Survey
* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
Download File - History @ The Brookvale Groby Learning Campus
Transcript
Name: ALPS Target: GCSE Grade (if applicable): Based on your overall performance so far: what is your most important skills and study targets for studying this essay based topic. AS ALPS target: Personal target: SKILL TARGET: STUDY TARGET: Russia Skills AO1a: I can use a wide range of accurate and relevant evidence. AO1a: I can accurately and confidently use appropriate historical terminology. AO1a: I can create clearly structured and coherent answers to questions. AO1a: I can communicate accurately and legibly. AO1b: I understand how to analyse key concepts (continuity/ change/ causation/ significance) within their historical context. AO1b: I can cover a range of relevant factors that are fully evaluated/ linked. AO1b: I can show clear understanding of significance/ links between factors. AO1b: I can produce a consistently and relevantly analytical answer with full support. Study skills: I can take responsibility for my own learning, seek information and clarification independently and know when to ask for help. Study skills: I can keep up to date with deadlines and stay organised. Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree nor disagree Disagree Strongly disagree Führerprinzip Volk Völkischer Beobachter Sturm Abteilung (SA) Gauleiter Anti-Semitism Anti-Capitalism Nationalism Lebensraum Volksgemeinschaft Schutz Staffel (SS) National opposition Grand Coalition Article 48 Intrigue Ideology Politics of Anxiety Propaganda Demographic Mass Suggestion Scapegoat Führer Cult Bröt und Arbeit Sonderweg Night of the Long Knives Legal Revolution Enabling Act Reichstag Fire Revolution from Below During the course of this theme, you will be using a learning technique called Building Learning Power which is all about helping you learn better. It works by developing your ability to learn through exercising four different learning muscles. This booklet is designed to help you identify your four learning muscles and work with them. The four different learning muscles seen in the brain opposite will have an image to help you identify them throughout the booklet. Resilience: Engaging with the learning, absorption in the task; managing distractions, persevering; being prepared to get it wrong and learn from mistakes and sticking at it; even when it is hard. Resourcefulness: Questioning; making links; imagining; reasoning; capitalising on the resources you have available and using them well. Reflectiveness: Planning your learning; revising, monitoring and adapting; distilling (drawing out lessons from experience) and meta-learning (understanding learning and how you learn). Reciprocity: Being ready, willing and able to learn alone and with others; balancing self reliance and sociability; collaborating; recognising and improving skills such as empathy and listening; imitation (picking up others’ skills, habits and values). Aspect of the Topic Legacy of Versailles and weaknesses of Weimar Confidence Level? Target Nazi Party in 1928 Impact of Great Depression, elections and governments 1928–33 Communism Rise and appeal of Nazism Role of propaganda The Role of Hitler Hindenburg; Papen, Schleicher and ‘backstairs’ intrigue The election of March 1933 Essay Title Mark /50 Grade Key Target Learning Objective To be able to explain and evaluate the position of the Nazi Party in 1928 . Success Criteria 1. (Ao1a) To be able to describe the position of the Nazi Party in 1928 . 2. (Ao1b) To be able to apply the weaknesses of the Weimar Republic and the legacy of the Treaty of Versailles to the Nazi Party . 3. (A01b) To be able to assess whether the Nazi Party really was just “noisy, undisciplined, vainglorious” with a leader who was “a half-educated posturing foreigner” (Historian, Eugene Davis ). Task 1: The Weaknesses of the Weimar Republic In the space below, write a list of the weaknesses of the Weimar Republic. You do not need to go into detail. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. You have a timeline of the Rise of the Nazis. How many of these weaknesses do you see on that timeline. Task 2: How did the Nazi Party emerge? Read pages 87-89 of Access to History on the emergence of the Nazi Party note on lined paper any evidence of; a) Hitler’s personal skills. b) Hitler acting as an astute politician. c) Use of the media and propaganda. d) Nazi popularity, or lack thereof. Then, answer the following questions: i. How important was Hitler to the development of the Nazi Party? ............................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... ii. What were the SA? Why were they important? ............................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... iii. How effectively did the Nazis use the media? ............................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... Task 3: The Structure of the Nazi Party Use your reading (from Heinemann Advanced History p. 87-89 and Weimar and Nazi Germany, John Hite and Chris Hinton, p.110-111, and 119) to create your own diagram of the structure of the Nazi Party in the box below. Add to the diagram where you think the organisation of the Nazi Party will be a strength for the Nazis. Task 4: Strategy and Leadership of the Nazi Party in the 1920s? Read page 96-97 of Access to History and complete the table below. What evidence is there of the following in your reading? It is also worth highlighting your reading. The Nazis were revitalised Divisions, splits and factions in the That Hitler had solved any problems following the Munich Putsch Nazi Party by the end of the Bamberg Conference in 1926. Task 5: The Reichstag Elections of 1928. a) What do the following figures reveal about the popularity of the Nazi Party in Germany? Election of May 4th 1924: the Nazis (standing as the National Socialist Freedom Movement) received 6.5% of the popular vote and 32 seats in the Reichstag out of a total of 472 seats. Election of December 7th 1924: the Nazis (standing as the National Socialist Freedom Movement) received 3% of the popular vote and 14 seats in the Reichstag out of a total of 493 seats. Election of May 20th 1928: the Nazis received 2.6% of the popular vote and 12 seats in the Reichstag out of a total of 491 seats. ............................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... b) Using Access to History page 99, what glimmers of hope can you spot for the Nazi Party? ............................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... Task 5: Evaluation, was the Nazi Party really just “noisy, undisciplined, vainglorious” with a leader who was “a half-educated posturing foreigner”? In the box below, using whatever method you feel is best, produce your answer to this question- it can be written, drawn, explained using a diagram or a combination of the three. Learning Objective To be able to explain what the Nazi Ideology was . Success Criteria 1. (Ao1a) To be able to describe Nazi ideology . 2. (Ao1b) To understand and explain the difference between the Nationalism and Socialism aspects of National Socialism . Challenge Success Criteria Make connections between your understanding of the Weimar Republic in order to explain how some aspects of National Socialism would have been appealing to Germans at the time . Task 1: Nazi beliefs and Ideology (Homework) Read pages 92-95 on Nazi beliefs and ideology in Access to History/ research Nazi ideology using your orange textbook and any other sources. It is easy to find out about this aspect of Nazism. Your task is to: Produce a leaflet that explains Nazi beliefs and ideology to the uninformed. Ensure that you don’t focus purely on race, but also on the Treaty of Versailles, German Nationalism, Socialist aspects of Nazi policies etc. Find examples of Nazi propaganda (not just posters, but also speeches, pamphlets, etc.) that show different aspects of Nazi ideology. Include them in your leaflet. The propaganda can be from any time period, but it would be preferable to have a range- e.g. pre 1933, 1933-39 and then wartime propaganda. Be prepared to show yours to the class. A useful website on Nazi Propaganda is available from this address: http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/ Task 2: The Nazi’s 25 Point Programme a) Write a definition of the word “Nationalism”. ............................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... b) Write a definition of the word “Socialism”. ............................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... c) Look at the copy of the Nazi 25 Point Programme (1920) below. Where can you identify nationalism and where can you identify socialism? 1. We demand the unification of all Germans in the Greater Germany on the basis of the people's right to self-determination. 2. We demand equality of rights for the German people in respect to the other nations; abrogation of the peace treaties of Versailles and St. Germain. 3. We demand land and territory (colonies) for the sustenance of our people, and colonization for our surplus population. 4. Only a member of the race can be a citizen. A member of the race can only be one who is of German blood, without consideration of creed. Consequently no Jew can be a member of the race. 5. Whoever has no citizenship is to be able to live in Germany only as a guest, and must be under the authority of legislation for foreigners. 6. The right to determine matters concerning administration and law belongs only to the citizen. Therefore we demand that every public office, of any sort whatsoever, whether in the Reich, the county or municipality, be filled only by citizens. We combat the corrupting parliamentary economy, office-holding only according to party inclinations without consideration of character or abilities. 7. We demand that the state be charged first with providing the opportunity for a livelihood and way of life for the citizens. If it is impossible to sustain the total population of the State, then the members of foreign nations (non-citizens) are to be expelled from the Reich. 