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A Critical Linguistic Study of the Representation of Islam and Muslims in
the Discourse of the New York Times Op-Eds
Rachid Acim
University Sultan Moulay Slimane
Beni Mellal, Morocco
Abstract
The present paper aims at studying the ideological discourse of the New York Times (and
henceforth NYT) Op-Eds (originally short form for “opposite the editorial page”, latterly
known as “opinion editorial”) written on Islam and Muslims, through the examination of
linguistic structures that are embedded in this opinion discourse. The linguistic analysis is
based on the theoretical framework of Critical Linguistics. Indeed, this analytical tool puts
much emphasis on the fundamental role and centrality of ideology in articulating certain
views and perceptions about Islam and Muslims. The data collected follows non-random
sampling and is retrieved from the NYT database after three months of digital subscription.
Within this journalistic discourse, language is viewed more than a vehicle for
communication; it is a carrier of ideology, a site of struggle and an energy that transforms
human experience into expression, or say simply opinion. The inclusion and exclusion of
certain linguistic structures such as passive and active forms, the excessive use of quasisynonymous terms and lexical items, as well as the (re)occurrence of a whole plethora of
nominal constructions, suggest that a process of selection is particular if not exclusive to the
opinion discourse of the New York Times Op-Eds addressing Islam and Muslims.
Keywords: The New York Times, Islam, Discourse, Op-Eds, Ideology
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“If a dog bites a man that’s not news, but if a man bites a dog, that’s news.”
Charles A. Dana
Introduction
The aim of the present paper is to scrutinize the main ideologies implicated in the
discourse of the NYT Op-Eds written about Islam and Muslims at the level of linguistic
structures. It is articulated within the multidisciplinary movement of Critical Linguistics (CL).
CL is a technique for analyzing and examining specific texts or speech acts as well as one
way of grasping the relationship between discourse, social and political phenomena. It
assumes that linguistic structures are never neutral, but rather they contribute to the creation
and reproduction of unequal power relations between social groups (Jackson, 2005, p. 25).
This framework of analysis is a useful strategy to analyze the representation of Islam
in the NYT Op-Eds in as much as it lifts off the veil about what is ordinary and commonsensical in order to get at the cryptic ideologies structured in discourse-be it print, audio or
whatsoever. In our view, CL is capable of uncovering ideological viewpoints through a
linguistic analysis of discourse. As Leonardi (2007, p. 73) puts it, “we do not speak or write at
random. Speaking or writing are social activities with a specific aim, that of expressing our
personal point of view about someone and/or something.” Having said that, CL is believed to
be the best instrument for unmasking the potential biases embedded in discourse and how
these biases are used to mystify or obscure the nature of language in news reporting. The
paper starts off by providing a brief overview of CL. Then, the discussion unfolds with the
aim of deconstructing and denaturalizing those ideologies formed through linguistic structures
such as nominalization, passivization and lexicalization.
Critical Linguistics
Critical Linguistics, more precisely Fowler (1991) approach, has been called for and
accommodated since it is viewed that it could help us reveal how the writers of the NYT OpEds use language and grammatical features to create meaning, to persuade people to think
about events related to Islam and Muslims in a particular way, and sometimes to even seek to
manipulate them while at the same time concealing their communicative and ideological
intentions. What is ordinary to people is no longer a thing that is ordinary or familiar in CL;
every single structure ought to be analyzed, castigated and questioned in this critical
approach.
Fowler (1991) heavily hinges on Systemic Functional Grammar (and henceforth, SFG)
theory to show how tools provided by this standard linguistic theory could be used to uncover
linguistic structures of power in texts. Not only in news discourse, but also in literary
criticism, Fowler (1991) illustrates that systemic grammatical devices function in establishing,
manipulating and naturalizing social hierarchies. He maintains that the selection of one
linguistic item over another is one solid evidence by which the writer’s ideology can be
traced. He even posits that linguistic forms, lexical items, and linguistic processes carry
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specific meanings. Any selection of these aforesaid items is never innocent or ideology-free
Alazzany, 2012). By contrast, it is articulated from an ideological viewpoint to be politically,
socially and economically situated and related to the various narrative voices within
discourse. In fact, “anything that is said or written about the world is articulated from a
particular ideological position: language is not a clear window but a refracting, structuring
medium” (Fowler, 1991, p. 10).
