Survey
* Your assessment is very important for improving the work of artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
* Your assessment is very important for improving the work of artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
Communist and Post-Communist Studies 46 (2013) 79–93 Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect Communist and Post-Communist Studies journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/postcomstud The importance of geopolitics in firms’ international location decisions: The Polish case Aurora A.C. Teixeira a, *, Mariana Dias b a b CEF.UP, Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto, INESC Porto, OBEGEF, Rua Dr. Roberto Frias, 4200-464 Porto, Portugal Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto, Portugal a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t Article history: Available online 11 January 2013 Despite connections and common traits between geopolitics and International Business based on geography and location, literature on this matter is scarce. This study aims to contribute to this literature gap, by assessing the importance of Poland’s geopolitical factors in FDI location decisions. By applying a hybrid methodology which combines qualitative and quantitative analyses we conclude that there is a connection between Poland’s geopolitical factors (stable, variable and interactional) and the volume, origin and distribution of the FDI received. Ó 2012 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Geopolitics International business International markets International location decisions Poland 1. Introduction Researchers have long ignored the ties between the fields of International Relations (IR), Economics and International Business (IB), which are frequently accepted as compartmented areas (Strange, 1970). This scenario has recently experienced some changes. From the perspective of IR, the emergence of disciplines such as Geo-economics (Luttwak, 1990; Correia, 2004) has contributed to the growth of the literature on the matter, by studying the international economic situation from the viewpoint of Geopolitics (Luttwak, 1990; Duarte, 1997; Correia, 2004; Vesentini, 2007). In the field of Economics and IB, the relevance of geography and location factors has garnered greater interest among academics (Hofstede, 1980; Kotler et al., 1997; Dunning, 1997, 1998, 2000; Holmes, 1998; Minifie and West, 1998; Buckley and Ghauri, 2004; MacCann and Mudambi, 2004; Peng, 2009), although in the past they have been somewhat underrated and circumscribed to the economic mainstream (Smith, 1776; Ricardo, 1817; Vernon, 1966; Knickerbocker, 1973; Krugman, 1991, 1998; Venables, 1998). However, literature related to the influence of Geopolitics on IB is almost nonexistent (As-Saber et al., 2001). Thus, in the present work, we aim to test the application of geopolitical concepts to the analysis of international markets and their influence on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). We intend to contribute to the existing literature on this matter and highlight the significance and meaning of the relations among IR, Economics and IB. More specifically, we also intend to provide answers to the following research questions: 1) How important is Geopolitics in international location decisions? 2) Which factors have relatively more impact on the volume of FDI received by a country and what is its influence (positive/ negative) on it? To answer these questions, the case study methodology will be followed, and hopefully our conclusions may contribute to the construction of an emerging field of study (Yin, 2004). * Corresponding author. 0967-067X/$ – see front matter Ó 2012 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2012.12.006 80 A.A.C. Teixeira, M. Dias / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 46 (2013) 79–93 The study is structured as follows. In Section 2 we review the literature related to Geopolitics, International Economics and IB. Section 3 explains the methodological options and Section 4 analyzes the case of Poland. Finally, the main conclusions are drawn. 2. Relations between geopolitics and international economics: a theoretical overview Geopolitics arose at the beginning of the 20th century as a multidisciplinary approach that brought together political, strategic, geographical, historical and economic studies. Its conceptual field has been surrounded by a haze of ambiguity that has generally led to misinterpretations and unclear views about its definition (Tuathail and Toal, 1994; Correia, 2004; Drulák, 2006), vacillating between a historical and reconstructive science that aimed to explain geopolitical events that had already taken place in international setting, and a predictive science, that was able of anticipating and conjecturing States’ geopolitical moves before they really happened (Retaillé, 2000). The most accepted definition of geopolitics is that of Kjellen (apud Correia, 2004), who defines it as “the theory of the state as a geographical organism or phenomenon of space”. In other words, geopolitics studies the influence of space and location on human action and, consequently, on political action, supporting the argument of Defarges (2003) that geographical backgrounds frame and distinguish mankind’s intrinsic ways of life. Nowadays, there is a new group of authors arguing towards the decreasing importance of military power in relation to non-military means, such as commerce (Luttwak, 1990; Duarte, 1997; Fernandes, 2002; Couloumbis, 2003; Gagné, 2007; Mercille, 2008). In a truly Realistic1 manner, Lacoste (1988) states that Geopolitics is, generally, a line of reasoning that aims to overcome adversity having in mind the circumstances and availability of resources and means. This reasoning is particularly analogous to the strategic and competitive action of multinational enterprises (MNEs) and, in general, to the dynamics of international economics. Hence, States and MNEs share a common purpose: strategic use of space as a way to achieve major influence in the international system and, therefore, leverage their power. Questions such as: ‘What is power?’2, ‘Where is it located?’ and ‘Which factors increase the potential attractiveness3 of a certain location in relation to another?’ (Eva, 2000; Fabry and Zeghni, 2002) are at the very core of both the actions of States and MNEs (Correia, 2004). Thus, the methodological employment of Geopolitical Power Factors (GPFs) (stable, variable and interactional) (cf. Table 1), normally used to classify the power of a State, is justified in the analysis of an international market, in this specific case, that of Poland. The geopolitical perspective of spatial understanding and its strategic use meets the economics literature which supports the significance of geography in MNE strategy (Porter, 1998b; Dunning, 1998, 2000; Daniels and Radenbaugh, 2001; Jiménez, 2002; Mellinger et al., 2003; Buckley and Ghauri, 2004). It also fits into the rationale of geopolitical Possibilism, which argues Man’s ability to adapt to his geographical surroundings and his ability to use it advantageously, despite existing constraints and limitations (Lacoste, 1988; Correia, 2004). In a transposition to the economic literature, Schoenberger (2003: 322) follows the same line of thought claiming that “the earth is not merely a natural surface on which we play out our social and economic lives” but it is instead “a necessary background” where Man acts and intervenes actively. Schoenberger (2003) adds that the management of time and space is interconnected, becoming a key aspect of MNE strategy. The geopolitical situation is also determined by time and space (As-Saber et al., 2001). Even though the Geopolitics-IB literature is almost inexistent, the articles by As-Saber et al. (2001) and Sethi (2007) provide a stimulus to academic debate on the matter. These authors discuss the literature gap on this issue, highlighting the lack of awareness of the connection between geopolitical changes and IB dynamics. In the last twenty years, a new trend that underlined importance of location and space has emerged among academics, discussing new factors of influence on the action of MNEs (Hofstede, 1980; Kotler et al., 1997; Holmes, 1998; Wei, 2000; Kirkmann et al., 2006; Sanyal, 2008; Demirbag et al., 2010). This tendency is closer to Economic Geography (Dicken, 2003) which has a more comprehensive point of view, emphasizing social, political, cultural and institutional aspects, and contrasts with New Economic Geography, which attempts to integrate geography into the mainstream through economic models (Krugman, 1991, 1998; Venables, 1998; Bosker et al., 2010). Dunning (1998, 2000), a contemporary author of location studies with his Eclectic Paradigm, stresses the relevance of the geographical dimension in internationalization processes, complementing the characteristics and macroeconomics of enterprises described as FDI determinants by the mainstream. Other authors (Porter, 1998a; Jiménez, 2002) position themselves in the same line of thought as Dunning, as they value a country’s distinctiveness and place emphasis on location and the competitive advantage of the countries, that is, the strategic and unique characteristics of a country that provide it with an advantage over other countries. In addition, and mainly in the IB literature, we found more wide-ranging authors who extend the factors that influence a country’s competitiveness, such as: culture (Hofstede, 1980; Sivakumar and Nakata, 2001; Kirkmann et al., 2006), corruption 1 Realism is a positivist perspective of International Relations Theory that argues that world political scenario is driven by competition and the pursuing of self interest. The main assumption of the realist’s theory is the inexistence of an entity above States capable of regulating their interactions. International anarchy self imposes and State interrelations are managed by different levels of power. The pursuing of national interests becomes the main driver of States international actions and the objective and instrument of states participation on international setting, since no cooperation or alliance can endure or be trusted (Cravinho, 2006). 