8. Any further immigration of non-citizens is to be prevented. We demand that all nonGermans, who have immigrated to Germany since 2 August 1914, be forced immediately to leave the Reich. 9. All citizens must have equal rights and obligations. 10. The first obligation of every citizen must be to work both spiritually and physically. The activity of individuals is not to counteract the interests of the universality, but must have its result within the framework of the whole for the benefit of all. Consequently we demand: 11. Abolition of unearned (work and labour) incomes. Breaking of debt (interest)-slavery. 12. In consideration of the monstrous sacrifice in property and blood that each war demands of the people, personal enrichment through a war must be designated as a crime against the people. Therefore we demand the total confiscation of all war profits. 13. We demand the nationalisation of all (previous) associated industries (trusts). 14. We demand a division of profits of all heavy industries. 15. We demand an expansion on a large scale of old age welfare. 16. We demand the creation of a healthy middle class and its conservation, immediate communalization of the great warehouses and their being leased at low cost to small firms, the utmost consideration of all small firms in contracts with the State, county or municipality. 17. We demand a land reform suitable to our needs, provision of a law for the free expropriation of land for the purposes of public utility, abolition of taxes on land and prevention of all speculation in land. 18. We demand struggle without consideration against those whose activity is injurious to the general interest. Common national criminals, usurers, profiteers and so forth are to be punished with death, without consideration of confession or race. 19. We demand substitution of a German common law in place of the Roman Law serving a materialistic world-order. 20. The state is to be responsible for a fundamental reconstruction of our whole national education program, to enable every capable and industrious German to obtain higher education and subsequently introduction into leading positions. The plans of instruction of all educational institutions are to conform with the experiences of practical life. The comprehension of the concept of the State must be striven for by the school [Staatsbuergerkunde] as early as the beginning of understanding. We demand the education at the expense of the State of outstanding intellectually gifted children of poor parents without consideration of position or profession. 21. The State is to care for the elevating national health by protecting the mother and child, by outlawing child-labor, by the encouragement of physical fitness, by means of the legal establishment of a gymnastic and sport obligation, by the utmost support of all organizations concerned with the physical instruction of the young. 22. We demand abolition of the mercenary troops and formation of a national army. 23. We demand legal opposition to known lies and their promulgation through the press. In order to enable the provision of a German press, we demand, that: a. All writers and employees of the newspapers appearing in the German language be members of the race; b. Non-German newspapers be required to have the express permission of the State to be published. They may not be printed in the German language; c. Non-Germans are forbidden by law any financial interest in German publications, or any influence on them, and as punishment for violations the closing of such a publication as well as the immediate expulsion from the Reich of the non-German concerned. Publications which are counter to the general good are to be forbidden. We demand legal prosecution of artistic and literary forms which exert a destructive influence on our national life, and the closure of organizations opposing the above made demands. 24. We demand freedom of religion for all religious denominations within the state so long as they do not endanger its existence or oppose the moral senses of the Germanic race. The Party as such advocates the standpoint of a positive Christianity without binding itself confessionally to any one denomination. It combats the Jewish-materialistic spirit within and around us, and is convinced that a lasting recovery of our nation can only succeed from within on the framework: The good of the state before the good of the individual.[8] 25. For the execution of all of this we demand the formation of a strong central power in the Reich. Unlimited authority of the central parliament over the whole Reich and its organizations in general. The forming of state and profession chambers for the execution of the laws made by the Reich within the various states of the confederation. The leaders of the Party promise, if necessary by sacrificing their own lives, to support by the execution of the points set forth above without consideration. Challenge Which points do you think would be appealing to Germans in Weimar and why? Use page 128-129 of the Weimar and Nazi Germany (John Hite, Chris Hinton) book to help you. From what you know of the Nazis already, which points do you think would be most important to the Nazis? Learning Objective To be able to assess the level of support that Nazis had . Success Criteria 1. (Ao1b) To be able to explain why some groups supported the Nazis and some didn’t 2. (Ao1b) To be able to assess the success of the Nazis in attracting voters . Challenge Success Criteria To be able to evaluate the significance of the Nazi votes . Task 1: The Nazi Appeal Use your reading from Access to History to add notes to the diagram below. . Task 2: The Nazi Gingerbread Man Use your reading from the Weimar and Nazi Germany (John Hite, Chris Hinton) textbook (page 118-127) to explain the proportion of support that the Nazis got from each group. Divide your gingerbread man up into roughly proportional sections for each section. CHALLENGE: Can you show how the vote changed? Task 3: The Success of the Nazis What problems did the Nazis have to overcome in attracting voters? ............................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... How successful were the Nazis at attracting voters? Use what you have read to explain this. (Note: it may be helpful to highlight evidence of Nazi success). ............................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... Learning Objective To be able to explain the impact of the Great Depression and how that affected the Nazis . Success Criteria 1. (Ao1a) To be able to describe the impact of the Great Depression on Weimar Germany AND the response of the Weimar government . 2. (Ao1b) To be able to explain how that affected different groups in Germany . 3. (Ao1b) To begin to explain how that might affect the votes for extremist parties such as the Nazis and the Communists . Challenge Success Criteria To develop well substantiated conclusions using detailed knowledge and evidence . Task 1: The Great Depression. How did it happen? This diagram explains how the depression affected Germany, as does the box on page 43 of your orange textbook. Use the PowerPoint that accompanies this lesson, plus page 45 of your textbook to add more detail to this diagram. Task 2: The Impact of the Great Depression a) Use these diagrams to create a conclusion about what happened to the German economy 1928-1933. Aspect Industrial Production (1913=100) Exports (billion RM) Imports (billion RM) Unemployment (million) Wages (1913=100) Agricultural prices (1913=100) Industrial prices (1913 =100) Government income (billion RM) 1927 110 145 138 1928 113 12.3 14.0 1.4 164 132 159 9.0 1929 114 13.5 13.5 1.8 169 126 157 1930 99 12.0 10.4 3.1 155 107 154 1931 82 9.6 6.7 4.5 137 89 142 1932 66 5.7 4.7 5.6 113 77 118 6.6 1933 74 4.9 4.2 4.8 115 84 111 6.8 Percentage drop in income in 1932 compared to 1929 France Britain Percentage drop in income in 1932 compared to 1929 Germany USA 0 Ratio of unemployed in 1933 USA Germany Britain France 1 in 4 1 in 3 1 in 5 1 in 7 10 20 30 40 50 Write your conclusion in this box. What was the impact of the Great Depression on Germany’s economy? Challenge: What effect do you think this would have on the political stability of Weimar? ............................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... b) Using the tables above, the information on page 42-43 and any other information available to you, explain how the Depression would affect: A young working class male Middle class white collar workers Farmers Families paying rent or mortgages Workers who were already unemployed Business owners who produced/ sold goods mainly for export c) Can you add to this: how that would affect these groups politically (e.g. who they might support etc.)? Task 3: What did the government do about the Great Depression? a) Use the table below to draw a conclusion. Government expenditure: per capita state expenditure (at all levels, i.e. federal states, local) at 1900 prices (M) (i.e. so fluctuations in prices are taken into account). Items 1913 1925 1929 1939 Economy (e.g. transport) 17 16 22 18 Welfare Services 20 65 102 106 Public housing 0.4 10 13 4 Education 17 20 28 24 Interest payments on National Debt 6 1 4 7 ............................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... b) Read the information below and highlight the following: 1. Limits to the actions that the Weimar government could take. 2. Actions the Weimar government took that would annoy the people of Germany. 3. Actions the Weimar government took that were successful. 