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Transcript
German Prisoners of War in the United States
Author(s): Arnold P. Krammer
Source: Military Affairs, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Apr., 1976), pp. 68-73
Published by: Society for Military History
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1987148 .
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http://www.jstor.org
of War in the United Stte
by Arnold P. Krammer
Texas A&M University
WH
EN the United States entered GeneralJurgen
vonArnim,
Rommel'ssuc- levels,anyoneofwhichmighthavehad a
causing
orinterpretation,
opinion
WorldWarII, theproblemofmain- cessoras Commander
Korps), different
oftheAfrika
and delay whichwouldnotbe
taining
enemyprisoners
ofwarwasamong andbetweenMayandOctober1943,an av- confusion
thelastconsiderations
ofa country
arrivedin eliminateduntilJune1945,whena final
reeling erageof20,000
prisoners
a month
providedforthe Provost
reorganization
froma Japaneseattackandfeverishly
tool- theUnitedStates.2
thefollow- MarshalGeneralto reportdirectlyto the
FromDecember1943through
ingup fora warinEurope.Yet,bytheend
GeneraloftheASF as a full
figuresdroppedto Commanding
of the war, Americafounditselfholding ingJune,themonthly
nearlya halfmillion
AxisPOWsevacuated 2,000,
theperiodfollowing
the staffadvisor.5In 1942,however,General
andalthough
frombattle areas an ocean away, had Normandy
Allies Bryan'sfirstjob was toestablishcampsto
invasionsaw theWestern
unending
thesuddenandseemingly
placed themin existingor hastilycon- takingprisoners
at therateof 100,000
per contain
enemyprisoners.
structed
campsacrossthecountry,
andhad month,the liberationof France allowed delugeofarriving
Followingtheircapture in the field,
dealt witha tangledweb of problemsin- manyofthemto be maintained
outsideof
maze
entereda confusing
volvingfeeding,
clothing,
De- enemyprisoners
securing,regis- theUnitedStates.FromJunethrough
Theywereasprocedures.
tering,interrogating,
entertaining,
and cember 1944,the numberof prisoners ofregistration
photoevenre-educating
theprisoners.
statesideaveraged30,000per signed numbers,fingerprinted,
transferred
interroBecause theUnitedStateshad notheld month,witha surgeof morethan60,000 graphed,givenmedicalattention,
givenrelargenumbers
offoreign
prisoners
inwell prisonersarrivingduringApriland May gatedformilitaryinformation,
personalproperty,
over100years,whenBritishsoldierswere 1945alone. Despitethe growingdemand ceiptsfornonessential
internedin 1812,past experiencescould froma numberofcongressional
and gov- and placedaboardavailableoceantransdifprovidelittleguidance.The remaining
al- ernmentofficialsto transfereven more porttotheUnitedStates- a normally
bya lack
processmademoredifficult
ternative
wastheGenevaAccordsof1929,
a POWstohelprelievethefarmlaborshort- ficult
G.I.s as
plethoraof conventions
which,although age in theUnitedStates,3theWarDepart- of Germanand Italian-speaking
tohamper
enemyefforts
ratified
by40 nationsby 1939,was stillan mentannouncedthatsuch shipmentsof wellas deliberate
toAmericancampswouldcease accurateregistration.6
untried
document
whoseapplication
hadto prisoners
auofAxispris- TheProvostMarshalGeneral'soffice
betestedat everystep.Thus,whenthewar onV-EDay. Thetotalnumber
oftwotypesofcamps:
thecreation
brokeout, the War Department,acting onersintheUnitedStatesat theendofMay thorized
throughthe Provost Marshal General, 1945was to be 371,683Germans,50,273 permanentcamps and branchcamps,7
by
141and 319,respectively,
numbering
the Geneva Convention
into Italians,and3,915Japanese.4
synthesized
emphasisonsecurity
1942, May1945.Thestrong
periodthrough
twofundamental
whichformed Despitetheplanning
principles
boththelocationandconstruction
to deal withso affected
thefoundaton
forall futuretreatment
of Americanunpreparedness
thatthe large a numberof foreignprisonerswas of the camps, forthe War Department
ofwar.Theywere,first,
prisoners
thatthecamp sitesbe isolated
at theonsetbythegovernment'sstipulated
was a humanitarian reflected
Geneva Convention
divi- andeasilyguarded,andawayfrom'blackdivisionofresponsibility:
documentintendedto preventindignities inefficient
150milesinfrom
charged outareas' whichextended
theWarDepartment,
against enemysoldierssimplybecause sionbetween
75miles
theyhadsuffered
themisfortune
ofhaving withguarding,feeding,and housingthe theMexicanandCanadianborder,
beentakenprisoner;andsecond(andmore prisoners,and the State Department, inlandfrombothcoasts,or nearshipyards
For thesereasons,
fortheirrepatri- or vitalwarindustires.
important),
thatthe enemynationsheld chargedwithnegotiatons
theirownshareofAmericansoldierswho ationvia neutralactions.TheWarDepart- as wellas a lackofavailablefundsfornew
itwas necessarythatpermawereto be protected
bytheUnitedStates ment,in turn,reassignedsome respon- construction,
possible,wouldbe
decenttreatment
ofenemyprison- sibilitiesto the ArmyService Forces, nentcamps,whenever
through
bases,
headedbyGen.BrehomSomervell,
which, locatedat or nearexistingmilitary
ers.
