Download a test of the emotional-integrative model

APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 23: 98–114 (2009)
Published online 8 March 2008 in Wiley InterScience
(www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI: 10.1002/acp.1444
Flashbulb Memories for Expected Events:
A Test of the Emotional-Integrative Model
ANTONIETTA CURCI1* and OLIVIER LUMINET2,3
1
Department of Psychology, University of Bari, Italy
Department of Psychology, Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium
3
Research Unit on Emotion, Cognition, and Health, Belgian National Fund for
Scientific Research, Belgium
2
SUMMARY
Flashbulb memories (FBMs) are vivid, long-lasting and consistent recollections for the reception
context of shocking and unexpected public news. Only a few studies have assessed FBMs for
predictable events. In the present study the emotional-integrative model is considered to account for
FBMs for an expected event, that is, the death of President Mitterrand, across two national groups,
that are, French and Belgian citizens. Results showed that FBMs can develop for an expected event;
they are affected by its emotional impact and subsequent rehearsal, while surprise did not play a role
in their formation. The emotional-integrative model was confirmed as a promising tool to model
datasets on FBMs. It holds for both subsamples, with a better parsimony for Belgian respondents’
data. Implications for the debate about the nature of FBMs are discussed. Copyright # 2008 John
Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
The investigation of the relationship between memory and emotion has provided much
support to the idea that emotionally charged stimuli or events result in enhanced recall
(Burke, Heuer, & Reisberg, 1992; De Houver & Hermans, 1994; Guy & Cahill, 1999;
Harris & Pashler, 2005; Rubin & Friendly, 1986). In line with this idea, Flashbulb memory
(FBM) studies have demonstrated that, when a significant public event occurs, people
may remember for a long time not only features of the event itself, but also some seemingly
irrelevant details of its reception context, for example, the exact location where they were,
the time when they first learned of the event, the ongoing activity, informant and other
idiosyncratic elements often including perceptual aspects (Bohannon, 1988; Brown &
Kulik, 1977; Conway et al., 1994; Larsen, 1992). Brown and Kulik (1977) were the first
authors who considered the phenomenon. They hypothesised that FBMs result from an
emotionally based mechanism accounting for their unusual vividness and durability over
time. The process is activated once the individual faces an unexpected and important event.
Additionally, this special mechanism would be responsible for the feeling of confidence
associated with these recollections. It follows that FBMs might be considered as a class of
enhanced memories, mainly originated by the subjective impact of the original emotional
experience.
*Correspondence to: Antonietta Curci, Department of Psychology, University of Bari, Piazza Umberto I, 1, 70121
Bari, Italy. E-mail: [email protected]
Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Flashbulb memories for expected events
99
After the original study by Brown and Kulik (1977), case-study designs have frequently
been employed to assess FBMs. When a shocking and unexpected public event occurs, an
ad hoc study is set up, and the impact of the subjective variables associated with its
occurrence is investigated. Although this approach does not allow researchers to compare
FBM for different sampled events (Wright & Nunn, 2000), it has the advantage of focusing
on features of an original stimulus event, and its potential to trigger FBMs. A reasonable
degree of validity for the procedure derives from the univocal definition of the set of
considered variables and the methods for collecting data across different studies (Luminet
& Curci, 2008). To this purpose, following Brown and Kulik (1977), many researchers
have considered the quantity of details in narratives, together with individuals’ confidence
in their recollections, as a good approximation for a correct assessment of FBM
(Bohannon, 1988; Bohannon & Symons, 1992). By contrast, more recent studies have
emphasised the persistence and consistency of these memory formations over long periods
of time (for a review, see Curci & Luminet, 2006). As a consequence of this, test–retest
assessments have often been employed as a valid and reliable procedure to investigate
FBMs for emotional events.
The present study investigates the process of formation and maintenance of FBM for a
public event having some distinctive emotional features, that is, the death of the former
French President F. Mitterrand, on 8 January 1996. The present study adopts a
case-study approach, by focusing on a single elicitor of FBM, and a test–retest design is
employed to get a consistent and reliable measure of FBM over time. The death of F.
Mitterrand was considered as the original event for the present study, since it had a high
emotional impact for the public opinion, and noteworthy implications for French and
European politics. This event therefore shared the same characteristics of the commonly
considered elicitors for FBM research. However, the death was expected and
foreseeable, since Mitterrand had suffered from a prostate cancer for some years,
and his disease was in its terminal state. As a consequence, the present study is intended
to investigate the process of formation and maintenance of FBMs for a predictable
public event.