4. Extension- actions the Weimar government took that might push the people of Germany to extremist parties. The Great Depression was all very different to the hyperinflation of 1923 – prices fell and the main issue was unemployment. Lack of demand lowered prices. Hyperinflation still had an impact on Weimar’s collapse. Weimar’s response to the depression was affected by what had happened in 1923- they couldn’t pump money into the economy or use deficit financing to stimulate industry, and help the unemployed because of their fear of causing inflation. Also, voters were still annoyed at yet another economic crisis. The Weimar government actually did the following: Protectionism Restricting imports from other countries, especially if they were cheaper than homeproduced goods. However- other countries could retaliate and restrict your imports and prices tend to rise (especially food). It also annoyed sections of the economy- e.g. workers (who want low food prices) and industries that exported goods (who want imports). Reduction of Expenditure 1928-1933, budget for war victims’ pensions cut by one third. This made people angry and betrayed. Intervention (too little, too late) Chancellor Brüning set up some public works schemes (although there is evidence to suggest that he allowed the crisis to continue as part of his campaign to dismantle the welfare state and get reparations payments ended). Papen allocated unused land to dispossessed peasants and workers. The economy did begin to improve late in 1932, but too late to have an effect on voters. The Nazi party took the credit for it. What caused the Weimar government to act in that way? Fear: scared of recurring hyperinflation. Legal restrictions: on the Reichsbank as part of the Dawes and Young plans) meant it could not greatly increase the amount of money printed nor devalue the mark. Problems borrowing money: investors had lost their savings in 1923, and were unable or reluctant to lend money. Foreigners lacked confidence. Foreign governments asked unacceptable terms. Brüning: his aforementioned scheming. Precedent: a minor slump in 1926 had been solved without any action being taken. Coalition government: could not agree on what to do. March 1930, Müller’s government collapsed because they could not agree on what cuts to make. Homework task On lined paper, make notes on the fall of different coalition governments and Chancellors from your textbook (pages 44-50) AND complete the following questions (in this booklet). You will need to make the notes BEFORE answering the questions. It is suggested that you also make a simple timeline to go alongside your notes. 1) Why does Müller’s government fall? ............................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... 2) Why does Brüning’s government fall? ............................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... 3) What do Müller’s and Brüning’s governments show about Hindenburg’s role as President? ............................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... 4) How democratic were Müller’s and Brüning’s governments? ............................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... 5) Why did the Nazi vote increase? ............................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... 6) To what extent did the Great Depression increase support for the Nazi and Communist parties? ............................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... Learning Objective To be able to explain how Hitler became Chancellor in 1933 . Success Criteria 1. (Ao1a) To be able to describe the different events that led to Hitler becoming Chancellor . 2. (Ao1b) To be able to explain why Hitler was able to become Chancellor in 1933 . 3. (Ao1b) To evaluate the significance of the different factors that enabled Hitler to become Chancellor in 1933 . Challenge Success Criteria To develop well substantiated conclusions using detailed knowledge and evidence . You will know you are successful when you can answer the following two questions. When you have finished all the tasks, complete these boxes? Why did Hitler and the Nazis become so politically powerful? Why was Weimar Germany replaced by a Nazi dictatorship? Task 1: The reasons for the fall of Parliamentary Democracy a) Using the reading from page 135 of the SHP textbook (Weimar and Nazi Germany, John Hite and Chris Hinton). Highlight your reading with the different reasons that are in this diagram. b) Which reasons appear to be most significant? ............................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... c) How did the Communists exploit the depression? (use page 50 in your textbook to help you answer this question) ............................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... d) How important was the Great Depression in increasing the Nazi vote? Read the reading below to help you answer this question, which you should complete on paper (feel free to represent this in a different way from simply writing it. You could create a diagram, produce a mind map, develop a poster- whatever you prefer!). You can also use page 51-52, and Access to History: Democracy and Dictatorship in Germany pages 102-109. Ensure you refer to both Nazi electoral success in the Reichstag and Hitler’s presidential campaign. Why was the 1930 Reichstag election so important? Chancellor Brüning had hoped that in the developing crisis the people would be encouraged to support the parties of the centre-right from which a coalition could be formed. However, the election results proved him wrong and the real beneficiary was the Nazi Party, which increased its vote from 810,000 to a staggering 6,409,600. This gave them 107 seats and 18.3%, the NSDAP became the second largest political party in Germany. The DNVP (nationalists) halved their vote from 14.2% to 7% and the DDP and DVP (middle class, democratic) lost 20 seats. Of the left wing parties, the SPD declined from 29.8% to 24.5% but the KPD increased from 10.8%-13.1%. There are several key factors to explain the Nazi breakthrough: Since 1928, the Nazi leaders had deliberately directed their propaganda at rural and middle class/ lower middle-class audiences. Nazi gains were at the expense of the DNVP, DVP and DDP. Key term: The Politics of This wasn’t just ‘protest votes’. Nearly half of the Nazi Anxiety seats were won by the Party’s attracting ‘new’ votersRefers to the practice of including those new to voting: extremist parties of making o The electorate had grown by 1.8 million since the people worry about the previous election because a new generation of current government in voters had been added to the roll. order to win votes. o The turn out had increased from 75.6% to 82%. One of the main implications of the 1930 Reichstag election were that the left and right extremes had made extensive gains against the pro-democratic parties. This now made it very difficult for proper democratic parliamentary government to function. Task 2: Von Papen and Von Schleicher and their failure to stabilise the situation in Germany leading to the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor. Using pages 52-53 to create a storyboard of the events that got Hitler into power. Try to think of an interesting way to show what is happening- e.g. election results could be show by a newspaper front page. Task 3: Analysis tasks based on this information. a) Could Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor have been avoided? ............................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... b) Hitler was manoeuvred into power by ‘back stairs intrigue’. How far do you agree with this view of Hitler’s success in January 1933? ............................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... c) Hitler came to power just at the moment when the Nazi Party was in decline. How far do you agree with this view? ............................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... Learning Objective To be able to evaluate how effectively Hitler established a one party dictatorship in Germany. Success Criteria 1. (Ao1a) To be able to describe the different methods that were used by Hitler to establish a one party dictatorship in Germany, 1933-1934 . 2. (Ao1b) To be able to explain why he was able to do this . 3. (Ao1b) To be able to evaluate the effectiveness of his method . Before you Begin Today’s Lesson This is a place to help you go through your notes and work through the success criteria. You could do this as you go through, or when you have completed this section or a mixture of the two. Success Criteria 1: Ao1a, description of methods Use this box to record key Use this box to record who legislation and its dates: important people/ organisations are. Use this box to record any key terms that are particularly important to this section. Success Criteria 2: Ao1b. Why could he achieve this? Throughout your notes, highlight, colour code or create a symbol to show which of the factors below help Hitler to achieve his one party dictatorship? Weaknesses in the Weimar Violence/ Imprisonment Use of the army/ police constitution. Propaganda Use of Nazi organisation (e.g. the Support from business/ industry Gauleiters) Support from the army Support/ ignoring from the Church Hitler’s leadership (Führerprinzip) Success Criteria 3: Ao1b. How effectively did he do this? Wherever you think Hitler has done something well give him a smiley face. Wherever things may cause problems in the future, give him a frowny/ unhappy face. Task 1: The Election of March 1933 Using page 55-56, and the election posters below, explain how the Nazis tried to win votes in the Reichstag elections of March 1933. “Hitler Builds. Vote List 1” “Remembering the National Socialist Revolution, 1933” “In deepest need, Hindenburg turned to Hitler. Do the same and vote list 1, National Socialist”. a) How did Hitler try to win votes in the Reichstag election of March 1933? ............................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... b) Why did Hitler call the election of March 1933? ............................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... c) How did Hindenburg allow Hitler to use the emergency powers act (Article 48)? ............................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... d) How did the Reichstag fire help the Nazi election campaign? ................................................................................................................ .................