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Soft Underbelly:
Allied & German Strategy
in the
1943 Italian Campaign
by Joseph Miranda
6
WORLD at WAR 15 | DEC 2010 − JAN 2011
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Strategic Debates
underbelly,” the Americans were less
ous invasion in the Mediterranean. The
optimistic. Further large-scale operaAllies were preparing for Overlord, the
tions there might lead to nothing more
invasion of northern France, which
he Italian campaign started less
than protracted combat with little in the
would finally be executed in June
than auspiciously. Operation
way of real strategic gain. The American
1944 in Normandy. That operation’s
Husky, the invasion of Sicily,
high command preferred the most direct
required preparation called for the
began on 9 July with two Allied armies
route to Germany, which was via a landconcentration of Allied logistics and
hitting the beaches: Gen. George S.
ing in northwestern Europe followed by
amphibious craft in Britain. Continuing
Patton’s US Seventh Army and Field
a mechanized drive across the relatively
the war in the Mediterranean meant
Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery’s
open terrain of France and Belgium.
diversion of resources from Overlord.
British Eighth Army. The Germans
Even so, further campaigning in
While Winston Churchill saw the
fought a brilliant rearguard action with
Mediterranean theater as the Reich’s “soft the Mediterranean was also seen as a
a panzer corps under the command of
necessity. For one thing, the Anglo-Allies
Gen. Hans Hube. He fell back on the port
needed to take some of the pressure off
of Messina and evacuated his divisions,
the still-beleaguered Soviet Union. At
along with many Italian troops, to the
the start of Husky the Germans were in
mainland, despite Allied naval and air
the midst of their Citadel offensive, a
superiority. On 17 August the Allies took
series of great tank battles around Kursk
Messina, the last Axis stronghold on the
(5-16 July), and the larger course of the
island, but Hube had escaped cleanly.
war on the eastern front remained in
Still, the Allies could claim a victory
doubt. Politically, then, it was necessary
as, among other things, the political
to demonstrate to Moscow the Western
impact of Allied troops landing on
Allies were fully in the war, thereby
Italian soil had led to the overthrow
heading off any temptation Stalin
of Mussolini in a 24 July coup and
might otherwise have felt to make a
his replacement with Marshal Pietro
separate peace with Berlin (a possibility
Badoglio. With Italian participation in the
that in retrospect was unlikely, but at
Axis faltering, the question arose among
the time was of great concern).
the Allied commanders: where next?
Another factor motivating another
Immediately at issue was whether
Mediterranean operation was, ironically
there should even be another amphibiGen. George S. Patton in Italy
T
WORLD at WAR 15 | DEC 2010 − JAN 2011
7
Home
enough, logistics. That is, the Allied
divisions and air forces then based
in North Africa and Sicily couldn’t
be easily shifted elsewhere. Bases in
Britain were already filling up with the
forces dedicated for Overlord. While
Allied units in the Mediterranean
could certainly be shipped to Britain,
the added facilities needed to house
and maintain them didn’t yet exist.
Thus, for lack of any convenient
alternative if nothing else, campaigning
in the Mediterranean would continue.
The dilemma then became choosing the
specific target for the next operation.
The solution came as the result of
more debate among Gen. Dwight D.
Eisenhower, by then in command of
all US forces in Europe; Field Marshal
Harold Alexander, Allied commander
for the Mediterranean Theater; and Gen.
Charles de Gaulle of the Free French.
The British wanted to go for the
8
Balkans. An invasion of Greece or
Yugoslavia would lead the way toward
the Danube and from that river valley
into the heart of the Reich. Late in World
War I, the Allied breakout from the
Salonika beachhead had done much to
finally collapse the Austro-Hungarian
Empire and initiate the general Central
Powers in the closing months of the
war. In 1943 there were large partisan
forces across the area that could provide
the Allies with much in the way of local
support. An invasion of the Balkans, it
was argued, might also bring Turkey
into the war on the side of the Allies
and open a new route for sending
Western Allied aid to the USSR.
The Americans, however, advocated
an invasion of the Italian mainland.
Such an operation would knock out
Hitler’s major Axis partner in Europe.
