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DETERMINING THE DATA NEEDED TO TEST THE FEASIBILITY OF A QUOTA SYSTEM FOR INDONESIAN CORAL REEF FISHERIES By PUTUH SUADELA Source: http://awsassets.wwf.or.id/img/original/img_2410_wwf_indonesia_1.jpg A MAJOR PAPER SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AND MANAGEMENT UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND May 20, 2016 MAJOR PAPER ADVISOR: DAVID A. BENGTSON, Ph.D MESM TRACK: SUSTAINABLE SYSTEMS LIST OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................................. 4 1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................... 5 2 METHODS .......................................................................................................................................... 9 3 CORAL REEF FISHERIES IN INDONESIA ................................................................................. 9 4 COMPONENTS IN ECOSYSTEM MODELS FOR QUOTA SYSTEM FEASIBILITY ......... 10 4.1 Ecological ................................................................................................................................... 10 4.1.1 Habitat ................................................................................................................................. 10 4.1.2 Multispecies ........................................................................................................................ 11 4.1.3 Biological reference points ................................................................................................. 11 4.1.4 Targeting ............................................................................................................................. 11 4.1.5 Discards............................................................................................................................... 12 4.2 Social........................................................................................................................................... 13 4.2.1 Fishery-dependent ............................................................................................................... 13 4.2.2 Equity .................................................................................................................................. 13 4.2.3 Education ............................................................................................................................ 13 4.3 Economics ................................................................................................................................... 14 4.3.1 Overcapitalization ............................................................................................................... 14 4.3.2 Fishery value ....................................................................................................................... 14 4.3.3 Market ................................................................................................................................. 14 4.4 Governance ................................................................................................................................. 14 4.4.1 Spatial ................................................................................................................................. 14 4.4.2 Quota allocation .................................................................................................................. 15 4.4.3 Transferability ..................................................................................................................... 16 4.4.4 Species aggregation............................................................................................................. 16 4.4.5 Catch balancing ................................................................................................................... 17 4.4.6 Implementation ................................................................................................................... 17 4.4.7 Monitoring and enforcement ............................................................................................... 18 4.5 Politics......................................................................................................................................... 18 4.5.1 Urgency ............................................................................................................................... 18 4.5.2 Transparency ....................................................................................................................... 19 5 ECOSYSTEM MODELING OF A QUOTA SYSTEM IN CORAL REEF FISHERIES .......... 19 6 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................. 25 2 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ........................................................................................................................ 25 REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................................... 26 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. Ecological subsystem of a quota system in coral reef fisheries ................................................... 20 Figure 2. Social subsystem of a quota system in coral reef fisheries .......................................................... 20 Figure 3. Economics subsystem of a quota system in coral reef fisheries .................................................. 21 Figure 4. Governance subsystem of a quota system in coral reef fisheries ................................................ 22 Figure 5. Political subsystem of a quota system in coral reef fisheries ...................................................... 22 Figure 6. Ecosystem modeling diagram of a quota system in coral reef fisheries ...................................... 24 LIST OF APPENDICES Appendix 1. Volume of marine capture fisheries production by species, 2004 – 2014 (tons) ................... 33 Appendix 2. Value of marine capture fisheries production by species, 2004 – 2014 (billions of rupiah ) . 34 3 ABSTRACT Indonesia’s fisheries are managed by traditional fishery management strategies such as license limitation, fishing vessel limitation, gear type and size limitation, etc. which still allow the fishermen to race for fish. The Indonesian Government established a Strategy Plan for the years 2015 - 2019 where one of the strategies is to maintain fishery resources sustainability by developing a quota management system. The feasibility of a quota system for coral reef fisheries by the Indonesian Government needs to be analyzed by first determining and defining the variables involved in a quota system and how they interact with one another. One way to investigate this is to build an ecosystem model. Here I develop a qualitative ecosystem model to obtain insights and determine the variables needed for future quantitative analyses. A literature review on quota management systems for many aspects was conducted to gain insight from other countries in developing and implementing quota management systems, especially in multi-species fisheries, which is the characteristic of Indonesian coral reef fisheries. Variables or components to build an ecosystem model are determined, defined and grouped into five subsystems: ecological, social, economics, governance, and politics. This ecosystem model is useful for managers and decision makers by laying out the system interactions and feedbacks, thus leading to a better understanding of dynamics associated with a potential quota system. Additionally, the resulting model can serve to as a starting point for quantitative analysis that investigates the feasibility of a quota system for coral reef fisheries in Indonesia. 