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... After the Reichstag fire, Dr Wilhelm Frick drew up (and Hindenburg signed, the ‘Decree for the Protection of People and State’). It repressed the Communists (KPD), removed the civil and constitutional rights of the German people and meant the Nazis could take anyone into “protective custody” for as long as they liked). This law (sometimes referred to as the Basic Law of the Third Reich) lasted as long as the Nazis were in power. e) Who do you think set the Reichstag fire? ............................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... f) What were the results of the March 1933 election? Were they a problem for the Nazi party? ............................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... Task 2: How was the Enabling Act passed and why was it so important? The Enabling Act was an amendment to the German constitution that allowed Hitler to draw up legislation without the involvement of the Reichstag OR the president. a) Using page 63-65 of the textbook and your reading, produce a timeline (on paper) of how the Enabling Act came to be passed. This can simply be recorded as a sequence of events and does not need much in terms of detail. b) How important was the Enabling Act in establishing Nazi power? ............................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................... Task 3: Use page 65-69 to complete the following Little Box Notes on Gleichschaltung (Coordination). How did the Nazis take control of the different political parties? How did the Nazis take control of the workers? How did the Nazis take control of Business and Industry? How did the Nazis take control of the Churches? How did the Nazis take control of education, the media and culture? How did the Nazis take control of the army? Do you think that would be sufficient? Task 4: The Night of the Long Knives Complete the following diagram, using Access to History (pages 151-153) and the textbook (pages 69-71). What did Hitler decide to do? The Night of the Long Knives ................................................................................ .................................................................................... .................................................................................... ................................................................................... ................................................................................... ................................................................................... .................................................................................... .................................................................................... .................................................................................... Task 5: Conclusions How secure was Hitler by August 1934? Use the following box to conclude: in whichever way you feel appropriate. Task 6: Essay Planning Use the History Burger to plan the following essay title. How successful were the Nazis in their policy of Gleichschaltung (coordination) after 1933? historytoday.com http://www.historytoday.com/david-welch/hitler-who-voted-him Hitler - Who Voted For Him? David Welch attributes the Nazi leader's electoral success to much more than slick propaganda. In January 1933, von Schleicher's government, which had attempted to conciliate both Centre and Left interests within the Weimar system, was unable to secure a majority in the Reichstag and resigned. On 30 January the President, Field Marshal Hindenburg, accepted a cabinet with Hitler as Chancellor, von Papen as Vice-Chancellor and nationalists including Nazis in other posts. There is little mystery about the electoral success in 1933 of the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP). Hitler became Chancellor constitutionally. The suggestion that Hitler and his party somehow 'seized' power is rather misleading. The Nazis themselves are largely responsible for perpetuating this myth by continuing to refer to a Kampfzeit (period of struggle) and to their Machtergreifung (seizure of power). Admittedly having gained power the Nazis used the Reichstag fire of 27 February 1933 as a pretext for suspending civil liberties and holding elections in circumstances highly favourable to themselves. In the elections of 5 March the NSDAP made further gains, winning 288 seats but failed to secure an overall majority (43.9 per cent). In this article I want to look at the means employed by the Nazis that led to their electoral success and. particularly to reappraise the view that they somehow 'conquered the masses' and that propaganda alone had 'brainwashed' the German people into electing them. Merely to talk in terms of the 'conquest of the masses' implies the manipulation or seduction of millions into voting for the Nazi Party in apparent disregard for their own best interests. The assumption is that these voters, who might otherwise have resisted Nazism, were 'mesmerised' by a well-functioning propaganda machine. The danger of such an approach is that it concentrates on the 'techniques of persuasion' at the expense of detached analysis of the programme put forward by the NSDAP to solve fundamental economic and social problems Such an approach leads to the inevitable conclusion that to vote for the Nazi manifesto was an 'irrational' act. This does not solve the problem of why millions of Germans acted in such an apparently irrational way. It seems clear that many groups rather than being 'seduced' by Nazi propaganda, perceived voting for the NSDAP as being in their own interests and that Nazi propaganda served to reinforce such beliefs. Similarly, other groups remained stubbornly resistant to the Nazi message, and no amount of skilful propaganda could persuade them otherwise. To over-emphasise the importance of propaganda would be to diminish the failure of the Weimar system to solve prevailing economic and social problems and of political opponents of the NSDAP to provide viable alternatives. If, as seems likely, many Germans reluctantly voted for the Nazi Party because there seemed to be little credible alternative, then that is not necessarily the outcome of propaganda alone but the failure of the Weimar system. It is therefore imperative to re-examine the manner in which propaganda disseminated the Nazi programme and to distinguish between supporters and opponents of the NSDAP and those who remained indifferent. The role of propaganda I would suggest that propaganda played an important part in mobilising support for the NSDAP in opposition and maintaining the party once in power. But propaganda alone could not have sustained the Nazi party and its ideology over a period of twelve years. There is now considerable evidence to suggest that Nazi policies and propaganda reflected many of the aspirations of large sections of the population. Propaganda in Nazi Germany was not, as is often believed, a 'catch-all' process. The 'revolutionary' aim of the Nazi regime to bring about the Volksgemeinschaft, the true harmony of classes, highlights the remarkably ambitious nature of its propaganda. Nevertheless, the 'success' of propaganda should not be measured purely in terms of its ability radically to change opinions and attitudes. Propaganda is as much about confirming as converting public opinion. Propaganda if it is to be effective must, in a sense, preach to those who are already partially converted. Writing before the Second World War, Aldous Huxley observed: 'Propaganda gives force and direction to the successive movements of popular feeling and desire; but it does not do much to create these movements. The propagandist is a man who canalises an already existing stream. In a land where there is no water, he digs in vain'. If we look at propaganda as a means of reinforcing existing attitudes and beliefs, then the continuing 'success' of propaganda during the Third Reich in creating a largely acquiescent public points to the conclusion that a 'consensus' of sorts had been achieved. In this sense, the regime's propaganda was pragmatic enough to recognise that its policies could be maintained provided sections of the community who were opposed to Nazism remained quiescent. Coercion and terror would play an important restraining role here. But nevertheless, it is my contention that, once in power, the economic programme put forward by the Nazis and the insidious use made of propaganda in a 'closed' environment was enough to ensure at least 'passive' support for the regime. Electoral success Before discussing the nature of Nazi propaganda in opposition, it might be useful to begin with a brief outline of the political performance of the Nazi Party during the final years of the Weimar Republic in order to set their political achievement in some sort of context. In 1928, a mere 810,127 electors voted for the NSDAP; four years later, in July 1932, this figure had increased to a staggering 13,765,781. Support for the Nazis in national elections between May 1928 and September 1930 rose from 810,127 (2.6 per cent of the total) to 6,379,672 votes (18.3 per cent) – an 8 fold increase! By July 1932 the NSDAP was the largest party in the Reichstag with 37.3 per cent of the total vote and 230 seats, almost 100 more than their nearest rivals the Social Democrats (SPD). In the elections of November 1932 the Nazis suffered a minor setback when their percentage of the vote was reduced to 33.1 per cent (196 seats). Nevertheless, the combined electoral successes of 1932 helped pave the way for Hitler's assumption of the Chancellorship in January 1933. As economic and social conditions deteriorated between 1928 and 1930, membership of the NSDAP also continued to grow although not to the same extent as the explosion of the Nazi vote. In October 1928 Nazi Party membership had reached 100,000, in September 1930 300,000 and by the end of 1931 membership exceeded 800,000. One can see therefore that the most rapid increase in membership occurred after the election victories of 1930 and was thus the result not the cause of the Party's electoral breakthrough. Hitler on propaganda The appeal of National Socialism is understandably one of the most closely studied issues in European history. Historians have been concerned to explain why millions of Germans voted for the Nazi Party (NSDAP) in free elections. As we have