Download 1 The Effects of Wining and Losing on Attitudes about Political

The Effects of Wining and Losing on Attitudes about Political Institutions and
Democracy in the United States
Shaun Bowler
University of California, Riverside
[email protected]
Todd Donovan
Western Washington University
[email protected]
Abstract:
In this paper, we test how losses in the electoral area affect attitudes of partisans in
America – directing attention to the 2000 election. This represents a rare case where
many losing partisans may have perceived that their party was denied victory by the
performance of democratic institutions themselves. We examine how losing affected
their satisfaction with democracy, confidence in government, and their attitudes toward
institutions such as the Electoral College and the Supreme Court. We find that the 2000
election produced a significant reaction among partisan Democrats in evaluations of
democracy and political institutions; a reaction that corresponded with support for
institutional reform. When placed in perspective, however, some of the effects of losing
in 2000 appear little different than the experiences of losers in most US elections over the
last 30 years.
Paper prepared for presentation at the Midwest Political Science Association Meeting,
Chicago, IL. April 3 – 6. 2003.
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The Effects of Wining and Losing on Attitudes about Political Institutions and
Democracy in the United States
The stability of democratic regimes depends, at one level, upon mass acceptance
of the legitimacy of public officials, political institutions, and of rules that structure the
political order. At another level, we assume that democratic governments require some
minimal level of mass confidence in government and institutions in order to function.
Government officials, elected and unelected, can probably exercise their public
responsibilities “better” if there is some base-level of acceptance that their actions serve
the “public” interest. In contrast, distrust can reflect a sense that they only act on behalf
of a narrow segment of society. Lower levels of confidence and trust may reflect that
many perceive their government is not impartial, and that the political system is unfair
(Miller and Listhaug 1999; Gibson and Calderia 1995; Iynegar 1980). System support
across established democracies, moreover, has been found to be lower among citizens
who did not support the governing party (Anderson and LoTempio 2002; Norris 1999;
Anderson and Gillory 1997; Nadeau and Blais 1993).
The assumption that democracies require some base level of trust and confidence
in political institutions is derived from the same logic that associates governmental
performance with regime legitimacy (e.g. Easton 1965; Putnam 1993; etc.). That is, trust
and confidence in political institutions are assumed to be sub-components of regime
legitimacy, and are related to support for the political system. A decline in trust of
government officials and in confidence in regime institutions need not reflect a
proportionate decline in the legitimacy of a political regime itself (democracy), but may
be seen as a sign of the (declining) health of a democratic polity. With less public
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confidence, politics may become more bitter and acrimonious, as opponents come to
view each other as villains (Tolchin 1996; various studies in Craig 1996).
How then, is losing in the electoral arena associated with attitudes about
democracy, government and confidence in political institutions? The relative political
stability of many democratic nations suggests that the effects of losing are mitigated by
cultural and institutional factors. Several scholars note the consensual style of democracy
characterized by proportional representation acts to incorporate electoral losers into
government, and mitigate the effects of supporting losing parties (Lijphart 1999;
Anderson and LoTempio 2002; Norris 1999; Anderson and Gillory). Elsewhere, we
argue that federalism and separation of powers might have similar effects in the US
(Bowler and Donovan 2002).
In this paper, we test how losses in the electoral area affect attitudes of partisans
in America – directing attention to the 2000 election. The unusual 2000 U.S. presidential
election provides an important case for examining the effects of losing. It provides a
dramatic case of a close, bitter loss that, in and of itself, deserves attention. If losing does
affect attitudes about democracy, government, and institutions, it seems reasonable to
expect that any such effects would be particularly pronounced in 2000. This represents a
rare case where many losing partisans may have perceived that their party was denied
victory by the performance of democratic institutions themselves. We test how partisans
responded to this loss by examining how it affected their satisfaction with democracy,
confidence in government, and their attitudes toward institutions such as the Electoral
College and the Supreme Court.