2 To Correia (2004), power is today rooted in economy, at the global, state and business levels. 3 We can define a location’s attractiveness as the “dynamic process that reflects both the ability of the host country to build and manage its attractiveness and the multinational enterprises’ (MNEs) willingness to invest abroad” (Fabry and Zeghni, 2002: 292). A.A.C. Teixeira, M. Dias / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 46 (2013) 79–93 81 Table 1 Geopolitical power factors. Class of factor Geopolitical factor Examples: Stable Geographical extent Position Physical structure and configuration Climate Population Resources Social, economic and political structure Technology History, ideology, power and strategy Ecumene/anecumene; sense of space; Effective National Territory. Boundaries; geopolitical position. Distance to capital city; geographical isolation (transports). Climate type. Dimension; human capital. Availability of resources; strategic meaning. Type of social, economic and political structure. Knowledge questions. History’s influence; Foreign Policy; International positioning; International recognition. Variable Interactional Source: Adapted from Célerier (1961); Cohen (2003). (Wei, 2000; Egger and Winner, 2005; Sanyal, 2008), transports and infrastructures (Asiedu and Esfahani, 2001; Limao and Venables, 2001; Khadaroo and Seetanahb, 2007), or institutional aspects (Henisz, 2000; Meyer, 2001; Yiu and Makino, 2002; Bevan et al., 2004; Demirbag et al., 2010). Also, we found a lack of literature on the impact of physical geography (climate, coastline) on the analysis of international markets with internationalization purposes (Mellinger et al., 2003; Buckley and Ghauri, 2004). Another group of arguments related to the geographical question explains the drop in importance of ‘distances’ within the context of the globalization process. In opposition to the former perspective, which advocates location and reviews the factors that make it unique, this more recent “Born Global Literature” (Brock et al., 2010) highlights a “Borderless World” (Levitt, 1983; Ohmae, 1990; Bell et al., 2001; Cravinho, 2006). This approach suggests that technological improvements in communications and transports shorten distances and render them irrelevant. On the contrary, some authors still place emphasis on distance, not only physical (Ghemawat, 2001; Dow and Karunaratna, 2006; Ellis, 2008) but also psychological and cultural (Lim et al., 2004; Brock et al., 2010). Porter (1998a: 11) sums up the debate and, although defending the local dimension, he assumes that the faster flows of communications and transports have a preponderate effect on IB. He finishes by saying that “anything that can be efficiently sourced from a distance has been essentially nullified as a competitive advantage”. Therefore, it is possible to state that a country’s geopolitical situation cannot be transferred or replicated since it does not represent a fixed condition like the existence of resources or a market condition, but a specific circumstances of a region, resulting from a combination of factors. Consequently, our work does not aspire to formulate the optimal geopolitical situation but rather determines whether geopolitics can be useful in international market analysis. 3. Methodological considerations In this study we intend to provide an answer to the question ‘How important is Geopolitics in international location decisions?’ by analysing the relationship between the geopolitical situation of Poland and the FDI it has received. Based on our study goals and the aim to develop a multidisciplinary approach we believe that the best methodological option is to combine quantitative and qualitative methods. We will also look for the answer to the question ‘Which factors have relatively more impact on the volume of FDI received by a country and what is its influence (positive/negative) on it?’ The option for the case study method is based on the need to provide a solid basis of reasoning through comprehensive data gathering (Yin, 2004), in an area of study where the literature and information are clearly insufficient (As-Saber et al., 2001; Sethi, 2007). The choice of Poland as the case study is strongly linked to the profound geopolitical changes the country has undergone in the last two decades. The fall of the USSR determined the end of its dependence in both internal and external matters. Therefore, Poland had to follow its own path as a sovereign country and to manage its new independent geopolitical situation in terms of domestic structure and foreign affairs. The Polish situation is also worthy of analysis from the perspective of economics. Although it is a recently open market, it has become a case of success in FDI attraction, having currently a stock of FDI as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) that is equivalent to that of major European economies (cf. Section 4.1). Our timeframe covers the period from 1990 to 2010, given that we can only consider Poland as an independent and selfdetermining country after the fall of the USSR, when the centrally planned economy was replaced by an open market, highly receptive of foreign capital (Fabry and Zeghni, 2002). The present study develops two channels of data gathering, which work in a complementary manner. We review the literature (scientific articles, journals) that serves to frame the Polish geopolitical situation from the perspective of its Geopolitical Power Factors, GPFs (Célerier, 1961). At the same time, we collect statistics that will facilitate the FDI analysis (stock and flow) and support qualitative information. Having framed the geopolitical situation of Poland based on qualitative and quantitative data, we compare it with statistical information about the FDI received. In this way, it is possible to assess whether or not there is a connection (positive or negative) between the volume, distribution and origin of the FDI received by a country and one or more GPFs. 82 A.A.C. Teixeira, M. Dias / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 46 (2013) 79–93 The GPFs represent the guidelines of the analysis conducted in Section 4 where we establish the Polish geopolitical situation. The latter is conditioned by multiple circumstances and can be described as more or less favourable, as having a greater or lesser impact on the international setting and its upgrading potential, and so on. The framing of a country’s geopolitical situation involves the combination of multiple GPFs (cf. Table 1): stable (geographical extent, position, physical structure and configuration, climate), which remain the same over time; variable (population, resources, social, economic and political structure), which can suffer alterations; and interactional (technology, history, ideology, power and strategy), which result from the combination of stable and variable GPFs. 4. Empirical analysis of the Polish case 4.1. FDI evolution in Poland, from 1990 to 2010 The end of the Cold War brought a broad array of growth opportunities with the opening of the thus far inaccessible Polish market to the international economy and foreign capital (Deichmann, 1998). In the early 1990s, Poland supported FDI attraction as the main strategy of its transition to an open market (Kornecki, 2010). FDI became a key factor not only to attract capital but also to access management competencies, know-how and technology (Chidlow and Young, 2008). The Polish commitment to the open market is clear in certain moments, such as the entry into force of the Balcerowicz Plan (Hunter and Ryan, 2009; Deichmann, 1998) or the fulfilment of institutional adjustments that favoured FDI attraction. One example is the Business Activity Law of 1999 which gives Polish and foreign enterprises equal rights to take up and conduct business activities in Poland (UNCTAD, 2002). Some characteristics of the Polish market, such as its dimension, central location in the European Union (EU) and low cost of the workforce and suppliers, seem to maintain foreign investors in the country even in a context of crisis such as that of 2009. The Polish effectiveness in attracting FDI and the importance of foreign capital can be placed on the same level as that of other countries in terms of the ratio of FDI stock as a percentage of the GDP. Poland is on par with the EU average and goes beyond the Russian case (cf. Fig. 1). 