Download transitional economies: the case study of bosnia and herzegovina

Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze
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T RANSITIONAL E CONOMIES : T HE
C ASE S TUDY OF B OSNIA AND
H ERZEGOVINA
(P R Á C E S T U D E N T Ů B A K A L Á Ř S K É H O S T U D I A )
Ensar Halilović Počet znaků: 27 104
Kontakt: [email protected]
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Podpis je zároveň souhlasem s publikováním práce ve sborníku prací úspěšně se účastnících SOCD 2013.
1 Abstract Transitional economies, as well as emerging markets, present one of the topics in the world of
economics from which arise ever-growing dilemmas: How do they thrive; what policies
create the most perspective development; how will they find the most suitable place in highly
vibrant globalized community? Bosnia and Herzegovina is still engaged in the transition
which is subjected to various irregularities and inefficient acts of the government. So, in the
centre of this study is: How do policies and constituted laws hinder economic growth of
Bosnia and Herzegovina in transition from socialism to capitalism?
In order to reach the answer, various sources were addressed: international and national
statistical offices, scientific papers and books. The whole study is based on empirical and
historical approach to the issue as well as critical thinking judgments on imposing possible
solutions and dealing with inefficient legislative branches. Main economic indicators – GDP
growth, unemployment, inflation, current account balance, corruption index - were used to
present the most vivid picture of the current situation and the whole transitional path.
In the end, hypothesis of corruption, inefficient monetary and fiscal policies and laws as the
greatest hazards for economic growth is proven to be correct and possible solutions to the
issue are presented.
Key words: Transitional economies, Dayton Accords, economic growth, free market,
corruption, monetary policy
JEL Classification: P24, P26, D73, E50
Transformace ekonomiky stejně jako rozvíjející se trh představují jedno z témat světové
ekonomiky, z něhož vzniká bezpočet stále se opakujících dilemat: Jak se jim daří; za jakých
podmínek je tvořen perspektivní rozvoj, jak najdou v této vysoce pulsující globalizované
komunitě nejpřijatelnější pozici? Bosna a Hercegovina je stále zapojena do přechodů, ve
kterých je vystavena mnoha protiprávnostem a nevýkonným aktům vlády. Zásadní otázkou
této studie je jak politika a ústavní práva brání Bosně a Hercegovině v transformaci ze
socialismu na kapitalismus?
K dosažení požadované odpovědi bylo využito mnoho zdrojů jako například: národní a
mezinárodní statistické úřady, odborné studie a knihy. Celá studie je založena na empirickém
a historickém přístupu k danému problému, stejně tak jako na rozhodnutí na základě
2 kritického smýšlení, týkající se představování možných výsledků a řešení neefektivních
legislativních odvětví. K nejživějšímu vyobrazení dané situace byly použity hlavní
ekonomické ukazatele: růst HDP, nezaměstnanost, inflace, saldo běžného účtu či korupční
index. Závěr prokazuje hypotézu o korupci, neefektivní monetární a fiskální politiku a zákony
jako jedno z největších nebezpečí pro ekonomický růst a ilustruje potencionální řešení
uvedeného problému.
Klíčová slova: transformace ekonomiky, Daytonské dohody, ekonomický růst, volný trh,
korupce, měnová politika
JEL klasifikace: P24, P26, D73, E50
I Introduction 3 Transitional economies are type of economic systems in which countries go through highly
volatile and drastic changes of their economic settings – in the nearest past, from centrally
planned to free market economies. It inevitably includes modernization, reformation of laws,
privatization, introduction of price mechanism, opening financial and goods markets for
foreign competition, adjusted monetary policies, setting new bounds for international
cooperation as well as complete reconstruction of institutional apparatus of the state.
Democratic principles are subsequent values which are introduced through constitution,
respectively. Aforementioned ‘shock therapies’, if not exercised properly may deteriorate
economic growth and development while inducing incentives for various types of
misconducts in the society.
Economic growth is an increase in country’s national income (GDP) during a certain time
period, usually a year. It is most widely used measure for comparison of the economies
because it shows economic activity of the state which includes cosumer expenditure,
investments, and government spending as well as net exports. However, growing issues of
unemployment, inflation, balance of payments and corruption in transitional economies also
have to be analyzed as main indicators of economic efficiency and stability.