seen, their success has been attributed in large measure to successful manipulation by a well-functioning propaganda machine. The skilful exploitation of propaganda techniques has been cited by historians of widely different political persuasions and approaches as having played a crucial role in mobilising support for the Nazis. In this context, attention has by and large been focused on the dynamics of the Nazi party, its parades, its symbols, the uniforms and banners, the bands, the marching columns of the SA, etc., which 'captured the imagination' of the masses. In the light of such consensus, it would appear that one of the most important factors contributing to the Nazis' rise to power was the cumulative effect of their propaganda: certainly the Nazis themselves were convinced of its effectiveness. In Mein Kampf (My Struggle), Adolf Hitler devoted two chapters to the study and practice of propaganda. In 1925, when Mein Kampf was first published, Hitler's thoughts on war propaganda were largely a reflection of the prevailing nationalist claims that Allied propaganda was responsible for the collapse of the German Empire in 1918. Convinced of the essential role of propaganda for any movement set on obtaining power, Hitler saw propaganda as a vehicle of political salesmanship in a mass market. He argued that the consumers of propaganda were the masses and not the intellectuals. In answer to his own question, 'To whom should propaganda be addressed – to the scientifically trained intelligentsia or to the less educated masses?' he answered emphatically, 'It must be addressed always and exclusively to the masses'. Hitler made no attempt to hide his contempt for the masses. They were malleable and corrupt, they were 'overwhelmingly feminine by nature and attitude' and as such their sentiment was not complicated, 'but very simple and consistent'. In Mein Kampf, where Hitler laid down the broad lines along which Nazi propaganda was to operate, he assessed his audience as follows: 'The receptivity of the great masses is very limited, their intelligence is small, but their power of forgetting is enormous. In consequence, all effective propaganda must be limited to a very few points and must 'harp on these in slogans until the last member of the public understands what you want him to understand by your slogan.' The function of propaganda, Hitler argued, was to bring the masses' attention to certain facts, processes, necessities, etc., 'whose significance is thus for the first time placed within their field of vision'. Accordingly, propaganda for the masses had to be simple, it had to concentrate on as few points as possible which then had to be repeated many times, concentrating on such emotional elements as love and hatred.. 'Persistence is the first and most important requirement for success'. Through the continuity and sustained uniformity of its application, propaganda, Hitler concluded, would lead to results 'that are almost beyond our understanding'. Joseph Goebbels and Nazi propaganda Hitler's theories on propaganda were first put into practice in 1925 in the NSDAP newspaper, the Volkischer Beobachter (People's Observer). The Nazis had bought the newspaper in 1920 with a small circulation in and around the Munich area, but following the failure of the putsch in 1923 the newspaper had disappeared from newspaper stands until 26 February 1925 – the official date of the 're-establishment' of the Party. Within two months of its re-launch it had become a daily newspaper and its circulation began to rise until in 1929 it had reached a figure of 26,715. Unlike the long, detailed articles and academic discussion of economic and social problems which characterised the political presses of the Weimar Republic, the Volkischer Beobachter went in for short hyperboles on topical National Socialist themes; the evil of Jewry and Bolshevism, the humiliation of the Versailles Treaty, the weakness of Weimar parliamentarianism, all of which were contrasted with Nazi patriotic slogans such as ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Fuhrer (One People, One Nation, One Leader) – later to be used to great effect in 1938 with the Anschluss (the union with Austria). Convinced more than ever that propaganda was a powerful weapon in the hands of an expert, Hitler appointed Joseph Goebbels Head of Party Propaganda in November 1928. In many respects propaganda is easier in opposition than in power, and Goebbels proved a skilled orchestrator of the Party's propaganda resources. However, until 1929, the technical facilities at Goebbels disposal were rather limited and the Party still relied heavily on Hitler and a few other Party figures, speaking at public meetings. The instruments of mass communication which are commonly associated with authoritarian police states – mass circulation press, radio, film and television – these weapons were largely absent from the Nazis' initial rise to prominence. Under Goebbels' direction, however, the Party showed an increasing opportunism for learning and adapting new propaganda techniques. The situation began to change, albeit it slowly, in 1927. It is probably no coincidence that this is when Goebbels first revealed his skill as a propagandist. In November 1926 Goebbels had been appointed Gauleiter of Berlin and began immediately to reshape the party organisation in the German capital. Although nationally the NSDAP's paid-up membership was only 72,590, in July Goebbels launched a weekly newspaper Der Angriff (The Attack), which, as the title suggests, was set-up to attack political opponents and exploit anti-Semitic feelings by claiming that Jews were responsible for most of the ills of the Weimar 'system'. Its challenging motto on the front page read: 'For the Suppressed Against the Exploiters! ' Towards the end of 1930 Der Angriff was appearing daily and had become closely associated with a relentless campaign of personal abuse and criticism levelled by Goebbels on 'establishment' figures (invariably Jewish) associated with the Weimar Republic. A recurring slogan was Deutschland erwache, Jude verrecke! (Germany awake, Judaism be damned!) The essentially negative anti-parliamentarianism and anti-Semitism of National Socialist propaganda allowed Goebbels to use the paper as a vehicle for the dissemination of one of the most important positive themes in Nazi propaganda, namely the projection of the 'Fuhrer-myth', which depicted Hitler as both charismatic superman and a man of the people. Der Angriff's circulation however was limited to Berlin, and the Party still lacked a national newspaper network. In Beobachter could claim to be a national newspaper with a Munich and Berlin edition. To some extent, this was offset by the fact that it was in 1927 that Alfred Hugenberg, the press baron and leader of the right-wing Conservative National People's Party (DNVP), bought the largest and most prestigious German film company, Ufa (Universum-Film-Aktiengesellschaft). From now on the social and political activities of the NSDAP were captured more regularly by Ufa newsreels and shown to the German public on the large national network of Ufa cinemas. Until this time National Socialist propaganda had been characterised by the comparatively skilful use of rhetoric and controlled manipulation of meetings, which depended for its success on the organisational skills of local Party cells to stage its own meetings and disrupt those of its political opponents. Therefore in the final stages of the Nazis' rise to power, circumstances conspired to make the rise easier. Not only did Hugenberg's press and film empire help legitimise the Party, but German industry was also providing valuable financial resources which allowed the Party to escalate its propaganda campaigns. Moreover, the technical means for propaganda had been developed to such an extent that during 1930 microphones and loudspeakers became a standard feature at all Nazi rallies for the first time. As we have already seen, the NSDAP's electoral breakthrough occurred between 1928 and 1930. How can one explain this dramatic increase in the Nazi vote and what role did propaganda play in securing this electoral success? Who voted for the Nazis - and why? Recent research into Nazi voting patterns suggests that after 1928 the NSDAP performed best in the predominantly Protestant and rural districts of the North German plain. Whereas the large cities and urban conurbations, together with predominantly Catholic rural areas in the west and south, proved more resistant to the Nazi appeal. These are, of course, broad generalisations and it is quite clear that manual workers in the cities together with Catholics were prepared to vote for the NSDAP as well, The conclusion that can be drawn from electoral figures about social composition shows that despite the disproportionate number of Protestant, rural and middle class supporters, the NSDAP could justifiably claim to represent a wider range of economic and social groups than any other political party. The short explanation for this was that individuals and groups were prepared to desert traditional allegiances (mainly Protestant middle class parties) and vote for the Nazis for different reasons. Most historians would agree however that the Nazi movement, or rather the Hitler-bewegung (Hitler movement), as it was appropriately labelled at the time, successfully integrated the German middle class. First, it won support from the 'old middle class' of' small retailers, self-employed artisans, peasant farmers, pensioners and those on fixed incomes. Secondly it also appealed to the 'new middle class' of white-collar, non-manual employees. Under the Second Reich both of these groups had shared a sense of their own identity that made them the backbone of the nation. They were known collectively as the Mittelstand, the healthy core in the middle of German society. With the collapse of the German Empire in 1918, the values and assumptions that. had shaped and buttressed the Mittelstand were suddenly removed. The Weimar Republic represented an acute threat to their status. Some looked to the Nazis as the saviour of old style capitalism that would restore the old