4 1 INTRODUCTION Indonesia’s fisheries are managed by traditional fishery management strategies such as license limitation, fishing vessel limitation, gear type and size limitation, etc. These strategies still allow the fishermen to race for fish, and by not controlling the number of fish that can be caught, the sustainability in many fisheries is threatened. Therefore, the Indonesian Government established a Strategy Plan for the years 2015 - 2019 through Ministerial Decree No. 25 in 2015, where one of the strategies is to maintain fishery resources sustainability by developing a quota management system (MMAF 2015). To carry out the strategy, the Government should understand what requirements are needed for a fishery to be regulated by a quota system. Since the 1970s, fishing quota or catch share management systems have been introduced in several countries (Walters and Pearse 1996). New Zealand was the first country that developed a Quota Management System (QMS) in the form of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ) in 1986, which allocates the catch quota of commercial species (Sanchirico et al. 2006, Lock and Leslie 2007). The Individual Vessel Quota (IVQ) system for the groundfish trawl fishery was implemented in Canada in 1997 after the fishery was closed in 1995 due to Total Allowable Catch (TAC) overages, discards, and stock management concerns (Sanchirico et al. 2006). In the US, the first catch share program was implemented in 1990 in the Mid-Atlantic Surf Clam and Ocean Quahog fishery, and now 15 catch share programs have been implemented around the country (NOAA 2015). According to Brinson and Thunberg (2013), catch share programs are a fishery management tool that dedicates a secure share of quota allowing individual fishermen, fishing cooperatives, fishing communities, or other entities to harvest a fixed amount of fish. Catch shares are allocated privileges to land a portion of the total allowable catch (TAC) in the form of quota shares. ITQ programs are a form of catch shares program where the shares are transferrable; shareholders have the freedom to buy, sell, and lease quota shares (Garrity 2011). A quota management system can be used to ensure sustainable utilization of fisheries resources by controlling harvest levels directly (Lock and Leslie 2007), however, regulators need to resolve several issues to ensure sustainable utilization. These include the spatial scale where species are managed, the process for setting sustainable harvest levels, the allocation of catch among the different fishing sectors, and the definition of quota. A quota management system is considered as the cornerstone of all the conservation measures to maintain fish stock and conserve the resources (Karagiannakos 1996) and also to make the fisheries more profitable and to halt over-capitalization (Little et al. 2009). 5 Individual quotas (IQs), particularly individual transferable quotas (ITQs), have attracted considerable attention from both the scientific community and fisheries management agencies since the 1970s (Arnason 1990). ITQs are widely recognized to prevent the ‘race for fish’ and, when transferable, are believed to increase the economic efficiency of fishing activities (Grafton and McIlgorm 2009, Marchal et al. 2011). Several countries have implemented a quota system in their fisheries managements. Some countries obtained positive results in their fisheries performance after going through several improvements (e.g., the multispecies fisheries in New Zealand, halibut fishery in British Columbia, Canada, the offshore scallop fishery in Nova Scotia, Canada, the surf clam and ocean quahog fisheries in eastern U.S., the sablefish fishery in Alaska, U.S., and the rock lobster fishery in Tasmania, Australia). However, in other countries the decline in fish stocks still occurred after ITQ implementation (e.g., the multispecies fishery in Nova Scotia, Canada, the northern abalone fishery in British Columbia, Canada, and the squat lobster fishery in Chile (Branch 2009)). ITQs represent a dominant form of fisheries management in countries such as Australia, Canada, Chile, Iceland, The Netherlands, and New Zealand. In the European Union (EU), the common fisheries management framework builds mainly on biological measures and only to a limited extent on access regulation measures (Marchal et al. 2011). At the level of EU Member States, quota allocation procedures are usually not explicit, except in the Netherlands and Denmark, where ITQs are implemented formally (Marchal et al. 2009, Marchal et al. 2011) In 1986, New Zealand introduced a QMS based on ITQ rights operating within an administered TAC. The TAC covers all mortality to a fish stock caused by human activity, including the annual total allowable commercial catch and total allowable non-commercial catch which are customary (e.g. allocated for customary fishing rights of the Maori) and recreational fishing (Batstone and Sharp 2003, Lock and Leslie 2007). Before allocating catch levels between fishing sectors, the allowance of the customary catch was first identified, and the remainder of the TAC can then be allocated to the commercial and recreational fishing sector (Lock and Leslie 2007). The QMS relies on biological models to provide estimates of maximum sustainable yield (MSY), and current and projected stock biomass (B) levels. In the stock assessment consultative process, several data need to be provided such as records of annual landings, estimates of catch per unit effort (for some fisheries) and, in sports fisheries, estimates of recreational harvest. The consultative process involves biologists, fisheries managers, and other stakeholders, who consider available data and information to provide an estimation of biomass at maximum sustainable yield (BMSY) and recommendation on the 6 appropriate level of TAC. Management of stock levels toward BMSY should be adjusted by social and economic considerations (Batstone and Sharp 2003). Implementation of ITQ can reduce TAC overruns (catch > TAC) when it is enforced properly. In the groundfish fisheries in British Columbia, ITQ implementation reduced the frequency of TAC overruns (Branch 2009). Similar results were shown in New Zealand after ITQ implementation (Branch 2009). Reduced TAC could also be supported or even proposed by quota holders when they are interested in raising stock size and catch per-unit-effort (CPUE), as happened for New Zealand Paua (abalone) fishery where 10% reduction of TAC was requested (Branch 2009). For coral reef fisheries, implementation of ITQ has been applied in several locations. For example, ITQ has been implemented on the Coral Reef Fin Fish Fishery (CRFFF) in the Great Barrier Reef, Australia since 2004, with ITQ’s allocated separately for coral trout, red throat emperor and ‘other reef fish species’ important to the commercial sector (Mapstone et al. 2008, Little et al. 2009). According to Mapstone et al. (2008), introduction of the quota management in the Great Barrier Reef resulted in a progressive decline of fishing efforts between 2004 and 2006 from 70% to 55% of that in 1996; meanwhile, commercial harvest