Download Almost, and Contrafactual Implicatures

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ALMOST, AND COUNTERFACTUAL IMPLICATURES
Debra Ziegeler
Monash University and National Tsing Hua University
An area of infrequent analysis in past pragmatic research is the role of approximating or proximative adverbs such as almost and nearly in producing meanings
of counterfactuality, and the place of such adverbs on an implicature scale of the
nature of Horn (1972). From first appearances it would seem that there is no reason
why proximative adverbs could not appear on such a scale, alongside quantifiers
such as some, most, few and more precise indicators of quantity such as cardinal
numerals. The function of such items appears to be comparable to that of the quantifiers in restricting a universal proposition, or in grading degree in some adjectives
and other quantifiers. However, there emerges a clear difference: quantifiers like
some conversationally imply the negative of a stronger proposition, by the observance of the Gricean Maxim of Quantity 1, while almost (and those akin to it) has
been believed to contain negative entailments, for the reason that the relevant inferences are non-defeasible, making them unlikely candidates for implicature scales
(see, e.g., Atlas 1984; Hitzeman 1992). The paradox which arises is that, as noted by
Sadock (1981:257), the negation of the stronger proposition that almost restricts is
not part of its semantic content, and yet this counterfactual proposition, in the
majority of cases, cannot be cancelled.
The present paper aims to resolve the paradox, analysing the meaning of
almost as a strong counterfactual implicature, and offering an account by which this
and many other counterfactual meanings may be explained.¹ The argument for an
implicature analysis for almost will be supported by revealing a predictive function
for proximatives, similar to that of certain modal verbs, and comparison will be
made with proximatives in other languages, which grammaticalize from the same
crosslinguistic sources as predictive meanings. A factor to be considered is whether
co-occurrence conditions will affect the interpretation of almost, and a small number of native-speaker intuitions will assess the grammatical distribution of almost
in order to investigate whether contradictions, indicating entailments, can be found
in all environments. It will be shown that the negative inferences assumed to be part
of the meaning of approximators are actually strong counterfactual implicatures,
their strength determined by means of a given Principle. The Principle is hypothesized to apply to a wide range of counterfactual meanings.
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Debra Ziegeler
1. Arguments for an implicature analysis
1.1 Prediction. According to Sadock, it was possible to consider the denial of the
truth value of the predicate of almost as a generalized conversational implicature
based partly on its meaning, rather than an entailment (1981:261). Sadock had
admitted that the cancellation of such an implicature out of context would be
difficult, and not parallel to the kinds of cancellation applicable to some/all examples on the implicature scale of Horn (1972),² but that this was mainly because of
the strength of the implicature. In order to provide evidence for the presence of an
implicature and not an entailment, Sadock argued for a number of cases. One was
the use of the conjunctor but in examples such as:
(1)
He almost, but didn’t quite, win the race.
This use is compared with the use of truth-functional equivalents such as and:
(1)'
?He almost, and didn’t quite, win the race.
(1)' is considered inappropriate since, unlike but in (1), the use of and adds nothing
to the meaning of almost. Sadock (1981:264) therefore assumed that almost implies
the denial of his winning the race, and but, used in (1), is said to reinforce the implicature, adding more information. However, the conventionally implied meanings
in but suggest that the conjunctor typically introduces a contrastive statement, so in
(1), the possibility of his winning must also be contained in the meaning of almost
for such statements to be appropriate. Sadock does not discuss this possibility, but
but-clauses offer firm evidence for the implication of predictive senses in the proximative adverb. All past time reference uses of almost can be appended with a conjoining clause introduced by but, and, as well as adding more information, the
conjunctor can be used in most cases to suggest a contrary turn of events; e.g.:
(2)
She had almost sung Strauss’s ‘Four Last Songs’, but she broke into a
sneezing fit before she had finished.
Although Sadock refers to the use of but to reinforce the implicature of negation, it
is questionable whether an implicature that is strong enough to be considered by
some accounts to be an entailment actually still needs reinforcing. The use of but in
(1) and (2) to conventionally implicate contrast, adversity, or unexpectedness is
unlikely if the inferences surrounding the use of almost are that the predicated
event did not occur anyway—just where does the contrast lie?
For this reason, it is likely that the relevant inferences are related to the Gricean
Maxim of Quantity 2. The Gricean Quantity 2 Maxim (termed q2 by Levinson 1995,
or R-based by Horn 1984), in contradistinction to the Quantity 1 Maxim, is infor-
almost, and counterfactual implicatures
225
mationally upper-bounded, and may license the implicature that the speaker was
inferring more information than was expressed. q2 implicatures have been shown
to influence the grammaticalization of predictive meanings from modal verbs historically (Traugott 1989), by the implicatures of future action resulting from present
intentions, abilities, or permission. The use of a but-clause in examples such as (1)
and (2) reveals the presence of similar inferences associated with almost. This offers
strong evidence against the entailment hypothesis, which, if it is sustained, will
require an explanation for such cases.