2
We address three, related, sets of questions; First, what evidence is there of a
reaction among losers in the 2000 Presidential election? Was there an impact on
assessments of American institutions or, were such effects muted because the US has
such a long experience with democracy that electoral losers are not affected by even the
most bitter lost? Second, are there wider consequences of losing or is the reaction to loss
simply confined to disappointment with the result of a particular race? Third, we take a
longer, more historical perspective - do we see evidence that winning and losing in
previous, and less controversial contests, produced similar effects among voters? Put
differently, were the effects of losing in 2000 bigger than those of previous elections? We
show that losers respond adversely to the federal government and this is true both over
time and also in 2000. We find that the result of the 2000 race produced a strong reaction
among partisan Democrats in terms of evaluations of democracy and American political
institutions, a reaction that corresponded with support for institutional reform. When
placed in perspective, however, some of the effects of losing among Democrats in 2000
appear little different than the experiences of losers in most US elections over the last 30
years.
The 2000 Presidential Race
George Bush won the US presidency with 47.9% of the popular vote but a
majority of votes in the Electoral College. His opponent, Albert ‘Al’ Gore Jr. won a
bigger share of the popular vote (48.4%) but fewer Electoral College votes. The key to
the election came in Florida, where early exit polls showed Gore had won. The final
election night tally, however, placed Bush in the lead by about 1000 votes. Subsequent
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disputes over registration records, the “butterfly” ballot structure in one key county, statewide intimidation of African American voters, and the failure of machines to count
thousands of ballots in some heavily Democratic areas, produced several weeks where it
was unclear who would be awarded the state’s decisive Electoral College votes.
Disputes over the counting and re-counting of votes resulted in a series of legal
challenges that, eventually, resulted in the involvement of the US Supreme Court. In its
December 12th Bush vs. Gore decision, the Court effectively gave Florida’s Electoral
College votes to Bush – and so the Presidency. Gore conceded immediately after the
Court issued its decision - despite evidence that an electoral roll purge of many legal
African American voters by Republicans, and illegally counted overseas ballots, probably
tipped the presidency to Bush.1
Effects of the 2000 Election on Attitudes about Institutions and Government
So what, if any, were the consequences of this loss for Democratic partisans? The
standard pattern we see in other research is that electoral loss produces a declining regard
for political institutions. It should come as little surprise to expect that partisan
Democrats should be less satisfied with the outcome than Bush supporters. It would
perhaps be more surprising to see Democrats begin to lose confidence in the Supreme
Court, the Electoral College, or democracy itself.
Prior to December 12th 2000, we expect the division in partisan attitudes about
democracy and institutions such as the Supreme Court was relatively modest. We know,
1
See David Barstow and Don Van Natta Jr. 2001. “How Bush took Florida: Mining the Overseas Absentee
Vote.” New York Times. Wand, Jonathan et al. 2001. “The Butterfly Did It: The Aberrant Vote for
Buchanan in Palm Beach County, Florida. American Political Science Review. (December). Palast, Greg.
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for example, that strong identifying partisans tend to have greater political efficacy, and,
hence, less cynicism, than other citizens (see Donovan and Bowler 2003 for a review).
With regard to the Court, prior to Bush v. Gore, many Democrats may have admired its
role in civil rights period and landmark cases such as Roe v. Wade, while resenting other
decisions. Likewise some key Republican tenets - religious instruction in school,
abortion rights, limits on gay rights and flag burning – often come under legal attack,
while other key principles (state’s rights) were supported by the Court. Yet if winning
and losing affect how partisans evaluate government and institutions, we expect Bush v.
Gore to have produce a shift in views on both sides of the partisan fence. We have two
ways to illustrate the importance of the Supreme Court using two different sets of survey
data that allow us to test how citizens responded to the 2000 election.
First, using CBS monthly polling data from November and December of 2000, we
model of opinion towards the US Supreme Court at points before and after the 2000
election was finally decided. We assume that a shift in opinions then between the two
time periods confirms the effects of losing. Second, using a date-of-interview counter on
the 2000 American National Election Study survey, we can also examine whether there
was a shift in opinion about the Supreme Court, the federal government, and democracy
more generally immediately after the Bush vs. Gore decision. That is, if we examine
Democratic opinion and see a shift in attitudes at the time of the decision we can test how
the Court decision – presenting Democrats with a very visible, controversial electoral loss
– affected mass attitudes about democracy and institutions.
Table 1 about here
2002. The Great Florida Ex-Con Game: How the felon voter-purge was itself felonious.” Harpers.
March.