According to this critical model, the reporters of the NYT Op-Eds tend to use a wide
range of linguistic structures to ideologically thematize Islam and Muslims. Fowler (1991)
believes that linguistic structures have the potential for promoting the ideologies of writers
and institutions. Some of these strategies that have been suggested and identified by Fowler
(1991) are the strategies of choice and selection. The selection of certain topics to be
published as well as the choice of certain linguistic structures to report them are considered to
be ideological rather than accidental or conventional (see Alazzany, 2012). As a matter of
fact, any choice of words or syntactic constructions can have some ideological significance or
implication assigned to them.
Within this framework of analysis, we are going to focus only on three elements and
levels of linguistic analysis, namely nominalization, (over)lexicalisation and passivization.
These linguistic structures are highlighted in this paper to show that the communication and
the transmission of meaning in the discourse of the NYT Op-Eds is never innocent, but it rests
upon options: what to include and what to exclude, what to background and what to
foreground from the NYT Op-Eds addressing Islam and Muslims.
Nominalization
Alazzany (2012, p. 17) maintains that “nominalizations are used when agents are
unknown, when they have just been mentioned and should not be repeated, or when the
current focus is on other participants – such as the victims of violent actions rather than on the
actors. Fowler (1991), in turn, suggests that English language has often been called a
“nominalizing” language, particularly in dealing with “official, bureaucratic and formal
modes of discourse.” It is worth-stressing that nominalization is well motivated and opted for,
especially in the headlines of the NYT Op-Eds. Nominalization is not solely one ritual feature
that has evolved in the last decades to make print media discourse more ambiguous or even
obscure like passive constructions, but it is also one important resource and component for
organizing, arranging and presenting information together with opinion. Consider the
following headlines taken from the NYT Op-Eds haphazardly:
(1) AFTER AFGHANISTAN, A NEW GREAT GAME. The New York Times (Aug.
22, 2012. A25)
(2) EGYPT’S BUMBLING BROTHERHOOD. The New York Times (Feb. 4, 2011.
A27)
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(3) FIGHTING OVER GOD’S IMAGE. The New York Times (Sept. 27, 2012. A29)
(4) IN IRAQ, ABONDONING OUR FRIENDS. The New York Times (Dec. 16, 2011.
A24)
(5) EXPLOITING THE PROPHET. The New York Times (Sept. 23, 2012. SR13)
(6) TAKING BIN LADEN’S SIDE. The New York Times (Aug. 22, 2010. WK10)
(7) GOING MAD IN HERDS. The New York Times (Aug. 22, 2010. WK9)
(8) JOINING A DINNER IN A MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD HOME The New York
Times (Dec. 8, 2011. A39)
(9) MILITANTS, WOMEN AND TAHRIR SQ. The New York Times (Feb. 6, 2011.
WK8)
(10)
FINDING HOPE IN SYRIA. The New York Times (Sept. 8, 2011. A29)
(11) TALES FROM TORTURE’S DARK WORLD. The New York Times (Mar. 15,
2009. WK13)
In these headlines taken from the NYT Op-Eds of this analysis, nominal structures
have been carefully chosen to produce a specific effect on the readers. These nominal
structures are syntactic transformations that are awashed with much vagueness and ambiguity.
A quick look across the headlines mentioned above shows that the writers have used words
that are short, attention-getting and even confusing. They play on the potential for ambiguity
that can exist in the relationship between word and meaning (Rea, 1998, p. 17). Examples
from (1) to (11) displays that the writers’ tendency to omit the agents and doers of actions and
concentrate on the actions themselves for certain ideological reasons. To this end, it can be
said that nominalization in the NYT Op-Eds plays a very special and significant part, like
other linguistic and rhetorical devices. It is also significant that one finds nominalizations like
‘change’ and inanimate nouns like ‘capital’ and ‘technology’ as the agents of verbs, rather
than human agents. In thinking about the social effects of texts here, one might say that
nominalization contributes to what is, I think, a widespread elision of human agency in and
responsibility for processes in accounts of the ‘new global economy’, but it is clear that it is
not nominalization alone that contributes to this effect but a configuration of different
linguistic forms (Fairclough, 2003, p. 13). Biber (2007), in Billig (2013, p. 117), claims that
“discourses, which are rich with nominalizations, also tend to be rich with passivization and
vice-versa.” The subsection below details on this linguistic technique in the discourse of the
NYT Op-Eds.