FBMs for expected events
According to Brown and Kulik (1977), the two main factors contributing to the special
encoding of FBM are the reaction of surprise to a given news item, and its evaluation of
importance-consequentiality. The authors did not directly measure the level of surprise
associated with the events considered in their study, as they assumed that most of them
were unexpected (i.e. the assassination of John F. Kennedy, Malcolm X or Martin Luther
King). However, in their investigation they also included the death of General Francisco
Franco, which was expected, as it occurred for natural causes. Some other studies have
focused on FBMs for expected news (Bellelli, 1999; Curci, 2005; Curci, Luminet,
Finkenauer, & Gisle, 2001; Morse, Woodward, & Zweigenhaft, 1993; Neisser, 1982;
Ruiz-Vargas, 1993; Tekcan, 2001; Weaver, 1993; Winograd & Killinger, 1983). For
instance, Winograd and Killinger (1983) considered two expected news besides the
unexpected events investigated in their study on children’ FBMs, such as the astronauts’
landing on the moon in 1969, and the resignation of President Nixon in 1974. Bellelli
(1999) assessed FBMs for the resignation of the Italian judge A. Di Pietro from the judicial
inquiry called ‘Mani Pulite’ (Clean Hands), which was envisaged by the mass media in the
months preceding the event. The same event was considered in the first study described by
Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 23: 98–114 (2009)
DOI: 10.1002/acp
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A. Curci and O. Luminet
Curci (2005). Weaver (1993) and Tekcan (2001) investigated FBMs for the American
attack on Iraq during the Gulf war. Morse et al. (1993) collected their data about the
memory for the Senate hearings of Clarence Thomas in the Supreme Court, during which
allegations of Thomas’s sexual harassment of a woman were examined. The hearings
continued for several days, thus reducing the impact of surprise on public opinion (Morse
et al., 1993). Finally, Curci et al. (2001) considered the same event investigated in the
present study—that is the death of F. Mitterrand—to assess the average impact of this
event, its memory, and the associated predictors in two national groups, that are, French
and Belgian citizens. Although they used different designs and methodologies to
investigate the phenomenon, all these studies found evidence that FBMs develop also for
expected events, and tried to provide an account on the factors intervening in their
formations.
The models of formation and maintenance of FBMs
The debate on the process of formation and maintenance of FBM is still open (Luminet &
Curci, 2008). Brown and Kulik (1977) put forward a rather speculative account of the
phenomenon, based upon the neuropsychological theory of ‘Now Print!’ (Livingston,
1967). After them, three comprehensive models have been proposed in the literature
(Conway et al., 1994; Er, 2003; Finkenauer, Luminet, Gisle, El-Ahmadi, Van Der Linden,
& Philippot, 1998), all tested through Structural Equation Modelling (SEM; Bollen, 1989).
The SEM approach has the main advantage of providing a test of theoretical hypotheses of
relations among variables. In other words, SEM allows the researcher to compare a
theoretically established model with empirical evidence to assess the degree to which data
fit the theory, instead of simply deriving a model based upon empirical evidence.
All three models for FBM prediction (Conway et al., 1994; Er, 2003; Finkenauer et al.,
1998) have severe limitations concerning either the measurement of the construct or the set
of predictors included in the model. The model proposed by Conway (1995; Conway et al.,
1994) did not take into account the role of the novelty appraisal, which was already
theoretically considered by Brown and Kulik (1977). Additionally, the authors did not
distinguish surprise from the general emotional reaction experienced for the news. The
model by Er (2003) collapsed Flashbulb and event memories into a unique construct, which
was assessed 6–9 months after the event. Furthermore, the author did not distinguish the
impact of surprise from the evaluation of novelty provided by respondents after the
quake. Finally, Finkenauer et al. (1998) assessed FBMs for the death of Belgian King
Baudouin through questionnaires collected 7–8 months after the event, and no measures of
memory consistency were provided in their study. However, despite its limitations, the
Finkenauer et al.’s model (1998) has the main advantage of providing a global account
of FBM, since it incorporates the effects of both cognitive-emotional and social variables
in two pathways of prediction. For this reason, the authors called their model
‘emotional-integrative’.
The first of the two pathways proposed by Finkenauer et al. (1998) indicates the effects
of surprise, emotional impact of the event and their cognitive antecedents, that is, the
appraisals of novelty and importance/consequentiality (Frijda, 1987; Frijda, Kuipers, & ter
Schure, 1989; Scherer, 1984, 1997; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Surprise affects both FBM
and the emotional reaction to the original event, which is also determined by the
concomitant cognitive evaluation of importance-consequentiality. The second pathway
concerns the indirect effect of emotion and its appraisals, through the modulation of
Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 23: 98–114 (2009)
DOI: 10.1002/acp
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rehearsal processes which develops in social contexts (Bohannon & Symons, 1992;
Christianson, 1989; Finkenauer et al., 1998; McCloskey, Wible, & Cohen, 1988; Wright,
1993). Rehearsal directly addresses information about the original event, and indirectly,
reinforces memory for its reception context. Finally, affective attitudes towards the
protagonist of the public event influence both emotional reactions and rehearsal processes.
From the theoretical point of view, the emotional-integrative model represents a significant
synthesis of different research work on FBM and its antecedents. Furthermore, from the
empirical point of view, in the study on the death of King Baudouin, it was shown to have a
very good fit when compared with the previously proposed models (Finkenauer et al.,
1998).
Overview and hypotheses
The aim of the present study is to test the emotional-integrative model (Finkenauer et al.,
1998) to account for the formation and maintenance of FBM for an expected event, such as
the death of President F. Mitterrand. A test–retest design is employed to measure the
construct of FBM (Curci & Luminet, 2006). Participants were interviewed one to two
months after the original event and retested one year later. It follows that the
emotional-integrative model is tested on employing consistency measures for FBM and
event memories, and this represents a clear advancement with respect to the original study
by Finkenauer et al. (1998).
In the present study, FBMs are defined as long-lasting and consistent memories for
specific details of the reception context of the news, that is, the categories of location, time,
other people present, ongoing activity and additional details of the context (Bohannon,
1988; Brown & Kulik, 1977; Conway et al., 1994; Neisser & Harsch, 1992). In conformity
with the emotional-integrative model (Finkenauer et al., 1998), both cognitive-emotional
and social factors are predicted to have an impact on FBMs for the death of Mitterrand.
However, as the original event of the present study was expected, then it follows that the
direct impact of surprise and novelty appraisal is expected to be non-significant.
