Download Review of the African Development Bank`s Capital Resource

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
Review of the African Development Bank's Capital
Resource Requirements (GCI-VI) – Third Working
Paper
GCI Task Force Members:
T. de Longuemar
P. Van Peteghem
C. Akintomide
A. Batumubwira
R. Bharat
J-B. Bile
C. Boamah
A. Coulibaly
T. De Kock
K. Diallo
K. Gadio
S. Kayizzi-Mugerwa
P. Kei-Boguinard
M. Ketsela
J. Kolster
B. Moyo
J. Ngure
H. N’Sele
G. Penn
T. Rajhi
E. Santi
M-A. Saraka-Yao
Vice President, Finance, Chair
Treasurer, Alternate Chair
Acting Secretary General
Head, External Relations and Communications Unit
Office of the President
Office of the Vice President, Finance
Director, Financial Control
Financial Management
Division Manager, Financial Management
Director, Financial Management
General Counsel
Director, Operational Resources & Policy
Division Manager, Financial Management
Lead Expert, Operational Resources & Policy
Director, Regional Operations North-A
Legal Services
Office of the Vice President, Sector Operations III
Division Manager, Treasury
Legal Services
Economic Research
Regional Operations North-A
Division Manager, Operational Resources & Policy
1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary .............................................................................................. 5
1
Introduction ........................................................................................................... 7
2
Revised African Economic Outlook Projections and Updated Impact
Analysis .................................................................................................................. 8
3
Demand for ADB Resources............................................................................... 19
4
Relevance of the GCI to LICs ............................................................................ 29
5
Increased Capacity to Deliver ........................................................................... 40
6
Financial Policy Options to Increase Headroom.............................................. 52
7
Alternative Options to Provide Interim Relief ................................................. 53
8
GCI Scenarios...................................................................................................... 55
9
Subscription for Shares ...................................................................................... 59
10
GCI-VI Process.................................................................................................... 63
11
Conclusion and Recommendation ..................................................................... 64
Annex 1: Basic Data on Middle Income Country Members of the Bank .................. 66
Annex 2: Middle Income Country Profiles ................................................................... 67
Annex 3: Governance, Controls and Safeguards in the Bank .................................... 91
Annex 4: GCI Scenarios ................................................................................................ 94
Annex 5: GCI-V Share Subscriptions Under 4 Step Process………………………..98
2
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ADB
ADF
ADOA
AEO
AFP
AICD
AsDB
ASLC
Bps
CPIA
DBSA
DFI
DOC
DRC
DUC
EBRD
EIB
EITI
ELF
EMBI
EME
FDI
FMO
FO
GCC
GCI
HIPC
HQ
IADB
ICA
ICT
IDC
IFC
IFI
IMF
LIC
MDG
MDB
MDRI
MFW4A
MIC
MTS
NCB
NPV
ODA
PEFA
PPP
PSO
African Development Bank
African Development Fund
Additionality and Development Outcome Assessment
African Economic Outlook
African Financing Partnership
Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic
Asian Development Bank
Adjusted Short-Lived Crisis Scenario
Basis points
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
Development Bank of South Africa
Development Finance Institution
Drawn-out Crisis Scenario
Democratic Republic of Congo
Debt to Usable Capital
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
European Investment Bank
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
Emergency Liquidity Facility
Emerging Market Bond Index
Emerging Market Economy
Foreign Direct Investment
Financierings-Maatschappij voor Ontwikkelingslanden
Field Office
Governors’ Consultative Committee
General Capital Increase
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
Headquarters
Inter-American Development Bank
Infrastructure Consortium for Africa
Information and Communication Technologies
Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Ltd
International Finance Corporation
International Financial Institution
International Monetary Fund
Low Income Country
Millennium Development Goal
Multilateral Development Bank
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative
Making Finance Work for Africa
Middle Income Country
Medium Term Strategy
Non-Concessional Borrowing
Net Present Value
Official Development Assistance
Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
Public Private Partnership
Private Sector Operations
3
RMC
RCUR
TFI
UA
UST
WB
Regional Member Countries
Risk Capital Utilization Rate
Trade Finance Initiative
Units of Account
US Treasury Yield
World Bank
4
Executive Summary
1. This document addresses issues raised during the meeting of the Governors’ Consultative
Committee (GCC) held in Tunis on 11 September 2009 to discuss Management’s
proposals relating to the Sixth Increase of the Ordinary Capital of the Bank (GCI-VI).
2. The African Development Bank has raised its profile among its member countries via
continued dialogue, increased lending and non- lending activities, and an efficient and
swift response to their needs. In 2007, the High- Level Panel laid out a vision for the Bank
to become the premier development finance institution in Africa. The Bank’s MediumTerm Strategy (MTS) espoused the principles laid out by the High- Level Panel report and
charted a way forward for the Bank. The Bank’s lending volumes have been on an
increasing trajectory, particularly in 2007 and 2008, in response to increased demand, and
the MTS foresaw the need for a capital increase by 2012.
3. The global financial and economic crises that started in 2008 have had a severe impact on
Africa. The ability of MICs and private sector entities to raise funds to finance their
development programs and investments have been particularly affected. Despite the
beginnings of a global recovery, the economic outlook for Africa has worsened further
since early 2009. This is attributable mainly to a collapse in demand for, and in most cases
the prices of commodities that constitute the bulk of Africa’s exports. African countries’
access to capital markets has also deteriorated and the pre- crisis low cost of borrowing is
not expected to materialise in the foreseeable future.
4. As a result of the economic and financial deterioration, the demand for lending from the
Bank has increased. Pre-crisis demand for 2009 was estimated at UA 5 billion, which has
increased post crisis to UA 8 billion. Demand is projected to remain at this level until
2011. Demand from the Bank is projected to remain high in the medium to long term, due
to the economic recovery which will need financing, limited access to reasonably priced
funds from capital markets and the heightened confidence in the Bank as a lender of
choice.
5. Comprehensive institutional reforms have greatly enhanced the Bank’s capacity to deliver.
These efforts encompass several areas, including business processes, decentralization,
quality at entry and results management, institutional efficiency, Information and
Technology services (IT) and risk management. These reforms have enabled the Bank to
increase lending volumes and to enhance its development impact.
6. The Bank’s operations and any capital increase remain relevant to all borrowing members
of the Bank, albeit in different ways. The Bank’s guidance note on non sovereign
operations outlines that 50% of the resources earmarked for non-sovereign operations will
finance projects in LICs, some via innovative Public Private Partnerships. As of 30
September 2009,the proportion of the active portfolio benefitting LICs directly and
indirectly stood at 60% The Bank is also undertaking a review of its Enclave Projects
policy in conjunction with other MDBs, to facilitate greater access to the Bank’s resources
for LICs. In addition, a capital increase that results in a substantial increase in the Bank’s
paid-in capital would enhance the net income prospects of the Bank, thereby facilitating
the allocation of more net income to the ADF and other development initiatives in LICs,
subject to the approval of the Board of Governors.
5
7. Given the evolving situation on the continent, the Bank has updated its lending scenarios
and is projecting demand to remain higher than envisaged in the MTS, until at least 2011
and potentially 2015. Following requests from the Board of Directors, Management has
also undertaken a review of the Bank’s lending programme for 2009 and 2010. While
implementing this increased lending, the Bank will maintain its strategic focus on its areas
of comparative advantage: infrastructure, private sector, governance and technical and
higher skills formation. In order to maximise the contribution, it will continue to work in
partnership with key multilateral and bilateral organisations.
8. As a result of the Bank’s increased lending, the utilization of its financial resources has
been faster than anticipated in the MTS and a breach of some of its prudential limits is
projected by the end of 2010. This is following the infusion of contingent capital by two
Non Regional Member Countries, as an interim measure which will allow the Bank to
remain within prudential limits for an additional year, preventing a breach in 2009.
However this would have no impact on capital adequacy ratios, as paid –in capital will not
be affected. As a result, Management finds that there is an immediate and urgent need for
a General Capital Increase to enable the Bank to continue to lend beyond 2010.
9. The Bank will make efforts to facilitate the participation of LICs in any GCI. In order to
ensure high subscription rates, an innovative four-step process for the allocation of shares
based on pre-emptive rights is proposed.
10. Various scenarios for a capital increase have been presented in this document. However,
given expectations of sustained high demand from the Bank, a significant capital increase
with a substantial paid-in portion would be required for the Bank to continue to deliver on
its mandate.
6
1.
INTRODUCTION
1.1
On 13 May 2009, the Board of Governors, having considered a document on a
General Capital Increase1 for the Bank authorized the GCC to deliberate on proposals arising
from studies on issues pertaining to a sixth capital increase and to initiate consultations with
Member States leading, should it be needed, to a plan for a general increase designed to
enable the Bank to meet its ordinary requirements in the future.
1.2
On 11 September 2009, the GCC met in Tunis to discuss Management’s proposals2
relating to an increase in the Bank’s capital increase. The GCC requested further elaboration
and more current information on a number of topics contained in the aforementioned
document. This document responds to such requests and presents the results of studies
undertaken in response.
1.3
Short term, medium term and projected long term demand for ADB resources, both
sovereign and non sovereign, across all its RMCs is at an all time high far outstripping
available resources. Increased and ongoing mobilization of resources to LICs is yielding
positive results. Comprehensive institutional reforms throughout the Bank’s operations have
greatly enhanced the Bank’s capacity to deliver. The Bank’s response to the ongoing global
financial crisis has led to a much quicker utilization of resources than anticipated in the
Medium Term Strategy with a breach of prudential limits projected by the end of 2009. The
interim measure of contingent capital offered by two Non Regional Member Countries will
only delay the breach of prudential limits by an additional year. As a result there is an
immediate and urgent need for a General Capital Increase to enable the Bank to maintain its
current level of activity beyond 2010.
1.4
Following this introduction, this document presents the revised African Economic
Outlook projections and updated Impact Analysis in section 2; section 3 outlines the evolution
of demand for ADB resources and the Bank’s comparative advantage and value added in the
international aid architecture; section 4 articulates how a GCI is relevant to LICs ; section 5
illustrates how the Bank has increased its capacity to deliver; section 6 presents financial
policy options to increase headroom; section 7 lays out alternative options to provide interim
relief; section 8 presents scenarios for a GCI; section 9 details the share subscription
mechanism; section 10 summarises the GCI VI process; and section 11 concludes and
presents recommendations.
1.5
In addition to the above analyses, and as requested by the GCC:
1. A separate, independent evaluation of the GCI V has been undertaken, and will be
circulated to the Board of Directors.
2. A reputed consulting firm has been appointed to review the Bank’s risk management
framework and processes.
1
2
The Sixth General increase in the Capital resources of the African Development Bank: Issues and Framework
ADB/BD/WP/2009/125/Rev.2 entitled GCI-VI Issues and dated 24 July 2009
7
2.
REVISED AFRICAN ECONOMIC OUTLOOK (AEO) PROJECTIONS AND
UPDATED IMPACT ANALYSIS
2.1
Overview
2.1.1 The impact of the financial crisis on Africa has been severe and the second round
effects in several countries continue to deepen. This is despite the apparent bottoming out of
the recession in developed countries and the positive turn in the global economic outlook.
While most African countries will avoid recession, growth has dipped significantly for most
countries and there are no clear signs of recovery yet. The impact of the crisis has been varied
across the continent, with countries heavily dependent on export of oil and metals hit the
worst. While the resource-poor and low-income countries have not been hit as hard, even a
small negative impact on these countries is potentially even more harmful.
2.1.2 The African Economic Outlook, which was released in February 2009 (the “AEO
2009”), laid out the economic outlook for Africa for 20093. However, as the impact of the
financial crisis on Africa becomes evident, it is clear that the economic indicators have
deteriorated since, in line with the rapidly evolving economic situation. This note provides an
update to the estimates provided in the AEO 2009.
2.2
Revised Economic Outlook
2.2.1 Although there was a lag in the manifestation of the effects of the global financial
crisis on African economies, the negative economic impact began to emerge in the first half of
2009. Africa’s rapid growth during the period 2000 to 2008 was disrupted in 2009 due to a
severe external shock caused by the global financial and economic crisis. The underdeveloped
financial markets and limited global financial exposure protected most of the Bank’s Regional
Member Countries (RMCs) from the immediate impact of the crisis in 2008. However, by
mid-2009 it had become clear that the impact of the crisis on the economies of RMCs had
been considerable. The crisis led to a severe external shock to the continent in the form of
deterioration of terms-of-trade, collapsing import demand, reduced capital flows, remittances
and aid inflows.
Figure 1: GDP Grow th Rates: 2008 and 2009
6%
2008 (actual)
2008 (actual)
5%
4%
2009
(February
forecast)
3%
2009
(February
forecast)
2009 (October
forecast)
2%
2009 (October
forecast)
1%
0%
Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
3
The African Economic Outlook and this paper present the outlook for 51 out of 53 African countries. Somalia
and Zimbabwe have been excluded due to lack of data. Basic Data on Middle Income Countries Members of the
bank can be found in Annex 1.
