- weregraduatedto returnto Germanyas leadersundertheAlliedoccupa1943 countfortheArmy'spoliciesof"laxity,in- potential fromSeptember matelyeightmonths, in Germany of experience,and lack of safeguards."30 tion,to initiate"government bytheratherlargesegment toApril1944, thatperiod,6 mur- Perhapstheonlybeneficial fanaticalNazis.Within effect produced thatwe can trust,whichmeans thatwe ders, 2 forcedsuicides,43 "voluntary" by these chaotic events was the War musthave peopleheadingit thatwe can suicides,a generalcampriot,andhundreds Department's decisionto in- trust.33 long-belated theprojectto "democoflocalizedacts ofviolenceoccurredin a itiateeducationand recreationprograms In summarizing ratize" Germanprisoners,Col. Alpheus inves- fortheprisoners. ofcamps.In everyinstance, number officer oftheprogram commanding tigationby ArmyauthoritiespointeddiSecretaryStimsonobjected to these Smith, statedthat Nazis, plansonthegrounds ofhard-core rectlyto theinfluence thata newaggressive at FortEustis,Virginia, thatsaw thepris- educationalprogramwoulddivertmana pattern whichfollowed oners"accusedbytheircomradesofanti- powerfromthewareffort, createhostility Maybethisisdoingsomegood.Itcertainlyisn't doingany harmand it Nazi activities,sentencedby kangaroo amongthe prisoners,and perhapseven isn't costing the taxpayers a courts,and hanged,beaten,or coercedto jeopardizethe safetyof any participant nickel.... Twenty-five years from In many uponhis repatriaton. death by Gestapo methods."27 Buttheable headof we nowmaybewe'll knowwhether cases, thesuspectscouldonlybe thrown theSpecialProjectsDivision,Lt. Col. Edhavefailedor succeeded.... but ward Davison, overcame Secretary intothecampstockadeforpunishment; studyhas ever nopost-war evidenceexisted, Stimson'sobjectionsand finallyreceived Unfortunately, in cases wherestronger tomeasurethatsuccessor theywere shippedto a special camp for permission to inauguratetheprogramin beenconducted failure. "hardcases" at Alva,Oklahoma.In cases totalsecrecy. of or the wheretheevidencewas conclusive, withthereelection Asthewardrewtoa close,thequestion cautiously Beginning becamea centralissue.Long brutal,thePOWswere ofprisoner crimesparticularly bysecretballot repatriation representatives court-martialedand sent to a federal as an experiment indemocracy, theeduca- beforethe end of the war, prisonerexThe Americanauthorities tionalexperiment penitentiary.28 was launchedwiththe changeshad takenplace in compliance pointedout, however,that the ratio of distribution ofbooksbannedbyHitler(and withArticles68and69oftheGenevaConwhichrequiresthesickand serihomicideandsuicideamongtheprisoners thebanningof booksby Germanauthors vention, as soonas tobe repatriated ofwarwasstilllowerthanamonganygiven deemed"undemocratic"), followed bythe ouslywounded allowthemto be moved. segmentof the Americanpopulationat distribution tobe rep- theirconditions ofbooksdetermined inEuropeapwhich,of course, resentative large,a rationalization spirit, likeAbe Yet,as theendofhostilities oftheAmerican beggedthequestionofbasic POWcontrol. Lincolnin Illinois and The Life of Alexan- proached,the UnitedStates founditself der Graham Bell. Attendance at all lec- tornbetweentwo opposingarguments: of repatriation related issue to camp violenceand tureswas optional,withtheexceptionof thosewhourgedimmediate POW control,and one whichcaused mandatory attendance at Germanatrocity prisonersand thosewhourgedthatthe somepublicconcern,was thatofprisoner films,the "WhyWe Fight" series, and prisonersbe retainedin the countryfor escapes.From21April1942,whenthefirst otherWarDepartment andOWIfilms.De- labor.Aneditorialin theWashingtonPost thearguments warningthat prisonersarrivedin theUnitedStates,to spitethemanyhighhopesthatthecamps summarized homeat the theendofthewarthreeyearslaterthere wouldbecomeclassroomsofdemocracy,31 "tosendtheGermanprisoners or soonthereafter werea totalof 1,583escapes. The estab- attendanceby the prisonerswas admit- cessationofhostilities - a skepticism lishmentofthecamp workprogramsin- tedlylightandskeptical not seems highlyimpracticable and even se- entirely