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Tables 1 displays results from models that use CBS data to estimate public
confidence in the Supreme Court. Table 1 shows an immediate polarization of opinions
across time. When surveyed in November, Gore voters were actually less likely than
others to be critical of the Court (albeit this significance of this is at p = .107, two-tail).
By December, we see a sign reversal as Gore voters become significantly more critical of
the Court. Nader voters and non-voters also became more critical by December. In
general we see leftwing voters becoming more negative and right wing ones more
positive towards the Court over the course of this period. It is possible to sharpen our
focus on what drives these opinions. Table 2 shows the impact of citizens’ expectations
about who actually won the election on confidence in the Supreme Court. Table 3
demonstrates how such expectations affect citizens’ views of the motivation behind the
Court’s judgment in Bush v. Gore. We represent expectations here with a question that
asked if the respondent believed Gore would have won had the recounts been allowed to
continue.
Tables 2 and 3 about here
What do these results show? They support two conclusions: first, that losing
generates adverse evaluations of the judicial process and, second, expectations (of loss
and gain) play an important role in those evaluations. Put differently, if one expects to
lose, one takes the loss a little less hard. Gore voters are generally more critical of the
Court after Bush v. Gore, (Table 1 and Table 2), but those who thought Gore could not
have won are somewhat less critical (Table 2). By the same token, Table 3 illustrates that
those who thought Gore could have won were much more likely to see partisan
motivations, rather than legal reasoning, behind the Court’s decision.
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Tables 4 and 5 about here
NES data show similar results. In Table 4, we estimated feeling thermometer
scores about the Supreme Court using a model that can distinguish responses of strong
Democratic partisans interviewed before Bush v. Gore from strong Democratic partisans
interviewed after. Again, we find strong Democrats generally sympathetic to the Court
rating it about 3.8 points higher than others on a 100 point scale. However, partisan
Democrats interviewed after December 12th (represented by the interaction between
strong Democrat ID and our marker for being interviewed after December 12th) rate the
Court 6.5 points lower.2
The shift in attitudes of partisan Democrats, moreover, is not limited to their
perspective of the Court. As Table 5 strong Democrats became less confident in
government and the political process after December 12th. Where Democratic partisans
interviewed prior to December 12th were significantly more supportive of the federal
government, significantly more likely to think voting matters, and significantly more
satisfied with democracy – these effects reverse or disappear among partisan Democrats
when it became clear that they lost due to Bush v. Gore. When contacted prior to Bush v.
Gore, strong Democrats rated the federal government 9 points higher than average on the
100 point feeling thermometer scale. After the Bush v. Gore decision, these Democratic
partisans rated it nearly 4 points lower. At the same time, strong Democrats were
significantly more satisfied with Democracy prior to Bush v. Gore, but significantly less
satisfied afterwards.
2
We produce similar results with Gore voters are used in the model rather than strong Democrats.
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Losing and Support for Political Reform
These effects of losing on confidence in the Court, the Federal government, and
on the efficacy of voting and democracy, are especially important since they suggests that
people respond not just the electoral outcomes, but also to the process. One of the
consequences for this is that citizens may well be so upset at the political process that
they are receptive to the idea of reforming political institutions. That is, losing, and
especially losing in what is perceived by the loser to be an ‘unfair’ manner may
undermine the legitimacy of democratic institutions to the point of making voters willing
to change even long established institutional practices. That is, the willingness of voters
to change institutions is one test of the shallowness of the legitimacy of those institutions.
We examine the impact of losing in the 2000 presidential election on the
assessment of institutions to test this. We do this by modeling the impact of the election
result on support for altering how the US president should be elected. In mid November
2000, the CBS News poll asked voters if they thought “we should keep the electoral
college or should we amend the Constitution and elect as President whoever gets the most
votes in the whole country?” The poll also asked respondents who they believed came
out ahead in the popular vote count in the election. Table 6 shows models estimating the
willingness of people to amend the Constitution to provide direct election of the
President, rather than election via the Electoral College. Interestingly, the main effect
here is not so much that “Gore supporters” or Democrats insist on reform. Rather, Gore
voters who believe he actually won were more likely to approve of amending the
Constitution to allow direct popular election. Indeed, Bush voters who thought Bush had
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won the popular vote were also more likely than Gore voters to support abandoning the
Electoral College.3
Table 6 about here
Those voters who think their candidate won the popular vote makes for a more
legitimate winner are – not surprisingly – more supportive of the Electoral College.
