Download determining the data needed to test the feasibility of a quota system

DETERMINING THE DATA NEEDED TO TEST THE
FEASIBILITY OF A QUOTA SYSTEM FOR
INDONESIAN CORAL REEF FISHERIES
By
PUTUH SUADELA
Source: http://awsassets.wwf.or.id/img/original/img_2410_wwf_indonesia_1.jpg
A MAJOR PAPER SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ENVIRONMENTAL
SCIENCE AND MANAGEMENT
UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND
May 20, 2016
MAJOR PAPER ADVISOR: DAVID A. BENGTSON, Ph.D
MESM TRACK: SUSTAINABLE SYSTEMS
LIST OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................................. 4
1
INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................... 5
2
METHODS .......................................................................................................................................... 9
3
CORAL REEF FISHERIES IN INDONESIA ................................................................................. 9
4
COMPONENTS IN ECOSYSTEM MODELS FOR QUOTA SYSTEM FEASIBILITY ......... 10
4.1
Ecological ................................................................................................................................... 10
4.1.1
Habitat ................................................................................................................................. 10
4.1.2
Multispecies ........................................................................................................................ 11
4.1.3
Biological reference points ................................................................................................. 11
4.1.4
Targeting ............................................................................................................................. 11
4.1.5
Discards............................................................................................................................... 12
4.2
Social........................................................................................................................................... 13
4.2.1
Fishery-dependent ............................................................................................................... 13
4.2.2
Equity .................................................................................................................................. 13
4.2.3
Education ............................................................................................................................ 13
4.3
Economics ................................................................................................................................... 14
4.3.1
Overcapitalization ............................................................................................................... 14
4.3.2
Fishery value ....................................................................................................................... 14
4.3.3
Market ................................................................................................................................. 14
4.4
Governance ................................................................................................................................. 14
4.4.1
Spatial ................................................................................................................................. 14
4.4.2
Quota allocation .................................................................................................................. 15
4.4.3
Transferability ..................................................................................................................... 16
4.4.4
Species aggregation............................................................................................................. 16
4.4.5
Catch balancing ................................................................................................................... 17
4.4.6
Implementation ................................................................................................................... 17
4.4.7
Monitoring and enforcement ............................................................................................... 18
4.5
Politics......................................................................................................................................... 18
4.5.1
Urgency ............................................................................................................................... 18
4.5.2
Transparency ....................................................................................................................... 19
5
ECOSYSTEM MODELING OF A QUOTA SYSTEM IN CORAL REEF FISHERIES .......... 19
6
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................. 25
2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ........................................................................................................................ 25
REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................................... 26
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Ecological subsystem of a quota system in coral reef fisheries ................................................... 20
Figure 2. Social subsystem of a quota system in coral reef fisheries .......................................................... 20
Figure 3. Economics subsystem of a quota system in coral reef fisheries .................................................. 21
Figure 4. Governance subsystem of a quota system in coral reef fisheries ................................................ 22
Figure 5. Political subsystem of a quota system in coral reef fisheries ...................................................... 22
Figure 6. Ecosystem modeling diagram of a quota system in coral reef fisheries ...................................... 24
LIST OF APPENDICES
Appendix 1. Volume of marine capture fisheries production by species, 2004 – 2014 (tons) ................... 33
Appendix 2. Value of marine capture fisheries production by species, 2004 – 2014 (billions of rupiah ) . 34
3
ABSTRACT
Indonesia’s fisheries are managed by traditional fishery management strategies such as license limitation,
fishing vessel limitation, gear type and size limitation, etc. which still allow the fishermen to race for fish.
The Indonesian Government established a Strategy Plan for the years 2015 - 2019 where one of the
strategies is to maintain fishery resources sustainability by developing a quota management system. The
feasibility of a quota system for coral reef fisheries by the Indonesian Government needs to be analyzed
by first determining and defining the variables involved in a quota system and how they interact with one
another. One way to investigate this is to build an ecosystem model. Here I develop a qualitative
ecosystem model to obtain insights and determine the variables needed for future quantitative analyses. A
literature review on quota management systems for many aspects was conducted to gain insight from
other countries in developing and implementing quota management systems, especially in multi-species
fisheries, which is the characteristic of Indonesian coral reef fisheries. Variables or components to build
an ecosystem model are determined, defined and grouped into five subsystems: ecological, social,
economics, governance, and politics. This ecosystem model is useful for managers and decision makers
by laying out the system interactions and feedbacks, thus leading to a better understanding of dynamics
associated with a potential quota system. Additionally, the resulting model can serve to as a starting point
for quantitative analysis that investigates the feasibility of a quota system for coral reef fisheries in
Indonesia.
4
1
INTRODUCTION
Indonesia’s fisheries are managed by traditional fishery management strategies such as license limitation,
fishing vessel limitation, gear type and size limitation, etc. These strategies still allow the fishermen to
race for fish, and by not controlling the number of fish that can be caught, the sustainability in many
fisheries is threatened. Therefore, the Indonesian Government established a Strategy Plan for the years
2015 - 2019 through Ministerial Decree No. 25 in 2015, where one of the strategies is to maintain fishery
resources sustainability by developing a quota management system (MMAF 2015). To carry out the
strategy, the Government should understand what requirements are needed for a fishery to be regulated by
a quota system.
Since the 1970s, fishing quota or catch share management systems have been introduced in several
countries (Walters and Pearse 1996). New Zealand was the first country that developed a Quota
Management System (QMS) in the form of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ) in 1986, which
allocates the catch quota of commercial species (Sanchirico et al. 2006, Lock and Leslie 2007). The
Individual Vessel Quota (IVQ) system for the groundfish trawl fishery was implemented in Canada in
1997 after the fishery was closed in 1995 due to Total Allowable Catch (TAC) overages, discards, and
stock management concerns (Sanchirico et al. 2006). In the US, the first catch share program was
implemented in 1990 in the Mid-Atlantic Surf Clam and Ocean Quahog fishery, and now 15 catch share
programs have been implemented around the country (NOAA 2015).
