Download Italy`s Growth and Decline, 1861–2011 Throughout the

Journal of Interdisciplinary History,
XLV:4
(Spring, 2015), 507–548.
Emanuele Felice and Giovanni Vecchi
Italy’s Growth and Decline, 1861–2011 Throughout the
course of its history, Italy has undergone several ages of prosperity
and decline. In ancient times, Rome was the most advanced country
of the world. According to Maddison, at the time of the Emperor
Augustus’ death (14 A.D.), the Italian peninsula was (by far) the richest
Roman province of the Mediterranean basin. Although Maddison’s
reconstruction of gross domestic product (GDP) during the ancient
Roman period is clearly adventurous from a methodological standpoint, the evidence from ancient sources corroborates Maddison’s
findings; most scholars acknowledge Italy’s primacy by the apex of
the Roman Empire. Conversely, the subsequent centuries were bleak,
characterized by long swings of economic depression. Signs of recovery are not in evidence until the tenth century.1
For the Middle Ages and the early modern period, the GDP estimates produced by other economic historians are equally uncertain.
The earliest long-run series for per capita GDP of the Italian peninsula
date back to 1300. They show that by the early 1300s, Italy had returned to a leading role, at least in the European context. According
to Cipolla’s thesis, the Italian economy of the early Middle Ages had
Emanuele Felice is Visiting Professor of Economic History, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.
He is the author of Perché il Sud è rimasto indietro (Bologna, 2013); Divari regionali e intervento pubblico:
Per una rilettura dello sviluppo in Italia (Bologna, 2007).
Giovanni Vecchi is Associate Professor of Economics, Università di Roma, “Tor Vergata.”
He is the author of In ricchezza e in povertà: Il benessere degli italiani dall’Unità a oggi (Bologna, 2011);
with Andrea Brandolini, “Standards of Living,” in Gianni Toniolo (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of
Italy and the World Economy since Unification (New York, 2013), 227–248.
The authors thank Alessandro Brunetti and Michelangelo Vasta for data and advice and
Alessandro Nuvolari and Gianni Toniolo for helpful discussions. All remaining errors are the
authors’ responsibility. Emanuele Felice gratefully acknowledges financial support from the
Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, project HAR2013-47182-C02-01, and
the Generalitat de Catalunya, project 2014 SGR 591.
© 2015 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and The Journal of Interdisciplinary
History, Inc., doi:10.1162/JINH_a_00757
1 Angus Maddison, Contours of the World Economy, 1–2030 AD: Essays in Macro-Economic History
(New York, 2007); Frank Tenney, An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome. V. Rome and Italy of the
Empire (Paterson, 1959); Richard Duncan-Jones, The Economy of the Roman Empire: Quantitative
Studies (New York, 1982); Raymond W. Goldsmith, Premodern Financial Systems: A Historical
Comparative Study (Cambridge, 1987), 55–58; Elio Lo Cascio and Paolo Malanima, “Cycles
and Stability: Italian Population before the Demographic Transition,” Rivista di Storia Economica,
III (2005), 204–205.
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a mastery of the most advanced technology of the times. With the
advent of the modern age—after, say, 1500—the overall GDP of the
Italian economy started to rise, but it was accompanied by an even
greater increase in the population, resulting in a slow decline in
per-capita income. Despite an overall downward trend, Italy ranked
among the most advanced countries until the mid-1700s when the gap
between it and other Western European countries began to grow:
“Things changed after 1750. For more than a century, with very short
interruptions, the Italian economy experienced a decline which was
at once absolute and relative.”2
At the time of its political unification (1861), Italy was a relatively
backward country, located on the European “periphery.” Yet, after
an impressive revival, which took place mostly during the second half
of the twentieth century, Italy managed to reach the “center” of the
world economy. Statistics from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) show that in GDP per person at
market exchange rates, Italy temporarily overtook Great Britain in
1987; Maddison found that in GDP per person at purchasing power
parity (PPP, 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars), Italy overtook
Great Britain in 1991. In the recent past, however, Italy’s economic
performance has been disappointing, by any standards. Since the early
1990s, economic growth has come to a halt; most socioeconomic indicators reveal the country to be sliding down the chart, suggesting to
many that a new phase of economic decline might well be underway.3
Scholars disagree about interpretations of Italy’s economic performance not only during the entire post-unification history but also
during specific periods. Fenoaltea called the years from unification
until World War I a “failure,” whereas Federico termed the years
from unification until World War II a “little-known success story.”
Zamagni expressed a generally optimistic view in The Economic History
2 Malanima, “Measuring the Italian Economy 1300–1861,” Rivista di Storia Economica, III
(2003), 265–295; Carlo Maria Cipolla, “Note sulla storia del saggio d’interesse, corso dividendi
e sconto dei dividendi del Banco di S. Giorgio nel Sec. XVI,” Economia Internazionale, II (1952),
255–274; Malanima, “The Long Decline of a Leading Economy: GDP in Central and Northern
Italy, 1300–1913,” European Review of Economic History, II (2011), 169–219; idem, “When Did
England Overtake Italy? Medieval and Early Modern Divergence in Prices and Wages,” European
Review of Economic History, I (2013), 45–70; idem, “Alle origini della crescita in Italia 1820–1913,”
Rivista di Storia Economica, III (2006), 306–330. For the quotation, see idem, “An Age of Decline:
Product and Income in Eighteenth–Century Italy,” Rivista Historia Economica, II (2006), 111.
3 Maddison, “Historical Statistics of the World Economy: 1–2008 AD” (2010), available at
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/content.shtml (accessed October 6, 2013).
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of Italy (1861–1990), in disagreement with Ciocca’s more pessimistic
Ricchi per sempre?1796–2005 (Wealthy Forever?). Di Martino and Vasta
argued, “Italy never really converged towards the technological
frontier and never left the semi-periphery of the world economy,”
in stark contrast to Toniolo’s opening chapter of The Oxford Handbook
of the Italian Economy since Unification, which tells of a long convergence
(1896–1992) and two briefer periods of divergence (1870–1896 and
1992–2010). In spite of the disappointing performance of the last
two decades, Toniolo’s interpretation is not a pessimistic one. His
“divergence” is not to be construed as “decline”; he places Italy’s
“diminished social capacity for growth” in the context of other
European countries that struggled to adapt to the challenges of the
second globalization era.4
This article documents the historical trajectory of Italy’s modern economic growth, taking advantage of the last generation of
long-run statistics made available by Italy’s recent 150th birthday,
updated with the latest historical estimates of industrial production and regional accounts. The focus is on GDP, for the country
as a whole and for its administrative regions, covering the period
from Italy’s unification to the present day. How and to what
extent has Italy succeeded in reaching the standards of the most
advanced economies? How serious is the prospect of Italy’s economic
decline?
To diagnose whether a country is declining is a difficult and
ambitious task. The first difficulty is to determine an adequate
definition of economic decline. At this point, the term has many different meanings. A useful distinction is between an absolute decline (a
country’s inability to maintain the level of well-being achieved in
the past) and relative decline (its inability to keep pace with the most
4 Stefano Fenoaltea, “Lo sviluppo economico dell’Italia nel lungo periodo: riflessioni su tre
fallimenti,” in Pierluigi Ciocca and Gianni Toniolo (eds.), Storia economica d’Italia. I. Interpretazioni
(Rome, 1998), 3–41; idem, “I due fallimenti della storia economica: il periodo post-unitario,” Rivista
di Politica Economica, III–IV (2007), 341–358; Giovanni Federico, “Italy, 1860–1940: A Little-Known
Success Story,” Economic History Review, IV (1996), 764–786; Vera Zamagni, Dalla periferia al centro:
La seconda rinascita economica dell’Italia (1861–1990) (Bologna, 1993; orig. pub. 1990, though inclusive
only until 1981); Ciocca, Ricchi per sempre? Una storia economica d’Italia (1796–2005) (Turin, 2007);
Paolo Di Martino and Michelangelo Vasta, “Happy 150th birthday Italy? Institutions and Economic
Performance since 1861,” Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Statistica, Università di Siena,
no. 662 (2012), available at http://www.econ-pol.unisi.it/dipartimento/it/node/1729; Toniolo,
“An Overview of Italy’s Economic Growth,” in idem (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Italian
Economy since Unification (New York, 2013), 29, 35.
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dynamic economies and to hold steady in the international ranking
of prosperity, although not experiencing any actual worsening of
living conditions). The second difficulty attends the fact that decline
is slow and hardly perceptible, becoming a political and social problem only when the cost of ignoring the results becomes unbearable
for a governing elite (sometimes due to such shocks as wars, revolutions, and financial crises). Decline often occurs when an old production model fails to cover new circumstances, especially if this model
was highly successful in the past.5
Neither economists nor economic historians have developed a
unified conceptual framework to analyze economic decline. Moreover, the multidimensional nature of decline adds to the complexity
of measurement exercises. The strategy in this article is to rely on
GDP as the main tool for analyzing economic decline. Despite its
shortcomings, GDP remains the single best way to describe the performance of a market economy, like that of Italy throughout the
period under consideration. If the value of GDP equals a country’s
overall income, and GDP per person the average income of that country, GDP per person might appear to be a good proxy measure of
(average) well-being (no matter how theoretically inappropriate this
line of argument is). Furthermore, GDP per worker can be interpreted
as a measure of productivity, the increase in which ultimately determines the sustained income rise observed during the process of
modern economic growth. As we will see, the differences between
GDP per capita and GDP per worker can provide useful insights into
the determinants of convergence and divergence—the characteristics
and causes of economic growth, or the lack of it.6
Hence, GDP is the prime indicator in comparisons between
the economies of the present as well as of the past (at least as far back
as the onset of the Industrial Revolution). Economic historians
have devoted many efforts to the art of reconstructing GDP time
series, and Italy can be proud of its long tradition in this field. One
of the main limitations in these attempts—the lack of subnational
series of GDP—has been remedied by a number of recent studies.
Time seems to be ripe for re-assessing the long-run dynamics of
Italy’s economic progress.
5 Toniolo, L’Italia verso il declino economico? in idem and Vincenzo Visco (eds.), Il declino economico
dell’Italia: Cause e rimedi (Milano, 2004), 9–10.
6 François Lequiller and Derek Blades, Understanding National Accounts (Paris, 2006).
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LESSONS FROM NEW LONG-RUN ESTIMATES OF GDP
Thanks to the
reconstruction published by the Italian national statistics agency
(ISTAT) in 1957, Italy was one of the first countries to create its
own historical series for GDP, though the results of this pioneering
work were not entirely successful. Italy’s first series of GDP, running from 1861 to 1955, had serious inconsistencies, which subsequent revisions did not fully remedy. The main criticism is
that these official statistical series were never accompanied by an
adequate description of methods and sources; without these elements it is difficult—if not impossible—to evaluate the quality of
the data. Hence, the consensus of the scientific community was
that Italy’s “first generation” time series did not meet international
standards.7
In the following decades, the reconstruction of the historical
series of Italian GDP intensified; new estimates of the same variable
have been published at an average rate of one every four years.
Nonetheless, the scholars entrusted with producing the historical
series of national accounting were not able to devise a consistent
historical time series for the entire post-unification period. Not until
the 150th anniversary of Italy’s unification, celebrated in 2011, did a
project coordinated by the Bank of Italy (in cooperation with ISTAT
and Rome’s “Tor Vergata” University) manage to publish a complete reconstruction of the national accounts. The study did not
just connect all of the existing series; it also incorporated the results
of new studies for uncovered sectors and periods, thereby yielding
historical series covering the entire 150-year history of united Italy.
This work has recently been updated, filling the last gap in the reconstruction of industrial GDP. Furthermore, by taking advantage of
new data about the Italian labor force, we are now also able to discuss
7 ISTAT (Istituto centrale di statistica), Studi sul reddito nazionale (Rome, 1950); idem, “Indagine
statistica sullo sviluppo del reddito nazionale dell’Italia dal 1861 al 1956,” Annali di statistica, IX
(1957); idem, Sommario di statistiche storiche italiane 1861–1955 (Rome, 1958). The system of national
accounting was introduced in Italy in the aftermath of World War II, shortly after “the governments of Britain, Canada and the United States had started to use it, during the war, in order to
assess compatibility between aims and resources.” See Gian Carlo Falco, La contabilità nazionale
italiana (1890–1995), in Claudio Pavone (ed.), Storia d’Italia nel secolo ventesimo: strumenti e fonti
(Rome, 2006), I, 377; Andre Vanoli, A History of National Accounting (Amsterdam, 2005). For
the early GDP series compiled in the 1960s, see Giorgio Fuà (ed.), Lo sviluppo economico in Italia.
III. Studi di settore e documentazione di base (Milan, 1968); for criticism, Fenoaltea, “Notes on the
Rate of Industrial Growth in Italy, 1861–1913,” Journal of Economic History, III (2003), 695–735.
For the consensus view of the first-generation time series, see Jon S. Cohen and Federico,
The Growth of the Italian Economy, 1820–1960 (New York, 2001), 8–9.