declined to 70% of that in 1998 and CPUE increased 20% compared to that in mid-1998. Potential ecological problems such as discarding can be a problem in multispecies ITQs fisheries. A comparison study of the Australian southeast trawl fishery with the British Columbia groundfish trawl fishery reveals one possible solution (Branch 2009). Based on the study, discards in the Australia fishery are not monitored and are high, whereas in the British Columbia fishery, discards are deducted from quotas and every vessel carries an on-board observer, and discards have decreased. According to Branch (2009), incentives management under ITQs theoretically should cause fishers to avoid any damaging practices to protect resources they have an interest in and to avoid poor publicity which could affect market prices. Several options can also be considered to manage associated and dependent habitats and species in combination with an ITQ regime on target species (Gibbs and Thebaud 2012). Those options include establishing TACs and quotas for a range of associated and dependent habitats and species, integrating associated and dependent species into the TACs of target species, applying incentive-based measures other than catch shares, complementing input control into ITQ regime, and ITQ scheme with spatial fishing rights. However, these options are potentially costly to implement and manage and would need to be responsive to ongoing scientific research. 7 In determining the quota management system criteria, a conceptual study by Arnason (1990) using basic fisheries modeling was conducted to generate equations containing the minimum information management scheme for an Individual Transferable Share Quota System (ITSQ). The study suggested that a fisheries management system has to satisfy a number of social and economic requirements, and among other things, it must be cost-effective. Batstone and Sharp (2003) applied the above model in New Zealand and found evidence that supports the use of quota prices to guide the setting of limits to commercial harvest of X species. The result of the study also suggested that the information gathered in a quota process could complement the findings of stock assessment research in fisheries management. A further conceptual study using a simple aggregative model of ecological fisheries attempted to seek ways (institutional arrangements, management methods, etc.) to achieve a more efficient utilization of marine ecosystems (Arnason 1998). Based on the study, a multispecies variant of the individual transferable share quota system (ITSQ) seems to offer an alternative to the traditional approaches in fisheries management using ITQs by manipulating the vector of total quotas (TAC) to the point where aggregate quota are maximized. From a biological perspective, Walters and Pearse (1996) examined the importance of stock assessment in quota management systems to set allowable annual catches (Walters and Pearse 1996). They examined in detail the stock assessment problem and the objective to reduce uncertainty. Key points from that study are that under individual quota management systems, accurate and timely stock assessment is needed and there is a potential role of fishers, by taking advantage of the incentives of quota holders, to contribute to gathering the information to improve stock assessment. Regarding environmental issues, some studies point out the impact of the quota management system on the marine ecosystem. Fisheries management in European waters is gradually moving from a singlespecies perspective towards a more holistic ecosystem approach to fisheries management (EAFM), and Reiss et al. (2010) concluded that the relationship between TACs and effort is insufficient for TACs to be used as the principal management tool within an EAFM (Reiss et al. 2010). Transferable Quotas have largely positive effects on target species, but mixed or unknown effects on non-target fisheries and the overall ecosystem (Branch 2009). A study of multi-species individual fishery quotas using an agent-based approach was conducted by modelling the effect of an ITQ system on a multi-species and multi-sector fishery and applying the model to a CRFFF in Queensland – Australia (Little et al. 2009). The model simulates the use of tradeable quota units by operators in the fishery and considers several components such as initial quota allocation to operators, seasonal fish prices and individual operator variable cost, fishing efficiency and experience, 8 and constraints on vessel movement. The model predicted some effects that the ITQ system can have on reductions of effort, increases in profit, and changes over time in quota prices. However, ecological impact also emerges by implementing an ITQ system in a multi-species fishery where increased discards of the less profitable species could affect community-level biomass. The first step to determine the feasibility of a quota system for coral reef fisheries by the Indonesian Government is to determine and define the variables needed to build an ecosystem model. A qualitative analysis can be used as a method to obtain insight and determine the variables needed for future quantitative analyses. Designing a pilot scale investigative study of a quota system in coral reef fisheries is expected to illustrate the data needs for quota management system implementation for Indonesian coral reefs. 2 METHODS The process in developing this major paper was to review literature on quota management systems for many aspects and countries. The purpose was to gain insight from other countries’ experiences in developing and implementing quota management systems, especially in multi-species fisheries, which is characteristic of Indonesian coral reef fisheries. Based on this literature review, variables or components to build an ecosystem model are determined and defined; these can then be considered for use in a quota system for Indonesian coral reef fisheries. Components are grouped into five subsystems: ecological, social, economics, governance, and politics. 3 CORAL REEF FISHERIES IN INDONESIA Reef fish spend their lives in a coral reef region from their juvenile stage until adult (Sale 1991). Reef fish consist of six trophic groups: herbivores, omnivores, plankton feeders, crustacean and fish feeders, piscivores, and others (McConnell and Lowe-McConnell 1987). Reef fish are one of the largest fisheries resources in Indonesia in terms of catch and economic value. According to Allen and Adrim (2003), Indonesia has 2057 reef fish species from 113 families with 10 major families: Gobiidae (mudskippers, 272 species), Labridae (wrasses,178 species), Pomacentridae (anemone fish, 152 species), Apogonidae (cardinal fish, 114 species), Blenniidae (blennies, 107 species), Serranidae (groupers, 102 species), Muraenidae (eels, 61 species), Syngnathidae (pipefish, 61species), Chaetodontidae (butterflyfish, 59 species), and Lutjanidae (snappers, 43 species). Reef fish provide important ecological value for the coral reef ecosystem and also economic value for fishermen in Indonesia. Demand for reef fish is increasing, leading to increased fishing efforts. According to DGCF (2015), reef fish catch increased 9.64% in 2014 (231,955 ton) from 2013 (211,570 ton), while 9 the value also increased 25.5% to IDR 6.15 trillion in 2014 from IDR 4.90 trillion in 2013. The highest fishery production in 2014 was Redbelly yellowtail fusilier (ekor kuning) with 81.563 tons followed by Blue-lined seabass (kerapu karang) with 50.516 tons (Appendix 1). However, the highest value fish was Blue-lined seabass with a value of IDR 1.54 trillion followed by Leopard coral grouper with IDR 1.53 trillion (Appendix 2). Coral reef fisheries are overexploited by small-scale fishers as a consequence of high demand of reef fish, low operational fishing cost, availability of employment and destructive fishing methods (Arami 2006). Fishing gear that are mostly used to catch reef fish are traps, bottom long line, hand line, gillnet, and setnet. Several problems for reef fisheries in Indonesia are stock depletion, illegal or destructive fishing activities, and coral reef habitat degradation. Other problems are fishermen’s poverty, fisheries production and export collection data, bycatch of protected and endangered species, horizontal conflict among fishermen, law enforcement, management institutions and regulations, and illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing activities by foreign vessels. 