Another reason was put forth by Gen.
Harold “Hap” Arnold, commander of
WORLD at WAR 15 | DEC 2010 − JAN 2011
the US Army Air Force: the capture
of southern Italy could be exploited
to build up airpower for the strategic
bombing campaign against the Reich’s
war industry. Southern Italy, among
other things, contained the large
airfield complex at Foggia, and those
facilities could be used to stage heavy
bombers against targets in southern
Germany and the Danube valley.
The Free French also had an opinion.
They favored sequenced invasions into
Sardinia and Corsica, to be climaxed by
a landing in southern France. While the
Free French were a force subsidized by
the Americans and British in terms of
equipment and logistics, their interests
had to be taken as a matter of concern.
London and Washington needed to
maintain the coalition of the “United
Nations” (not yet the international organization of today, the term was already
in extensive use in Allied propaganda
by mid-war). Operating in such a way
as to facilitate the maintenance of good
postwar relations among the Western
powers was yet another consideration.
In the end, of course, the strategic
consensus came to be it was best to
invade the Italian mainland. Invading
the Balkans was deemed undesirable,
as that would shift the main power of
the Western Allies into in an entirely
new strategic direction, from western to
central Europe. There would also be difficulties in providing invasion forces there
with air cover and logistics. Southern
France, while certainly a tempting target
by itself, was ultimately a strategic dead
end: an Allied invasion force there would
be unlikely to get far enough north to
reach critical objectives such as Paris or
the German border. Such a move might
also cause Hitler to fully shift his armed
forces’ strategic concentration from the
USSR to France, thereby endangering
the projected Overlord operation.
An invasion of mainland Italy had
several strategic advantages. It would
be sure to divert German attention
from France, thereby aiding Overlord’s
eventual success. Moreover, secret
negotiations being conducted with
Italy’s new government indicated such
an invasion would not only bring on
an Italian surrender, it might also lead
to that country committing its armed
forces against the Germans. At the
same time, southern Italy was within
easy range of Allied airpower based in
Sicily and North Africa. With mainland
Italy the objective, then, US, British
and Free French forces assembled for
their return to mainland Europe after
an absence of more than three years.
Operational Plans
With the strategic objective of
Italy settled, the operational planning
began. Several invasion beaches were
debated. Initially the Allies considered
landing directly at Naples and seizing
its port, vital for logistical support of
deeper operations. Naples, however,
was less than ideal in that it was out of
range of Allied single-engine aircraft.
There was some talk of using aircraft
carriers to provide air cover, but that
was deemed unfeasible because
those ships couldn’t provide sufficient
numbers of fighters to guarantee
air superiority, and their operations
were subject to the vagaries of the
weather. Later events of the campaign
would prove the wisdom of that
decision, as the Luftwaffe would
make a major effort in support of the
German counterattack at Salerno,
sinking and damaging numerous
ships even with Allied fighter cover.
The final Allied plan called for
a three-pronged assault. The main
attack would be at Salerno, south
of Naples, executed by the US Fifth
Army (including both an American
and a British corps), codenamed
Operation Avalanche. British Eighth
Army would cross the narrow Straits
of Massena to land in Calabria at the
“toe” of the Italian “boot” (Operation
Baytown). British 1st Airborne Division
would make an amphibious landing
at Taranto to secure the far right flank
Field Marshal Smuts (left) and Gen. Eisenhower
WORLD at WAR 15 | DEC 2010 − JAN 2011
of the invasion (Operation Slapstick).
There was some argument over
the utilization of the US 82nd Airborne
Division. One idea — the plan originally
selected — was for that unit to make a
drop into Rome, thereby securing the
Italian capital and giving more impetus
to anti-German Italian forces to rally
to the Allies. This plan was scotched,
at literally the last minute, due to full
consideration of the impossibility of
effectively reinforcing, or even just
sustaining, the 82nd that far behind
enemy lines. If German resistance
prevented a breakout from the beachheads, the airborne would be cut off
and destroyed. As with Naples, Rome
was also out of range of easy air cover.
The 82nd therefore remained in reserve
for the initial phase of the operation.