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Fig. 1
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Italy’s Per Capita GDP, 1300–2011
For the years 1300 to 1861, the series refers to Northern Italy; for 1861 to 2011, the
graph uses the new series.
SOURCES Paolo Malanima, “Measuring the Italian Economy 1300–1861,” Rivista di Storia
Economica, III (2003), 265–295; our series presented in Appendix II.
NOTE
the new series of Italy’s GDP per worker (productivity), as a total and
by sector of activity.8
The yearly series of Italy’s GDP per head and per worker, running
from 1861 to 2011 at constant prices, are presented in Appendix II.
8 Many of the previous estimates were variations on those published by ISTAT in 1957: Vecchi,
“Il benessere dell’Italia liberale (1861–1913),” in Ciocca and Toniolo (eds.), Storia economica d’Italia.
III. Industrie, mercati, istituzioni. I. Le strutture dell’economia (Rome, 2003), 71–98. For the new estimates, see Alberto Baffigi, “National Accounts, 1861–2011,” in Toniolo (ed.), Oxford Handbook,
157–186; Alessandro Brunetti, Felice, and Vecchi, “Reddito,” in Vecchi (ed.), In ricchezza e in
povertà: Il benessere degli italiani dall’Unità a oggi (Bologna, 2011), 209–234. For the years 1938 to
1951, see Felice and Albert Carreras, “When Did Modernization Begin? Italy’s Industrial Growth
Reconsidered in Light of New Value-Added Series, 1911–1951,” Explorations in Economic History,
IV (2012), 443–460. For productivity, see Stephen N. Broadberry, Claire Giordano, and Francesco
Zollino, “Productivity,” in Toniolo (ed.), Oxford Handbook, 187–226. GDP per hour worked, an
alternative measure of productivity, could not be calculated due to lack of suitable data: See Andrea
Brandolini and Vecchi, “Standards of Living,” in Toniolo (ed.), Oxford Handbook, 227–248;
Michael Huberman, “Working Hours of the World Unite? New International Evidence of
Worktime, 1870–1913,” Journal of Economic History, IV (2004), 964–1001.
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Figure 1, however, has an even more ambitious goal: By supplementing Malanima’s reconstruction with the new estimates of the
period from 1861 to 2011, it displays the long-run evolution of Italy’s
per capita GDP from the late Middle Ages to our time. The contrast
with the period of pre-unification highlights a defining characteristic of modern economic growth, its sustained increase in GDP per
capita. Figure 1 also shows the distinctive feature of a pre-industrial
economy, such as that of medieval and Renaissance Italy—the
centuries-long stagnation of per-capita GDP. Note, however, that
the graph’s scale hides the frequency as much as the intensity of
the annual variations during that period: Even though at that time,
Italy was a leading economy, famines were recurring, even within
the same generation, with disastrous consequences for the population’s standard of living, regardless of the cycles around the same,
flat trend.9
At the close of the 1700s, Italy did not participate in the first
Industrial Revolution because it could not adopt British steam technology and construct a railway system. Hence, the GDP trend for
this period in the figure shows a smooth continuation of the past.
The curve starts to rise during the last decades of the nineteenth
century, the start of the second Industrial Revolution, which was
based on electricity, oil, and chemicals. At this epochal juncture, Italy
began the process of “modern economic development,” as described
by Kuznets: Rural backward Italy embarked on a deep transformation that would eventually change its features, on both qualitative
and quantitative levels, and turn it into an advanced economy within
the space of a century or so.10
When measured in absolute terms, and over the long run, the
increase in GDP per head in the century and a half from unification
until the present day is remarkable. On average, Italians today earn
thirteen times more than their ancestors did at the time of unification. Figure 1 also shows that the most impressive progress in GDP per
head is a recent phenomenon, largely occurring in the latter half
of the twentieth century. Since World War II, per capita GDP has increased more than sevenfold; in the previous 100 years or so (1861 to
9 Malanima, “Measuring the Italian Economy”; Massimo Livi Bacci, Population and Nutrition:
An Essay on European Demographic History (New York, 1991); Cormac Ó Gráda, Famine: A Short
History (Princeton, 2009).
10 Robert C. Allen, The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective (New York, 2009);
Simon Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure and Spread (New Haven, 1966).
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Table 1 The Changeable Growth Rate of Italy’s
GDP
GDP/WORKER
YEARS NECESSARY
GDP/PERSON
AVERAGE ANNUAL
FOR GDP PER
AVERAGE ANNUAL
VARIATION (%)
PERSON TO DOUBLE
VARIATION (%)
(1)
(2)
(3)
−0.06
−1,167
n.a.
Italy in the Liberal
period (1861–1913)
1861–1881
1881–1901
1901–1913
0.91
77
0.89
0.61
0.71
1.73
115
99
40
0.26
1.15
1.53
Fascist Italy
(1922–1938)
1922–1929
1929–1938
1.46
48
1.65
3.12
0.19
22
372
3.09
0.54
Republican Italy
(1948–2011)
1948–1973
1973–1992
1992–2002
2002–2011
3.10
23
2.78
5.51
2.51
1.56
−0.48
13
28
45
−146
4.96
1.92
1.32
0.25
1.74
40
1.58
Pre-unification Italy
(1300–1860)
Italy 150 years on
(1861–2011)
NOTE Column (2) shows the number of years needed for per capita GDP to double, assuming
that it changes at the average rate given in column 1; the negative values are interpreted as the
number of years necessary for per capita GDP to halve.
1951), it had little more than doubled. The income of the Italians
made a long leap in a short time.11
Most of the action in Figure 1 takes place in the late nineteenth century. For post-unification Italy, the nonlinear nature
of the growth can best be grasped by looking at the rate at which
GDP increased (or decreased) in the main periods of Italy’s postunification history (Table 1). The main “facts” emerging from
the Table are capable of schematic analysis by period.
11 Toniolo and Vecchi, Nel secolo breve il lungo balzo del benessere degli italiani, in Luca Paolazzi (ed.),
Libertà e benessere in Italia: 150 anni di storia unitaria e i traguardi del futuro (Rome, 2010), 15–59.
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1861 to 1901 The first two generations of Italians in postunification Italy did not experience high growth rates in per capita
GDP. Indeed, the rate at which GDP increased during the first four
decades of the new Kingdom of Italy (0.6 to 0.7 percent per year)
would have required at least a century to double. The political
unification of the country did not lead to any “take-off ” with regard to the average income of its citizens but to a slow and gradual
increase. Productivity, however, strongly increased during the second half of the period, anticipating the momentous change in GDP
per head that was about to come at the dawning of the twentieth
century.12
1901 to 1913 The years of the so-called “Giolitti age,” Giovanni
Giolitti being prime minister from 1903 to 1914, saw an acceleration
in GDP: Compared to the previous two decades, the economic growth
rate more than doubled (1.7 percent per year in per capita terms).
World War I marked a sharp break in this favorable period, but
growth resumed rapidly again in the aftermath of the Treaty of
Versailles.13
1922 to 1938 The new estimates describe the interwar period
as the combination of two decades that differed vastly from one
another. The 1930s were as bleak (average per capita GDP growth
rate was +0.2 percent) as the 1920s were rosy (+3.1 percent); differences in productivity were only slightly less pronounced and negligible on the whole.
1948 to 2011 The republican period shows three well-known
features: (1) from 1948 to 1973, Italy advanced at an unprecedented
rate—+5.5 percent per year in per capita terms—not since matched;
(2) from 1973 to 1992, the rate decreased conspicuously; and (3) from
2002 to 2011, per capita GDP actually fell by 0.5 percent per year
while the growth rate of productivity slowed but remained slightly
positive.
12 Toniolo, “Overview,” 3–36, gives two reasons for the deadlock of this period. First, in three
parts, was the sluggishness of (1) the process for creating a single national market (political,
administrative, and economic unification), (2) the slow formation of an adequate human capital
stock (schooling of the population was difficult), and (3) the establishment of the new legal institutions (from the single currency to the approval of the commercial and administrative codes). Second
was the succession of external shocks (two wars of independence and the problem of banditry in
the south of the country) and policy mistakes with regard to trade and monetary matters.
13 Growth actually began in 1898. The yearly growth rate for the years 1898 to 1913 is
1.75. Also, the previous decades were marked by significant cyclical movements (as discussed
below), which did not change the overall picture. The growth rate for the years 1876 to 1898
is 0.76 and for the years 1876 to 1888, 1.18.
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ITALY AS AN OPEN ECONOMY Nations do not live in isolation; Italy’s
performance must be assessed relative to that of other countries.
Thanks to the availability of new long-term statistical series, we
can track Italy’s participation in the international economy with
greater accuracy. The evolution of Italy’s openness to international
trade is shown in Figure 2, using the ratio of the sum of imports and
exports to GDP. The increase in the degree of openness is particularly
marked in the early stages of industrialization—between 1892 and
1914—despite the country’s propensity for protectionism, which
was, in fact, more apparent than real. After World War I, the increase
resumed during the 1920s, only to decline following the autarchic
Fig. 2
International Factor Mobility, Italy 1861–2011
SOURCES For current account as a percentage of GDP, 1870–1939, see Brian R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Europe 1750–2005 (London, 2007); Maurice Obstfeld and Alan M.
Taylor, “The Great Depression as a Watershed: International Capital Mobility over the Long Run,”
in Michael D. Bordo, Claudia Goldin, and Eugene N. White (eds.), The Defining Moment: The
Great Depression and the American Economy in the Twentieth Century (Chicago, 1998), 353–402;
International Monetary Fund (IMF), “World Economic Outlook Database” (2012), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/02/weodata/index.aspx (accessed on 6 October
2013). The emigration rate is our own calculation from ISTAT data; trade openness was kindly
provided to the authors by Michelangelo Vasta.
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policies of the Fascist regime. Economic recovery during the boom
years of the so-called “economic miracle” coincided with Italy’s
inclusion in the new international order, as well as in the European
Common Market, which, among other things, involved a gradual
abatement of international tariffs. The great fluctuations of the
1970s and 1980s were due to sharp changes in oil prices. In general,
the correlation between GDP and long-term trade openness is positive: In the liberal age (1863 to 1963), imports (Granger) caused GDP,
which in turn caused exports (Granger); in the period following
World War II (1951 to 2004), Granger causality, although weaker,
is reversed, exports–GDP–imports.14
A second aspect of openness concerns migration flows.
Between 1869—the first year for which reliable estimates are
available—and 2005, more than 28 million Italians emigrated, the
majority of them beyond Europe (to the United States, Canada,
Argentina, and Brazil). The right axis of Figure 2 shows the gross
emigration rate (emigrants per 1,000 inhabitants). The late 1860s
saw fewer than 5 per 1,000, but in the years leading to World
War I, almost 25 per 1,000 left the country. The war almost
completely stopped migration flows. After a brief resumption, Italian
emigration found a new obstacle in the restrictive U.S. quotas of
1921 (Emergency Quota Act) and 1924 (Immigration Act), in the
Fascist laws of 1927, and in the world crisis of 1930. The combined
effects of lower supply and demand with regard to migrants led to a
real drop in the emigration rate. When emigration picked up again
after World War II, the Italians went mainly to Western European
countries. Although the (gross) emigration rate was always below 10
per 1,000, the actual number of people emigrating was significant—2.5
to 3 million Italians emigrated during the 1950s and the 1960s.
Gomellini and Ó Gráda found that “relative wages, relative per capita
incomes and network effects (proxied by previous migrants) are the
variables that explain most [of the emigration].” Emigrant networks
14 Michelangelo Vasta, “Italian Export Capacity in the Long-Run Perspective (1861–2009): A
Tortuous Path to Stay in Place,” Journal of Modern Italian Studies, I (2010), 133–156; Federico,
Sandra Natoli, Giuseppe Tattara, and Vasta, Il commercio estero italiano, 1862–1950 (Rome, 2011);
Baffigi, “National Accounts”; Federico and Antonio Tena, “Was Italy a Protectionist Country?”
European Review of Economic History, I (1998), 73–97. For tests of Granger causality, see Barbara
Pistoresi and Alberto Rinaldi, “Exports, Imports and Growth: New Evidence on Italy: 1863–2004,”
Explorations in Economic History, II (2012), 241–254. A variable x is said to Granger-cause variable y, if
y can be predicted better by using past values of both x and y than by using past values of y alone.
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seem to be the single most important factor behind the Italian emigration flows.15
The third aspect of openness concerns capital movements,
which have significant implications for economic growth—from
both a theoretical and an empirical standpoint. The mobility of
international capital, which enables the bond constraining domestic
investments to a country’s saving capacity to be broken, is one of the
most important factors promoting economic growth in the more
backward economies. Obstfeld and Taylor’s estimates of the mean absolute value of current account for Italy show high values—indicating
high capital mobility—as far back as the first globalization during the
the 1900s and 1920s. These years showed the highest economic growth
before World War II, as well as the most intense capital movements.