8
2.2.2 Estimates of GDP growth have deteriorated further: In February 2009, the AEO 2009
projected a growth rate for Africa in 2009, of 2.4 percent. Revised estimates of GDP growth,
as of October 2009, project that the 2009 real GDP growth will not exceed 2 percent. It also
represents a sharp decline from 5.4 percent in 2008 (Figure 1) and close to 6 percent achieved
during the period 2005 – 08. In 2009, the real GDP per capita for the continent will decline
for the first time in this decade. The outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa is worse than for North
Africa. Real GDP growth is expected to drop to 1.1 percent, down from 2.4 percent projected
in February 2009. Variations across the continent are substantial. While the majority of
countries have experienced a sharp deterioration of growth prospects, a select few are still
projected to have positive growth (Figure 2). The Bank has been at the forefront in providing
support to the hardest hit countries.
Figure 2: GDP Growth Rates: Deterioration since February 2009
15%
Liberia
10%
Congo Dem . Rep.
Real GDP Growth
Guinea
5%
Gabon
0%
South Africa
Nam ibia
-5%
Madagascar
Equatorial Guinea
February 2009 forecast
-10%
October 2009 forecast
Botsw ana
Seychelles
-15%
2.2.3
Other key macroeconomic indicators have also deteriorated since early 2009.
Current Account Balance: Export revenues are expected to halve compared to those of
2008, as a result of curtailed import demand in advanced countries and lower commodity
prices. The overall trade balance is expected to deteriorate, and in several countries the
current account and fiscal balances will also worsen (Figure 3). Figure 3 also shows that most
African countries are expected to have a twin deficit (both fiscal and current account deficit).
The continent as a whole is projected to move from a current account surplus of 3.4 percent of
GDP in 2008 to a deficit of 4.2 percent in 2009. The oil-exporting countries will run a current
account deficit of 1.4 percent of GDP, compared to a surplus of 11 percent in 2008, although
part of this deficit can be financed by running down accumulated reserves. Hence, unless
sufficient FDI and concessional financing is available to cover the deficit, existing foreign
exchange reserves, accumulated over several years, could be rapidly depleted.
Fiscal Balance: A continent-wide aggregate fiscal surplus of 3.3 percent of GDP in 2008 is
likely to turn into a deficit of 3.7 percent in 2009, threatening expenditures on core
infrastructure spending and social sectors and constraining fiscal space. The crisis has affected
the fiscal balance through two channels: (i) directly through revenue losses and (ii) indirectly
through automatic stabilizers associated with slower economic activity. Commodity-related
9
revenues, especially oil revenue have been strongly affected. In several countries, commodity
related revenues account for a significant share of government revenues (e.g., Angola,
Botswana, Chad, Gabon, Republic of Congo, and Nigeria). Oil exporting countries as a group
are expected to have a fiscal deficit of 4.3 percent of GDP in 2009 compared to a surplus of
6.8 percent in 2008. Some oil-importing countries will also see their fiscal balance deteriorate,
with the deficit of oil importing countries as a group increasing from 1.4 percent of GDP in
2008 to 3 percent in 2009.
Figure 3. The return of “twin deficits”: changes in fiscal and current account balances, 20094
Lesotho
15
Correl. Coeff. = 0.68
10
Seychelles
5
Guinea-Bissau
0
points)
Change in current account balance (percentage
20
Eritrea
São Tom é & Príncipe
Congo Rep. of
-5
Botsw ana
-10
Chad
Algeria
-15
Nigeria Gabon
Libya
-20
Equatorial Guinea
Angola
-25
-30
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Change in fiscal balance (percentage points)
Liberia
13
Togo
Gam bia, The
Sw aziland
8
points)
Change in current account balance (percentage
18
3
-2
-7
Senegal
Cape Verde
Com oros Central African Rep. Djibouti
Tanzania Mauritius
Malaw i
Guinea
Uganda
Burkina Faso
Madagascar
Kenya
Sierra Leone
Mali
South Africa
Rw anda
Ethiopia
Cam eroon
Egypt
Tunisia
Sudan
Morocco
Niger
Benin
Mozam bique
Ghana
Congo Dem . Rep.
Côte d'Ivoire
Nam ibia
Zam bia
Mauritania
-12
-17
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
1
2
3
4
Change in fiscal balance (percentage points)
Source: African Economic Outlook database (October 2009) and staff calculations.
4
Negative sign means deterioration in 2009. Both fiscal and current account balances include grants. The change
is calculated as balance in as a share of GDP (in percent) in 2009 minus balance in 2008.
10
Currency depreciation: Several African countries experienced a depreciation of their
currency vis-à-vis the dollar. The greatest depreciation5 was experienced by the Congolese
Franc (-47.1 percent), the Seychelles Rupee (-32 percent), and the Zambian Kwacha (-24
percent). Exchange rate depreciation against the US dollar will have a negative impact on
debt-service burdens for countries that have high external debts. Depreciation also results in
increased costs of imported intermediate inputs, with consequences for inflation and
employment.
2.3
Varied Impacts of the Crisis Across Countries
2.3.1 Several countries have been unable to avoid a recession: The aggregate GDP growth
figures presented above highlight substantial differences amongst the different countries.
According to the latest ADB estimates, 6 African countries will face recession in 2009.
However an additional 36 countries will also see their GDP growth rates slow down, and in
some cases significantly. For example, while Angola is not expected to experience a
recession, its real GDP growth is likely to slow from 14 percent in 2008 to stagnation in 2009.
Prudent macroeconomic policies and improved macroeconomic fundamentals of recent years
have helped soften the impact of the crisis and have increased the ability of RMC
governments to mitigate the impact on their economies. However, the situation differed across
the continent, with countries that enjoyed a strong fiscal position prior to the crisis using the
budget flexibly in a countercyclical manner. A number of the oil exporting countries used
accumulated fiscal savings to protect the budget against expenditure cuts and in the process
sustain capital expenditures. Fragile and post-conflict states in particular, lacked the policy
space for counter-cyclical measures that could ease recovery.
Income levels: As a group, upper-middle income countries are projected to contract by 0.5
percent (un-weighted average), driven by a contraction in output in South Africa, Botswana,
and the Seychelles. This constitutes a 4.9 percentage point decline from their 2008 growth
rate of 4.5 percent. Countries in the ‘lower middle income’ range6 are projected to fare better,
reaching growth rates of up to 3.8 percent in 2009. Nevertheless, this represents a substantial
decline of 2.1 percentage points relative to 2008. Due to their limited integration into the
global economy and the relatively better performance in international prices of some
agricultural exports such as coffee and cocoa during the crisis, the poorest countries have
proven to be the most resilient and are projected to grow at 3.3 percent, with the smallest
decline in growth compared to 2008, at 1.4 percentage points. 4 African LICs (Ethiopia,
Uganda, Malawi, and Republic of Congo) are projected to record GDP growth rates of above
5 percent in 2009.
Fragile States: All fragile states, except Eritrea, have been hurt less, but have nevertheless
seen their growth rate fall. The real GDP growth rate for this group is projected to decline by
only 1.2 percent to 2.7 percent. However, these countries started with a lower average rate of
growth in 2008, and a slowdown is particularly harmful given the widespread poverty, the
risk of policy reversal, and the resurgence of fragility.
With the increased risk of policy reversals which could raise poverty levels and aggravate
inequality, the financial crisis exacerbated the very causes of conflicts which continue to pose
a challenge to fragile regimes and governments. Furthermore, the combination of the effects
5
6
July 31, 2008 is considered as the benchmark.
With GDP per capita between $ 786 and $ 3115
11
of the financial crisis, high food and fuel prices adds further burden on fragile states, given
their relatively weak macroeconomic fundamentals. This limits their capacity to undertake
mitigation measures on their own, and in turn strengthens the case for external assistance.
Figure 4 below shows a strong correlation between the pre- financial crisis rate of growth of
countries and the decline in GDP growth.
Figure 4. Africa: Pre-crisis (2008) real GDP growth and projected (2009) decline
3
Chad
Correl. Coeff.= -0.52
Uganda
-2
Malaw i
Niger
points)
Real GDP change between 2008 and 2009 (percentage
Congo Rep. of
Rw anda
Ethiopia
South Africa
-7
Madagascar
Botsw ana
Seychelles
-12
Angola
Equatorial Guinea
-17
-1
1
3
5
7
9
11
13
15
Real GDP grow th, 2008 (annual change in percent)
Kenya
Togo
1
Côte d'Ivoire
Senegal
Central African Rep.
Com oros
Sierra Leone
0
Mauritania
Burundi
Morocco
Cam eroon
points)
Real GDP change between 2008 and 2009 (percentage
2
-1
Gabon
Benin Zam bia
Algeria
Guinea-Bissau
Sw aziland
-2
Libya
Lesotho
Djibouti
Burkina Faso
São Tom é & Príncipe
Tunisia
Mali
Cape Verde
Mauritius
Gam bia, The
-3
Nigeria
Tanzania
Ghana
Mozam bique
Liberia
Sudan
Egypt
Congo Dem . Rep.
Guinea
Nam ibia
-4
-5
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Real GDP grow th, 2008 (annual change in percent)
Source: African Economic Outlook database (October 2009) and staff calculations.
12
8
Key factors that determine the extent of the impact on countries of the crisis are the following:
•
Openness of the Economy: Given that the crisis is an external shock, economies that
were more open to trade and capital flows such as emerging and frontier markets and
oil exporters, have suffered sharper contractions in growth in 2009. A majority of
MICs rely heavily on exports of oil or minerals, whose prices have been adversely
affected by the crisis. South Africa was exposed to the first round effect of the crisis
through the sudden slowdown of capital inflows, and the contraction of demand, as
was the case in emerging market economies in other regions.
•
Resource endowment: Resource-rich countries were hit more severely than resourcepoor countries. Countries that grew the fastest in 2008, mostly the oil and minerals
exporters, have experienced the sharpest fall in 2009. Oil exports by African
countries7 to the United States dropped significantly in the second half of 2008, with
volumes falling by 75 percent within 6 months. The drop in oil prices significantly
affected countries such as Angola and Equatorial Guinea which are heavily dependent
on exports of oil with GDP growth contracting by about 15 percentage points in 2009.
Countries such as Botswana, which sustained impressive growth rates in the 1990s and
2000s suffered from the collapse in diamond prices. Many resource rich countries
have been hit particularly severely because of their undiversified export and
production structures.
•
Food prices: With the drop in prices of food, most food importers experienced a fall
in their food import bill. However, some of the benefits from reduced import costs
were eroded in the aftermath of the crisis as international commodity prices for a wide
range of export products dropped. There has been a recovery in some of the
commodity prices such as coffee and cocoa during the current year providing relief to
a number of LICs. This has lowered pressure on current accounts and household
budgets for countries such as Ghana, Cote D’Ivoire, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and
Uganda.
•
Overseas Development Assistance (ODA): Most LICs are expected to undertake
increased public investments in 2009, financed largely by ODA, which will help keep
the economies buoyant. The latest OECD Report on Aid Predictability indicates that
ODA levels were at their highest in 2008, although the commitments to Africa are
lagging behind. A part of this increased ODA is expected to be channelled into
increased public investments and will be crucial in maintaining public spending levels
and offsetting the negative impact of the crisis on LICs. In Burkina Faso for example,
about 80 percent of public investment is financed by ODA. If all the pre-existing ODA
commitments for 2009 are met, public investment will increase by more than 40
percent.
2.3.2
Impact on Banking and Finance
Due to low financial depth and limited integration with international markets, the credit
crunch itself played a less prominent role in most African countries. However, some emerging
and frontier economies, including South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, and Kenya experienced the
7
Nigeria, Angola, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Republic of Congo, Gabon, Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Democratic
Republic of Congo
13
first round effects of the crisis due to their stronger link with the global financial markets.
Access to trade finance and banking credit lines were substantially reduced, with the region’s
trade finance gap rising several times.
•
With tightened global lending conditions, some emerging and frontier markets were
not able to borrow in external markets. For example, Nigeria’s banks had difficulties
obtaining trade credit in the United States and Europe. The Central Bank of Nigeria
had to provide lines of credit to the affected banks as a measure to sustain liquidity in
the economy. More recently, the Central Bank had to inject additional funds into the
industry in August 2009 when five large banks, accounting for about a third of the
country’s banking assets, faced large losses from non-performing loans due to
excessive lending mostly to the energy sector.
•
The stock exchanges of South Africa and Egypt suffered losses similar to those of
emerging market economies (EMEs) in other regions in 2008, but have been slowly
recovering since the second quarter of 2009.
•
Some countries are suffering from the second round effects with the continent
suffering from the credit crunch indirectly. Because of falling export receipts, the net
foreign assets of the banking sector fell sharply in some countries. The banking sector
in Ghana has shown signs of strain, with declining profitability and rising nonperforming assets, which reached almost 10 percent of total assets in March 2009.
However, no Central Bank intervention was needed.
