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June 8, 2016 Fed Thoughts: Existential Angst A remarkable amount of effort at the nation’s central bank is devoted to justify doing nothing. As evidenced by the 16 footnotes and 12 references of Chairwoman Yellen’s most recent speech, there is a lot of science involved, with data smoothed, models run, and inferences offered.1 As tracked by researchers at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, a reader of the statements of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) needs a postundergraduate education to grasp the meaning.2 Still, more than economics is needed to understand current policy setting. Based on their behavior, the nineteen participants in the FOMC process no doubt took their share of Vincent Reinhart Chief Economist French literature and film classes. After all, they are delivering monetary policy firming with the trepidation and sense of external dread as Yves Montand delivering nitroglycerin across a mountain ridge in the 1953 classic, “The Wages of Fear.” For those who left arthouse cinemas behind, in the film an evil American oil company needs to get explosives to a field in a remote part of South America to blow out a well fire. Not wanting to risk their relationship with their unionized workers, they recruit four outcasts to transport the volatile material along a rudimentary road. Spoiler alert: Explosions ensue. Over the past nine months, many private-sector forecasts of policy rates have similarly blown up as official assurances that firming was in the cards tapped out. Also similarly to the film, the experience has raised existential angst among investors as the random blows of fate accumulated. A scare in China evens GDP growth tracked above 6%? A referendum looming in a country making up 6-3/4% of global GDP? Disappointment about a component of the employment report that has a 90% confidence interval of 230,000 workers? These were enough to stop the FOMC truck in its tracks along the gradual incline of its rate guidance. Understanding why Janet Yellen grips the steering wheel so tightly is part about economics and part about policy committee dynamics. 1 http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20160606a.htm. 2 The research is available here https://reserch.stlouisfed.org/publications/es/14/ES_23_2014-11-05.pdf. 2 In the Standish economic outlook, US real GDP growth bounces about in a channel centered at 1-3/4%. Data on real GDP growth are inherently volatile, so sometimes readings are at the low end of the channel, such as the paltry 0.8% expansion in the first quarter, and sometimes at the higher end, such as the 2-1/2% tracking estimate for the ongoing quarter. Expansion at 1-3/4% is both dispiriting for the nation and likely a touch above trend. Even so, with an aging population growing slowly and productivity stuck in a rut, resource slack will erode and inflation creep up. The It would not take much handwringing about the outlook from the committee’s leader to cast doubt about the Fed’s resolve regarding an upcoming meeting... sad news on the growth of the labor force and output per hour also pulls the real federal funds rate expected to prevail in the long run below its historical average, to 1 to 1-1/4%. In our forecast, full employment and inflation moving toward the Fed’s goal extracts tightening from a reluctant FOMC leadership, which ultimately plans to level the nominal fed funds rate at around 3%. The incline to their rate guidance is shallower than last year both because policymakers are resigned to a lower terminal federal funds rate and wary of following a more aggressive path after the market reaction to their December move startled them.3 That is, in response to greater uncertainty about the effects of their policy through financial markets to the economy, they scaled back their guidance from four to two quarter-point hikes in 2016. This concern about the financial market reaction to their action also explains their reticence to embrace the alternative strategy of waiting until they see the whites of inflation’s eyes to tighten. Such a strategy, similar to the “optimal policy” path that Chairwoman Yellen espoused earlier, requires moving quickly and by a substantial amount in the event, which might pose an outsized risk to policymakers that are unsure about the reception of any move in markets. Group Dynamics The policy pronouncements of Janet Yellen over the years—as an academic, a Fed Board governor, and a Fed president—placed relatively more weight on unemployment than inflation. Unconstrained, the chair would probably sound like Fed Governor Lael Brainard.4 Janet Yellen may have her own individual policy preferences, but she also has the responsibility of herding a disputatious committee with many participants that do not share her policy preferences. In such circumstances, the chair’s biggest headache is that the center might not hold if policy incrementalism felt imposed from the top rather than decided by the group. In the event, it was a remarkable achievement in group management in March to get the FOMC to agree (mostly) to two quarterpoint firmings per year. Still, there is a feature of that path that may tempt Yellen. Spreading two hikes over eight meetings a year implies an unconditional probability of 25% at any particular one. That is imprecise guidance for an institution historically desirous of avoiding market surprises. Here lies the temptation: It would not take much handwringing about the outlook from the committee’s leader to cast doubt about the Fed’s resolve regarding an upcoming meeting, creating the perception when the meeting