The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina is especially interesting to discuss because, in
comparison to most of the countries that went through transition, its process was stopped due
to the war which lasted from 1992 to 1995. Bosnia and Herzegovina started transitional
process in 1989 but all of the initial successes were restrained as a result of nationalistic
animosities and pre-war tensions. Furthermore, after 1995 Bosnia was subjected to immense
foreign inflows as part of the post-war reconstruction and its continued transition. On the
other hand, these inflows were kept on margin due to continuous corruption gridlock of
political elites which stood against active passing of the laws and created hazardous
environment in combination with strongly irrational decisions related to trade.
This study examines all of the mentioned factors and in addition, focuses on central bank’s
role in attracting foreign direct investments, correlation between corruption and climate for
business development. These accounts are not taken a priori to be immensely harmful for the
economy but instead, empirical research is provided to support the hypothesis that economic
growth, as well as successful transition, is mainly distorted due to bad political decisions and
laws constituted by the Dayton accords (Bassuener, 2010).
In addition, another big part of the hypothesis is corruption rate which prolonged all of the
legislative processes and deteriorated already stinging environment for successful and
4 relatively fast transition. Criminal activities conducted in privatization processes and in
allocation of donations to proper sectors obstructed growth. Still, the same opportunistic
political elites lead Bosnia and Herzegovina into the gloomy future.
II Theoretical Background 5 Alongside with most of the socialist countries of that time, Bosnia and Herzegovina started its
transition from command planned to free market economy in 1989. Unfortunately, due to
various volatile relations triggered by nationalistic tensions, first efforts of transition were not
successful. Animosity between Yugoslavian republics was highly intense in a way that it just
needed a spark to start the fire - firstly between Serbia and Croatia in 1991 and later in March
of 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina was attacked by Serbian military and paramilitary troops.
Unfortunate and disastrous war stopped Bosnia’s transformation for 5 years (Causevic, 2012).
It did not solely deprive the country of industrial potential which had been destroyed in the
war (about 80% of industrial infrastructure), but created completely new setting for country’s
transition (Bassuener, 2010). Bosnia and Herzegovina was forced to engage transition with
newly constituted laws; otherwise its transitional path would be based on laws which were set
up by ex-Yugoslavian government. In the period of 1996-2001, Bosnia received donations for
further transformation as well as for reconstruction of industry in the amount of $5.582 billion
and still, it was not able to make huge leaps after ‘donation period’ had come to the
end(Mervar, 2009). Allocation of these donations will be thoroughly examined in the fourth
part of the essay but it is important to set the weight on Dayton accords and its decrees.
Dayton Peace Agreement was signed on 21st November, 1995 by which all military actions
and further rise in human casualties was stopped in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Presidents of
three ex-Yugoslavian republics (Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina) signed the
agreement which was guarantee for peace but did not present a solution for internal
discrepancies which mostly negatively influenced structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Decrees of the Dayton accords were used to set up new constitution for Bosnia. In addition to
bumpy nature of transitional process, Bosnia had to make greater efforts to restructure and to
encourage democratic and free market principles in crippled economy. However, decrees of
Dayton accords can be defined as incredible and immensely illogical set of miscalculations
which deprived Bosnia from effective execution of free market policies. In addition, Dayton
made chances for reconciliation between three ethnic majorities even more unlikely in the
legislative branches as three main constitutional levels were created: FBiH (Federation –
majorities of Croats and Bosniaks), RS (Republic of Srpska – majority of Serbs) and District
of Brcko (Orbus, 2009).
The major flaw was created within the Central Bank. In Dayton accords, led by democratic
principles, right to create Central Bank was given to Parliament which happened on 20th June,
1997. However, from the very beginning, the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina has
been dysfunctional body as Bosnian currency - ‘convertible mark’ – had been pegged to
6 ‘Deutsche mark’ and it could have not initiated any loans to legislative bodies nor to
commercial banks and therefore, liquidity is weakened (Orbus, 2009). Also, the Central Bank
cannot by any mean control money supply and interest rates, neither for long-term or shortterm loans. Commercial banks are free to create their own interest rates which in the latest
period created major discrepancies between active and passive interest rates. Just to name a
few, for short-term loans, interval of passive and active interest rates ranged from 10% to 30%
(Savic, 2011). High active interest rates are rational reaction of the market to volatile
economic situation in the country in which foreign banks keep passive interest rates low due
to sufficient foreign resources (Savic, 2011).