2.4
The longer term impact and risks to the outlook
2.4.1 Real GDP growth rate for Africa is projected to pick up in 2010 to 4.1 percent, fuelled
primarily by the global recovery and domestic policy responses. However, this will remain
well below the growth rates achieved in recent years of close to 6 percent. In the longer term,
the key question is, whether, and when Africa will be able to return to a high and sustainable
growth path. Some of the effects of the financial and economic crisis will have a long lasting
negative impact on Africa’s growth prospects.
2.4.2 Focus on reforms and Institutions: African governments have so far remained
committed to programs of reform. Governments have prudently used fiscal resources and
borrowing from both the external and internal sources to address the immediate impacts of the
crisis. However, a prolonged crisis will strain some fundamentals of the economy, such as
quality of institutions, foreign direct investment inflows, savings and human capital with
possible long term consequences for growth.
2.4.3 Budget management: The additional pressure from the crisis has forced some
governments to cut down on social sector expenditure and public investments. This could lead
to a slow down of progress on social indicators and set back progress towards achieving the
MDGs. It will also push back the growth in productive capacity and infrastructure
development.
2.4.4 The speed and size of the global recovery: While the global recovery has started, there
is speculation of a double- humped recovery and the risks to the global recovery itself are
tilted to the downside. A recovery in global trade and finance is a key factor behind Africa’s
prospects.
14
2.4.5 Overseas Development Assistance: The sustenance of growth in some of the African
LICs is critically hinged on delivery of ODA commitments. If there are cuts or delays in
delivery of commitments, the growth prospects of these countries will be significantly hurt.
2.4.6 The above factors would hurt key drivers of growth, seriously jeopardizing the
region’s longer term growth potential and leading to a lower growth trajectory in the postrecovery period. If this happens, the global financial and economic crisis would degenerate
into a development crisis.
2.5
Africa’s Response
2.5.1 African countries have adopted a variety of measures aimed at mitigating the impact
of the financial and economic crisis, including fiscal stimulus packages, targeted sectoral
assistance, capital and exchange controls, setting up of special monitoring units to identify
causes and responses to the crisis, and new regulations in the banking sector. Several MICs
have applied expansionary monetary policies. In addition, resource-rich MICs are also
drawing on reserves accumulated over the years for fiscal stimulus spending.
2.5.2 Several African countries do not have adequate domestic resources to fully offset the
impacts of the crisis. Even in countries where some expansionary policy is feasible, such as
Tanzania and Uganda, the key concern is striking a balance between preserving the hard-won
policy space and stimulating domestic aggregate demand through short term measures.
Spending on stimulus packages, at the expense of poverty-related expenditures on health,
education, and infrastructure, may also have undesirable long term effects. The Bank has been
requested to support several such efforts.
2.5.3 Reforms aimed at increased domestic revenue mobilization have increased in
importance on the policy agenda, but results are likely to take time to materialize. The Bank
has also stepped up its support, via efforts such as the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative (EITI), which promotes revenue transparency in oil, gas and mining thereby
reducing leakages.
2.5.4 In low income countries, such as Ethiopia or Sudan, the response may also be
constrained by the lack of foreign exchange. Success of support to struggling export sectors
will also depend on a healthy global recovery. The stimulus measures should therefore be
carefully selected in coordination with international measures.
2.5.5 To prevent the financial and economic crisis from becoming a development crisis, the
actions of African policymakers need to be coordinated with, and supplemented by,
developed countries, including adequate commitments and timely delivery of financial aid
and technical assistance. As growth prospects of both China and India have improved,
deepened trade and investment linkages with them could also help Africa recover faster.
15
Box 1: Domestic Policy Responses
South Africa: The government has set aside a countercyclical fiscal stimulus amounting to
Rand 787 billion (about USD 100 billion) for public investments during 2010-12. The South
African Reserve Bank eased monetary policy between December 2008 and May 2009, when
it cut its policy rate by 450 basis points.
Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda: All raised government expenditures on infrastructure (road
and energy projects) in their 2009/10 budgets by 20 to 30 percent, to sustain economic
growth. In Kenya, the Central Bank pursued accommodative monetary policy, including
through cutting the policy rate. In Tanzania, the Central Bank increased the growth of money
supply by several percentage points.
Tunisia: Public investment increased by more than 20 percent in 2009, to compensate for the
35 percent decrease in FDI.
Morocco: Public investment is expected to increase from 3.4 percent to 3.6 percent, as the
government seeks to sustain growth, support structural reforms, and strengthen sectoral
policies.
Mauritania: Similar trends are observed, with the government considering raising public
investment by 40 percent in 2009 to sustain growth.
2.6
MICs access to International Capital Markets
2.6.1 A review of the current situation in African capital markets indicates that there is
currently no confidence that African countries’ access to capital markets will be restored at
pre- crisis levels or prices, which were an exception rather than the norm, particularly in terms
of the low cost of capital. There is also no evidence that the Bank’s increased lending
operations may crowd out lending from commercial banks.
2.6.2 MIC access to capital markets has improved compared to the height of the financial
crisis in Q4 2008 and in Q1 2009. As a general indicator, the Emerging Market Bond Index8
(EMBI), a measure of the spread at which international bonds issued by emerging sovereigns
trade in the secondary market with respect to US Treasuries, was at 1.7 percentage points over
US Treasuries in 2007, widened to nearly 9 percentage points at the height of the crisis (a
yield, or effective rate of interest of over 12 percent) when risk aversion was at its peak and
investors avoided this asset class. This spread has recovered to around 3 percentage points at
the end of October 2009 (Figure 5).
8
The EMBI Global tracks total returns for US dollar-denominated debt instruments issued by emerging market sovereign and
quasi-sovereign entities: Brady bonds, loans, Eurobonds. Currently, the EMBI Global covers 206 instruments (each with a minimum
size of USD 500 million) across 37 countries. Africa is currently represented by South Africa, Tunisia, Egypt, Gabon and Ghana.
16
Figure 5: EMBIG Spread
9%
8%
7%
6%
5%
4%
3%
2%
1%
Oct 09
Jul 09
Apr 09
Jan 09
Oct 08
Jul 08
Apr 08
Jan 08
Oct 07
Jul 07
Apr 07
Jan 07
0%
2.6.3 Recent improved economic and financial conditions make it likely that MICs will
soon start to regain access to the international financial markets that were closed to most of
them so far in 2009. Nonetheless, it remains difficult to predict which countries will regain
access, at what price, and whether countries will find it efficient to pursue this option.
2.6.4 A limited number of MICs have a history of tapping international capital markets and
have thus developed a track-record and investor base in this regard. South Africa is in a
league of its own and has tapped its investor base twice this year – first in May and then in
August with a USD 2 billion bond due to mature in May 2019 (Table 1). However, this
borrowing has come at a high cost. In 2007, South Africa could have raised funds for 10
years, at a cost of around mid-swaps9 + 50 bps reflecting the then prevailing conditions. The
recent bond issuances have been significantly more expensive in comparison.
South Africa
19 May 09
26 August 09 (tap)
Table 1: South Africa’s recent Bond Issuance
10 year bond issue
10 year swap spread at
(amount)
issuance (internal
calculation)
USD 1.5 billion
370
USD 500 million
215
10
10-year CDS (bps)
Bloomberg
245
180
2.6.5 For other MICs such as Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco, and to a lesser extent, blend
countries such as Nigeria, that could source funds from international capital markets before
the crisis, access remains restricted but the outlook is improving. If these countries were to
issue bonds now, transactions would be possible at a price lower than that at the height of the
recent financial turmoil. Table 2 shows the evolution of Credit Default Swaps (CDS) from
9
Mid-swaps flat (or plus 0 bps) is equivalent in fixed rate market of LIBOR flat – the rate at which banks can borrow in the
interbank market – which can be seen as a transaction with low credit risk. So, for example, mid-swaps plus 50 bps for 10 years can
be seen as a very small risk premium reflecting the then prevailing market environment before the onset of financial crisis.
10
A credit default swap is a contract established between a protection buyer and a protection seller where the buyer pays a premium
to the seller, in exchange for payment in the case of a credit event with respect to an issuer – called a Reference Entity - for example,
a default. Since the protection seller assumes the credit risk of the Reference Entity, it is a situation similar to buying the bond of the
Reference Entity (with some difference like it is unfunded) and therefore CDS spreads are a good indication of bond spreads.
17
2003 to 2009. Undoubtedly one major factor driving the move in CDS level from 2003 to
2007 was the search for yield that led to a massive tightening of credit spread in the build up
to the financial crisis. Additionally, the momentum in compression of CDS levels was aided
by favourable domestic developments in these countries.
Table 2: 5 –year CDS of African Countries (bps) (Bloomberg)
Country
Egypt
Morocco
Tunisia
South
Africa
2003
348
281
195
2004
166
156
114
Pre-crisis
June 2007
75
45
30
149
105
25
Crisis March
2009
650
335
337.5
Post-crisis
October
2009
209.2
104.8
109.3
524.1
124.4
Box 2: Tunisia – Market feedback indicates that cost of borrowing remains high
Tunisia has been a regular issuer of bonds for over a decade. It has issued bonds in the
Japanese Yen, US Dollar and Euro bond markets. Its last bond issuance was in August 2007
when it priced a 20 year bond in the Japanese domestic market at JPY mid-swaps plus 75 bps.
5 year CDS levels for Tunisia which had widened to around 350 bps during the financial
crisis have now fallen to around 110 bps.
In determining investors' pricing requirements for a new bond, the secondary level would
provide a reference point for Tunisia. The outstanding bonds are illiquid and as an example,
indicative trading spread for Tunisia’s USD bond due 2012 is shown at 150 bps.
Market indicative feedback is that a new 5 year bond could be issued at around 160-175 bps
over swaps for both USD and Euros, while a 10 year bond would cost an additional 20-30
bps11. Rates for bond issuance are thus improving but remain much higher than pre-crisis
levels.
2.6.6 Sub-Saharan countries that have issued bonds in international capital markets in the
pre-crisis period such as Ghana and Gabon have seen their bonds spreads fall recently.
Gabon’s bond due 2017 has tightened from over 12 percentage points over UST in March
2009 to around 4.5 percentage points over UST as of end October 2009. Similarly, Ghana
had issued a 10-year bond in September of 2007 at par to yield 8.50 percent (UST+387 bps).
The bond sold off dramatically as a result of the crisis with the yield reaching nearly 20
percent but has seen a significant correction since then with a current trading level of around 9
percent.
11
These are indicative levels and given Tunisia’s absence from the market and lack of investor work, precise estimates are difficult
to obtain.
18
2.6.7 In summary, MICs’ estimated costs of funds for international bond market issues are
moving in the right direction but remain high compared to pre-financial crisis levels. How
much further the costs will fall remains open to debate. While the current fall in spreads
reflects a return of risk-appetite, it also represents a search for high yielding bonds given the
current low interest rate environment. Access to capital markets for MICs still remain
expensive, and current conditions are not ideal for debut transactions as was noted by Nigeria
in early October 2009 when it decided to delay plans to issue a $500 million Nairadenominated bond citing unfavourable market conditions.
2.6.8 The likelihood of MICs’ cost of funds returning to pre-financial crisis levels is
uncertain in the medium term. The financial crisis is likely to lead to a re-pricing of risk and
investors may realize that low costs of bond issuance before the onset of the financial crisis
were unreasonable and did not fully compensate them for the risk they assumed. In this
scenario, bond issuance spreads will remain high in the medium term and some countries may
find it too expensive to access the capital markets. Internal factors will also be important, such
as how countries are able to manage deteriorating public finances.
2.7
ADB’s access to International Capital Markets
2.7.1 Following record sub-Libor spread levels achieved for the most part of 2008, Sovereign,
Supranational and Agency issuers faced spiralling funding costs during the early part of 2009
as capital markets adapted to their sharply increasing financing needs as well as to the
announcement of massive government bailout programs. However, Supranational and Agency
issuers were still viewed as being among the safest asset class in this challenging environment
and were able to access the capital markets with relative ease throughout the year, despite the
most testing and volatile conditions. Going into the last quarter of 2009, the positive market
sentiment, underpinned by ongoing improvement in economic outlook and the return of
investors’ risk appetite, contributed to the return of Supranational and Agency issuers' subLibor funding for short and medium term maturities.
2.7.2 For the African Development Bank, and taking the 3 year tenor in USD as a case study,
this translated into an increase of its funding cost with respect to mid-swaps of about 50 bps
between Q3 08 and Q1 09 followed by a decrease of 30 bps between Q1 09 and Q4 09
resulting in a moderate 20 bps increase overall. Longer tenors cost of funds have moved up
more significantly (up to 40 bps for 10 year maturities). However, since the impact of the
financial crisis on MICs funding conditions has unfortunately been more dramatic, the cost
effectiveness of the Bank’s products remains intact.
3.
DEMAND FOR ADB RESOURCES
3.1
Introduction
3.1.1 As outlined in the revised economic update, Africa grew at an unprecedented rate in
the previous decade. This rate of growth has been significantly slowed down by the financial
and economic crisis. Maintaining the momentum of growth and to ensure that development is
inclusive and sustainable will require continued substantial investments in transport, energy,
and rural infrastructure, as well as in social sectors.
