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Ma#hew Barber
To what extent was the lack of industry and
infrastructure the principle reason for
Southern defeat in the American Civil War?
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….1
IntroducEon……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………...2
Ma#hew Barber
Literature review……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….3
Discussion………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….4
-Lack of Industry and Infrastructure……………………………………………………………………………..…4.1
-Loss of will……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..4.2
-Internal divisions……………………………………………………………………………………………………………4.3
-PoliEcal leadership………………………………………………………………………………………………………...4.4
-Military leadership…………………………………………………………………………………………………………4.5
-Strategy…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………4.6
-Slavery…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..4.7
-ConEngency…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..4.8
Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………5
Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………6
1. Abstract
Ma#hew Barber
The quesEon of why did the South lose the Civil War has been asked by historians since the end of
the war. Many aspects of the Confederate war effort have been scruEnised such as military strategy
or poliEcal leadership however when looking at industry and infrastructure, I will aim to look at a
more general view of the war, examining the Eme running up to the beginning of the war as well as
the war itself. This has been done for example for slavery, but li#le has been wri#en specifically
quesEoning whether the lack of industry and infrastructure was the main reason for southern defeat.
In this dissertaEon, I concluded that weak strategy, compounded by weak military leadership was the
primary reason for Southern defeat in the Civil War.
2. IntroducEon
The quesEon whether the lack of industry and infrastructure was the principle reason why the South
lost the civil war is a key one since industry and infrastructure are two crucial necessiEes for any
naEon to have in order to fight a successful war. Before the Civil War, the South was largely agrarian
in its nature and co#on was king. Towns and ciEes were generally small and larger ones were almost
always on the Coast or a river, acEng as gateways between the farming interior of the land, to the
export markets abroad. The insEtuEon underpinning the whole Southern way of life, the
‘plantocracy’ as it is called with rich plantaEon owners being in control, was slavery. Long before the
Civil Wall, during the Eme of the establishment of the United States in the late Eighteenth Century,
slavery was seen as an evil necessity that would soon disappear. However with the invenEon of the
co#on which revoluEonised the way co#on was farmed, slavery became very profitable and soon
people began to defend it in earnest. Transforming from a social evil that simply was necessary, it
became in the eyes of its defenders a force for good social order and stability.
By the Eme of the civil war, the Southern way of life was the complete opposite of the North. During
the early Nineteenth Century, many Northern states abolished slavery and aboliEon as a concept
developed as a naEonwide movement. In addiEon to this, the North rapidly industrialised in the two
decades before the civil war, causing further divide between North and South. Furthermore the
Northern populaEon exploded. The North had huge industrial capability and infrastructure to go with
it, mainly the railway, with tens of thousands of miles of track being laid in the 1850s. Slavery
became a point of hatred for many and the seeds of the Civil War were sewn.
In this dissertaEon I will be assessing, rather than the causes of the Civil War, the reasons why it
ended as it did. I will look at a number of key factors that I feel are the most important when judging
the reason for Southern defeat. These will include the lack of industry and infrastructure of course
but also comparing this to the relaEve significance of leadership, both poliEcal and military. Linked to
this is the strategy taken by the South as well as the war effort at home mainly focussing on the
strength of Southern will and unity. I will also look at two more abstract reasons; slavery itself and
conEngency. I will assess the role of slavery in the South’s defeat but with conEngency, I will consider
whether a reason for defeat could simply be luck at certain points during the war. These reasons will
hopefully allow me to fully answer my quesEon and consider all the factors in the war.
3. Literature Review
While many historians at the Eme of the Civil War sancEfied the war as the Great War that ended
slavery and portrayed Lincoln as the great emancipator, more contemporary historians have stripped
away the ‘glory’ of the war and quesEoned it directly.
Ma#hew Barber
In the 1920s, the progressive school of thought argued that the root cause of the war were the
economic and social differences between North and South. The South seceded and fought the war to
preserve the agrarian plantaEon society of agriculture against the industrialising capitalism of the
North. They fought to preserve their civilisaEon from Northern businessmen and their growing
ambiEons. It cannot be a coincidence that this interpretaEon of the war emerged at a similar Eme to
when Gone With the Wind was published which portrayed the South as a civilised society, fighEng to
preserve their way of life. 1 This argument was held by many white racists in the South.
By the 1940s however, the revisionist school of thought came up with a different argument, claiming
that the secEonal differences between North and South were not a root cause at all and the
differences didn’t exist at all. The revisionists argued that no secEonal divide resulted in the war.
They argued that it was rather the work of poliEcians that blundered into the war, led on by
extremists from both sides. They insisted that any differences could have been contained peacefully
and the war was a terrible mistake.2 This isn’t hard to believe either, following on from two world
wars which had seen so much destrucEon, this school of thought is partly born out of a hate for war,
and the failure of poliEcians to do anything about it.