of whichwere locatedin the
theOffice
oftheProvost two-thirds
in inturn,controlled
Otherthanbasic principles,
however,
thecapacityofeach
1941,Americawas in no waypreparedfor MarshalGeneral,underMaj. Gen. Allen SouthandSouthwest;
themorethan425,000
Germanand Italian Gullion.The State Department,mean- camprangedbetween1,000and5,000men,
prisonersof war thatwouldinundatethe while,establishedan InterneesSectionin averaging2,500.BecausetheGenevaConofprisrequiredthatthestructure
countrybetweenthe springsof 1943and theOfficeofSpecial WarProblemsDivi- vention
thosefor
sion. To complicate the situationstill onercampsshouldapproximate
1945.1
theProvostMarshalGeneral'sOf- troopsat base camps of the retaining
came further,
America'ssingleyearofplanning
fortheAliensDivision, power,the standardlayoutforthe conto a close as theAlliesopenedtheirNorth ficewasresponsible
of nearly50 newcampswas as
ofwhich,in June1943, struction
Africancampaignin November1942,and thereorganization
of follows:
ledtothecreationofthePrisoner
thesubsequentdefeatofRommel'sarmy finally
oftheexsent the numbersof incomingprisoners WarDivision,underthedirection
Thecampconsistsofoneor more
soaring.The firstmassivegroupof Ger- tremely able new Assistant Provost
bytwowire
surrounded
compounds
man and Italian prisonerscapturedby MarshalGeneralBrig.Gen.BlackshearM.
fences...andcompoundsare sepawere
AmericanandBritishforcestotalledmore Bryan.Policydecisions,therefore,
ratedfromeach otherby a single
than150,000
men(including
theprizecatch, reroutedthroughseveral administrative fence.Each compoundhousesfour
68
MILITARY AFFAIRS
and
Custer,Michigan,and prepareda refer- plants,as mechanics,forharvesting
toa
ironically
and
projects,
clearance
land
ence manualon prisonerofwar adminishouse.
Once set- New Jerseykoshermeat-packing
tration(farmoresuccessful).13
andbusinessesquickly
werereadyforwork. Local communities
tled,theprisoners
spectacleofcol"familiar
to
the
adjusted
perenemy
captive
of
The forcedlabor
practice, umns of gray or denim-clad POWs
sonnelhas beena time-honored
alongintheprecise,easyrhythm
did swinging
and althoughthe GenevaConvention
it did re- achievedonlybymenfamiliarwithmarchnotpreventtheiremployment,
strictthemtocertaingeneralareas.Placed ingsincechildhood."15
Moreover,the GenevaAccordsrequired underthedirection
oftheWarManpower Despitetheapparentease withwhichthe
thatfood,sanitary,and healthservices Commission
acceptedtheirtasks,theofficial
andtheWarFoodAdministra-prisoners
werenotonlytobe adequate,butprisoners tionwithin
theissue Handbook for Work Supervisors of PristheWarDepartment,
were to receive the same treatmentas of prisoneremployment
simplydirected oner of War Labor (ArmyServiceForces
membersoftheAmericanarmedforces.9 thata prisonermustbe physicallyable, Manual,M 811,July1945)exhorted
Ameriweremain- that the workin questionmust not be can worksupervisors
To insurethatsuchconditions
to "be aloof,forthe
tained,inspectionteams were commis- dangerousor unhealthy,
and thatnowork Germansrespectfirmleadership... Allow
of the projectcouldbe directly
sionedto reporton the conditions
relatedtothewar them to rest only when necessary.
POWs to the responsibleAmericanand effort.
Pay scales wereadjustedto rank, DRIVE! (p. 15) By 5 April1945,theNew
at regularintervals.
Swissauthorities
werenotobligatedto York Times was able to reportthatofthe
officers
andalthough
heldin theUnited
POWscurrently
work,mostelectedtofillat leastsupervis- 365,437
LL camps were guarded,of course, ory positions.All enlistedpersonnelre- States,nearly200,000of themwere emsector.
whichgrewto ceived100a day,plusan additional
personnel,
J Lby military
700per ployedinjobsoutsideofthemilitary
anditwasdeemedvitalto day foranyworkabove and beyondtheir A numberof complicationsdid arise,
innumber,
47,000
nottheleastofwhichwas theire
con- requiredmaintenance
thattheprisoners'
oftheprisoncamp. however,
interests
American
wereharnessedtoa slidingscale: of Americanlabor unions.The War DetactwithAmericanpersonneland wayof Officers
quicklybecametheobjectofan
Competent lieutenants
permonth;cap- partment
received$20.00
liferesultina positiveattitude.
however,werein shortsupply tains, $30.00 per month; and majors organizedprotestafterGermanprisoners
personnel,
withor were detailedto workon the railroads.
andtheArmy through
generals,$40.00permonth,
duetotheoverseaspriorities,
railroadswere,andstillare,the
made American
labor.The strictdistinction
Service Forces oftenutilized its least without
inthenation,and
industry
thecare mostunionized
between
necessary(or qualified)personnel- re- bytheGenevaConvention
itselfat logfound
Department
the
War
for
remen
destined
or
those
and
enlisted
retired
officers,
officers
cently
of enemy
of
Brotherhood
toprovide gerheadswiththepowerful
authorities
a terminalor "dead-end"appointment. quiredtheAmerican
which,as official Germanofficers
a situation
Thisproduced
thesamequalityquarters, RailwayClerks.GeorgeHarrison,Presias thecaptive dentoftheUnion,carriedon a vociferous
ASF historianJohnMillettnoted,caused staff,andmilitary
courtesy
.. .tobe thedump- poweraccordedits ownofficers.