19
3.1.2 This section focuses on the demand for Bank Group financing emanating from MICs.
It also outlines the demand for private sector borrowing from all African countries. Section 4
discusses the relevance of the General Capital Increase to Low income countries.
3.1.3 This updates the outline of demand presented in September 2009 and is supplemented
by country level assessments12. The Bank’s discussions with RMCs indicate a sharp increase
in potential demand for Bank resources in the near-term to about UA 8 billion per year over
the period 2009-2011. About a third of the demand is for infrastructure, and another third for
private sector lending covering all RMCs including LICs. This figure represents “managed”
demand; total demand from the private sector far exceeds the resources likely to be available.
In 2009 alone total private sector demand amounted to over UA 7 billion.
3.1.4 The demand for Bank financing is expected to remain high in the medium to long
term. This is due to the following reasons: (i) the financial crisis has reduced spending on
infrastructure, and huge gaps remain; (ii) economic recovery and endogenous expansion of
private sector activity will generate demand for financing, whilst access to financial markets
will be both slow to return and expensive; (iii) economic integration and climate change
imperatives will continue to require funding; and (iv) MICs will play a key role in financing
and implementation.
3.1.5 These estimates are based on broad consultations with RMCs focused on the Bank’s
areas of strategic focus. To assess short-term demand, this section draws on information from
direct discussions with Governments, projections drawn from national budgets and investment
plans, and a survey administered in RMCs on the impact of the global economic crisis on the
demand for financing as expressed by countries. Of course, country conditions and
preferences will vary over time. It should be noted also that the RMCs own estimates of
demand for Bank financing are conditioned by their knowledge of the limitations on Bank
resources.
3.2
Context
3.2.1 Financing to Sustain Growth and the MDGs: MICs are important drivers of growth in
Africa, and their performance can have a major impact on their neighbours. This impact is
further detailed in Section 4. Long term sustainability in all countries must be based on
private sector growth. According to Bank projections, taking into account debt repayments,
new loans and FDI, the external financing needs of the continent will increase to USD 75bn
per year during 2009-2011, compared to USD 56bn in 2008. Africa continues to lag in
progress towards the MDGs; these alone would require an additional USD 50bn per year. This
is close to 5% of Africa’s total GDP and would require a substantial increase from current
levels of ODA inflows13 and for more to be in the form of in country investment expenditure.
The MDG Africa Steering Group Report - 2008 estimated that public external financing needs
to be stepped up by USD72 billion per year14 until 2010, in order to achieve the MDGs.
Attention will again focus on the MDGs in the run up to the UN high level review Conference
in 2010.
12
Annex 2 provides MICs Profiles.
Net ODA from DAC members, Korea and major multilateral agencies to Africa was USD 35 billion in 2008,
according to preliminary estimates, “2009 DAC Report on Aid Predictability”, OECD, March 2009.
14
MDGs Africa Steering Group (2008), “Achieving MDGs in Africa”, New York
13
20
Box 3: Africa’s Middle-Income Countries (MICs): Helping the poor
Africa’s MICs face a number of development challenges similar to those of low income
countries, such as creating conducive conditions for sustained growth combined with high
unemployment rates and poverty. About 128 million of Africa’s 320 million poor (below
USD1/day) live in MICs. A number of African MICs are small countries, some landlocked,
others islands, with limited resources, small budgets, and comparatively low social indicators.
For instance, basic health services and basic infrastructure remain inaccessible to a high
proportion of the population in a number of MICs, such as Botswana, Namibia, and
Swaziland where HIV-AIDS affect more than 15% of the population.
Without access to additional resources the poor in MICs will remain vulnerable.
Improvements are needed in basic infrastructure, connectivity, and the business environment,
including for small and medium enterprises. In recent years, MICs have increasingly
approached the ADB for financing and for advice. They want to be able to access a range of
services and products, and the demonstrated capacity of the Bank to respond has increased the
level of demand.
3.2.2 Infrastructure Financing: The Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic concluded
that Africa’s MICs will need an investment of about 10% of GDP per year15 in infrastructure
alone. For LICs, the investment needs are even higher, at about 15% of GDP per year. This
implies investments of between USD 100bn and USD 200bn per year in Africa, depending on
the level of GDP growth over the next decade, of which about 75% is in MICs. This is twice
the current infrastructure investment in Africa, which is about 4 to 5% of GDP and leaves a
gap of between USD50bn and USD100bn per year.
3.3
Short-Term Demand for African Development Bank Financing
3.3.1 The Bank has received an increased level of requests for support from RMCs as a
result of the financial crisis. Some MICs have sought substantial assistance from the Bank for
the first time in more than a decade. This section presents an indication of the potential
demand from the RMCs, including an examination of demand at sector level (Table 3), within
the Bank’s strategic areas of infrastructure, governance and the private sector.
3.3.2 The short-term demand for the Bank’s resources as expressed by RMCs is stable and
robust: Before the economic and financial crisis, the annual demand from the Bank was
strong and was expected to be between UA 5bn and UA 6bn per year. In the aftermath of the
crisis, about UA 8bn of demand for financing is expected to be directed to the Bank each year
between 2009 and 2011. This increased demand reflects the worsening of the financing gap
for pre-existing deficits, notably in energy and infrastructure and especially power and
transport. Given expectations of a slow recovery and return of access to financial markets, this
increased financing gap is likely to keep demand for Bank lending high in the near future.
15
Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic 2009, World Bank, African Development Bank, African Union,
Agence Française de Développement, European Union, New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development,
Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility, and U.K. Department for International Development.
21
This is in line with the analysis of economic impact of the crisis presented in the previous
section.
3.3.3 The projected demand, for Non-Sovereign borrowing accounts for about 36%, split
almost equally between infrastructure and industry, and finance. Public infrastructure
accounts for 32%. Thus, the aggregate share of infrastructure is about 50%. Fast disbursing
general budget support and sector support represents about 22%.
Table 3: Demand for ADB Resources (UA billion), 2009-2011)
Demand for ADB Resources
2009
2010
2011
Total (2009- Percentage
2011)
7.8
8.3
7.9
24
2.7
1.7
2.6
0.8
2.2
2.6
1.9
3
0.8
2.2
2.4
1.7
3
0.8
2.9
7.7
5.3
8.6
2.4
7.3
Of which:
Infrastructure (public/sovereign)
Programmatic
Non-Sovereign
Higher Education and Other
MTS projections
32%
22%
36%
10%
3.3.4 Infrastructure: Demand for infrastructure financing has increased. Several countries
have addressed economic contraction with stimulus packages, with infrastructure investment
being a core component. It is estimated that a large portion of short-term demand for
infrastructure financing from the ADB emanates from four countries: Nigeria, South Africa,
Egypt, and Morocco.
3.3.5 Programmatic lending: Demand for financing in this area has increased markedly.
Several countries have approached the Bank for either general budget support or more
targeted sector support. These countries include Botswana, Cape Verde, Egypt, Mauritius,
Morocco, Namibia and Seychelles. The worsened budgetary situation of African countries is
expected to persist in the short to medium-term. Up to three-quarters of the countries surveyed
indicate that budget deficits were likely to continue through 2011. The demand for budget and
sector support is expected to be about UA 5bn for the period 2009-2011.
3.3.6 Non- Sovereign: Private sector lending is characterized by a large number of
stakeholders and potential clients, rapid change in market conditions, and a broad variety of
financing sources. The Bank’s Non-Sovereign lending window has received a significantly
increased level of requests for financing which amount to over UA 7 billion in 2009 alone.
However the Bank has limited capacity in terms of country limits, equity guidelines, and HR
constraints and is thus unable to process all these requests; from an initial screening about UA
2.5 – 3 billion per year is retained as ‘managed demand’ from the Bank. Demand is split
almost equally between Infrastructure and other sectors, including mining, industry and
finance. In line with the Bank’s Private Sector Guidance Note on Low Income Countries and
Fragile States, around 50% of non-sovereign lending is expected to flow to LICs and Fragile
22
States from 2009 to 201116. This includes 40% in direct lending to LICs and 10% in their
indicative share in regional operations, which are expected to receive a total of 20% of all non
sovereign lending.
Box 4: Private Sector Lending: Additionality and Leverage effect
Reflecting the Bank’s role of catalyzing resources to the African continent, the Bank’s Private
Sector Department only selects projects that demonstrate additionality and complementarity.
The additionality is independently assessed by an independent unit of the Bank. The
complementarity is achieved mainly through co-financing with a range of entities including
other DFIs and commercial banks.
It is estimated that that for every dollar of private sector Bank financing four dollars come
from other sources. Furthermore, the Bank has recently adopted the B-Loan syndication
structure whereby commercial banks channel resources to borrowers through the Bank as the
lender of record, thereby enabling borrowers to have access to resources that would otherwise
not be available. The Bank has also established a collaborative platform of co-financing, the
African Financing Partnership (AFP), with EIB, IFC, DBSA, IDC, FMO, DEG and Proparco,
whereby one institution coordinates the preparation of projects and investment proposals and
the others contribute as co-financiers. At the Annual meeting in Dakar, the declaration of the
joint IFI Action Plan for the Private Sector in Africa stated that the US$ 15 billion in crises
response pledges of the Group of MDBs/DFIs would be channelled through the use of the
APF mechanism. A significant capital increase would enable the Bank to contribute its own
share of the resources pledged under the joint IFI Action plan.
3.4
Estimates of Medium to Long-term Demand for Financing in MICs
3.4.1
Demand for Infrastructure Financing by MICs
The World Bank (2009), in collaboration with the ADB and other partners, undertook the
Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD), an ambitious project to analyze the cost for
redressing the infrastructure deficit in 24 African countries, based on country level
information on various dimensions of infrastructure needs. The study estimated that an
average investment of about 15% of GDP per year for LICs and about 10% of GDP per year
for MICs would be required over the next decade.
Figure 6: Africa's Infrastructure needs (Annual)
LICs (15% of
GDP)
26.4
11
MICs (10% of
GDP)
52.8
0
16
6.6
20
Total USD
44 bn
22
40
60
13.2
Total USD
88 bn
80
USD
bnRegional Operations.
This includes lending to LICs and Fragile States
under
Energy
Water and sanitation
Others
23
100
Figure 6 presents estimates of
the investment in infrastructure
needed under three GDP
growth scenarios. It is
estimated that MICs need
between USD 77bn and USD
153bn per year to close
infrastructure deficits in the
next decade. About half of the
financing will be required for energy, and the rest for roads, water and sanitation and other
sectors.
MICs currently spend on average between 5%-6% of GDP per year on infrastructure
development bringing the additional financing gap to about 4%-5% of GDP per year. This is
between USD 38bn and USD 75bn per year for the next decade.
3.4.2
Private Sector Financing
•
Access to capital is a key constraint to private sector development in Africa,
particularly due to shallow capital markets. Before the financial crisis, there was
extensive but unmet demand for financing from the private sector in Africa. This was
ameliorated to some extent by the expansion of commercial financing in the continent,
which was rising in the run up to the crisis. Several African companies, notably those
in Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya had recently issued bonds and credit spreads were at
their lowest ever for Africa.
•
As outlined in the section on access to capital markets, the situation has deteriorated
markedly since the onset of the financial crisis. While African countries’ access to
capital markets is slowly returning, prices remain much higher than pre- crisis levels.
In a number of countries, commercial lenders have withdrawn their services altogether
or scaled down financing. The unmet demand for financing from the private sector has
thus increased significantly.
•
Several large infrastructure projects have been put on hold or postponed due to a lack
of financing, across a range of sub-sectors, including energy, transport and
telecommunications. Trade finance has also seen a withdrawal of lenders from the
market, with commercial banks unwilling to underwrite guarantees or unable to
provide trade credit. Some commodity marketing boards, which previously benefited
from revolving credit facilities with major international commercial banks, have had
to resort to traditional sources of finance as financial markets dried up.
•
As a result of this financial retrenchment, demand for private sector financing from
multilateral banks has increased significantly. Several borrowers that were previously
able to access financial markets are now unable to find any lenders. For those who are
able to access commercial financing, the cost of the funds is exorbitantly high. As for
sovereign borrowers, pricing is an important factor as the high cost of commercial
borrowing makes projects financially unviable, thus making the lower- cost borrowing
from multilateral banks such as the ADB one of the few feasible options.
3.4.3
Cost of Addressing Climate Change adaptation in Africa
•
There are relatively few estimates of the economic costs of climate change for Africa,
due to either poor climatic data availability or difficulties in differentiating natural
disasters that are typical for the region or additionally inflicted by an increased
climatic variability. Estimates by the Stockholm Research Institute, presented at the
African Ministerial Conference on the Environment in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia show
that annual net economic costs of climate change impacts in Africa could be
equivalent to 2.7% of GDP each year by 2025 (or around $40 billion/year). In the
absence of global mitigating elements, economic costs could be extremely large, as in
the short-term a significant increase of climate related disasters are expected to occur.
Africa’s priority therefore remains adaptation. However it also has strong
opportunities to develop a low-carbon economy by harnessing its vast renewable
energy potential.
