Download Informal Sanctions on Prosecutors and Defendants and the

Informal Sanctions on Prosecutors and Defendants and the
Disposition of Criminal Cases
By Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum
Abstract: We model the strategic interaction between a prosecutor and a defendant
when informal sanctions by self-interested outside observers may be imposed on
either or both. Non-strategic outside observers rationally use the disposition of the
case (plea bargain, case drop, acquittal, or conviction) to impose these sanctions, but
also recognize that errors in the legal process (as well as hidden information) means
they may misclassify defendants and thereby erroneously impose sanctions on both
defendants and prosecutors. There is a unique equilibrium wherein a guilty defendant
accepts the prosecutor’s proposed plea offer with positive (but fractional) probability,
an innocent defendant rejects the proposed offer, and the prosecutor takes a
defendant who rejects the offer to trial. Furthermore, we show that: 1) changes in the
level of the formal sanction affect the level of informal sanctions imposed by outsiders
on defendants and prosecutors; and 2) increases in the informal sanction rate
imposed on prosecutors results in changes in the level of informal sanctions imposed
on defendants. The latter case is particularly noteworthy, as (for example) an increase
in the rate associated with informally sanctioning prosecutors for convicting the
innocent can result in an increase in the level of informal sanctions by third parties on
innocent defendants.
Tuesday, 30 June 2015
1:00 - 2:00 pm
Location
148, av. de la Faïencerie
L-1511 Luxembourg
Room BRC201
Langue
English
Registration
-
Andrew F. Daughety is the Gertrude Conaway Vanderbilt Prof. of Economics and a Prof. of
Law (by courtesy). He is a co-editor of the Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, on
the editorial board of The American Law and Economics Review, and is an associate editor of
the RAND Journal of Economics.
Jennifer F. Reinganum is the E. Bronson Ingram Prof. of Economics and a Prof. of Law (by
courtesy). She is a former co-editor of the RAND Journal of Economics and the Journal of
Law, Economics and Organization, and a past president of the American Law and Economics
Association.
Their common research interests include imperfect competition in markets; product quality
provision and signaling; settlement and plea negotiation; models of courts and court systems;
products liability and safety; privacy; and the market for legal services.
Free seminar
Registration to [email protected]
(please specify full name and
institution)
Lunch is planned for registered
participants
Contact
[email protected]
Tel: +352 46 66 44 6336