Many historians looked at the civil war with too much hindsight, seeing the result of the war, mainly
the emancipaEon of the slaves, as a principle reason why the war broke out. While overall this can
be jusEfied, most Northerners didn’t enter the war thinking of emancipaEon of slaves as the aim of
the war, rather many, like Lincoln, believed the Southern states were rebels and it was a war to
reunite the Union. The emancipaEon proclamaEon was simply a war tacEc to aid the North and
possibly prevent European help for the South. The view that all the horrific suffering and death of the
war was simply part of the great struggle to achieve emancipaEon cannot be jusEfied and historians
have now quesEoned this view and most now would argue the war was a mistake and caused
unnecessary death and destrucEon.
The war must be seen as a vast accumulaEon of different events and issues that resulted in the
secession crisis in 1860-61, rather than Northern victory being inevitable, something stressed in
Whig history which must quesEoned. We must consider that there were many Emes during the war
that Union surrender was very likely, even as late as 1864, just before the PresidenEal elecEons, acer
the stalling of the Union war effort. However the NaEonalist school of thought believes that, as well
as the war being a culminaEon of many different factors, the principle cause of the war was slavery.
Slavery prevented the South from industrialising and modernising and therefore the industrialised
North and the rural and agrarian South were pracEcally guaranteed to go to war against each other
and conflict was unavoidable. This belief is also deeply rooted in the African American school of
thought which looks at the war from a racial perspecEve, seeing the prejudiced views of whites and
therefore their jusEficaEons of slavery, as the principle reason for civil war. This is today the main
school of thought on the subject and the progressive and revisionist arguments are mainly
discredited. The argument that slavery was the root cause isn’t new, it was actually said by Lincoln at
his second inaugural address in March 1865. It can therefore be said that historians have come full
circle in their thinking.
Yet when looking at the reasons why the South was defeated in the Civil War, there are many
arguments surrounding this quesEon. The main argument by historians for Northern victory and
1
A, Farmer, The American Civil War: Causes, course and consequences 1803-1877, Hodder EducaEon (2008),
p. 107
2
Ibid., p. 107
Ma#hew Barber
Southern defeat was the Confederacy was simply outmanned and outgunned by the North and
Southern defeat was only a ma#er of Eme; the rather surprising fact was the Confederate States
lasted as long as it did. Another factor that comes into this argument is the lack of internaEonal
recogniEon for the South which hindered any peace negoEaEons. This argument is supported by a
majority of historians such as McPherson and is a clear answer to why the North won. However my
quesEon is concerning why the South lost, not why did the North win. I feel this disEncEon can be
made since I will focus mainly on Southern failures and weaknesses rather than Northern strengths.
These views come from more contemporary historians who have wri#en in the last half century on
the war.
Historian James McPherson cleverly cites in his book Ba#le Cry of Freedom that the American victory
in the War of Independence and the American defeat in Vietnam show that a side with superior
numbers and military capability does not guarantee victory. While he does admit that superior guns
and number of soldiers did contribute to Northern victory, it does not explain Southern defeat. He
argues that substandard Southern leadership was responsible for losing the war, principally Jefferson
Davis. Even though the North was arguably far more divided than the South, the leadership offered
by Lincoln far outstripped what was offered by Davis. Furthermore the superior leadership goes
further than just poliEcal leaders and McPherson also suggests that Northern military leaders were
also involved. By 1863-64, the Union had evolved the Grant and Sherman combinaEon, supported by
other very competent generals such as Sheridan. On the other hand in the Confederacy, while it can
be argued that Lee was a superior general in what he achieved with the limited resources the Army
of Northern Virginia had, he had no supporEng generals of comparable skill. So the North had a team
of excellent generals while the South relied almost totally on Lee. In addiEon to the leaders
themselves, McPherson also points to their strategy of destroying the South’s resources to fight the
war, including slavery, which eventually saw the fall of the Confederacy by 1865. He concludes that it
was the combinaEon of superior poliEcal leadership coupled with superior military leadership which
saw the downfall of the South. I support this view so far that it also accepts that by default Southern
leadership was poor, but I strongly believe that there were other factors at work.
While historian Richard McMurry agrees with McPherson that it was the military leadership in the
South, apart from Lee, that simply wasn’t good enough to stand up to Grant and Sherman, many
other historians disagree with McPherson and argue it was more than just poor leadership that
caused the South to be defeated.