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Passivization
As noted above, Fowler (1991) has concentrated on passivization as a linguistic
construction. He claimed that this construction heavily features in official language. By
passivizing, authorities can produce formal documents which describe actions and present
orders as agentless things, thereby achieving what Fowler et al (1979), in Billig (2013, p.
117), have called ‘agent-deletion’. To illustrate, authorities usually phrase orders in the
passive voice –‘You are requested not to walk on the grass’; ‘Students are informed that
essays should be submitted before 17.00’, etc. It is, therefore, claimed that when authorities
draw on the passive form, they are more likely capable of obscuring themselves as the authors
of these orders and they tend to introduce their orders and commands as if they were objective
necessities of the world. In the examples below, from (1) to (6), the writers have opted for
passive constructions (see italics) to emphasize their thematic priorities and to de-emphasize
the agents of the actions. Passivized objects (the attacks, the greatest suffering, we, U.S.
foreign policy, Muslims, the narrative, Hezbollah, the threat, thousands of people, more
people) “may seem to be agents, despite their real function as affected rather than affecting
roles” (Fowler, 1979, p. 209). Consider the following extracts:
(1) An open trial will also provide a catalyst for reflection among Americans on both
9/11 and its aftermath. The years before the attacks have been thoroughly hashed
out through the report of the 9/11 commission and by memoirs and histories. The
eight years since, a time of unremitting warfare, has had no similar opportunity for
taking stock. Regrettably, no trial can provide closure for the traumas of that day.
But a judgment in New York, where the greatest suffering was inflicted, will
remind us both of the narrow viciousness of the terrorists’ cause and of the
enduring strength of our own values. WHY WE SHOULD PUT JIHAD ON
TRIAL. The New York Times (Nov. 18, 2009. A35).
(2) For what it’s worth, I’d say Ikenberry underestimates the power of nationalism.
There’s little evidence that different nations with their contradictory moral cultures
can really cooperate, except in utter crisis. But I’d also say Kagan underplays
postnational threats. More than in the 19th century, security threats come in the
form of global guerrillas, loose nukes and disintegrating nations.
Instead, we’re trapped in a hybrid world, in which many problems are
postnational but the social structures are unavoidably national. The interesting
bright spot is that both Ikenberry and Kagan believe in a Concert of Democracies,
an emerging body where countries that do share values can rebut autocracy and
consolidate their common success. It’s a start. A NEW GLOBAL BLUEPRINT.
The New York Times (Jun. 19, 2007. A21)
(3) Yes, after two decades in which U.S. foreign policy has been largely dedicated to
rescuing Muslims or trying to help free them from tyranny — in Bosnia, Darfur,
Kuwait, Somalia, Lebanon, Kurdistan, post-earthquake Pakistan, post-tsunami
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Indonesia, Iraq and Afghanistan — a narrative that says America is dedicated to
keeping Muslims down is thriving. AMERICA VS. THE NARRATIVE. The
New York Times (Nov. 29, 2009. WK8).
(4) Although most of the Muslims being killed today are being killed by jihadist
suicide bombers in Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan and Indonesia, you’d never know it
from listening to their world. The dominant narrative there is that 9/11 was a kind
of fraud: America’s unprovoked onslaught on Islam is the real story, and the
Muslims are the real victims — of U.S. perfidy. Have no doubt: we punched a fist
into the Arab/Muslim world after 9/11, partly to send a message of deterrence, but
primarily to destroy two tyrannical regimes — the Taliban and the Baathists —
and to work with Afghans and Iraqis to build a different kind of politics. In the
process, we did some stupid and bad things. But for every Abu Ghraib, our
soldiers and diplomats perpetrated a million acts of kindness aimed at giving Arabs
and Muslims a better chance to succeed with modernity and to elect their own
leaders. The Narrative was concocted by jihadists to obscure that (ibid).