The predictive nature of almost in past contexts may therefore contribute to the
irrealis meanings of counterfactuality considered to be negative entailments in
some accounts. In the following section it will be seen that the proximative functions of almost are grammaticalized diachronically in other languages from verbs of
volition. It is such parallels with volition verbs that enable a modal function to be
suggested as attributable to the use of almost.
1.2 Evidence from the grammaticalization of proximatives. Although verbs
of volition often form the sources for the grammaticalization of predictive future
meanings, similar lexical sources have been found to grammaticalize into proximative meanings. Kouteva and Heine (1995) and Heine (1994) were able to isolate in
their data from African languages and Bulgarian a volition verb with a corresponding grammatical function of marking proximity, that is, expressing meanings of
‘nearly’ or ‘almost’. In a study of the grammaticalization of negative marking in
Chamus, a Maa dialect of the Eastern Nilotic family, Heine (1992) illustrates a gradual chain of concepts: the lexeme -yyéú moves from being a main verb of volition
with a noun phrase object, to an auxiliary-like verb with a main verb complement,
and then to a grammaticalized, uninflected aspect marker with an inanimate agent
as subject, conveying the meaning ‘almost’, and finally grammaticalizing to imply
negation. Part of this chain is illustrated in (3):
(3)
a. k-á-yyéú n-aâ
k-1sg
F-food.abs
‘want food’
b. k-é-yyéú l-cáni
n-é-uróri
k-3sg- M-tree.nom nar-3sg-fall
‘the tree almost fell’
(Heine 1992:338–40)³
In (3)b the grammaticalized senses of proximity are well established, as is demonstrated by the presence of an inanimate subject not capable of expressing volition.
The use of yyéú is now as an aspect marker, described by Heine (1992:339) as the
almost-aspect, but later renamed the proximative aspect in Heine (1994).
Other languages in which volitional verbs have provided the lexical sources for
the proximative include Swahili, Mvua, and Ewe (ibid); and Heine (1992:342) notes
that in Southern Soto, a Bantu language, the verb batla meaning ‘seek’, ‘desire’, or
‘want’ has developed into an auxiliary with a proximative aspect. Matisoff
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Debra Ziegeler
(1991:394) notes that for Chrau (a Mon-Khmer language spoken in Vietnam), the
verb cornh (‘want to’) can also function as a non-negatable, pre-verbal particle
meaning ‘almost’. It is of interest to note that not all of these attested examples have
progressed to become negative markers, but that when the temporal reference is
past, negative inferences also begin to appear as a meaning shift in a limited number of environments. This suggests the influence of the Maxim of Quantity 1, which
implies the negation of the predicate proposition.
The arguments for the negative entailments rather than counterfactual implicatures resulting from the use of almost are further weakened by this cross-linguistic
data, illustrating the gradual development of proximative inferences from volition
verb sources via the strengthening of q1 implicatures. Given such evidence, it is suggested therefore, that the senses of counterfactuality associated with almost in
English may be similarly the result of the gradual strengthening of Quantity implicatures, and that both q1 and q2 implicatures may interact to determine proximative meanings.
2. Co-occurrence conditions. One of the arguments Hitzeman (1992) uses to
justify an entailment analysis of almost is the contradiction suggested by almost P
and P occurring co-temporally. However, Atlas (1984:348) argues that a sentence
such as:
(4)
Moore almost understood ‘material object’ and he understood it
is acceptable. The acceptability of (4) can hold if the proximity to the event and the
event itself are considered co-temporal. Leech (1987:25) describes verbs such as
understand as ‘verbs of inert cognition’, or ‘unrestricted present’, referring to mental states. As such, they should be easier to construe as situations which are
homogeneously distributed over an indefinite time-span, and such temporallyunbounded environments cannot individuate the implied separate events required
to create the contradiction necessary to ascertain an entailment account. Perhaps,
then, in some environments almost produces a greater likelihood of contradiction
than in others, suggesting that the negative inferences may in fact be graded in a
continuum-like fashion according to varying strengths. It is possible to see that (4)
does not appear so sharply contradictory as, for example, Sadock’s (1981) example
would appear:
(5)
Bill almost swam the English Channel, and he swam it
when referring to the same event in both clauses. The reason for this is that almost
usually refers to a point close to the boundary of the predicate it quantifies (as suggested by Heine (1994:36) referring to the proximative in African languages), and
this point is more vaguely construed in imperfective situations such as (4).
almost, and counterfactual implicatures
imperfectives
Figure 1.