24
•
Further estimates released by the Grantham Research Institute and the International
Institute for Environment and Development early in 2009 show that in the short term,
the adaptation cost for Africa will reach approximately $13-19 billion by 2015. This is
estimated to rise to $21–27 billion by 2030. The additional costs of ‘climate proofing’
investment is typically estimated at $12 to $28 billion/year by 2030 for Africa. On the
mitigation side, the cost of putting Africa on a low-carbon growth pathway with
significant emission reductions could amount to $9–12 billion by 2015, including $5–
6 billion per year for forestry, $2–4 billion per year for agriculture, and $2 billion per
year for the energy sector. The total cost is expected to rise to $31–41 billion by 2030.
These estimates are based only on incremental marginal costs for renewable energy
development.
•
The Bank’s Climate Change Action Plan has identified key areas of intervention in the
near term, spanning mitigation and adaptation actions and will require substantial
financial resources to implement. Available financial resources from global Funds to
address climate change are insufficient to meet the demands in the continent. A key
challenge is that African countries are reluctant to borrow from the Bank to address
their climate change risks, which they believe are not self induced and therefore
expect financial assistance from developed countries to address these risks. The Bank
would need to allocate substantial resources from ADF 12 to climate change
initiatives, as failure to address climate change challenge will not only hinder the
ability to reduce poverty in the continent, but could also reverse the modest gains the
continent has recorded in achieving the MDGs. Furthermore, integrating climate Risk
Management right from the onset of project design will be the least costly option as
opposed to future stand-alone adaptation to existing infrastructure. The Bank can also
play a major role in enhancing both regional collaboration and leveraging private
sector resources to help address climate change risks in Africa.
3.5
Lending Scenarios for the African Development Bank
3.5.1 Lending scenarios: The GCI Issues and Framework paper laid out three alternative
lending scenarios for the Bank. These have been further updated as the extent of demand from
the Bank in the medium term has become clearer.
•
The Medium Term Strategy (MTS) Scenario was approved as part of the Bank’s
Medium Term Strategy (2008-2012). This scenario was developed against the backdrop of
a positive outlook for the global economy and the international financial markets. It made
two key assumptions: an overall demand for financing from RMCs in real terms in line
with GDP growth, and a strengthened position of the Bank, and projects an annual growth
in lending of 14% between 2008 and 2012, in line with the Bank’s ambition to raise its
profile in financing its priority areas such as infrastructure, governance, and private sector
development.
•
Scenario 117 is based on the assumption that the surge in ADB lending due to the
financial crisis will last two years and that the Bank will return to MTS lending levels by
2011. Scenario 1 supplements the MTS lending scenario in 2009 and 2010 with additional
17
Scenario 1 was previously also called the Adjusted Short Lives Crisis Scenario (ASLC) and Scenario 2 was
previously also called the Drawn Out Crisis Scenario (DOC)
25
operations already approved by the Board of Directors and those expected to be presented
in the coming months.
•
Scenario 2 is built on the assumption that lending from the Bank will remain higher than
MTS levels until 2015. As MTS only projected lending until 2012, in this scenario, the
annual increase in lending is estimated to converge to the Bank’s long term lending
growth rate in 2015. Various scenarios for this are shown below.
3.5.2 Short-to-Medium-Term Lending Projections: In the light of feedback received from
the Bank’s Board of Directors, the Bank’s lending program for 2009 has been revised
downwards. However, given the strength and urgency of demand from RMCs, this will lead
to an increase in the 2010 lending program to accommodate some of the projects which
cannot be financed in 2009. Table 4 below provides projections under the three different
scenarios for the period 2009-2011.
Table 4 – Short –Term Lending Scenarios (in UA million)
Lending Scenarios for the Short Term
2009
2,187
5,704
5,704
MTS
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
2010
2,171
4,145
5,745
2011
2,890
2,890
4,990
It must be noted that the Bank’s lending scenarios propose to meet only a part of the UA 8bn
demand expected each year based on the Bank’s operational capacity constraints and the
availability of funds.
3.5.3 Medium-to-Long-Term Lending Projections: The projections reflect the underlying
expected demand for loans by member countries, but actual lending will be determined by a
range of factors particular to each country or entity. Overall the Bank’s long term lending
growth could evolve in several different ways, depending on various factors. Key among
these are GDP growth on the continent, availability of other sources of finance and the
lending capacity of the Bank. The long term lending presented below, span the time horizon
2012 to 2020 (Figure 7; Table 5). These three projections assume:
•
Extension at 5% rate of growth: This is the ‘minimal growth’ scenario and could
represent a fall in the Bank’s lending volume in real terms, depending on inflation.
•
Extension at 13% rate of growth: In order to support a 5% real GDP growth, nominal
GDP growth of about 13% is necessary, assuming an average rate of inflation of 8%.
Table 5: Lending scenarios for the Medium and Long Term
Extension at 5% growth
2012
MTS
3,292
Scenario 1
3,292
Scenario 2
4,692
Extension at 13% growth
MTS
3,292
Scenario 1
3,292
Scenario 2
4,692
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
3,457
3,457
3,629
3,629
3,811
3,811
4,001
4,001
4,202
4,202
4,412
4,412
4,632
4,632
4,864
4,864
4,718
4,917
5,001
5,251
5,514
5,789
6,079
6,383
3,720
3,720
4,204
4,204
4,750
4,750
5,368
5,368
6,065
6,065
6,854
6,854
7,745
7,745
8,752
8,752
4,718
4,917
5,001
5,651
6,386
7,216
8,154
9,214
26
Figure 7: Lending Projections
ADB Annual Lending Projections (2009-2020): Long term growth of 13%
9000
Amount (UA mn)
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
MTS
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
3.5.4 Lending Projections 2009-2020: The immediate impact of the crisis is likely to
diminish in the medium term. However, it is reasonable to assume a structural upward shift in
the level of Bank lending. This arises from the increased volume of economic activity with
resumed growth, the inability of borrowing members to access alternative sources of finance
immediately, and the choice made by RMCs themselves reflecting their increased confidence
in the Bank as a partner which has demonstrated its capacity to deliver quickly and effectively
during the crisis period.
3.6
The Bank’s comparative advantage and value added in the International Aid
Architecture
3.6.1 The Bank has a clear strategic focus aligned with RMC priorities. The Bank’s MTS
established a longer term strategic focus on its areas of comparative advantage where it has
acknowledged expertise and experience: infrastructure, governance, private sector, and the
development of technical and higher skills level. In responding to the economic and financial
crisis the Bank has maintained this selective approach. Through investments in these areas
the Bank will promote regional integration, support agriculture and food security, adaptation
to climate change, and gender equality. It should be noted that the Bank has let others take a
lead in social safety nets, increased access to basic education, the provision of balance of
payments support, and macroeconomic oversight and surveillance.
27
3.6.2 It is mandated to promote economic and regional integration. The African Union has
assigned the Bank responsibility to promote and to financially support economic integration.
As an African institution the Bank is uniquely well placed to facilitate cross border dialogue
and investment, and in doing so works closely with other African institutions, including the
AU Commission, Economic Commission for Africa, NEPAD, Regional Economic
Commissions, and Regional Banks. It also has MOUs with the European Commission and
the World Bank, and hosts the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa.
3.6.3 It has integrated private and public sector activities across all RMCs. Given the
increasing importance of private sector development in Africa, the Bank’s integrated structure
adds value by promoting a holistic approach which is responsive to RMC priorities, exploiting
synergies between the public and private sectors, and in improving the investment climate.
Through instruments such as the African Financing Partnership (AFP), the Bank is taking the
lead on leveraging the market skills and knowledge of development finance institutions
(DFIs) to mobilize private sector resources for large scale projects, particularly infrastructure.
3.6.4 The Bank has demonstrated speed and flexibility in response to the 2008-2009 food,
energy and financial crises, through front-loading of resources, provision of additional
resources to budget support operations, introduction of a trade facility, and portfolio
restructuring in order to unlock additional resources. Several fast- disbursing emergency
budget support programs have made it possible for the Bank’s RMCs to provide rapid
counter-cyclical responses and maintain pro-poor spending. This effective response
encompassed MICs and LICs using both ADF and ADB instruments.
3.6.5 The ADB is increasingly becoming African countries’ partner of choice. This is
particularly true for ADB countries, as shown by the recent data for lending in the 3rd quarter
2009, which indicate ADB as the biggest lender in Africa followed by the European
Investment Bank and the World Bank18. The strong demand for ADB resources is also
confirmed by the pipeline of both public sector and private sector projects, estimated
respectively at UA 3,087 million and UA 2,586 million, largely exceeding the projections by
other organizations19. This is consistent with recommendations of the High Level Panel in
2007 that the Bank should aim to become the premier development institution in Africa, a
voice for development within Africa and for Africa internationally. This ambition was
endorsed by shareholders and remains a key driving factor for the Bank. The trend of
increasing demand is also consistent with country led development, the importance of
countries being able to engage with preferred development partners.
3.6.6 The Bank has a growing role as the voice of Africa in development fora. The Bank’s
African focus and character provide it unrivalled access to countries and their political
leadership. It has used its convening power to launch a number of important initiatives. For
instance, in 2008 the Bank, in partnership with the African Union Commission and the United
Nations Economic Commission for Africa, convened the first Meeting of African Finance
18 ADB approvals during the 3rd quarter 2009 totaled UA 713.00 million. The World Bank Group and the
European Investment Bank lending to Middle Income Countries1 and African Private Sector totaled respectively
UA 330.00 million and UA 484.00 million. ADB approvals during the first three quarters 2009 totaled UA
2,406.430 million. The World Bank Group and the European Investment Bank lending to Middle Income
Countries and African Private Sector totaled respectively UA 1,942.98 and UA 1,709.71 million. Source: WB
and EIB websites.
19
Asset Liability Committee (ALCO), Quarterly Report, III, September 30th.
28
Ministers and Central Bank Governors in Tunis to discuss the impact of the financial and
economic crisis. A Committee of Ten was established after the meeting to monitor the crisis
and provide analysis and advice. It continues to meet regularly and to contribute African
perspectives to the G20, G8 and other international discussions of the crisis. The President
attended both the London and Pittsburgh G20 Leaders Summit. The communiqués issued by
the Committee testify to the role they want the Bank to play, both as a channel of investment
to the continent and in providing advice and expertise.
3.6.7 The Bank is a key part of the international aid architecture in Africa. Complementing
its focus on selected strategic priorities, a cardinal principle for the institution is to work in
partnership with others. It has continued to build productive partnerships with key multilateral
and bilateral organisations in order to maximise the combined contribution to Africa’s
development. The ADB been a partner with the World Bank and the IMF, in the HIPC and
MDRI processes and is also participating in a joint MDB working group to review the Debt
Sustainability Framework. ADB has been asked to work with the World Bank, IMF and
European Commission in implementing the new EU Vulnerability Flex instrument, designed
to mitigate the social consequences in the countries worst hit by the crisis. A large number of
MOUs have been signed with bilateral and multilateral organizations and the Bank hosts a
number of continental initiatives in its areas of expertise. The latter include the Secretariat of
the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA), the Africa Fertiliser Facility, the African
Water Facility, and the Congo Basin Initiative. The Bank is also a major participant in the
Partnership for Making Finance Work for Africa (MFW4A), supported by 12 bilateral and
multilateral development agencies. The increased representation in countries permits the Bank
to have a close dialogue with its RMCs and to play its full part in local donor groups.
4
RELEVANCE OF THE GCI TO LICs
4.1
A GCI will have a strong and demonstrable positive impact on LICs: Low income
countries (LICs) will benefit both directly and indirectly from a general capital increase,
through various channels as demonstrated in this section. The Bank has made a determined
and conscious effort towards increasing access to resources to LICs, optimizing nonfinancing services to LICs as well as maximizing the impact of other ADB operations on
LICs.
•
The Bank’s expected lending pipeline for private sector operations (PSO) is at an all
time high with new approvals projected to reach about UA 1.3 billion in 2009. PSO
that benefit LICs today directly or indirectly account for nearly 60% of the active
private sector portfolio volume including both national and regional operations. Going
forward, new innovative credit enhancement instruments are being considered to offer
more operational headroom and offset the generally higher consumption of risk capital
needed for PSO in LICs.
•
ADB financing to Middle Income Countries (MICs) and to regional integration
operations, through both its sovereign and non sovereign windows, has a demonstrable
impact on LICs. Macroeconomic linkages between MICs and LICs are indisputable
and are further enhanced by the Bank’s core mandate of regional integration with
priority being given to regional operations that cut across national borders and benefit
all Regional Member Countries (RMCs).
29
•
The institutional synergy between the ADB’s, non concessional, and the ADF’s,
concessional, resource, is being increasingly drawn upon for the benefit of LICs. The
increasing use of Public Private Partnerships (PPP) on the continent is a testament to
this operational synergy.
•
The Bank has been consistently increasing its percentage of net income allocation to
initiatives that directly benefit LICs from 13% in 1998 to an average of 60% over the
last 5 years. Going forward, it is proposed to increase net income allocation to
development related initiatives, subject to the approval of the Board of Governors
•
The Bank, in coordination with the Bretton Woods Institutions is considering making
some adjustments to its Enclave Policy with a view to expanding the list of projects
for which ADF countries can borrow ADB resources.