German campaign,at onepointdeclaringofSecreprisoncampcommands
who
officers
grade
field
.for
rank
of
ingground..
captain,forex- taryStimson:
abovethe
officers
werefoundto be unsatisfactory."l1
ample, were allowed an orderlyfrom
MyGod,doeshe notknowthatRailThe shortageof qualifiedpersonnel, amongthe prisoners;all officersto the
roading is a most delicate
bedbythecriticallackofGerman rankofmajorwereallowedindividual
complicated
operation....We carryon nightand
a rooms;majorsand above wereprovided
and Italian-speakingadministrators,
dayinsplitsecondschedules.I have
enlistedper- withseparatelivingrooms;and generals
byAmerican
generalhostility
notbeenabletogeta reasonforturnsonnel towardsthe prisoners,and the weregivenindividualhuts.The WarDeing loose Nazi soldiers,skilledin
demolitionpractices,so thatthey
werebeing partment
sysover-allbeliefthattheirefforts
evencreatedan accounting
mayrunamuckontherailroads.16
werealandprisoners
wastedstatesidewhile"the action"was temforthethrifty,
theirsavingsat theend
takingplaceoverseas,ledtoa moraleprob- lowedtowithdraw
waryof
The RooseveltAdministration,
tothepublic oftheircaptivity.
brought
lemwhichwasfinally
laborunrest,decidedagainstdeattentionin late 1944by the respected Paid laborexistedintwobasicforms:at further
segto heavilyunionized
JamesH. PowersoftheBostonGlobe. His Americaninstallationsand relatedsta- tailingprisoners
and contracts
front,
a tions,and as labor contracted
involved
to private mentsoftheworking
thatthesituation
sharpcriticism
considered.
morecarefully
Pris- werethereafter
testof nationalwill forwhichAmerican business.Maj. MaxwellS. McKnight,
was thatthe
personnelwere "less thanproficient,"" onerofWarDivision,assuredtheanxious The netresultin retrospect,
astonishinglybroughtagreementfrom Americanpublicthatsuchworkinvolved Germanprisonerswere generallyemlittleor notechniandthat"every ployedinjobs requiring
BernardGuflerof the State Department nodangertothewareffort,
whostated effort
at work cal skill,a grosswasteofvaluable,cheap,
is madetoemployprisoners
SpecialWarProblemsDivision,
seemstohavebeen in connection
withmilitaryreservations and legallabor.
that,indeed,"noeffort
arosewiththefallof
A seconddifficulty
and
made to traineitherthe officersor the because it is the mostsatisfactory
shifttothe
specialized economical means of utilizing their fascistItalyanditssubsequent
fortheirhighly
guardpersonnel
work,"and thattheprisonersoftenwere labor... [and] prisonersare used to dis- Alliedside.In ordertoremedytheembarthe thenAllied
exposedto themostcomicand least effi- place American troops whenever rassmentof imprisoning
there possible."114
cientsideoftheircaptors. Although
notemployed troops,the United States declared all
Thoseprisoners
is noaccuratemeasureoftheseciticisms, at militarypostswere contractedout to Italian POWs,53,607in number,as "cowhichstipulated
a definition
the privatebusiness,farms,and smallindus- belligerents,"
and,inparticular,
theWarDepartment
theItaliancaptivescouldnot
launched tries.Prompted
ProvostMarshalGeneral'sOffice
bythespectreofdomestic thatalthough
forASF laborshortagesin late 1943,Secretaryof be released,at thesame timetheUnited
seriesofconferences
animmediate
custodialcare withservice commandsin 1943and 1944(of WarStimsonarrangedforlocalindustries Statescouldcontinue
oftheGenevaConvenmili- outtherestrictions
questionablevalue), createdthree-week toapplyforPOWworkdetailsthrough
wouldbe
Italianprisoners
trainingprogramsbeginningin October tarychannels,and laborbattalionswere tion.Henceforth,
proTexas,andFort farmedout to brickplants,drycleaning utilizedforjobswhichwereotherwise
at FortSamHouston,
1944,
or approxicompaniesofprisoners,
conmately1,000men.Thefacilities
a mess
sistoffivebarracks,a latrine,
building
hall,andan administration
each
foreach company.In addition,
companyis providedwitha recreaa workan infirmary,
tionbuilding,
shop,a canteenbuilding...a chapel,
and a stationhospital.8
A
12
APRIL 1976
69
at largewasobligatedtoappointrepresen- Seavey'sproposedinvestigaton
ofthesitutativesto deal withcamp administratorsation,theWarDepartment,
inresponse
toa
and inspection
teamson its behalf,an op- Germanmemorandum
via Switzerland,
portunity
seizedmostoften
bythemoreag- reintroduced
theNazisaluteas anaccepted
gressiveNazis.Insteadofinterfering
with greetingwithinPOW camps. The War
the workprogram,the Nazi-dominated ProblemsDivisionmemorandum
tocamp
camps,infact,wereusuallymodelsofeffi- commanders
explainedthat
ciency.TheNazisrealizedthatan orderly
The labor of prisonersof war to
Thenewsalutehas,ofcourse,disand well-runcamp wouldgive themthe
date on militaryestablishments
is
tinctNazi implications
butso have
continuedbackingof the Americanauvaluedat above$80,000,000.
In addiuniforms
the
Swastika
on
German
thorities,
and,
the
real
therefore,
control
tion,contractors
have paid intothe
whichtheprisoners
and decorations
over
the
As
a
camp.
were
result,
they
given
UnitedStatesTreasury$22,000,000
in
ofwarare allowedtodisplay....
an almostfreehand,andwithout
an effeccold cash. This moneyhas been
Wemightbe able togainsomeadtive intelligencesystemand adequate
depositedin the miscellaneousrecanendeavorto
vantages:personnel
ceiptsfundintheTreasury.Ineffect,
keep carefultrackof theprisoners
guidelines,the War Departmentmoved
thisrepresents
a deduction
fromthe
aboutthe
whoseemtobeenthusiastic
slowlytocountertheirinfluence.20
costofmaintaining
andguarding
the
Nazi salute...a countofNazi noses
The
success
obtained
by
the
Nazis
within
prisoners
ofwar.17
couldthusbecomepossible....
thecampsoften
createda totalitarian
enviTheNazisaluteshouldnotbemade
in
ronment
the
prisoner
system,
a
conclufunoforcommented
onbyAmerican
Oncetheprocessofcamplifeandthedivibya HarvardUniversity guardpersonnel
within
ofthe
hearing
sion of labor had been settled,attention sionsubstantiated
prisonersof war. The best way of
turnedto the political and ideological study,headedbyProf.WarrenA. Seavey,
it wouldseemto be theold
treating
whichwarnedthat"UnitedStatespolicyin
framework
within
thecamp.