However, incapability of Bosnia and Herzegovina to control its monetary policy contributed
to decreasing liquidity and plummeting foreign direct investments which will be discussed in
the analysis of economic growth.
The other two factors analyzed in this part set insecure foundations for Bosnian state and its
transition to EU membership. Heritage of war is burden for the peoples as political elites
make nationalistic tensions omnipresent even now, almost 20 years after the war. In addition,
Dayton accords enabled such kind of political figures to be in power even up to this day.
Inter-political disputes between leading parties make it harder to reregulate the laws which
would improve general well-being and get Bosnia and Herzegovina closer to EU.
III Data and Method 7 In order to properly comprehend the mounting issues in Bosnia’s transition toward EU, it is
not enough to collect data and to let them speak for themselves without inclusive explanation
of circumstances which create the story behind those figures. However, data obtained from
Bosnia’s Agency for Statistics and Bosnian ministries as well as from CIA and Worldbank
websites show invaluable quantitative side of political and economic struggle.
The second reason for data being beneficial for this topic is that through chronological set of
different economic indicators:
• GDP growth and GDP per Capita (1997-­‐2011) • Unemployment, Inflation Rates, CPI (2002-­‐2011) • Current Account Balance, VAT, FDIs, Donations, – one is able to see vivid picture of general situation and business i.e. economic trends in the
period of 1996-2011.
Processed and sampled data is used to create different charts which visually represent figures
and make them excessively comprehensible within the context of the whole paper in
development of Bosnia through time-series.
Solely, figures and graphs contribute to an immense extent to the understanding of the issue
but without other scientific papers and publications written about corruption and incredibly
complex public sector of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the whole study would lack many details.
Therefore, among many publications taking account about this issue, the following have
provided the most thorough insight as well as quantitative figures:
• Economic Perspectives on Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Period of Global Crisis (Fikret Causevic; March, 2012) • The Role of Monetary Policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Course of Joining the European Monetary Union (Savic, 2011) • Privatization Report in Bosnia and Herzegovina by Transparency International In “Analysis and Discussion” part of the paper, these data will be used to create principle
sample of policies and Dayton decisions which set the foundations for Bosnia’s questionable
development in the future. The extent of influence to current situation of each factor and
policy will be determined through deductive approach. In the end, this method should result in
various conclusions and bringing up questions of possible outcomes and changes.
IV Analysis and Discussion 8 4.1 Donations Right after the war, the world’s most powerful economies, led by unified Germany, devoted
respectful amount of their funds to restructuring of Bosnia’s economy. In total, more than
$5.000 billion were donated to Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period of 1996-2001. This
incredible figure was planned to be directed for rebuilding infrastructure, renovation of
industrial facilities and complete administrative reformation. Table 1 below shows how these
donations were allocated among different sectors in the economy.
TOTAL FBiH RS D.BRCKO Whole state Total (000) USD 5,156,672 4,139,257 911,426 81,989 24,000 Total (%) 100 100 100 100 100 Administration 9.2 8.9 11.4 2.0 6.6 4.7 4.4 6.2 2.0 0.0 5.1 4.9 4.0 24.5 1.1 Social sector 14.1 15.3 10.2 0.1 2.5 Other 14.8 16.0 10.1 9.5 0.0 Energy 10.6 9.1 18.6 0.2 0.0 Banks and 13.8 15.4 8.2 0.0 0.0 Industry 4.5 3.8 7.7 7.5 0.0 Primary sector 10.6 10.6 11.8 0.0 0.0 Traffic 3.9 4.7 0.0 8.3 0.0 Water supply 7.3 6.7 4.4 45.8 89.6 and house building Healthcare and social security Education, science, culture finance Table 1 – Allocation of donations between different sectors in the economy Sources: Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations of BiH, Ministry for Economic Relations and Coordination RS; Initial plan of donators – USA, Norway, and Germany, just to name a few – was to put Bosnia
back to its feet so when massive inflow of donations stops, Bosnia would be ready to continue
developing in desirable pace. Although Bosnia and Herzegovina received huge inflows of
9 foreign aid, due to the boundaries set by Dayton Agreements and prevailing nationalistic
pressure within the country, sole donations were insufficient to set the country on tracks for
soaring prosperity (Causevic, 2012). Right the opposite, in 1998, 60% of the population lived
below the poverty line (Mervar, 2009). In that time, political elites were still eagerly
discussing about who will win greater number of seats in legislative branches introduced by
messy Dayton Accords. Privatization exercised ‘behind the curtains’, powerful nationalistic
discourse and post-war bitterness kept away potential investors in the first few years of
restarted transition. When looked at the table above, almost the same percentage of total funds
was used to rebuild bureaucratic state apparatus as for the energy potential. Most of the
money cannot be traced because institutions are favorable to influence of political parties
which operate under corruptive measures (UNODC, 2011).