volvedthecalculatedriskofminimum alone."It dangerous... [yet]...the draftingof pristotheprisoners confined curityin an effortto free the greatest is notourbusinessto changethesemen's onersforforcedlaborwouldbe a violation numberof Armypersonnelforcombat habitsorbeliefsortore-educate them,"an of the spirit and letter of the Geneva Therewere additionalaroverseas,and a small numberofescapes Americanofficer "this Convention."35 candidlyadmitted, fromotherquarters.Somegroups guments was consideredacceptable.The average companysimplyhas a job todo."32 monthly escaperatefromJune1944toAu- It finallybecameobviousto Armyau- lobbiedfortheuse of prisonersas cheap their labordemanded was over100,oran av- thoritiesthata carefulscreeningwould labor;andorganized gust1945,however, erageof3 to4 escapesperday.Thelargest havetobe initiated ifcoercionbythehard- immediate repatriationfor the same reachedbyall massescapeoccurred enedNazisupontheirless ideological andmostpublicized com- reason.Theonlyagreement on Christmas Eve, 1944,when25 German radesweretobe overcome, andMaj. Gen. parties was summarizedby one Army tunnel Archer POWs escaped througha 250-foot L. Lerch,ProvostMarshalGeneral, spokesmanwhostatedthatregardlessof fromtheircampat PapagoPark,Arizona. beganthelong-overdue processoftesting the date of their repatriation,"while we'llworkthehell within and interrogation. Although everymanwasrecaptured The firstcategory,13 they'rein thiscountry threeweeks,thecryraisedbythepublic percentof theprisoners, containedhard- outofthem."36 a Congressional hearingbythe ened Nazis and sympathizers,labelled prompted The finaldecisioncame fromtheWar onMilitary Fannedby "blacks,"whoweresimplyignoredas inCommittee Affairs. that inJune1945,announcing alarmistnewspaperreports,and a con- corrigibles; 74 percent,in the second Department according wouldbe repatriated tinued cry by FBI Director J. Edgar category, werelabelled"gray,"thosewho prisoners Hooverthat"an escapedprisonerofwar, had simplyfollowedalong- theones at to certainpriorities:sick and wounded ofdestruc- whom the educational program was first,cooperativeprisonerssecond,and trainedas heis inthetechnique tion,is a dangerto ourinternalsecurity, aimed; and finallythe "whites,"in the hostileelementslast, dependingon the andcivilianlaborto ofshipping andthelivesandsafety thirdcategory,notless than13 percent, availability ourwarproduction, nationalattentionfo- whoserecordsindicatedthattheyhadpre- replacePOWlaborintheUnitedStates.In of our citizens,"29 France,Britothisdecision, cused on thePOW situation.Despitethe viouslyopposedtheNaziregime.Itwasnot sharpcontrast bythedesperescaped untilV-EDaythattheeducational ofprisoners factthatthemajority program tain,andRussia,motivated thanboredom, was publiclydisclosed,and theprogram ateneedforrawlaborandnosmallamount forreasonsnomoresinister thatnearlyeveryescapeewas roundedup continued oftheirrepa- of revengeagainstNazi Germany,conuntilthebeginning within twoweeks,andthatnota singleinci- triation inApril1946.Despitea fewdescrip- tinuedtoholdmorethanfivemillionGer- A APRI L 1976 71 manprisoners fornearlythreeyearsafter and education, which slowed rather hundredcamps throughout the country, V-E Day - and theSovietUnionhas as- streamlined diofmilitary personnel theexperience.Perhapsthe witha minimum tonishingly ignored,to date, all interna- chieferrorwas theWarDepartment's The prisoners fail- vertedfromthewar effort. tionalappeals to release theuntoldnum- uretoisolateincorrigible Nazisfromother werekepthealthyandoccupied,thelatter bersofsurvivors. theUnited oflocalbusinesses, prisoners, andwhilea number ofprograms tothebenefit inJuly1945, werelaterinitiated Repatriation beganofficially tocorrect thissituation, StatesTreasury,and theprisonersthemin "re-education" andalthough only70,000 hadbeenreturned thefactremainsthattheUnitedStatesdid selves.Thoseinterested the anit-Nazi envi- (thosewhocouldsuccessfully side-step by November 1945,Secretary of War littletoproduceaneffective of theirpoliticalcomrades) Robert P. Patterson announcedon 20 ronment.Regardingthe camps them- intimidation Novemberthatthe remainingprisoners