Professor Gary Gallagher claims that rather than it being poor leadership, he also argues that the
long term military strategy of the Confederacy failed to achieve its aim; peace with the North and
independence for the South. He argues that the South simply didn’t win enough victories in a quick
enough succession to be able to force the Union to negoEate for peace. Lee’s strategy was an
offensive one while President Davis saw the war as a defensive one; this difference resulted in
conflicEng aims for the war. Lee is criEcised for wasEng valuable men and equipment following an
offensive strategy to try and defeat the Union in large scale ba#les. Davis on the other hand saw the
aim as defending the Confederacy unEl the North couldn’t fight anymore. But it can be argued the
only way for the Confederacy to win the war was to either force France or Britain to intervene, or
crack Northern morale, something very nearly done in summer 1864. So a strategy that didn’t
involve large scale ba#les with federal armies wouldn’t have achieved victory for the South. So
therefore Lee’s strategy could have been the correct one, and as Gallagher says, Lee simply didn’t
win enough ba#les to force Union surrender. This argument is supported by historian Edwin C.
Bearss who argues that if the South wished to win the war, it would have to do so quickly in what
Ma#hew Barber
Bearss describes as a Blitzkrieg style war. This type of combat is reflected in Lee’s Seven-Day
campaign which forced the Union army to abandon the Peninsula campaign but caused severe
casualEes.
A completely different strand of thinking on the part of historians is the argument that the South
lacked the will to win the war. While there were a large number of Union supporters in the South,
especially in the Appalachian Mountains, this argument suggests even strong supporters of the
Confederacy lost faith during the war and this was reflected on the ba#lefield and ulEmately caused
the South to lose. Some would go so far as to say that when Southerners went into the war they
didn’t have the collecEve will to win it and therefore defeat was inevitable. This has been debated
however if we look at events that would show lack of support. The closest event in the South were
the bread riots in Richmond, while in the North the drac riots in 1863 clearly show a lack of support
for the war. The bread riots simply were about not having enough food. Furthermore if we look at
le#ers from Confederate soldiers wriEng back home we see them far more commi#ed to the war
than expected, including soldiers from Border States such as Kentucky, and those whose family didn’t
own slaves. In comparison, Northern soldiers, while patrioEc, didn’t have the same level of
commitment to the aim of the war. While the South was fighEng for their independence and the
defence of their homeland, the Northern argument for fighEng the war was more complicated.
Soldiers went to fight for the reunificaEon of the Union and to crush the rebellion.
My dissertaEon will cover all of the arguments discussed and will answer the quesEon why the
Confederacy lost but will focus on the argument of whether the South was defeated because it was
outmanned and outgunned. This argument has been neglected in my opinion and I will endeavour to
understand the impact of a lack of industry and infrastructure on the South’s ability to fight the war.
Here I will be asking why it could have been defeated in this way, assessing the situaEon in the South
before the war started. Therefore with my quesEon I will be looking at the previous condiEon of the
South before war broke out as well as the war itself. I believe that many of the reasons for Southern
defeat lie in what the South actually was as an enEty and what contribuEon this had to Confederate
defeat. I will therefore also be looking at the effects of slavery on the South, during the war as well as
before it. Since I am looking at industry and infrastructure investment in the South before the war
started, this has a lot to do with the Confederacy’s ability to not only fight a war, but being able to
support a long war which it seems it couldn’t by the end and I want to understand why and to what
extent this caused Southern defeat.
4. Discussion
4.1
Why the South lost the war is juxtaposed the quesEon why did the North win since it asks not for
what reasons did the North win for example more soldiers, but it asks what reason caused, or at
least was the main contributor to, Confederate defeat. Industry and Infrastructure was something
the South sincerely lacked before the Civil War, with 90% of manufacturing output and 97% of
weapon manufacturing coming from the North in 1860.3 While the efforts of Josiah Gorgas at the
Ordinance Bureau to create a Confederate industry to supply the armies did enable the Confederacy
to keep fighEng, it was more down to a lack of materials at the end of the war coupled with lack of
3
B. Arrington, “Industry and Economy during the Civil War”, The Civil War Remembered (2011)
Ma#hew Barber
food, men and transportaEon that caused industry to falter.4 Furthermore, the South imported much
of its war resources such as 60% of small arms and nearly all paper used to make cartridges and
when the Union blockade truly became effecEve towards the end of the war, the Confederacy
suffered.5 So we can see that a lack of industry before the start of the war was recEfied during the
war to create the bare necessiEes to be able to fight the war, however as well as industry we must
also look at the lack of infrastructure in the South and its contribuEon to the Southern defeat. By
1861 the North had laid down 22,000 miles of track in comparison to 9,600 miles in the South. Many
Southerners viewed railroads simply as a way of transporEng co#on to the coast. This iniEal lack of
railways before the start of the war was compounded by a lack of materials and people to ensure
they kept running during the war. Most of the iron used for the railways in the South was imported
from Britain and with blockade runners in the early years of the war more concerned with making
money by bringing in luxury items than materials needed for the war, railroads couldn't be repaired
and the South's ability to move troops and resources around the Confederacy slowed dramaEcally.6
In comparison, in the North, the War Department created the United States Military Railroads which