One of the major methodological concerns for the research on FBM refers to the need for
a systematic investigation on how memories differ across subsamples (Wright & Gaskell,
1995). In the present study, the model will be tested on two different groups of respondents,
that are, French and Belgian citizens having a different level of involvement in the news
(Curci et al., 2001). For this reason, although using the same indicators considered in the
study by Curci et al. (2001), the present study differs from the previous one since it focuses
on a test of structural relationships among FBM variables across the two subsamples of
respondents, instead of comparing the average impact of the same variables in the two
subgroups.
French citizens might be assumed to be more concerned by Mitterrand’s death because
of the direct impact Mitterrand’s politics had on their societal life. On the other hand,
Belgians experienced the news as a foreign political matter having much less effect on their
lives. In conformity with findings from Curci et al. (2001), in the present study, the
emotional-integrative model (Finkenauer et al., 1998) is hypothesised to hold for both
subsamples of respondents, that is, both French and Belgian citizens, although the
pattern of relationships among structural variables is expected to be more dense for the
first subsample of respondents, who had a greater involvement in the original event
(Curci, 2005).
Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 23: 98–114 (2009)
DOI: 10.1002/acp
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A. Curci and O. Luminet
METHOD
Design
Participants in the present study were French-speaking French and Belgian citizens,
interviewed one to two months after the death of Mitterrand and retested one year later.
FBM was assessed through attributes of the reception context corresponding to the
canonical categories of time, location, other people present, ongoing activity and other
details of the context (Bohannon, 1988; Brown & Kulik, 1977; Conway et al., 1994;
Finkenauer et al., 1998; Neisser & Harsch, 1992). Other crucial variables for the model are
the measures of event memory (i.e. Mitterrand’s death), and cognitive-emotional and social
factors supposed to affect FBM formation, such as appraisals of novelty and importance/
consequentiality, surprise, emotional feeling states, rehearsal, and affective attitudes
towards the protagonist of the event and his politics (Finkenauer et al., 1998).
Participants
A total of 664 participants volunteered to participate in a study on memories and reactions
related to Mitterrand’s death, one to two months after the event. Respondents were
recruited among undergraduate psychology students, researchers from psychology departments and experimenters’ acquaintances. Of these respondents, 54.5% were French, and
45.5% Belgians. One year later, participants were re-contacted, and 229 of them answered
a second questionnaire investigating the same topic (response rate: 34.5%). In the
present study only the test–retest subsample of 229 respondents is considered.1 Of these,
54.1% were French citizens (67.7% women; Mage ¼ 28.4; SD ¼ 11.2), and the remaining
45.9% were Belgians (50.5% women; Mage ¼ 34.5; SD ¼ 14.2).
Measures
The questionnaire is fully described in Curci et al. (2001). The version distributed at the test
was identical to the version at retest. To assess the constructs of FBM and Event memory,
indices of consistency were computed by comparing answers given by participants at the test
and retest (Curci & Luminet, 2006). For all other variables in the model, measures collected
during the test phase were employed as more reliable assessments of the considered constructs.
Thus, the constructs considered in the present study correspond to the following sets of items:
(1) FBM attributes, (2) Event memory, (3) Emotional feeling states, (4) Surprise, (5) Appraisal
of novelty, (6) Appraisal of importance/consequentiality, (7) Rehearsal, (8) Attitudes.
FBM attributes
The questions in this section correspond to the canonical categories defining FBMs
(Bohannon, 1988; Brown & Kulik, 1977; Conway et al., 1994; Finkenauer et al., 1998).
1
Comparing test–retest respondents with those who only participated in the first phase of data collection evidenced
significant differences only on the amount of reported FBM attributes and Event memory details, and on Novelty
and Rehearsal ratings (at least, p < .05), which were found to be higher for participants involved in both phases of
data collection. This might account for a kind of self-selection bias of participants, in that only those who scored
the highest on these variables at the test agreed to participate in the retest phase. The fact that some people were
willing to complete questionnaires at both phases of data collection might be considered as an indicator of interest
in the event. We might speculate that, for those participants, FBMs as consistent memory formations were also
more likely to be formed, and this would make us more confident about the fact that we are really investigating
FBM for Mitterrand’s death on a sample of people highly concerned by the event.
Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 23: 98–114 (2009)
DOI: 10.1002/acp
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They dealt with the exact time participants heard the news (date, day of week and hour), the
place they were (country, city, room or other kind of location, i.e. the car), the other people
they were with, their ongoing activity and some other details about the reception context
(with a maximum of 5). The variable assessing the informant was included in the
questionnaires but not considered among the FBM indicators, as a ceiling effect was found
for its distribution; almost all respondents seemed to remember how she/he heard the news.
To obtain consistency measures for this set of indicators, responses at the first data
collection and at the retest were compared. For each attribute of the context, the value 2 was
assigned if respondents provided exactly the same answer at the first data collection and at
retest. The value 1 was assigned if the answers were substantially but not entirely identical,
that is when a minor gain/loss of information was found (i.e. cleaning at test, vacuuming
the house at retest). The value of 0 was assigned if the answers were totally different or
missing at the retest. As an example, consider the following protocol provided by a
respondent at the test: ‘It was Monday January 8th, 1996. I was sitting in my kitchen, at
home in Brussels, having breakfast, with my mother and my sister. We switched the TV on
and suddenly heard of the news. I was astonished. I finished my breakfast and went to
study’. The same respondent at the retest responded: ‘I was having breakfast in my kitchen
at home in Brussels, when the TV announced that Mitterrand had died. I was with my
family’. The consistency score for this participant was 7 (2þ2þ0 for the place, 1 for other
people, and 2 for the ongoing activity).