fashionedAmerican poker-faced
prisoner's camps was only servingto
method.In thecourseoftimemany
strengthen
Nazismamongthecaptives.'"21
prisonerswill tendto get tiredof
RTICLE 4 of the Geneva Conven- Similarsentiments
wereechoed,interest- it ....25
tionsolemnlydeclaredthat "differ- ingly,by an anti-Naziprisonerin Camp
encesintreatment
is law- Campbell,Kentucky,
amongprisoners
in a November1944 The finalcomplicationregardingthe
fulonlywhenit is based on themilitary memototheExecutiveOfficer
ofthecamp. politicalleadershipwithin
thecamps,and
rank,stateofphysicalor mentalhealth," "I takethisunusualstepofwriting
thislet- perhapsthemostsignificant,
concernsthe
therebymakingno distinctionbetween ter,as itwas impossible
tosee you,"wrote factthatthefirstlargebodyofprisoners
to
ideologically
hardenedprisoners
andthose one Pvt. FriedrichSchiltz,8WG-25509.
"I arrive in the UnitedStates,and consewhoare "re-educated."Although
neither am toldthatyoudon'tlikeanti-Nazis,
butI quently,those aroundwhomthe camp
theSovietUnionnorGreatBritaintookthe appealtoyourfairness..
He wentonto structureswere designedand those to
Geneva Conventionseriouslyenoughto say:
whomall laterarrivalswouldbe forcedto
handicaptheirownprograms,theUnited
werethemostthoroughly
indoctrisubmit,
I
acknowledge
that
a
snappy
beStatesappliedits provisions
wholesaleto
natedNazis."Thefirst
North
captivesfrom
haviorlooksnice,machine-like.
You
all situations.The central probleminSidAfrica,"wrotetheHarvardhistorian,
feelit is likea goodrunning
motor,
volvedtheAmerican
failuretotakeadvansmoothanddependable.Butitis all
neyFay,
facade... .Those who are your
foltageofthecriticalperiodimmediately
enemiesare respected.Those who
lowingthe prisoners'capture.The first
ofany
werea toughlot- thetoughest
had to fightagainst you as theyhad
- partly
severalweeksare critical,because miligroupofGermanprisoners
nootherchoice,andwhoflocktoyou
becausetheyhadwageda remarkaand
taryprisonersare dazed, disrupted,
forprotection,
whoworkforyourvicheroic though unsuccessful
bly
It is at
displaya universalvulnerability.
tory,whichmeans theirvictory,
campaign... while the quality of
thismoment
thattheprisonermustbe intheseare contempted.
Why?22
Germanprisonerstaken later in
terrogated,
segregated
bypoliticalpersuamiddleFrance is verydifferent,
To these,and a numberofothercharges
sion,processed,andassignedtoa campNazi ....26
agedandnotsofanatically
yet it was precisely at this pointthat thatthe UnitedStates was encouraging
American
concern
withtheprisoner's
men- Nazism rather than eliminatingit,23 TheseelitemembersoftheAfrikaKorps,
andadmiredbytheirfeltalandpoliticalcondition
disciplined
ceased.Onlythe Secretary
ofWarHenryL. Stimsonadmit- rigidly
low prisoners
and Americanguardsalike
mostbasic divisionofcaptivestookplace. tedthat
as the cream of the German military
wereseparatedfrom
First,Navyprisoners
Occasionally,
groupsofNazi prisonmachine,
doggedly
maintained
theirbelief,
Armyprisoners,and thenofficerswere
ershaveattempted
their
todominate
to thelastdaysofthewar,thatGermany
segregatedfromenlistedmen.The most
fellowprisoners,but..,there has
wouldemergevictorious.
Although
thereis
visiblyrabidNazis,4,500by 1945,wereinbeensubstantialsuccess in curtailsufficient
evidence
to
indicate
that
such
ternedat Alva,Oklahoma,and the most
ingtheactivitiesofsuchminorities
prisonerattitudeswereby no meansunivisibly dedicated anti-Nazis, 3,300 in
andinpreventing
coercionofprisonversal,thepoliticalatmosphere
within
the
ers by Nazi extremists...
.The War
number,were shippedto Fort Devens,
is cognizant
Department
oftheprobcampswouldmakelaterplansto"democMassachusetts, and Camp Campbell,
inour
lemscreatedbyNazielements
ratize"theprisoners
thatmuchmoredifa massiveprogram
Kentucky.'8
Although
is
and
effort
camps,
every
being
ficult.
The
authorities
werenotoblivious
to
was later initiatedto "democratize"the
made... .I therefore
feelthatthereis
the degree of Nazi activityflourishing
thebestopportunity
tosegregate
prisoners,
no necessity for an investigawithinthecamps,ofcourse,yetlittlerethevariousshadesofpoliticalideology
had
tion....24
coursewas takenunlessa captivevolunreinforcement
was
passed,andtotalitarian
tobe placedina speSecretary
Stimson's
optimism
aside,there teeredandpetitioned
allowedtotakeplace.'9
As aninitialresult,theinfluence
overthe is no doubtthatNazi elementscontrolled cial purgedcamp -admission to which
slowanddangerously
pubaffairs
ofmanyprisoner
ofwar wasexceedingly
Germanprisonerswas wieldedin large theinternal
partbyhard-core
Nazis.According
toArti- camps,and it appearsironicthatexactly lic.
Oneoftheresultsofthislackofcommon
cle 43oftheGenevaConvention,
thecamp fourmonthsafterStimson'srejectionof
hibited
toGermanandJapaneseprisoners.