227
perfective events
Figure 2
Langacker (1987:79) described the use of imperfective processes to refer to an
extension of a stable situation through time, one with no inherent boundaries.
Thus, the state of full understanding may not be conceptually distinct from any
approach stages or states of approximate understanding which may overlap with it,
and may not entirely contradict such states. (4) may be schematized then as in
Figure 1, the centre shading marking the area of approximation which overlaps with
the darkest area marking the (predicted) fully represented state. Grammatical
imperfectivity, using the progressive aspect, can be similarly schematized, using an
activity verb (see Vendler 1967), which is also inherently unbounded, as in Bill was
almost swimming (see Figure 1). The center shading does suggest for expressions
such as almost swimming that some action is on-going at reference time, which may
overlap with and indicate a less representative instance of the state of swimming.
Punctual or telic achievement verbs, however, do not contain the possibility of
grading indicating a part-whole relationship, since they are bounded in time, and
the time span over which the event occurs is too brief to be considered as co-occurring with an approach phase. For this reason, the grading provided by almost is
pragmatically determined by a time-scale, not semantically determined by the
internal composition of the entity, and the approach stage is implied as occurring
independently and outside of the bounds of the event. The representation of almost
with a punctual achievement event; e.g., Mike almost fell, can be illustrated as follows, the cross marking the point of proximity, and the dotted figure marking a predicted event:
Because of the conceptualisation of an external approach point in Figure 2,
accounts such as Hitzeman (1992) cannot consider the use of almost with such verbs
unless the adverb refers to a time point outside the time at which the action did
occur (if at all). The punctuality of many actions makes it impossible to perceive,
for example, an event schematized in Figure 3, where the act of falling includes or
is fused with the approach point. In reporting the conceptualization of a punctual
event, the approach point is often not viewed as discrete from the result, and, furthermore, it would be conversationally uncooperative to report only the approach
point without reporting the complete event, if known. It is for such reasons that
proximative adverbs can be given an implicature account, rather than an entailment
account.
Langacker (1987) also ranked perfective and imperfective verb types as direct
notional analogues of count and mass nouns, count nouns being comparable to
228
Debra Ziegeler
|–—fell—–|
Figure 3.
perfective processes, and mass nouns to imperfective processes. If the use of proximative adverbs invokes a point close to a conceived boundary of a predicate, then a
spatial boundary demarcated in the notion of a count noun should be amenable to
approximation by almost in the same way as the temporal boundary demarcated by
a perfective verb type. It is possible to use almost to refer to the count nouns
Langacker terms ‘interconnected entities’, e.g., team, constellation and alphabet,
since these refer to bounded entities which are compositionally distributed over a
number of members. The grading of size then provides the internal scalarity
needed for the use of almost; and the boundary relevant to approximation is the terminal one; e.g., in We have almost a team here; in which the quantifying expression
may be diagrammatically represented as Figure 4.
Noun phrases with adjectival quantification can be similiarly represented, some
gradable adjectives (e.g., almost bald—see (3)), as well as one reading of accomplishment predicates (the other is plotted as in Figure 2), in which the boundary to
which the adverb approximates is the terminal boundary of the object of accomplishment (e.g., the English Channel in Bill almost swam the English Channel).
(Again, the dotted boundary indicates a predicted, not an actual, demarcation.)
Almost may also occur with some uses of mass nouns, as in This soup is almost
water, where it is implied that too much water has been added in the making of it,
producing a substance which is partly water, partly soup. In such contexts, the mass
noun water has been construed as having an approach point, in which the entity
described by the mass noun is seen to partially overlap into the entity described by
another mass term, soup, and is not discontinuous with it. This situation may be
schematised, as in Figure 1, in which the approach marker almost may be used to
indicate the direction in which the composition of the soup is heading, but the
interconnected entities
Figure 4.
almost, and counterfactual implicatures
229
approach phase and the resulting state are not totally discrete, since some of the
resulting state may be construed as already present in the approach phase. The same
situation can also be seen with some cases of non-gradable adjectives; e.g., almost
crazy, where almost crazy is considered as partially overlapping with the absolute
state, crazy, at the same time being a less representative instance of it. Such adjectives can also be diagrammed according to Figure 1.