Before World War I, capital flew to Italy from elsewhere in Europe
(especially Britain) to finance construction and infrastructure, significantly contributing to the upward bend of the GDP series.16
Capital flows reached a low during the 1930s, corresponding
with the Italian Fascist period, and began to rise again during the
years of the economic miracle. They peaked during the 1960s
when GDP growth was also at its best. Conversely, in the final
decades of the twentieth century, capital movements underwent a
gentle downward trend, despite being on the rise throughout the
world. As we have seen, the economic performance of the country
declined dramatically at this time. In general, Italy’s economic
growth seems to be strongly correlated with its degree of openness
to foreign capital movements. Participation in the international
economy was vital to the country.
TECHNOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONS: RE - INTERPRETING THE ITALIAN
ECONOMY The debate about Italy’s industrialization and economic
growth has a long tradition. Romeo and Gerschenkron disputed
about capital accumulation and the “prerequisites” of industrialization more than half a century ago. Despite accumulated research,
15 The data reported herein refer to gross emigration rates. See Matteo Gomellini and
Ó Gráda, “Migrations,” in Toniolo (ed.), Oxford Handbook, 271–302. For an analysis of regional
flows, see Felice, Divari regionali e intervento pubblico: Per una rilettura dello sviluppo in Italia (Bologna,
2007), 42–54; Gomellini and Ó Gráda, “Migrations,” 282. For the post-World War II period,
see Alessandra Venturini, Postwar Migration in Southern Europe, 1950–2000: An Economic Analysis
(New York, 2004).
16 Fenoaltea, “International Resource Flows and Construction Movements in the Atlantic Economy: The Kuznets Cycle in Italy, 1861–1913,” Journal of Economic History, III (1988), 605–638.
IT ALY ’S GR OWT H A ND D E C LI N E
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the debate is still lively and contentious. The new body of quantitative evidence makes it possible to add new insights to the interpretation of the Italian economy over the long run. Italy’s per-capita
GDP series can be divided into the three periods corresponding to the
country’s political history during the 150 years since its unification—
the Liberal age (1861 to 1913), the Fascist period (1922 to1938), and the
republican era (since 1946). Placing these GDP series within a broader
context that includes technological progress and institutions is useful
in explaining the country’s long-term economic performance.17
Technology is the driving force behind increases in productivity
(per worker GDP) that represent the main determinant of per capita
GDP. During the 150 years since its unification, Italy has experienced
four technological regimes: the first (1861 to 1875) identified by the
three main inventions of the previous decades—the steam engine, the
spinning machine, and the railways; the second (1875 to 1908) coinciding with the “Second Industrial Revolution,” characterized by
heavy industry (steel, first and foremost, vital to mechanical industry)
and electricity; the third (1908 through the 1970s) defined by the
establishment of mass production (exemplified by Henry Ford’s automobile manufacturing) in which petroleum was key, and durable
consumer goods began to emerge; and the fourth associated with
the “Third Industrial Revolution,” or the electronics age (1970s to
the present day), triggered by the advent of information technology
and telecommunications, particularly computer technology.18
Technology is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a
country to determine its own course toward prosperity; technological
17 For the debate, see Rosario Romeo, Risorgimento e capitalismo (Bari, 1959); Alexander
Gerschenkron, “Notes on the Rate of Industrial Growth in Italy, 1881–1913,” Journal of Economic
History, IV (1955), 360–375; Gerschenkron and Romeo, “Lo sviluppo industriale italiano [testo del
dibattito tenuto a Roma, presso la Svimez, il 13 luglio 1960],” Nord e Sud, XXIII (1961), 30–56.
18 Boyan Jovanovic and Peter Rousseau, “General Purpose Technologies,” in Philippe Aghion
and Steven Durlauf (eds.), Handbook of Economic Growth (Amsterdam, 2005), I, 1181–1224;
Christopher Freeman and Carlota Perez, “Structural Crises of Adjustment, Business Cycles and
Investment Behaviour,” in Giovanni Dosi et al. (eds.), Technical Change and Economic Theory
(London, 1988), 38–66; Robert J. Gordon, “Is U.S. Economic Growth Over? Faltering Innovation Confronts the Six Headwinds,” NBER Working Papers 18315, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Inc. (2012), available at http://www.voxeu.org/epubs/cepr-reports/us-economicgrowth-over-faltering-innovation-confronts-six-headwinds (accessed October 6, 2013). The
dates marking the shift from one regime to another are obviously approximate, serving only to
outline the timeline of the main innovations. Franco Amatori, Matteo Bugamelli, and Andrea
Colli, “Technology, Firm Size, and Entrepreneurship,” in Toniolo (ed.), Oxford Handbook,
455–484, provide an excellent and up-to-date account of unified Italy’s different technological
paradigms during the past 150 years.
520
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E MA N U E LE F E LI C E A N D G I O V A N N I V EC C HI
change must be accompanied by institutional change, in the broadest
sense, as well as ideological change. Did the new technological
paradigms—exogenous factors with regard to the Italian economy—
find fertile terrain in the country because institutions and ideologies
were favorable to their adoption?19
Much has been written about the economic history of Liberal
period Italy. The question at the heart of the historiographical debate
concerns when and why Italy was able to transform itself from a rural,
poor, and backward country into a wealthy, modern, and industrial
one. Along with Romeo, Gerschenkron, the intellectual “giant who
dominated the Italian debate” after World War II, dated the “big industrial push” of the country at the mid-1890s, attributing it to the
creation of mixed banks—Banca Commerciale Italiana (Comit), founded
in 1894 with German capital; Credito Italiano (Credit); Banco di Roma;
and, later, Banca Italiana di Sconto. Mixed banks—or universal banks—
collect capital (the prerogative of commercial banks) and channel it to
favor industrial development (the prerogative of investment banks).
Through their network of branches, mixed banks collect short-term
deposits from ordinary citizens to invest in shares; that is, they turn
the capital into long-term credits to industry—precisely what is
needed, according to Gerschenkron, to industrialize a backward
country. Mixed banks were the institutional innovation that acted as
Gerschenkron’s “engine of growth” in both Italy and Germany. They
were able to compensate for the country’s scarcity of natural resources,
its political instability, and its governmental sluggishness during the first
decades after unification on the path toward Italy’s industrialization.20
19 Kuznets made this point about technological change in Stockholm when he received the
Nobel Prize for economics. See Kuznets, “Modern Economic Growth: Findings and Reflections,” American Economic Review, III (1973), 247–258; Moses Abramowitz, Thinking about Growth
and Other Essays on Economic Growth & Welfare (New York, 1989); Daron Acemoglu and James
Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (New York, 2012).
20 Among the more important works about the Liberal period are Toniolo, Storia economica; idem,
“Overview”; Zamagni, Economic History; Ciocca, Ricchi per sempre?; Fenoaltea, L’economia italiana
dall’Unità alla Grande Guerra (Roma, 2006); idem, The Reinterpretation of Italian Economic History: From
Unification to the Great War (New York, 2011). The quotation about Gerschenkron and Romeo is
from idem, “I due fallimenti,” 352. The mixed banks typically entered the boards of the firms that
they financed, thus obtaining access to strategic information. The advantages associated with the
presence of a mixed bank must be weighed against the greater fragility of the economic system,
due to the relationship between credit capital (banking system) and industrial capital (the real economy). Gerschenkron, “Notes”; idem, “Rosario Romeo e l’accumulazione primitiva del capitale,”
Rivista Storica Italiana, IV (1959), 557–586; idem, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (New
York, 1962).
IT ALY ’S GR OWT H A ND D E C LI N E
| 521
The debate that Gerschenkron’s work sparked remained intense
for decades. The common denominator of its various interpretations
through the years—particularly by Romeo, Cafagna, and Bonelli—
was the assumption that economic development followed a stageby-stage progression. According to this view, a country develops
through an orderly sequence of stages (or phases). The first stage
encompasses the prerequisites for growth—for instance, infrastructure
and human capital; the second stage involves a striking economic
take-off, introducing a distinct break with the previous GDP series
trend; the next stage marks a rise to maturity, in which technology
creates new investment opportunities, the economy becomes more
complex, and, finally, mass well-being ensues.21
It is difficult to establish whether the per-capita GDP series in
Figure 3 shows a trend congruent with the explanation offered by
stage-based models. The figure displays the series of GDP per person
and per worker against the background of technological changes
and the main political and economic innovations. The first two
decades of post-unification Italy reveal an uncertain start; only with
the beginning of the “Historical Left” and the Depretis Government (1876) did GDP begin to grow at an increased rate. The trend
does not show any trace of the crisis of the 1880s, but the slowdown
of the 1890s is visible. On the whole, however, the terms “take-off ”
or “big industrial push” are inappropriate to describe the trend of
GDP per capita during the latter half of the 1890s—especially if we
look at GDP per worker.
Fenoaltea proposed an alternative to the stage-based model.
He observed that the new GDP series has an upward trend with no
breaks or take-offs, only fluctuations—“economic cycles” mainly
caused by the construction industry and more generally by the infrastructure sector. According to Fenoaltea, foreign investment,
especially British, was responsible for the various stages of Italian
economic growth during the Liberal period. In this model, Italy
behaved like any other European fringe country: When the political
21 Romeo, Risorgimento; Luciano Cafagna, “L’industrializzazione italiana: La formazione di
una ‘base industriale’ in Italia fra il 1896 e il 1914,” Studi storici, III–IV (1961), 690–724; idem,
Intorno alle origini del dualismo economico in Italia, in Alberto Caracciolo (ed.), Problemi storici
dell’industrializzazione e dello sviluppo (Urbino, 1965), 103–150; Franco Bonelli, Il capitalismo
italiano: Linee generali di interpretazione, in Ruggiero Romano and Corrado Vivanti (eds.), Storia
d’Italia: Dal feudalesimo al capitalismo (Turin, 1978), 1193–1255; Fenoaltea, L’economia italiana, 38;
Walt W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (New York, 1960).
|
522
Fig. 3
SOURCE
E MA N U E LE F E LI C E A N D G I O V A N N I V EC C HI
GDP
per Person and per Worker, 1861–1913
Elaborations from Appendix II.
climate positively influenced investor expectations, capital flowed
into the country and moved the economy forward; when investors
perceived greater risk, capital flows into Italy ceased, or reversed
direction, and the economy contracted. The view of Italy as an open
economy does not require any stage-based developmental process
and does not warrant any take-off stage; the process was guided by
the interweaving of the international economic cycle, investor
expectations, and the domestic political cycle. Fenoaltea’s interpretation appears largely consistent with a cyclical development along
an increasing trend, like the one shown in Figure 3. Less convincing is its disregard for the role played by national institutions and
domestic economic-policy decisions.22
Toniolo made this point effectively: “In order to profit from
the international boom, Italy had to abandon expensive colonial
adventures and put order to its public finances, rebuild almost
from zero a banking system that laid in tatters, create a central
bank, overcome the credibility shock generated by the suspension
22
Fenoaltea, “International Resource Flows”; idem, L’economia italiana; idem, Reinterpretation.
IT ALY ’S GR OWT H A ND D E C LI N E
| 523
of gold convertibility. More than that: Italy had to overcome a social
and political crisis that threatened to undermine the very foundations of the liberal state. Both politics and society stood up to the
occasion: the crisis (…) was overcome. Democracy was maintained,
the disastrous African policy was discontinued, sound economic
institutions were put in place and the banking system was revitalized.
In the following years successive governments maintained a timeconsistent fiscal and monetary policy, the gold standard was shadowed but cleverly not officially reinstated, commercial treaties brought
back the fresh air of freer trade. All this lies behind Italy’s ability to
surf the long wave of international growth. It did not need to be so: even
sailing with the tide requires expert skippers” (our italics).23
On a more technical level, the estimates of Felice and Carreras
pertaining just to industry from 1911 to 1951, when combined with
those of Fenoaltea (1861 to 1913), suggest that the cyclical model
is valid only until the mid-1890s. From that time onward, more
or less coinciding with the creation of the mixed banks, not only
does the production of durable goods count for the cycle of Italian
industry; so does the production of consumer goods. In short, the
new quantitative evidence is consistent with a cyclical model
(exogenous) in combination with the institutional innovations
(endogenous): Domestic policy intervened to reinforce the upward
curve cycle of foreign capitals.24
The interwar period has received considerably less attention
than the Liberal period even though during these years, Italy
modernized and enhanced the sectors of the Second Industrial
Revolution (chemicals and heavy industry, at the expense of textiles
and foodstuffs), and created the institutional framework that would
accompany the subsequent economic miracle.25
Previous GDP estimates view Italy’s economy, unlike that of
other belligerent countries, as booming during the World War I
23 Toniolo, “Stefano Fenoaltea, L’economia italiana dall’Unità alla Grande Guerra (Rome,
2006),” Journal of Modern Italian Studies, I (2007), 132.