BetweenJune 1943and 31 March 1944,
POWsputin10,300,321
man-days
ofwork,
of
which12,298,165
man-dayswereinprivate
business.In June1945,BrigadierGeneral
Bryanwas able to announceto theHouse
Committee
ofMilitary
Affairs
that:
A
70
MILITARY AFFAIRS
senseindealingwithGermanPOWswas a dentofsabotagebyan escapedprisoneris tionsoffailure,morethan23,142"whites"
reignof violencewhichlasted approxi- onrecord,GeneralBryanwas calledtoac- weregraduatedto returnto Germanyas
leadersundertheAlliedoccupa1943 countfortheArmy'spoliciesof"laxity,in- potential
fromSeptember
matelyeightmonths,
in Germany
of experience,and lack of safeguards."30 tion,to initiate"government
bytheratherlargesegment
toApril1944,
thatperiod,6 mur- Perhapstheonlybeneficial
fanaticalNazis.Within
effect
produced thatwe can trust,whichmeans thatwe
ders, 2 forcedsuicides,43 "voluntary" by these chaotic events was the War musthave peopleheadingit thatwe can
suicides,a generalcampriot,andhundreds Department's
decisionto in- trust.33
long-belated
theprojectto "democoflocalizedacts ofviolenceoccurredin a itiateeducationand recreationprograms In summarizing
ratize" Germanprisoners,Col. Alpheus
inves- fortheprisoners.
ofcamps.In everyinstance,
number
officer
oftheprogram
commanding
tigationby ArmyauthoritiespointeddiSecretaryStimsonobjected to these Smith,
statedthat
Nazis, plansonthegrounds
ofhard-core
rectlyto theinfluence
thata newaggressive at FortEustis,Virginia,
thatsaw thepris- educationalprogramwoulddivertmana pattern
whichfollowed
oners"accusedbytheircomradesofanti- powerfromthewareffort,
createhostility Maybethisisdoingsomegood.Itcertainlyisn't doingany harmand it
Nazi activities,sentencedby kangaroo amongthe prisoners,and perhapseven
isn't costing the taxpayers a
courts,and hanged,beaten,or coercedto jeopardizethe safetyof any participant nickel.... Twenty-five
years from
In many uponhis repatriaton.
death by Gestapo methods."27
Buttheable headof
we
nowmaybewe'll knowwhether
cases, thesuspectscouldonlybe thrown theSpecialProjectsDivision,Lt. Col. Edhavefailedor succeeded....
but ward Davison, overcame Secretary
intothecampstockadeforpunishment;
studyhas ever
nopost-war
evidenceexisted, Stimson'sobjectionsand finallyreceived Unfortunately,
in cases wherestronger
tomeasurethatsuccessor
theywere shippedto a special camp for permission
to inauguratetheprogramin beenconducted
failure.
"hardcases" at Alva,Oklahoma.In cases totalsecrecy.
of
or the
wheretheevidencewas conclusive,
withthereelection Asthewardrewtoa close,thequestion
cautiously
Beginning
becamea centralissue.Long
brutal,thePOWswere ofprisoner
crimesparticularly
bysecretballot repatriation
representatives
court-martialedand sent to a federal as an experiment
indemocracy,
theeduca- beforethe end of the war, prisonerexThe Americanauthorities tionalexperiment
penitentiary.28
was launchedwiththe changeshad takenplace in compliance
pointedout, however,that the ratio of distribution
ofbooksbannedbyHitler(and withArticles68and69oftheGenevaConwhichrequiresthesickand serihomicideandsuicideamongtheprisoners thebanningof booksby Germanauthors vention,
as soonas
tobe repatriated
ofwarwasstilllowerthanamonganygiven deemed"undemocratic"),
followed
bythe ouslywounded
allowthemto be moved.
segmentof the Americanpopulationat distribution
tobe rep- theirconditions
ofbooksdetermined
inEuropeapwhich,of course, resentative
large,a rationalization
spirit,
likeAbe Yet,as theendofhostilities
oftheAmerican
beggedthequestionofbasic POWcontrol. Lincolnin Illinois and The Life of Alexan- proached,the UnitedStates founditself
der Graham Bell. Attendance
at all lec- tornbetweentwo opposingarguments:
of
repatriation
related issue to camp violenceand tureswas optional,withtheexceptionof thosewhourgedimmediate
POW control,and one whichcaused mandatory
attendance
at Germanatrocity prisonersand thosewhourgedthatthe
somepublicconcern,was thatofprisoner films,the "WhyWe Fight" series, and prisonersbe retainedin the countryfor
escapes.From21April1942,whenthefirst otherWarDepartment
andOWIfilms.De- labor.Aneditorialin theWashingtonPost
thearguments
warningthat
prisonersarrivedin theUnitedStates,to spitethemanyhighhopesthatthecamps summarized
homeat the
theendofthewarthreeyearslaterthere wouldbecomeclassroomsofdemocracy,31 "tosendtheGermanprisoners
or soonthereafter
werea totalof 1,583escapes. The estab- attendanceby the prisonerswas admit- cessationofhostilities
- a skepticism
lishmentofthecamp workprogramsin- tedlylightandskeptical
not seems highlyimpracticable and even
se- entirely
volvedthecalculatedriskofminimum
alone."It dangerous... [yet]...the draftingof pristotheprisoners
confined
curityin an effortto free the greatest is notourbusinessto changethesemen's onersforforcedlaborwouldbe a violation
numberof Armypersonnelforcombat habitsorbeliefsortore-educate
them,"an of the spirit and letter of the Geneva
Therewere additionalaroverseas,and a small numberofescapes Americanofficer
"this Convention."35
candidlyadmitted,
fromotherquarters.Somegroups
guments
was consideredacceptable.The average companysimplyhas a job todo."32
monthly
escaperatefromJune1944toAu- It finallybecameobviousto Armyau- lobbiedfortheuse of prisonersas cheap
their
labordemanded
was over100,oran av- thoritiesthata carefulscreeningwould labor;andorganized
gust1945,however,
erageof3 to4 escapesperday.Thelargest havetobe initiated
ifcoercionbythehard- immediate repatriationfor the same
reachedbyall
massescapeoccurred enedNazisupontheirless ideological
andmostpublicized
com- reason.Theonlyagreement
on Christmas
Eve, 1944,when25 German radesweretobe overcome,
andMaj. Gen. parties was summarizedby one Army
tunnel Archer
POWs escaped througha 250-foot
L. Lerch,ProvostMarshalGeneral, spokesmanwhostatedthatregardlessof
fromtheircampat PapagoPark,Arizona. beganthelong-overdue
processoftesting the date of their repatriation,"while
we'llworkthehell
within and interrogation.