4.2. Delusive economic growth – unsustainable economic situation Before 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina was socialist country, measuring about 5% of constant
economic growth since 1945 (Woodward, 1995). After 1995, situation changed with newly
emerged incumbents who came out of war with growing fortune.
Due to the war in Bosnia (1992-1995) the country’s GDP was reduced from USD10.7 billion
(1991) to USD3.2 billion (1996) (Causevic, 2012). However reluctant political elites were to
come up with reconciliation, donations had an immense effect on rebuilding the basic
infrastructure for partial economic revival. Everything was rebuilt from the ashes and
economic activity was reinitiated and made a leap as shown in table 2 and graph 1 below.
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
growth (%)
34.4
15.6
9.6
5.5
4.4
GDP per capita
1,091
1,183
1,301
1,491
1,534
Annual GDP
($)
Table 2 – Annual GDP growth and GDP per capita Sources: Worldbank; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Federal Office of Statistics 10 Annual GDP Growth (%)
40
35
34.4
30
25
20
Annual GDP growth
15.6
15
10
9.6
5.5
5
4.4
0
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
Graph 1 – Real GDP Growth Sources: Worldbank; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Federal Office of Statistics In this period, Bosnia reached unprecedented levels of GDP growth rate even up to 35%. This
happened mainly due to the fact that almost everything was destroyed in the war and that
every single piece of the industry need to be rebuilt and reintegrated in the economic activity.
Correspondingly, GDP per capita followed positive trend of economic growth. On the other
hand, this growth did not mean prosperity for Bosnia’s citizens. Despite the fact that economy
was growing, political incumbents were desperately looming to get bigger size of the cake in
post-war dubious privatization.
In the publication of Transparency International in Bosnia and Herzegovina, many fallacies
and irregularities were mentioned in the process of privatization of once state-owned capital
(Transparency International, 2009). Certificates and vouchers were used to undervalue the
actual market price of state-owned firms which induced huge benefits for newly created
political and business elite. They became owners, entrepreneurs over night and turned highly
profitable beer brewers and other state-owned companies into cash-cows with encouraged
monopoly. Before 1998, 765 companies were privatized in Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, while 390 companies went through the same process in Republic of Srpska.
Furthermore, by 2008, 30.26% of these companies were either already bankrupt or were in the
process of bankruptcy (Transparency International, 2009).
Taken into account that most of the firms that ran pre-war growth, such as 4 big firms which
accounted for 35% of the total GDP were near to bankruptcy and that in the same time
government apparatus expanded by 40%, it would be the greatest fallacy to present allocation
11 of donations as successful or that privatization was driven for state’s benefits (Mervar, 2009;
Woodward, 1995). Instead, individuals who used their preferential positions in the
government used these processes for obtaining miscellaneous benefits.
Huge amounts of donations stopped to pour into the country in 2001. Tough economic climate
and disputes among incumbents were not factor of encouragement for perspective start-ups or
high unemployment. Table 3 and Graph 2 below show the relations between annual GDP
growths, unemployment rates and corruption perceptions indexes between 2002 and 2011.