24 Felice and Carreras, “When Did Modernization Begin?”
25 Among those few who covered the interwar period are Toniolo, L’economia dell’Italia
fascista (Rome, 1980); Gualberto Gualerni, Storia dell’Italia industriale: Dall’Unità alla Seconda
Repubblica (Milan, 1995); Fabrizio Galimberti and Luca Paolazzi, Il volo del calabrone: Breve storia
dell’economia del Novecento (Florence, 1998); Rolf Petri, Storia economica d’Italia: Dalla grande
guerra al miracolo economico (1918–1963) (Bologna, 2002); Charles Feinstein, Peter Temin, and
Toniolo, The World Economy between the World Wars (New York, 2008); Felice and Carreras,
“When Did Modernization Begin?”
524
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E MA N U E LE F E LI C E A N D G I O V A N N I V EC C HI
period: From 1913 to 1918, Italy’s total GDP at constant prices increased by 33.3 percent according to Maddison, and by 45.4 percent
according to Rossi, Sorgato, and Toniolo. Scholars were skeptical,
to say the least, about these figures, which sharply contrasted with
those of the other major countries of continental Europe—Germany
at −18.0 percent, Austria at −26.7 percent, and France at −36.1 percent. Italy’s increase in total GDP was even higher than those of Britain
(+13.2 percent) and the United States (+14.8 percent). New estimates
for both the service sector and industry, however, bring the performance of the Italian economy more into line with that of the other
warring countries: From 1913 to 1918, Italy’s total GDP reduced by
2.7 percent and Italy’s per capita GDP by 4.6 percent. After the war
years, when Italy’s allies favored imports of crucial materials, Italy reoriented toward a more inward-looking industrialization, which
culminated in the autarchy of the 1930s. Even though the period
from 1919 to 1938 was difficult on every level, Italy’s per-capita GDP
growth rate (1.5 percent per year) was significantly higher than the one
recorded during the Liberal period (0.9 percent). Behind this overall
figure, however, lay the oscillations of the 1920s and 1930s. Figure 4
Fig. 4
SOURCE
GDP per Person and per Worker from World War I to World War II
Elaborations from Appendix II.
IT ALY ’S GR OWT H A ND D E C LI N E
| 525
shows a boom in the decade after the Treaty of Versailles (1919
to 1929), a recession following the 1929 crisis, and a lively recovery
starting in the latter half of the 1930s.26
The growth of the 1920s was rapid, the result of an increase in
productivity; if the war had any beneficial consequence, it was
its positive effect on the preexisting technological backwardness;
progress in the chemical industry, in motor-vehicle production,
and in aeronautics went hand-in-hand with the war effort. Between
1919 and 1929, Italy grew at a high rate, more than 3 percent per
year, on average. But the 1920s were followed by economic and
political calamity. The Great Depression of 1929 appears to have
had a greater impact than previously thought. Between 1929 and
1933, Italy suffered an 8 percent decrease in per-capita GDP, significantly lower than the 3.5 percent decrease estimated by the “old”
series. This decrease is worse than Britain’s (−4 percent), close to
France’s (−10 percent) and Germany’s (−12 percent) but a long way
from the catastrophic U.S. figure (−27 percent).27
Paradoxically, at least from one perspective, the deflationary
policies of the Fascist regime favored modernization and thus the
expansion of the Italian productive base, as is clear from the difference between GDP per person and GDP per worker, which was substantially better from the second half of the 1920s until World War II
(see Figure 4). The deflationary turning point of 1926 (with the
drastic revaluation of the Italian lira) made the price of imported
materials (for example, cast iron) and of machinery drop, thereby
benefiting industry. But it made prices rise for traditional Italian
exports in such light industries as textiles, thereby damaging the less
advanced Italian production sectors. The 1929 crisis led to a broad
reform of the Italian production system. On the one hand, it forced
the industrial sector to replace labor (now more expensive) with
26 Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy, 1820–1992 (Paris, 1995), 148–151; Nicola Rossi,
Antonio Sorgato, and Toniolo, “I conti economici italiani: una ricostruzione statistica 1890–
1990,” Rivista di Storia Economica, I (1993), 1–47. For a skeptical view, see Broadberry, “Appendix:
Italy’s GDP in World War I,” in idem and Mark Harrison (eds.), The Economics of World War I
(New York, 2005), 305–307. The new estimates for the service sector and industry are from
Patrizia Battilani, Felice, and Zamagni, Il valore aggiunto dei servizi a prezzi correnti (1861–1951)
(Rome, 2011); Carreras and Felice, “L’industria italiana dal 1911 al 1938: ricostruzione della serie
del valore aggiunto e interpretazioni,” Rivista di storia economica, III (2010), 285–333.
27 Feinstein, Temin, and Toniolo, World Economy, 87; Ornello Vitali, La stima del valore aggiunto
a prezzi costanti per rami di attività, in Fuà (ed.), Lo sviluppo economico in Italia: Studi di settore e
documentazione di base (Milan, 1969), III, 463–477.
526
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E MA N U E LE F E LI C E A N D G I O V A N N I V EC C HI
capital, leading to an increase in mechanization. On the other hand,
the disastrous effects of the crisis on the real economy and on finance
led to the institutional re-organization of national capitalism: The
institute for industrial reconstruction (IRI, or Istituto per la Ricostruzione
Industriale) was created in 1933, and in 1936 the banking reform law
effectively severed banking from industry, that is, the tie between
short-term and long-term credit.28
According to Petri, the state’s decisive intervention in support of certain strategic sectors—metal-making, engineering, and
chemicals—during the extremely difficult interwar years paved the
way for the economic boom to follow. As argued by James and
O’Rourke, among others, “Financial restructuring was used as an
opportunity to reshape the structure of industry.” Today, the widespread view is that the Fascist interwar years were not a break in the
long-term path of the Italian economy but rather a preparation for
the great leap that occurred after World War II. This interpretation is
consistent with the new series with regard to the aggregate picture,
as we have seen, but also with regard to the development of the
industrial sectors and structure.29
The new GDP estimates for the years after World War II (Figure 5)
do not add much to what we already knew. GDP in the decades after
World War II shows an upward trend—per capita and, even more,
per worker—and a conspicuous slowdown starting in the 1990s,
leading to stagnation with the advent of the new millennium.
Once postwar reconstruction was completed, Italy “put on
wings” and embarked on the period of growth that has become
known as the “economic miracle.” The new estimates confirm the
exceptional performance of the 1950s and 1960s, which emphasizes,
as evident in Figure 1, a break in the centuries-old trend. In these
two decades, Italy completed its transition from, in Zamagni’s
terms, the “periphery to the center,” becoming a modern industrial
28 Deflation, that is, price decreases, led to a rise in real wages or to an increase in the cost of
labor factor of production, which became more expensive compared to other goods. See Fabrizio
Mattesini and Beniamino Quintieri, “Italy and the Great Depression: An Analysis of the Italian
Economy, 1929–1936,” Explorations in Economic History, III (1997), 265–294.
29 Petri, Storia economica, 336–347; Harold James and Kevin H. O’Rourke, “Italy and the
First Age of Globalization, 1861–1940,” Bank of Italy Economic History Working Papers, XVI
(2011), 3, available at http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/pubsto/quastoeco/QSE_16/
QSEn_16.pdf (accessed October 6, 2013); Gualerni, Storia dell’Italia industriale; Marcello De
Cecco, L’economia di Lucignolo: Opportunità e vincoli dello sviluppo italiano (Rome, 2000); Felice
and Carreras, “When Did Modernization Begin?”
IT ALY ’S GR OWT H A ND D E C LI N E
Fig. 5
SOURCE
GDP
| 527
per Person and per Worker after World War II
Elaborations from Appendix II.
nation, with labor shifting from rural to industrial areas, even in Italy’s
Mezzogiorno (the southern regions). There were many reasons for this
development, starting from some decisions in the geopolitical and
international arena. First, the funds provided by the Marshall Plan
found better use in Italy (to renovate the industrial apparatus) than
in other countries. Second, Italy’s decision to participate in a larger
European context was prescient. Other factors, such as the fixed
exchange rate based on the dollar (and the undervaluation of the
Italian lira), low prices for oil and other natural resources, and the
gradual liberalization of international trade, were particularly beneficial to Italy. The decrease in raw-material prices during the 1950s
and 1960s was vital to a country lacking in natural resources.30
Among the important elements explaining Italy’s growth after
World War II is also Italy’s continuity with its past, especially the
30 GDP showed a “miraculous” trend in most countries of Western Europe from 1950 to 1973,
which became known as “Europe’s golden age.” For an economic history of the Reconstruction
and the “Italian miracle,” see Guido Crainz, Storia del miracolo italiano: culture, identità, trasformazioni fra
anni cinquanta e sessanta (Rome, 2005); Nicholas Crafts and Marco Magnani, The Golden Age and
the Second Globalization in Italy, in Toniolo (ed.), Oxford Handbook, 69–107. Zamagni, Dalla periferia
528
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E MA N U E LE F E LI C E A N D G I O V A N N I V EC C HI
interwar years. Such is the case with the system of partecipazioni
statali (joint stock companies under private law indirectly owned
by the state), which began in the 1930s and became the driving force
of industrial modernization during the 1950s and 1960s. Notwithstanding the lack of genuine counter-evidence, the idea is that these
state holdings played a key role in devising the “far-seeing strategic
plans which were instead absent—if we exclude FIAT of Valletta—in
large scale private industry.”31
By the end of the 1960s, Italian industry had diversified broadly,
even impressively in some respects, excelling in information technology and in the manufacture of automobiles, chemicals, domestic
appliances, and, remarkably, aerospace components. The commodities traditionally bearing the label “Made in Italy” (particularly textiles, footwear, food, and home furnishings) were also flourishing,
supported by a web of small and medium-sized enterprises.32
Growth slowed during the 1970s and 1980s, starting with the
first energy crisis in 1973. The system of partecipazioni statali fell
to clientele-type political demands, which led to the construction
of manufacturing plants in far-flung, inconvenient locations. Largescale enterprises lost ground, and a shift of GDP from industry to
services ensued.33
In any case, Italy’s GDP increased during this period in step
with that of its main European competitors, driven by exports
al centro, 409–481; idem (ed.), Come perdere la guerra e vincere la pace: l’economia italiana tra guerra e
dopoguerra, 1938–1947 (Bologna, 1997); Francesca Fauri, Il piano Marshall e l’Italia (Bologna, 2010);
idem, L’Italia e l’integrazione economica europea, 1947–2000 (Bologna, 2001); Ciocca, Ricchi per sempre?
228–284. For the position of Italy in the new monetary system, see Virginia Di Nino, Barry
Eichengreen, and Massimo Sbracia, “Real Exchange Rates, Trade and Growth,” in Toniolo (ed.),
Oxford Handbook, 351–377.
31 Fabrizio Barca and Sandro Trento, “State Ownership and the Evolution of Italian Corporate
Governance,” Industrial and Corporate Change, VI (1997), 533–560.
32 Ivan Paris, “White Goods in Italy during a Golden Age,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History,
I (2013), 83–110. In 1964, Italy became the third country, after the Soviet Union and the United
States, to launch a satellite; it launched another one in 1967. See Vera Zamagni, Finmeccanica:
Competenze che vengono da lontano (Bologna, 2009), 225. Franco Amatori, “Entrepreneurial
Typologies in the History of Industrial Italy (1880–1960): A Review Article,” Business History
Review, III (1980), 359–386; idem, “Entrepreneurial Typologies in the History of Industrial Italy:
Reconsiderations,” ibid., I (2011), 151–180; Colli and Vasta, “Introduction: Forms of Enterprise
in 20th Century Italy,” in idem (eds.), Forms of Enterprise in 20th Century Italy: Boundaries, Structures
and Strategies (Cheltenham, 2010), 1–21.
33 Felice, “State Ownership and International Competitiveness: The Italian Finmeccanica
from Alfa Romeo to Aerospace and Defence,” Enterprise and Society, XI (2010), 594–635; Rinaldi
and Vasta, “The Italian Corporate Network after the ‘Golden Age’ (1972–1983): From Centrality
to Marginalization of State-Owned Enterprises,” ibid., XIII (2012), 378–413.
IT ALY ’S GR OWT H A ND D E C LI N E
| 529
and by the country’s industrial districts, which seemed to establish
a new paradigm for enterprise. Some critical observers noted,
however, that the rise of these new businesses owed more to the
devaluation of the lira and to a lack of fiscal control than to any
inherent entrepreneurial expertise—a view confirmed in the light
of their disappointing performance in subsequent years.34
The years since 1992 have witnessed a decrease in growth,
which is less than half of what it was during the previous twentyyear period. As Rossi observed, “Adapting to the ICT revolution
and globalization … was, and is, not an easy process, above all with
regard to the change in technological paradigm” (our translation).