4 COMPONENTS IN ECOSYSTEM MODELS FOR QUOTA SYSTEM FEASIBILITY Fisheries are complex systems consisting of the integration of human (including social, economic, and political components) and ecological subsystems. In developing a quota system, we should consider a broad ecosystem-based fisheries management approach to meet three objectives of fisheries management: ecological, economic and social sustainability (Sumaila 2010). The system should consider not only improved economic efficiency and equity but also maintenance of fisheries resources and ecosystem sustainability. Governance forms the principles and objectives in such fishery management system, develops the policy and regulatory framework, and connects government with fishery societies (FAO). Based on those objectives, components in a quota system are grouped into five subsystems: ecological social, economics, governance, and politics. 4.1 4.1.1 Ecological Habitat Coral reef ecosystems are one of the important ecosystems in coastal fisheries with a high biodiversity of associated species, various trophic levels, and ecology function (e.g. feeding ground, nursery ground, and spawning ground) for associated species including reef fish (Arami 2006). Reef fish have complex cycles consisting of several distinct life-history stages (egg, larvae, juvenile, and adult) which may require spatially separated habitats. A prerequisite for population persistence is suitable abiotic conditions, food availability, and shelter to escape from predation or disease, as well as connectivity among habitats to 10 allow the survivors to mature and return to the spawning grounds to reproduce successfully (Rijnsdorp et al. 2009). 4.1.2 Multispecies Quota systems (setting the TAC on the target species) have ecological consequences, especially in multispecies fisheries, by their effects on the incidental catches of other species through high-grading, particularly when discard mortality is high (Little et al. 2009). Specifically, the problem occurs in multispecies fisheries where fishers may have sufficient quota for one species but not for another, which can occur when either the ratio of species TACs, based on biological productivity, or individual quota holdings, do not match the ratio of species’ catch rates (Little et al. 2009). 4.1.3 Biological reference points Determining the total allowable catch (TAC) is important in a quota system. A quota system is a mechanism for dividing up the TAC, thus if the TAC is set at unsustainable levels, the fishery is likely to collapse regardless of the method of allocating the TAC (Branch 2009). Setting the TAC relies on biological models in stock assessments to provide estimation of biological reference points. Biological reference points are widely used to define safe levels of harvesting for marine fish populations such as minimum acceptable biomass levels or maximum fishing mortality rates and each is defined based on the level of some criterion (e.g., yield per recruit, MSY, etc.) (Collie and Gislason 2001). The values of biological reference points are determined through biological models which incorporate the principle of population dynamics of the target species including vital life history characteristics (such as growth, reproduction and mortality) and historical abundance data (Collie and Gislason 2001, Little et al. 2009). In a quota system for multispecies fisheries, ratios of TAC between one species and other species should also be considered when they are caught by the same fishing gear. The TAC of one species can affect catch rates, harvest level and the amount of discards of other species (Little et al. 2009). A harvest level that is optimal for one species might be too high or too low of other species in a mix of species. When the TAC of a certain species has been fulfilled, fishermen could continue to catch other species and discard the species that no longer has available TAC, however, this could cause discarding issues. 4.1.4 Targeting The ability to target specific species in multispecies fisheries such as coral reef fisheries is needed in designing a quota system. Targeting ability depends on: the number of species and the relatively distinct stock by area or depth; the selectivity of fishing gear; level of vessel electronic technology for discrimination of fish species and fish stocks; harvesting strategy (whether there are different strategies for different species or one strategy for all species); and period of harvesting that could affect the ability 11 of fishermen to control catch rates and species composition, where short period could result in less ability to control than long period as fishermen can modify fishing gear or fishing ground to improve their targeting ability over longer times (Squires et al. 1998). Also, understanding fishing dynamics is important in designing a quota system in coral reef fisheries. Information on the movement, reef selection processes, and fishing activities of individual vessels are needed and further simulation can predict how the fishing effort will respond dynamically to changes of management measures such as a quota restriction (Little et al. 2008, Little et al. 2009). 4.1.5 Discards Discarding may result in high-grading where fishermen discard lower-value fish (i.e. fish with lower quality), or by reaching the TAC of one species, but not other species. This can result in unfavorable impacts on fish stocks. In multispecies fisheries, quota systems may increase discarding when a) at-sea enforcement is minimal, b) it is difficult or expensive to lease quota to cover overages, c) discarding is allowed, d) discarding does not count against quota, e) high market demand and value on certain or targeted fish, and f) quota lease prices are high (Branch 2009). Discarding incidence under a quota system implementation in multispecies fisheries can be reduced through a) increasing enforcement, b) assigning observer on board to enhance the monitoring system and data collection of discarded fish, c) fishing industry agreement on adjusting their catch mix and methods of operation, d) severe penalties, e) assigning individual bycatch quota along with individual targeted species quota where when the individual bycatch quota is reached, the target species quota will be closed, f) discard being deducted from quota holdings, and g) flexibility of fishers’ to alter their fishing behavior (Diamond 2004, Branch 2009). There are other ways to reduce discarding in a quota system while still being able to remain profitable, one of which is enabling quota leasing to cover the overage and allowing catches to be landed legally (Sanchirico et al. 2006, Branch 2009). Allowing the quota to be shifted to or borrowed from the following year with a penalty of over-quota can also be an alternative way to reduce discarding, however this mechanism can increase the risk of overfishing due to exceeding TAC (Sanchirico et al. 2006, Branch 2009). Another mechanism is by allowing quota trading among fisheries and gear types where instead of discarding their bycatch, they could purchase quota from each other when their bycatch is the others fisheries target catch (Fujita and Bonzon 2005, Branch 2009). 