(5) Hezbollah was defeated in the Lebanese elections. Hamas is facing an energized
Fatah in the West Bank and is increasingly unpopular in Gaza. Iraqi Sunnis have
ousted the jihadists thanks to the tribal awakening movement, while the biggest
pro-Iranian party in Iraq got trounced in the recent provincial runoff. And in Iran,
millions of Iranians starving for more freedom rallied to the presidential candidate
Mr Hussein Moussavi, forcing President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to steal the
election. (If he really won the Iranian election, as Ahmadinejad claims, by a 2-to-1
margin, wouldn’t he invite the whole world in to recount the votes? Why hasn’t
he?) THE VIRTUAL MOSQUE. The New York Times (Jun. 17, 2009. A27).
(6) Within weeks, the threat to eastern Libya was minimized, giving the rebel
movement breathing space to gain cohesion and battlefield experience and
eventually defeat Colonel Qaddafi’s small and increasingly unpopular army.
In the past few decades, the United States and other countries have successfully
intervened for humanitarian purposes on three other occasions — in 1991, to stop
Saddam Hussein’s attempted massacre of the Kurds in northern Iraq after the gulf
war, and to protect first Bosnians, in 1993, and then Kosovars, in 1999, from the
Serbs’ attempts at ethnic cleansing. All three humanitarian interventions occurred
after thousands of people had been killed and exponentially more people had been
injured or displaced. And all three were successful and saved thousands of lives.
WHY WE SHOULDN’T ATTACK SYRIA (YET)? The New York Times
(Feb. 3, 2012. A25).
Passive constructions are usually formed by using the passive auxiliary “be” and the
main verb has an –ed inflection if it is regular. They often obfuscate and overshadow
meaning. They even tend to create serious problems to computerized grammar checkers and
people are advised against the overuse of the passive forms. The latter’s use is recommended
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in two kinds of situations: to express an action whose subject is unknown or when it is
advantageous and tactful not to make the subject known. In examples (2), (3), (5) and (6),
agents have been deliberately omitted. Clearly, transformations of active constructions into
passive forms can be motivated by the desire to elide agency and therefore systematically
background responsibility for actions in some instances or to foreground responsibility in
others (Opie, 2004, p. 42). Trew (1979), in Mills (1997, p. 135), has already analyzed a series
of South African newspaper headlines where the overall message of the text seemed to
depend on choices over the use of the passive or active voice. Thus, one newspaper headline
read:
RIOTING
BLACKS
SHOT DEAD BY POLICE AS LEADERS MEET
(The Times, 1975, cited in Mills, 1997 p. 135)
Trew (1979) argues that choosing the passive (Blacks [are] shot by police) has the
effect of making the actions of the Black people more salient than the actions of the police.
Furthermore, choosing to place the term ‘rioting Blacks’ first has the effect of minimizing the
actions of the police. He contrasts this with a phrase like ‘Police shoot Blacks’, where it is
clear who is responsible for the unrest. By modifying the term ‘Blacks’ by the word ‘rioting’,
Trew (1979) argues, a value judgment is implicit in the headline so to who is responsible for
the unrest. In examples (7), (9) and (10), agency is denied and the NYT reader is incapable of
decoding who is really in power, performing the action. While in example (9), there is a total
deletion of the agents as the reader does not know who attacked those women wearing hijab,
who vandalized mosques and firebombed them, in fact, no information is given on who is to
be held accountable for the beheading act in example (10). The favouring of these passive
constructions rather than active ones tend to obscure and disguise who is responsible for all
these events. Now, examine the following excerpts elucidating this linguistic phenomenon:
7) This error was compounded when the Brotherhood threw in its lot with
Mohamed ElBaradei, the former diplomat and Nobel Prize winner. A
Brotherhood spokesman, Dr. Essam el-Erian, told Al Jazeera, “Political groups
support ElBaradei to negotiate with the regime.” But when Mr. ElBaradei strode
into Tahrir Square, many ignored him and few rallied to his side despite the
enormous publicity he was receiving in the Western press. The Brotherhood
realized that in addition to being late, it might be backing the wrong horse.