Perhaps equally unsurprising – those voters who thought their candidate had won the
popular vote are especially likely to believe this. Plainly, the inference we wish to draw
on the basis of Table 6 is that losing can undermine the legitimacy of a political system in
very real ways by generating support for alternatives. One, eminently reasonable,
objection to such an inference is that it depends too closely on the events of 2000.
Outside of these events people will be happier with the current institutions and unwilling
to change. However, studies of support for major political reforms in other nations
demonstrate greater support for reforms among supporters of parties left out of
government (on Italy, see M. Donovan 1995; on New Zealand see Karp and Banducci,
1999). Additional research is needed to estimate how electoral losses are associated with
support for political reform in the US.
The 2000 Election in Historical Context
The consequences of the 2000 presidential election can be placed in context by
comparing the effect of losing in this election to other federal elections. We do this by
estimating how support for the party in control of the White House is associated with
3
In table 6 all voters who thought their candidate won the popular vote are represented by the same
variable. Models using separate terms to represent Gore supporters who thought Gore won, and Bush
voters who thought Bush won, produce similar results.
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trust in government. As noted above, strong Democrats’ feelings about the federal
government shifted immediately after Bush v. Gore.
There are several advantages to assessing the impact of losing on trust in
government across time. First, this allows us to demonstrate if losers in 2000 were more
distrusting than losers of previous decades. Republicans at the mass and elite level in the
USA were visibly hostile to President Clinton, for example, due his low popular vote
total, opposition to some of his policies, and also due to his “cultural” and “lifestyle”
positions (admissions of drug use and adultery, tolerance of homosexuality in the
military, etc.).4 The lack of GOP consent with Clinton’s presidency culminated in the
congressional GOP impeaching him in 1997. Does this mean, however, that a
Republican voter who supported Bob Dole in 1996 was less distrusting of the
government than, say, a Democratic voter who supported Gore in 2000, or a Republican
supporting their party’s loser in 1976 (Ford)? Likewise, was the 2000 election such a
dramatic loss that it created an even more serious erosion in trust in government among
Democrats than occurred in previous Democratic defeats?
Second, examining the relationship between losing and trust across time may tell
us something about why mass distrust of government has increased over time. If losing
in the electoral arena is one of a determinant of distrust in government, what happens if
there are more losers over time? Trends in US elections - in both voter turnout and
electoral results - suggest that a smaller proportion of citizens now vote for whomever
wins the presidency or whomever controls Congress. However, a large proportion of
Americans still “lean” towards, or are loyal to, one of the major political parties. Thus,
there are two key forces that may vary across time and have implications for our
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understanding of what trust in the political system might mean: (A) the magnitude of the
relationship between winning/losing and trust, and (B) the proportion of folks who may
see themselves as losers in the electoral arena. Assuming that trust is associated with
losing, the substantive effect of this relationship (for the political order) depends on how
trends in A and B correspond.
We use cross-sectional NES data from 1964 to 2002 to estimate trust in
government as a function of support for the winning party. We test how support for
losing candidates is associated with distrust by estimating a simple model of trust for
each year the NES sampled during this period. Our dependent variable here is measured
with the NES question, “generally speaking, can the [federal] government, that is, the
government in Washington DC, be trusted to do the right thing.” Response categories
range from 1 to 4, with 1 being “none of the time” and 4 being “a lot.” Trust is
estimated with a simple model that controls for the respondents age, gender, race,
Latina/o ethnicity, education, union status, religious attendance, and unemployment.
The effect of being a winner/loser in the electoral arena is coded as a dummy
variable, where 1 = the respondent had the same party ID as the President at the time of
the survey, 0 = other. Thus, a Republican identifier in 1970 or 1972 would be coded as a
winner, while a Democratic identifier in 1964 or 1966 would be coded as a winner.
Citizens who did not have the same political allegiance as the President were coded as
losers for ‘on-year’ and ‘off-year’ surveys. Thus, our “losing” variable reflects not being
aligned with the party controlling the White House. By using the same basic model for
the 20 US elections conducted from 1964 to 2002, this method allows us to isolate a
4
Or, as the NRA bumper-stickers put it, “My President is Charleston Heston.”