The last twenty years were marked by Italy’s inability to adapt
to a context once again exogenously created. At the turn of the
millennium, while Italy continued to fall behind in Europe, which,
as a whole, was losing ground to the United States and to emerging
Asian countries, both the Italian press and public opinion spoke in
terms of an economic decline.35
THE LONG-RUN DIVERGENCE OF THE ITALIAN REGIONS
Following
the reconstruction of Italy’s national accounts, a number of economic historians began to bestow the same treatment on Italy’s
regional accounts. An early attempt, by Zamagni in 1978, included
an estimation of income within the Italian regions for the year
1911. Similar regional scholarship lagged until the new millennium,
when new studies enabled an outline of long-term per-capita GDP
development for each of the country’s regions, thus offering insight
into the origins of current territorial imbalances.36
34 Giacomo Becattini, “Dal ‘settore’ industriale al ‘distretto’ industrial: Alcune considerazioni
sull’unità di indagine dell’economia industriale,” Rivista di economia e politica industriale, I (1979),
7–21. For critics see, De Cecco, L’economia di Lucignolo, 185–189.
35 Salvatore Rossi, Aspetti della politica economica italiana dalla crisi del 1992–93 a quella del 2008–
09, in Maurizio Ciaschini and Gian Cesare Romagnoli (eds.), L’economia italiana: metodi di
analisi, misurazione e nodi strutturali: Studi per Guido M. Rey (Milan, 2011), 310; Luca Paolazzi
and Mauro Sylos Labini, L’Italia al bivio: Riforme o declino, la lezione dei paesi di successo (Rome,
2013).
36 Zamagni, Industrializzazione e squilibri regionali in Italia: Bilancio dell’età giolittiana (Bologna
1978). Official statistics for regional GDP were not published until 1970. See SVIMEZ, I conti del
Mezzogiorno e del Centro-Nord nel ventennio 1970–1989 (Bologna, 1993). Alfredo G. Esposto
produced estimates for 1871 (macro-regions), 1891, and 1911 in “Estimating Regional Per
Capita Income: Italy, 1861–1914,” Journal of European Economic History, III (1997), 585–604.
SVIMEZ produced estimates for 1938 and 1951 in Un secolo di statistiche storiche italiane: Nord e
Sud, 1861–1961 (Rome, 1961). Daniele and Malanima produced annual estimates from 1861 to
530
Fig. 6
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E MA N U E LE F E LI C E A N D G I O V A N N I V EC C HI
The Great Italian Divide, 1871–2009
The Northwest comprises Piedmont, Liguria, Lombardy, Aosta Valley; the Northeast
Veneto, Emilia-Romagna, Trentino-Alto Adige, and Friuli-Venezia Giulia; the Center Tuscany,
the Marches, Umbria, and Latium; the South Abruzzi, Molise, Campania, Apulia, Lucania, and
Calabria; the Islands Sicily and Sardinia. All of the estimates are at the historical borders.
SOURCES See Appendix I and II.
NOTE
Figure 6 shows the trend of regional differences in per-capita
for the five large macro-areas of the country. In the baseline
year (1871), Italy showed distinct per-capita GDP differences: The
richest area of the country, the northwest, had around a 25 percent
GDP
1951, by linking estimates by Federico, Fenoaltea, and Felice, with the assumption that, for
each sector of economic activity (agriculture, industry, and services), the regional cycles would
be the same as the national cycle. See Daniele and Malanima, “Il prodotto delle regioni e il
divario Nord-Sud in Italia (1861–2004),” Rivista di Politica Economica, III–IV (2007), 267–315;
idem, Il divario Nord-Sud in Italia: 1861–2011 (Soveria Mannelli, 2011); Federico, “Le nuove
stime della produzione agricola italiana, 1860–1910: primi risultati e implicazioni,” Rivista di
Storia Economica, III (2003), 359–381; Fenoaltea, “Peeking Backward: Regional Aspects of Industrial Growth in Post-Unification Italy,” Journal of Economic History, IV (2003), 1059–1102;
Felice, “Il reddito delle regioni italiane nel 1938 e nel 1951: Una stima basata sul costo del
lavoro,” Rivista di Storia Economica, I (2005), 3–30; idem, “Il valore aggiunto regionale: Una
stima per il 1891 e per il 1911 e alcune elaborazioni di lungo periodo (1891–1971),” ibid., III
(2005), 83–124. This section is based on Felice, “Regional Value Added in Italy (1891–2001)
and the Foundation of a Long Term Picture,” Economic History Review, III (2011), 929–950,
and on hitherto unpublished estimates for 1871 and 1931.
IT ALY ’S GR OWT H A ND D E C LI N E
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advantage over the poorest area, the south (about 2,000 Euros
per person per year in the northwest versus 1,600 Euros in the
south)—a significant gap, consistent with what emerges in other
social indicators and with what we know about the distribution
of transport and credit infrastructure. The situation in other countries, such as Spain or the Austria-Hungarian Empire, indicates
a similar disparity in favor of regions with an industrial or services base—Madrid and Catalonia in Spain and Vienna in AustriaHungary. In general, however, the dispersion of average incomes
at the time was relatively modest compared to later conditions after
industrialization had progressed.37
Regional differences increased conspicuously during the interwar years. The northwest progressed along the path of industrialization and modernization, while the Mezzogiorno remained
dramatically still, eventually becoming, in the aftermath of World
War II, a sort of second, shadow Italy. The extraordinary development in the northwest benefited from World War I (1915 to 1918),
when the war effort inexorably steered public procurement toward
enterprises in the so-called “industrial triangle” (Lombardy, Piedmont,
and Liguria). The north also benefited from deflationary measures
and an autarchic policy, which meant an intensification of industrial
production in advanced sectors, most of which were located there.38
The Mezzogiorno suffered from the demographic policies of
the Fascist regime: Benito Mussolini’s restrictions to emigration
increased the demographic pressure on the poorest regions; his
attempt to make Italy self-sufficient in food, starting with wheat
(the so-called “wheat battle”), stifled the more profitable crops of
37 For social indicators and transport and credit infrastructures, see Vecchi (ed.), In ricchezza e
in povertà: Il benessere degli italiani dall’Unità a oggi (Bologna, 2011); Felice and Vasta, “Passive
Modernization? The New Human Development Index and Its Components in Italy’s Regions
(1871–2007),” European Review of Economic History, I (2015), available at doi:10.1093/ereh/heu018;
Zamagni, Dalla periferia al centro, 42; Andrea Giuntini, Nascita, sviluppo e tracollo della rete infrastrutturale, in Amatori et al. (eds.), Storia d’Italia: Annali, XV, L’industria (Turin, 1999), 597; Joan R. Rosés,
Julio Martínez-Galarraga, and Daniel A. Tirado, “The Upswing of Regional Income Inequality in
Spain (1860–1930),” Explorations in Economic History, II (2010), 244–257; Max-Stephan Schulze,
“Regional Income Dispersion and Market Potential in the Late Nineteenth Century Habsburg
Empire,” London School of Economics working paper, 106/07 (2007), available at http://www.
lse.ac.uk/economicHistory/pdf/ WP106schulze.pdf (accessed October 6, 2013).
38 Between 1911 and 1951, the percentage of agricultural labor in southern Italy did not
decrease (remaining at around 60%), while in the northwest, it fell from 47% to 28% (Felice,
“Regional Value Added,” 938).
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E MA N U E LE F E LI C E A N D G I O V A N N I V EC C HI
Puglia and Sicily (wine, grapes, and citrus fruits); and his protection of rents for landowners, even those without productive land,
hindered the modernization of southern agriculture. Once again,
although historians have been well aware of the “problem of the
south” (questione meridionale) since the last century, the sheer scale
of the differences that Figure 6 illustrates is striking: By 1951, percapita GDP in the South had reduced to less than half of that in the
central and northern regions.39
Regional imbalances greatly decreased from 1951 to 1971.
Convergence of the South during the 1950s and 1960s was exceptional, made possible by both interregional migration toward the
north and the deus ex machina of state intervention. The state promoted the creation of great infrastructural works in the southern
regions—from aqueducts to roads and industrial plants—through
the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno (the Southern Italy Development
Fund), established in 1950, which also provided for indirect funding
of production activities. The initiatives involved public enterprises,
which were obliged by law to devote a considerable amount of
their investment to the Mezzogiorno, as well as private ones; both
kinds of enterprise received loans with low interest rates and free
contributions. This top-down policy focused on such “heavy,” high
added-value sectors as the chemical, steel, and advanced mechanical
industries, led by state-owned enterprises. In terms of resources allocated in relation to GDP, the investment was on a scale unparalleled
in any other Western European country.40
This resurgence of the Mezzogiorno turned out to be shortlived, however; the economic policy was not sufficient to trigger
a continuous self-generating process in the South. When the oil crisis
of the 1970s occurred, the model of production that Ford had initiated in the United States, based on large energy-intensive factories,
39 For the policies of the Fascist regime, see Piero Bevilacqua, Le campagne del Mezzogiorno
tra fascismo e dopoguerra: il caso della Calabria (Turin, 1980); Felice, Divari regionali, 124–126, 197.
40 Felice, “Regional Development: Reviewing the Italian Mosaic,” Journal of Modern Italian
Studies, I (2010), 72–73; Antonio La Spina, La politica per il Mezzogiorno (Bologna, 2003); Felice,
Divari regionali; Amedeo Lepore, “La valutazione dell’operato della Cassa per il Mezzogiorno e il
suo ruolo strategico per lo sviluppo del Paese,” Rivista Giuridica del Mezzogiorno, XII (2011), 281–
317; Amatori, “Un profilo d’insieme: l’età dell’IRI,” in idem (ed.), Storia dell’IRI. II. Il miracolo
economico e il ruolo dell’IRI, 1949–1972 (Rome, 2013), 30–39; Augusto De Benedetti, “L’IRI e il
Mezzogiorno: Una interpretazione,” in Amatori (ed.), Il miracolo economico, 563–673; Felice, “Le
politiche regionali in Italia e nel Regno Unito (1950–1989),” Rivista economica del Mezzogiorno,
I–II (2002), 175–235.
IT ALY ’S GR OWT H A ND D E C LI N E
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suffered a setback. In Italy, its repercussions were particularly damaging for the weaker links of the chain—the plants inconveniently located in southern Italy because of state incentives or initiatives. At
this point, public intervention proved to be incapable of re-inventing
itself, becoming entangled in welfare or income-support policies,
bloating the staff of public administration, and even benefiting organized crime.41
Figure 6 clearly shows that from the 1970s onward, albeit
slowly, the southern regions started to fall behind again, whereas
the northeastern regions, and later the central regions, started to converge economically with the northwestern ones. The driving force
of the northeast was a growing capillary network of export-oriented
manufacturing firms. The most recent data (2009) confirm gaps that
are wider than the ones estimated for the time of Italy’s unification.
Italy is now divided into two halves, the Center/North and the
Mezzogiorno. The South has partly closed the gap in productivity
but not that in employment rate and structural change, which is
growing worse. Institutions and social capital have arguably prevented it from keeping pace in factor endowments (as measured
by the employment rate and its allocation through agriculture, industry, and services), in spite of factor-price equalization (as measured
by the greater equality in total and within-sector productivity).42
41 See Piero Bevilacqua, Breve storia dell’Italia meridionale dall’Ottocento a oggi (Rome, 1993),
126–132; Carlo Trigilia, Sviluppo senza autonomia: Effetti perversi delle politiche nel Mezzogiorno
(Bologna, 1992). The Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, which was dissolved in 1984, was followed by
the short-lived Agensud (1986–1992).
42 For the northeastern and central regions, see Aldo Bagnasco, Tre Italie: La problematica territoriale
dello sviluppo italiano (Bologna, 1977); Becattini, “Dal settore al distretto.” Per-capita GDP differences
between the various geographical macro-regions cannot even be explained by the price differences
found in these areas. Brunetti, Felice, and Vecchi (“Reddito”) showed that correcting GDP to allow
for differences in purchasing power does not change the key features of the historical picture
described in Figure 5. Felice, “Regional Value Added,” 937–941; idem, “Regional Convergence
in Italy (1891–2001): Testing Human and Social Capital,” Cliometrica, III (2012), 267–306; idem,
Perché il Sud è rimasto indietro (Bologna, 2013). According to the neoclassical trade theory, differences
in per capita incomes are due to differences in factor endowments and factor prices: Within a unified
state, if convergence in factor endowments (via decreasing returns in the production function) is
prevented by conditioning variables, there can be convergence in factor prices but also divergence
in income. See Matthew J. Slaughter, “Economic Development and International Trade,” American
Economic Review, II (1997), 194–199. The alternative new economic-geography (NEG) approach
focuses instead on the demand side, by looking at the size of the market and Marshallian externalities
that favor increasing returns and productivity gains (divergence) but at the cost of congestion (convergence): See Masahisa Fujita, Paul Krugman, and Anthony J. Venables, The Spatial Economy: Cities,
Regions, and International Trade (New York, 1999). Hence, most of the income inequality would
be attributable to differences in within-sector productivity rather than differences in the
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E MA N U E LE F E LI C E A N D G I O V A N N I V EC C HI
ITALY’S GDP IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Between 1870 and
2011, Italy’s GDP per head increased twelvefold, surpassing the
average figure for the twelve countries of Western Europe (where
per-capita GDP increased elevenfold during the same period). Italy’s
improvement was better than that of Britain (sevenfold) and
equaled that of France and Germany, but it was not as good as that
of Spain (fourteenfold) or that of Greece (sixteenfold)—or, as the
case may be, that of the United States (thirteenfold). Moreover,
certain Scandinavian countries showed exceptional performance in
this regard. Norway and Finland increased their incomes twentyone times during the same period, and Sweden nineteen times
over. In Asia, Japan’s per-capita GDP rose thirty times over and South
Korea’s thirty-seven times over. Judging from the long-term picture, Italians have good reason to feel satisfied with their performance, nothwithstanding that of southern Italy, which was
radically different from the center/north’s. The northern region increased its per-capita GDP almost fourteenfold—similar to Spain and
significantly better than France and Germany—but the Mezzogiorno’s
increase was less than tenfold—despite its higher potential for
convergence, that is, its lower initial GDP—much worse than any
other country of the European periphery, thereby weakening the
performance of the country as a whole.43
employment rate and structural change. For an application of the NEG framework to the Italian
case, see Brian A’Hearn and Venables, “Regional Disparities: Internal Geography and External
Trade,” in Toniolo (ed.), Oxford Handbook, 599–630.