12 4.2 4.2.1 Social Fishery-dependent A quota system has potential consequences on fishery-dependent families and communities which depend on the design of the quota system, the prevailing kinship, inheritance and taxation systems, and other factors (McCay 1995). A family-based fishery may be particularly vulnerable when not all family members were able to finance acquiring a sufficient amount of fishing rights. This could shift the sociocultural dynamics and cause the potential loss of fishing right. Social impact analysis is an approach to determine possible consequences of a quota system on a fishing dependent community. In doing so, it requires identification of community participants who depend upon the fisheries in that area, identification of the amount of dependency on the fishery, identifying other employment opportunities that exist within the community in case they have to switch to other fisheries or occupations outside the fishing sector due to the implementation of a quota system. Data can be obtained from commercial landings data, demographic information, and social structure and dynamics based on census data to examine community structure and potential impact of a quota system implementation. 4.2.2 Equity Equity is an important issue in a quota system. A quota system may increase social inequity in fishing communities, where quotas are concentrated in large fishing companies that are more economically efficient than small-scale fishermen. The claim of fishing rights or the right to earn revenue from fisheries by native people should also be considered in a quota system. Therefore, limitation on the amount of quota that can be held by each quota holder should be enforced to mitigate social problems. Alternatively, quota can be allocated to communities in the form of community transferable quotas (CTQs) or to residents of a territorial area as territorial user rights in fisheries (TURFs) quota systems (Sumaila 2010), allowing them to lease out their fishing rights in exchange for revenues (McCay 1995). 4.2.3 Education A management system can be applied successfully if related stakeholders can best participate in the design and implementation. Providing sufficient information and training to stakeholders is needed to raise awareness and increase understanding about the benefits and cost of the system implementation for their long-term economic return and livelihood (NOAA). Stakeholders include fishermen (small and large scale), market dealers, and other related participants in quota systems. 13 4.3 4.3.1 Economics Overcapitalization Overcapitalization or investment that cannot readily be turned to other uses is the major reason economists offer for supporting a quota system (McCay 1995). Input control in fisheries management such as a limited-entry system provides incentives for over-investment. Declining profit can tend to happen when entry and effort are not strictly limited. 4.3.2 Fishery value Understanding the economic and technological structure of the harvesting process is crucial to designing and implementing an effective quota system for multispecies fisheries. Information on the technical interaction among the different species harvested and economic input is needed by knowing whether the stocks of all species are harvested jointly or separately using all economic inputs such as the vessel, labor, gear, equipment and fuel (Squires et al. 1998). Profitability calculation of individual vessels is also needed by using the vessel cost structure, the expected catch rates of the various species, and the fish price for which the operators can sell their product (Little et al. 2009). Cost data are needed to know the distribution of the average cost per vessel per day of fishing whether for live or dead target fish by sampling individual vessels to identify vessel cost structure (Little et al. 2009). 4.3.3 Market The ability of the market to absorb landed fish year-round with a negotiable price for fishermen is important in a quota system. By having a sufficient quota and dependable market, fishermen are able to sell their catch year-round based on their quota, rather than catch as many as possible in a short period of time. Thus, implementation of a quota system is expected to affect market conditions by eliminating seasonal abundance of fish product, ensuring a steadier supply of fresh fish, improving product quality, and lowering fishing operation costs due to fishing trip length and input selection efficiency. 4.4 4.4.1 Governance Spatial A fish species can consist of numerous geographically isolated and biologically distinct populations, so that managing separate fish stocks independently instead of nationally in a quota system might be the optimal method to ensure the sustainability of the stock (Lock and Leslie 2007). Managing fish stocks in smaller areas will more likely control the population size within a level that may sustain the Maximum Sustainable Yield (Batstone and Sharp 1999). However, managing multiple fish stocks could increase the costs of monitoring, enforcement and quota trading (Lock and Leslie 2007). 14 Collecting data for spatial distribution of catch and effort can be derived from logbook data of catch records and coordinates where fishes were caught. The data should be from different fishing sectors, small-scale and larger industry. The spatial distribution data could capture the major patterns of fishing activity in coral reefs locally or regionally depending on the scope of quota system implementation. 