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
-­‐5
Annual GDP Growth
Unemployment rate
CPI
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
5.3
4
6.1
5
6.2
6.8
5.4 -­‐2.9 0.8 1.7
31
31
31
31
31.8 27.3 28.1 37.3 43.1 43.3
3.3
3.1
2.9
2.9
3.3
3.2
3
3.2
3.2
Table 3 and Graph 2 – Indicator of economic activity and fallacies Sources: Transparency International; Worldbank; Central Intelligence Agency; Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina Indicated values, especially certain unemployment rates, cannot be taken as completely
truthful. The third index, given by Transparency International, sets the value upon the
previous two. Bosnia and Herzegovina is evaluated as one of the most corrupted countries in
Europe. The highest value for CPI is 10; as seen in the table, Bosnia has on average value of 3
which puts her in undesirable place for potential investors. Unemployment rates are soaring
from year to year. Taking into account that these are official figures, actual situation might be
even worse. High jumps in GDP growth rates serve more as a delusion as will be shown in the
further analysis.
Unemployment rates in 2007 and 2008 seem highly doubtful in comparison to other years in
the table. One reason for possible manipulation of the data is that 2008 was the election year
12 and politicians needed to show at least slight improvements in the overall economy. In
addition, GDP growth is also dubious, except for crisis year of 2009, because of discouraging
environment for business formation and job growth. The next table shows high inflation rates
with one irregularity in 2009 and plummeting investment percentage of GDP.
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
6.1
1.5
7.4
-0.4
2.2
3.7
6.2
13.6
5.3
1.4
1.4
2.4
Inflation rate
(%)
Investments
(as % of
GDP)
Table 4 – Inflation rates and Investments Sources: Federal Statistical Office There are two main reasons for depressing environment for possible investors in Bosnia and
Herzegovina: deprived monetary policy and business laws.
Monetary policy was partially explained earlier in the ‘Theoretical Background’ section. To
further detail, the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina has no right to control money
supply unless it is supported by foreign currency; it cannot control interest rate, neither
benchmark in terms of inflation or maximum interest rate for commercial banks. There is no
inflation of the currency because it was firstly pegged to deutsche mark and after to euro in
order to preserve competitiveness, ceteris paribus. However, diminishing demand and high
costs led to growing cost-push inflation rates as shown in Table 4. People save more and
spend less as future is uncertain which sets high interest rates for active loans, depriving
chances for investments. On the other hand, cost of basic commodities (gas, electricity, water)
is increasing annually making the cost of production to soar.
Other problems for prosperous economic growth are high corporate taxes and no incentives
for start-ups. Now, in desperate situation of 43% of labor force being unemployed, bigger
problem for government is disproportionally miserable job growth. To make situation even
worse, youth unemployment strikes the rate of 73.7% (Đipa, MDGIF, 2012).There are not
desirable incentives for foreign direct investments due to high rate of corruption, political
instability and maturity period for registration of firm which takes up to 2 months and
thousands of Euros (Mervar, 2009). Depressing business environment shows how ineffective
bureaucratic apparatus of the state is. With this kind of regulation, creation of productive
start-ups and top notch working atmosphere seems impossible.
13 As a part of transitional process, liberalization of trade was imminent factor. But, Bosnian
government made fatal mistake by disregarding its own producers in 2004 with complete
liberalization toward Croatian food products. It would not present any greater concern if
Bosnia had established fully functional and efficient industrial sector. The table below shows
current account balance and revenues from value added tax introduced in 2006.
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
-1.6
-2.6
-1.1
-0.9
-1.6
1.9
2.3
2.1
2.2
2.3
Current account
balance (billions $)
Value added tax
(billions $)
Table 5 – Current account balance and VAT Sources: Worldbank Value added tax was planned to be a source of extra profit which would serve the
government. Graph 3 below shows how much VAT contributed to indirect taxation in 2011.
Unfortunately, initial gains from VAT are completely diminishing in comparison to the
greater scale of events which happen in net export sections. Bosnia and Herzegovina
constantly has negative current account balance and complete balance of payments.
Consequentially, internal debt keeps growing up to rates of 40% (Transparency International,
2009).