•
As part of the Bank’s Strategy for Knowledge Development and Management,
capacity building and knowledge dissemination products are being increasingly
tailored to LICs.
4.2
LICs and Private Sector Operations (PSO)
4.2.1 Surging Demand for PSO: Responding to growing market demand, PSO has
witnessed a remarkable growth in recent years. From an annual approval volume of about UA
248 million (for 6 projects) in 2006, the annual business volume for PSO reached
approximately UA 1.0 billion (for 32 projects) in 2008, and it is estimated that new PSO
approvals will reach about UA1.3 billion for 35 projects in 2009.
4.2.2 Growing Emphasis on LICs (including Nigeria)20 : While pursuing its annual business
plans the Bank, in responding to the Board’s calls, has increased the proportion of LICs
exposure in its portfolio. In 2007, 27% of the new approval volume was in LICs. In 2008,
against a business plan target of 40% of direct investments in LICs, the actual achievement
was 42%. Distributing the multinational projects to LICs and MICs, the proportion of
approvals for projects benefitting LICs either directly or indirectly as of September 30 2009
stands at 60% and is expected to rise by year end. In terms of volume, annual approvals for
direct national projects in LICs have more than doubled between 2006 and 2008 and are likely
to triple by the end of 2009. In addition LICs also benefit from national transactions that
appear on the books as MIC operations but in actual fact target investment in LICs (see
section 4.3.1).
•
20
The evolution of approvals from 2006 to 30th September 2009 is presented in Figure 8
below. It is worth nothing that while the proportion of the generally riskier LICs
exposure has been on the rise, the Bank has carefully monitored the impact on the
credit risk profile of the entire portfolio, keeping the weighted average risk profile
around the target of 3.5 through balancing with lower risk exposures in MICs and
regional operations. For 2009, the impact of the financial crisis on Nigeria is
evidenced by the significance of the country’s share in approvals.
For purposes of this section, the proportion of investments in LICs includes Nigeria.
30
Figure 8: Evolution of Approval Volume Distribution, 2006 – 30 September 2009
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
2006
2007
2008
Q3 2009
Regional Intermediaries
Regional Integration Projects
Direct MIC
Direct Nigeria
Direct LIC (excluding Nigeria)
•
Figure 9 below breaks down the portfolio volume as of 30 September 2009 between
MICs and LICs with an estimated 60 % of the investment volume benefitting LICs.
Nigeria is highlighted in a separate category to show the impact of the financial crisis.
Also of note is the comparatively large proportion of projects at UA 776 million or
19% that directly promote regional integration (see Section 4.3.1 for specific
examples).
Figure 9: Breakdown of the Portfolio volume at 30 September 2009 in MICs and LICs
Regional LOCs, UA 426 mn (~50% LIC)
Private Equity Funds, UA 296 mn (~55% LIC)
Direct LIC,(excluding Nigeria)
UA 1.119 bn
Regional Integration Projects, UA 776 mn (~40% LIC)
Direct Nigeria, UA 508 mn
Sub‐regional DFIs & Regional Fis, UA 220 mn
(~50% LIC)
Direct MIC, UA 649 mn
31
The total PSO portfolio had 115 operations amounting to UA 3,994 billion. This included
direct investments in 18 LICs and 41 regional operations benefitting LICs in general. Figure
10 below presents the geographical distribution of the active portfolio as of 30 September
2009.
Figure 10: Active Portfolio Distribution at 30 September 2009
Regional operations
20
16
6
% of Portfolio
13
12
8
5 4
1
4
2 32
2 2 2 5
1 1 11 2
1 3 1 2 2 1
So
ut
h A
Ni frica
g
Tu eri
ni a
s
Eg ia
M G yp
au uin t
rit ea
an
M
ad Gh ia
a a
Ca g as na
m ca
e r
Ug roo
Co a n n
n d
Dj go Ra
ib D
Se o u t
n i
Za e ga
Bo m l
ts bi
Et w ana
h
M Mo iop a
o z r o ia
Cô am c c
te b o
D iqu
'I v e
o
Ga ire
b
K e on
A n
Ta lge ya
nz ria
a
Lib nia
e
Co ria
ng
Lic o M s
ic s
0
5 6
LICs
MICs
LICs
MICs
Number of operations
32
4.2.3 Going forward: Credit enhancement instruments and Operational Headroom: The
Bank’s PSO, in particular those that target the generally riskier markets in LICs, are
constrained by the limitations caused by their higher risk capital usage. To mitigate this effect,
a number of credit enhancement initiatives either have been developed or are being
developed, including the following.
•
Credit enhancement and other measures that would help open up more headroom,
including selective selling down of mature loans (where ADB’s presence may no
longer be critical for ensuring the achievement of development objectives and/or
additionality), the activation of new resource mobilization initiatives such as B-loan
syndication and the enhanced utilization of the African Financing Partnership (AFP).
•
Innovative credit enhancement initiatives for using a proportion of ADF resources for
guarantee operations in support of PSO. These proposals will be explored with ADF
Deputies during discussions for the next ADF replenishment.
4.3
Benefits to LICs from MIC Operations and Regional Integration
4.3.1 Macroeconomic Linkages between MICs and LICs: MICs play a central role as
engines of growth, in paving the way for regional integration, as conduits of capital, as
centres of knowledge and excellence, as agents of stability (particularly in regions dominated
by fragile states) and as gateways for trade and integration with the global economy. Their
growth and expansion of business opportunities have important spillovers on their neighbours.
The larger economies such as Egypt and South Africa play the role of growth and
development dynamos for the region around them and provide a gateway to regional
integration and global markets for neighbouring countries. Consequently, LICs derive
substantial benefits from ADB-funded operations in MICs. There are numerous examples of
Bank involvement in projects in MICs that have a clear impact on LICs. For instance, the
Bank provided a $150 million senior loan to the Damietta Container Terminal in the Suez
Canal in Egypt for upgrading and expansion. The terminal, located 70km west of the
Mediterranean entrance of the Suez Canal links to the world's busiest trade routes. It is
helping transform the port into a major trans-shipment hub in the entire eastern
Mediterranean. The new terminal within the Port of Damietta is expected to handle some of
the largest containers in the Mediterranean and will significantly lower operating costs and
sailing time for trans-shipment activities, which will benefit trade in Africa and the rest of the
world. The Bank’s recent investment of $ 20 million in the Citadel Capital Fund was
explicitly structured with a condition precedent that 15% of the Fund be invested in Sub
Saharan Africa (Box 5). The Bank has also supplied US $320 million of lines of credit to the
Standard Bank of South Africa and Ned Bank in South Africa as intermediaries for on lending
to infrastructure and industrial projects in LICs outside South Africa. This clearly illustrates
one of the ways in which institutional capacity in MICs is used to promote development in
LICs.
33
Box 5: Citadel Capital Joint Investment Fund
The Citadel Capital Joint Investment Fund is an Egypt based multi-sector fund which aims to
make equity investments in Greenfield or Brownfield projects in various sectors across
agribusiness, financial services (including microfinance), energy, natural resources, waste
management, and manufacturing enterprises primarily in North Africa with select investments
in Sub-Saharan Africa. As a condition precedent to the Bank’s participation, the Fund
managers committed a minimum of 15% of the Fund to Sub-Saharan Africa. This illustrates
how the Bank’s investment in MICs can have a direct impact on LICs.
Citadel Capital’s investment strategy typically involves originating some transactions in
Egypt for subsequent regional expansion into Sub Saharan Africa, primarily in LICs like
Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Burundi. Citadel Capital seeks to invest in national
companies which act as a ‘platform’ for regional expansion, leading to enhanced regional
integration, increased GDP and government revenues. This growth strategy helps to stabilize
the macroeconomic environment of domestic economies, rendering host countries less
vulnerable to exogenous shocks. Such regional growth supports job creation and poverty
reduction. In addition, the active participation and involvement of the Fund managers in the
investee companies will lead to effective skills transfer, improved governance, standardized
processes, improved competitiveness and operational efficiency in companies operating in
LICs.
4.3.2 Regional Integration: Regional integration is one of the Bank’s core mandates and is
considered a sine qua non to Africa’s development in all of the Bank’s RMCs. The Bank’s
Regional Integration Strategy focuses on two key pillars - infrastructure (energy, transport,
ICT and water resources) and institutional capacity building, including for trade facilitation.
A regional approach to addressing infrastructure deficits is critical as many African countries
are simply too small to address the challenges alone. Regional integration lowers the cost of
infrastructure by giving smaller countries access to more efficient technologies and a larger
scale of production. Regional integration also harnesses the benefits of transboundary
commons, such as climate change – for example financing of power generation capacity using
clean energy like hydropower stations, wind farms and solar energy as part of efforts to
support low carbon growth and adaptation efforts.
Capacity building is essential to enable Regional Institutions to strengthen their role in policy,
planning, harmonization and advocacy to provide effective institutional frameworks for
implementing regional infrastructure and trade activities. Major strides are currently being
undertaken throughout Africa to scale up regional economic integration with MICs playing a
pivotal role as regional economic hubs, trade facilitators and anchors of regional
development.
ADB resources partly fill the huge financing gap in cross-border infrastructure operations.
Surging demand for such operations, together with the drying up of financing alternatives has
made it imperative for the ADB to bolster resources. An illustrative example is the EASSY
project, a regional private sector ICT project spanning both MICs and LICs with clear and
demonstrable impact on LICs (Box 6).
ADB funds have also been used directly for private sector operations in LICs, which support
regional integration efforts. ADB provided a loan in 2003 of US$10m (33% of project value)
to Société Djiboutienne de Gestion du Terminal Vraquier (SDTV) to support their concession
to develop, design, construct, own, operate and maintain Bulk Terminal Facilities for Cereals
34
and Fertilizers at Djibouti Port.
These facilities are helping store and process
(unloading/bagging/loading) cereals and fertilizers in bulk form for export to Ethiopia and the
sub-region. The concession has helped improve port turnaround time, added value and
improved competitiveness, empowered local and indigenous companies and subcontractors
for the supply of certain components of goods and services, created new business
opportunities in servicing the port operations and associated logistics, and is providing a
reasonable rate of return for its shareholders.
Analysis and strategy: In response to this increasing demand the Bank is scaling up its
analytical and strategy work to ensure greater coherence and focus on delivery of economic
cooperation and regional integration. The Bank is managing the Program for Infrastructure
Development in Africa (PIDA) on behalf of the AUC/NEPAD. PIDA will establish a
strategic vision, objectives and policy framework for the development of regional and
continental infrastructure in four sectors - Energy, Transport, Information and
Communication Technology, and Transboundary Water Resources up to 2030, provide a
prioritized continental/regional infrastructure development programme focusing on
infrastructure hardware and complementary software and prepare an implementation strategy
and process, including a priority action plan. The Bank is also currently developing Regional
Integration Strategy Papers (RISPs) for north, west, central and east / southern Africa. RISPs
will identify and prioritise areas for Bank engagement and regional operations over the next
three years building on analytical work and the vision outlined in the Medium Term and
Regional Integration Strategies. These tools will help maximize effectiveness and leverage
the Bank’s resources.
A shortage of bankable projects. Well prepared regional projects remain a key bottleneck for
delivery of regional infrastructure. The MIC Trust Fund has played an important role in
helping undertake upfront work to produce studies and detailed designs, which have helped
facilitate cross border projects. The NEPAD Infrastructure Project Preparation Facility
(IPPF) also housed in the ADB is designed to assist all African countries, Regional Economic
Communities (RECs) and specialised institutions (SIs) to prepare high quality and viable
regional infrastructure projects and programs, develop consensus and broker partnerships for
their implementation. The MIC Trust Fund and IPPF have a critical role to ensure a good
supply of bankable projects is available to meet the demand from financiers.
Box 6: EASSY Project
EASSY is an initiative to construct and operate a submarine fibre-optic cable along the east
coast of Africa to connect 20 coastal and land-locked countries to each other and to the rest of
the world. The project is expected to have a huge impact in the regional economies by
helping improve and lowering the cost of ICT services. This will help create employment,
promote regional integration and cross-country trade between all the concerned countries of
the EASSY, as well as boosting economic growth in the region. The project will run a cable
from Port Sudan, Sudan to Mtunzini, South Africa, covering about 9,000 km. The Sponsors
of the EASSY project are the 29 leading telecommunications operators from Eastern and
Southern Africa who make up the parties involved in the construction and maintenance of
EASSY. The EASSY Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) established to receive financing for the
project is the Western Indian Ocean Cable Company (WIOCC).
NEPAD-Infrastructure Project preparation Facility (IPPF) provided up to US$0.5m for the
Transaction Advisor. ADB is providing a private sector loan to WIOCC of up to USD 14.5
million – around 12.5% of the total project cost.