status quo. For such groups, the Nazis represented a 'reactionary' force restoring former status and values. While others, particularly among younger white-collar workers, saw National Socialism as a 'revolutionary' movement bent on destroying archaic social hierarchies and replacing them with a new social order. The secret of their success was this 'dual’ appeal. As the economic crisis deepened and class tension increased, the various sections of the Mittelstand came together within the Nazi movement. The Hitlerbewegung was the 'mobilisation of disaffection' and as such far more successful than the traditional political parties which had become discredited through their association with the Republic and its failure to redress genuine or imagined grievances. There can be little doubt that under Goebbels' direction the NSDAP exploited these grievances for the purposes of propaganda. By means of an efficient propaganda apparatus that Goebbels had been building up since 1928, the party was in a strong position to make a highly effective response to the growing sense of crisis and through its propaganda to appeal to both the interests and the ideals of the Mittestand. Indeed, some historians have suggested that towards the end of 1927, with the fall in agricultural prices and following its failure in the 1928 Reichstag elections, there was a significant reorientation in the Party's propaganda away from the industrial working class in the urban conurbations towards a series of campaigns aimed at the MittestnnJ in the rural areas. More recently there have been attempts to look again at Nazi efforts to mobilise the alienated urban proletariat. By the early part of 1932 Goebbels was confident enough to write: 'The election campaign is ready in principle. We now only need to press the button in order to set the machine into action'. With unemployment exceeding six million and the Weimar Republic sinking into its death throes, the 1932 elections were fought in a growing atmosphere of political violence and disorder. By January 1933 Hitler had obtained the support of the army and sections of industry, and on January 30 he was constitutionally appointed Chancellor by President Hindenburg. The Nazis' political success in opposition has frequently been attributed to Goebbels' manipulatory talents. There can be little doubt that Nazi propaganda was quick to seize its opportunity and that it was firmly based on the principles outlined in Mein Kampf. It carried through with a ruthless consistency a campaign of propaganda which appealed directly to the emotions rather than to the intellect, and was reinforced at all levels by terror and violence. But propaganda alone cannot change social and political conditions. It acts in conjunction with other factors, like organisation. While the Nazis' propaganda machine was important in helping achieve this electoral victory, the NSDAP was in the fortunate political position, unlike almost every other party in the Weimar Republic, of appealing to different groups for different reasons. The Nazi party did not simply recognise the importance of propaganda, but more importantly the need to adapt its propaganda to these different groups. National Socialist propaganda did not destroy Weimar democracy, although it did undermine it. What distinguished the NSDAP from other parties in opposition was its ability to combine the themes of traditional German nationalism with Nazi ideological motifs. By unifying German patriotism with Nazi ideology Hitler forged a compelling weapon against what he referred to as the 'immorality of Weimar rationalism' and its associations for many (including non-Nazis) with cultural decadence and racial impurity. To this end, the Nazis alone were perceived by many groups to represent certain ideas that appeared to transcend Weimar politics. This not only gave them a wider appeal, but it also set them apart from other political parties. Key themes of Nazi propaganda There can be little doubt that the two most important ideas that distinguished the Nazis from other parties and allowed Goebbels' propaganda to mobilise widespread grievances were the notion of Volksgemeinschaft (community of the people) based on the principle laid down in the party programme of 1920, Gemeinnutzgeht vor Eigennutz (Common good before the good of the individual), and the myth of the charismatic 'Fuhrer'. The community of the nation was to replace the 'divisive' party system and the class barriers of the Weimar Republic and in effect offer the prospect of national unity without either a bloody revolution or the need to offer too many concessions to the working class. The other element which appears to have been genuinely effective and unique was the projection of Hitler as a 'charismatic' leader. The 'Fuhrer cult' had become synonymous with the NSDAP and it is significant that the Party referred to itself even on the ballot papers as the 'Hitler movement'. From 1930 onward the panache of its propaganda in staging political rallies, where Hitler could project his leadership and the faithful could give the impression of being a dynamic movement, far exceeded these of other parties. The carefully constructed mass rallies with their marches, banners and Hags, when combined with Hitler's speeches provided Goebbels with the opportunity to synthesise the twin concepts of Volksgemeinschaft and the 'Fuhrer cult' in one political experience. The mass political rally would continue to play a dominant role in the politics of the Third Reich where it was seen to be the physical manifestation of a nation's 'triumph of the will'. This also explains why the Nazis repeatedly staged 'national moments' (Stunden der Nation), when Hitler's speeches would be broadcast throughout the Reich. On such occasions life would come to a standstill, demonstrating the sense of national solidarity. The individual participant in the ritual, moved by Hitler's rhetoric and swayed by the crowd, underwent a metamorphosis, in Goebbels' famous phrase, 'from a little worm into part of a large dragon'. Further Reading D. Welch, The Third Reich, Politics and Propaganda, Routledge 1993 R. Hamilton, Who Voted for Hitler?, Princeton 1982 I. Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, London 1993 M. Broszat, Hitler and the Collapse of Weimar Germany, Leamington Spa 1987 David Welch is author of Propaganda and the German Cinema 1933-45 (OUP 1983) and Modern European History 1871-1975: A Documentary Reader (Heinemann 1994). historytoday.com http://www.historytoday.com/david-welch/hitler-who-voted-him Hitler - Who Voted For Him? David Welch attributes the Nazi leader's electoral success to much more than slick propaganda. In January 1933, von Schleicher's government, which had attempted to conciliate both Centre and Left interests within the Weimar system, was unable to secure a majority in the Reichstag and resigned. On 30 January the President, Field Marshal Hindenburg, accepted a cabinet with Hitler as Chancellor, von Papen as Vice-Chancellor and nationalists including Nazis in other posts. There is little mystery about the electoral success in 1933 of the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP). Hitler became Chancellor constitutionally. The suggestion that Hitler and his party somehow 'seized' power is rather misleading. The Nazis themselves are largely responsible for perpetuating this myth by continuing to refer to a Kampfzeit (period of struggle) and to their Machtergreifung (seizure of power). Admittedly having gained power the Nazis used the Reichstag fire of 27 February 1933 as a pretext for suspending civil liberties and holding elections in circumstances highly favourable to themselves. In the elections of 5 March the NSDAP made further gains, winning 288 seats but failed to secure an overall majority (43.9 per cent). In this article I want to look at the means employed by the Nazis that led to their electoral success and. particularly to reappraise the view that they somehow 'conquered the masses' and that propaganda alone had 'brainwashed' the German people into electing them. Merely to talk in terms of the 'conquest of the masses' implies the manipulation or seduction of millions into voting for the Nazi Party in apparent disregard for their own best interests. The assumption is that these voters, who might otherwise have resisted Nazism, were 'mesmerised' by a well-functioning propaganda machine. The danger of such an approach is that it concentrates on the 'techniques of persuasion' at the expense of detached analysis of the programme put forward by the NSDAP to solve fundamental economic and social problems Such an approach leads to the inevitable conclusion that to vote for the Nazi manifesto was an 'irrational' act. This does not solve the problem of why millions of Germans acted in such an apparently irrational way. It seems clear that many groups rather than being 'seduced' by Nazi propaganda, perceived voting for the NSDAP as being in their own interests and that Nazi propaganda served to reinforce such beliefs. Similarly, other groups remained stubbornly resistant to the Nazi message, and no amount of skilful propaganda could persuade them otherwise. To over-emphasise the importance of propaganda would be to diminish the failure of the Weimar system to solve prevailing economic and social problems and of political opponents of the NSDAP to provide viable alternatives. If, as seems likely, many Germans reluctantly voted for the Nazi Party because there seemed to be little credible alternative, then that is not necessarily the outcome of propaganda alone but the failure of the Weimar system. It is therefore imperative to re-examine the manner in which propaganda disseminated the Nazi programme and to distinguish between supporters and opponents of the NSDAP and those who remained indifferent. The role of propaganda I would suggest that propaganda played an important part in mobilising support for the NSDAP in opposition and maintaining the party once in power. But propaganda alone could not have sustained the Nazi party and its ideology over a period of twelve years. There is now considerable evidence to suggest that Nazi policies