EGYPT’S BUMBLING BROTHERHOOD. The New York Times (Feb. 4,
201. A27).
8) The Muslim Brotherhood, whose party is called Freedom and Justice, draws a
lot of support from the middle classes and small businesses. The Salafist Al Nour
Party is dominated by religious sheiks and the rural and urban poor.
POLITICAL ISLAM WITHOUT OIL. The New York Times (Jan. 11, 2012.
A27).
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9) We discovered that well before the debate last year over a proposed Islamic
center in Lower Manhattan, American Muslims felt under siege. We heard
heartbreaking stories: schoolchildren assaulted as “terrorists,” women wearing
the
hijab
attacked,
and
mosques
vandalized
and
firebombed.
FAIR TO MUSLIMS? The New York Times. (Mar.9, 2011. A27).
10) Meanwhile, the Iraqis who loyally served us are under threat. The extremist
Shiite leader Moktada al-Sadr has declared the Iraqis who helped America
“outcasts.” When Britain pulled out of Iraq a few years ago, there was a public
execution of 17 such outcasts — their bodies dumped in the streets of Basra as a
warning. Just a few weeks ago, an Iraqi interpreter for the United States Army got
a knock on his door; an Iraqi policeman told him threateningly that he would
soon be beheaded. Another employee, at the American base in Ramadi, is in
hiding after receiving a death threat from Mr. Sadr’s militia.
IN IRAQ ABANDONING OUR FRIENDS. The New York Times (Dec. 16,
2011. A24).
11) The waning relevance of Al Qaeda and authoritarian legitimacy opened a
political space for the Jasmine Revolution in Tunis and the Tahrir Square uprising
in Egypt. Islamists and their sympathizers have been involved in the
antigovernment movements. Some might once have been lured by Qaeda
mythology, but most seek to blend democracy and pluralism with the tenets of
Islamic civilization. BIN LADEN WAS DEAD ALREADY. The New York
Times (May. 8, 2011. WK10).
As for examples (8) and (11), in concord with Trew’s (1979) supposition, the matter
differs quite markedly. The writers opted for certain choices as they, wittingly or unwittingly,
resolved to spot the light on “the Salafist Al Nour Party” and “Islamists” and minimize the
actions of “religious sheiks and the rural and urban poor”, along with “Qaeda mythology”.
These terms have been foregrounded because they seem to be important in so far as the NYT
writers are concerned. In the subsection that follows, we diagnose (over)lexicalization as
another linguistic structure dominating the discourse of the NYT Op-Eds on Islam and
Muslims.
(Over)Lexicalization
Various linguistic techniques are used by the writers of the NYT Op-Eds in their
thematisation and representation of Islam and Muslims. Through over-lexicalization for
example, these writers tend unobtrusively to focus their audience’s attention onto topics
which they consider to be so important and valuable. The use of a large number of
synonymous terms for the same referent in the Op-Eds is not to be taken for granted. Fowler
(1991, p. 85) points out that “we must mention over-lexicalization, which is the existence of
an excess of quasi-synonymous terms for entities and ideas that are a particular preoccupation
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or problem in the culture’s discourse.” The proliferation of (often pejorative) words for
designating Muslims and Islam has often been mentioned. In a startling example of overlexicalization, one can note that the NYT reporters used different lexical structures to
designate Muslims. These lexical choices include “desert Islam”, “coastal Islam”, “riverine
Islam”, “Sunni extremists”, “Sunni Islam”, “conservative Muslim”, “extreme Muslim
groups”, “American Muslims”, “Muslim activists”, “Islamist ideologues”, “militant jihadists”,
“the extremist Shiite”, “Islamist extremists”, “extremist groups”, “Islamist extremism”,
“Islamist states”, “Islamic radicalism”, “Islamist movements”, “Islamic theocracy”, “Islamist
parties”, “Muslim rage”, “irate Muslims”, “Islamic terror”, “Muslim suicide bombers”,
“jihadist violence”, “angry jihadists”, “jihadist bombers”, “radical salafis”, etc. Excerpt [A23]
is brought to the fore to elucidate more this point in question. In this extract, the writer has
over-used different lexes to refer to Muslims. These lexical choices and carefully selected
terms will be italicized below for more guidance to the reader:
Often forgotten amid the ugly violence of Al Qaeda’s attacks was that the
terrorists’ declared goal was to replace existing governments in the Muslim
world with religiously pure Islamist states and eventually restore an Islamic
caliphate. High on Al Qaeda’s list of targets was Egypt’s president, Hosni
Mubarak. The protesters of Tahrir Square succeeded in removing him without
terrorism and without Al Qaeda (…).