35
4.4
An Integrated Financial Institution: The institutional synergy between the ADB and
the ADF financing windows places the Bank in a unique position to use both concessional and
non concessional resources at its disposal for the benefit of LICs and in providing tailor made
financial solutions to all its RMCs. The increasingly available resources and integrated
synergies within the Bank have been innovatively combined to address the complex financing
needs for national and regional PPPs. Examples include the Nairobi-Mombasa Toll Road
where the ADB’s private sector window is financing the construction of an important portion
of the project.
The Bujagali Dam in Uganda was similarly innovative with power generation undertaken by a
private consortium co-financed by the ADB. On the transmission side, support is from ADF
resources, supplemented by support from the Japanese Government. The Dakar-Diamniadio
Toll Road project is also illustrative of the broader synergies between the two windows of the
Bank Group (Box 7). Other examples include the Sasol Natural Gas Transmission Project
linking Mozambique and South Africa, the Main One Sub-Marine Cable, the pan-African
Rascom Telecommunications Satellite, ADB’s participation in the Global Trade Liquidity
Programme and the EASSY Submarine Cable along the east coast of Africa.
Box 7: The Dakar – Diamniadio Toll Road Project: An Example of Public-Private
Partnerships
In undertaking the Dakar-Diamniadio project, a public-private option was pursued by the
Government of Senegal as a means of raising private interest in co-financing, building and
operating the motorway. The Bank Group’s provision of limited ADF resources was a catalyst
for government involvement and availability of private investment. This highway is a
component of the West African Dakar-Bamako-Ouagadougou- Niamey Road and is a major
infrastructure link for the integration of Dakar and its port to the region. It constitutes a vital
artery for the decongestion and the economic development of the Dakar area, where nearly 25
percent of the country’s population generates 60% of the country’s GDP within an area equal
to 0.3 percent of the national territory.
The Toll road will be operated under a 30-year concession, by the Eiffage Company, a private
operator. The company has approached the private sector window of the ADB for financial
support. Under the terms of the PPP, the private operator will assume 42 percent of the total
cost of the motorway (UA 181 million excluding the costs of expropriations, which will be
borne exclusively by the government). The Government of Senegal, the French Development
Agency and the ADF will fund the balance. The ADF will contribute UA 45 million.
The expected benefits of the projects are several. First, part ownership by a private operator
will ensure the durability of the infrastructure in the long term. Second, the mobility index in
the Dakar area will improve, resulting in more efficient and productive activity and the
reduction of poverty due to improved living conditions for several thousand inhabitants.
Third, project construction will provide numerous jobs and business opportunities for both
SMEs and the population at large. Fourth, more fluid traffic will reduce atmospheric pollution
and harmful health impacts. Fifth, reduced government funding will free government
resources for spending on other sectors. Sixth, the project will act as a model for other large
infrastructure projects in the region that also call for private participation.
36
4.5
Net Income Allocations to LICs
Pursuant to Article 42 of the Agreement Establishing the Bank, the Board of Governors upon
the recommendation of the
Board of Directors is
empowered within certain
criteria to distribute the
Bank’s
net
allocable
income as between three
potential
claimants;
reserves,
surplus
and
development
related
initiatives, with reserves
being allocated first.
As Figure 11 clearly
indicates, over a period of
10 years, development
initiatives have received an
increasing percentage of
the Bank’s net income allocation, from 13% in 1998 to a peak of 76% in 2007. This is a
reflection of the Bank’s strategic priority of increasing resource allocation to development
initiatives in its RMCs, and especially to its most needy LIC and Fragile States. As
summarised in Table 6, the Bank’s net income distributions to date, other than the amounts
retained in reserves and surplus, fall under one of the following three categories: Category I:
Distributions arising from recurrent undertakings; Category II: Distribution for high priority
needs that could not otherwise be met but for which no recurrent undertakings have been
made, and Category III: Distributions for activities that are generally unpredictable. Under
such framework, LICs benefit on average up to 87% of the total Bank’s net income allocation
to development initiatives. Also, since 2003 allocation to LIC related initiatives represented
about 60% of the total Bank’s allocable net income.
With demands on net income increasing over the next few years due to multi-year
commitments by the Bank to the recurrent and developmental undertakings (HIPC, DRC,
ADF), Management will strive to reinforce the capacity of the Bank to generate additional
risk capital to back up the increase in its loan portfolio while at the same time meeting the
multi-year LICs commitments.
37
Table 6: The Bank's Net Income Allocation for Development Initiatives from 1998
through 2008
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Recurrent Undertakings
16
16
16
16
42
115
124
124
101
186
91
HIPC
ADF
DRC
PCCF
High Priority but not
recurrent
MIC
Invest. Climate Facility*
NEPAD-IPPF
African Fertilizer
FAPA
African Legal Support*
FSF
Unpredictable recovery
activities
SRF
Food Crisis*
Total
6
10
-
6
10
-
6
10
-
6
10
-
6
25
13
-
6
10
54
45
11
46
37
30
11
21
67
25
22
14
65
-
15
109
62
-
25
66
-
-
-
-
1
-
15
-
19
51
72
-
-
-
-
1
-
15
-
10
9
25
10
2
16
3
3
18
16
5
5
21
10
10
53
115
5
5
144
15
15
139
120
6
5
5
10
-
60
20
20
257
163
* Development initiatives funded by Surplus Account.
4.5.2 The recurrent initiatives of HIPC and the ADF are worthy of closer examination. The
HIPC initiative has the objective of reducing the annual debt service obligations of low
income countries to levels considered sustainable. From 1997-2003 the Bank contributed 5%
of its annual net income to this initiative and an average of UA 15 million for the past 5 years.
4.5.3 The Bank has consistently made net income contributions to the ADF to replenish
resources used for financing operations in RMC, all them are LICs that cannot borrow from
the ADB sovereign window. It pledged UA 30 million over the three-year ADF-VIII
replenishment period and an additional UA 30 million for each of the ADF-IX & X
replenishments. For the ADF-XI period, the amount pledged was increased by 100% to UA
60 million over the three year period of which UA 50 million have already been allocated out
of 2007 and 2008 net income respectively.
4.5.4 From 2003 to date, LICs have directly benefited from approximately 60% of the
Bank’s net income, with an average annual contribution of UA 130 million. This amount
comprises the following annual contributions: UA 20 million to the ADF, UA 15 million to
the HIPC initiative, approximately UA 60 million to the arrears clearance of the DRC, and
other special contributions to Post Conflict Countries and to the Fragile States Facility.
4.5.5 Other bank allocations to specialized funds that benefit LICs include contributions to
the Fund for African Private Sector (FAPA), the African Fertilizer Fund, NEPAD
38
Infrastructure Project Preparation Fund (IPPF), the African Legal Support Facility, the
Investment Climate Facility, the Special Relief Fund, the Food Crisis Initiative, and most
recently the African Water Facility.
4.5.6 The increasing demands on the Bank to provide resources for development initiatives
will continue to exert pressure on future net income. There is therefore a need to strike a
balance between direct allocation to development initiatives and increasing reserves which
enables increased lending volumes to LICs for both sovereign and non-sovereign operations.
Income allocation proposals will nevertheless be commensurate with the need to support
development initiatives, after determining transfers to reserves necessary to ensure an
adequate level of risk capital to support the Bank’s lending activities and portfolio risk. The
capital increase scenarios presented in Section 8 assume an average income allocation of UA
110 million per year (or 60% of annual net income) over the ADF-12 period including
mandatory allocation to the DRC, recurrent undertaking for ADF and other allocations to
development initiatives, subject to the approval of the Board of Governors.
4.5.7 The level of capital increase and paid-in ratio will determine whether the Bank, subject
to the approval of the Board of Governors, could transfer more or less net income to
development initiatives instead of to its reserves. Subject to available resources, the option of
increasing net income allocations for the next 3 year ADF XII replenishment period will be
considered. The greater the paid-in portion, the greater the ability to transfer more to
development initiatives. Options to increase contributions to development initiatives through
broader technical assistance activities (as defined under Article 2 of the Charter) with
mainstreaming in the annual work programs and related resource allocations will also be
considered.
4.6
Adjustments to the Bank’s Credit Policy
4.6.1 Since 1995 the Bank Group has applied the eligibility criteria of the World Bank to
determine which countries are eligible to ADF financing only (Category A), a blend of
ADF/ADB financing (Category B) and ADB financing only (Category C). This classification
is based on several criteria, key among these being the RMC’s GNP per capita and
creditworthiness, with the overall aim of helping RMC, and especially LICs, balance their
financial needs and debt sustainability. As an exception to the general eligibility rule
described above, Category A countries are eligible to borrow ADB resources for enclave
projects which meet strictly defined criteria.
4.6.2 The adoption by the Bank Group in 1995 of the Credit Policy was instrumental in
restoring the Bank’s AAA rating. Given its strong role in ensuring the institution’s financial
soundness and the comfort this provides to shareholders as well as rating agencies, the Credit
Policy is to remain fundamentally intact. The Bank is closely coordinating with the World
Bank and the IMF to consider widening the definition of enclave projects eligible for ADB
financing. This envisages broadening the eligibility from the current prerequisite of export
only driven projects to national projects with a high development impact that can service
project loan indebtedness from the income they generate with a securitized payment structure.
A decision in this regard is imminent.
39
4.7
Capacity Building and Knowledge Dissemination Products
4.7.1 The Bank is implementing its most recent Strategy for Knowledge Development and
Management for 2008-2010 (KMDS) with the overall aim of establishing the African
Development Bank as the ‘Knowledge Bank for Africa’ (KBA) and to effectively disseminate
knowledge products to all its RMC, but with particular focus on those which are witnessing
major development constraints- LICs and Fragile States.
4.7.2 Between 2002 and 2008, the African Development Institute (EADI) undertook 299
activities training and learning activities with an audience of 13,600 people covering 52 RMC.
The Bank has been particularly active in developing systems for the measurement of
knowledge by patenting African specific statistical systems; training and capacity building, in
addition to Bank project implementation workshops.
4.7.3 Capacity Building Several workshops were organized by EADI in 2008 and 2009 in
Public Financial Management for senior civil servants in Fragile States with the participation
of 15 RMCs.
4.7.4 Project Implementation Workshops The Bank regularly organizes Project
Implementation workshops in LICs and Fragile States to support specific Bank operations.
Government officials involved in the management of Bank-funded projects are provided with
the knowledge and skills on how to manage projects. EADI also conducts complementary
seminars and workshops in this regard to develop the capacity of these groups of countries to
manage the macro-economic environment as a means of attracting investment and stimulating
economic growth, including trade negotiation and regulation, integrated water resources
management, international financing, legal issues, monitoring and evaluation, scaling up of
poverty reduction and results-based CSPs.
4.7.5 Statistical Capacity Building The Bank has an ongoing Statistical Capacity Building
Programme with the underlying objective of increasing the reliability of regional poverty
indicators, improving the databases and functioning of statistical systems, increasing crosscountry measurable data, and harmonizing results measurement throughout Bank operations.
SCB was designed to assist RMCs, especially LICs and Fragile States in addressing data
requirements for effective policy and decision making, and facilitating the efficient
measurement, monitoring, evaluation and dissemination of results. Phase 1 of the Programme
has been completed with the establishment of data bases of Purchasing Power Parities that
facilitate comparison for 51 countries, and National Strategies for the Development of
Statistics (NSDS) in all participating countries. Phase 2 is intended to consolidate upon the
gains achieved in Phase 1 including improved country data systems, and better MDG
monitoring and results’ measurement.
4.7.6 Going Forward The Bank intends to continue to increase its capacity building and
knowledge dissemination products to LICs and Fragile States.
5.
INCREASED CAPACITY TO DELIVER
5.1
The Bank is transitioning to a period of comprehensive and ambitious operational
reform, built on a sharper strategic focus, a reinforced mandate, and a strengthened core
emphasis on results. The Bank Group’s President reinforced in the MTS, that the key obstacle
to achieving the Bank’s mission will be that of delivery capacity and the resource base and
40
that the way to overcome this obstacle is to steadily build internal capacity and reform the
Bank’s business processes. To capture the anticipated results arising from this reform, the
Bank is putting in place a robust measurement framework which allows both for reporting
success as well as spotlighting areas requiring additional focus. Realizing a results-oriented
culture and scaling Bank impact both upwards (in terms of increased and improved results)
and outwards (in terms of decentralization and reach) will be a gradual, iterative process over
time. The Bank’s efforts towards improved capacity and better measurement of impact have
been focused on the following main areas: (i) Business Processes; (ii) Decentralization; (iii)
Quality at Entry and Managing for Results (iv) Institutional Efficiency; (v) Improved Human
Resources (vi) Information and Technology services (IT); (vii) Alignment with International
Best Practices; (viii) Better Communications (ix) Budget Reforms; (x) Risk Management and
(xi) Governance, Controls and Safeguards. Selected key reform actions and anticipated results
are summarized in Table 7.