4.4.2 Quota allocation Determining quota allocation is crucial in designing a quota system. The way the quota is allocated, traded and regulated influence how the quota market and the fishery will work. In developing a quota system, the management authority must determine initial allocation (to whom, how much), the nature of the right (exclusivity, quality of life, duration), ownership limits (minimum or maximum quantities, nationality of owners) and limits over transfers (divisibility, restrictions on sale, leasing options) (Lock and Leslie 2007). Allocating quota varies between countries and can be characterized based on ownership when associated: to a fisherman is called Individual Fishing Quota (IFQ); to a vessel is called Individual Vessel Quota (IVQ); to a community is called Community fishing quota; to an organization (producer) is called ring-fenced quota (van Hoof et al. 2007). Identifying a quota allocation mechanism that is acceptable for a certain fishery is necessary to achieve the success of a quota system, so that the implementation of the system will be supported by the industry or fish processor. The commitment of fishers to the implementation of a quota system may be maintained as they are supported by the processing industry that they depend on for buying their catch. Therefore, commitment of both the fishers and the processing industry should be considered in allocating the quota to fishers. Deciding to whom the quota will allocated among the fishers is a key point in developing a quota system. Fishers characteristics should be identified, i.e., whether they are full-time fishers, part-time fishers, vessel owners, or people who are involved in the fishing industry but do not own vessels or boat. Based on this survey of characteristics, determine which fishers are eligible to receive quota. Rationalizing the fishing industry and reducing capacity can be achieved through the eligibility of quota requirement, but significant losses to the ineligible people who are removed from the fishery should then be mitigated. Methods for distributing the initial allocation for individual operators are auction, sale at fixed price, or given away for free (Copes 1986). Except for the case of auction, a determination would have to be made as how large a quota each operator would receive. The quota could be given to the operators by equal shares, or based on historical catch performance, or on fishing vessels and gear capacity, or number of crew, or various combinations of these and/or other criteria related to consideration of equity, rationality or practicability. 15 Amount of quota that can be held by operators or quota holders should be limited to mitigate the social problems of concentration of fishing power or monopoly. This is already a feature of many existing ITQ systems. In some fisheries, equity concerns may be alleviated by allocating ITQs to communities in the form of CTQs or to residents of a territorial area as TURF quota systems (Wingard 2000; Christy 1982). With such schemes in place, the economic efficiency benefits of ITQs may be captured while minimizing their negative social impacts (Sumaila 2010). 4.4.3 Transferability An individual quota is transferable when regulations allow the quota holders to sell, buy or lease their quota (Soliman 2014). Transferability of individual quotas fosters economic efficiency because more efficient fishers tend to harvest a greater share of the total allowable catch (TAC) and because it provides incentives for inefficient fishers to exit the fishery (Squires et al. 1998). The net benefits of quota transferability should be assessed in order to achieve biological, economic and social objectives of fisheries management. Some transferability limitations are “owner-on-board”, “use it or lose it” or “active fishing entities”. Allowing inter-sector transfer should also be taken into account to promote future access opportunities and contribute to conservation and management goals in reducing overcapacity and improving economic efficiency. 4.4.4 Species aggregation Most quota systems manage a single species, however, coral reef fisheries are usually multispecies. A quota system can be simplified if those species can be aggregated into a single TAC or quota as long as they are caught in the same ratio consistently. However, based on biological criteria, each species has substantial differences in terms of the age structure, recruitment and year class which make aggregation problematical in setting a quota (Squires et al. 1998). The Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council (Council) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) implemented Reef Fish Management Plans and established an individual fishing quota program for red snapper in 2006 (began in January 2007) and for grouper and tilefish in 2009 (began in January 2010) (Council and NOAA 2006, Council and NOAA 2008). For grouper and tilefish, they argued that by having a single grouper share will further complicate the future establishment of annual catch limits. Instead they preferred to establish species-specific shares for red grouper, gag, other shallow water grouper, deep water grouper and tilefish (Council and NOAA 2008). Under the arrangement, fishermen could harvest aggregate quota limits within each grouping and could potentially reduce the amount of discard. The Council would be allowed to adjust the harvest level within each grouping. This should benefit fishermen because overharvesting one species in a group would not lower 16 the whole grouper complex. Thus, this was considered to be the only alternative that could prevent overfishing while achieving optimum yield on a species-specific basis. 4.4.5 Catch balancing In a multispecies fishery, species are caught simultaneously whether they are being targeted or captured unintentionally. TACs in multispecies fisheries are typically set independently, with little or no consideration for relative catch rates and productivity, so catches are often out of balance with TACs (Holland and Herrera 2006). Catch balancing is considered in developing a quota system to address this issue. The mechanism of catch balancing is to allow fishers to deal with their excess catch of species over the quota or the unintentional catch of species without quota by allowing exchange of quota across, allowing fishers to carry back or carry forward quota between years, and allowing fishers to surrender or discard catch that they cannot match with quota (Holland and Herrera 2006, Sanchirico et al. 2006, Lock and Leslie 2007). However, it is difficult to predict the catch composition and fishers will not exactly catch the quota that they have. Therefore, this mechanism should be carefully designed in a quota system so that the fishers do not encourage overfishing and exceed TAC. Some approaches used for catch balancing were addressed by Sanchirico et al. (2006). The first approach allows market transactions, such as permanent and temporary transfer of quota. Retrospective balancing or trades after landings can be permitted to allow fishermen to cover overharvest of quota. Other approaches through non-trading mechanisms have been used, including rollover provisions such as carrying forward or back of quota, deemed value payment where fishers are charged a fee for each unit of catch they land that exceeds their quota, and/or permitting fishers to discard catch that cannot match their quota. However, the last option can result in discarding issues that weaken a quota system ecologically. Another approach is by permitting cross-species exchanges where quota of one species can be used to cover catches of another species at an arranged trading ration. 4.4.6 Implementation The success of implementation of a quota system depends on the ability of the authority institution to properly design and enforce the regulation, as well as society’s acceptance and compliance with the system. Design characteristics including the exclusivity, durability, transferability, security, flexibility, and divisibility of the rights or privileges will collectively determine the “desirability” or quality of the property right or privilege granted to program participants (Anonymous 2008). Conducting public consultation through workshops and other forms of discussion with the stakeholders potentially enhances the success of a quota system implementation. When quota holders are encouraged to undertake comanagement in the quota system, it might simplify the system’s implementation and achieve the fisheries 17 management objectives for sustainable fisheries. In addition, duration of the quota system implementation should be explicitly defined. 