Meanwhile, the Allies continued
to conduct secret negotiations with
Italian leaders to try to ensure their
country would surrender peacefully
and fully. Those talks involved no small
9
The German Perspective
As the Allies debated their plans for invading Italy, the German
high command did the same concerning its own strategy for that
country. Erwin Rommel, of Afrikakorps fame, wanted to fall back
into north Italy and make a stand in the Po valley. That would keep
secure the vital industrial areas of Italy’s far north while also avoiding
having to operate within easy range of Allied sea power. Defending
in the south would be dangerous, Rommel argued, because the
long coastal flanks of the peninsula would be vulnerable to Allied
amphibious invasions that could cut off major German forces. There
was also the question of the Italian armed forces. If they defected
to the Allies, it would place large numbers of newly hostile troops
across the lengthy German line of communications to the far south.
Albert Kesselring, German commander in the Mediterranean
Theater (Oberkommando Sud, “High Command South”), believed
central and southern Italy could be held, or at least turned into a trap
for the Allies. Given past Allied patterns of operation, Kesselring
figured they would land only under solid air cover, which meant
southern Italy. By deploying mobile units in the south, and then
moving them forward quickly to counterattack the beachhead,
the Germans could pin down Allied invaders and perhaps even
throw them back into the sea. The Luftwaffe still had effective
strength remaining in the Mediterranean and, if concentrated over
one spot, German airpower could possibly cause critical damage
to Allied shipping, making any landing tenuous at best.
To deal with the Italians, Kesselring put together Operation
Axis, which had German divisions moving quickly to disarm the
erstwhile ally’s units. As for follow-on invasions along the seaward
flanks, they could also be dealt with by mobile reserves that
would contain any beachheads. Moreover, rough calculations of
Allied shipping capacities showed they had the tonnage on hand
for only one major invasion per year in the Mediterranean. In any
event, until the Allies seized southern Italy, they would be unable
to provide sufficient air cover to support invasions farther north.
Kesselring realized the critical nature of airpower to the entire
Allied campaign scheme, and he therefore planned accordingly.
Another factor in the balance was Benito Mussolini. In late July
the fascist dictator had been imprisoned by disgruntled Italians and
held at the mountain resort of Gran Sasso. A German commando
operation planned by Luftwaffe Gen. Kurt Student rescued Mussolini
on 12 September and returned him to the Reich. Otto Skorzeny, who’d
been appointed by Hitler to head up German special operations,
10
Field Marshal
Kesselring
(3rd from left)
inspects German
troops in the field
amount of skullduggery, with Allied
representatives meeting with the
Italians as far afield as Lisbon, and even
a clandestine mission into Germanoccupied Rome itself by Gen. Maxwell
Taylor to make final arrangements. In
the event, Italy would surrender and
declare itself an Ally, though that had
less effect than the Allies had hoped.
Course of the Campaign
The invasion of the Italian
mainland began on 3 September
with Eighth Army landing at
Calabria. On 8 September the Allies
announced the Italian armistice.
On 9 September, Fifth Army came
ashore at Salerno. Everything seemed
to be going according to plan.
Then, however, the German
commander in Italy, Luftwaffe
Field Marshal Albert Kesselring,
implemented his plan. (Kesselring had
begun his career in the German Army,
and thus was no stranger to ground
war strategy.) His units implemented
Operation Axis, swiftly moving to
occupy strategic points throughout
Italy, while also disarming Italian
troops to prevent their interfering.
German Tenth Army moved to contain
the Salerno landing, while units
farther south conducted delaying
actions, trading space for time and
keeping Eighth Army from linking up
with Fifth for several critical days.
Kesselring launched his divisions
against the Salerno beachhead, almost
throwing the Allies back into the sea
while, in the sky above, the Luftwaffe
hit Allied shipping and hit it hard. A
last-ditch defense of the beach, supported by naval gunfire, finally threw
back the Germans. Elements of the
82nd Airborne were also parachuted in
as emergency reinforcement, and the
beachhead held. Eighth Army linked
also got involved and did much to ensure the success of the raid.
Mussolini’s rescue was a morale booster for the Germans, who were
facing otherwise universally bad news that summer on both the
Mediterranean and the eastern fronts. It also did much to give Hitler
confidence that some kind of victory could be secured in southern Italy.