Event memory
The memory for the death of Mitterrand was assessed by items concerning the exact time of
the event (date, day of the week, and hour), the place where it happened and the cause of the
death. Consistency scores were computed for these measures by comparing recollections at
the test and retest. A score of 2 was assigned if respondents provided exactly the same
answer at both times of measurement, no matter whether this answer was right or wrong;
1 was assigned if the answers were substantially but not entirely identical, no matter
whether they were right or wrong, that is when a minor gain/loss of information was found
(i.e. Mitterrand’s death occurred on 8 January 1996 at test, January 1996 at retest); 0 if the
answers were totally different or missing at the retest.2
Emotional feeling states
Participants rated the extent to which they felt (a) upset, (b) shaken and (c) affected by the
news on 7-point scales ranging from 1 ‘not at all’ to 7 ‘very much’.
Surprise
Respondents rated on three 7-point scales (1 ¼ not at all; 7 ¼ very much) to what
extent they had experienced the news as (a) surprising, (b) astonishing, and (c)
unbelievable.
2
In the present study, the Event memory consistency index was employed as a proxy for accuracy for two reasons.
First, from a theoretical point of view, the link between Event memory and FBM would be more easily assessed if
the same kind of measures were employed for the two constructs. In other words, the fact that people keep a
consistent memory of the original event might affect memory consistency for the corresponding reception context,
whereas an effect of Event memory accuracy on FBM consistency seems more difficult to be maintained. Second,
indices of Event memory consistency and accuracy at test and retest were found to be significantly associated to a
high extent (r > .60, p < .001).
Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 23: 98–114 (2009)
DOI: 10.1002/acp
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A. Curci and O. Luminet
Appraisal of novelty
Participants rated how (a) unusual, (b) special, (c) uncommon the event was. The items
ranged from 1 ‘not at all’ to 7 ‘very much’.
Appraisal of importance/consequentiality
Respondents rated the extent to which the original event was important for themselves and
their life on a 7-point scale (1 ¼ not important at all, 7 ¼ very important). Additionally, they
rated the extent to which it had consequences for them on a 7-point scale (1 ¼ no
consequences at all; 7 ¼ many consequences).
Rehearsal
A 5-point scale (1 ¼ never; 5 ¼ often) was used to assess the global frequency of
conversations about the original event. Additionally, respondents rated on a 5-point scale
(1 ¼ never; 5 ¼ more than six times) how many times they had had spontaneous thoughts or
images about the event during the days following the event. Finally, participants rated on
three 5-point scales (1 ¼ never, 5 ¼ more than 10 times) how often they had followed the
news on TV, radio and newspapers.
Attitudes
Three 7-point scales (1 ¼ not at all, 7 ¼ very much) were employed to assess to what extent
participants (a) had sympathy for Mitterrand, (b) admired him, and (c) were favourable to
his politics.
Procedure
Questionnaires were distributed to the participants one to two months after Mitterrand’s
death. The retest phase took place one year after the first data collection. A preliminary
short text in the questionnaire explained that the research dealt with memories and personal
reactions towards Mitterrand’s death. Participants were told that there were no right and
wrong answers to any of the questions, the study being concerned with the memory for
mass media events.
RESULTS
Descriptive analyses
Descriptive analyses were run on the indicators of consistency for FBM attributes and
Event memory, with participants scoring either 1 or 2 for each attribute (respectively
substantially and totally consistent) included in the analyses. Respondents from the whole
sample appeared to be highly consistent when recalling the place where they were when
they learned of the news (97.4%), time (74.2%) and other present people (68.6%).
Percentages of consistency were lower for ongoing activity (52%), and other details of the
context (40.6%). French respondents were significantly more consistent than Belgians
when recalling the place where they learned of the news (respectively, 100% and 94.3%,
x2 (1, N ¼ 229) ¼ 7.28, p < .01), and the time (respectively, 87.1% and 59%, x2
(1, N ¼ 229) ¼ 23.39, p < .001). Regarding the indicators of Event memory, participants
seemed to be very consistent when recalling the exact time (72.9%), and cause of death
Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 23: 98–114 (2009)
DOI: 10.1002/acp
Flashbulb memories for expected events
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(88.6%), and less consistent when recalling the place where Mitterrand died (29.3%).
Percentages of consistency for exact time of the death appeared significantly higher
for French respondents than for Belgians (respectively, 85.5% and 58.1%, x2
(1, N ¼ 229) ¼ 21.60, p < .001).