4.2. Geopolitical factors 4.2.1. Stable factors 4.2.1.1. Geographical extent. The extent of a country’s territory is the first GPF we analyse with the purpose of framing the Polish geopolitical situation. We cannot say that the larger or smaller size of a territory is in itself synonymous of greater or lesser state power. It is how the territorial extent is managed, revealing its sense of space or not,4 that can bring strategic returns in terms of the FDI it attracts. To outline the Ecumene5 of Poland is no easy task. Most of the Polish population lives in the central and southern region of the country. The northern and eastern regions however tend to be under-populated (cf. Fig. 2a). Located in north of the Polish territory, Gdansk represents the exception in the Ecumenic pattern. Although isolated, this city can also be considered an Ecumenic point given its population density and the importance of its seaport as a door to the Baltic. Therefore, the Polish ecumene is not constituted by a single, congregated zone. It is instead formed by several Ecumenic points including the urban centres of Warsaw, Katowice, Poznan, Krakow, Wroc1aw and Gdansk (cf. black circles in Fig. 2b). These cities and their surroundings represent economic, cultural and scientific centres (Wisniewski, 2004), which means that only these areas can be considered true Ecumene. Similarly, the Effective National Territory (ENT) is also fragmented and spread out away from the Polish Ecumenic centres (cf. grey circumferences in Fig. 2b). Bearing in mind the definition of ENT as a moderately populated area, with economic development potential (Cohen, 2003), we realize that the Polish ENT corresponds to the areas surrounding the Ecumenic cities and their future expansion. Furthermore, there are no anecumene.6 Although being sparsely populated, the northern and eastern regions cannot be considered as Ecumenes since they do not fit the definition of an inhospitable territory for human settlement. After having made these primary geopolitical considerations about the Polish territory, we now analyse how it is managed and organized. There is an obvious pattern of disparity in Poland in geographic, demographic and developmental terms. This inequality is evident in three dimensions: eastern and western regions; Warsaw and the rest of the country; and urban and rural regions (OECD, 2008). We examine these dimensions separately. First, the development levels of the different Polish regions illustrate the country’s historical evolution, inexistent as a unified state until 1918 (cf. Fig. 3). The territorial division among the German Empire on north and west (cf., Fig. 3, delimited 4 We define a State’s sense of space as the ability to perceive the territory and exterior space in such a way that they can be strategically potentiated. This means that entire territory is occupied without significant density disparities and that even anecumenic zones can be strategically managed or converted into Ecumenic. 5 An Ecumene is an area with high population density and high concentration of economic activities (Cohen, 2003). 6 An anecumene is an under-populated or totally uninhabited area, normally because of inhospitable climate (Arctic) or geographically hostile conditions (deserts). A.A.C. Teixeira, M. Dias / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 46 (2013) 79–93 83 Fig. 1. Stock of FDI as a percentage of the GDP, 1990–2008. Source: UNCTAD, 2011. by a black line); the Russian Empire on east (cf. Fig. 3, delimited by dotted line) and the Austro-Hungarian Empire on southwest (cf. Fig. 3, delimited by dashed line) until the end of World War One reflects the contemporaneous development pattern (Wisniewski, 2004). Currently, the territory that belonged to the former German and Austro-Hungarian Empires (southwest and west) aggregates the most developed and productive regions (cf. Figs. 3 and 4), while the zones that were part of the Russian Empire tend to be more rural and less developed, with little impact on GDP, with the exception of the Warsaw region (cf. Fig. 5). These inequalities are a challenge to Poland’s growth strategy since they make the harmonization of regional development difficult. FDI aggravates regional disparities since MNEs select the most developed regions (central, western and southern), where the transition process is well-developed, as the destination of their investment. Consequently, even though FDI has played an important role in the modernization of the productive structure and in job creation, its regional impact was adverse, since it has leveraged the development of some regions at the expense of others. Linked to regional disparity, we find differences between the urban and rural zones that reflect different socio-economic realities. These asymmetries lie in population density as we saw previously, but also in regional contributions to GDP, Fig. 2. Poland: Population density, Ecumene and Effective National Territory (ENT). 84 A.A.C. Teixeira, M. Dias / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 46 (2013) 79–93 Fig. 3. Polish territorial division among the German Empire, the Russian Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire before 1918 (estimated areas). Note: Map from d-maps.com, in http://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car¼15037&lang¼en, accessed on April 21st, 2011. Source: Authors elaboration based on Wisniewski (2004). Fig. 4. Regional share of GDP, in 2001. Note: Map from d-maps.com, in http://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car¼15037&lang¼en, accessed on April 21st, 2011. Source: Authors’ compilation based on Wisniewski (2004). A.A.C. Teixeira, M. Dias / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 46 (2013) 79–93 85 Fig. 5. Geographical origin of the main MNEs established in the Mazowieckie region (Warsaw). Source: Grochowski et al. (2006: 218). depending on their urban or rural condition (cf. Fig. 4). Therefore, we find urban areas such as Mazowsze (Warsaw), Silesia (Wroc1aw) or Malopolska (Krakow) that respectively represent 20.5%, 13.7% and 7.2% of the national GDP, and rural areas like Podlaskie, Lubelskie or Warminsko-Mazurskie that account for only 2.4%, 4.0% and 2.8%, respectively. Naturally, the urban areas tend to attract the attention of foreign investors leading to disparities in consolidation. The last level of disparities is based on the differences between Warsaw and the rest of the country. Warsaw has a greater ability to attract FDI in view of the fact that, as the capital, is has a dominant position in relation to other urban centres (Wisniewski, 2004; Grochowski et al., 2006). Other factors that maintain Warsaw as a leading receptor of FDI are its privileged geographical location, somehow central (although not entirely equidistant to its frontiers), and a good-quality transport infrastructure that brings the capital city closer to foreign investors. As a result, the Mazowsze region, where Warsaw is located, attracts more than half of the total FDI received, accounting for 52.9% (Wisniewski, 2004). However, other regions, such as the north-west, may be “more attractive to foreign investors if low input costs as well as the availability of labour and resources are considered to be important motives for investing in Poland” (Chidlow and Young, 2008: 20). Hence, considering the Polish international strategy of coming closer to the EU and the United States, it is to be expected that the FDI received by the Mazowsze region comes from Western countries (cf. Fig. 5). The symbolic meaning of investing in Poland, and specifically in Warsaw, meets the Western countries’ geopolitical conceptions of Eastern Europe, where they seek to achieve major influence, gaining ground on a similar Russian strategy. In conclusion, we can state that there is a strong connection between how the Polish territory is structured and the volume, distribution and origin of the FDI it has received. It is clear that Ecumenic points are favoured by foreign investors as they coincide with the main urban centres, contrasting with the rural areas. When we talk about Effective National Territories (ENT) zones, which irradiate from Ecumenic points, the rationale is analogous and suggests the increasing importance of these areas for MNEs in the future. Warsaw acquires particular relevance in this argument as a political centre and geopolitical strategic point. It should also be noted that the asymmetries between the central, western and eastern regions have historical roots. Furthermore, these inequalities are emphasized by ‘neighbouring’ questions. Therefore, regions bordering Germany take advantage of this proximity, strengthening economic and financial ties. In contrast, the Eastern regions do not benefit from their Byelorussian, Ukrainian and Lithuanian borders. 