and propaganda reflected many of the aspirations of large sections of the population. Propaganda in Nazi Germany was not, as is often believed, a 'catch-all' process. The 'revolutionary' aim of the Nazi regime to bring about the Volksgemeinschaft, the true harmony of classes, highlights the remarkably ambitious nature of its propaganda. Nevertheless, the 'success' of propaganda should not be measured purely in terms of its ability radically to change opinions and attitudes. Propaganda is as much about confirming as converting public opinion. Propaganda if it is to be effective must, in a sense, preach to those who are already partially converted. Writing before the Second World War, Aldous Huxley observed: 'Propaganda gives force and direction to the successive movements of popular feeling and desire; but it does not do much to create these movements. The propagandist is a man who canalises an already existing stream. In a land where there is no water, he digs in vain'. If we look at propaganda as a means of reinforcing existing attitudes and beliefs, then the continuing 'success' of propaganda during the Third Reich in creating a largely acquiescent public points to the conclusion that a 'consensus' of sorts had been achieved. In this sense, the regime's propaganda was pragmatic enough to recognise that its policies could be maintained provided sections of the community who were opposed to Nazism remained quiescent. Coercion and terror would play an important restraining role here. But nevertheless, it is my contention that, once in power, the economic programme put forward by the Nazis and the insidious use made of propaganda in a 'closed' environment was enough to ensure at least 'passive' support for the regime. Electoral success Before discussing the nature of Nazi propaganda in opposition, it might be useful to begin with a brief outline of the political performance of the Nazi Party during the final years of the Weimar Republic in order to set their political achievement in some sort of context. In 1928, a mere 810,127 electors voted for the NSDAP; four years later, in July 1932, this figure had increased to a staggering 13,765,781. Support for the Nazis in national elections between May 1928 and September 1930 rose from 810,127 (2.6 per cent of the total) to 6,379,672 votes (18.3 per cent) – an 8 fold increase! By July 1932 the NSDAP was the largest party in the Reichstag with 37.3 per cent of the total vote and 230 seats, almost 100 more than their nearest rivals the Social Democrats (SPD). In the elections of November 1932 the Nazis suffered a minor setback when their percentage of the vote was reduced to 33.1 per cent (196 seats). Nevertheless, the combined electoral successes of 1932 helped pave the way for Hitler's assumption of the Chancellorship in January 1933. As economic and social conditions deteriorated between 1928 and 1930, membership of the NSDAP also continued to grow although not to the same extent as the explosion of the Nazi vote. In October 1928 Nazi Party membership had reached 100,000, in September 1930 300,000 and by the end of 1931 membership exceeded 800,000. One can see therefore that the most rapid increase in membership occurred after the election victories of 1930 and was thus the result not the cause of the Party's electoral breakthrough. Hitler on propaganda The appeal of National Socialism is understandably one of the most closely studied issues in European history. Historians have been concerned to explain why millions of Germans voted for the Nazi Party (NSDAP) in free elections. As we have seen, their success has been attributed in large measure to successful manipulation by a well-functioning propaganda machine. The skilful exploitation of propaganda techniques has been cited by historians of widely different political persuasions and approaches as having played a crucial role in mobilising support for the Nazis. In this context, attention has by and large been focused on the dynamics of the Nazi party, its parades, its symbols, the uniforms and banners, the bands, the marching columns of the SA, etc., which 'captured the imagination' of the masses. In the light of such consensus, it would appear that one of the most important factors contributing to the Nazis' rise to power was the cumulative effect of their propaganda: certainly the Nazis themselves were convinced of its effectiveness. In Mein Kampf (My Struggle), Adolf Hitler devoted two chapters to the study and practice of propaganda. In 1925, when Mein Kampf was first published, Hitler's thoughts on war propaganda were largely a reflection of the prevailing nationalist claims that Allied propaganda was responsible for the collapse of the German Empire in 1918. Convinced of the essential role of propaganda for any movement set on obtaining power, Hitler saw propaganda as a vehicle of political salesmanship in a mass market. He argued that the consumers of propaganda were the masses and not the intellectuals. In answer to his own question, 'To whom should propaganda be addressed – to the scientifically trained intelligentsia or to the less educated masses?' he answered emphatically, 'It must be addressed always and exclusively to the masses'. Hitler made no attempt to hide his contempt for the masses. They were malleable and corrupt, they were 'overwhelmingly feminine by nature and attitude' and as such their sentiment was not complicated, 'but very simple and consistent'. In Mein Kampf, where Hitler laid down the broad lines along which Nazi propaganda was to operate, he assessed his audience as follows: 'The receptivity of the great masses is very limited, their intelligence is small, but their power of forgetting is enormous. In consequence, all effective propaganda must be limited to a very few points and must 'harp on these in slogans until the last member of the public understands what you want him to understand by your slogan.' The function of propaganda, Hitler argued, was to bring the masses' attention to certain facts, processes, necessities, etc., 'whose significance is thus for the first time placed within their field of vision'. Accordingly, propaganda for the masses had to be simple, it had to concentrate on as few points as possible which then had to be repeated many times, concentrating on such emotional elements as love and hatred.. 'Persistence is the first and most important requirement for success'. Through the continuity and sustained uniformity of its application, propaganda, Hitler concluded, would lead to results 'that are almost beyond our understanding'. Joseph Goebbels and Nazi propaganda Hitler's theories on propaganda were first put into practice in 1925 in the NSDAP newspaper, the Volkischer Beobachter (People's Observer). The Nazis had bought the newspaper in 1920 with a small circulation in and around the Munich area, but following the failure of the putsch in 1923 the newspaper had disappeared from newspaper stands until 26 February 1925 – the official date of the 're-establishment' of the Party. Within two months of its re-launch it had become a daily newspaper and its circulation began to rise until in 1929 it had reached a figure of 26,715. Unlike the long, detailed articles and academic discussion of economic and social problems which characterised the political presses of the Weimar Republic, the Volkischer Beobachter went in for short hyperboles on topical National Socialist themes; the evil of Jewry and Bolshevism, the humiliation of the Versailles Treaty, the weakness of Weimar parliamentarianism, all of which were contrasted with Nazi patriotic slogans such as ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Fuhrer (One People, One Nation, One Leader) – later to be used to great effect in 1938 with the Anschluss (the union with Austria). Convinced more than ever that propaganda was a powerful weapon in the hands of an expert, Hitler appointed Joseph Goebbels Head of Party Propaganda in November 1928. In many respects propaganda is easier in opposition than in power, and Goebbels proved a skilled orchestrator of the Party's propaganda resources. However, until 1929, the technical facilities at Goebbels disposal were rather limited and the Party still relied heavily on Hitler and a few other Party figures, speaking at public meetings. The instruments of mass communication which are commonly associated with authoritarian police states – mass circulation press, radio, film and television – these weapons were largely absent from the Nazis' initial rise to prominence. Under Goebbels' direction, however, the Party showed an increasing opportunism for learning and adapting new propaganda techniques. The situation began to change, albeit it slowly, in 1927. It is probably no coincidence that this is when Goebbels first revealed his skill as a propagandist. In November 1926 Goebbels had been appointed Gauleiter of Berlin and began immediately to reshape the party organisation in the German capital. Although nationally the NSDAP's paid-up membership was only 72,590, in July Goebbels launched a weekly newspaper Der Angriff (The Attack), which, as the title suggests, was set-up to attack political opponents and exploit anti-Semitic feelings by claiming that Jews were responsible for most of the ills of the Weimar 'system'. Its challenging motto on the front page read: 'For the Suppressed Against the Exploiters! ' Towards the end of 1930 Der Angriff was appearing daily and had become closely associated with a relentless campaign of personal abuse and criticism levelled by Goebbels on 'establishment' figures (invariably Jewish) associated with the Weimar Republic. A recurring slogan was Deutschland erwache, Jude verrecke! (Germany awake, Judaism be damned!) The essentially negative anti-parliamentarianism and anti-Semitism of National Socialist propaganda allowed Goebbels to use the paper as a vehicle for the dissemination of one of the most important positive themes in Nazi propaganda, namely the projection of the 'Fuhrer-myth', which depicted Hitler as both charismatic superman and a man of the people. Der Angriff's circulation however was limited to Berlin, and the Party still lacked a national newspaper network. In