43 Conference Board, “Total Economy Database” (2013), available at http://www.conferenceboard.org/data/economydatabase/ (accessed October 6, 2013). That all of the comparisons are
made through the PPP measured in 1990 Geary-Khamis international dollars is likely to create a
distortion for the early periods. For the main advanced countries, current price PPPs have been
estimated by Leandro Prados de la Escosura in benchmark years spanning from 1820 to 1990, by
retropolating the relationship between PPPs and basic economic characteristics from the second half
of the twentieth century: According to Prados de la Escosura, “International Comparisons of Real
Product, 1820–1990: An Alternative Data Set,” Explorations in Economic History, I (2000), 1–41,
because Italy in 1860 had a real GDP per capita, compared to the United States, lower (0.641)
than the one estimated by Maddison (0.722), Italy’s performance over the long run would be
better than that of the United States. The figures of both Prados and Maddison (his old ones),
however, are based on Maddison’s series of Italy’s GDP: See Maddison, “A Revised Estimate of
Italian Economic Growth, 1861–1989,” Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, CLXXVII
(1992), 225–241. For the Liberal age, the estimate was based on constant prices from 1870, thus
resulting in a lower GDP in 1861 (and higher growth rate) than our estimate at 1911 prices. In this
section, we use Maddison’s 1990 PPPs because those by Prados are only available for a limited
number of countries. For a positive judgment about Italyʼs long-run economic performance,
see Nicola Rossi, Toniolo, and Vecchi, “Introduzione,” in Vecchi (ed.), In ricchezza e in povertà:
Il benessere degli italiani dall’Unità a oggi (Bologna, 2011), XI–XXVII.
IT ALY ’S GR OWT H A ND D E C LI N E
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During the post–World War II years, Italy, in the space of
two generations, completed the country’s reconstruction and its
road to well-being. How does Italy’s postwar economic growth
compare with that of other countries? Figure 7 contrasts the Italian
per-capita GDP growth with that of the United States, with the
average figure for the European Union (fifteen countries—the
EU 15), with the OECD average, and with the world average. In
1950, the gap between the average income of Italians and that
of Americans was huge, but Italy was also significantly poorer than
the average of the EU 15. The years 1950 to 1973 are the “golden
years” of Western Europe; a general stability of macroeconomic
indicators (acceptable inflation and limited cyclical fluctuations)
went hand in hand with extraordinarily high growth rates. Europe
may have been rapidly growing at the time, but Italy managed to
expand even more rapidly. In fact, the upward trend, with a turning point at 1991/92, means that during the first forty-two years
(1950 to 1992), Italian growth was systematically faster than that of
the whole world—an average annual rate 3.5 percent higher than
the average of the other countries. The years 1992 to 2011 show an
Fig. 7
The Rise and Fall of Per-Capita
SOURCES
See the text.
GDP,
1950–2011
536
Fig. 8
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E MA N U E LE F E LI C E A N D G I O V A N N I V EC C HI
From the Periphery to the Center, and Back Again: The Growth
Rate of Italy’s GDP in International Comparisons (1861–2010)
NOTE Figure 8 excludes countries of sub-Saharan Africa and the oil-based Middle-Eastern economies, as well as countries with a population below 1 million. For certain countries and certain
years, we reconstructed the GDP trend by log-linear interpolation.
SOURCES Data are from Conference Board, “Total Economy Database” (2013), available at http://
www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/ (accessed October 6, 2013). The title of the
Figure is an expression taken from Marcello De Cecco, L’economia di Lucignolo: Opportunità e vincoli
dello sviluppo italiano (Rome, 2000), 119.
inverse trend: Italy grew less rapidly than the rest of the world, at an
escalating rate per year—on average, a 4.4 percent lower rate than the
other countries. The diagnosis seems to indicate a country in decline.44
Figure 8 strongly confirms this diagnosis. It compares Italy’s
per-capita GDP growth rates with that of every other country in
the world (at least those for which reliable per capita GDP figures
44 For the Italian convergence during the Golden Age, see Toniolo, “Europe’s Golden Age,
1950–1973: Speculations from a Long-Run Perspective,” Economic History Review, II (1998), 252.
Italy’s average lower rate of growth is not a consequence of the “China effect.” If we compare
Italy’s relative growth with that of the rest of the world, after excluding the most dynamic and
demographically important countries (Brazil, India, and China), the conclusions reported in the
text do not change: Between 1950 and 1992, Italy grew faster than the rest of the world (+2.4%
per year, on average), whereas between 1992 and 2011, it grew less rapidly (−0.9% per year).
World averages are population-weighted.
IT ALY ’S GR OWT H A ND D E C LI N E
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exist) during the 150 years since the country’s unification. Based on
calculations of the average annual growth rates of per-capita GDP by
decade, the figure indicates (1) the growth rate of per-capita GDP for
the country that grew most rapidly, on average, during each decade;
(2) the growth rate of the country that grew most slowly during
each decade; and (3) Italy’s position between these two extremes.
It also displays the trend for Italy throughout the period, compared
with the OECD average.
The new Kingdom of Italy, which was born poor in 1861,
grew below the OECD average during the following forty years,
unable to exploit the advantages of its own backwardness. During
the first decade of the 1900s, Italy managed to align its growth rate
with the OECD average: Growth during the Giolitti’s age, considered
“exceptional” by domestic standards, was nothing of the kind,
given the international level. After achieving the growth rate of
the OECD countries, Italy managed to do little more for decades
than to “grow with the average.” Witness the entire first half of
the twentieth century. The years 1950 to 1970, however, mark an
extraordinary phase in which the country came a little closer to
the front-runners. For two decades, Italy maintained an annual
average growth rate of 5 percent before slowing down and falling
behind. This dynamic might be understandable to some extent. It
is not easy to stay in the vanguard; it is sometimes easier to progress
by following another’s lead. Yet, Figure 8 does not convey Italy’s
difficulty in staying close to the top countries as much as it conveys
its difficulty in avoiding a fall below the bottom ones. Since the early
1990s, the country has embarked on a phase of relative decline, not
only slowing its GDP pace more markedly than the average of the
OECD countries but, unlike any of those countries, actually regressing
(its per-capita GDP growth rates becoming negative). Italy had the
worst average growth rate in the world from 2001 to 2010.45
This last decade has also been characterized by a divergence
between labor productivity (GDP per worker), the trend of which
was still slightly positive, and average income (GDP per capita), which
decreased. This pattern is consistent with the trend observed in GDP
45 For convergence (and divergence) in the second half of the twentieth century, see Moses
Abramovitz and Paul A. David, “Convergence and Deferred Catch-Up: Productivity Leadership
and the Waning of American Exceptionalism” (1994), available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/
viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.123.2219 (accessed October 6, 2013); for Italy, Toniolo,
“Overview.”
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per hour from 2002 to 2011—+ 0.12 percent on average per year.
Compared with the Euro’s “core” (Germany and France), Italy fell
back in income more than in productivity, whereas compared with
the United States, the opposite pattern holds. But during the 1990s,
before the creation of the Euro, Italy’s dynamic relative to France
and Germany was reversed—(slowly) converging in income but
(strongly) diverging in productivity.46
What does this history tell us? After unification, Italy had to
catch up with the European core; after the creation of a common
currency in continental Europe, the unified macro-economic setting should have fostered this convergence by promoting equalization in factor endowments (the level and structure of employment)
and prices. The fact that Italy’s activity rate has been suffering more
than its productivity suggests that negative conditioning factors
might be responsible for Italy’s shortfall in factor endowments.
Domestic policy and institutions look to be the main subjects of
further investigation; they remain the most important national
variables in Italy, as in the rest of the Euro zone.
Since its unification, Italy has managed to bridge the gap in average
national income with the European countries that were most
advanced in 1861—Britain, France, and Germany. By reaching
the center from the periphery, Italy accomplished an unlikely feat.
In 1916, Louis Bonnefon Craponne, a French industrialist and first
president of Confindustria, published L’Italie au travail, in which he
described France’s incredulity in learning that Italy had not only
started to produce automobiles but was also entering them in the
first races. Most observers of the day were unable to update the
country’s image as the poor relation of Western Europe to a country
well on its way to modern economic development. The GDP estimates presented in this article well document the process by which
Italy transformed a pre-industrial rural economy into an advanced
economy ranking among the major industrial powers of the world.
46 In comparison with Germany’s, Italy’s GDP per capita went from 92.2% (2002) to 78.1%
(2011), but during the same period Italy’s GDP per hour reduced only from 83 to 76.5; in
comparison with France’s, Italy’s GDP per capita went from 98.6 to 90.0 and its GDP per hour
from 81.0 to 76.5. Conversely, when compared with the United States, Italy’s GDP per capita
decreased from 70.8 to 63.8 and its GDP per hour from 81.0 to 70.6. Italy’s two variables were
identical in comparison with those of Britain, which was then arguably in an intermediate
position between the United States and the Euro’s “core”: Italy’s GDP per capita went from
92.7 to 82.2 and its GDP per hour from 96.6 to 86.2 (OECD, “StatExtracts”).
IT ALY ’S GR OWT H A ND D E C LI N E
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Stagnation gradually gave way to growth; today, average per-capita
income is almost thirteen times what it was at the time of Italian
unification.47
The process has been discontinuous, however, and the country
has experienced an intransigent inequality inside its borders. The
“economic miracle” after World War II did not cancel the line
dividing the North from the South, an original feature of the
Kingdom of Italy. The empirical evidence presented in this article
shows that regional convergence has been the exception rather than
the rule, only evident from 1951 to 1971; the remaining 130 years
were marked by divergence or immobility, at least in relative terms.
The last twenty years have seen Italy’s per-capita GDP stop growing
(+0.6 percent per year) and even regional convergence grind to a halt.
If southern Italy had continued to converge toward the center/north,
Italy’s performance would have improved considerably. The recent
decline has naturally nurtured fears of failure.48
Not all analysts share these apprehensions. Some scholars are
stubbornly optimistic. As Macaulay wrote of nineteenth-century
Britain, “On what principle is it that, when we see nothing but
improvement behind us, we are to expect nothing but deterioration before us?” Contemplating the past to find comfort about the
future may be an old and licit activity, but it is also a groundless
one: History does not lend itself to mere extrapolation. The analysis of per-capita GDP herein depicts Italy as a country that is at least
in relative decline. Although relative decline is a necessary, though
not a sufficient, condition for absolute decline, the negative
growth rate of per capita GDP during the last decade points toward
a decline on any terms. Given the lack of a suitable temporal perspective to judge whether Italy’s malaise is temporary—prolonged
as it is—reversible, or irreparable, is caution about drawing conclusions still warranted? Is Italy capable of yet another, in Toniolo’s
words, “burst of pride?”49
47 For French incredulity about Italian automobiles, see Louis Bonnefon-Craponne, L’Italie
au travail (Paris, 1916), 114; De Cecco, “The Italian Economy Seen from Abroad,” in Toniolo
(ed.), Oxford Handbook, 134–154.
48 Toniolo and Vincenzo Visco (eds.), Il declino economico dell’Italia: Cause e rimedi (Milan,
2004).
49 Thomas Macaulay’s quotation, a response to the poet Robert Southey in 1930, is cited in
Barry Supple, The Economic History of Britain since 1700 (New York, 1994), 442; Toniolo,
“Overview.”
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GDP is not the only dimension, however, in which Italy has been
losing ground. After a century-long decrease, poverty indicators and
economic inequality have started to move in the wrong direction.
Equally alarming are recent measures of institutional efficiency and
political/personal freedom, which reveal Italy to occupy last place
among the countries of Western Europe in the Press Freedom Index
and in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index.