comes that the lack of preparation in markets for action was an overwhelming argument against action. Chairwoman Yellen wrung her hands about the outlook in her speech in Philadelphia 3 That is the topic of the note, “Fed Thoughts: The House on the Hill”, at https://www.standish.com/us/en/research-and-insights/index.jsp 4 Governor Brainard’s most recent speech on monetary policy cacn be found at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/ brainard20160603a.htm. 3 (referenced earlier). While embracing the gradual removal of policy accommodation (in line with the intent of her committee), she characterized the stance as “modestly accommodative” and no longer mentioned the time frame of “coming months.” Even more significant, the message the Fed chair read from the employment report was not that the unemployment rate, at 4.7%, was below the median of all FOMC participants’ assessment of its natural rate, but that weak net job creation called into question the vigor of economic momentum. Fed chairs do not often ask rhetorical questions, so read carefully the item on Yellen’s list of issues, “Or will monthly payroll gains move up toward the solid pace they maintained earlier this year and in 2015?” This sets the bar for the next action in the near term at the return of net payroll gains of around 200,000 per month, the earlier average. That is an ambitious goal in an economy chugging along in a low-growth channel, which, based on the Standish outlook, has about a three-in-ten chance of eventuating in the June employment report, released about three weeks after the upcoming FOMC meeting. Rolling the rock up the hill (another existential reference) So, in coming months, expect that: • The FOMC will punt on policy action at its meeting on June 14th and 15th, for all the reasons we expressed back in April (here). Even a small chance (and it is more than small) of being wrongfooted by the results of the UK referendum is too much of a risk for the Fed to bear. • Policy makers will express a willingness to firm at future meetings, but with less of a sense of urgency than had May payrolls met expectations. • The Summary of Economic Projections will extend the pattern of a flattening of the path of expected rates exhibited over the history of the “dot” chart (which we discussed here). In the press conference, the tone of which will be repeated in the semiannual testimony one week later, Chair Yellen will embrace in a somewhat timeless manner the incremental removal of modest policy accommodation. We believe Fed may even pull the trigger at its July meeting in the onein-three chance a high-enough reading on payrolls prints. If not, the probability weight on two hikes gets shifted to September and December and trimmed some in aggregate because tightening that are deferred may not come. All that, of course, assumes that the data runs the course laid out in our latest outlook and that Janet Yellen does not succumb to the temptation of talking tightening out of the market through the tone of her remarks even as she mouths the words of the group that accommodation must be removed. The former is about the vagaries of forecasting, with a standard confidence band about our outlook suggesting that there is a one-in-three chance that there will only be one or no rate hike this year. The latter is about Janet Yellen. Putting off until tomorrow what the group wants may mean she runs out of tomorrows—i.e., the Fed get behind the curve of an inflation resurgence, or that her group runs out of patience. Inflation does not seem the immediate risk, but the drama of last September onward suggests that the quietude of her group is more an issue. Her safer path is to lock in a glacial path of the removal of policy accommodation by actually removing some soon, so as to buy time to define subsequently just how “modest” is remaining accommodation. The Fed may pull the trigger at its July meeting in the one-in-three chance a high-enough reading on payrolls prints. 4 The comments provided herein are a general market overview and do not constitute investment advice, are not predictive of any future market performance, are not provided as a sales or advertising communication, and do not represent an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any security. Similarly, this information is not intended to provide specific advice, recommendations or projected returns of any particular product of Standish Mellon Asset Management Company LLC (Standish). These views are current as of the date of this communication and are subject to rapid change as economic and market conditions dictate. Though these views may be informed by information from publicly available sources that we believe to be accurate, we can make no representation as to the accuracy of such sources nor the completeness of such information. Please contact Standish for current information about our views of the economy and the markets. Portfolio composition is subject to change, and past performance is no indication of future performance. BNY Mellon is one of the world’s leading asset management organizations, encompassing BNY Mellon’s affiliated investment management firms, wealth management services and global distribution companies. BNY Mellon is the corporate brand for The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation. Standish is a registered investment adviser and BNY Mellon subsidiary. WP/June 2016/6-9-16/BR Standish Mellon Asset Management Company LLC Boston • Pittsburgh • San Francisco Standish Mellon Asset Management (UK) Limited Standish Mellon Asset Management (Singapore) Pte. Limited www.standish.com • [email protected]