4.4.7 Monitoring and enforcement Since a quota system depends on the setting of TAC, support from stock assessment processes backed up by effective monitoring and enforcement are needed. Hence, effective monitoring and strict enforcement are critical to the success of a quota system. Unreported catches can result in difficulties of monitoring of quota catches and enforcement. The condition of multispecies fisheries and numerous participants in the quota system increase the challenge in monitoring and enforcement. Moreover, large numbers and geographical dispersion of landing sites and buyers of the quota catches increase the difficulties. Unreported catches could result in unreliable stock estimation and fishing effort control. Quota busting or not reporting of over-quota catch can also be a problem in a quota system. The chance of detection of quota busting is influenced by the number of vessels, market channels, and geographically widely dispersed activity where the larger magnitudes increase the difficulties of monitoring and enforcement (Copes 1986). Quota busting could happen when the stock is valuable, enforcement is difficult or poorly funded, fines are small, and dissatisfaction with the initial quota allocation leads to widespread cheating on quotas (Branch 2009). Implementing 100% observers on board should reduce unreported data in monitoring, but increases the cost of monitoring and enforcement. This would probably be effective for offshore fisheries which have fewer vessels and high economic return per trip, but not feasible for inshore fisheries such as coral reef fisheries with large numbers of vessels and low value of landing (Squires et al. 1998). A community quota system could be an alternative as community members have their objective to protect the interest of resources against no-compliant competitors. A logbook system could cover the information needed for quota reporting, such as the amount of catch of specific species and location, if fully implemented among quota holders. Also, reporting of illegal activities by the fishers (whistle blower) should be an alternative to be encouraged. ITQ fisheries often cost more to manage than equivalent input-controlled fisheries as they require a system of quota reconciliation and monitoring of fisher activities and the setting of a TAC (Grafton and McIlgorm 2009). 4.5 4.5.1 Politics Urgency All fishery managements must have a specific measurable goal and specific outcome for management. Not every fishery is suitable for a quota system; hence, the quota authority should consider the appropriateness of such a system and decide whether it can benefit the fishery or not. Characteristics of a 18 fishery where a quota system could be beneficial to be implemented are a) the fishery is overcapitalized, b) stocks are overfished and overfishing is occurring, c) significant bycatch, d) regional/institutional infrastructure exists, and e) stakeholders are receptive (NOAA). By adopting a principle of identifying specific, clear, biological, economic and social objectives and outcomes for their fishery, a quota system can be designed appropriately to controls and avoid unintended consequences. 4.5.2 Transparency Transparency is an important principle in a quota system, from assessing its suitability to a fishery, to designing, allocating, assigning transferability, and implementation until monitoring processes. Frequent consultation with fishermen and other related stakeholders promotes transparent public participation in constructing participation criteria in the system, analysis of trade-offs, and evaluation of the outcomes. This would provide transparent opportunity for stakeholders to assess the pros and cons of setting a quota system in a particular fishery to meet the goals and objectives of fisheries management plan. 5 ECOSYSTEM MODELING OF A QUOTA SYSTEM IN CORAL REEF FISHERIES Designing a pilot scale investigative study of a quota system in coral reef fisheries is expected to illustrate the data needs for quota management system implementation for Indonesian coral reefs. Variables or components to build an ecosystem model that are determined and defined can be used to determine the feasibility of a quota system for Indonesian coral reef fisheries. This qualitative analysis can be used as a method to obtain insight and determine the variables needed for future quantitative analyses. An ecosystem model is developed for the quota system model. A diagrammatic model provides visual representation of the quota system structure and function.. Five subsystems are determined: economics, social, ecological, governance, and politics. Each subsystem consists of several components that are connected each other to show the relationship and influences. Figures 1 - 5 represent causal loop diagrams that show the causal structure involved in a quota system. The arrows between components portray the direction of causal influences. There are two types of connections, “+” or “-“, to show how a dependent variable will be influenced (positively or negatively) or change (increase or decrease) based on the change in the independent variable. A positive link means a positive impact, so if the cause variable increases, then the effect variable also increases. A positive causal link will reinforce the initial causal influence. A negative link means a negative impact, so if the cause variable increases, then the effect variable will decrease. A negative causal link will balance the initial causal influence. 19 Figure 1. Ecological subsystem of a quota system in coral reef fisheries In Figure 1, the relationship between components in an ecological subsystem is shown. The most important variable in the subsystem is the biological reference points as it requires ecological information about the fish, habitat, and discards. The multispecies factor will add complexity to obtain biological reference points, as it has to consider the relationships among species, trophic structure and fish population dynamics. Habitat like coral reefs has multispecies of reef fish which tend to aggregate and are caught simultaneously, which could increase discarding. Fishers have influence in the ecological subsystem, by exploiting the fish and gaining benefit from them. They could cause overfishing, discards and habitat destruction. However, their ability to target species by using selective fishing gear and environmentally-friendly methods could mitigate discards and habitat degradation. Figure 2. Social subsystem of a quota system in coral reef fisheries 20 The social subsystem diagram in Figure 2, consists of two components, fishery dependence and equity. Fishery dependence arises from the dependence of fishers on the fish and also habitat in the ecological subsystem, which will be shown in the ecosystem model (Figure 6). The magnitude of fishery dependence will negatively influence the fishers’ social structure and performance. Equity factor is influenced negatively by fishery dependence and transferability of quota in governance subsystem (shown in Figure 6). Social equity problem is occurred when a regime affects the distribution of rights, power, opportunities and wealth, or how it affects the quality of life and the function of communities, household and