According to Brinson and Thunberg (2013), catch share programs are a fishery management tool that
dedicates a secure share of quota allowing individual fishermen, fishing cooperatives, fishing
communities, or other entities to harvest a fixed amount of fish. Catch shares are allocated privileges to
land a portion of the total allowable catch (TAC) in the form of quota shares. ITQ programs are a form of
catch shares program where the shares are transferrable; shareholders have the freedom to buy, sell, and
lease quota shares (Garrity 2011).
A quota management system can be used to ensure sustainable utilization of fisheries resources by
controlling harvest levels directly (Lock and Leslie 2007), however, regulators need to resolve several
issues to ensure sustainable utilization. These include the spatial scale where species are managed, the
process for setting sustainable harvest levels, the allocation of catch among the different fishing sectors,
and the definition of quota. A quota management system is considered as the cornerstone of all the
conservation measures to maintain fish stock and conserve the resources (Karagiannakos 1996) and also
to make the fisheries more profitable and to halt over-capitalization (Little et al. 2009).
5
Individual quotas (IQs), particularly individual transferable quotas (ITQs), have attracted considerable
attention from both the scientific community and fisheries management agencies since the 1970s
(Arnason 1990). ITQs are widely recognized to prevent the ‘race for fish’ and, when transferable, are
believed to increase the economic efficiency of fishing activities (Grafton and McIlgorm 2009, Marchal et
al. 2011). Several countries have implemented a quota system in their fisheries managements. Some
countries obtained positive results in their fisheries performance after going through several
improvements (e.g., the multispecies fisheries in New Zealand, halibut fishery in British Columbia,
Canada, the offshore scallop fishery in Nova Scotia, Canada, the surf clam and ocean quahog fisheries in
eastern U.S., the sablefish fishery in Alaska, U.S., and the rock lobster fishery in Tasmania, Australia).
However, in other countries the decline in fish stocks still occurred after ITQ implementation (e.g., the
multispecies fishery in Nova Scotia, Canada, the northern abalone fishery in British Columbia, Canada,
and the squat lobster fishery in Chile (Branch 2009)).
ITQs represent a dominant form of fisheries management in countries such as Australia, Canada, Chile,
Iceland, The Netherlands, and New Zealand. In the European Union (EU), the common fisheries
management framework builds mainly on biological measures and only to a limited extent on access
regulation measures (Marchal et al. 2011). At the level of EU Member States, quota allocation procedures
are usually not explicit, except in the Netherlands and Denmark, where ITQs are implemented formally
(Marchal et al. 2009, Marchal et al. 2011)
In 1986, New Zealand introduced a QMS based on ITQ rights operating within an administered TAC. The
TAC covers all mortality to a fish stock caused by human activity, including the annual total allowable
commercial catch and total allowable non-commercial catch which are customary (e.g. allocated for
customary fishing rights of the Maori) and recreational fishing (Batstone and Sharp 2003, Lock and Leslie
2007). Before allocating catch levels between fishing sectors, the allowance of the customary catch was
first identified, and the remainder of the TAC can then be allocated to the commercial and recreational
fishing sector (Lock and Leslie 2007).
The QMS relies on biological models to provide estimates of maximum sustainable yield (MSY), and
current and projected stock biomass (B) levels. In the stock assessment consultative process, several data
need to be provided such as records of annual landings, estimates of catch per unit effort (for some
fisheries) and, in sports fisheries, estimates of recreational harvest. The consultative process involves
biologists, fisheries managers, and other stakeholders, who consider available data and information to
provide an estimation of biomass at maximum sustainable yield (BMSY) and recommendation on the
6
appropriate level of TAC. Management of stock levels toward BMSY should be adjusted by social and
economic considerations (Batstone and Sharp 2003).
Implementation of ITQ can reduce TAC overruns (catch > TAC) when it is enforced properly. In the
groundfish fisheries in British Columbia, ITQ implementation reduced the frequency of TAC overruns
(Branch 2009). Similar results were shown in New Zealand after ITQ implementation (Branch 2009).
Reduced TAC could also be supported or even proposed by quota holders when they are interested in
raising stock size and catch per-unit-effort (CPUE), as happened for New Zealand Paua (abalone) fishery
where 10% reduction of TAC was requested (Branch 2009).
For coral reef fisheries, implementation of ITQ has been applied in several locations. For example, ITQ
has been implemented on the Coral Reef Fin Fish Fishery (CRFFF) in the Great Barrier Reef, Australia
since 2004, with ITQ’s allocated separately for coral trout, red throat emperor and ‘other reef fish species’
important to the commercial sector (Mapstone et al. 2008, Little et al. 2009). According to Mapstone et al.
(2008), introduction of the quota management in the Great Barrier Reef resulted in a progressive decline
of fishing efforts between 2004 and 2006 from 70% to 55% of that in 1996; meanwhile, commercial
harvest declined to 70% of that in 1998 and CPUE increased 20% compared to that in mid-1998.
Potential ecological problems such as discarding can be a problem in multispecies ITQs fisheries. A
comparison study of the Australian southeast trawl fishery with the British Columbia groundfish trawl
fishery reveals one possible solution (Branch 2009). Based on the study, discards in the Australia fishery
are not monitored and are high, whereas in the British Columbia fishery, discards are deducted from
quotas and every vessel carries an on-board observer, and discards have decreased. According to Branch
(2009), incentives management under ITQs theoretically should cause fishers to avoid any damaging
practices to protect resources they have an interest in and to avoid poor publicity which could affect
market prices.
Several options can also be considered to manage associated and dependent habitats and species in
combination with an ITQ regime on target species (Gibbs and Thebaud 2012). Those options include
establishing TACs and quotas for a range of associated and dependent habitats and species, integrating
associated and dependent species into the TACs of target species, applying incentive-based measures
other than catch shares, complementing input control into ITQ regime, and ITQ scheme with spatial
fishing rights. However, these options are potentially costly to implement and manage and would need to
be responsive to ongoing scientific research.