For each set of items in the questionnaire, scores of the indicator variables were summed
up to get aggregated indices, corresponding to the considered constructs. Means for these
indices were compared across subsamples. As shown in Table 1, French respondents
displayed a higher level of FBM and Event memory than Belgians. Additionally, French
respondents appeared significantly more emotionally involved, rated the event as more
Table 1. Descriptives for all items of the FBM questionnaire
Constructs and indicators (range)
MFrench (SD) MBelgians (SD)
Mtotal (SD)
FBM (0–22)
Time (0–6)a
Place (0–6)b
Other people (0–2)
Ongoing activity (0–2)
Details (0–10)c
Event memory (0–10)
Time (0–6)d
Place (0–2)
Cause (0–2)
Emotional feeling states (3–21)
Upset (1–7)
Shaken (1–7)
Affected by the news (1–7)
Surprise (3–21)
Surprising (1–7)
Astonishing (1–7)
Unbelievable (1–7)
Novelty (3–21)
Unusual (1–7)
Special (1–7)
Uncommon (1–7)
Importance/Consequentiality (2–14)
Important (1–7)
Having consequences (1–7)
Rehearsal (5–25)
Conversations (1–5)
Spontaneous thoughts (1–5)
TV (1–5)
Radio (1–5)
Newspapers (1–5)
Attitudes (3–21)
Sympathy (1–7)
Admiration (1–7)
Favour (1–7)
11.91
3.06
5.03
1.31
1.01
2.45
5.11
2.87
.56
1.68
10.24
3.28
4.48
2.48
10.40
4.00
3.53
2.86
11.34
2.50
4.68
4.16
4.21
2.55
1.66
13.49
3.85
2.68
2.66
2.33
2.02
10.99
3.79
3.59
3.61
10.63
2.42
4.68
1.27
.98
1.96
4.30
2.20
.49
1.61
9.27
2.95
4.09
2.22
9. 54
3.77
3.21
2.47
11.10
2.54
4.53
4.03
3.73
2.22
1.51
13.03
3.57
2.54
2.55
2.28
2.06
10.90
3.74
3.60
3.56
(5.04)
(2.01)
(1.43)
(.89)
(.97)
(3.18)
(2.37)
(1.96)
(.88)
(.68)
(4.81)
(1.62)
(1.98)
(1.88)
(5.32)
(2.13)
(2.03)
(2.07)
(5.03)
(1.89)
(2.20)
(2.48)
(2.61)
(1.69)
(1.21)
(4.01)
(1.12)
(1.29)
(1.14)
(1.18)
(1.07)
(4.91)
(1.78)
(1.62)
(1.94)
9.11
1.67
4.48
1.23
.94
1.39
3.33
1.40
.41
1.52
8.11
2.56
3.63
1.92
8.34
3.50
2.83
2.01
10.83
2.59
4.36
3.88
3.16
1.83
1.33
12.49
3.25
2.38
2.43
2.21
2.11
10.79
3.68
3.61
3.50
(4.70)
(1.78)
(1.85)
(.94)
(.98)
(2.50)
(2.06)
(1.59)
(.78)
(.68)
(4.21)
(1.59)
(1.98)
(1.53)
(4.58)
(1.87)
(1.94)
(1.66)
(4.60)
(1.94)
(2.14)
(2.22)
(1.85)
(1.22)
(.81)
(3.96)
(1.23)
(1.22)
(1.01)
(1.16)
(1.06)
(4.56)
(1.69)
(1.46)
(1.86)
t (df)
(5.07) 4.32 (227)
(2.03) 5.52 (227)
(1.65) 2.57 (227)
(.91)
.64 (227)
(.97)
.51 (227)
(2.93) 2.77 (227)
(2.40) 6.01 (227)
(1.94) 6.16 (227)
(.81)
1.45 (227)
(.68)
1.70 (227)
(4.66) 3.53 (227)
(1.64) 3.38 (227)
(2.02) 3.26 (227)
(1.75) 2.40 (227)
(5.09) 3.10 (227)
(2.02) 1.86 (227)
(2.02) 2.66 (227)
(1.94) 3.40 (227)
(4.83)
.80 (227)
(1.91) .36 (227)
(2.18) 1.09 (227)
(2.36)
.91 (227)
(2.35) 3.45 (227)
(1.53) 3.63 (227)
(1.06) 2.37 (227)
(4.01) 1.82 (216)
(1.21) 3.83 (226)
(1.27) 1.78 (220)
(1.09) 1.60 (224)
(1.17)
.77 (224)
(1.06) .57 (224)
(4.74)
.31 (227)
(1.73)
.47 (227)
(1.55) 10 (227)
(1.90)
.43 (227)
a
Sum of consistency scores for the FBM attributes date, day of week and hour.
Sum of consistency scores for the FBM attributes country, city and exact location.
Sum of consistency scores for 5 additional details of the reception context.
d
Sum of consistency scores for the Event memory attributes date, day of week and hour.
p < .05; p < .01; p < .005; p < .001.
b
c
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A. Curci and O. Luminet
important and felt a higher level of surprise upon hearing the news than Belgian
respondents. Detailed comparisons on the single items of the questionnaire are reported in
Table 1.
Structural equation modelling
To test the emotional-integrative model (Finkenauer et al., 1998) on the data of the present
study, the SEM approach (Bollen, 1989) was applied, through the software Lisrel (Jöreskog
& Sörbom, 1996). More specifically, the hypothesised pattern of relationships among
variables was estimated through a path analysis model. In such a model, explanatory and
dependent variables are all observed, and constructs are considered to be directly
measured, not assessed through a measurement model. As a consequence, no measurement
errors are estimated by the procedure, since all theoretical constructs are supposed to be
fully captured by the corresponding observed indicators. Relationships among variables in
the model might be directional and non-directional. Directional relationships are estimated
through regression coefficients. Non-directional relationships correspond to covariances
among variables. The main advantage of using a path analysis model is that it allows the
researcher to test hypotheses of causal chains among variables. Indeed, directional
effects might be either direct or indirect, when the causal relationship between two
variables is mediated by another or more variables. For each endogenous variable, the
procedure gives an estimate of the proportion of variance explained by structural
relationships (Bollen, 1989; Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1996). Finally, all computed coefficients
are associated with a significance test, which allows the researcher to draw inferences about
the generalisation of results.