was tasked with creaEng a rail network that allowed Union troops and materials to be carried to the
front lines and also to operate captured Confederate railways.7 By the end of the war it was the
largest rail network in the world. With the South, I believe that a similar undertaking would have
been made, if resources hadn’t been so scarce. These differences between North and South in terms
of industry and infrastructure show that the North had huge advantages over the South, however I
do not believe this had a direct impact on Southern defeat. The lack of industry, infrastructure,
materials and men denied the South the ability to fight a long, drawn out war with the North which
the Civil War turned out to be. Therefore we can say the North won because they slowly wore the
South down unEl the Confederate war effort broke down. In addiEon to this, it can also be said that
since the North had a populaEon of 22 million in comparison to 9 million in the South (of which only
5.5 million were free), the North had an advantage of 2 to 1 in terms of soldiers for most of the war
and God was on the side of the heaviest ba#alions. 8 From this point of view, since the South was
outmanned and outgunned it was no surprise they lost and defeat was inevitable.9 Yet the heaviest
ba#alions are not guaranteed by the larger populaEon or wealth as well as Professor McPherson
discusses other wars for example the Paraguayan War of 1864-70 in which the smaller side wins wars
against a much more powerful opponent such as during the American War of Independence.10 Since
previous examples demonstrate that the South in theory could have won because of the defensive
nature of its fight and the need for the Union to invade and then occupy the South, some other
factors must be at work which caused the Confederacy to be defeated. However, it is important to
note that wars such as the war in Paraguay did end up being a guerrilla war for the last four years of
the war. In the case of the Civil War, even though President Davis did call for a guerrilla war to
conEnue acer 1865, his call went unheard and the war ended.
4.2
4
A. Farmer, The American Civil War: Causes, course and consequences, 1803-77 (2006). P. 123
5
Ibid., p. 123
6
Ibid., p. 124
7
B. Arrington, “Industry and Economy during the Civil War”, The Civil War Remembered (2011)
8
J. McPherson, Ba#le Cry of Freedom, (1988), p. 855
9
Ibid., p. 855
10
R. Mitchell, Why the Confederacy Lost, (1992), p. 122; Ibid., p. 855
Ma#hew Barber
One key argument is a loss of will on the part of the people of the South. This argument suggests
that because of defeat, Southerners lost the will to fight on for their independence. Because the
Union had superior will on the part of its people, they won the war. In Gabor S. Borri#’s Why the
Confederacy Lost, historian Reid Mitchell compares the Civil War to the Vietnam War where a
general lack of will on behalf of Americans can be argued to be a main reason for defeat in Vietnam.
However, as he goes onto say, no-one every quesEoned what would have happened if, in 1861,
Union men didn’t sign up in droves as they did.11 Confederate independence would have been a fact
and the North would have been powerless to do anything12. Yet because they did sign up, so many
that thousands had to be turned away, we must ask why and to what extent this equivalent
happened in the South? The main argument put forward by Mitchell is the soldiers love for the
Union.13 They had been handed the precious concept of the United States of America down from the
founding fathers and each generaEon needed to uphold and protect it.14 Le#ers home show that
they felt a sense of pride when they were at the front of the Union and “nothing but darkness and
Rebellion is beyond.”15 However I believe this argument doesn’t stand up to scruEny. If we look also
at le#ers sent home from Confederate soldiers during the whole course of the war, we can see a high
level of commitment to the cause, even from soldiers from Border States such as Kentucky and
Tennessee. It can even be argued that Southerners had a much greater sense of patrioEsm and
vested interest in their success in the war than the North since they had much more to lose.16
Furthermore, many of these soldiers didn’t own slaves so to argue only people who had a vested
interest in seeing an independent South, because they owned slaves, is not supported, however
many poor whites did have a vested interest in slavery since it kept them from being at the bo#om of
the social hierarchy. In addiEon to this, we can point out the level of deserEons from the Army of
Northern Virginia in late 1864 to early 1865. Tens of thousands of Southerners deserted so it can be
argued that because the same thing wasn’t seen in the North, the South lacked the collecEve will to
win. However evidence from reasons why soldiers deserted suggests that they lec not because they
didn’t believe they could win the war, but it was because of le#ers they were receiving from home,
telling of the hardships their families were facing such as food shortages. Many soldiers lec
Confederate armies to help at home and then they later would return. So to argue that in
comparison Northern soldiers had more commitment than Southerners cannot be jusEfied. To add to
this, we must also analyse the war effort at home, away from the ba#lefield, and the possible lack of
will there and in the case of the South this primarily concerns Southern women. While many
historians point at class divisions in the South, historian Drew Gilpin Faust stresses that the role of
women has been overlooked and that because women became disenchanted with the war
conEnuing, it soon ended because of this.17 The role of women in the North is less regarded as a
factor in Union victory due to the North’s much larger populaEon and therefore a much smaller
proporEon of men went to fight in comparison to the South. Yet Professor McPherson argues we
11
R. Mitchell, Why the Confederacy Lost, (1992), p. 124
12
Ibid., p. 124
13
Ibid., p. 124
14
W. Fisk, AnE-Rebel: The Civil War Le#ers of Wilbur Fisk, (1983), p. 19
15
Ibid., p. 124
16
J. McPherson, Why the Confederacy Lost, (1992), p. 41
D. G. Faust, “Altars of Sacrifice: Confederate Women and the NarraEves of War,” Journal of American History,
78 (March 1990), p. 1201-1228
17
Ma#hew Barber