7
In determining the quota management system criteria, a conceptual study by Arnason (1990) using basic
fisheries modeling was conducted to generate equations containing the minimum information
management scheme for an Individual Transferable Share Quota System (ITSQ). The study suggested
that a fisheries management system has to satisfy a number of social and economic requirements, and
among other things, it must be cost-effective. Batstone and Sharp (2003) applied the above model in New
Zealand and found evidence that supports the use of quota prices to guide the setting of limits to
commercial harvest of X species. The result of the study also suggested that the information gathered in a
quota process could complement the findings of stock assessment research in fisheries management. A
further conceptual study using a simple aggregative model of ecological fisheries attempted to seek ways
(institutional arrangements, management methods, etc.) to achieve a more efficient utilization of marine
ecosystems (Arnason 1998). Based on the study, a multispecies variant of the individual transferable
share quota system (ITSQ) seems to offer an alternative to the traditional approaches in fisheries
management using ITQs by manipulating the vector of total quotas (TAC) to the point where aggregate
quota are maximized.
From a biological perspective, Walters and Pearse (1996) examined the importance of stock assessment in
quota management systems to set allowable annual catches (Walters and Pearse 1996). They examined in
detail the stock assessment problem and the objective to reduce uncertainty. Key points from that study
are that under individual quota management systems, accurate and timely stock assessment is needed and
there is a potential role of fishers, by taking advantage of the incentives of quota holders, to contribute to
gathering the information to improve stock assessment.
Regarding environmental issues, some studies point out the impact of the quota management system on
the marine ecosystem. Fisheries management in European waters is gradually moving from a singlespecies perspective towards a more holistic ecosystem approach to fisheries management (EAFM), and
Reiss et al. (2010) concluded that the relationship between TACs and effort is insufficient for TACs to be
used as the principal management tool within an EAFM (Reiss et al. 2010). Transferable Quotas have
largely positive effects on target species, but mixed or unknown effects on non-target fisheries and the
overall ecosystem (Branch 2009).
A study of multi-species individual fishery quotas using an agent-based approach was conducted by
modelling the effect of an ITQ system on a multi-species and multi-sector fishery and applying the model
to a CRFFF in Queensland – Australia (Little et al. 2009). The model simulates the use of tradeable quota
units by operators in the fishery and considers several components such as initial quota allocation to
operators, seasonal fish prices and individual operator variable cost, fishing efficiency and experience,
8
and constraints on vessel movement. The model predicted some effects that the ITQ system can have on
reductions of effort, increases in profit, and changes over time in quota prices. However, ecological
impact also emerges by implementing an ITQ system in a multi-species fishery where increased discards
of the less profitable species could affect community-level biomass.
The first step to determine the feasibility of a quota system for coral reef fisheries by the Indonesian
Government is to determine and define the variables needed to build an ecosystem model. A qualitative
analysis can be used as a method to obtain insight and determine the variables needed for future
quantitative analyses. Designing a pilot scale investigative study of a quota system in coral reef fisheries
is expected to illustrate the data needs for quota management system implementation for Indonesian coral
reefs.
2
METHODS
The process in developing this major paper was to review literature on quota management systems for
many aspects and countries. The purpose was to gain insight from other countries’ experiences in
developing and implementing quota management systems, especially in multi-species fisheries, which is
characteristic of Indonesian coral reef fisheries. Based on this literature review, variables or components
to build an ecosystem model are determined and defined; these can then be considered for use in a quota
system for Indonesian coral reef fisheries. Components are grouped into five subsystems: ecological,
social, economics, governance, and politics.
3
CORAL REEF FISHERIES IN INDONESIA
Reef fish spend their lives in a coral reef region from their juvenile stage until adult (Sale 1991). Reef fish
consist of six trophic groups: herbivores, omnivores, plankton feeders, crustacean and fish feeders,
piscivores, and others (McConnell and Lowe-McConnell 1987). Reef fish are one of the largest fisheries
resources in Indonesia in terms of catch and economic value. According to Allen and Adrim (2003),
Indonesia has 2057 reef fish species from 113 families with 10 major families: Gobiidae (mudskippers,
272 species), Labridae (wrasses,178 species), Pomacentridae (anemone fish, 152
species), Apogonidae (cardinal fish, 114 species), Blenniidae (blennies, 107 species), Serranidae
(groupers, 102 species), Muraenidae (eels, 61 species), Syngnathidae (pipefish,
61species), Chaetodontidae (butterflyfish, 59 species), and Lutjanidae (snappers, 43 species).
Reef fish provide important ecological value for the coral reef ecosystem and also economic value for
fishermen in Indonesia. Demand for reef fish is increasing, leading to increased fishing efforts. According
to DGCF (2015), reef fish catch increased 9.64% in 2014 (231,955 ton) from 2013 (211,570 ton), while
9
the value also increased 25.5% to IDR 6.15 trillion in 2014 from IDR 4.90 trillion in 2013. The highest
fishery production in 2014 was Redbelly yellowtail fusilier (ekor kuning) with 81.563 tons followed by
Blue-lined seabass (kerapu karang) with 50.516 tons (Appendix 1). However, the highest value fish was
Blue-lined seabass with a value of IDR 1.54 trillion followed by Leopard coral grouper with IDR 1.53
trillion (Appendix 2).
Coral reef fisheries are overexploited by small-scale fishers as a consequence of high demand of reef fish,
low operational fishing cost, availability of employment and destructive fishing methods (Arami 2006).
Fishing gear that are mostly used to catch reef fish are traps, bottom long line, hand line, gillnet, and setnet. Several problems for reef fisheries in Indonesia are stock depletion, illegal or destructive fishing
activities, and coral reef habitat degradation. Other problems are fishermen’s poverty, fisheries production
and export collection data, bycatch of protected and endangered species, horizontal conflict among
fishermen, law enforcement, management institutions and regulations, and illegal, unreported and
unregulated (IUU) fishing activities by foreign vessels.