Although
everymanwasrecaptured
The firstcategory,13 they'rein thiscountry
threeweeks,thecryraisedbythepublic percentof theprisoners,
containedhard- outofthem."36
a Congressional
hearingbythe ened Nazis and sympathizers,labelled
prompted
The finaldecisioncame fromtheWar
onMilitary
Fannedby "blacks,"whoweresimplyignoredas inCommittee
Affairs.
that
inJune1945,announcing
alarmistnewspaperreports,and a con- corrigibles; 74 percent,in the second Department
according
wouldbe repatriated
tinued cry by FBI Director J. Edgar category,
werelabelled"gray,"thosewho prisoners
Hooverthat"an escapedprisonerofwar, had simplyfollowedalong- theones at to certainpriorities:sick and wounded
ofdestruc- whom the educational program was first,cooperativeprisonerssecond,and
trainedas heis inthetechnique
tion,is a dangerto ourinternalsecurity, aimed; and finallythe "whites,"in the hostileelementslast, dependingon the
andcivilianlaborto
ofshipping
andthelivesandsafety thirdcategory,notless than13 percent, availability
ourwarproduction,
nationalattentionfo- whoserecordsindicatedthattheyhadpre- replacePOWlaborintheUnitedStates.In
of our citizens,"29
France,Britothisdecision,
cused on thePOW situation.Despitethe viouslyopposedtheNaziregime.Itwasnot sharpcontrast
bythedesperescaped untilV-EDaythattheeducational
ofprisoners
factthatthemajority
program tain,andRussia,motivated
thanboredom, was publiclydisclosed,and theprogram ateneedforrawlaborandnosmallamount
forreasonsnomoresinister
thatnearlyeveryescapeewas roundedup continued
oftheirrepa- of revengeagainstNazi Germany,conuntilthebeginning
within
twoweeks,andthatnota singleinci- triation
inApril1946.Despitea fewdescrip- tinuedtoholdmorethanfivemillionGer-
A
APRI L 1976
71
manprisoners
fornearlythreeyearsafter and education, which slowed rather hundredcamps throughout
the country,
V-E Day - and theSovietUnionhas as- streamlined
diofmilitary
personnel
theexperience.Perhapsthe witha minimum
tonishingly
ignored,to date, all interna- chieferrorwas theWarDepartment's
The prisoners
fail- vertedfromthewar effort.
tionalappeals to release theuntoldnum- uretoisolateincorrigible
Nazisfromother werekepthealthyandoccupied,thelatter
bersofsurvivors.
theUnited
oflocalbusinesses,
prisoners,
andwhilea number
ofprograms tothebenefit
inJuly1945, werelaterinitiated
Repatriation
beganofficially
tocorrect
thissituation, StatesTreasury,and theprisonersthemin "re-education"
andalthough
only70,000
hadbeenreturned thefactremainsthattheUnitedStatesdid selves.Thoseinterested
the
anit-Nazi
envi- (thosewhocouldsuccessfully
side-step
by November 1945,Secretary of War littletoproduceaneffective
of theirpoliticalcomrades)
Robert P. Patterson announcedon 20 ronment.Regardingthe camps them- intimidation
Novemberthatthe remainingprisoners selves,conditions
variedso widelyfrom were able to benefitfromthe available
the
"will be entirelyout of privatecontract camptocampthatitwouldbeimpossible
to programs.Perhapsmostimportantly,
bytheendof arriveat an accurateconclusion
work,including
agriculture,
aboutthe government'sstrict adherance to the
aneffective
constituted
from dailywelfareoftheaveragePOW.Still,the GenevaConvention
February,and will be withdrawn
military
workbytheendofMarch,1946," OfficeofCensorship
madea concerted
ef- propaganda device, insuringsimilar
in GerforAmericanprisoners
forultimate
Atthe forttogaugethesentiment
and moraleof treatment
repatriation
by1April.37
as pointed
outina report
byexamining
POWmail,with many;inaddition,
same time,an agreementwas concluded theprisoners
Affairs
withFrance in December,wherebythe the expectedvariationin results.They to CongressbytheHouseMilitary
thePOWpolicywas "a great
suchas onewrit- Committee,
UnitedStateswouldsendadditionalpris- rangedfromcomplaints,
factorin breakingdownthe morale of
a month,
andre- tenfromCampTrinidad,Colorado,
onersat therateof50,000
Germantroopsand makingthemwilling,
patriationcontinueduntilby June1946,
...Theytransported
us likethelow.Had thisnot
even eager to surrender...
GermanPOWsremainedinthe
only32,000
estcriminals
aboutwhichtheyseem
beentrue,victory
wouldhavebeenslower
UnitedStates.The finalboatloadofsome
to have plentyofexperiencein this
and harderand a fargreaternumberof
1,500 German prisoners from Camp
country....They fear us "Bad
Americans
killed."40
Shanks,NewJersey,sailedforEuropeon
Nazis" so much,butthisfearonly
22 July 1946, "waving an indifferent fillsus withpride...conditions
here
Although
thepracticalexperience
gained
are indescribable and primitive
ofCamp
farewell,"
leavingthecommander
duringtheprisoner
ofwarprogram
wasof
in
...
four
of
us
a
no
tables
or
room;
Shanks,Col. HarryW. Maas, to echo the
littlepracticalvalue in thedifferent
circhairs...
feelingof the countryat large, sighing,
cumstancesposedbytheKoreanand Viet
Andwiththe
"thankGod,thatis over."38
theWorldWarII POWexofpraisefromprisoners
in Namconflicts,
exception
ofonly188Germans,25Italians, to expressions
perience,in summary,was not onlya
Camp
Tennessee:
Crossville,
leftin theUnited
and 1 Japaneseprisoner
reasonablysuccessfulexperiment
in miliStates,it was,indeed,over.