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coefficient that reflects the magnitude of the relationship between political trust and being
and electoral winner or loser.
Table 7 reports three series of coefficients for each year from 1964 to 2002. Each
column reports OLS regression coefficients for the effect on trust of identifying with the
party in control of the White House, controlling for other social and demographic traits.
The first column lists the effect for all respondents, and the second column reports the
effect for weak partisans and independents only, while the third column reports the effect
to strong partisans. Figure 1 plots the trends in the proportion of the NES sample who
identify with the party in control of the White House (e.g., electoral winners) and the size
of the effect of this on trust in government for strong partisans.
Table 7 and Figure 1 about here
Several things are illustrated by these data. First, the effect of winning (and, by
extension, the inverse effect of losing) are most pronounced among strong partisans.
Although winners from the overall sample (Column 1) are generally more likely to trust
the government, this effect is greatest among the strong partisans. This makes sense if we
consider that partisans have the keenest interest in politics and are more informed, and,
thus, are most likely to have specific concerns about election outcomes.
Second, winners are not always the most trusting citizens. However, the data
suggest that former losers, who may have been more distrusting while out of power,
quickly change their perception of government once their party controls the White House.
For example, in 1968 and 1980 GOP identifiers are coded as winners, but they tend to be
less trusting than other citizens. After just two years in power (in control of the
presidency), they become significantly more trusting of government. Likewise,
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Democratic identifiers were no more trusting in 1992, but they were significantly more
likely to trust government after two years of the Clinton presidency. Of course, the
inverse also holds – Republicans were more trusting of government in 1990, yet become
significantly less trusting by 1994.
Third, Figure 1 and Table 7 illustrate that the effect of winning on trust has been
fairly invariant across time – with 2000 being no particular exception. Despite a threedecade long trend toward greater distrust of government, the relationship between
winning and trust shows no clear pattern over this period. Moreover, Figure 1 illustrates
that from 1980 to 2000, there was been a subtle decline in the proportion of losers in the
electorate, as measured by citizens who identified with the party in control of the White
House. This contrasts with the shrinking popular vote shares winners have received in
presidential elections since 1988.
Fourth, it is worth noting that there are relatively few years where there is both a
large proportion of losers and a large effect of winning (and, therefore, losing) on trust.
However, in years such as 1972, 1986, and 1988 there are relatively small proportions of
the electorate who identify with the party in power, and, at the same time, we find
relatively strong effects of losing on trust in government in those years. These could be
years when the substantive effects of losing might be greatest. One time when we do
expect to see effects of losing can be seen in the dramatic result of the 2000 Presidential
election.
Table 8 about here
Finally, the 2000 election does not seem to have produced a situation where
differences in trust in government among Democrats and Republicans reached levels that
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are beyond the “normal” effects we have seen since 1964 when a party loses control of
the White House. Preliminary NES data suggest that by 2002, the coefficient for the
effect of identifying with the party holding the White House was actually smaller in 2002
than during much of the previous three decades – potentially an effect of political
consensus generated after September 11, 2001. Table 7 illustrates that the effect on trust
of being a strong Democrat in 1994, for example, had a coefficient of .19, whereas the
effect of being a strong Republican in 2002 had a coefficient of just .09. Table 8
illustrates the same effect over time, yet isolates the effect on trust of being a Democrat
from 1994 – 2002. We do see a potential erosion over time here but nothing that is
clearly associated with the 2000 election. The coefficient for the effect of being a strong
Democrat was .25 in 1996, became insignificant by 1998, and displays a sign change by
2002 (again, insignificant).
Conclusions
This paper demonstrates that Democrats were affected by the Bush v. Gore
decision, and that their confidence in democracy and political institutions suffered as a
result. We have shown, furthermore, that they lost some measure of confidence in the
Supreme Court and federal government and that these attitudes may have consequences
for the political system – those who thought Gore won the popular vote supported
proposals to amend the U.S. Constitution in order to alter how elections are conducted.
Still, we see no trends to suggest that winning or losing in the 2000 election bred a unique
form of distrust that might present a fundamental challenge to the American political
system.
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Several avenues for future research emerge from the material considered here.