4.2.1.2. Position. Poland’s position is critical in this geopolitical analysis. Historically speaking, Poland’s geographic location has converted the country into a key location for two centres of power, Europe and Russia, not only from geopolitical and geostrategic points of view but also from economic and financial perspectives. These two views are intimately correlated and follow the same rationale of competition for the Polish territory. From the Russian perspective, Poland represented a military position functioning as an important buffer state against European invasions. The fall of the USSR brought Russia’s direct control over Eastern European countries, including Poland, to an end. The consequence was the loss of Russia’s ‘protection’ barrier against Western influence. Poland’s accession to both NATO and the EU guaranteed the Western flank (Unge et al., 86 A.A.C. Teixeira, M. Dias / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 46 (2013) 79–93 2006) and symbolically ‘ended’ Russia’s power in this region. The integration of Poland in the Atlantic Alliance was seen by Russia as a hostile action (Ozbay and Aras, 2008). Nowadays, Poland’s membership of the EU favours both parts economically and geopolitically. On the one hand, the EU reinforces its power by extending its territory to areas previously hidden behind the ‘iron curtain’. The EU benefits from enlargement, taking advantage of new and unexplored market potentialities. On the other hand, Poland gains from its transition process, economic growth and FDI attraction fostered by EU mechanisms even before 2004, the date of Polish accession (Bevan et al., 2001). FDI confirms the importance of the Polish market to Europe: in 2002, 84.6% of the initial foreign capital invested in this country came from the EU (Wisniewski, 2004), and in 2009, this figure rose to 92%, from which 21.7%, 14.0%, and 12.7% came from Germany, France and Luxembourg, respectively (Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency, 2010). On the list of the top 27 countries investing in Poland, there are only three non-Western countries, South Korea, Japan and Singapore, with 2.6%, 0.17% and 0.07%, respectively, of the share of initial foreign capital (Wisniewski, 2004). Thus, we can conclude that the Polish borders have great impact on the geopolitical situation of the country and, consequently, on the FDI it receives. Some authors, such as Lansbury et al. (1996), Bevan et al. (2001), Walkenhorst (2004) and Ersoy (2006), point out geographic proximity as one of the most important FDI determinants in Poland, highlighting its European economic partnership. But more than that, the Polish geographic location and its positioning regarding other countries, specifically the European bloc and Russia, had influenced Poland’s post-1990s economic and political evolution. Poland’s positioning towards the West and integration in Western institutions have favoured FDI coming from EU countries, in particular. In terms of FDI, we can conclude that Poland’s location has great impact on incoming international investments, since a major part of foreign investors is from the Western bloc, as we saw earlier. As a result, Poland is influenced not only by its ‘physical’ boundaries, with Germany, Byelorussia and Ukraine, but also by its ‘real’ boundaries, with the entire Western bloc. We conceptualize the latter not as the frontier between two countries, but rather as a boundary between two geopolitical zones that are positively or negatively correlated. ‘Real’ boundaries may exist even when there is a physical separation between the countries/zones considered. In the modern globalized world where distances are shorter, ‘physical’ boundaries lose importance in relation to ‘real’ boundaries. Thus, Poland’s positioning is mainly affected by its ‘real’ boundaries, which incorporate the country into the EU and the surrounding geopolitical Western bloc. 4.2.1.3. Physical structure and configuration. As far as physical configuration is concerned, Poland has a compactly shaped territory that facilitates the management of its spatial organization, communications and infrastructure networks, and ensures political control over the different regions. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the infrastructures that were formerly suitable to the social, economic and geopolitical situation of the COMECON countries (Komornicki, 2005), and appropriate to the operation of Poland’s national economy, became inadequate to meet new internal and external conditions. The need to advance its economic transition, adjusting the country to a new reality, was heightened with Poland’s entry into the EU in 2004 (Michalska, 2009). Infrastructure modernization, often considered a determinant in international location decisions (Asiedu and Esfahani, 2001; Limao and Venables, 2001; Khadaroo and Seetanahb, 2007), arose as a strategic aspect of capital importance to FDI attraction. Nevertheless, several studies (Komornicki, 2005; ECORYS, 2006; Michalska, 2009; OCDE, 2011) claim that the Polish transport infrastructure has not kept pace with economic growth and acceleration, raising efficiency questions and comprising a barrier to FDI. We can use the Accessibility Problem Index (ECORYS, 2006) to better understand the Polish physical structure and configuration, and the relation between the existing transport infrastructure and questions of accessibility (cf. Fig. 6). First, we note that accessibility in the Polish territory is below the European average, especially in terms of its rail network. Second, the rail and road networks are less developed in the south-eastern and eastern areas, standing out as the regions with the most serious accessibility problems, in comparison to the western regions. Once again, poor infrastructures in border areas illustrate the influence that a less developed neighbour, in this case Ukraine and Slovakia, has had on regional development. Confirming this idea, we find that the western region bordering Germany is economically boosted and presents accessibility results at the level of the European average. Thus, in what concerns physical structure and configuration, although the transport network has full territorial coverage, it presents some weaknesses at the quality level, and there is a lack of highways and high-speed rail (ECORYS, 2006). The existing infrastructure does not provide enough quality to the secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy, constituting a barrier to the country’s development and FDI attraction. We argue that quality improvements are required on infrastructures in cities like Warsaw or Krakow when comparing these to the standards of European economic centres. Nevertheless, these are preferred as investment locations in detriment of the more isolated and less accessible rural eastern zone. Therefore, the Polish physical structure and configuration clearly highlights the need for investment in transport infrastructures that can come from both European funds (KPMG, 2010) and FDI. As long as accessibility problems persist in Poland in comparison to European standards, the GPF ‘physical structure and configuration’ will remain a constraint to the advantages of ‘position’ and ‘geographical extent’. Until this obstacle is overcome, Poland will remain a well-located territory (cf. ‘Position’) but inaccessible to its European partners and foreign investors. 4.2.1.4. Climate. The Polish climate has a transitional character between maritime and continental, with very cold winters and warm summers (Experience Poland, 2003). In this country, as in others, climate can have a negative impact on economic activities, such as the agricultural sector, for example in periods of drought or heat waves (Szwed et al., 2010). According to forecasts, the climate’s impact on the economy will probably grow with the global warming phenomenon (Szwed et al., 2010), A.A.C. Teixeira, M. Dias / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 46 (2013) 79–93 87 Fig. 6. Accessibility Problem Index, road and rail network, comparison between Poland and Europe, in 2006. Source: ECORYS (2006: 36–37). ski et al., 2000). Even though climate has some impact on the but it can be mitigated through anticipation measures (Stuczyin Polish geopolitical situation, since geographical backgrounds frame and distinguish Man’s intrinsic ways of life (Defarges, 2003), its preponderance is quite minor when compared to the other GPFs analysed earlier (e.g., ‘Geographical Extent’, ‘Position’). Due to the lack of evidence to the contrary, we can conclude that Climate is not a GPF of capital importance in the formulation of the Polish geopolitical situation. 4.2.2. Variable factors 4.2.2.1. Population. During the Polish transition process, some changes took place regarding the population and human capital. The adaptation of the country to the new market economy, more open to international flows, has reoriented human capital from the more technical sectors to the tertiary sector, especially business and services (Jeong et al., 2008). The latter currently dominate foreign capital with 68% of the stock of received FDI in 2008 (Zimny, 2010). The large amount of FDI received during the economic transition process has accelerated technological changes and, as a result, it had prompted the need for human capital improvement and reorientation to innovation sectors, giving answers to new market needs (Pastore, 2005). Accordingly, the Polish workforce has some characteristics that draw the attention of foreign investors. On the one hand, it aggregates a good amount of qualified human capital that results from government investment in the education sector. In 2006, the Polish government spent 5.3% of its GDP on education expenditures, surpassing Russia’s investment of just 3.9% (UNDP, 2012). In 2009, 66.8% of population aged 25-64 had attained an educational qualification and 21.2% had a higher degree (OECD, 2012). Thus, Poland features a good deal of human capital, complemented by the fact that this is relatively cheaper than that existing in Western Europe and the USA. This combination of factors turns the Polish workforce into a determinant of FDI attraction. Additionally, the workforce in Poland is characterized by a good productivity, quick adaptation to investors’ expectations and different corporate cultures (Sinnathamby and Czernicka, 2009). Finally, the existence of a young population, more open to mobility and who struggles to constantly improve its qualifications, raises Poland’s attractiveness among foreign investors (Sinnathamby and Czernicka, 2009). In cities conditions for the creation of human capital remain high, when compared to rural areas. The weak system of scholarships and subsidies creates barriers to access to higher education for those who live outside the urban agglomerations and, therefore, have greater financial difficulties (Cichy and Malaga, 2006). Consequently, it is easier for MNEs to invest in urban regions, where they can effortlessly find an adequate workforce, highlighting both the MNEs inclination to locate in these areas as a destination of investment and the aggravation of the disparities that we have seen before (cf. ‘Geographical Extent’). 