selves,conditions variedso widelyfrom were able to benefitfromthe available the "will be entirelyout of privatecontract camptocampthatitwouldbeimpossible to programs.Perhapsmostimportantly, bytheendof arriveat an accurateconclusion work,including agriculture, aboutthe government'sstrict adherance to the aneffective constituted from dailywelfareoftheaveragePOW.Still,the GenevaConvention February,and will be withdrawn military workbytheendofMarch,1946," OfficeofCensorship madea concerted ef- propaganda device, insuringsimilar in GerforAmericanprisoners forultimate Atthe forttogaugethesentiment and moraleof treatment repatriation by1April.37 as pointed outina report byexamining POWmail,with many;inaddition, same time,an agreementwas concluded theprisoners Affairs withFrance in December,wherebythe the expectedvariationin results.They to CongressbytheHouseMilitary thePOWpolicywas "a great suchas onewrit- Committee, UnitedStateswouldsendadditionalpris- rangedfromcomplaints, factorin breakingdownthe morale of a month, andre- tenfromCampTrinidad,Colorado, onersat therateof50,000 Germantroopsand makingthemwilling, patriationcontinueduntilby June1946, ...Theytransported us likethelow.Had thisnot even eager to surrender... GermanPOWsremainedinthe only32,000 estcriminals aboutwhichtheyseem beentrue,victory wouldhavebeenslower UnitedStates.The finalboatloadofsome to have plentyofexperiencein this and harderand a fargreaternumberof 1,500 German prisoners from Camp country....They fear us "Bad Americans killed."40 Shanks,NewJersey,sailedforEuropeon Nazis" so much,butthisfearonly 22 July 1946, "waving an indifferent fillsus withpride...conditions here Although thepracticalexperience gained are indescribable and primitive ofCamp farewell," leavingthecommander duringtheprisoner ofwarprogram wasof in ... four of us a no tables or room; Shanks,Col. HarryW. Maas, to echo the littlepracticalvalue in thedifferent circhairs... feelingof the countryat large, sighing, cumstancesposedbytheKoreanand Viet Andwiththe "thankGod,thatis over."38 theWorldWarII POWexofpraisefromprisoners in Namconflicts, exception ofonly188Germans,25Italians, to expressions perience,in summary,was not onlya Camp Tennessee: Crossville, leftin theUnited and 1 Japaneseprisoner reasonablysuccessfulexperiment in miliStates,it was,indeed,over. ...the foodis excellent; this is a tarymanagement, butalsoa reaffirmation marvelous andhealthful climate....I ofthevalueandtheflexibility oftheGeneva am taking courses toward my Accords,and perhaps,mostimportantly, Meisterzeugnis (Certificate of servedtoprovide partofthefoundation HAT, then, is the final assessfora Maturity)...conditions are much healthier reconstruction of Americanmentof theAmericanPOW experibetterthanI expected...1am even Germanrelations inthepost-war ence? Thereis no questionthatthegovworld.In takingpianolessons....39 of the words of a formerGerman POW fortheproblem wasunprepared ernment ofenemy Onthepositiveside,theAmericanPOW Wilhelm Sauerbrei, whoreturned ofthousands tolivein caringforhundreds can justifiably prisoners. This unpreparedness was experience boastofitsabil- Texas afterthe war, "if thereis ever di- ity to overcomethe manyobstacles in anotherwar,geton theside thatAmerica quicklycomplicated bya governmental fortheprisoners' transporting the enemyprisonersto the ain't,thengetcapturedbytheAmericans visionof responsibility camps, maintenance,labor, censorship, UnitedStatesandtothecreationofseveral - you'llhaveit made.'"4' W REFERENCES ArnoldP. Krammeris Associate Professor of Historyat Texas A&M University, College Station, TX. He is author of The Forgotten Friendship: Israel and the Soviet Bloc, 1947-1953,published by the Universityof Illinois Press. This article was accepted forpublicationin July1975. tedStates DuringWorldWarII," Ball State Prisoner of War Utilization by the United University,1970; and the excellent article States Army: 1776-1945 (Washington: Deby Jake W. Spidle, Jr.,"Axis Prisonersof partmentof the Army,June 1955), PamA Bib- phletNo. 