First, our discussion emphasizes that the relationship between winning, losing, and
perceptions of democracy and political institutions may be contingent upon how voters
perceive what is at stake in an election. The ‘stakes’ of elections USA might be
somewhat unique due to the relatively decentralized nature of its federal system and its
system of separation of powers. Although there are winner-take-all elections at each
level of government, there are multiple levels of government (federal, state, county, and
city) that a given citizen may participate in, and each level has races for executive and
legislative positions at relatively frequent intervals. This provides another explanation
(besides culture and level of development) for why elections in the emerging democracies
discussed in our introduction occasionally produce chaos, while America can muddled
through the 2000 Florida election with relatively little conflict. The stakes of any single
election for any single office in the USA are, to some extent, less “all or nothing” than in
places where a single election elects parliament once every 5 to 7 years. The major
finding here is that American voters are relatively unfazed by a single controversial
election such as 2000.
All of this begs a critical question – at what point, and at what level of
government does a US citizen perceive themselves to be an electoral winner or loser?
Our national-level data suggest that these perceptions may change over one or two
election cycles. Our state-level data suggest that the effects of winning and losing are
greater for offices with more authority, and they also demonstrate that the effects of
winning are not limited to federal offices. Citizens also respond to winning and losing at
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the state level. But what happens to citizens who “lose” across multiple levels of
government – at the executive and legislative level?
Of especial interest, then, is the cumulative effect of losing. If as our crosssectional data demonstrate, there is lower trust among citizens who are not aligned with
the government of the day, what becomes of those citizens who are on the losing side of
several elections? They may eventually become less likely to participate, and/or may
provide a potential reservoir of support for proposals to change the electoral system that
disadvantages them. This question may be approached best with some form of dynamic
analysis, or experimental survey data. In the future, we will examine this issue with data
collected from a survey experiment designed specifically for this task.5
5
Our national sample survey will measure how frequently a respondent supported candidates who won,
across a range of elections, and measure attitudes democracy, trust, and about changing rules that structure
elections and government. The survey will be in the field in Fall, 2003.
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Table 1: Confidence in US Supreme Court: Before and After 2000 Election.
December 2000
B
Std.
sig.
Error
(Constant)
Florida resident
Female
Anglo
Latina/o
Gore voter
Nader voter
Buchanan voter
Did note vote
Democrat ID
Republican ID
Younger (age)
Thirties (age)
Middle (age)
Education
Rate National
Economy
2.589
0.193
0.163
-0.165
-0.098
0.521
0.568
-0.254
0.419
0.088
-0.164
-0.192
-0.198
-0.155
-0.113
0.098
0.194
0.125
0.06
0.089
0.149
0.125
0.212
0.121
0.127
0.079
0.078
0.107
0.088
0.086
0.027
0.046
0.00
0.12
0.01
0.06
0.51
0.00
0.01
0.04
0.00
0.26
0.03
0.07
0.03
0.07
0.00
0.03
November 2000
B
Std.
Sig
Error
2.569
-0.049
0.058
-0.267
-0.175
-0.213
-0.055
-0.042
0.066
0.112
-0.137
0.089
-0.016
-0.089
-0.136
0.163
0.207
0.134
0.062
0.087
0.127
0.132
0.283
0.131
0.133
0.083
0.081
0.11
0.094
0.089
0.027
0.05
0.00
0.71
0.34
0.00
0.16
0.11
0.84
0.75
0.62
0.18
0.09
0.42
0.86
0.32
0.00
0.01
Note: Dependent variable 1= A great deal, 2= Quite a lot, 3=Some, 4= Very little.
Figures in bold are significant at .10 level or better. Young, Thirty, and Middle are age
dummies.
Source: CBS News/ New York Times Monthly Poll # 6, November 27 – 28 2000. ICPSR
Study # 3238; CBS News Monthly Poll # 2, December 14 – 16. ICPSR Study # 3231.
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Table 2: Confidence in U.S. Supreme Court; December 2000.
Variables
(Constant)
Florida dummy
Female
Anglo
Latino
Gore voter
Thought Gore could have won
Thought Gore could not have won
Nader voter
Buchanan voter
Non-voter
Democrat
Republican
Age Group
Education
Rate National Economy
Number of cases
R2
Unstandardized
Coefficients
2.446
.211
.177
-.150
-.083
.472
-.069
-.255
.513
-.282
.392
.104
-.130
.051
-.120
.095
1211
.21
s.e.
t
Sig.