Indirect Taxation 2011
VAT
Customs
Excise
Tolls
Graph 3 – Indirect taxation Sources: Federal Statistical Office; Worldbank 14 V Conclusion All of the factors analyzed in previous sections are completely interconnected in creation of
real economic situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. High unemployment rate, surging
inflation (despite the fact that artificially controlled currency does not produce any of it), as
well as discouraging climate for foreign direct investments - are all consequences of distorted
laws and constitution which keep on serving partial interests of incumbents while inducing
uncertainty in the future of development of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Economy cannot grow virtually as a result of government spending. Diminishing net exports,
investments and consumer spending will not be empowered to greater extent unless laws for
private sector are more thoroughly addressed and reformed. Government has to encourage
entrepreneurship, massive job growth in terms of more favorable climate for investments and
even subsidies for start-ups which look promising for job creation (high-end manufacturing,
for instance). On the other hand, incapability to have independent monetary policy prevents
country to step in with desirable monetary goals which would provide benefits for the whole
economy. For example, if the Central Bank was able to control money supply i.e. the
exchange rate, it could make goods from Bosnia and Herzegovina far more favorable for
foreign markets. Other way around, strong convertible mark makes them too expensive for
foreign markets, even for those in the region, and exceedingly unattractive. All being said
proves the hypothesis from the very beginning that the greatest obstacle in country’s transition
toward EU membership and toward completely functioning free market mechanisms is
legislative branches.
Therefore, steps (Dayton amendments) that Bosnia ought to take in order to thrive are:
1. Fighting corruption through decreasing state apparatus (could also serve as a form of
austerity measures)
2. Monetary policy independency – control of inflation and creating better climate for
FDIs
3. Greater solvency of fiscal deficits and correction of fiscal laws (taxation) in order to
encourage FDIs
4. Subsidies for start-ups and shorter time for creation of a company as legal entity
15 If government and abovementioned laws remain sclerotic, Bosnia and Herzegovina will
hardly be able to fight greater challenges in globalized world on its way toward EU
membership risking to be left out in a climate highly unfavorable for development.
16 Literature Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina. National Accounts. Bosnia and
Herzegovina, 2000/2012.
Bassuener K. Bosnia-Herzegovina, the EU and the International Community. Heinrich Boll
Stiftung, EU, 2010.
Causevic F. Economic Perspectives on Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Period of Global
Crisis. Oxford University Press, 2012.
Central Intelligence Agency. Data. Available from: https://www.cia.gov
Đipa, Dino and Salminka Fazlić. Glasovi mladih. MDGIF, Feburary, 2012.
Federal Office of Statistics. Data. Available from: http://www.fzs.ba/Eng/index.htm
Mervar A. Ekonomski problemi Bosne i Hercegovine kao zemlje u tranziciji. Scribd. 2009.
Jan, 2013 (cited). Available from: http://www.scribd.com/doc/87073782/EkonomskiProblemi-Bosne-I-Hercegovine-Kao-Zemlje-u-Tranziciji
Ministry of Economic Relations and Coordination RS. 2009. Jan, 2013 (cited). Available
from: http://www.icr.rs
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations of BiH. Reports and Publications. 2012.
Jan, 2013 (cited). Available from: http://www.mvteo.gov.ba
Orbus. Dejtonski Ustav Bosne I Hercegovine. Orbus 2009 (internet). Jan, 2013 (cited).
Available from: http://www.orbus.be/bih/dejtonski_ustav_bosne_i_hercegovine1.htm
Savic M. The Role of Monetary Policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Course of Joining
the European Monetary Union. Univerzitet Sinergija, 2011.
Transparency International BiH. Privatizacija državnog kapitala u Bosni i Hercegovini. 2009.
Jan, 2013 (cited). Available from: http://ti-bih.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/03/PRIVATIZACIJA_DRZAVNOG_KAPITALA_U_BiH1.pdf
17 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Bribery
as Experienced by the Population. UNODC, 2011.
Woodward S.L. Socialist Unemployment: The Political Economy of Yugoslavia 1945-1990.
Princeton University Press, 1995.
Worldbank. Data. Available from: http://data.worldbank.org
List of tables and Graphs
Table 1 – Allocation of donations between different sectors in the economy
Table 2 – Annual GDP growth and GDP per capita
Table 3 – Indicator of economic activity and fallacies
Table 4 – Inflation rates and Investments
Table 5 – Current account balance and VAT
Graph 1 – Real GDP Growth
Graph 2 – GDP, UR and CPI
Graph 3 – Indirect taxation
18