...the foodis excellent; this is a
tarymanagement,
butalsoa reaffirmation
marvelous
andhealthful
climate....I
ofthevalueandtheflexibility
oftheGeneva
am taking courses toward my
Accords,and perhaps,mostimportantly,
Meisterzeugnis (Certificate of
servedtoprovide
partofthefoundation
HAT, then, is the final assessfora
Maturity)...conditions
are much
healthier
reconstruction
of Americanmentof theAmericanPOW experibetterthanI expected...1am even
Germanrelations
inthepost-war
ence? Thereis no questionthatthegovworld.In
takingpianolessons....39
of
the words of a formerGerman POW
fortheproblem
wasunprepared
ernment
ofenemy Onthepositiveside,theAmericanPOW Wilhelm
Sauerbrei,
whoreturned
ofthousands
tolivein
caringforhundreds
can justifiably
prisoners. This unpreparedness was experience
boastofitsabil- Texas afterthe war, "if thereis ever
di- ity to overcomethe manyobstacles in anotherwar,geton theside thatAmerica
quicklycomplicated
bya governmental
fortheprisoners' transporting
the enemyprisonersto the ain't,thengetcapturedbytheAmericans
visionof responsibility
camps, maintenance,labor, censorship, UnitedStatesandtothecreationofseveral - you'llhaveit made.'"4'
W
REFERENCES
ArnoldP. Krammeris Associate Professor of Historyat Texas A&M University,
College Station, TX. He is author of The
Forgotten Friendship: Israel and the
Soviet Bloc, 1947-1953,published by the
Universityof Illinois Press. This article
was accepted forpublicationin July1975.
tedStates DuringWorldWarII," Ball State Prisoner of War Utilization by the United
University,1970; and the excellent article States Army: 1776-1945 (Washington: Deby Jake W. Spidle, Jr.,"Axis Prisonersof partmentof the Army,June 1955), PamA Bib- phletNo. 20-213,90-91.
War in the UnitedStates, 1942-1946:
liographical Essay," Military Affairs,Apr.
1975,61-66
2. Frank L. Kluckhorn,"Tunisian Resistance Ends inRoutofGermans," New York
1. There is astonishinglylittle written Times, 13 May 1943,11 July1944;Beverly
about theprisonerofwar experiencein the Smith, "The Afrika Korps Comes to
UnitedStates duringWorldWar II, though America," American Magazine, Aug. 1943.
3. "Seek German prisonersto Replace
a large amount of raw material may be
foundin the Records Group389ofthe Mod- Farm Labor," New York Times, 13 Febern Military Records Division, and Re- ruary 1945.
4. United States Provost Marshal
cordsGroup 211 of the War Manpower
Committee in the National Archives in General's Bureau, Prisoner of War OperaWashington,and the Colonel StephenFar- tions Division, mimeographed summary.
rand Collectionat the Hoover Institution, Col. StephenM. Farrand Collection.For a
breakdown of incoming
Stanford,California.The two best availa- month-by-month
ble academic studies are Edward Pluth's prisoners, see Prisoner of War Circulars,
highlyauthoritativedoctoral dissertaton, ASF WD MonthlyProgress Report,series
"The Administration and Operation of 1943, 1945, covered by TH-19-500. Also
GermanPrisonerofWar Camps in theUni- George Lewis and JohnMewha, Historyof
72
5.John D. Millett, The Army Service
Forces: The Organization and Role of the
Army Service Forces, The United States
Army in World War II (Washington: Office
of the Chief of MilitaryHistory,Departmentof Army,1954),348-354.
6."Enemy PrisonersofWar," TM 19-500,
Chapt. 2, 2; Yvonne E. Humphrey,"On
Shipboard With German Prisoners,"
American Journal of Nursing, XLVII, Sept.
1943,821-822.
7. The shortageof adequate housingfor
branchcamps led totheuse ofgovernment
CCC camps, armories, and state fairgrounds.See ArthurM. Kruse, "Custodyof
PrisonersofWarin theUnitedStates," The
Military Engineer, XXXVIII, Feb. 1946,72.
8. Maxwell S. McKnight,"Employment
of Prisonersof War in the UnitedStates,"
MILITARY AFFAIRS
International Labor Review, July 1944,49.
9. See memo,Major General,H.Q. Third
Service Command,ArmyService Forces,
Baltimore,19Sept. 1944:"Your obligations
forfurnishingthe necessities to prisoners
are just as strongas forAmericanpersonnel." Farrand Collection.
10. Millett,371.
11. James H. Powers, "What to do with
German Prisoners," Atlantic Monthly,Nov.
1944,46.Accordingtothe New YorkHerald
Tribune,13 Apr. 1944,"Only one officerat
Camp Breckenridge speaks German... a
situation duplicated at 194 other POW
camps."
12. Bernard Gufler, "Indoctrinationof
German Prisonersof War," Reorientation
File, ProvostMarshal General Operations.
13. See, for example, an excellent
mimeographed manual, covering every
aspect ofPOW life,includingregulationson
labor, morale, constructionof guard towers, machine-gun mountingprocedures,
sample formsofall varieties,and wordsof
advice fromprisonercamps throughout
the
thoritiesimmediatelyisolated the 36 percent Nazi-related prisoners and enjoyed
excellent success in curtailingNazi influence and propaganda withinthe camps.
Henry V. Dicks, "Personality Traits and
National Socialist Ideology," Human
Relations, June 1950, 120.