But such rejoicing would be premature. To many Islamist ideologues, the Arab
Spring simply represents the removal of obstacles that stood in the way of
establishing the caliphate. Their goal has not changed, nor has their willingness
to use terrorism. BIN LADEN’S DEAD. AL QAEDA’S NOT. The New
York Times (May. 3, 2011. A23)
The reader of excerpt [A23] might think that the terms italicized can be used
interchangeably. Therefore, “Islamist ideologues” are “extremist groups”; they are themselves
“Islamist extremists”; they are “militant jihadists”; and they are themselves “moderate
Muslims”. The promotion of such an interpretation is consequently particularly hazardous to
the integration and well-being of Muslim minorities in America and other parts of the globe.
We ought to remember that not all Americans and Westerners are cognizant and aware of the
differences between all these terms and lexical structures we came to mention above.
In another occasion, the Op-Ed writer has used a huge reservoir of words and phrases
that are attributable to Islam and Muslims. The presence of lexical items like “Sunni Islamist
radicalism”, “Salafism”, “Sunni Salafi groupings”, “Sunni Salafism”, along with “Salafi
adherents” and “Islamist militants” blur one’s view in regard to Islam as a faith and a culture.
The reader will inevitably be lost in this labyrinth of synonymous terms and dictions.
Consider the italicized words in [A23] below:
Last week, Saudi Arabia donated $100 million to the United Nations to fund a
counterterrorism agency. This was a welcome contribution, but last year, Saudi
Arabia rejected a rotating seat on the United Nations Security Council. This
half-in, half-out posture of the Saudi kingdom is a reflection of its inner
paralysis in dealing with Sunni Islamist radicalism: It wants to stop violence,
but will not address the Salafism that helps justify it.
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Let’s be clear: Al Qaeda, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, Boko Haram, the
Shabab and others are all violent Sunni Salafi groupings. For five decades,
Saudi Arabia has been the official sponsor of Sunni Salafism across the globe.
Most Sunni Muslims around the world, approximately 90 percent of the Muslim
population, are not Salafis. Salafism is seen as too rigid, too literalist, too
detached from mainstream Islam. While Shiite and other denominations
account for 10 percent of the total, Salafi adherents and other fundamentalists
represent 3 percent of the world’s Muslims (...).
We are rightly outraged at the beheading of James Foley by Islamist militants,
and by ISIS’ other atrocities, but we overlook the public executions by
beheading permitted by Saudi Arabia. By licensing such barbarity, the kingdom
normalizes and indirectly encourages such punishments elsewhere. When the
country that does so is the birthplace of Islam, that message resonates. SAUDIS
MUST STOP EXPORTING EXTREMISM. The New York Times
(Aug. 22, 2014. A23).
It is suggested that the proliferation of these different words in the same area of
meaning are more likely to have an ideological overtone. Far from being a stylistic
shortcoming, (over)lexicalisation refers to a certain ideology in discourse. In this respect,
Fairclough (1989, p. 96) writes: “We sometimes have ‘overwording’ – and unusually high
degree of wording, often involving many words which are synonyms. Overwording shows
preoccupation with some aspect of reality -- which may indicate that it is a focus of
ideological struggle.” This linguistic is naturalized in the next extract [SR11]:
There is so much state failure in the Arab world, argues Fukuyama, because of
the persistence there of kinship/tribal loyalties — “meaning that you can only
trust that narrow group of people in your tribe.” You can’t build a strong,
impersonal, merit-based state when the only ties that bind are shared kin, not
shared values. It took China and Europe centuries to make that transition, but
they did. If the Arab world can’t overcome its tribalism and sectarianism in the
face of ISIS barbarism, “then there is nothing we can do,” said Fukuyama. And
theirs will be a future of many dark nights. ISIS, BOKO HARAM AND
BATMAN. The New York Times (Oct. 5, 2014. SR11).