4
COMPONENTS IN ECOSYSTEM MODELS FOR QUOTA SYSTEM FEASIBILITY
Fisheries are complex systems consisting of the integration of human (including social, economic, and
political components) and ecological subsystems. In developing a quota system, we should consider a
broad ecosystem-based fisheries management approach to meet three objectives of fisheries management:
ecological, economic and social sustainability (Sumaila 2010). The system should consider not only
improved economic efficiency and equity but also maintenance of fisheries resources and ecosystem
sustainability. Governance forms the principles and objectives in such fishery management system,
develops the policy and regulatory framework, and connects government with fishery societies (FAO).
Based on those objectives, components in a quota system are grouped into five subsystems: ecological
social, economics, governance, and politics.
4.1
4.1.1
Ecological
Habitat
Coral reef ecosystems are one of the important ecosystems in coastal fisheries with a high biodiversity of
associated species, various trophic levels, and ecology function (e.g. feeding ground, nursery ground, and
spawning ground) for associated species including reef fish (Arami 2006). Reef fish have complex cycles
consisting of several distinct life-history stages (egg, larvae, juvenile, and adult) which may require
spatially separated habitats. A prerequisite for population persistence is suitable abiotic conditions, food
availability, and shelter to escape from predation or disease, as well as connectivity among habitats to
10
allow the survivors to mature and return to the spawning grounds to reproduce successfully (Rijnsdorp et
al. 2009).
4.1.2
Multispecies
Quota systems (setting the TAC on the target species) have ecological consequences, especially in multispecies fisheries, by their effects on the incidental catches of other species through high-grading,
particularly when discard mortality is high (Little et al. 2009). Specifically, the problem occurs in multispecies fisheries where fishers may have sufficient quota for one species but not for another, which can
occur when either the ratio of species TACs, based on biological productivity, or individual quota
holdings, do not match the ratio of species’ catch rates (Little et al. 2009).
4.1.3
Biological reference points
Determining the total allowable catch (TAC) is important in a quota system. A quota system is a
mechanism for dividing up the TAC, thus if the TAC is set at unsustainable levels, the fishery is likely to
collapse regardless of the method of allocating the TAC (Branch 2009). Setting the TAC relies on
biological models in stock assessments to provide estimation of biological reference points. Biological
reference points are widely used to define safe levels of harvesting for marine fish populations such as
minimum acceptable biomass levels or maximum fishing mortality rates and each is defined based on the
level of some criterion (e.g., yield per recruit, MSY, etc.) (Collie and Gislason 2001). The values of
biological reference points are determined through biological models which incorporate the principle of
population dynamics of the target species including vital life history characteristics (such as growth,
reproduction and mortality) and historical abundance data (Collie and Gislason 2001, Little et al. 2009).
In a quota system for multispecies fisheries, ratios of TAC between one species and other species should
also be considered when they are caught by the same fishing gear. The TAC of one species can affect
catch rates, harvest level and the amount of discards of other species (Little et al. 2009). A harvest level
that is optimal for one species might be too high or too low of other species in a mix of species. When the
TAC of a certain species has been fulfilled, fishermen could continue to catch other species and discard
the species that no longer has available TAC, however, this could cause discarding issues.
4.1.4
Targeting
The ability to target specific species in multispecies fisheries such as coral reef fisheries is needed in
designing a quota system. Targeting ability depends on: the number of species and the relatively distinct
stock by area or depth; the selectivity of fishing gear; level of vessel electronic technology for
discrimination of fish species and fish stocks; harvesting strategy (whether there are different strategies
for different species or one strategy for all species); and period of harvesting that could affect the ability
11
of fishermen to control catch rates and species composition, where short period could result in less ability
to control than long period as fishermen can modify fishing gear or fishing ground to improve their
targeting ability over longer times (Squires et al. 1998). Also, understanding fishing dynamics is
important in designing a quota system in coral reef fisheries. Information on the movement, reef selection
processes, and fishing activities of individual vessels are needed and further simulation can predict how
the fishing effort will respond dynamically to changes of management measures such as a quota
restriction (Little et al. 2008, Little et al. 2009).
4.1.5
Discards
Discarding may result in high-grading where fishermen discard lower-value fish (i.e. fish with lower
quality), or by reaching the TAC of one species, but not other species. This can result in unfavorable
impacts on fish stocks. In multispecies fisheries, quota systems may increase discarding when a) at-sea
enforcement is minimal, b) it is difficult or expensive to lease quota to cover overages, c) discarding is
allowed, d) discarding does not count against quota, e) high market demand and value on certain or
targeted fish, and f) quota lease prices are high (Branch 2009). Discarding incidence under a quota system
implementation in multispecies fisheries can be reduced through a) increasing enforcement, b) assigning
observer on board to enhance the monitoring system and data collection of discarded fish, c) fishing
industry agreement on adjusting their catch mix and methods of operation, d) severe penalties, e)
assigning individual bycatch quota along with individual targeted species quota where when the
individual bycatch quota is reached, the target species quota will be closed, f) discard being deducted
from quota holdings, and g) flexibility of fishers’ to alter their fishing behavior (Diamond 2004, Branch
2009).
There are other ways to reduce discarding in a quota system while still being able to remain profitable,
one of which is enabling quota leasing to cover the overage and allowing catches to be landed legally
(Sanchirico et al. 2006, Branch 2009). Allowing the quota to be shifted to or borrowed from the following
year with a penalty of over-quota can also be an alternative way to reduce discarding, however this
mechanism can increase the risk of overfishing due to exceeding TAC (Sanchirico et al. 2006, Branch
2009). Another mechanism is by allowing quota trading among fisheries and gear types where instead of
discarding their bycatch, they could purchase quota from each other when their bycatch is the others
fisheries target catch (Fujita and Bonzon 2005, Branch 2009).