20-213,90-91. War in the UnitedStates, 1942-1946: liographical Essay," Military Affairs,Apr. 1975,61-66 2. Frank L. Kluckhorn,"Tunisian Resistance Ends inRoutofGermans," New York 1. There is astonishinglylittle written Times, 13 May 1943,11 July1944;Beverly about theprisonerofwar experiencein the Smith, "The Afrika Korps Comes to UnitedStates duringWorldWar II, though America," American Magazine, Aug. 1943. 3. "Seek German prisonersto Replace a large amount of raw material may be foundin the Records Group389ofthe Mod- Farm Labor," New York Times, 13 Febern Military Records Division, and Re- ruary 1945. 4. United States Provost Marshal cordsGroup 211 of the War Manpower Committee in the National Archives in General's Bureau, Prisoner of War OperaWashington,and the Colonel StephenFar- tions Division, mimeographed summary. rand Collectionat the Hoover Institution, Col. StephenM. Farrand Collection.For a breakdown of incoming Stanford,California.The two best availa- month-by-month ble academic studies are Edward Pluth's prisoners, see Prisoner of War Circulars, highlyauthoritativedoctoral dissertaton, ASF WD MonthlyProgress Report,series "The Administration and Operation of 1943, 1945, covered by TH-19-500. Also GermanPrisonerofWar Camps in theUni- George Lewis and JohnMewha, Historyof 72 5.John D. Millett, The Army Service Forces: The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces, The United States Army in World War II (Washington: Office of the Chief of MilitaryHistory,Departmentof Army,1954),348-354. 6."Enemy PrisonersofWar," TM 19-500, Chapt. 2, 2; Yvonne E. Humphrey,"On Shipboard With German Prisoners," American Journal of Nursing, XLVII, Sept. 1943,821-822. 7. The shortageof adequate housingfor branchcamps led totheuse ofgovernment CCC camps, armories, and state fairgrounds.See ArthurM. Kruse, "Custodyof PrisonersofWarin theUnitedStates," The Military Engineer, XXXVIII, Feb. 1946,72. 8. Maxwell S. McKnight,"Employment of Prisonersof War in the UnitedStates," MILITARY AFFAIRS International Labor Review, July 1944,49. 9. See memo,Major General,H.Q. Third Service Command,ArmyService Forces, Baltimore,19Sept. 1944:"Your obligations forfurnishingthe necessities to prisoners are just as strongas forAmericanpersonnel." Farrand Collection. 10. Millett,371. 11. James H. Powers, "What to do with German Prisoners," Atlantic Monthly,Nov. 1944,46.Accordingtothe New YorkHerald Tribune,13 Apr. 1944,"Only one officerat Camp Breckenridge speaks German... a situation duplicated at 194 other POW camps." 12. Bernard Gufler, "Indoctrinationof German Prisonersof War," Reorientation File, ProvostMarshal General Operations. 13. See, for example, an excellent mimeographed manual, covering every aspect ofPOW life,includingregulationson labor, morale, constructionof guard towers, machine-gun mountingprocedures, sample formsofall varieties,and wordsof advice fromprisonercamps throughout the thoritiesimmediatelyisolated the 36 percent Nazi-related prisoners and enjoyed excellent success in curtailingNazi influence and propaganda withinthe camps. Henry V. Dicks, "Personality Traits and National Socialist Ideology," Human Relations, June 1950, 120. 20. The Farrand Collection contains manyU.S. ArmySignal Corpsphotographs of the barracks at POW Camp Forrest, Tennessee, a number of which inadvertentlyshow framedphotosof AdolfHitler above several prisoners'bunks. 21. New York Times, 30 Nov. 1944. 22. P. W. Friedrich W. Schultz to Major Mins, Executive OfficerCamp Campbell, Kentucky,29Nov. 1944.FerrandCollection. 23. See, for example, William Shirer's scathingarticle in the WashingtonPost, 20 Aug. 1944;"Nazi Prisonersare Nazis Still," New York Times Magazine, 21 Nov. 1943; 29. J. Edgar Hoover, "Enemies at Large" American Magazine, Apr. 1944,97. Also "Eight Nazis Escape in Michigan," New YorkTimes,10July1944;"Says Nazis Run Wild in Arizona Streets," New York Times, 13 Feb. 1945. 30. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Congressional Record: Appendix, 79thCongress,1stSess., 22Feb. 1945,A786; "Laxity Led to Escape of German Prisoners," New York Times, 8 Apr. 1945. 