mustn’t put the cart before the horse. Defeats cause demoralisaEon, not the other way round he
argues.18 He uses the rapid change of opinion following the capture of Atlanta and the ba#le in
Mobile Bay in 1864, which reversed Northern public artude from despair to jubilaEon, something
which handed the presidency back to Lincoln.19
4.3
The argument of a lack of will Ees in closely with internal divisions within the Confederacy that
caused its downfall. The Confederacy was founded to have a weaker federal government and
stronger state governments. President Davis said himself the South seceded because of
infringements of states’ rights, not because the North was going to abolish slavery (here it can be
argued that an important state right for Southerners was the ability to own slaves). Davis argues that
the Northern states had moved away from the true prerogaEve of federal government and therefore
the South had the right to leave the Union to form the Confederacy, based on the inalienable rights
expressed in the ConsEtuEon.20 However the lack of a strong central government meant that certain
decisions that would have allowed a more efficient fighEng of the war didn’t take place for example
construcEon and prioriEsaEon of railroads. Furthermore the fact that States had powerful
governments meant that they held sway over central government, to the point where they withheld
troops and equipment from the main Confederate armies, parEcularly Governor Brown of Georgia
and Governor Vance of North Carolina. Historian Frank Owsley in his book States Rights in the
Confederacy aptly wrote that on the tombstone of the Confederacy should be carved “Died of State
Rights.”21 In comparison, the North didn’t have as strong State governments and Lincoln was able to
command great power during the war. In addiEon to this, the South had the divisions between
slaveholders and non-slaveholders. These divisions made many Confederate soldiers see the war as a
rich man’s war, poor man’s fight. 22 All these divisions caused the Confederacy to have a lack of focus
and not fighEng as efficiently as possible and in the end losing the war because they weren’t united
enough. One key difference between North and South was the differences in the poliEcal landscape.
In the North, the Republican government had an opposiEon in the Democrats and therefore had to
close rank and all support war policies of the President in order to overcome the Democrats.23 In the
South, no such insEtuEonalised opposiEon existed which opened the door for greater divisions and
no opportunity to crush resistance towards war policies and President Davis. 24 However it can be
argued that the North was equally, if not more, divided.25 The Union went into the war to fight for
the more abstract reason of restoring the Union, in comparison to the South who were fighEng to
defend their country and their homes. Following the EmancipaEon ProclamaEon of late 1862, many
people in the Union feared an exodus of blacks to the North and quesEoned Lincoln since they had
18
J. McPherson, Ba#le Cry of Freedom, (1988), p. 858
19
Ibid., p. 858
20
J. Davis, “Jefferson Davis’ First Inaugural Address”, The Papers of Jefferson Davis, Vol. 7 (1992), pp. 45-51
21
F. L. Owsley, States Rights in the Confederacy, (1925), p. 1
22
J. McPherson, Ba#le Cry of Freedom, (1988), p. 602
23
Ibid., p. 857
24
Ibid., p. 857
25
Ibid., p. 856
Ma#hew Barber
gone to war to reunite the Union, not free the slaves.26 It was also seen by many, especially in Britain
as a sign of desperaEon on the part of Lincoln, even if it was given acer a Union victory.27 The
proclamaEon did split the North in the short run but by the end of the war had united most
Northerners. One example of a divided North was the drac riots in New York following the
introducEon of conscripEon in 1863. While many in the South also fought conscripEon when the
Confederacy introduced it, nothing happened on the scale of New York. The closest event to happen
in the Confederacy were the 1864 bread riots in Richmond. McPherson disagrees with Mitchell on
the comparison between Northern and Southern internal divisions and says that internal divisions on
both sides seemed to, at best, neutralise its claim as an explanaEon for Northern victory.28
4.4
Since internal divisions were not the main reason for Union victory, we must turn to other
explanaEons that could refute the claim of a lack of industry and infrastructure in the South. Another
key argument is leadership, both poliEcal and military, in the Confederacy. The roles of poliEcal
leaders, North and South, have been analysed closely by historians and many have argued that
Jefferson Davis was the principle reason for Southern defeat. Southern historian David Po#er even
claimed that if President Davis and President Lincoln had swapped places, the South could have well
won the Civil War.29 As I have already stated about State Rights in the Confederacy, some Southern
governors withheld materials and resources from the Confederate armies in order to build up their
own State miliEas and waging a poliEcal war against Jefferson Davis. A broad view is that Lincoln was
more eloquent than Davis in expressing war aims and a be#er leader at holding facEons together for
the good of the war.30 Davis had an unlikeable personality and was said to want to win an argument
rather than the war, unlike Lincoln who was happy to lose an argument as long as it helped the war.31
Davis’ feuds with two Confederate generals, which were well known at the Eme, could also have
contributed to Confederate defeat. It is no surprise then that in the memoirs of both general Joseph
E. Johnston and Pierre G. T. Beauregard they placed the blame for Confederate defeat squarely with
Davis.32 Furthermore his inability to delegate responsibility for minor issues to subordinates, unlike
Lincoln, took up much of his Eme. However it is regarded among historians that while Davis may
have been sub-standard in comparison to Lincoln, there was no one else who could have done a
be#er job. We must also consider Lincoln also had his failings such as his rapid changing of generals
in the eastern theatre before finally finding the right general.33 From the point of view of Southern
defeat, while Davis did have his faults in comparison to Lincoln, I strongly believe that his role in
Southern defeat is minor as a single factor and other factors also played a part.