12
4.2
4.2.1
Social
Fishery-dependent
A quota system has potential consequences on fishery-dependent families and communities which depend
on the design of the quota system, the prevailing kinship, inheritance and taxation systems, and other
factors (McCay 1995). A family-based fishery may be particularly vulnerable when not all family
members were able to finance acquiring a sufficient amount of fishing rights. This could shift the sociocultural dynamics and cause the potential loss of fishing right.
Social impact analysis is an approach to determine possible consequences of a quota system on a fishing
dependent community. In doing so, it requires identification of community participants who depend upon
the fisheries in that area, identification of the amount of dependency on the fishery, identifying other
employment opportunities that exist within the community in case they have to switch to other fisheries
or occupations outside the fishing sector due to the implementation of a quota system. Data can be
obtained from commercial landings data, demographic information, and social structure and dynamics
based on census data to examine community structure and potential impact of a quota system
implementation.
4.2.2
Equity
Equity is an important issue in a quota system. A quota system may increase social inequity in fishing
communities, where quotas are concentrated in large fishing companies that are more economically
efficient than small-scale fishermen. The claim of fishing rights or the right to earn revenue from fisheries
by native people should also be considered in a quota system. Therefore, limitation on the amount of
quota that can be held by each quota holder should be enforced to mitigate social problems. Alternatively,
quota can be allocated to communities in the form of community transferable quotas (CTQs) or to
residents of a territorial area as territorial user rights in fisheries (TURFs) quota systems (Sumaila 2010),
allowing them to lease out their fishing rights in exchange for revenues (McCay 1995).
4.2.3
Education
A management system can be applied successfully if related stakeholders can best participate in the
design and implementation. Providing sufficient information and training to stakeholders is needed to
raise awareness and increase understanding about the benefits and cost of the system implementation for
their long-term economic return and livelihood (NOAA). Stakeholders include fishermen (small and large
scale), market dealers, and other related participants in quota systems.
13
4.3
4.3.1
Economics
Overcapitalization
Overcapitalization or investment that cannot readily be turned to other uses is the major reason
economists offer for supporting a quota system (McCay 1995). Input control in fisheries management
such as a limited-entry system provides incentives for over-investment. Declining profit can tend to
happen when entry and effort are not strictly limited.
4.3.2
Fishery value
Understanding the economic and technological structure of the harvesting process is crucial to designing
and implementing an effective quota system for multispecies fisheries. Information on the technical
interaction among the different species harvested and economic input is needed by knowing whether the
stocks of all species are harvested jointly or separately using all economic inputs such as the vessel, labor,
gear, equipment and fuel (Squires et al. 1998). Profitability calculation of individual vessels is also
needed by using the vessel cost structure, the expected catch rates of the various species, and the fish
price for which the operators can sell their product (Little et al. 2009). Cost data are needed to know the
distribution of the average cost per vessel per day of fishing whether for live or dead target fish by
sampling individual vessels to identify vessel cost structure (Little et al. 2009).
4.3.3
Market
The ability of the market to absorb landed fish year-round with a negotiable price for fishermen is
important in a quota system. By having a sufficient quota and dependable market, fishermen are able to
sell their catch year-round based on their quota, rather than catch as many as possible in a short period of
time. Thus, implementation of a quota system is expected to affect market conditions by eliminating
seasonal abundance of fish product, ensuring a steadier supply of fresh fish, improving product quality,
and lowering fishing operation costs due to fishing trip length and input selection efficiency.
4.4
4.4.1
Governance
Spatial
A fish species can consist of numerous geographically isolated and biologically distinct populations, so
that managing separate fish stocks independently instead of nationally in a quota system might be the
optimal method to ensure the sustainability of the stock (Lock and Leslie 2007). Managing fish stocks in
smaller areas will more likely control the population size within a level that may sustain the Maximum
Sustainable Yield (Batstone and Sharp 1999). However, managing multiple fish stocks could increase the
costs of monitoring, enforcement and quota trading (Lock and Leslie 2007).
14
Collecting data for spatial distribution of catch and effort can be derived from logbook data of catch
records and coordinates where fishes were caught. The data should be from different fishing sectors,
small-scale and larger industry. The spatial distribution data could capture the major patterns of fishing
activity in coral reefs locally or regionally depending on the scope of quota system implementation.
4.4.2
Quota allocation
Determining quota allocation is crucial in designing a quota system. The way the quota is allocated,
traded and regulated influence how the quota market and the fishery will work. In developing a quota
system, the management authority must determine initial allocation (to whom, how much), the nature of
the right (exclusivity, quality of life, duration), ownership limits (minimum or maximum quantities,
nationality of owners) and limits over transfers (divisibility, restrictions on sale, leasing options) (Lock
and Leslie 2007). Allocating quota varies between countries and can be characterized based on ownership
when associated: to a fisherman is called Individual Fishing Quota (IFQ); to a vessel is called Individual
Vessel Quota (IVQ); to a community is called Community fishing quota; to an organization (producer) is
called ring-fenced quota (van Hoof et al. 2007).
Identifying a quota allocation mechanism that is acceptable for a certain fishery is necessary to achieve
the success of a quota system, so that the implementation of the system will be supported by the industry
or fish processor. The commitment of fishers to the implementation of a quota system may be maintained
as they are supported by the processing industry that they depend on for buying their catch. Therefore,
commitment of both the fishers and the processing industry should be considered in allocating the quota
to fishers.
Deciding to whom the quota will allocated among the fishers is a key point in developing a quota system.
Fishers characteristics should be identified, i.e., whether they are full-time fishers, part-time fishers,
vessel owners, or people who are involved in the fishing industry but do not own vessels or boat. Based
on this survey of characteristics, determine which fishers are eligible to receive quota. Rationalizing the
fishing industry and reducing capacity can be achieved through the eligibility of quota requirement, but
significant losses to the ineligible people who are removed from the fishery should then be mitigated.