.221
.124
.060
.088
.148
.126
.077
.085
.212
.122
.128
.078
.078
.033
.027
.046
11.060
1.699
2.939
-1.696
-.560
3.750
-.900
-3.000
2.419
-2.310
3.065
1.326
-1.683
1.557
-4.422
2.072
.000
.090
.003
.090
.575
.000
.368
.003
.016
.021
.002
.185
.093
.120
.000
.038
Note: Dependent variable 1= A great deal, 2= Quite a lot, 3=Some, 4= Very little.
Source: CBS News Monthly Poll # 2, December 14 – 16. ICPSR Study # 3231.
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Table 3: Attitudes about Court’s Motive Behind Bush v. Gore Decision
Variables
Florida dummy
Female
Anglo
Latina/o
Gore voter
Though Gore could have won
Thought Gore could not have won
Nader voter
Buchanan voter
Non-voter
Democrat
Republican
Age
Education
Economic assessment
Constant
Number of cases
% correctly predicted
B
S.E.
.137 .325
.045 .155
-.245 .212
-.379 .368
1.630 .308
.337 .194
.126 .218
1.024 .492
-.825 .331
.818 .314
.519 .182
-.171 .215
.235 .083
-.063 .071
.044 .114
-1.837 .560
1048
74
Wald
Sig. Exp(B)
.179 .673 1.147
.083 .774 1.046
1.341 .247 .782
1.061 .303 .684
27.985 .000 5.105
3.009 .083 1.400
.335 .563 1.135
4.335 .037 2.784
6.211 .013 .438
6.786 .009 2.266
8.163 .004 1.680
.636 .425 .843
7.967 .005 1.265
.802 .370 .939
.150 .698 1.045
10.762 .001 .159
Note: Logistic regression model. Dependent variable is response to question that asked if
court motivated by partisan considerations or objective interpretation of law (1=partisan,
0 =not).
Source: CBS News Monthly Poll # 2, December 14 – 16. ICPSR Study # 3231.
19
Table 4: Effects of Losing on Feelings about Supreme Court: USA, 2000
Variable
Strg Dem * Post Bush v. Gore decision
Strong Democrat
Strong Republican
Nader voter
Education
Age
Voted
Female
(Constant)
2
R
Number of cases
B
SE B
-6.49
2.25
3.77
1.28
1.45
1.43
1.87
3.44
0.44
0.20
0.11
0.03
1.92
1.24
-0.51
0.97
52.28
3.28
0.03
1451
T
-2.89
2.94
1.01
0.54
2.15
3.65
1.55
-0.52
15.92
sig.
sig
2-tail 1-tail
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.31
0.16
0.59
0.29
0.03
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.12
0.06
0.60
0.30
0.00
0.00
Note: dependent variables = feeling thermometer scores
Source: 2000 American National Election Study.
20
Table 5: Effects of Losing on Attitudes about Government and Democracy: USA, 2000.
Effect of losing on Feelings about Federal Government
Strg. Dem * Post Bush v. Gore decision -3.71 2.45 -1.51
0.13
0.07
Strong Democrat 8.98 1.36
6.60
0.00
0.00
Strong Republican -3.74 1.53 -2.45
0.01
0.01
Nader voter -6.34 3.61 -1.76
0.08
0.04
Education -0.15 0.22 -0.71
0.48
0.24
Age 0.10 0.03
3.22
0.00
0.00
Voted 2.09 1.32
1.58
0.11
0.06
Female 1.69 1.03
1.65
0.10
0.05
(Constant) 48.49 3.49 13.91
0.00
0.00
R2
0.06
Number of cases
1464
Note: dependent variable = feeling thermometer scores
Effect of losing on "think vote matters?"
Strg. Dem * Post Bush v. Gore decision -0.13 0.12
Strong Democrat 0.12 0.07
Strong Republican 0.18 0.08
Nader voter -0.02 0.19
Education 0.07 0.01
Age 0.00 0.00
Voted 1.08 0.07
Female 0.04 0.05
(Constant) 2.34 0.18
R2
0.06
Number of cases
1409
Note: High score = strongly disagrees
Effect of losing on "satisfied with democracy?"