Beobachter could claim to be a national newspaper with a Munich and Berlin edition. To some extent, this was offset by the fact that it was in 1927 that Alfred Hugenberg, the press baron and leader of the right-wing Conservative National People's Party (DNVP), bought the largest and most prestigious German film company, Ufa (Universum-Film-Aktiengesellschaft). From now on the social and political activities of the NSDAP were captured more regularly by Ufa newsreels and shown to the German public on the large national network of Ufa cinemas. Until this time National Socialist propaganda had been characterised by the comparatively skilful use of rhetoric and controlled manipulation of meetings, which depended for its success on the organisational skills of local Party cells to stage its own meetings and disrupt those of its political opponents. Therefore in the final stages of the Nazis' rise to power, circumstances conspired to make the rise easier. Not only did Hugenberg's press and film empire help legitimise the Party, but German industry was also providing valuable financial resources which allowed the Party to escalate its propaganda campaigns. Moreover, the technical means for propaganda had been developed to such an extent that during 1930 microphones and loudspeakers became a standard feature at all Nazi rallies for the first time. As we have already seen, the NSDAP's electoral breakthrough occurred between 1928 and 1930. How can one explain this dramatic increase in the Nazi vote and what role did propaganda play in securing this electoral success? Who voted for the Nazis - and why? Recent research into Nazi voting patterns suggests that after 1928 the NSDAP performed best in the predominantly Protestant and rural districts of the North German plain. Whereas the large cities and urban conurbations, together with predominantly Catholic rural areas in the west and south, proved more resistant to the Nazi appeal. These are, of course, broad generalisations and it is quite clear that manual workers in the cities together with Catholics were prepared to vote for the NSDAP as well, The conclusion that can be drawn from electoral figures about social composition shows that despite the disproportionate number of Protestant, rural and middle class supporters, the NSDAP could justifiably claim to represent a wider range of economic and social groups than any other political party. The short explanation for this was that individuals and groups were prepared to desert traditional allegiances (mainly Protestant middle class parties) and vote for the Nazis for different reasons. Most historians would agree however that the Nazi movement, or rather the Hitler-bewegung (Hitler movement), as it was appropriately labelled at the time, successfully integrated the German middle class. First, it won support from the 'old middle class' of' small retailers, self-employed artisans, peasant farmers, pensioners and those on fixed incomes. Secondly it also appealed to the 'new middle class' of white-collar, non-manual employees. Under the Second Reich both of these groups had shared a sense of their own identity that made them the backbone of the nation. They were known collectively as the Mittelstand, the healthy core in the middle of German society. With the collapse of the German Empire in 1918, the values and assumptions that. had shaped and buttressed the Mittelstand were suddenly removed. The Weimar Republic represented an acute threat to their status. Some looked to the Nazis as the saviour of old style capitalism that would restore the old status quo. For such groups, the Nazis represented a 'reactionary' force restoring former status and values. While others, particularly among younger white-collar workers, saw National Socialism as a 'revolutionary' movement bent on destroying archaic social hierarchies and replacing them with a new social order. The secret of their success was this 'dual’ appeal. As the economic crisis deepened and class tension increased, the various sections of the Mittelstand came together within the Nazi movement. The Hitlerbewegung was the 'mobilisation of disaffection' and as such far more successful than the traditional political parties which had become discredited through their association with the Republic and its failure to redress genuine or imagined grievances. There can be little doubt that under Goebbels' direction the NSDAP exploited these grievances for the purposes of propaganda. By means of an efficient propaganda apparatus that Goebbels had been building up since 1928, the party was in a strong position to make a highly effective response to the growing sense of crisis and through its propaganda to appeal to both the interests and the ideals of the Mittestand. Indeed, some historians have suggested that towards the end of 1927, with the fall in agricultural prices and following its failure in the 1928 Reichstag elections, there was a significant reorientation in the Party's propaganda away from the industrial working class in the urban conurbations towards a series of campaigns aimed at the MittestnnJ in the rural areas. More recently there have been attempts to look again at Nazi efforts to mobilise the alienated urban proletariat. By the early part of 1932 Goebbels was confident enough to write: 'The election campaign is ready in principle. We now only need to press the button in order to set the machine into action'. With unemployment exceeding six million and the Weimar Republic sinking into its death throes, the 1932 elections were fought in a growing atmosphere of political violence and disorder. By January 1933 Hitler had obtained the support of the army and sections of industry, and on January 30 he was constitutionally appointed Chancellor by President Hindenburg. The Nazis' political success in opposition has frequently been attributed to Goebbels' manipulatory talents. There can be little doubt that Nazi propaganda was quick to seize its opportunity and that it was firmly based on the principles outlined in Mein Kampf. It carried through with a ruthless consistency a campaign of propaganda which appealed directly to the emotions rather than to the intellect, and was reinforced at all levels by terror and violence. But propaganda alone cannot change social and political conditions. It acts in conjunction with other factors, like organisation. While the Nazis' propaganda machine was important in helping achieve this electoral victory, the NSDAP was in the fortunate political position, unlike almost every other party in the Weimar Republic, of appealing to different groups for different reasons. The Nazi party did not simply recognise the importance of propaganda, but more importantly the need to adapt its propaganda to these different groups. National Socialist propaganda did not destroy Weimar democracy, although it did undermine it. What distinguished the NSDAP from other parties in opposition was its ability to combine the themes of traditional German nationalism with Nazi ideological motifs. By unifying German patriotism with Nazi ideology Hitler forged a compelling weapon against what he referred to as the 'immorality of Weimar rationalism' and its associations for many (including non-Nazis) with cultural decadence and racial impurity. To this end, the Nazis alone were perceived by many groups to represent certain ideas that appeared to transcend Weimar politics. This not only gave them a wider appeal, but it also set them apart from other political parties. Key themes of Nazi propaganda There can be little doubt that the two most important ideas that distinguished the Nazis from other parties and allowed Goebbels' propaganda to mobilise widespread grievances were the notion of Volksgemeinschaft (community of the people) based on the principle laid down in the party programme of 1920, Gemeinnutzgeht vor Eigennutz (Common good before the good of the individual), and the myth of the charismatic 'Fuhrer'. The community of the nation was to replace the 'divisive' party system and the class barriers of the Weimar Republic and in effect offer the prospect of national unity without either a bloody revolution or the need to offer too many concessions to the working class. The other element which appears to have been genuinely effective and unique was the projection of Hitler as a 'charismatic' leader. The 'Fuhrer cult' had become synonymous with the NSDAP and it is significant that the Party referred to itself even on the ballot papers as the 'Hitler movement'. From 1930 onward the panache of its propaganda in staging political rallies, where Hitler could project his leadership and the faithful could give the impression of being a dynamic movement, far exceeded these of other parties. The carefully constructed mass rallies with their marches, banners and Hags, when combined with Hitler's speeches provided Goebbels with the opportunity to synthesise the twin concepts of Volksgemeinschaft and the 'Fuhrer cult' in one political experience. The mass political rally would continue to play a dominant role in the politics of the Third Reich where it was seen to be the physical manifestation of a nation's 'triumph of the will'. This also explains why the Nazis repeatedly staged 'national moments' (Stunden der Nation), when Hitler's speeches would be broadcast throughout the Reich. On such occasions life would come to a standstill, demonstrating the sense of national solidarity. The individual participant in the ritual, moved by Hitler's rhetoric and swayed by the crowd, underwent a metamorphosis, in Goebbels' famous phrase, 'from a little worm into part of a large dragon'. Further Reading D. Welch, The Third Reich, Politics and Propaganda, Routledge 1993 R. Hamilton, Who Voted for Hitler?, Princeton 1982 I. Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, London 1993 M. Broszat, Hitler and the Collapse of Weimar Germany, Leamington Spa 1987 David Welch is author of Propaganda and the German Cinema 1933-45 (OUP 1983) and Modern European History 1871-1975: A Documentary Reader (Heinemann 1994).
![Nazipowerpoint[1]](http://s1.studyres.com/store/data/008621453_1-0faad516da94b4327a4d2ab271f2e457-150x150.png)