4.5
26
A. Farmer, The American Civil War: Causes, course and consequences, 1803-77 (2006), p. 201
27
Ibid., p. 200
28
J. McPherson, Ba#le Cry of Freedom, (1988), p. 856
29
D. Po#er, Jefferson Davis and the PoliEcal Factors in Confederate Defeat, (1960), p. 112
30
J. McPherson, Why the Confederacy Lost, (1992), p. 47
31
Ibid., p. 47
32
Ibid., p. 31
33
Ibid., p. 49
Ma#hew Barber
As well as poliEcal leadership we must also consider military leadership. Many historians point to Lee
as one of the best generals of the war and only rivalled by the combinaEon of Generals Sherman and
Grant. However historians stress that the development of Northern military leadership happened
over Eme. This seems true if we look at the string of leaders of the Northern Army of the Potomac,
from McDowell, onto McClellan, then Burnside, Hooker and then finally Meade in the first two years
of the war. Grant was in fact commander-in-chief of all Union armies but set up his headquarters
with the army of the Potomac.
One key thing to stress is that, for the majority of 1861 and 1862, the South enjoyed generally only
victories with generals Beauregard, Lee and Jackson leading the Confederate armies. In comparison,
the North floundered and it can be argued that the Northern armies only survived because of their
sheer number advantage over the South. As I have stated, the number of different commanders who
were appointed is testament to their failings, Lincoln replaced the commander of the army of the
Potomac almost every Eme they were defeated at a major ba#le such as the Seven Days ba#les or
the Ba#le of Chancellorsville. If we take Union general McClellan, who was well regarded by Lincoln
and among the people since he was almost solely responsible for building up the army of the
Potomac acer the defeat at First Bull Run, even though he was expected to win during his Peninsula
campaign which would have seen the capture of Richmond if successful, he lost because of his
unwillingness to fight. He constantly thought the enemy force was larger than his and therefore
constantly requested more troops. In reality a force of around 11,000 awaited him, in comparison to
his 50,000 when he first landed at Fort Monroe. While McClellan did remain in charge during the
Ba#le of AnEetam, a Union victory, he was replaced soon acer by General Burnside because of his
failure to pursue the retreaEng Confederate armies back into Virginia. Professor McPherson is
scathing in his a#ack at what he calls “incompetent northern military leadership” which at key
strategic points during the war, it was their failings which held the outcome in the balance.34 Many
Southerners acer the war pointed to confederate General Robert E. Lee who many saw as the wars
greatest military leader. His victories during the la#er stages of the Peninsula campaign and those
before AnEetam seem to suggest, unlike previous Southern generals, that he could do a lot more
with a lot less than Northern commanders. Also many proponents of the Lost Cause claim that the
only reason Lee was finally defeated at Appoma#ox was because Grant simply used overwhelming
resources to wear down the army of Northern Virginia.35 But the Confederate military leadership
wasn’t all good. Its leadership in the western theatre, coupled with their weak strategy (see below),
did have a damaging effect on the South and it can be argued that defeat didn’t come sooner simply
because of equal Northern incapability. Therefore both sides had their flaws in military leadership
yet leadership Ees closely in with the strategy carried out by these leaders. Lee, while he may have
been an excellent general in the eastern theatre it can be argued this in itself was his major flaw, see
below.
4.6
When considering strategy, we must look at strategy of both sides as a whole, as well as strategy in a
few key examples. Lee was General of the Army of Northern Virginia and was responsible for winning
the war in the east. It can be argued, that the western campaign was the thorn in the side of the
Confederacy since once it was lost, it allowed Sherman to march into Georgia and begin his march to
34
Ibid., p. 48
35
G. Gallagher, Why the Confederacy Lost, (1992), p. 100
Ma#hew Barber
the sea, sealing the fate of the South. The ba#le of Shiloh is a well-documented failure of the
Confederacy to seize the opportunity and win a victory. Confederate general Johnston launched an
a#ack on Grant’s army on April 6th, 1862. Following a series of defeats at Nashville and Fort Donelson
in February that year, the South needed to try and regain their losses. The ba#le of Shiloh was a
surprise a#ack and drove Grant and his army all the way back to Pi#sburgh landing on the Tennessee
River but the Confederates failed to achieve the victory since they stopped the assault for the night.