The procedure gives general indices of fit for the model. For the purposes of the present
paper, only x2, RMSEA, GFI and AGFI indices will be considered (Bollen, 1989). The x2
index measures the distance between the sample covariance matrix and the estimated
covariance matrix. A small non-significant x2 corresponds to good fit and a large significant
x2 to bad fit (Bollen, 1989). The Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) is a
measure of the approximation between the model and the population covariance matrix. A
perfect fit will yield an RMSEA of zero. Values equal to or lower than .05 are considered
good. Values exceeding .10 are indicative of a poor fit (Browne & Cudeck, 1993).
The Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) represents the amount of variance and covariance
in the sample matrix predicted by the estimated covariance matrix. The Adjusted
Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) adjusts for the degrees of freedom in the model. Both
indices range 0–1 and can be considered as satisfactory if they exceed .90 (Bentler &
Bonnett, 1980).
The input for the procedure is the covariance matrix among the aggregated indicator
variables corresponding to the constructs of FBM, Event memory consistency, Emotional
feeling states, Surprise, Novelty, Importance/consequentiality, Rehearsal and Attitudes. In
order to simplify the interpretation of the covariances, Table 2 reports the correlation
coefficients among the aggregated measures, for both the French and Belgian subsamples.
The emotional-integrative model was separately tested on data from French and Belgian
respondents. Figures 1 and 2 contain the path diagrams for the model. As Figure 1 depicts,
the direct pathway of formation of FBMs does not appear fully activated for the French
subsample, in that there is no direct impact of Surprise. Emotional feeling states
experienced in response to the news seems to be affected by the appraisal of Novelty—
through the effect of Surprise—and Importance/consequentiality. In turn, emotion
Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 23: 98–114 (2009)
DOI: 10.1002/acp
Flashbulb memories for expected events
107
Table 2. Correlation matrix of the variables included in the structural model of formation and
maintenance of FBM
1
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
FBM
—
Event memory
.47
Emotional feeling states
.28
Surprise
.09
Novelty
.07
Importance/consequentiality .15
Rehearsal
.26
Attitudes
.23
Average inter-item correlations
French subsample
Belgian subsample
.36
.31
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
.52
—
.27
.02
.03
.24
.50
.35
.27
.17
.14
.04
—
.54
.34
—
.23
.37
.54 .39
.40 .05
.61 .32
.18
.09
.33
.40
—
.23
.05
.25
.22
.21
.61
.33
.13
—
.29
.37
.23
.35
.46
.12
.14
.52
—
.33
.13
.07
.59
.34
.09
.49
.33
—
.08
.10
.66
.53
.37
.30
.61
.64
.38
.38
.77
.74
.59
.55
Note: Correlations for the French subsample are reported in the upper triangle of the matrix, correlations for the
Belgian subsample are reported in the lower triangle of the matrix.
p < .05; p < .01; p < .005; p < .001.
activates the indirect pathway of prediction, through the modulation of rehearsal processes
and event memory. Finally, Attitudes towards Mitterrand and his politics influence
the appraisal of Importance/consequentiality, and Emotional feeling states. An additional
link was included in the model, corresponding to the direct effect of Emotional feeling
states upon FBM consistency. This link was originally predicted by Finkenauer and her
colleagues, in conformity with evidence of previous research work (Brown & Kulik, 1977;
Conway, 1995), nevertheless it was found not significant in the 1998 study. In the present
study, FBM for the death of Mitterrand appeared to be significantly affected by the intensity
of Emotional feeling states. Overall, the fit of the model appears to be acceptable although
not completely satisfactory (x2 (18, n ¼ 124) ¼ 35.13, p ¼ .009; RMSEA ¼ .088; GFI ¼
.934; AGFI ¼ .868).
As Figure 2 shows, the model for the Belgian subsample is basically similar to the
model for French respondents, except for two non-significant paths. The first of these
refers to the significant correlation between the two exogenous variables (Novelty
and Attitudes). The second refers to the relationship between Surprise and Emotional
feeling states: for Belgian respondents, Novelty and Surprise appeared to be completely
unrelated to the other variables in the model, thus having no consequences upon the
formation and maintenance of FBM for the death of Mitterrand. Overall, the fit of the
model is satisfactory (x2 (18, n ¼ 105) ¼ 24.05, p ¼ .154; RMSEA ¼ .057; GFI ¼ .945;
AGFI ¼ .891).
Comparatively, the model for the Belgian subsample appeared to be more parsimonious.
The ratio between the x2 coefficient and the corresponding degrees of freedom is smaller
for the model of Belgians than for French respondents (respectively, 1.34 and 1.95). To
verify whether the same model of formation and maintenance of FBM is suitable to account
for data of both subsamples, a multi-sample analysis was performed (Jöreskog & Sörbom,
1996). The multi-sample model exhibited a poor fit (x2 (45, n ¼ 229) ¼ 85.79, p ¼ .000;
RMSEA ¼ .090; pct. contribution x2: French sample ¼ 66.40; Belgian sample ¼ 33.60),
thus accounting for the fact that the pattern of structural relationships among the variables
in the model differs with respect to respondents’ provenance.
Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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108
A. Curci and O. Luminet
Figure 1. Emotional-integrative model for French respondents.
Note: All paths—except the dashed ones—were significant for p < .05. For the endogenous
variables, the estimated Rs-squared are reported in the squares. The right-facing arrows connected
to each endogenous variable refer to the equation errors of the model (cfr. Bollen, 1989)
DISCUSSION
The present study aimed to test a model of formation and maintenance of FBM for an
expected event, such as the death of President F. Mitterrand. More specifically, in the
present study, the emotional-integrative model was considered, which included the effects
of both cognitive-emotional and social predictors (Curci & Luminet, 2006; Finkenauer
et al., 1998). The model was applied on measures of memory consistency, on two different
groups of respondents, that are, French and Belgian citizens, having a different level of
involvement in the news (Curci et al., 2001).