Methods for distributing the initial allocation for individual operators are auction, sale at fixed price, or
given away for free (Copes 1986). Except for the case of auction, a determination would have to be made
as how large a quota each operator would receive. The quota could be given to the operators by equal
shares, or based on historical catch performance, or on fishing vessels and gear capacity, or number of
crew, or various combinations of these and/or other criteria related to consideration of equity, rationality
or practicability.
15
Amount of quota that can be held by operators or quota holders should be limited to mitigate the social
problems of concentration of fishing power or monopoly. This is already a feature of many existing ITQ
systems. In some fisheries, equity concerns may be alleviated by allocating ITQs to communities in the
form of CTQs or to residents of a territorial area as TURF quota systems (Wingard 2000; Christy 1982).
With such schemes in place, the economic efficiency benefits of ITQs may be captured while minimizing
their negative social impacts (Sumaila 2010).
4.4.3
Transferability
An individual quota is transferable when regulations allow the quota holders to sell, buy or lease their
quota (Soliman 2014). Transferability of individual quotas fosters economic efficiency because more
efficient fishers tend to harvest a greater share of the total allowable catch (TAC) and because it provides
incentives for inefficient fishers to exit the fishery (Squires et al. 1998). The net benefits of quota
transferability should be assessed in order to achieve biological, economic and social objectives of
fisheries management. Some transferability limitations are “owner-on-board”, “use it or lose it” or
“active fishing entities”. Allowing inter-sector transfer should also be taken into account to promote
future access opportunities and contribute to conservation and management goals in reducing
overcapacity and improving economic efficiency.
4.4.4
Species aggregation
Most quota systems manage a single species, however, coral reef fisheries are usually multispecies. A
quota system can be simplified if those species can be aggregated into a single TAC or quota as long as
they are caught in the same ratio consistently. However, based on biological criteria, each species has
substantial differences in terms of the age structure, recruitment and year class which make aggregation
problematical in setting a quota (Squires et al. 1998).
The Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council (Council) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) implemented Reef Fish Management Plans and established an individual fishing
quota program for red snapper in 2006 (began in January 2007) and for grouper and tilefish in 2009
(began in January 2010) (Council and NOAA 2006, Council and NOAA 2008). For grouper and tilefish,
they argued that by having a single grouper share will further complicate the future establishment of
annual catch limits. Instead they preferred to establish species-specific shares for red grouper, gag, other
shallow water grouper, deep water grouper and tilefish (Council and NOAA 2008). Under the
arrangement, fishermen could harvest aggregate quota limits within each grouping and could potentially
reduce the amount of discard. The Council would be allowed to adjust the harvest level within each
grouping. This should benefit fishermen because overharvesting one species in a group would not lower
16
the whole grouper complex. Thus, this was considered to be the only alternative that could prevent
overfishing while achieving optimum yield on a species-specific basis.
4.4.5
Catch balancing
In a multispecies fishery, species are caught simultaneously whether they are being targeted or captured
unintentionally. TACs in multispecies fisheries are typically set independently, with little or no
consideration for relative catch rates and productivity, so catches are often out of balance with TACs
(Holland and Herrera 2006). Catch balancing is considered in developing a quota system to address this
issue. The mechanism of catch balancing is to allow fishers to deal with their excess catch of species over
the quota or the unintentional catch of species without quota by allowing exchange of quota across,
allowing fishers to carry back or carry forward quota between years, and allowing fishers to surrender or
discard catch that they cannot match with quota (Holland and Herrera 2006, Sanchirico et al. 2006, Lock
and Leslie 2007). However, it is difficult to predict the catch composition and fishers will not exactly
catch the quota that they have. Therefore, this mechanism should be carefully designed in a quota system
so that the fishers do not encourage overfishing and exceed TAC.
Some approaches used for catch balancing were addressed by Sanchirico et al. (2006). The first approach
allows market transactions, such as permanent and temporary transfer of quota. Retrospective balancing
or trades after landings can be permitted to allow fishermen to cover overharvest of quota. Other
approaches through non-trading mechanisms have been used, including rollover provisions such as
carrying forward or back of quota, deemed value payment where fishers are charged a fee for each unit of
catch they land that exceeds their quota, and/or permitting fishers to discard catch that cannot match their
quota. However, the last option can result in discarding issues that weaken a quota system ecologically.
Another approach is by permitting cross-species exchanges where quota of one species can be used to
cover catches of another species at an arranged trading ration.
4.4.6
Implementation
The success of implementation of a quota system depends on the ability of the authority institution to
properly design and enforce the regulation, as well as society’s acceptance and compliance with the
system. Design characteristics including the exclusivity, durability, transferability, security, flexibility,
and divisibility of the rights or privileges will collectively determine the “desirability” or quality of the
property right or privilege granted to program participants (Anonymous 2008). Conducting public
consultation through workshops and other forms of discussion with the stakeholders potentially enhances
the success of a quota system implementation. When quota holders are encouraged to undertake comanagement in the quota system, it might simplify the system’s implementation and achieve the fisheries
17
management objectives for sustainable fisheries. In addition, duration of the quota system implementation
should be explicitly defined.
4.4.7
Monitoring and enforcement
Since a quota system depends on the setting of TAC, support from stock assessment processes backed up
by effective monitoring and enforcement are needed. Hence, effective monitoring and strict enforcement
are critical to the success of a quota system. Unreported catches can result in difficulties of monitoring of
quota catches and enforcement. The condition of multispecies fisheries and numerous participants in the
quota system increase the challenge in monitoring and enforcement. Moreover, large numbers and
geographical dispersion of landing sites and buyers of the quota catches increase the difficulties.
Unreported catches could result in unreliable stock estimation and fishing effort control.
Quota busting or not reporting of over-quota catch can also be a problem in a quota system. The chance of
detection of quota busting is influenced by the number of vessels, market channels, and geographically
widely dispersed activity where the larger magnitudes increase the difficulties of monitoring and
enforcement (Copes 1986). Quota busting could happen when the stock is valuable, enforcement is
difficult or poorly funded, fines are small, and dissatisfaction with the initial quota allocation leads to
widespread cheating on quotas (Branch 2009).