During the night, reinforcements commanded by D. C. Buell arrived and the next day Grant launched
his countera#ack which drove the Confederates back and won a Union victory. The Ba#le of Shiloh is
an example of weak ba#le strategy, failing to take advantage of the situaEon presented to them,
however this mistake is parEcularly the responsibility of General Beauregard (Johnston died in
ba#le). Therefore this creates the argument that weak western strategy was caused by the weak
leaders. However there is more to it. During the siege of Vicksburg, Davis called on General Lee to
send some of his army to relieve Vicksburg, a main link between the rest of the Confederacy and
Texas. There was li#le trade between east and west but the loss of Vicksburg would do far more
psychological damage than actual damage to the war effort.36 However Lee refused and carried on
with his plan for an invasion of Pennsylvania. Lee’s inability to see beyond the eastern theatre is
something credited to finally have caused the Confederate defeat in the west. However it is easy to
criEcise Lee for being stubborn and refusing to send aid, because it was not his responsibility to also
consider the fighEng in the west since his responsibility was victory in the east, something he
believed was possible with an invasion of Pennsylvania leading to the ba#le of Ge#ysburg. He also
believed he could do more to help in Tennessee by having success in Pennsylvania, like his AnEetam
campaign, than purng off his plans and sending troops west.37 Historians also criEcise Lee for his
offensive-defensive strategy; using forward a#acks on federal armies as a means of defending
Confederate territory. This strategy included a#empEng to destroy the enemy on the ba#lefield
which was seen by the Secretary of War in Richmond as a backward strategy and unrealisEc.38
Furthermore his strategy during the Seven Days’ Ba#les, while being a military success, resulted in
high Confederate casualEes that could have been used more effecEvely elsewhere. It can be argued
that overall Southern military strategy was flawed since in addiEon to Lee, the Confederate
government seemed to put more focus on the eastern theatre than the western. With the war in the
west all but lost, this lec the heartlands of the Confederacy such as Georgia and the Carolinas
exposed, something that was realised with Sherman’s campaign for Atlanta in 1864.39 It can be
argued that the fall of Atlanta and Sherman’s March to the Sea marked the end of the Confederacy.
Northern strategy was simply to take over and occupy territory in the South. However this strategy
was wasteful in a way that because they had to control this territory, as well as guarding supply lines
through occupied territory. This required detachments from federal armies being taken from the
front line therefore reducing troop numbers. However superior numbers allowed such a large
strategy. In addiEon to this the blockade of Southern ports, while only truly becoming very effecEve
towards the end of the war, did li#le to the military effecEveness in comparison to the poliEcal
benefits. It denied the South luxury items and reducing the standard of living there, something the
North never had to endure.40 With regard to Southern strategy, it can be argued they pursued overall
36
A. Jone, Why the Confederacy Lost, (1992), p. 76
37
Ibid., p. 77
38
Ibid., p. 78
39
J. McPherson, Ba#le Cry of Freedom (1988), p. 719
40
A. Jone, Why the Confederacy Lost, (1992), p. 86
Ma#hew Barber
a correct strategy in defending the South however it was individual commanders in how they
enacted this strategy which contributed to Southern defeat.41 Therefore it can be concluded that in
comparison to leadership, strategy played li#le part in Southern defeat. In addiEon to this since
strategy was defensive, this lent itself to a long war since the enemy was larger but had to conquer
large swathes of territory before they could have victory. With regard to this, Industry and
Infrastructure, or the lack of, played a crucial role since it prevented the South from winning a long
war. While the South wanted a quick victory in order to gain Independence, any overarching
a#empts to truly invade the North would have been suicidal for the Confederates and therefore a
quick, decisive victory was unlikely.
4.7
A further, more abstract, reason for Southern defeat could be that of slavery. Slavery is probably
without doubt the primary reason for the Civil War, even if the North and South at the onset of war
considered it about States Rights. Many historians such has Barbara J. Fields see the war as
something more than just a war between North and South but as the formaEon of the United States
that we have today. The war was a war on the ideology of the slaveholding South and Fields sees the
war on a higher plane about fighEng for humanity and freedom. While this would not have been
seen at the beginning of the war, I concede with hindsight that a principle part of the war was the
end of slavery. In the South during the war, slavery allowed a higher proporEon of whites to fight in
the army since they weren’t needed as much on the plantaEons. In addiEon to this slavery provided
a cheap labour force for the Confederate government. Slaves could also be used as soldiers in the
South, being promised their freedom if they served. However the la#er wasn’t employed unEl the
final months of the war when it was already too late. At the beginning of the war few voices called
for arming the slaves, the vast majority of Southerners could not even consider the idea.42 However
by 1864 many in the South considered the issue of slavery this; they could either fight with us or
against us. Many slaves had already fled their plantaEons and headed for Union lines, then enlisted
in the army, around 180,000 blacks served in the Union army during the Civil War. While slavery is
something that the war centres around, I doubt the relaEve importance of it for Southern defeat.