Some entities cannot be schematised at all, such as a count noun referring to a
non-gradable, physical object (e.g., beagle, in Hitzeman’s 1992 example, Martha has
almost one beagle). Such nouns cannot be given any kind of interpretation with
almost unless they refer to created entities (e.g., almost a cake, which could be represented as in Figure 4). The reason why certain count nouns and bounded verbs
are not direct analogues where approximation is concerned is that time provides
the quantifiable scalarity necessary for the expression of an approach point with
bounded verbs, and if the count noun has no inherent grading, there is no equivalent scalarity progressing towards a spatial goal without invoking temporal measurement as well. If temporal progression cannot be conceptualised, the expression
is unacceptable.
The potential for the negative inferences to be cancelled then, appears to vary
according to the environment in which almost appears, and with stative verbs, mass
nouns, and other time-stable predicates, an approximate representation of their
state provides a valid instance of that state without total contradiction of the full
representation. The strength of the negative inferences associated with the use of
almost are therefore hypothesized to be a factor of their co-occurrence conditions,
varying according to the presence of conceived boundaries in the predicates over
which they have scope. In order to test this hypothesis, a brief survey was conducted, investigating the extent of such variation perceived by individual speakers.
3. Testing the co-occurrence conditions. The survey consisted of a small
number of sentences which were constructed on the basis of the points discussed
above, and in which the variables were bounded and unbounded predicates.
Unbounded predicates included a quantified noun phrase (sentence 1), a gradable
adjective (sentence 2), and a lexically and grammatically imperfective verb (sentence 3). Bounded predicates included a physical object count noun (sentence 4), a
past achievement verb (sentence 5), and a past accomplishment verb (sentence 6),
both of the last two being grammatically and lexically perfective verb types. The
respondents were presented with a group of sentences of the form almost P, in fact
P, and asked to list those they thought were contradictory.⁴ The number of example sentences was kept to a minimum to avoid the problems of weakening of judgement due to repetitiveness of the task. It was hypothesised that the first three
sentences (1–3), in which the item quantified by almost was felt to be conceptually
unbounded and internally-scaled would invoke weaker implicatures (which would
be more easily defeasible) than the last three (4–6). If this were the case, the sense
230
Debra Ziegeler
Sentence
No./20
%
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
11
10
12
19
15
18
55
50
60
95
75
90
Table 1. Distribution of the assessment of contradictory sentences. (The number
of respondents listing all sentences as contradictory was 9 out of 20, or 45%.)
of contradiction in sentences 1–3 would be predicted to be less obvious to the
respondents than for sentences 4–6. The survey and results are summarized below.
(6)
The Survey Sentences
1. Almost all, in fact, all of the wheat crop was saved.
2. Sam is almost bald, in fact he is bald.
3. When I saw Sue she was almost running, in fact she was running.
4. The animal in the cellar was almost a mouse, indeed it was a mouse.
5. John almost fell off the bridge, in fact, he did fall.
6. The dog almost crossed the road, in fact, it crossed the road.
The results are listed in Table 1.
The limited data clearly suggests that opinions vary as to whether or not a sentence with co-occurring almost P and P are contradictory, and that there is a general tendency for externally, temporally-scaled, bounded perfective verbs (sentences
5–6) to have higher evaluations of contradiction (75–90%) than internally-scaled
count nouns, imperfective processes, or stative qualities (50–60% for sentences
1–3). (Sentence 4 showed neither internal scaling nor external, temporal scaling,
and thus scored the highest.) The differences in the evaluations of contradiction
indicate that an entailment reading of almost is not always present, suggesting
instead the presence of counterfactual implicatures varying in strength according to
environment and speaker intuitions. Given that temporally-bounded situations are
more likely to be listed as contradictory according to the survey, it may be hypothesised that implicature strength increases in such environments; i.e. those of more
specific conceptual distinction. The implications of such results are discussed in
section 4.
4. Determining implicature strength. Lewis (1973:69) claimed that a counterfactual could not be asserted without a factual premise to back it. Thus, in past contexts, the counterfactuality of an expression is dependent on the speaker’s
almost, and counterfactual implicatures
231
awareness of certain known facts to the contrary, otherwise, the meaning is considered merely hypothetical. A counterfactual implicature, therefore, is an inverse construal derived from accessible factual evidence.
The expression of a bounded, past perfective event is taken as having terminated
and is therefore unalterable in the subjective viewpoint of the speaker. As a result,
it becomes more highly factualized, and when co-occurring with proximatives,
licenses stronger implicatures than a time-stable, stative verb phrase, to the point at
which the implicature is interpreted as either conventionalized or an entailment.