Strg Dem * Post Bush v. Gore decision
Strong Democrat
Strong Republican
Nader voter
Education
Age
Voted
Female
(Constant)
R2
Number of cases
Note: high scores = less satisfied.
Source: 2000 American National Election Study.
0.15
-0.17
-0.16
0.41
-0.03
0.00
-0.20
0.08
2.66
0.06
1382
0.10
0.06
0.06
0.15
0.01
0.00
0.05
0.04
0.14
-1.09
1.77
2.25
-0.10
6.60
1.45
16.11
0.73
13.06
0.28
0.08
0.02
0.92
0.00
0.15
0.00
0.47
0.00
0.14
0.04
0.01
0.46
0.00
0.07
0.00
0.23
0.00
1.52
-3.16
-2.66
2.82
-3.35
-3.17
-3.73
1.86
18.70
0.13
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.06
0.00
0.06
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.00
21
Table 6: Support for Amending the US Constitution to allow Direct Election of President.
Variables:
Florida dummy
Female
Anglo
Latina/o
Gore voter
R’s candidate ahead in
vote
Nader voter
Buchanan voter
Non voter
Democrat
Republican
Age
Education
Economic assessment
Constant
N
%correct predicted
B
S.E. Wald
.308 .315
.951
.166 .145 1.305
-.436 .208 4.381
.387 .319 1.475
-.321 .338
.906
.718 .199 12.971
1.070
-.954
.071
.095
-.528
-.120
-.349
.077
1.956
1012
68.7
.713 2.247
.298 10.252
.299
.056
.194
.242
.185 8.151
.079 2.328
.064 29.858
.117
.435
.512 14.613
Sig.
.329
.253
.036
.225
.341
.000
.134
.001
.813
.623
.004
.127
.000
.510
.000
Note: Dependent variable 1 = amend constitution; 0 = Keep Electoral College.
Source: CBS News/ New York Times Monthly Poll # 6, November 27 – 28 2000.
22
Table 7: Trust in the Federal Government: Trends in the Effect of Identifying with the
Party in Control of the White House: USA, 1964 – 2002.
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
All
respondents
.09
.17
-.06
.07
.13
.16
-.07
.10
-.07
.09
.06
.18
.14
.06
-.006
.09
.16
.07
.09
.07
Weak party ID and
Independents
.07
.12
-.03
.04
.12
.08
-.03
.08
-.05
.10
.04
.15
.09
.04
-.029 n.s.
.04
.10
.07
.11
.05 n.s.
Strong party
identifiers only
.14
.32
-.13
.17
.18
.01 n.s.
-.21
.15
-.13
.07
.10
.25
.25
.12
.01 n.s.
.19
.25
.01 n.s.
.07 n.s
.09
Note: OLS coefficients, estimated from models predicting trust that control for race, age,
gender, union status, religious attendance, and unemployment. 2002 estimates do not
include controls for age and education. Respondents’ coded as “winning” if they
identified with the party in control of the White House at time of election. Trust is a fourcategory item where high scores equal more trust. All coefficients are statistically
significant unless notes with “n.s.”
Source: 1964 – 2000 NES Cumulative Data File. 2002 Early release of NES fresh crosssection.
23
Table 8: Effect of Democratic Party Identification on Trust in Government: 1994 – 2002.
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
All
respondents
.09
.16
.07
.09
-.06 (n.s)
Weak party ID and
Independents
.04
.10
.07
.11
-.06 n.s.
Strong party
identifiers only
.19
.25
.01 n.s.
.07 n.s
-.09 n.s
24
Figure 1: Effects on Trust in Government of Supporting Party in Control of White House:
1964 – 2002.
Figure 1: Trends in Effect of Winning
0.75
0.65
0.55
0.45
0.35
0.25
prop. losers
effect of winning
0.15
0.05
2002
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
1988
1986
1984
1982
1980
1978
1976
1974
1972
1970
1968
1966
-0.15
1964
-0.05
-0.25
Note: “Effect of winning” is the size of the coefficient for strong partisans who identify
with the party in control of the White House at the time of the survey. Proportion of
losers is the proportion of voters who did not identify with the party in control of the
White House at the time of the survey.
Source: National Election Study Data.
25