Italy is also at the bottom, although close to the core, in the Freedom
House index of political rights and civil freedom. Each one of these
indicators is subject to a number of methodological criticisms, possibly reflecting only part of a much more complex story, but they are
all in agreement with the hypothesis of Italy’s decline. The GDP data
in this article, in conjunction with other socioeconomic indicators,
shed undeniable light on Italy’s many structural weaknesses—hardly
signs for optimism.50
APPENDIX I: SOURCES AND METHODS
THE SOURCES FOR ITALY’S GDP,
1861–2011 Industry: for the years 1861–
1913, Stefano Fenoaltea, “La crescita economica dell’Italia postunitaria:
le nuove serie storiche,” Rivista di Storia Economica, II (2005), 91–121;
idem, “Il valore aggiunto dell’industria nel 1911,” in Guido M. Rey
(ed.), I conti economici dell’Italia. II. Una stima del valore aggiunto per il
1911 (Rome, 1992), 105–190; for 1911, idem and Carlo Bardini, “Il valore
aggiunto dell’industria,” in Rey (ed.), I conti economici dell’Italia. III. Il
valore aggiunto per gli anni 1891, 1938, 1951 (Rome, 2000), 113–238; Felice
and Albert Carreras, “When Did Modernization Begin? Italy’s Industrial
Growth Reconsidered in Light of New Value-Added Series, 1911–1951,”
Explorations in Economic History, IV (2012), 443–460.
Agriculture: Giovanni Federico, “Il valore aggiunto dell’agricoltura,” in
Rey (ed.), Una stima del valore aggiunto per il 1911, 3–103; idem, “Una stima
del valore aggiunto dell’agricoltura italiana,” in Rey (ed.), Il valore aggiunto
per gli anni 1891, 1938, 1951, 3–112; idem, “Le nuove stime della produzione
agricola italiana, 1860–1910: primi risultati e implicazioni,” Rivista di Storia
Economica, III (2003), 359–381, for the years 1861 to 1911.
Services: Vera Zamagni, “Il valore aggiunto del settore terziario italiano
nel 1911,” in Rey (ed.), Una stima del valore aggiunto per il 1911, 191–239;
50 Brandolini and Vecchi, “Standards of Living.” Reporters without Borders, “World Press
Freedom Index 2013” (2013), available at http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2013,1054.html
(accessed October 6, 2013). Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2012”
(2012), available at http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results (accessed October 6, 2013). Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2013” (2013), available at http://www.freedomhouse.org
(accessed October 6, 2013).
IT ALY ’S GR OWT H A ND D E C LI N E
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Zamagni and Patrizia Battilani, “Stima del valore aggiunto dei servizi,” in
Rey (ed.), Il valore aggiunto per agli anni 1891, 1938, 1951, 239–371; Battilani,
Felice, and Zamagni, Il valore aggiunto dei servizi a prezzi correnti (1861–1951)
(Rome, 2011).
Credit: Riccardo De Bonis, Fabio Farabullini, Miria Rocchelli, and
Alessandra Salvio, Il valore aggiunto del settore del credito dal 1861 al 2010
(Rome, 2011); for 1970, estimates by Rey, Luisa Picozzi, Paolo Piselli,
and Sandro Clementi, “Una revisione dei conti nazionali dell’Italia
(1951–1970),” Banca d’Italia, Quaderni di Storia Economica, XXVII (2012),
available at http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/pubsto/quastoeco/
quadsto_27 (accessed October 6, 2013), concerning resource accounting
and allocation; for method, Alberto Baffigi, “National Accounts, 1861–
2011,” in Gianni Toniolo (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Italian Economy
since Unification (New York, 2013), 157–186; Alessandro Brunetti, Felice,
and Vecchi, “Reddito,” in Vecchi (ed.), In ricchezza e in povertà: Il benessere
degli italiani dall’Unità a oggi (Bologna, 2011), 209–234.
THE SOURCES FOR ITALY’S REGIONAL GDP, 1871–2009
For the years 1871–
1951, the regional estimates are obtained by dividing the new estimates of
national GDP by regional employment and then correcting the results with
the nominal wages per region that approximate the differences in productivity per worker. This procedure, formalized by Frank Geary and Tom
Stark, “Examining Ireland’s Post-Famine Economic Growth Performance,” Economic Journal, CXII (2002), 919–935, is widely used internationally. Nicholas Crafts, “Regional GDP in Britain, 1871–1911: Some
Estimates,” Scottish Journal of Political Economy, I (2005), 54–64; Max-Stephan
Schulze, “Regional Income Dispersion and Market Potential in the Late
Nineteenth Century Habsburg Empire,” London School of Economics
working paper, 106/07 (2007), available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/economicHistory/pdf/WP106schulze.pdf (accessed October 6, 2013); Kerstin Enflo,
Martin Henning, and Lennart Schon, “Swedish Regional GDP 1855–2000:
Estimations and General Trends in the Swedish Regional System,” Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Working Papers in Economic History, III (2010), available
at http://orff.uc3m.es/bitstream/handle/10016/7125 (accessed October 6,
2013); Joan R. Rosés, Julio Martínez-Galarraga, and Daniel A. Tirado,
“The Upswing of Regional Income Inequality in Spain (1860–1930),” Explorations in Economic History, II (2010), 244–257; Pierre-Philippe Combes, Miren
Lafourcade, Jacques-François Thisse, and Jean-Claude Toutain, “The Rise
and Fall of Spatial Inequalities in France: A Long-Run Perspective,” Explorations in Economic History, II (2011), 243–271. The procedure is based on the
assumption that capital gains are distributed along the lines of incomes from
labor—that is, that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is
equal to one.
The method becomes more effective with the degree of sector decomposition. In our case, regarding the four original benchmark years of
1891, 1911, 1938, and 1951, we can refer to an exceptionally high level of
detail unparalleled in other countries. The workforce sources separately
542
|
E MA N U E LE F E LI C E A N D G I O V A N N I V EC C HI
considers data about women and child labor, and are divided by a broad
number of sectors (for industry and services, about 130 sectors in 1891, 160
in 1911, 400 in 1938, and 100 in 1951). The wage data have an identical
sector decomposition in 1938 and 1951, a less detailed but still high one in
1891 (thirty sectors) and 1911 (thirty-four sectors). The estimates for 1871
and 1931 are less detailed, slightly more than twenty sectors in both cases:
Felice, “Estimating Regional GDP in Italy (1871–2001): Sources, Methodology, and Results,” Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Working Papers in Economic
History, VII (2009), available at http://e-archivo.uc3m.es/handle/10016/5334
(accessed October 6, 2013).
For 1871, given the lack of data on wages for the tertiary sector, the
productivity of services is estimated by assuming that in every region
the ratio between the productivity of individual branches of services
and industry as a whole was similar to that of 1891. In all of the benchmarks, a different procedure was used with regard to agriculture. It was
based on the direct reconstruction of saleable gross production, calculated by Federico (“Le nuove stime”) for the years 1891, 1911, 1938, and
1951, or reconstructed from scratch by means of official sources for 1871
(Felice, “Estimating regional GDP”) and 1931. For part of the industrial
sectors from 1871 to 1911, we used the new estimates produced by Carlo
Ciccarelli and Fenoaltea, “Mining Production in Italy, 1861–1913:
National and Regional Time Series,” Rivista di Storia Economica, II
(2006), 141–208; idem, “The Chemicals, Coal and Petroleum Products,
and Rubber Industries in Italy’s Regions, 1861–1913: Time-Series Estimates,” Rivista di Storia Economica, I (2008), 3–58; idem, “The Growth of
the Utilities Industries in Italy’s Regions, 1861–1913,” ibid., II (2008), 175–
206; idem, “Construction in Italy’s regions, 1861–1913,” ibid., III (2008),
303–340; idem, La produzione industriale delle regioni d’Italia, 1861–1913:
una ricostruzione quantitativa. I. Le industrie non manifatturiere (Rome,
2009); idem, “Shipbuilding in Italy, 1861–1913: The Burden of the
Evidence,” Historical Social Research, II (2009), 333–373; private correspondence with the authors in 2009; idem, “Metalmaking in Italy, 1861–1913:
National and Regional Time Series,” Rivista di Storia Economica, I (2010),
121–153; idem, “The Rail-Guided Vehicles Industry in Italy, 1861–1913:
The Burden of the Evidence,” Research in Economic History, XXVIII (2012),
43–115. These estimates are based mainly on employment and wages but
in some cases also on industrial plants and direct production data. For
the revision of the estimates of 1891 and 1911, and a comparison of the
various hypotheses, see Felice, “Regional Value Added in Italy (1891–
2001): Estimates, Elaborations,” Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Working
Papers in Economic History, VIII (2009), available at http://e-archivo.uc3m.
es/handle/10016/5332 (accessed October 6, 2013). Those estimates were
also used for revising regional production by sector in 1891, necessary for
the 1871 estimate.
Estimates from 1961 onward are from official sources: Guglielmo
Tagliacarne, “Calcolo del reddito prodotto dal settore privato e dalla pubblica
amministrazione nelle provincie e regioni d’Italia nel 1961 e confronto con gli
IT ALY ’S GR OWT H A ND D E C LI N E
| 543
anni 1960 e 1951: Indici di alcuni consumi e del risparmio bancario,” Moneta e
credito, LIX (1962), 339–419; SVIMEZ, I conti; ISTAT (Istituto centrale di statistica),
Conti economici regionali: anni 1980–92 (Rome, 1995); idem, “Sistemi di indicatori territoriali, contabilità nazionale” (2012), available at http://sitis.istat.it/
sitis/html/ (accessed October 6, 2013).
APPENDIX II: GDP STATISTICS
Table A.1
GDP per Person and per Worker, Agriculture, Industry, and Services
(1861–2011)
GDP PER PERSON
YEAR
1861
1862
1863
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
TOTAL
EUROS)
(2011
1,971
1,996
2,044
2,047
2,171
2,167
1,979
2,019
2,045
2,095
2,049
2,003
1,993
2,096
2,107
2,055
2,068
2,120
2,126
2,159
2,225
2,252
2,272
2,238
2,271
2,321
2,379
2,367
2,295
2,296
2,327
2,330
2,366
2,379
2,399
2,435
2,439
2,429
2,456
GDP PER WORKER
%
%
%
AGR.
IND.
SERV.
48.70
48.42
47.55
46.19
48.07
46.44
47.93
48.87
47.51
48.33
47.31
46.76
48.83
50.52
46.17
44.77
47.33
48.09
47.34
48.51
46.84
46.71
44.81
42.69
43.12
43.65
41.66
40.98
41.84
43.95
44.53
42.11
41.60
41.31
42.97
42.11
42.11
41.81
41.40
23.32
22.70
22.55
23.14
21.71
22.29
23.00
21.87
22.79
22.07
23.03
23.67
22.96
21.00
23.08
23.43
23.14
22.02
21.01
20.63
21.46
22.10
22.32
22.68
23.08
22.99
22.31
22.19
22.13
21.34
20.93
21.33
21.63
21.11
20.45
20.67
20.38
20.78
21.91
27.98
28.88
29.89
30.67
30.22
31.26
29.07
29.26
29.70
29.60
29.65
29.57
28.21
28.48
30.76
31.80
29.53
29.89
31.66
30.86
31.70
31.20
32.87
34.62
33.80
33.36
36.02
36.84
36.02
34.71
34.54
36.56
36.77
37.58
36.58
37.23
37.50
37.41
36.69
TOTAL
EUROS)
(2011
6,103
6,178
6,321
6,333
6,720
6,704
6,132
6,222
6,284
6,448
6,302
6,119
6,043
6,311
6,283
6,089
6,110
6,235
6,242
6,300
6,423
6,562
6,442
6,452
6,675
6,949
7,234
7,193
6,871
6,996
7,266
7,419
7,686
7,724
7,781
7,841
7,749
7,775
7,790
AGR./
TOT.
IND./
TOT.
SER./
TOT.
0.77
0.76
0.75
0.72
0.75
0.72
0.74
0.76
0.73
0.75
0.73
0.72
0.76
0.80
0.73
0.72
0.76
0.78
0.77
0.80
0.78
0.77
0.77
0.72
0.72
0.72
0.68
0.68
0.71
0.73
0.73
0.68
0.66
0.66
0.69
0.69
0.70
0.70
0.70
1.32
1.31
1.32
1.38
1.31
1.38
1.44
1.40
1.48
1.46
1.55
1.56
1.48
1.33
1.43
1.42
1.38
1.29
1.21
1.17
1.19
1.25
1.11
1.18
1.27
1.33
1.38
1.33
1.21
1.22
1.32
1.45
1.61
1.50
1.40
1.33
1.21
1.24
1.23
1.47
1.51
1.55
1.58
1.56
1.59
1.47
1.47
1.49
1.48
1.47
1.46
1.38
1.37
1.47
1.51
1.39
1.40
1.49
1.44
1.47
1.43
1.54
1.60
1.53
1.49
1.58
1.61
1.60
1.53
1.49
1.56
1.55
1.59
1.56
1.60
1.63
1.62
1.61
Table A.1. (continued)
GDP PER PERSON
YEAR
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
TOTAL
EUROS)
(2011
2,521
2,562
2,603
2,626
2,672
2,727
2,820
2,870
2,930
2,954
2,957
2,989
3,004
3,149
2,987
2,825
3,054
3,071
3,005
2,906
2,960
2,843
3,055
3,300
3,357
3,577
3,579
3,461
3,635
3,788
3,585
3,506
3,548
3,484
3,452
3,621
3,466
3,779
3,853
4,011
3,837
3,709
GDP PER WORKER
%
%
%
AGR.