For both French and Belgian subsamples, high percentages of consistent recollections of
the attributes of the reception context were found. As expected, given the predictable
nature of the event, surprise had no direct effects on FBM, but, for the French group, a
significant relationship was found between ratings of surprise and emotional feeling states.
For both groups of respondents the emotional reaction to the news seemed to play a crucial
role in the process: it had both a direct effect on FBM (Brown & Kulik, 1977; Conway,
Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 23: 98–114 (2009)
DOI: 10.1002/acp
Flashbulb memories for expected events
109
Figure 2. Emotional-integrative model for Belgian respondents.
Note: All paths—except the dashed ones—were significant for p < .05. For the endogenous
variables, the estimated Rs-squared are reported in the squares. The right-facing arrows connected
to each endogenous variable refer to the equation errors of the model (cfr. Bollen, 1989)
1995), and activated the indirect pathway of prediction, through the modulation of
rehearsal processes and event memory. Finally, attitudes towards Mitterrand and his
politics affect the appraisal of importance/consequentiality, and intensity of emotional
feeling states.
Overall, the emotional-integrative model has an acceptable fit for the present data set.
Findings from the present study confirmed the existence of two pathways of formation for
FBM, the first concerning the effect of emotion and its related appraisals, the second
involving the mediation of rehearsal processes. The main differences with respect to the
original model by Finkenauer et al. (1998) concern the characteristics of the first pathway of
FBM formation. In the present study, the relationship between emotional feeling states and
FBM was found to be significant, which contrasts with the non-significant relationship found
by Finkenauer et al. (1998). By contrast, Surprise did not seem to affect FBM for the
Mitterrand’s death in that the direct path Novelty-Surprise-FBM was not found to be
significant. These differences are probably due to the nature of the original event considered
in the present study. As above outlined, the death of Mitterrand did not come unexpected,
since the French President had been suffering from a cancer for some years, and his disease
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was in its terminal state, nevertheless the event had a high emotional impact in the public
opinion as demonstrated by the large media coverage attributed to the news (Curci et al.,
2001). It follows that the emotional impact of the news rather than its unexpectedness
affected FBMs associated with the event. The emotional-integrative model, which was
originally applied on FBMs for unexpected events, appears to be acceptable also for expected
news, with some revisions due to the nature of the original event.
Comparatively, the model fitted Belgian data better than French data. For Belgian
respondents, the fit indices gave evidence of a better parsimony, although the theoretical
predictions of the emotional-integrative model seemed to be confirmed to a lower extent
than for French respondents. Furthermore, the multi-sample analysis revealed that the
process of prediction significantly differed across the two considered subsamples. These
findings need to be jointly considered with findings from Curci et al., 2001, in which a
test–retest design is employed in order to assess the impact of time and group provenance
upon FBM for the death of Mitterrand and its related cognitive-emotional and social
determinants. In this study, FBMs were found to be consistent for both French and Belgian
respondents. Additionally, the impact of surprise and novelty appraisal was not found to
differ across subsamples. Finally, for French participants, the average level of the indirect
pathway variables—emotional feeling states, importance and rehearsal—significantly
exceeded the average level for Belgian participants. The authors concluded that a different
concern in the original event and its protagonist gives rise to a different impact of
cognitive-emotional and social variables across subsamples. Concerns are defined as
motives or reasons for striving to reach or maintain a given state favourable to the
individual (Frijda, 1994). In this sense, they can be viewed as the most basic antecedents of
the emotional experience. With respect to FBM, the emotional impact of an event is
considered to depend upon the extent to which it favours or harms the individual’s concern.
It follows that the individual’s concern underlies the whole process of formation and
maintenance of FBMs for that event (Curci et al., 2001). As an implication for the present
study, the characteristics of the structural model for Belgians might be considered as
representative of the lower concern in the news of this national group as compared with the
French subsample.
A closer inspection of the path diagrams revealed that the difference between the
patterns of relationships for the French and Belgian groups was mainly due to the effect of
surprise, which was found to be more influential in the process for the former group of
respondents. A possible explanation for this would reside in the so-called appraisal theories
(Frijda, 1987; Frijda et al., 1989; Scherer, 1984, 1997; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Theorists
have distinguished two levels of evaluation relating to the appraisal of novelty: the first
concerns the unexpectedness of the original event, while the subsequent level refers to the
evaluation of exceptionality of the stimulus (Frijda et al., 1989; Leventhal & Scherer, 1987;
Scherer, 1988). In other words, an event might be considered novel not only as it came
suddenly and unexpectedly, but also in terms of its disruptiveness with respect to the
ordinary routine. The death of Mitterrand did not come suddenly and unexpectedly,
nevertheless respondents might have rated it as exceptional and outside of the ordinary
routine. This evaluation would have had an impact on the emotional reaction of French
respondents, who were directly concerned by the exceptional nature of the news, and
directly experienced its disruptiveness with regards to their daily routine. Again, a different
concern in the original event seems to be responsible for the process of formation of FBMs
across national groups, through its impact on the reaction of surprise experienced following
the event.
Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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However, the issue concerning the appraisal of novelty seems to be rather speculative,
since the distinction between evaluations of unexpectedness and exceptionality of the
stimulus was never made in previous studies on FBM. A new testing of the
emotional-integrative model should consider the twofold nature of the appraisal of
novelty, thus taking into account the effects of both evaluations, especially for events
foreseeable by public opinion.