4.2.2.2. Resources. In what concerns resource analysis and its influence on the Polish geopolitical situation, attention must be given to the energy question. As a small producer and consumer of energy (except for coal), Poland is generally an energy importer. Bearing in mind the relevance of energy issues as real geostrategic ‘tools’ that preponderate in the international power of each country, Poland has to know how to manage its lack of sufficient domestic energy supply in such way that it does not weaken its geopolitical situation further. Poland is a prominent producer and exporter of coal which constitutes the main domestic source of energy, supplying about 90% of the electricity consumed internally (Spencer et al., 2011). Owning a small amount of proven reserves of oil and 88 A.A.C. Teixeira, M. Dias / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 46 (2013) 79–93 natural gas, Poland is highly dependent on importing these types of energy, mainly from Russia, which satisfy 30% of the primary energy consumption. This dependence is motivated not only by the shortage of these types of energy in the Polish territory, but also by the Soviet heritage. This legacy of energy dependence, promoted by the USSR as a ‘mechanism’ of control over the countries under its influence, continues and, although it has positive effects on improving the quality and development of natural gas infrastructures, it also holds disadvantages in terms of political action and national sovereignty. Indeed, Poland, as a Western-oriented and independent country (cf. ‘Position), may see its political action in international affairs regarding Russia conditioned and constrained by the threat of energy supply cuts. Considering that finding alternative energy suppliers have turned out to be quite expensive, especially when it comes to natural gas, it has become critical to look for other sources of energy (Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2006). Thus, from a long-term perspective, renewable energies may be a feasible investment both for the public and private sectors. Although alternative energy such as biomass, geothermic energy, hydroelectric energy or wind power represent only 1.6% of the total energy used, the legal basis to develop the sector is established, surpassing the initial barriers to investment in these forms of energy (Taler et al., 2007). Several strategies and regulations have been created since the Energy Law of 1997, aligning the Polish legislation with EU norms. Summing up, we can say that the energy issue affects the Polish geopolitical situation since it comprises a dependence factor regarding Russia. While every other GPF promotes a Western-oriented Poland, ‘Resources’ (energy) remains the only GPF that connects this country to its former ‘metropolis’. Meanwhile, the investment in renewable energies can gain importance in the future, benefitting from the government’s strategy to supporting these energies, establishing legislation and favouring FDI in the sector. 4.2.2.3. Social, economic and political structure. The Polish social, economic and political structure is one of the most important GPFs when we think of its preponderance in the formulation of the geopolitical situation over the last twenty years. The transition process that entailed the shift from a planned and closed economy to an open market and capitalist economy, with all the inherent political and social consequences, has not ended yet and still influences the way in which Poland manages both its domestic and foreign affairs. Since the Polish transition process has coincided with the globalization process and the trans-nationalization of the world economy, its background and evolution is incredibly different from what it would have been if the transition had taken place in another period of time. Transnational transition, which includes the liberalization of trade and flow of capitals through open markets, was the natural path for a country like Poland, which aimed to enter the global market. In this way, although the transition process was based on Poland’s own initiative, it was leveraged by external factors, for example FDI (Jensen, 2006). The transnational process adjusted national policies and practices to global economic requirements (Shields, 2004). The adaptation of the Polish market and its restructuring with the objective of entering the global economy has facilitated the attraction of FDI (cf. Section 4.1). Nowadays, Poland’s social, economic and political structure provides an institutional framework that guarantees a safe business environment to foreign investors and facilitates their fixation in the Polish territory even in a scenario of crisis (cf. Section 4.1). We can conclude that Poland is a modern country (cf. Table 2). Although there are some Polish characteristics that cannot be included in the general traits of the modern sphere, for example, infrastructural and communication problems, Poland has come much closer to this standard since entering the EU, having become fully integrated in the European social, economic and political model. 4.2.3. Interactional factors 4.2.3.1. Technology. Technology transfer is crucial to economic growth and to the transition processes that have occurred in Eastern and Central Europe (ECE) after the fall of the USSR in 1990. Access to technology and its profitable use in national Table 2 Types of spheres according to their social, economic and political structure. Type of space Modern Static Monolithic and controlled In transition Characteristics Democratic and dynamic sphere; High GDP; Ease of communications and mobility; Consumer society, Great social mobility Education and importance of the role of women; Perception of equality; Trust in politic power. Western and Northern European countries; USA. Pre-industrial sphere; Low GDP; Limited communications; Agriculture as principal economic activity; Predominance of rural population; Little social mobility; Age hierarchy Dictatorial sphere; Existence of censorship; No freedom of expression;; Mentalities subject to the dominant ideology; Corruption and strong influence of dominant classes; No perception of equality; Distrust in political power. Mixed characteristics. Sub-Saharan African countries; medieval society. USSR; Nazi Germany; North Korea, Zimbabwe. Russia, India, China. Examples Source: Own elaboration. A.A.C. Teixeira, M. Dias / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 46 (2013) 79–93 89 economic dynamics are decisive in determining the Poland’s competitive position in the international division of work (Gurbiel, 2002). Since technology is a key aspect of the transition process, we question if the latter was followed by technological improvement (Arogyaswamy and Nowak, 2009). Poland’s technological status does not yield encouraging results, since it lags somewhat behind its OECD partners (cf. Table 3). As we can see in Table 3, the Polish Gross Domestic Expenditure on Research and Development (R&D) as a percentage of the GDP is one of the lowest among ECE countries, exceeding only Slovakia. This fact shows that the technological and innovation sector is rather unimportant in terms of Polish investment, both in the public and private sectors. Bearing in mind that Poland cannot count on a sudden increase of budgetary funds targeting the R&D sector, new means of funding should be found and encouraged, for example, in the private sector. Therefore, it is important that the Polish government increase the incentives to the private sector, both national and international, to invest in the technological and innovation sector. This can be achieved by granting benefits on bank loans, fiscal benefits and limiting bureaucracy (Gurbiel, 2002; OECD, 2004). The technological and innovation profile of Poland lags behind the average of countries in dimensions such as triadic patents per million population or scientific articles per million population (cf. Fig. 7 and Table 3). The number of patents with foreign co-inventors is below the ECE countries’ average and above the EU and OCDE countries’ average (cf. Fig. 7 and Table 3), which reveals the importance of foreign initiative, especially FDI, in knowledge transfer and innovation processes. In fact, Poland benefits significantly from transfer of technologies accumulated in more developed economies (Kolasa, 2008). Gurbiel (2002) argues that the spill-over effects verified in local industries since the establishment of MNEs are a case of success of the Polish transition process and the deepening of its relations with the EU. The transfer of technology originates mostly from FDI and foreign trade relations as “there is a lack of effective technology transfer between research and the industry sector” (Gurbiel, 2002: 14). The almost inexistent channels of communication between these two sectors are one of the greatest flaws in the Polish R&D system. Summing up, Poland presents potential for technological leverage if some difficulties are overcome. The combination of Poland’s central geographical position, intensive foreign trade relations with France and Germany, qualified workforce, longstanding entrepreneurship tradition and availability of organizations that support the activity of companies are the main starting points to the development of the technological sector (Gurbiel, 2002; Arogyaswamy and Nowak, 2009). These characteristics can also be determinant in attracting future FDI intended specifically for the innovation sector, since in the last twenty years, the latter has only indirectly benefited from the knowledge transfer of FDI in other areas of activity. 