While slaves did leave plantaEons and did contribute to the Northern war effort, the negaEve effect
on the South was negligible in comparison to other factors.
4.8
One issue expressed by McPherson has put forward is the concept of conEngency; the idea that the
outcome of the war hung in the balance at a few crucial moments during the Civil War. 43 McPherson
points to the autumn of 1862 when the Confederates had their first real defeat at AnEetam which
delayed European intervenEon, something that eventually never came. Things could have gone very
differently. Before the ba#le of AnEetam Lee planned his invasion of Maryland however the plans
were found by Northern troops wrapped around three cigars in a field where the army had been
staying. The plans were passed upwards and Union general McClellan exclaimed when he read it,
“Now I know what to do!” Because of this knowledge, the resulEng outcome was the ba#le of
AnEetam. The quesEon is what would have happened if the plans were never found. McPherson
argues that it would have caused a Democrat victory in the 1862 mid-term elecEons in the North and
with it those in favour of peace and furthermore European intervenEon which would have pracEcally
41
Ibid., p. 87
42
J. McPherson, Ba#le Cry of Freedom (1988), p. 831
43
Ibid., p. 858
Ma#hew Barber
assured Southern victory.44 However it is important not to overextend the applicaEon of the idea of
conEngency and not put the cart before the horse.45 McPherson stresses the importance of this in
the example of the lack of will argument. He argues that defeat causes demoralisaEon, not the other
way around.46 He points to late 1864 running up to the PresidenEal elecEon when Northern opinion
was very much in favour of peace due to the stalling of the Army of the Potomac in Virginia and
Sherman stuck outside Atlanta. However following the fall of Atlanta Northern morale was never
higher, and the flip side being Southern morale never lower.47 The issue of conEngency can of course
go into the far flung realm of ‘What if’ quesEons in which the American Civil War features heavily,
however it is criEcal to note that a lot can be said about the outcome of the war being about luck. If
certain events had gone very slightly differently, the result of the war could have been completely
different.
5. Conclusion
In concluding this dissertaEon I have considered a wide range of factors that contributed to
Confederate defeat in the American Civil War. Since the South was unable to win a swic victory, it
had to endure a long and bi#er war which the outcome was a foregone conclusion since the North
would eventually win due to its superior numbers and resources. In terms of the most credible factor
in why the South lost the Civil War, I strongly argue that weak strategy, compounded by weak
military leadership in the western theatre of the war was the primary reason for defeat since it was
this strategy that prevented the South from achieving two objecEves. The first being a swic victory
due to Union gains in the West, strengthening Northern morale and encouraging them to fight on.
The second reason was that due to the weak leadership in the West, the South lost this key area and
it split the Confederacy, severely weakening their already weak industry and ability to fight the war. If
the South hadn’t lost in the West, the splirng of the Confederacy by Sherman in 1864, culminaEng
in his ‘March to the Sea’, could have been prevented, allowing the South to fight for longer than it
did. Having said this, the lack of industry and infrastructure sEll prevented a long fight, but the defeat
in the West made this shorter than it could have been.
6. Bibliography
McPherson, J. 1988. Ba#le Cry of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Bori#, G. 1992. Why the Confederacy Lost. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Po#er, D. 1960. Jefferson Davis and the PoliEcal Factors in Confederate Defeat. Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press
44
Ibid., p. 858
45
Ibid., p. 858
46
Ibid., p. 858
47
Ibid., p. 858
Ma#hew Barber
Owsley, F. 1925. States’ Rights in the Confederacy. Chicago: Chicago University Press
Fisk, W. 1983. AnE-Rebel: Le#ers of Wilbur Fisk. Emil Rosenbla#. Croton-on-Hudson. Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas
Arrington, B. 2011. “Industry and Economy during the Civil War”. The Civil War Remembered.
Marceline: Walsworth Publishing Company
Davis, J. 1992. “Jefferson Davis’ First Inaugural Address”. The Papers of Jefferson Davis. Vol. 7. Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press
Farmer, A. 2008. The American Civil War: Causes, course and consequences, 1803-77. London:
Hatche#e UK Company
Faust, G. Mar., 1990. Altars of Sacrifice: Confederate Women and the NarraEves of War. The Journal
of American History. Vol. 76, No. 4. Pp. 1200-1228. Oxford: Oxford University Press