Implementing 100% observers on board should reduce unreported data in monitoring, but increases the
cost of monitoring and enforcement. This would probably be effective for offshore fisheries which have
fewer vessels and high economic return per trip, but not feasible for inshore fisheries such as coral reef
fisheries with large numbers of vessels and low value of landing (Squires et al. 1998). A community
quota system could be an alternative as community members have their objective to protect the interest of
resources against no-compliant competitors. A logbook system could cover the information needed for
quota reporting, such as the amount of catch of specific species and location, if fully implemented among
quota holders. Also, reporting of illegal activities by the fishers (whistle blower) should be an alternative
to be encouraged. ITQ fisheries often cost more to manage than equivalent input-controlled fisheries as
they require a system of quota reconciliation and monitoring of fisher activities and the setting of a TAC
(Grafton and McIlgorm 2009).
4.5
4.5.1
Politics
Urgency
All fishery managements must have a specific measurable goal and specific outcome for management.
Not every fishery is suitable for a quota system; hence, the quota authority should consider the
appropriateness of such a system and decide whether it can benefit the fishery or not. Characteristics of a
18
fishery where a quota system could be beneficial to be implemented are a) the fishery is overcapitalized,
b) stocks are overfished and overfishing is occurring, c) significant bycatch, d) regional/institutional
infrastructure exists, and e) stakeholders are receptive (NOAA). By adopting a principle of identifying
specific, clear, biological, economic and social objectives and outcomes for their fishery, a quota system
can be designed appropriately to controls and avoid unintended consequences.
4.5.2
Transparency
Transparency is an important principle in a quota system, from assessing its suitability to a fishery, to
designing, allocating, assigning transferability, and implementation until monitoring processes. Frequent
consultation with fishermen and other related stakeholders promotes transparent public participation in
constructing participation criteria in the system, analysis of trade-offs, and evaluation of the outcomes.
This would provide transparent opportunity for stakeholders to assess the pros and cons of setting a quota
system in a particular fishery to meet the goals and objectives of fisheries management plan.
5
ECOSYSTEM MODELING OF A QUOTA SYSTEM IN CORAL REEF FISHERIES
Designing a pilot scale investigative study of a quota system in coral reef fisheries is expected to illustrate
the data needs for quota management system implementation for Indonesian coral reefs. Variables or
components to build an ecosystem model that are determined and defined can be used to determine the
feasibility of a quota system for Indonesian coral reef fisheries. This qualitative analysis can be used as a
method to obtain insight and determine the variables needed for future quantitative analyses.
An ecosystem model is developed for the quota system model. A diagrammatic model provides visual
representation of the quota system structure and function.. Five subsystems are determined: economics,
social, ecological, governance, and politics. Each subsystem consists of several components that are
connected each other to show the relationship and influences.
Figures 1 - 5 represent causal loop diagrams that show the causal structure involved in a quota system.
The arrows between components portray the direction of causal influences. There are two types of
connections, “+” or “-“, to show how a dependent variable will be influenced (positively or negatively) or
change (increase or decrease) based on the change in the independent variable. A positive link means a
positive impact, so if the cause variable increases, then the effect variable also increases. A positive
causal link will reinforce the initial causal influence. A negative link means a negative impact, so if the
cause variable increases, then the effect variable will decrease. A negative causal link will balance the
initial causal influence.
19
Figure 1. Ecological subsystem of a quota system in coral reef fisheries
In Figure 1, the relationship between components in an ecological subsystem is shown. The most
important variable in the subsystem is the biological reference points as it requires ecological information
about the fish, habitat, and discards. The multispecies factor will add complexity to obtain biological
reference points, as it has to consider the relationships among species, trophic structure and fish
population dynamics. Habitat like coral reefs has multispecies of reef fish which tend to aggregate and are
caught simultaneously, which could increase discarding. Fishers have influence in the ecological
subsystem, by exploiting the fish and gaining benefit from them. They could cause overfishing, discards
and habitat destruction. However, their ability to target species by using selective fishing gear and
environmentally-friendly methods could mitigate discards and habitat degradation.
Figure 2. Social subsystem of a quota system in coral reef fisheries
20
The social subsystem diagram in Figure 2, consists of two components, fishery dependence and equity.
Fishery dependence arises from the dependence of fishers on the fish and also habitat in the ecological
subsystem, which will be shown in the ecosystem model (Figure 6). The magnitude of fishery dependence
will negatively influence the fishers’ social structure and performance. Equity factor is influenced
negatively by fishery dependence and transferability of quota in governance subsystem (shown in Figure
6). Social equity problem is occurred when a regime affects the distribution of rights, power,
opportunities and wealth, or how it affects the quality of life and the function of communities, household
and family life cycles (McCay 1995). Education is also an important factor for the successfulness in
designing and implementation of a quota system through raising awareness and understanding of
stakeholders. Well support from stakeholders including fishermen can give beneficial feedback to
fishermen’ economic return and livelihoods, also the sustainability of fish resources as one of the
system’s objectives.
Figure 3. Economics subsystem of a quota system in coral reef fisheries
Three components in economics subsystem are displayed in Figure 3. Overcapitalization negatively
influences fishers if their benefit from the fishing activity is below their capital or operational cost.
Fishery value is influenced by catch rates, fish price in market and operational cost of fishing. The market
(buyer) has the ability to control fish price, so most fishers (small-scale) do not have bargaining position
to earn a profit
21
Figure 4. Governance subsystem of a quota system in coral reef fisheries
Many components are incorporated in the governance subsystem referenced in Figure 4. Quota allocation
is based on information on spatial, species aggregation and biological reference points in the ecological
subsystem as shown in ecosystem model (Figure 6). Initial quota is needed for quota allocation and it
could be based on fishers’ catch history. Implementation of a quota system positively depends on
enforcement and monitoring performance, and the acceptance and compliance of fishers in the system.