family life cycles (McCay 1995). Education is also an important factor for the successfulness in designing and implementation of a quota system through raising awareness and understanding of stakeholders. Well support from stakeholders including fishermen can give beneficial feedback to fishermen’ economic return and livelihoods, also the sustainability of fish resources as one of the system’s objectives. Figure 3. Economics subsystem of a quota system in coral reef fisheries Three components in economics subsystem are displayed in Figure 3. Overcapitalization negatively influences fishers if their benefit from the fishing activity is below their capital or operational cost. Fishery value is influenced by catch rates, fish price in market and operational cost of fishing. The market (buyer) has the ability to control fish price, so most fishers (small-scale) do not have bargaining position to earn a profit 21 Figure 4. Governance subsystem of a quota system in coral reef fisheries Many components are incorporated in the governance subsystem referenced in Figure 4. Quota allocation is based on information on spatial, species aggregation and biological reference points in the ecological subsystem as shown in ecosystem model (Figure 6). Initial quota is needed for quota allocation and it could be based on fishers’ catch history. Implementation of a quota system positively depends on enforcement and monitoring performance, and the acceptance and compliance of fishers in the system. Multispecies characteristics in coral reef fisheries increase complexity in a quota system as target and non-target species could be caught altogether. Catch balancing and transferability of quota can be considered to enhance the performance of a quota system implementation in such fishery. However, it increases costs of monitoring and enforcement. Figure 5. Political subsystem of a quota system in coral reef fisheries 22 Figure 6. Ecosystem modeling diagram of a quota system in coral reef fisheries 24 The political subsystem, seen in Figure 5, consists of two components, urgency and transparency. Urgency in the development and implementation of a quota system determines the goal of fisheries management. Overfishing of a fishery is one of the factors why such a management system is needed. Overcapitalization in the economics subsystem as shown in the ecosystem model (Figure 6) is also a reason to apply a quota system. Transparency is one of important principles to be enforced in the quota allocation process, monitoring, enforcement and implementation, as shown in ecosystem modeling (Figure 6). Transparency process in a quota system will give benefit to the fishers and fish stock. Figure 6 is the ecosystem modeling of a quota system in coral reef fisheries which combines ecological, social, economics, governance and political subsystem. Inter-relationships of components beyond each subcomponent are shown. Each component is important and influences how the quota system works. The model is simplified by only incorporating several major components in each subsystem; meanwhile, each component has more detailed information to be considered, as described in chapter 4. 6 CONCLUSION The feasibility of a quota system for coral reef fisheries by the Indonesian Government needs to be analyzed by first determining and defining the variables needed to build an ecosystem model. In creating an ecosystem model for a quota system in coral reef fisheries, five subsystems are ecological, social, economics, governance, and politics. Each subsystem consists of components that have relationships inside a subsystem and inter-relationships with components beyond their subsystem. Each component is important and influences how the quota system works. The ecosystem model which has been built is a qualitative analysis to determine the data needed to develop and implement a quota system in coral reef fisheries. This model can further be used for quantitative analysis for feasibility of a quota system implementation in coral reef fisheries in Indonesia. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to say thank you to Dr. David. A. Bengtson for being my faculty advisor, and for his guidance through all semesters. Thank you to Dr. Austin Humphries for the idea of the ecosystem modeling and Nicole Andrescavage for their help in reviewing this paper. I also thank to Dr. Peter August and Dr. Arthur Gold for their guidance as the MESM coordinators. The Secretariat of CTI – Coremap – DGCF is the driver of this scholarship program, therefore they have my thanks as well. To URI Fishery Center members: Dr. Kathy Castro, Barbara Somers, and Laura Skrobe. To my family for their support and patience. Last but not least, to my Indonesian students as my companions-in-arms during the study. 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Volume of marine capture fisheries production by species, 2004 – 2014 (unit in ton) Reef fish Redbelly yellowtail fusilier Napoleon wrasse/ Humhead wrasse Blue lined seabass Humpback hind Honeycomb grouper Greasy rockcod/ Estuary rockcod Leopard coral/ grouper White-spotted spinefoot Barhed spinefoot Orange-spotted spinefoot Total 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Increasing rate (%) 200420132014 2014 2004 2005 39406 45180 42809 58835 56040 67624 59890 71553 68131 77071 81563 8.5 5.83 115 144 670 760 4236 4594 2017 1232 984 1458 1234 78.74 -15.36 14392 28577 36094 41461 30883 41314 48035 44322 46507 53274 50516 17.08 -5.18 5807 6076 4589 6271 5993 8174 7440 8685 10698 11123 11650 8.84 4.74 2182 2537 2844 5087 6986 4293 3968 4315 6662 6818 8520 18.89 24.96 - - 1020 1117 4912 5662 3605 2255 7617 9776 13830 - 41.47 19162 8666 5642 7827 9139 14597 10087 14482 20699 18913 25902 10.95 36.95 265 1337 1266 1047 1774 2380 3291 3411 4919 6784 9855 65.48 45.27 274 461 700 841 860 1052 2910 1343 1676 2517 3965 42.01 57.53 3181 4782 11807 14598 14539 25713 13845 15968 22812 23836 24920 31.84 4.55 84784 97760 107441 137844 135362 175403 155088 167566 190705 211570 231955 11.21 9.64 Source: (DGCF 2015). 29 Appendix 2. Value of marine capture fisheries production by species, 2004 – 2014 (unit in billions of rupiah ) Increasing rate Reef fish 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 183677 244126 241517 394875 350093 525742 513253 685230 740825 1014739 Napoleon wrasse/ Humhead wrasse 3019 3891 6767 13261 57932 93276 42581 34296 42934 Blue lined seabass 147186 388151 607340 884079 583175 808358 1360591 1011674 Humpback hind 213901 216327 66892 179975 202141 284917 280750 49022 58011 59793 105086 120292 87768 9747 8253 82035 Redbelly yellowtail fusilier Honeycomb grouper Greasy rockcod/ Estuary rockcod Leopard coral/ grouper 2013 2014 20042014 20132014 1082451 21.71 6.67 50897 40222 54.56 20.97 1044426 1575465 1536415 36.46 -2.48 278713 340396 336491 429790 20.09 27.73 85133 104714 165232 170210 265478 22.14 55.97 120175 55699 44758 202393 330065 530450 60.71 237323 99985 94716 205085 235917 358341 275036 506280 876112 856124 1530133 33.06 78.73 White-spotted spinefoot 1050 9810 5925 5914 20708 21502 31669 54923 78418 137337 206445 133.72 50.32 Barhed spinefoot 1309 2092 3013 3683 5705 8014 11307 14888 24957 45940 7683 51.32 67.25 25535 28756 81850 112368 126183 237634 167084 220047 289528 386571 456009 42.02 17.96 862023 1051149 1177560 1912578 1784182 2545726 2823103 2955522 3805220 4903839 6085076 23.11 25.5 Orange-spotted spinefoot Total 30