This extract is pregnant with some words with are presumed to have the same
meaning. Note the occurrence of terms like “kinship” and “tribal”, “tribalism” and
“sectarianism”, or even “barbarism”. The common denominator between them is that they all
tend to smear, deform and slander the Arab world, a term which is quite misleading in the
English academia, let alone the NYT reporting network. In excerpt [A23], the writer has once
again utilized different equivalents whilst referring to the perpetrators of the terror attack
storming Charlie Hebdo’s offices in Paris. From his proper perspective, “Islamic extremists”
are “fanatical Muslims” and “Islamic intolerance” is not dissimilar from “Islamic extremism.”
In fact, the overuse of these terms in the extract below denotes that the writer is good at
problematizing Islam and criminalizing Muslims.
Yet when masked gunmen stormed Charlie Hebdo’s offices in Paris on
Wednesday with AK-47s, murdering 12 people in the worst terror attack on
French soil in decades, many of us assumed immediately that the perpetrators
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weren’t Christian or Jewish fanatics but more likely Islamic extremists. Outraged
Christians, Jews or atheists might vent frustrations on Facebook or Twitter. Yet
it looks as if Islamic extremists once again have expressed their displeasure with
bullets. Many ask, Is there something about Islam that leads inexorably to
violence, terrorism and subjugation of women?
(…) The question arises because fanatical Muslims so often seem to murder in
the name of God, from the 2004 Madrid train bombing that killed 191 people to
the murder of hostages at a cafe in Sydney, Australia, last month. I wrote last
year of a growing strain of intolerance in the Islamic world after a brave
Pakistani lawyer friend of mine, Rashid Rehman, was murdered for defending a
university professor falsely accused of insulting the Prophet Muhammad.
(…) So, sure, there’s a strain of Islamic intolerance and extremism that is the
backdrop to the attack on Charlie Hebdo. The magazine was firebombed in 2011
after a cover depicted Muhammad saying, “100 lashes if you’re not dying of
laughter.” IS ISLAM TO BLAME FOR THE SHOOTING AT CHARLIE
HEBDO IN PARIS. The New York Times (Jan. 8, 2015. A23).
As stated somewhere, the excess use of synonyms to refer to the same entity is
regarded as being ideologically revealing. At this juncture, it can be argued that
(over)lexicalization, as one linguistic component, besides being a good indicator that points to
the areas which are particularly problematic in a culture, is itself a social practice that is
intended to produce a considerable effect on the reader and propels him/her to take sides visà-vis Islam and Muslims.
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Conclusion
This paper has tried to put into focus the major linguistic structures that are utilized in
the discourse of the NYT Op-Eds about Islam and Muslims. It is believed that these structures
are ideologically charged. The presence of nominalization, passivization and
(over)lexicalization, to a large extent, contributes to the propagation of different ideologies
and attitudes about Islam and Muslims. It may be true that the NYT, as a leading news
agency, own a huge body of reporters specialized in Islam and Muslims. Yet, its editorial
board is there to review, produce and reproduce the Op-Eds through processes of inclusion
and exclusion. So, by choosing nominal structures, for example, agency becomes denied and
even unknown to the reader. The corollary of this is both confusion and obscurity as regards
meaning and interpretation. Regarding passive constructions, as one powerful semantic tool, it
is found that the NYT Op-Eds tends to foreground certain features about Islam and Muslims
and background other ones. More awful than this, the continuous occurrence and reoccurrence
of certain lexical items, phrases and vocabulary are more likely to slant or misrepresent Islam
and Muslims not because the discriminating images produced turn fixed and stable in the
NYT Op-Eds, but mainly because Islam and Muslims are themselves projected more as a
problem than as an ordinary thematic customarily reported on. Thus, the pivotal role of CL is
to demonstrate that ideological structures are at the heart of the NYT Op-Eds. As they involve
opinion and points of view, these Op-Eds should be dealt with critically since they are more
likely to reinforce ideology.
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