Multispecies characteristics in coral reef fisheries increase complexity in a quota system as target and
non-target species could be caught altogether. Catch balancing and transferability of quota can be
considered to enhance the performance of a quota system implementation in such fishery. However, it
increases costs of monitoring and enforcement.
Figure 5. Political subsystem of a quota system in coral reef fisheries
22
Figure 6. Ecosystem modeling diagram of a quota system in coral reef fisheries
24
The political subsystem, seen in Figure 5, consists of two components, urgency and transparency.
Urgency in the development and implementation of a quota system determines the goal of fisheries
management. Overfishing of a fishery is one of the factors why such a management system is needed.
Overcapitalization in the economics subsystem as shown in the ecosystem model (Figure 6) is also a
reason to apply a quota system. Transparency is one of important principles to be enforced in the quota
allocation process, monitoring, enforcement and implementation, as shown in ecosystem modeling
(Figure 6). Transparency process in a quota system will give benefit to the fishers and fish stock.
Figure 6 is the ecosystem modeling of a quota system in coral reef fisheries which combines ecological,
social, economics, governance and political subsystem. Inter-relationships of components beyond each
subcomponent are shown. Each component is important and influences how the quota system works. The
model is simplified by only incorporating several major components in each subsystem; meanwhile, each
component has more detailed information to be considered, as described in chapter 4.
6
CONCLUSION
The feasibility of a quota system for coral reef fisheries by the Indonesian Government needs to be
analyzed by first determining and defining the variables needed to build an ecosystem model. In creating
an ecosystem model for a quota system in coral reef fisheries, five subsystems are ecological, social,
economics, governance, and politics. Each subsystem consists of components that have relationships
inside a subsystem and inter-relationships with components beyond their subsystem. Each component is
important and influences how the quota system works. The ecosystem model which has been built is a
qualitative analysis to determine the data needed to develop and implement a quota system in coral reef
fisheries. This model can further be used for quantitative analysis for feasibility of a quota system
implementation in coral reef fisheries in Indonesia.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to say thank you to Dr. David. A. Bengtson for being my faculty advisor, and for his
guidance through all semesters. Thank you to Dr. Austin Humphries for the idea of the ecosystem
modeling and Nicole Andrescavage for their help in reviewing this paper. I also thank to Dr. Peter August
and Dr. Arthur Gold for their guidance as the MESM coordinators. The Secretariat of CTI – Coremap –
DGCF is the driver of this scholarship program, therefore they have my thanks as well. To URI Fishery
Center members: Dr. Kathy Castro, Barbara Somers, and Laura Skrobe. To my family for their support
and patience. Last but not least, to my Indonesian students as my companions-in-arms during the study.
Their help and supports were key to the completion of my major paper and the study program.
25
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28
Appendix 1. Volume of marine capture fisheries production by species, 2004 – 2014 (unit in ton)
Reef fish
Redbelly
yellowtail
fusilier
Napoleon
wrasse/
Humhead wrasse
Blue lined
seabass
Humpback hind
Honeycomb
grouper
Greasy rockcod/
Estuary rockcod
Leopard coral/
grouper
White-spotted
spinefoot
Barhed spinefoot
Orange-spotted
spinefoot
Total
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Increasing rate
(%)
200420132014
2014
2004
2005
39406
45180
42809
58835
56040
67624
59890
71553
68131
77071
81563
8.5
5.83
115
144
670
760
4236
4594
2017
1232
984
1458
1234
78.74
-15.36
14392
28577
36094
41461
30883
41314
48035
44322
46507
53274
50516
17.08
-5.18
5807
6076
4589
6271
5993
8174
7440
8685
10698
11123
11650
8.84
4.74
2182
2537
2844
5087
6986
4293
3968
4315
6662
6818
8520
18.89
24.96
-
-
1020
1117
4912
5662
3605
2255
7617
9776
13830
-
41.47
19162
8666
5642
7827
9139
14597
10087
14482
20699
18913
25902
10.95
36.95
265
1337
1266
1047
1774
2380
3291
3411
4919
6784
9855
65.48
45.27
274
461
700
841
860
1052
2910
1343
1676
2517
3965
42.01
57.53
3181
4782
11807
14598
14539
25713
13845
15968
22812
23836
24920
31.84
4.55
84784
97760
107441
137844
135362
175403
155088
167566
190705
211570
231955
11.21
9.64
Source: (DGCF 2015).
29
Appendix 2. Value of marine capture fisheries production by species, 2004 – 2014 (unit in billions of rupiah )
Increasing rate
Reef fish
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
183677
244126
241517
394875
350093
525742
513253
685230
740825
1014739
Napoleon wrasse/
Humhead wrasse
3019
3891
6767
13261
57932
93276
42581
34296
42934
Blue lined seabass
147186
388151
607340
884079
583175
808358
1360591
1011674
Humpback hind
213901
216327
66892
179975
202141
284917
280750
49022
58011
59793
105086
120292
87768
9747
8253
82035
Redbelly yellowtail fusilier
Honeycomb grouper
Greasy rockcod/ Estuary
rockcod
Leopard coral/ grouper
2013
2014
20042014
20132014
1082451
21.71
6.67
50897
40222
54.56
20.97
1044426
1575465
1536415
36.46
-2.48
278713
340396
336491
429790
20.09
27.73
85133
104714
165232
170210
265478
22.14
55.97
120175
55699
44758
202393
330065
530450
60.71
237323
99985
94716
205085
235917
358341
275036
506280
876112
856124
1530133
33.06
78.73
White-spotted spinefoot
1050
9810
5925
5914
20708
21502
31669
54923
78418
137337
206445
133.72
50.32
Barhed spinefoot
1309
2092
3013
3683
5705
8014
11307
14888
24957
45940
7683
51.32
67.25
25535
28756
81850
112368
126183
237634
167084
220047
289528
386571
456009
42.02
17.96
862023
1051149
1177560
1912578
1784182
2545726
2823103
2955522
3805220
4903839
6085076
23.11
25.5
Orange-spotted spinefoot
Total
30