4.2.3.2. History, ideology, power and strategy. The last GPFs, history, ideology, power and strategy, are intensely related to the way Poland is situated on the global balance of power. These GPFs influence a country’s foreign policy and how it is strategically formulated, bearing in mind its historic path and ideology. The influence of these factors on geopolitics is quite significant because they represent the more heightened international expression of Poland’s geopolitical situation, which is created also by the remaining GPFs (Geographical Extent, Position, Population, Technology). Due to the existence of subliminal connections between foreign policy and strategy and the volume of FDI received, it becomes important to analyse the former to understand its linkages to the latter. Polish foreign policy only appears as autonomous and self-sufficient after the end of the USSR in 1990. Until then, Soviet Russia dominated the foreign relations of all its satellite nations, imposing common principles and conceptions in terms of Table 3 Some technological and innovation indicators, Poland vs. other countries. Group of countries Country GDERD % GDPa (2006) Triadic patents, per million populationb (2005) Scientific articles, per million population (2003) Patents with foreign co-inventors (2002–2004) ECEc Poland Czech Rep. Hungary Slovakia Germany France United Kingdom Netherlands Spain Portugal USA Israel 0.56 1.54 1.00 0.49 2.53 2.11 1.78 1.67 1.20 0.83 2.62 4.53 0.34 1.54 4.06 0.53 76.38 39.35 27.41 66.94 4.55 1.07 53.11 60.28 177.25 289.17 247.10 175.29 536.90 516.22 810.83 830.61 400.58 251.41 725.60 1037.57 35.97 38.85 36.44 56.03 12.90 17.16 23.90 45.26 21.38 25.70 12.49 16.21 EUd Other OECD countries a GERD % GDP: Gross Domestic Expenditure on Research and Development as a % of the GDP. Triadic patents are a group of patents registered at both the European Patent Office, Japan Patent Office, and US Patent and Trademark Office such that they can simultaneously protect the same invention (OECD, 2008: 176). c The represented ECE countries belong to EU. Their differentiation regarding other EU countries represented on the table aims to provide a clearer comparison between ECE and Western countries. d The EU group includes large economies (e.g., Germany, France and the United Kingdom), medium economies (e.g., the Netherlands and Spain) and small economies (e.g., Portugal).Source: OECD (2008: 180–181). b 90 A.A.C. Teixeira, M. Dias / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 46 (2013) 79–93 Fig. 7. Science and innovation profile of Poland. Source: OECD (2010: 211). international affairs. In the last twenty years, Polish foreign policy has proved to be the direct product of its history as a subjugated country, aiming to achieve self-determination (Reeves, 2010). Poland establishes a Western-oriented positioning as the first pillar of its foreign policy (cf. Position), which confirms its desire for total emancipation with regard to its former geopolitical zone, that is, Eastern Europe and Russia. There are several reasons for the priority given to the EU in Polish foreign policy and they are all extremely illustrative of the willingness of leaving the dynamics of ‘old Poland’ behind. Apart from the direct and material benefits of Poland’s entry into the EU (economic interests), it also symbolizes a very important step towards the country’s transformation into a democratic and liberal state, coming closer to the Western paradigm. Although some scepticism and pragmatism persists in the Polish standing regarding the supranational element and there is still a lack of flexibility in negotiations inside the EU, it is possible to say that the inclusion of Poland in the European community has leveraged the geopolitical transition and its subsequent benefits, namely in terms of FDI flows. In short, Polish foreign policy is characterized by a certain level of pragmatism and the need for independence and international affirmation. These features arise from Poland’s past as a dominated and dependent country whose internal and external decision-making power was constrained to another country’s will. Poland’s foreign policy formalizes the proTable 4 Geopolitics and FDI: final synthesis. Type of factor Geopolitical factor of power (GPF) Examples Stable Geographical extent Sense of space Territorial disparities (economic development) Position Variables Physical structure and configuration Climate Population Resources Interaction process Social, economic and political structure Technology History, ideology, power and strategy Borders and relations with the world Infrastructures and transports Human capital Cheaper workforce No renewable energy Renewable energy Modern space Foreign Policy Ecumene NET Other areas West East Warsaw Rest of the country Urban Rural Europe and Western bloc Rest of the World Accessibility disparities Transition process þ trans-nationality Western orientation Relevance to present FDI Good potential for future FDI U U No potential for future FDI U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U – Very unimportant; – Unimportant; – Indifferent; – Important; – Very important.Source: Authors’ compilation. A.A.C. Teixeira, M. Dias / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 46 (2013) 79–93 91 Western orientation at the expense of the country’s relations with Russia, which brings positive results in terms of the FDI it receives (cf. Position). Even though Poland has reached the status of Western partner essentially through entry into the EU, its alliance with the USA is often prioritized (Reeves, 2010). The USA is the international power that has provided the highest level of support to Poland’s independence and antagonism regarding Russia. 5. FDI and geopolitical factors: overview of the Polish case The Polish geopolitical situation is not, at the outset, embodied with exceptional characteristics. Nevertheless, some GPFs have certain positive impacts on increasing FDI inflows by setting a pro-Western orientation and the country’s integration. Poland’s ‘Geographical Extent’ and ‘Position’ spatially sustains this Western reorientation which has developed since 1990. ‘Geographical Extent’, with territorial organization centred on certain Ecumenic, urban and pro-Western points, and ‘Position’, distinguished by its centrality and versatility, are two of the main reasons for Poland’s progressive integration in Europe and alienation from Russia, its former metropolis. To this natural condition of physical space, typical of the stable factors, we add the variable factors and interaction products that corroborate the approximation to the West by strategically managing space towards this geopolitical zone. In this way, factors such as ‘Social, economic and political structure’ and ‘History, ideology, power and strategy’ embody the great geopolitical reorientation of Poland in the late 20th century. Thus, we find that Poland’s pro-Western geopolitical reorientation is at the source of massive FDI inflows, comprising a major determinant in the country’s present geopolitical condition. This circumstance is a result of the stable factors (‘Geographical Extent’ and ‘Position’) and of its strategic management, evident in the analysis of some variable factors (‘Population’ and ‘Social, economic and political structure’) and interaction products (‘History, ideology, power and strategy’). Hence, the more connected the GPFs are to its pro-Western geopolitical orientation, the larger their impact on the FDI received, as we can see in Table 4. 