When almost, then, is used to quantify time-stable entities such as quantifiable
nouns and stative verbs, it is more easily defeasible. When used to quantify realized
past perfective events, it is not so defeasible since the realisation of a perfective
event profiles the termination of the event, and almost P, which indicates the
approach stage of an event, cannot be conceived as co-occurring simultaneously
with the termination of the event P in the short time period in which such punctual events take place. The termination of the event, in turn, indicates a greater
potential for factual recall by the speaker, since it has already passed at the moment
of speaking. The enforcement of the implicature, then, depends only on the potential for the speaker to utter a statement about which true facts are known. As this
potential increases, so the likelihood of defeasibility decreases.
The likelihood of the occurrence of an implicature in past contexts is therefore
minimal, since we normally have facts about the past, and we do not need to derive
pragmatic inferences for further information. An implicature, then, is simply not
anticipated in relation to past contexts, or in similar information-rich situations.
This situation can be summarized in the form of a single principle, which will be
labelled in the present study the Counterfactual Implicature (ci-) Principle:
(7)
The ci-Principle:
‘The strength of an implicature is inversely proportional to the probability of its occurrence.’
In linguistic terms, this means that by increasing the information density of an
utterance, an implicature will not be likely to form; therefore, in a situation in
which the specificity and/or factuality of an utterance is expected to be greater, such
as in past perfective contexts, an implicature will be improbable. However, the
strongest counterfactual implicatures, such as are derived from predicates with
almost, apply to past, perfective contexts, so when in an improbable context a counterfactual implicature does occur, it will be much more powerful than in a more
probable context; in this way the pragmatic function is best preserved.
Environments with negation or with a first person subject were found in
Ziegeler (1994 and 1996) also to produce the strongest implicatures of counterfactuality relating to conditionals and hypothetical complements, negation because of
its marked nature, implying a relevant, corresponding positive expression (see
232
Debra Ziegeler
Horn 1989), and first person subjects as they are identical with the speaker and
imply the highest level of evidential support for an utterance. Sadock (1981:265)
observed that the cancellation of implicatures such as some X by in fact, all X, could
not be so easily transferred to instances in which the expressed quantity was more
specific: ?A fraction of, and possibly all, poodles have spots. In such cases, the difficulty
is due to the increased information density which lends the utterance a higher factual evaluation by the hearer. Givón (1994:310) questions the common appearance
in subjunctive clauses of past and perfect forms, essentially realis morphology. The
reason is that past and perfect forms express factually more specific concepts which
are more amenable to abstraction by counterfactuality. The licensing conditions for
a counterfactual implicature are therefore not the actual provision of factual information, but the hearer’s assessment of the potential for one given situation to provide more explicit and more detailed information than another.
5. Conclusions. The present paper analyses the meaning of almost in terms of a
strong conversational implicature (as suggested in Sadock 1981) of counterfactuality, and argues against the claims by Hitzeman (1992) and others that the proximative adverb is an entailment. Evidence for the implicature analysis comes from:
(i) the fact that a negative entailment from almost would suggest a prediction,
which is an expression of only possible truth, not actual truth, and which, furthermore, is derived by means of q2 implicatures; (ii) the evidence of proximatives in
other languages in which the meaning is grammaticalized via pragmatic implicatures from the same crosslinguistic sources as derive predictive meanings; and (iii)
the variation with which contradictions are assessed by native speakers when almost
is used in different grammatical environments. The negative inferences associated
with almost can be seen to be non-defeasible in many instances, but can be more
easily cancelled when quantifying unbounded, internally-gradable entities and
states. The phenomenon of increasing and decreasing implicature strength is a factor of the potentiality provided by the context for generating an implicature, and
this is summarised in the ci-Principle. The effects of the Principle are clearly seen
in the behaviour of almost in different contexts, as shown in the data from a small
survey.
While the Principle has been shown to be most effectively applied to counterfactual situations in the use of almost, it is not to suggest that it may be limited in
the extent of its application to such contexts. The obvious next task is to test the
Principle in other counterfactual domains such as conditionals and complement
clauses. Further investigations may also look to finding more precise and principled
means of predicting pragmatic inferences generally. Such tasks present a challenge
for future endeavours in the field.
almost, and counterfactual implicatures
233
¹ The definition of counterfactuality is to be understood here as determined only by
speaker knowledge: a counterfactual utterance can be made only in cases where the
speaker has full knowledge of facts contrary to the hypothesised proposition; in all
other cases the meaning is merely hypothetical.
² Such scales are termed ‘Horn-scales’ by Atlas and Levinson (1981).
³ Heine notes that in these examples the function of the prefix k- is unclear.
⁴ The form almost P, in fact P could be understood by the reader as a self-correction of
an utterance. However, this form has been used because it also serves typically to cancel implicatures in scalar expressions, e.g., John ate some, in fact all of the cake.
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