Hitler therefore ended up approving Kesselring’s approach
over that of Rommel, though it was conditional approval. Rommel
remained in command of numerous divisions in the Po valley as
a strategic reserve in the event of another Allied invasion behind
Tenth Army. Kesselring’s forces in southern Italy were restricted to
those of Tenth Army, commanded by Gen. Heinrich von Vietinghoff.
An examination of the order of battle reveals the German forces
in Italy at that stage of the campaign represented the single greatest
large-scale mobile striking force they’d ever assembled in World War
II. It had a higher proportion of mechanized to non-mechanized units
of any German army-level command of the war. It included numerous
panzer (armored), panzer grenadier (motorized) and Fallshirmjaeger
units. The latter were Luftwaffe paratroop units, though by that
time in the war actual jump-training had fallen off. Instead, their
mission had shifted to becoming rapid-reaction units that could
be air-transported anywhere on the Reich’s fronts to meet threats.
Throughout the Italian campaign, the parachute divisions proved
themselves some of the toughest defensive fighters of the war. ★
WORLD at WAR 15 | DEC 2010 − JAN 2011
WORLD at WAR 15 | DEC 2010 − JAN 2011
11
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up on the 16 . Kesselring ordered
Tenth Army to fall back into a series
of defensive lines south of Rome.
The Luftwaffe proved to be
particularly effective. Its aircraft
attacked Allied shipping in the Gulf
of Salerno using, among other things,
new Fritz-X radio- controlled bombs
to inflict serious damage on Allied
vessels as well as Italian naval units
th
that attempted to sail to Malta to join
the Allies. The situation in the air,
however, would soon turn around.
On the 27th, Eighth Army took
Foggia while Fifth Army moved into
Naples on 2 October. The Germans,
though, didn’t attempt to make stands
in those places. Instead, they fought
only delaying actions aimed at slowing
the Allied advance. Allied armies
driving north found blown bridges,
mined ports and enemy ambushes.
Rome was the culminating point of
any campaign coming out of southern
Italy, and Kesselring was willing
to sacrifice territory to its south in
order to keep secure the main prize
itself. He would make his stand — or
rather, a series of them — in fortified
lines prepared in front of Rome.
Mid-October found the Allied
armies at the Volturno River, where
the Germans stood and fought. After
some difficult infantry actions, the
Allies crossed the Volturno — only to
find themselves faced by yet more
German defenses behind it, as well
as by ever more abominable terrain,
poor roads and worsening weather.
By the end of the year the Allies were
held up at the Gustav (or Winter) Line,
lower-left — British troops go ashore at Salerno
below — British Churchill tank
After Action
In a sequence of events rare for
military history, things can be said
to have gone off according to plan
for both sides in the opening stages
of the Italian campaign. The two
Allied armies landed successfully
in Italy, while German Tenth Army
moved into its countering positions, all pretty much as planned.
The Germans contained the Fifth
Army beachhead, while delaying
actions kept Eighth Army in check.
Kesselring’s counterattack almost
succeeded in the destruction of
the beachhead, but the Allies held.
Kesselring’s divisions then fell back
to their prepared defensive lines and
held the Allies away from Rome, the
ultimate objective of the campaign.
The Allies, meanwhile, maneuvered
the Germans out of the important
objectives of Naples and Foggia.
In the short term the campaign
was something of an Allied victory,
since Fifth and Eighth Armies seized
their initial objectives. At the same
time Italy was knocked out of the
war, though its support for the Allied
cause remained anemic at best.
Sadly, though, the Allies failed to take
Rome and also failed to destroy the
German force in Italy. The Germans
thus accomplished their general
objective in that they held the Italian
capital and bogged down two Allied
armies. In the end, Kesselring’s
strategy worked (see sidebar). ✪
STORMING
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upper-left — British AA position at Mt. Cassino
still well south of Rome, with German
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Montgomery, along with some of the
divisions and much of the logistical
support, were transferred to Britain to
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The Allied advance in Italy ground to
a halt. Kesselring could rest easy for
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Rome until June of the following year.
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