6. Conclusion In present work we analysed the existence of connections among distinct fields of study: International Economics, Management and Geopolitics. Reaffirming the importance of an interdisciplinary approach in the study of international matters, such as FDI and Geopolitics, this study aimed to highlight the existing affinity between International Economics, Management and International Relations. In concrete, we seek to overcome the lack of literature on the Geopolitics-IB connection, by framing Poland’s geopolitical situation and establishing connections between the latter and the FDI it has received. We can draw two main conclusions. First, in the Polish case study, there is no natural geopolitical advantage, although the possibility remains of strategically managing the territory and resources (natural, energetic, human, technological), aiming to maximize the potential benefits – Search for geopolitical affirmation. Consequently, it is the way in which countries position themselves and manage their more or less favourable geopolitical situation, boosting or not the different GPFs, that will determine the impact of geopolitics on the volume, origin and distribution of inward FDI. Some positive features such as its significant geographical extent, central position, qualified workforce or well-organized social, economic and political structure, will only be validated as FDI determinants if they are potentiated as such. Second, due to the Polish strategy of geopolitical leverage based on its Western orientation, several GPFs are managed having this objective in view. In this way, the GPFs that are more closely related to Poland’s inclusion in the Western geopolitical bloc are those which have more impact on the present levels of inward FDI (cf. Table 4). The GPFs that have more relevance on the volume, origin and distribution of FDI in Poland are ‘Geographical Extent’, ‘Position’, ‘Population’, ‘Social, economic and political structure’, and ‘History, ideology, power and strategy’ (cf. Table 4). Based on the Polish case study, we can conclude that a country’s geopolitical situation is relevant to international location decisions. The interconnections between Geopolitics and IB, tested in this study, are strong and corroborate the review of the literature made previously. Location and the distinctive features of specific places continue to be crucial pillars of the Economics and IB fields of study. Our results meet this argument, showing the extent to which the geopolitical situation, with its specific particularities and distinctive character, matters to international location decisions. Thus, a new common element to Geopolitics, International Economics and International Business stands out: the strategic element. Both in politics and IR studies and in Economic Sciences and IB, we find that the major players (States or MNEs) seek to leverage their power/profits and to overcome adversity, bearing in mind the circumstances and availability of resources and means (Lacoste, 1988). Strategy bounds the two academic areas and brings them closer than they appear at a first glance. References Arogyaswamy, B., Nowak, A., 2009. High tech and societal innovation in Poland: prospects and strategies. East-West Journal of Economics and Business 12 (1), 47–73. As-Saber, S.N., Liesch, P.W., Dowling, P.J., 2001. Geopolitics and Its Impacts on International Business Decisions: a Framework for a Geopolitical Paradigm of International Business. In: Working Paper Series, vol. 1. University of Tasmania, School of Management. Asiedu, E., Esfahani, H.S., 2001. Ownership structure in foreign direct investment projects. Review of Economics and Statistics 83 (4), 647–662. Bell, J., McNaughton, R., Young, S., 2001. Born-again global firms: an extension to the born-global phenomenon. Journal of International Management 7 (3), 173–189. 92 A.A.C. Teixeira, M. Dias / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 46 (2013) 79–93 Bevan, A., Estrin, S., Grabbe, H., 2001. “The impact of EU accession process on FDI inflows to Central and Eastern Europe”, ESRC Policy Papers 06/01, Brighton: Sussex European Institute. Bevan, A., Estrin, S., Meyer, K., 2004. Foreign investment location and institutional development in transition economies. International Business Review 13 (1), 43–64. Bosker, M., Brakman, S., Garretsen, H., Schramm, M., 2010. Adding geography to the new economic geography: bridging the gap between theory and empirics. Journal of Economic Geography 10 (6), 793–823. Brock, J.K.U., Johnson, J.E., Zhou, J.Y., 2010. Does distance matter for internationally-oriented small firms? Industrial Marketing Management 40 (3), 384–394. Buckley, P.J., Ghauri, P.N., 2004. Globalization, economic geography and the strategy of multinational enterprises. Journal of International Business Studies 35 (2), 81–98. Célerier, P., 1961. Géopolitique et Géoestrategie. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris. Chidlow, A., Young, S., 2008. “Regional Determinants of FDI Distribution in Poland”, Working Paper, 943, William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan. Cichy, K., Malaga, K., 2006. The quantity and quality of human capital in Poland and USA analyzed in the framework of the Manuelli-Seshadri model. Poznan University of Economics Review 6 (1), 5–24. Cohen, S.B., 2003. Geopolitics of the World System. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham. Correia, P.P., 2004. Manual de Geopolítica e Geoestratégia – Conceitos, Teorias e Doutrinas, vol. 1. Quarteto Editora, Coimbra. Couloumbis, T.A., 2003. Toward a global geopolitical and geoeconomic concert of powers? In: Hunter, S. (Ed.), Strategic Developments in Eurasia After 11 September. Routledge, London, pp. 17–27. Cravinho, J., 2006. Visões do Mundo: As RI e o Mundo Contemporâneo. ICS, Lisbon. Daniels, J.D., Radenbaugh, L.H., 2001. International Business: Environment And Operations. Prentice-Hall, London. Defarges, P.M., 2003. Introdução à Geopolítica. Gradiva, Lisbon. Deichmann, J.I., 1998. Foreign direct investment in Poland: sub-national distribution and location factors, 1989-1997. Middle States Geographer 31, 83–92. Demirbag, M., McGuinness, M., Altay, H., 2010. Perceptions of institutional environment and entry mode: FDI from an emerging country. Management International Review 50 (1), 208–240. Dicken, P., 2003. Places and flows: situating international investment. In: Clark, G.L., Feldman, M.P., e Gertler, M.S. (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Economic Geography. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 275–291. Dow, D., Karunaratna, A., 2006. Developing a multidimensional instrument to measure psychic distance stimuli. Journal of International Business Studies 37 (5), 578–602. Drulák, P., 2006. Between geopolitics and anti-geopolitics: Czech political thought. Geopolitics 11 (3), 420–438. Duarte, A.S., 1997. A economia: arma da estratégia. Nação e Defesa 82 (2), 139–174. Dunning, J.H., 1997. Governments and the macro-organization of economic activity: an historical and spatial perspective. In: Dunning, J.H. (Ed.), Governments, Globalization and International Business. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 31–72. Dunning, J.H., 1998. Location and the multinational enterprise: a neglected factor. Journal of International Business Studies 29 (1), 45–66. Dunning, J.H., 2000. The eclectic paradigm as an envelope for economic and business theories of MNE activity. International Business Review 9 (1), 163–190. ECORYS, 2006. Study on Strategic Evaluation on Transport Investment Priorities under Structural and Cohesion Funds for the Programming Period 20072013 – Country Report Poland. Rotterdam: ECORYS. Egger, P., Winner, H., 2005. Evidence on corruption as an incentive for foreign direct investment. European Journal of Political Economy 21 (4), 932–952. Ellis, P.D., 2008. Does psychic distance moderate the market size-entry sequence relationship? Journal of International Business Studies 39 (3), 351–369. Ersoy, M.B., 2006. Potential Effects of EU Membership on Turkish Foreign Direct Investment Inflows: Implications of Experiences of Ireland, Spain and Poland, MSc thesis., Ankara: Middle East Technical University. Eva, F., 2000. China and Japan: culture, economics, and geopolitics in the quest for a leading international role. Geopolitics 5 (3), 1–21. Experience Poland, 2003. Climate. http://www.experiencepoland.com/climate.html (accessed 10.05.11.). Fabry, N., Zeghni, S., 2002. Foreign direct investment in Russia: how the investment climate matters. Communist and Post-Communist Studies 35 (3), 289–303. Fernandes, J.P.T., 2002. Da Geopolítica clássica à Geopolítica pós-moderna: entre a ruptura e a continuidade. Política Internacional 26 (2), 161–186. Gagné, J.F., 2007. “Geopolitics in a Post-Cold War Context: From Geo-strategic to Geo-economic Considerations?”, Occasional Paper, 15, Raoul Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies. Ghemawat, P., 2001. Distance still matters - the hard reality of global expansion. Harvard Business Review 79 (8), 137–147. Grochowski, M., Fuhrmann, M., Madurowicz, M., Pieniazek, M., Wilk, W., Zegar, T., 2006. Warsaw metropolitan area in an international relations network. Miscellanea Geographica 12, 215–223. Gurbiel, R., 2002. Impact of Innovation and Technology Transfer on Economic Growth: the Central and Eastern Europe Experience. www.eadi.org/fileadmin/ WG_Documents/Reg_WG/gurbiel.pdf (accessed 21.05.11.). Henisz, W.J., 2000. The institutional environment for multinational investment. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 16 (2), 334–364. Hofstede, G., 1980. Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work Related Values. Sage, Beverly Hills. Holmes, T.J., 1998. The effect of state policies on the location of manufacturing: evidence from state borders. Journal of Economic Geography 106 (4), 667–705. Hunter, R., Ryan, L.V., 2009. Poland in 1989: enter Tadeusz Mazowiecki and the creation of the Balcerowicz Plan. Research Journal of International Studies 11, 31–39. Jensen, C., 2006. Foreign direct investment and economic transition: panacea or pain killer? Europe-Asia Studies 58 (6), 881–902. Jeong, B., Kejak, M., Vinogradov, V., 2008. Changing composition of human capital: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Economics of Transition 16 (2), 247–271. Jiménez, E.M., 2002. Glocalization: new theoretical approaches to regional (subnational) development in the context of economic integration and globalization. Integration & Trade 6 (16), 199–231. Khadaroo, A.J., Seetanahb, B., 2007. “Transport infrastructure and FDI: lessons from Sub Saharan African Economies”, Paper presented at the African Economic Conference (AEC), Addis Ababa: UN Conference Centre. Kirkmann, B.L., Lowe, K.B., Gibson, C.B., 2006. A quarter century of culture’s consequences: a review of empirical research incorporating Hofstede’s cultural values framework. Journal of International Business Studies 37 (3), 285–320. Knickerbocker, F.T., 1973. Oligopolistic Reaction and Multinational Enterprise. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. Kolasa, M., 2008. Productivity, innovation and convergence in Poland. Economics of Transition 16 (3), 467–501. Komornicki, T., 2005. Specific institutional barriers in transport development in the case of Poland and other central European transition countries. IATSS Research 29 (2), 50–58. Kornecki, L., 2010. FDI in Central and Eastern Europe: business environment and current FDI trends in Poland. Research in Business and Economics Journal 3, 1–12. Kotler, P., Jatusripitak, S., Maesinncee, S., 1997. The Marketing of Nations. The Free Press, New York. KPMG, 2010. Investment in Poland. KPMG, Warsaw. Krugman, P., 1991. Increasing returns and economic geography. Journal of Political Economy 99 (3), 483–499. Krugman, P., 1998. What’s new about the new economic geography? Oxford Review of Economic Policy 14 (2), 7–17. Lacoste, Y., 1988. Questions de Géopolitique: l’Islam, la Mer, l’Afrique. Le Livre de Poche, Paris. Lansbury, M., Pain, N., Smidkova, K., 1996. Foreign direct investment in Central Europe since 1990: an econometric study. National Institute Economic Review 156, 104–113. A.A.C. Teixeira, M. Dias / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 46 (2013) 79–93 93 Levitt, T., 1983. The globalization of markets. Harvard Business Review 61 (3), 92–102. Lim, K.H., Leung, K., Sia, C.L., Lee, M.K.O., 2004. Is e-commerce boundary-less? Effects of individualism-collectivism and uncertainty avoidance on internet shopping. Journal of International Business Studies 35 (6), 545–559. Limao, N., Venables, A.J., 2001. Infrastructure, geographical disadvantage, transport costs and trade. World Development Economic Review 15 (3), 451–479. Luttwak, E., 1990. From geopolitics to geo-economics: logic of conflict, grammar of commerce. The National Interest 20, 17–23. MacCann, P., Mudambi, R., 2004. The location behavior of the multinational enterprise: some analytical issues. Growth and Change 35 (4), 491–524. Mellinger, A.D., Sachs, J.D., Gallup, J.L., 2003. Climate, coastal proximity and development. In: Clark, G.L., Feldman, M.P., Gertler, M.S. (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Economic Geography. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 169–194. Mercille, J., 2008. The radical geopolitics of US foreign policy: geopolitical and geoeconomic logics of power. Political Geography 27 (5), 570–586. Meyer, K.E., 2001. Institutions, transaction costs and entry mode choice. Journal of International Business Studies 31 (2), 257–267. Michalska, I., 2009. The Foreign Direct Investment Environment in Poland. NYKTO, Kraków. Minifie, J.R., West, V., 1998. A small business international market selection model. International Journal of Production Economics 56-57 (1), 451–462. OCDE, 2011. Country Statistical Profiles: Poland. http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode¼RGRADSTY# (accessed 16.09.12.). OECD, 2004. OECD Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 2004-Country Response to Policy Questionnaire. OCDE Publishing, Paris. OECD, 2008. OECD Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 2008. OCDE Publishing, Paris. OECD, 2010. OECD Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 2010. OCDE Publishing, Paris. OECD, 2012. Education at a Glance 2012: OECD Indicators. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, France. Ohmae, K., 1990. The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy. The Free Press, New York. Ozbay, F., Aras, B., 2008. Polish-Russian relations: history, geography and geopolitics. East European Quarterly 42 (1), 27–42. Pastore, F., 2005. “To study or to work? Education and Labour Market Participation of Young People in Poland”, IZA Discussion Paper, 1793, Seconda Università di Napoli. Peng, M., 2009. Global Strategic Management, International Edition. South-Western, Ohio. Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency, 2010. Foreign Direct Investments in Poland. http://www.paiz.gov.pl/poland_in_figures/foreign_direct_ investment (accessed 27.04.11.). Porter, M.E., 1998a. Clusters and the new economics of competition. Harvard Business Review 76 (6), 77–90. Porter, M.E., 1998b. “The Adam Smith address: location, clusters, and the “new” microeconomics of competition”. Business Economics 33 (1), 7–14. Reeves, C., 2010. Reopening the wounds of history? the foreign policy of the ‘fourth’ Polish Republic. Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 26 (4), 518–541. Retaillé, D., 2000. Geopolitics in history. Geopolitics 5 (2), 35–51. Ricardo, D., 1817. On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. John Murray, London. Sanyal, R., 2008. Effect of perception of corruption on outward US foreign direct investment. Global Business and Economics Review 10 (1), 123–140. Schoenberger, E., 2003. The management of time and space. In: Clark, G.L., Feldman, M.P., Gertler, M.S. (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Economic Geography. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 317–332. Sethi, D., 2007. “The Impact of Geopolitical Factors on International Business”, Paper for the International Academy of Business and Economics (IABE) Annual Conference, Las Vegas: IABE. Shields, S., 2004. Global restructuring and the Polish state: transition, transformation, or transnationalization? Review of International Political Economy 11 (1), 132–154. Sinnathamby, A., Czernicka, J., 2009. Foreign Direct Investment in Poland: Key Determinants and the Impact of Poland’s Accession to European Union, MSc thesis., Aarhus: Aarhus School of Business. Sivakumar, K., Nakata, C., 2001. The stampede toward Hofstede’s framework: avoiding the sample design pit in cross-cultural research. Journal of International Business Studies 32 (3), 555–574. Smith, A., 1776. An Inquiry into the Natures and Causes of the Wealth of the Nations. W. Strahan and T. Cadell, London. Spencer, T., Korpoo, A., Lang, K.O., Kremer, M., 2011. “Linking an EU Emission Reduction Target beyond 20% to Energy Security in Central and Eastern Europe”, Working Paper, 69, Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs. Strange, S., 1970. International economics and international relations: a case of mutual neglect. International Affairs 46 (2), 304–315. ski, T., Demidowicz, G., Deputat, T., Górski, T., Krasowicz, Kus, J., 2000. Adaptation scenarios of agriculture in Poland to future climate changes. Stuczyin Environmental Monitoring and Assessment 61 (1), 133–144. skwar, I., Radziejewski, M., Graczyk1, D., Ke˛ dziora, A., Kundzewicz, Z.W., 2010. Climate change and its effect on agriculture, water Szwed, M., Karg, M., Pin resources and human health sectors in Poland. Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences 10, 1725–1737. Taler, J., Wegloski, B., Cebula, A., 2007. An assessment of Polish power. Modern Power Systems 27 (5), 13–17. Tuathail, G.O., Toal, G., 1994. Problematizing geopolitics: survey, statesmanship and strategy. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 19 (3), 259–272. UNCTAD, 2002. FDI Statistics: Search by Country/Economy. http://www.unctad.org/templates/page.asp?intItemID¼3198&land¼1 (accessed 15.02.11.). UNCTAD, 2011. “World Investment Report 2010”, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva: United Nations. UNDP, 2012. International Human Development Indicators: Public Expenditure on Education (% of GDP). http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/38006.html (accessed 10.05.11.). Unge, W., Zamarlik, M., Maczka, M., Fudala, P., Tobyczyk, M., Wojcieszak, L., 2006. Polish-Russian Relations in an Eastern Dimension Context. FOI-Sweden Defence Research Agency, Stockholm. Ürge-Vorsatz, D., Miladinovab, G., Paizs, L., 2006. Energy in transition: from the iron curtain to the European Union. Energy Policy 34 (15), 2279–2297. Venables, A.J., 1998. The assessment: trade and location. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 14 (2), 1–6. Vernon, R., 1966. International investment and international trade in the product cycle. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 80 (2), 190–207. Vesentini, J.W., 2007. Novas Geopolíticas. Contexto, São Paulo. Walkenhorst, P., 2004. Economic transition and the sectoral patterns of foreign direct investment. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade 40 (2), 5–26. Wei, S.J., 2000. How taxing is corruption on international investors? The Review of Economics and Statistics 82 (1), 1–11. Wisniewski, A., 2004. “The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on Regional Development in Poland”, EURECO Working Paper, 4, Institute for World Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Science. Yin, R.K., 2004. The Case Study Anthology. SAGE, London. Yiu, D., Makino, S., 2002. The choice between joint venture and wholly owned subsidiary: an institutional perspective. Organization Science 13 (6), 667–683. Zimny, Z., 2010. Inward FDI in Poland and Its Policy Context. In: Country Profiles of Inward and Outward Foreign Direct Investment. Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment, Columbia.