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Détente and the Nixon Doctrine As president, Richard Nixon relied heavily on his National Security Advisor (and later Secretary of State) Henry Kissinger. Kissinger, a foreign policy scholar from Harvard University, had a penchant for realpolitik.1 This foreign policy team believed that the United States could exploit conflicts between the Soviet Union and China, in order to isolate North Vietnam and force it to come to terms at the negotiating table. By easing tensions with the Soviet Union, and normalizing relations with China, they hoped to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war and stabilize international relations. Document #1 The age of America’s nearly total dominance of the world stage was drawing to a close. America’s nuclear superiority was eroding, and its economic supremacy was being challenged by the dynamic growth of Europe and Japan, both of which had been restored by American resources and sheltered by American security guarantees. Vietnam finally signaled that it was high time to reassess America’s role in the developing world, and to find some sustainable ground between abdication and over-extension. -Former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (1994) Document #2: Détente In 1973, Nixon appointed Kissinger as Secretary of State, a position he held until 1977. Working with Nixon, Kissinger orchestrated a grand strategy for foreign policy: détente2 with the Soviet Union, normalization of relations with China, and disengagement from direct military involvement in Southeast Asia and other parts of the world. Although Nixon had built his political career on hard-line anticommunism, the Nixon-Kissinger team worked hard to ease tensions with the two major communist nations: the Soviet Union and China. Kissinger surmised that, as both nations 1 Realpolitik: n. A foreign policy based on practical or material interests, rather than on ethical or theoretical objectives. 2 Détente: n. The relaxation of strained relations or tensions between nations. began to seek favor with the United States, they might reduce their support for North Vietnam, facilitating America’s ability to withdraw from the war that was dividing the nation. -John Murrin et al, Liberty, Equality, Power: A History of the American People (2005) Document #3: The Nixon Doctrine The policies of rapprochement [reconciliation] with China and détente with the Soviet Union reflected Nixon’s and Kissinger’s belief in the importance of stable relationships among the great powers. But great-power relationships could not alone ensure international stability, for the “Third World” remained the most volatile and dangerous source of international tension. Central to the Nixon-Kissinger policy toward the Third World was the effort to maintain a stable status quo without involving the United States too deeply in local disputes. In 1969 and 1970 the president described what became known as the Nixon Doctrine, by which the United States would “participate in the defense and development of allies and friends” but would leave the “basic responsibility” for the future of those “friends” to the nations themselves. In practice, the Nixon Doctrine meant a declining American interest in contributing to Third World development; a growing contempt for the United Nations, where less-developed nations were gaining influence through their sheer numbers; and increasing support to authoritarian regimes attempting to withstand radical challenges from within. -Alan Brinkley, America: A Survey (2007) Docuemnt #4: Kissinger Explains Détente Since the dawn of the nuclear age the world’s fears of holocaust and its hopes for peace have turned on the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. […] Tragic as the consequences of violence may have been in the past, the issue of peace and war takes on unprecedented urgency when, for the first time in history, two nations have the capacity to destroy mankind. The destructiveness of modern weapons defines the necessity of the task; deep differences in philosophy and interests between the United States and the Soviet Union point up its difficulty. […] There can be no peaceful international order without a constructive relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. There will be no international stability unless both the Soviet Union and United States conduct themselves with restraint and unless they use their enormous power for the benefit of mankind. Thus we must be clear at the outset on what the term “détente” entails. It is the search for a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. It is a continuing process, not a final condition. -Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (September 19, 1974)