IND.
SERV.
41.72
41.60
40.75
41.15
40.73
39.84
40.06
39.85
37.68
37.06
36.41
38.47
37.21
37.96
36.89
37.16
38.31
37.29
39.43
40.06
42.54
41.65
38.78
37.10
33.56
35.58
36.32
33.07
33.96
32.48
28.18
28.25
31.36
27.66
27.45
29.93
27.89
28.99
28.55
28.42
27.89
32.14
20.85
21.34
21.63
21.20
21.02
21.98
22.36
23.74
23.90
24.67
25.02
23.78
25.32
24.64
24.76
22.27
21.98
23.36
23.31
21.96
21.58
21.47
24.30
25.44
27.40
27.46
26.44
27.33
27.14
28.54
30.47
28.21
25.03
28.64
28.89
27.98
28.77
29.53
30.36
30.26
29.79
25.53
37.44
37.06
37.62
37.65
38.25
38.18
37.57
36.40
38.42
38.27
38.56
37.75
37.48
37.40
38.35
40.57
39.71
39.35
37.27
37.98
35.89
36.88
36.92
37.46
39.04
36.96
37.24
39.60
38.89
38.98
41.34
43.54
43.61
43.69
43.66
42.09
43.34
41.48
41.09
41.31
42.32
42.33
TOTAL
EUROS)
(2011
7,956
8,068
8,294
8,376
8,512
8,695
8,987
9,087
9,076
9,231
9,322
9,455
9,480
9,729
9,126
8,837
9,518
9,386
8,961
8,326
8,314
8,120
8,601
9,373
9,406
9,813
9,787
9,637
10,182
10,598
10,260
10,425
10,862
10,802
10,750
11,085
10,611
11,341
11,111
11,651
11,183
10,821
AGR./
TOT.
IND./
TOT.
SER./
TOT.
0.71
0.71
0.69
0.70
0.70
0.69
0.70
0.70
0.68
0.67
0.65
0.69
0.67
0.69
0.66
0.65
0.67
0.65
0.69
0.71
0.76
0.73
0.69
0.66
0.61
0.66
0.68
0.61
0.63
0.61
0.52
0.50
0.56
0.50
0.50
0.57
0.55
0.59
0.61
0.61
0.61
0.71
1.12
1.12
1.18
1.13
1.11
1.14
1.14
1.18
1.09
1.14
1.18
1.10
1.19
1.11
1.12
1.11
1.11
1.15
1.13
1.05
1.02
1.12
1.22
1.29
1.29
1.21
1.15
1.27
1.24
1.25
1.42
1.45
1.43
1.63
1.57
1.34
1.36
1.26
1.14
1.13
1.12
0.97
1.65
1.63
1.64
1.65
1.67
1.67
1.65
1.59
1.70
1.68
1.69
1.66
1.65
1.67
1.72
1.78
1.73
1.73
1.65
1.67
1.57
1.57
1.55
1.56
1.66
1.57
1.55
1.60
1.59
1.64
1.72
1.79
1.67
1.64
1.62
1.56
1.55
1.52
1.54
1.54
1.53
1.49
Table A.1. (continued)
GDP PER PERSON
YEAR
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
GDP PER WORKER
TOTAL
EUROS)
%
%
%
AGR.
IND.
SERV.
3,479
2,940
2,423
2,196
2,989
3,527
3,809
4,071
4,407
4,813
5,006
5,338
5,500
5,838
6,087
6,397
6,720
7,151
7,605
8,158
8,650
9,110
9,386
9,724
10,292
11,004
11,726
12,421
13,096
13,268
13,695
14,560
15,260
14,847
15,810
16,138
16,596
17,522
18,074
18,202
18,266
18,468
39.12
43.42
52.01
48.40
42.18
36.86
34.01
30.24
29.24
25.85
24.13
24.86
22.73
21.99
20.66
19.07
19.47
17.51
15.22
15.62
15.05
13.77
13.17
12.81
12.07
11.87
10.22
10.12
8.99
8.47
7.68
8.18
7.33
7.58
7.10
6.90
6.74
6.52
6.15
5.76
5.52
5.63
20.20
18.45
14.83
16.79
27.85
32.22
32.70
33.43
33.38
35.65
35.11
34.50
35.42
35.35
35.07
35.65
35.16
35.87
37.21
37.37
37.65
37.88
37.37
36.34
36.22
36.47
36.98
37.56
38.62
37.66
36.87
38.09
39.68
38.08
39.07
38.37
37.45
37.26
37.51
36.54
35.68
34.55
40.68
38.14
33.16
34.81
29.97
30.92
33.29
36.33
37.38
38.50
40.76
40.64
41.84
42.66
44.27
45.27
45.36
46.61
47.58
47.01
47.29
48.34
49.46
50.85
51.70
51.66
52.80
52.32
52.39
53.87
55.46
53.74
52.99
54.34
53.83
54.73
55.81
56.21
56.34
57.70
58.80
59.82
(2011
TOTAL
EUROS)
(2011
10,132
8,541
7,122
6,530
9,009
10,722
11,660
12,557
13,725
15,106
15,457
16,169
16,306
17,181
17,653
18,274
18,958
20,008
21,010
22,094
23,638
25,136
25,733
27,131
28,952
30,376
32,278
33,730
35,243
35,925
37,451
39,253
40,598
39,719
41,873
42,509
43,650
45,543
46,198
46,604
46,545
46,787
AGR./
TOT.
IND./
TOT.
SER./
TOT.
0.88
0.99
1.18
1.10
0.95
0.84
0.78
0.70
0.68
0.60
0.58
0.62
0.58
0.59
0.57
0.56
0.59
0.54
0.49
0.54
0.53
0.53
0.53
0.51
0.50
0.51
0.47
0.50
0.48
0.45
0.44
0.49
0.46
0.49
0.47
0.48
0.47
0.47
0.46
0.45
0.46
0.47
0.77
0.70
0.56
0.62
1.02
1.18
1.19
1.21
1.20
1.28
1.24
1.18
1.19
1.16
1.13
1.12
1.10
1.11
1.13
1.08
1.07
1.04
1.02
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.99
1.00
1.00
0.98
0.97
1.00
1.05
1.02
1.06
1.03
1.02
1.02
1.03
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.39
1.27
1.12
1.20
1.05
1.08
1.16
1.25
1.29
1.32
1.36
1.33
1.35
1.33
1.34
1.32
1.30
1.32
1.33
1.30
1.29
1.30
1.29
1.31
1.30
1.28
1.28
1.25
1.23
1.26
1.25
1.19
1.15
1.15
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.13
1.13
1.12
1.11
1.10
Table A.1. (continued)
GDP PER PERSON
YEAR
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
TOTAL
EUROS)
(2011
19,063
19,588
20,145
20,788
21,650
22,367
22,809
23,141
23,318
23,100
23,588
24,268
24,543
24,987
25,337
25,702
26,634
27,113
27,219
27,051
27,250
27,234
27,695
27,981
27,431
25,740
26,076
26,065
GDP PER WORKER
%
%
%
AGR.
IND.
SERV.
34.29
33.75
32.81
32.56
32.23
32.55
31.58
30.65
30.15
29.77
29.76
29.89
29.31
29.08
28.80
28.18
27.72
27.29
27.01
26.39
26.42
26.26
26.63
26.99
26.55
24.75
24.93
24.44
60.60
61.44
62.57
62.96
63.74
63.51
64.77
65.62
66.25
66.73
66.77
66.64
67.23
67.58
67.91
68.58
69.25
69.77
70.15
70.86
70.86
71.28
70.93
70.66
71.13
72.89
72.84
73.24
5.11
4.81
4.62
4.48
4.03
3.94
3.65
3.73
3.61
3.50
3.47
3.47
3.45
3.34
3.29
3.24
3.03
2.93
2.84
2.76
2.71
2.46
2.45
2.35
2.32
2.36
2.23
2.32
TOTAL
EUROS)
(2011
48,107
49,013
49,984
51,311
52,895
54,502
55,080
55,486
56,389
57,729
59,603
61,344
61,832
62,715
63,041
63,610
64,759
64,813
64,285
63,856
64,721
65,221
65,641
66,112
65,578
63,793
65,525
65,743
AGR./
TOT.
IND./
TOT.
SER./
TOT.
0.44
0.44
0.44
0.44
0.42
0.44
0.42
0.44
0.43
0.44
0.45
0.46
0.47
0.47
0.48
0.50
0.48
0.47
0.47
0.48
0.48
0.45
0.45
0.45
0.45
0.45
0.42
0.45
1.07
1.07
1.05
1.06
1.04
1.05
1.02
1.00
1.01
1.01
1.01
1.01
1.01
1.00
0.99
0.98
0.97
0.96
0.96
0.93
0.94
0.93
0.95
0.96
0.95
0.92
0.95
0.94
1.08
1.07
1.07
1.07
1.07
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.07
1.07
1.06
1.06
1.06
1.06
1.06
1.06
1.06
1.07
1.07
1.07
1.07
1.07
1.07
1.06
1.06
1.07
1.06
1.06
SOURCES Per person GDP is based on resident population. Full-time equivalent (FTE) workers are
from Stephen N. Broadberry, Claire Giordano, and Francesco Zollino, “Productivity, in Toniolo
(ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Italian Economy since Unification (New York, 2013), 187–226;
sectoral figures are from data at current prices. All estimates are at present boundaries.
2327
2502
2064
2516
3349
2681
2692
n.a.
1864
n.a.
2460
2127
2376
2043
2362
3644
2585
1573
2253
2367
1722
1552
2011
2160
2180
2169
1891
2989
3279
2505
3446
4597
3566
3646
n.a.
2579
n.a.
3225
2854
2911
2421
2759
4459
3141
2032
2815
2543
2194
2095
2469
2543
2744
2579
1911
3506
3937
2713
4354
5763
4319
4529
3211
2615
4424
3832
3292
3720
2496
3499
4901
3884
2223
2854
2987
2461
1967
2615
2885
2997
2910
1931
3853
4477
2720
5348
6469
5356
5510
3664
3236
4573
4011
3691
3888
3036
3687
4585
3976
2239
3159
2766
2185
1884
2647
2766
3183
2863
1938
4813
5920
2921
7061
7604
7778
7369
7335
5092
4721
5362
5381
5082
5058
4125
4336
5145
4900
2796
3331
3128
2267
2257
2960
2796
3032
2844
1951
8158
9822
5294
10768
14472
10678
11992
11470
9495
8565
7505
9234
8769
8663
7130
6950
9406
8623
5466
4960
5825
5572
4797
4462
5425
4788
5882
5041
1961
13268
15138
9685
16054
17964
15417
17752
16969
13440
13148
13307
15125
13931
13958
12060
12299
14170
13692
10986
9248
9447
9964
9937
8850
9659
9301
11251
9765
1971
18202
21078
12832
21278
22771
19858
23735
22188
20441
19640
19840
23462
21205
20040
19148
17783
18985
19385
15763
13524
12159
13160
12450
11704
12760
12341
12942
12960
1981
23141
26913
16476
26473
28047
26867
29111
28070
27769
26057
26867
27862
26982
24506
23673
21683
26751
25224
20526
16893
16291
17101
13885
13815
16453
16129
17703
16523
1991
27113
31830
18464
31125
33593
29499
35220
33484
35084
30665
30366
33240
32020
29526
26869
25920
30583
29417
22965
22504
17705
18193
19738
17434
18410
17894
20660
18572
2001
25740
29987
17709
27953
33436
27490
32355
30656
33230
29446
28880
31068
30347
28494
26177
23990
30399
28751
21158
20592
16679
17091
19047
17297
17503
17426
20437
18172
2009
See the text. All estimates are at historical boundaries and based on present populations. Aosta Valley was included in Piedmont until 1938; Molise was included in Abruzzi until 1951.
2049
Italy (Euro 2011)
SOURCE
2180
1842
Center/North
South
1871
per Person in Italy’s Regions, 1871–2009 (Euro 2011)
2116
2844
2272
2276
n.a.
2071
n.a.
1944
2014
2151
1682
2034
2997
2200
1635
2196
1828
1371
1418
1834
1928
1598
1862
GDP
Piedmont
Aosta Valley
Liguria
Lombardy
Northwest
Trentino Alto Adige
Veneto
Friuli Venezia Giulia
Emilia Romagna
Northeast
Tuscany
Marche
Umbria
Lazio
Center
Abruzzo
Molise
Campania
Puglia
Basilicata
Calabria
South
Sicily
Sardinia
Islands
Table A.2