31. Curt Bondy, "Observation and Reeducation of German POWs," Harvard Educational Review, Jan. 1946, 12-17; "DemocratizingGermans," Science News Letter,9 Nov. 1946,293; "Re-educatingthe Nazis," America,26 Aug. 1944,515. 32. Powers, 49. 33. Quentin Reynolds, "Experiment in Democracy," Colliers,25 May 1946,12. In addition to the reeducation program,the POWs were allowed, throughan arrangement between the War Department,the German Red Cross, and The Reich MinistryforScience, Instructionand Educaton, to pursuetheirformaleducationsby proxy at any ofa longlistofGermanpolytechnic, mining,textile,and business universities. A small number of POWs were also enrolled in extension courses throughthe of California,Berkeley;the UniUniversity versity of Minnesota; the Universityof Chicago; and the UniversityofWisconsin. 34. Reynolds,13. 35. "Prisoner Problems," editorial, ReinholdPabel, "It's Easy to BluffAmericans," Colliers, 16 May 1953. 24. LetterfromSecretaryof War Henry L. Stimsonto Prof.WarrenA. Seavey, Harcountry, in Prisoner of War Regional Convard Law School, Cambridge, Masferences, 1944, Office of the Provost Marshal General, ArcherL. Lerch, Major sachusetts,11 May 1944,WDGAP 383.6. 25.Memo,JohnBrownMason,WarProbGeneral, Farrand Collection. lems Division,"MemorandumoftheSwiss 14. Maxwell S. McKnight,49. LegationontheIntroduction oftheNazi Sa15. Powers, 46. lute in Prisonerof War Camps as the New 16. New York Times, 14 Oct. 1943, 13. German Military Salute." 11 Aug. 1944. 17. House of Representatives, InvestigaFarrand Collection. tions of the National War Effortto the 26.SidneyB. Fay, "German Prisonersof Committee on Military Affairs,12 June War," CurrentHistory,Mar. 1945,194,also 1945,Washington,8. Washington Post, 24 Apr. 1945. 18. Even this process involveda number JohnBrownMason, "German Prisonersof War in the United States," American Jour36. "Reich Prisoners Here Told of Surof mistakes,as General Bryan himselfadmitted.Anexample whichoccurredat Fort nal of International Law, Apr. 1945, 198; render," New York Times, 4 May 1945; Devens: "At this camp about 1,300anti- M.I. Gurfeinand MorrisJanowitz,"Trends "The Nation: Enough Nazis," Newsweek, Nazis were confined in one compound. in Wehrmacht Morale," The Public Opin- 21 May 1945,38. 37. War DepartmentPress Release, 20 After approximately two months, four ion Quarterly, X, 1946, 78-84. Nov. 1945;"War CaptivesinU.S. tobe Gone 27. New York Times, 18 Jan. 1945. See prisoners stated that they were Gestapo agents, and that theyhad secured all the also, "Army Probes 'Suicides' at Prison bySpring; Total ofPrisonersHere is putat informationthey desired about the anti- Camp for Germans," PM, 13 Jan. 1944; 417,034,"New York Times, 13 Sept. 1945. 38. "Camp Shanks Ends War Mission as "Nazis Beat U.S. Captive," New York Nazi prisoner-of-war camp." Ibid., 10. 19.In contrast,theBritishfollowedtheir Times, 15 Aug. 1945.On 23 February 1944, Last GermanPWs StartHome," New York interrogation program by carefully the New York German language news- Times, 23 July1946; "Last of Supermen," separatingtheGermansinto"leaders" and paper Neue Volkszeitung noted that "the Newsweek, 5 Aug. 1946. "followers."Theirsuccess is illustratedby Nazis are organizedin thecamps through- 39. A large collection of such excerpts a lengthystudyby HenryV. Dicks, Senior out America...and have even established from the Office of Censorship, with the Psychiatrist with the British Medical gestapo units." names of senders and recipients,are loCorps, which indicated that of the POWs 28.The Army'ssummaryofitsinvestiga- cated in the Farrand Collection. tested,11 percentwere fanatical Nazis, 25 tion concluded that the violence and ter40. of U.S. Congress, House percentwere near-Nazis, 15 percentwere rorismhad ended, implying,quite errone- Representatives, Investigatons of the Napassive anti-Nazis,9 percentwere actively ously,thatNazi influencein thecamps had tional War Effortto the Committee on anti-Nazi,and the large plurality,40 per- ceased as well. "Prison Camps Rid ofNazi MilitaryAffairs.12 June 1945.19. cent, were nonpolitical. The British au- Terrorism," New York Times, 16Jan. 1945. 41. Bryan (Texas) Eagle, 14 Oct. 1973. APRIL 1976 73