20. The Farrand Collection contains
manyU.S. ArmySignal Corpsphotographs
of the barracks at POW Camp Forrest,
Tennessee, a number of which inadvertentlyshow framedphotosof AdolfHitler
above several prisoners'bunks.
21. New York Times, 30 Nov. 1944.
22. P. W. Friedrich W. Schultz to Major
Mins, Executive OfficerCamp Campbell,
Kentucky,29Nov. 1944.FerrandCollection.
23. See, for example, William Shirer's
scathingarticle in the WashingtonPost, 20
Aug. 1944;"Nazi Prisonersare Nazis Still,"
New York Times Magazine, 21 Nov. 1943;
29. J. Edgar Hoover, "Enemies
at
Large" American Magazine, Apr. 1944,97.
Also "Eight Nazis Escape in Michigan,"
New YorkTimes,10July1944;"Says Nazis
Run Wild in Arizona Streets," New York
Times, 13 Feb. 1945.
30. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Congressional Record: Appendix,
79thCongress,1stSess., 22Feb. 1945,A786;
"Laxity Led to Escape of German Prisoners," New York Times, 8 Apr. 1945.
31. Curt Bondy, "Observation and Reeducation of German POWs," Harvard
Educational
Review,
Jan. 1946, 12-17;
"DemocratizingGermans," Science News
Letter,9 Nov. 1946,293; "Re-educatingthe
Nazis," America,26 Aug. 1944,515.
32. Powers, 49.
33. Quentin Reynolds, "Experiment in
Democracy," Colliers,25 May 1946,12. In
addition to the reeducation program,the
POWs were allowed, throughan arrangement between the War Department,the
German Red Cross, and The Reich MinistryforScience, Instructionand Educaton,
to pursuetheirformaleducationsby proxy
at any ofa longlistofGermanpolytechnic,
mining,textile,and business universities.
A small number of POWs were also enrolled in extension courses throughthe
of California,Berkeley;the UniUniversity
versity of Minnesota; the Universityof
Chicago; and the UniversityofWisconsin.
34. Reynolds,13.
35. "Prisoner Problems," editorial,
ReinholdPabel, "It's Easy to BluffAmericans," Colliers, 16 May 1953.
24. LetterfromSecretaryof War Henry
L. Stimsonto Prof.WarrenA. Seavey, Harcountry, in Prisoner of War Regional Convard Law School, Cambridge, Masferences, 1944, Office of the Provost
Marshal General, ArcherL. Lerch, Major sachusetts,11 May 1944,WDGAP 383.6.
25.Memo,JohnBrownMason,WarProbGeneral, Farrand Collection.
lems
Division,"MemorandumoftheSwiss
14. Maxwell S. McKnight,49.
LegationontheIntroduction
oftheNazi Sa15. Powers, 46.
lute in Prisonerof War Camps as the New
16. New York Times, 14 Oct. 1943, 13.
German Military Salute." 11 Aug. 1944.
17. House of Representatives, InvestigaFarrand
Collection.
tions of the National War Effortto the
26.SidneyB. Fay, "German Prisonersof
Committee on Military Affairs,12 June
War," CurrentHistory,Mar. 1945,194,also
1945,Washington,8.
Washington Post, 24 Apr. 1945.
18. Even this process involveda number JohnBrownMason, "German Prisonersof
War
in
the
United
States,"
American
Jour36. "Reich Prisoners Here Told of Surof mistakes,as General Bryan himselfadmitted.Anexample whichoccurredat Fort nal of International Law, Apr. 1945, 198; render," New York Times, 4 May 1945;
Devens: "At this camp about 1,300anti- M.I. Gurfeinand MorrisJanowitz,"Trends "The Nation: Enough Nazis," Newsweek,
Nazis were confined in one compound. in Wehrmacht Morale," The Public Opin- 21 May 1945,38.
37. War DepartmentPress Release, 20
After approximately two months, four ion Quarterly, X, 1946, 78-84.
Nov. 1945;"War CaptivesinU.S. tobe Gone
27. New York Times, 18 Jan. 1945. See
prisoners stated that they were Gestapo
agents, and that theyhad secured all the also, "Army Probes 'Suicides' at Prison bySpring; Total ofPrisonersHere is putat
informationthey desired about the anti- Camp for Germans," PM, 13 Jan. 1944; 417,034,"New York Times, 13 Sept. 1945.
38. "Camp Shanks Ends War Mission as
"Nazis Beat U.S. Captive," New York
Nazi prisoner-of-war
camp." Ibid., 10.
19.In contrast,theBritishfollowedtheir Times, 15 Aug. 1945.On 23 February 1944, Last GermanPWs StartHome," New York
interrogation program by carefully the New York German language news- Times, 23 July1946; "Last of Supermen,"
separatingtheGermansinto"leaders" and paper Neue Volkszeitung noted that "the Newsweek, 5 Aug. 1946.
"followers."Theirsuccess is illustratedby Nazis are organizedin thecamps through- 39. A large collection of such excerpts
a lengthystudyby HenryV. Dicks, Senior out America...and have even established from the Office of Censorship, with the
Psychiatrist with the British Medical gestapo units."
names of senders and recipients,are loCorps, which indicated that of the POWs
28.The Army'ssummaryofitsinvestiga- cated in the Farrand Collection.
tested,11 percentwere fanatical Nazis, 25 tion concluded that the violence and ter40.
of
U.S.
Congress,
House
percentwere near-Nazis, 15 percentwere rorismhad ended, implying,quite errone- Representatives, Investigatons of the Napassive anti-Nazis,9 percentwere actively ously,thatNazi influencein thecamps had tional War Effortto the Committee on
anti-Nazi,and the large plurality,40 per- ceased as well. "Prison Camps Rid ofNazi MilitaryAffairs.12 June 1945.19.
cent, were nonpolitical. The British au- Terrorism," New York Times, 16Jan. 1945.
41. Bryan (Texas) Eagle, 14 Oct. 1973.
APRIL
1976
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