Finally, findings from the present study need to be considered for the contributions they
offer to the discussion about the nature of FBM. First, the high rates of consistent
recollections for all attributes of the reception context demonstrated that, for our sample of
respondents, FBMs did develop for an expected event such as the death of F. Mitterrand.
Brown and Kulik (1977) required a high impact of surprise for a FBM to be triggered. In the
present study, it appeared that this basic assumption can be released. Indeed, different
studies have shown that FBMs, as either detailed and vivid memory formations (Bellelli,
1999; Curci, 2005; Morse et al., 1993; Ruiz-Vargas, 1993; Tekcan, 2001; Winograd &
Killinger, 1983), or consistent recollections over time (Curci et al., 2001; Weaver, 1993),
might also develop for expected events as for unexpected news. However, the present study
represents a first attempt to test the structural hypothesis concerning the role of surprise in
the prediction of FBMs.
Second, the significant impact of emotion in the process of formation of FBM accounts
for the idea that FBM are to be considered as emotional memories. On this point, different
studies have provided mixed evidence. FBMs, as consistent memory formations, have
either been demonstrated to be influenced by the emotional impact of the original event
(see, for instance, Bohannon & Symons, 1992; Conway et al., 1994; Schmolck, Buffalo, &
Squire, 2000) or as completely unrelated to it (see Christianson & Engelberg, 1999;
Nachson & Zelig, 2003; Neisser & Harsch, 1992; Schmidt, 2004; Talarico & Rubin, 2003).
Curci and Luminet (2006) found that FBMs for the 11th September attacks were highly
affected by the emotional impact of the original event for those individuals who were more
concerned by it. In the present study, the direct impact of emotion on the process of
formation and maintenance of FBM was confirmed, in line with the original assumption by
Brown and Kulik (1977) on the emotional nature of FBMs.
Third, in the process of formation and maintenance tested in the present study, the strong
activation of the indirect pathway accounts for a considerable impact of reconstructive
processes, through rehearsal of the original news. It follows that FBMs can be considered
as a class of emotional memories, durable and persistent over time (Brown & Kulik, 1977;
Conway et al., 1994; Pillemer, 1984), yet they appeared not completely immune to
alterations over time, since they are noticeably affected by social factors and post-encoding
elaborations (Curci et al., 2001; Curci & Luminet, 2006).
To sum up, findings from the present study confirmed that the emotional-integrative
model offers a robust and promising tool for analysing data referring to FBMs for relevant
public news (Finkenauer et al., 1998). In addition, it appeared to have a satisfactorily fit
when applied to measures of memory consistency, and is still adequate for modelling data
sets concerning expected events. However, from a theoretical point of view, the discussion
about the process of formation and maintenance of FBM appeared to entail a closer
consideration of the construct of concern (Frijda, 1994). As in Curci et al. (2001), in the
present study, findings regarding differences in FBMs across national groups might be
explained by assuming that different groups exhibited a different involvement, and form
different recollections of the event and its reception context, as a function of their group
concerns (Curci et al., 2001). Although memories appeared consistent over time for all
Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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A. Curci and O. Luminet
groups of respondents, the underlying process of formation might differ to some extent
(Curci & Luminet, 2006).
Recommendations for future studies on FBM for expected events
Some issues need to be considered in future studies investigating the process of formation
and maintenance of FBM. First, the impact of individuals’ and group concerns should be
considered, by both implementing a direct assessment of the construct (Sonnemans &
Frijda, 1995), and testing structural hypotheses of relationships among cognitiveemotional and social predictors. Second, with regard to studies on FBM for expected
events, the twofold nature of novelty appraisal should be considered, in that people might
appraise relevant news items as either unexpected or exceptional, and their evaluations
might have a different impact on the process of formation and maintenance of FBMs.
Third, future studies should entail a systematic consideration of both unexpected and
expected events as for their potential to trigger FBM, to assess the peculiarities of the
models of formation across different original events on a same sample of individuals.
Finally, future studies should employ reduced time lags between the original event and its
first memory assessment in order to have both consistent and accurate indicators of the
construct (Bohannon & Symons, 1992). In the present study, the first data collection took
place one to two months after the death of Mitterrand. As variously shown, FBMs might be
highly vulnerable to reconstructive processes, which operate in the individual’s memory
even some days after the original event, thus influencing the accuracy of recollections
(Neisser & Harsch, 1992; Winningham, Hyman, & Dinnel, 2000). It follows that an
appropriate test of a model of prediction of FBM should employ both consistent and
accurate indicators in order to draw reliable conclusions about the general nature of
phenomenon.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The present study was supported by grants 1.5.128.03 and 1.5.078.06, from the Belgian
National Fund for Scientific Research.
The authors thank Catrin Finkenauer and Lydia Gisle for their cooperation in the first
stages of the present research work, and Guglielmo Bellelli for his comments on earlier
drafts of the manuscript. They also gratefully acknowledge the help of Jean-François
and Nadine Botermans, Patrick Chambres, Jacques Curie, Abdessadek El-Ahmadi,
Marie-Claire Gay, Michel Huteau, Tracy Mayne, Emmanuel Merlin, Natascha Rainis,
Jean-Pierre Rolland, Arielle Syssau, Nady Van Broeck, and Françoise Van Duuren for their
help in collecting the data.
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Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 23: 98–114 (2009)
DOI: 10.1002/acp