Download Hume: Of the Original Contract David Hume (1711

Hume: Of the Original Contract
David Hume
(1711-1776)
 Scottish philosopher; possibly the most
philosopher
to write in English.
important
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p
p
g
 Like Locke, an empiricist, but of a
much more radical (or consistent) sort.
Cf. Humean skepticism (e.g., about the
existence of God; the self; causation)
Portrait by Allan Ramsay (1766)
 Instrumentalism: An action is just if it serves an agents
goals or desires. Reason can show us how to realize
those goals and desires, but it cannot tell us which goals
and desires are choiceworthy…
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Hume: Philosophical Background
“Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the
p
passions,
, and can never pretend
p
to any
y other office than
to serve and obey them.” (Treatise of Human Nature, II, iii, 1740)
 Reason has no fundamental role in morally judging
behaviour; so, pace Locke, immoral actions are not
immoral in virtue of being ‘against reason’.
In fact,
fact says Hume,
Hume morality is ultimately founded on
sentiment – our desires and preferences for ourselves
and others with whom we happen to sympathize.
Of the Original Contract (1748)
 Parties (i.e., factions)—and perhaps, by extension, social
institutions and social movements generally—need a
justificatory
f
story, “a
“ philosophical or speculative system
of principles” (40)
 Parliamentary factions in Hume’s day:
Tories: The authority of government derives ultimately
from the Deity; so it would be sacrilege to disobey even a
t
tyrannical
i l governmentt
Whigs: The authority of government derives ultimately
from the consent of the people; the people retain the
power to remove a government that aggrieves them
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Hume:
Both of these principles are “just” (though
not for the reasons their proponents offer)
Moreover, both principles can lead to prudent (i.e.,
desirable for practical purposes) consequences, but not if
taken to the speculative extremes that their proponents
urge…
Against the Divine Right View
“That the Deity is the ultimate author of all government,
will never be denied by any, who admit of a general
providence ” (40)
providence…
Everywhere, in practically all cultures, we find
governments. But in no case does the Deity create
authority “by any particular or miraculous interposition.”
Moreover:
The same Divine Superintendent who
who, for wise purposes
purposes,
“The
invested a Titus or a Trajan with authority, did also, for
purposes no doubt equally wise, though unknown, bestow
power on a Borgia or an Angria.” (40)
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 So no particular sovereign can claim to be acting as the
y viceregent,
g , except
p in the veryy general
g
sense that
Deity’s
God “holds all things together" (Col. 1.17)
 Which is to say, appeals to divine right don’t actually
explain or justify the power of the state – any power,
whether or good or evil, can appeal to the same principle
Against the Contractarian View
 Since all human beings are more or less equal in strength,
intelligence, etc. (?), “nothing but their consent could, at
first, bring them together, and subject them to any
authority” (40)
In that respect, authority must indeed have arisen
originally out of agreement
 A Just-So Story: Once upon a time, the local chieftain may
have “ruled
ruled more by persuasion than command,”
command,
appealing to people’s utility in each case. Gradually, this
exercise of authority became habitual.
But civil government, properly so called, arises only once
authority has become fully habitual and rulers can use
force to bring people into line.
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The Empiricist’s Revenge
 But while civil government may have originated from
consent, this does not show that political authority
continues to be founded
f
on consent in the present.
 If we “look abroad into the world,” we find nothing that
corresponds to the idea of consent. Instead, we mainly
find claims to authority based on:
–
–
–
–
Conquest
q
Succession
Accepted, inculcated habits of obedience
Force and violence
“Were
Were you to preach, in most parts of the world, that
political connexions are founded altogether on voluntary
consent or mutual promise, the magistrate would soon
imprison you as seditious for loosening the ties of
obedience; if your friends did not first shut you up as
delirious for advancing such absurdities.” (42)
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 Even in democracies, we cannot speak of real consent to
g
government.
In ancient Athens, e.g., “establishment was not first made,
nor any law ever voted, by a tenth part of those who were
bound to pay obedience to it.”
 In fact, says Hume, virtually all governments are ultimately
f
founded
d d and
d maintained
i t i db
by force.
f
So, in short, the contract model does seem to fare very
well as an explanation of political authority and obedience.
(
(We’ve
’ seen this before.)
f
)
Does it fare any better as a normative justification?
Hume:
 We can’t argue that we continue to be bound by an
original contract.
contract Why assume “the
the consent of the
fathers to bind the children”?
 So, perhaps, as the Laws of Athens (and Locke) suggest,
perhaps we are bound by our tacit consent? …
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Tacit Consent I
 Implied consent only makes sense “where a man
imagines that the matter depends upon his choice.”
(
(44,
emphasis added).
)
 Are poor people, ignorant people, oppressed people, free
to choose between emigration and ‘not voting with their
feet’?
“We may as well assert that a man, by remaining on a
vessel freely consents to the dominion of the master;
vessel,
though he was carried on board while asleep, and must
leap into the ocean and perish the moment he leaves her.”
(44)
Tacit Consent II
 While a foreigner may offer a kind of tacit (or possibly
explicit) consent when he leaves his country to settle in
another, this doesn’t
’ necessarily extinguish the claim off
his native prince. His native prince would still be justified
in seizing him in time of war (i.e., the subject’s obedience
isn’t extinguished just because he moved away)
 In general, people give their tacit consent to whoever
successfully asserts authority over them, but “they never
i
imagine
i th
thatt th
their
i consentt made
d hi
him sovereign.”
i ” (45)
There are also “more philosophical” reasons to doubt the
contractarian argument…
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But First, To Review…
1. Divine Right: Appeals to divine right neither explain nor
justify very much: Given that the Deity does not pick out
political authorities “by
“ any particular or miraculous
interposition,” the most that DR can say is that the Deity
“holds all things together” – good, liberty-promoting
authorities and bad, tyrannical authorities alike.
2. Consent (I): Sometimes, e.g., at the very beginning of
civil society—when chieftains ruled “more by persuasion
than command
command”—a
a kind of consent brings people
together.
But persuasion is not command: Real political authority
involves obedience; real political communities are
compulsory, not voluntary, organizations…
3. Consent (II): …And, as a matter of fact (i.e., of history),
most political communities are founded not on consent
but on habit and/or
/ coercion.
4. Consent (III): Moreover, it’s not clear that consent could,
in practice, actually justify very much. Genuine consent
depends on (real) choice, but, in fact, for most people,
most of the time, are not in a position to make real
choices about what sort of government they will have.
And, in any case…
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A “More Philosophical” Refutation
There are, Hume says, two kinds of moral duties:
1) Those that arise from “natural instinct or immediate
propensity” – e.g., caring for children
2) Those that arise from a sense of obligation, in which our
instincts are checked and restrained by subsequent
judgment and observation
Political allegiance and promise keeping are both duties
of the second kind, so the idea of promise keeping adds
nothing to an account of allegiance…
 …instead, we recognize, on the basis of experience, that
y cannot function without authority,
y, and we
society
recognize that authority requires at least some degree of
general obedience.
 The contract story, by contrast, holds that we offer
allegiance because we promised to do so.
But why keep our promises?
Hume: Because experience and judgment teach us that
society cannot function without promise-keeping
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 Similarly, we may ask “to whom is allegiance due? Who is
g
our lawful sovereign?”
We could come up with all sorts of answers (this leader
because of his ancestry; that leader because he
successfully connived his way to the top)
 Any of these could potentially be a good reason, says
Hume since our allegiance is ultimately based on the
Hume,
value of the sovereign successfully maintaining order and
looking after our interests (i.e., not on our consent)…
“The
The general obligation which binds
us to government, is the interest and
necessities of society; and this
obligation is very strong.” (48)
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Humean Conservatism
 A well-functioning system of government is a contingent
pp to have g
good,,
historical achievement. If we happen
liberty-promoting government, then that’s the outcome of
rulers and ruled having gradually learned through
experience that that sort of government works.
 Consent/contract theories let us to pretend that we could
will good government into existence. But we cannot and
should not really believe that
that.
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