41
Table 7: Selected Key Reform Actions and Anticipated Impacts
Area Of Reform
Human Resources
Key Action
Anticipated
Conducting of the Staff Survey
Enhanced Responsiveness to staff views
Competitive Compensation
Framework and retirement plan
Decentralization of Human resource
function
Improved Recruitment and retention
Improved responsiveness to client needs; improved
services
Creation of the Operations
Committee (OpsCom) and Country
Teams
Business Processes and
Organization
Creation of Chief Operating Officer
(COO) position
Delegation of Authority Matrix
Streamlined review process
Improved strategic alignment
Increased cross-complex communication
Improved oversight of work products (Country Strategy
Papers, Country Portfolio Reviews, etc)
Improved cross-Complex decision making
Corporate Strategy oversight
Accelerated project processing time
Empowered local management
Enhanced country relations
Improved quality standards and service delivery
Creation of the Procurement and
Fiduciary Services Department
(ORPF)
Lower transaction costs and improved harmonization with
multilateral development Banks
Roll-out of 23 Field Offices with
customized staffing
Decentralization Guidelines
Increased country dialogue and ownership
Better donor coordination
Elevated role of Bank
Empowered Field Office Teams
Increased Field Office portfolio management
Creation of the Quality Assurance
and Results Department (ORQR)
Integration of results framework into operations
Shift to knowledge-based culture
Increased probability of project success
Decentralization
Quality-at-Entry and
Managing for results
Improved reporting through the timely delivery of
Project Completion Reports
Budget Management
Framework
Delegation of resource management
to cost centre managers
Creation of the Strategy and Budget
Department (COBS)
Better staffing and management decisions
Creating a continuum on Strategic planning,
Programming and budgeting processes
Increased response capacity
Fixed cost ratio to replace headcount
controls (at the full UA budgeting
implementation stage
Dynamic staff planning
42
5.2
Improved Business Processes
5.2.1 The realization of an effective Operations Committee (OpsCom) and effective
Country Teams as central fora to review and discuss country programming, delivery and
impact has brought the organizational changes of 2006 and 2007 to fruition. OpsCom is an
internal review body comprised of senior Management whose mandate is to sharpen the
country focus and strategic selectivity of the Bank’s operations, strengthen the Bank’s
internal cooperation and cohesion, and improve its development impact. Since its inception,
OpsCom has instituted rigorous, systemic changes to the review process, making it
both simpler and faster. From January 2008 to June 2009, OpsCom reviewed 187
projects, 39 country and institutional strategies, and 42 policies and formats. This
streamlined review process has improved quality and enhanced strategic alignment and
coordination across the institution and between the Bank and its shareholders and clients.
Furthermore, the introduction of systematic checks and balances has made it possible to
identify potential issues early so that they can be addressed in a timely and concerted
manner. An evaluation of the review process, including OpsCom’s role and operations, is
planned in order to assess its impact on delivery and programming. The lessons learned will
also guide the fine-tuning and further improvement of the review process21.
5.2.2 OpsCom also piloted the development of new designs, formats and oversight
procedures for Country Strategy Papers (CSPs), Country Portfolio Reviews (CPRs), Concept
Papers, Project Appraisal Reports and other critical documents for both public and private
sector operations. The CSP format, for example, has been widely praised by Board
members and sister institutions as the new business-plan reflection of governments’ National
Development Plans. Additionally, private sector operations now benefit from a greater
emphasis on effectiveness through the implementation of the Additionality and
Development Outcome Assessment process.
5.2.3 Accountability and corporate-level ownership have been reinforced through the
comprehensive revision of the Delegation of Authority Matrix, at both the Headquarters (HQ)
and the Field Office level. Delegating authority for loan negotiations and signature,
loan administration, portfolio management, project supervision and dialogue and
communication with RMCs and partners has accelerated project implementation by reducing
processing times. The average time elapsed between project approval and first disbursement
has been nearly halved, falling from 24 months in 2006 to 14 months as of the second quarter
of 2009.
5.3
Consolidation of Non-Sovereign Operations and Capacity Building
5.3.1 Following the rapid expansion of non-sovereign operations, the Private Sector and
Microfinance Department (OPSM) entered 2009 with the resolve of functional consolidation
and strengthening the management of its business processes. This was seen as critical in order
to ensure sustained quality of projects being prepared and in particular to build the capacity to
handle the management of the growing portfolio. Measures undertaken include the
21
The Additionality and Development Outcome Assessment framework analyses and groups development
outcomes in seven categories: (i) economic performance, (ii) effects on government, (iii) environmental effects,
(iv) gender and social effects, (v) private sector development and demonstration effects, (vi) effects on
infrastructure, and (vii) effects on macroeconomic resilience.
43
finalization of the major recruitment effort during 2008 and early 2009 by filling all vacant
senior positions including three at division manager level. Other notable initiatives include the
rationalization of OPSM’s divisional structure towards improved sector focus and stronger
transaction support, e.g. financial and economic modelling and environmental and social due
diligence.
5.3.2 Also, in order to apply full corporate competency on projects under consideration, the
team work among Bank units engaged in Private Sector Operations (PSO) (i.e. the “PSO
ecosystem”) was structured and formalized into Project Appraisal Teams (PATs). The
Additionality and Development Outcome (ADOA) evaluation launched by EDRE in 2008 is
now fully operational providing an independent rating of the “reward” of projects
concomitant with the equally independent risk rating provided by FFMA. OPSM now also
issues quarterly project status reports for all active projects to keep track of three critical
quality dimensions; (i) implementation progress, (ii) sustained commercial viability and (iii)
achievement of development outcomes. Moreover, a new on-line Business Manual to guide
ADB non-sovereign operations across the PSO ecosystem is expected to be in place early
2010.
5.4
Credit enhancement and Operational Headroom
5.4.1 As a result of the above measures, ADB now possesses a solid capacity to deliver a
steady flow of developmentally oriented non-sovereign projects in accordance with sound
banking principles in critical areas such as power (including renewable energy), transport,
telecommunications, mining, construction materials, agribusiness and financial intermediation
to micro- and SMEs.
5.5
Decentralization: improved client focus and awareness
5.5.1 The goals of a strengthened, effective country presence through decentralization
include greater delivery impact; enhanced dialogue between the Bank and RMCs;
greater RMC ownership of their development agenda; better alignment of the Bank’s
interventions with country priorities; and closer donor coordination in line with the
Paris Declaration commitments. Improved disbursement processes and project
performance are also being achieved through decentralized and empowered Field
Offices. The recent independent evaluation of the Bank’s decentralisation effort highlights
key achievements and challenges in greater detail22.
5.5.2 Decentralization is moving forward actively, with 23 Field Offices already operational
and three additional Field Offices23 at an advanced stage. These include Field Offices in MICs
which are large borrowers such as Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria and South Africa. To make these
Field Offices fully operational, measures for accelerated and tailored staffing, including the
redeployment of HQ sector-specific staff, have been put in place. Nearly 90 percent of the 200
Professional-Level international and local field-based positions have now been filled or are
awaiting assumption of duty. As a result, the Bank is in the process of staffing each operating
Field Office with the required core expertise, including country economists, country program
22
Independent Evaluation of Decentralization Strategy at African Development Bank: Summary for ADF-11
Mid-Term Review.
23
Including planned office in South Africa.
44
officers and sector specialists relevant to the priorities of clients’ national development
strategies. This progress, in conjunction with the additional business process reforms, is
moving the institution from a culture of individual reviews and sporadic supervision to one of
continuous dialogue and monitoring.
5.5.3 Dedicated decentralization guidelines and delegation of authority matrices were
issued to clarify the relationship between Field Offices and HQ and empower resident
representatives and their staff. Continued devolution of procurement and fiduciary service
activities to country offices is proceeding with a view to increasing the percentage of
projects with procurement authorization in country offices in line with the Accra
Agenda for Action. A process is underway to create a decentralized and critical mass
of experts comprised of procurement and disbursement officers, supplemented by financial
management experts, in selected Field Offices. This will be a key factor in improving
effectiveness with regard to responsiveness and project implementation. As task leadership is
increasingly delegated to the field, the focus is shifting towards strengthening task
management capacity in country offices by delegating portfolio management and project
supervision.
5.5.4 Efforts to improve information technology (IT) connectivity are being
undertaken to facilitate communication and full workflow integration, a sine qua non to
successful decentralization. Progress has been made but there is still room for improvement.
The connection with HQ is operational in all Field Offices. Nonetheless, to accompany the
increase in staff numbers, the IT framework and infrastructure will require further
strengthening to enhance Field Office service and connectivity. The recently launched
overhaul of the overall information systems architecture is the first step towards reaching this
important objective.
5.5.5 The decentralization program is well under way both in the field and at HQ. A number
of Field Offices have only recently become operational and are still in the process of fully
staffing up. In some countries where the Field Office has been operational for a longer time,
initial results can be measured by the progress made on key indicators. Table 2 shows
progress made since 2006 in improving on the ground results. On a more qualitative level, the
Bank’s on-the-ground presence enables the institution to take the lead in a number of
coordinating fora and sector dialogues, serving to reinforce synergies between donor
interventions and promote the harmonization of donor procedures. A key challenge
going forward will be to mainstream decentralization into the Bank’s corporate culture,
promoting a “One Bank” mindset that further empowers and incentivizes staff to support
the decentralization process. A decentralisation road-map is being developed under the
leadership of the Vice Presidency for Regional Operations, in order to chart a way forward.
45
Table 8: Indicators on Improving On-the-ground Results through Decentralization and
Harmonization
Indicator
Percentage of professional staff based in Field Offices
Percentage of portfolio managed from Field Offices
Percentage of missions conducted jointly (Paris indicator 10a)
5.6
Baseline
Value
2006
5
0
19
in 2005
Target
Value
2009
15
15
Achieved as
of December
2008
15.4
7.4
40
in 2010
13
in 2007
Quality-at-Entry and Managing for Results
5.6.1 With a view to enhancing the quality-at-entry of operations and strategies and
conducting better results reporting, a new review process was initiated and a Quality
Assurance and Results Department established in mid-2008. Internal reforms have
already resulted in improvements during the 2006-2008 period. In particular, results
frameworks in CSPs and lending operations increasingly include baseline data and
targets that facilitate the assessment of the impact of Bank-financed interventions. Project
readiness, as gauged by the time elapsed between approval and first disbursement, also
improved both for budget support programs and investment projects. Proactive follow-up on
the timely production of Project Completion and Project Supervision Reports is now in
place and has contributed to improved performance in these areas.
5.6.2 The Bank acknowledges a number of persisting challenges with regard to the qualityat-entry of CSPs and lending operations, also highlighted in the recent Independent Review of
Quality at Entry 2005-2008 conducted by the Operations Evaluation Department. New
initiatives are being piloted to address these issues and further enhance the Bank’s
focus on quality and results. Investment projects now undergo a systematic Readiness
Review which, together with OpsCom’s review, aims to improve the focus on quality and
results of Project Appraisal Reports submitted to the Board of Directors. Revised formats for
completion and supervision reports in conjunction with independent evaluations of the
quality-at-entry of operations are also enhancing accountability and contributing to learning.
5.6.3 The 2007-2008 budget reforms introduced greater devolution of budget
management authority to the level of individual managers and strengthened
accountability through the monitoring of Key Performance Indicators. The focus on
accountability and results will be further enhanced through the final phase of the budget
reforms and the move towards Unit of Account (UA) budgeting in 2010. Among other
goals, UA budgeting24 aims to further decentralize budget management, providing
managers with flexible resources to help them focus on delivery and results. Financial
resource management will be further delegated to cost center managers, empowering them to
make rational and knowledge-based decisions. When fully implemented, UA budgeting will
replace the headcount control policy with budget-based controls (i.e., the fixed cost ratio and a
24
Under UA budgeting, resource allocation will be determined by first identifying the work program to be
funded and thereafter translating the work load into the total resource envelop needed to execute the work
program.
46
total budget envelope). This, in accordance with work program priorities, will allow for
dynamic staff planning to enhance the Bank’s capacity to respond to emerging priorities
in a more rapid, flexible and rational manner.
5.6.4 These measures will ensure stronger links between resource allocation and
institutional priorities on the one hand, and performance on the other. By maintaining a
strong oversight framework, they will also enhance flexibility and devolve resource
management to allow for more results-oriented and cost-efficient delivery.
5.6.5 To enhance the quality of Private Sector projects, an assessment of the additionality
and development impact (ADOA) of each private sector project is undertaken. A dedicated
division has been established in the ECON Complex, which works closely with the Private
Sector Department of the Bank.
5.6.6 A separate, independent evaluation of the GCI V has been undertaken, and will be
submitted to the Board of Directors.
5.7
Improved institutional efficiency
5.7.1 The creation of the position of Chief Operating Officer (COO) and approval of
the organizational fine-tuning25 designed to improve corporate performance are expected
to produce gains in efficiency and alignment between the corporate structure and
reform processes.
5.7.2 Appointed in May 2009, the COO has overall responsibility for monitoring
performance with the support of the newly created Performance Monitoring Group. The
COO also has a mandate to improve delivery.
5.7.3 The Procurement Unit was upgraded to a full-fledged department that comprises
procurement and financial management functions. It was also rationalized to improve services
delivery and efficiency for both internal and external clients, with quality control at
international standards26. The restructuring of procurement and financial management
functions has ensured high-quality, rapid and consistent decision making. This
accomplishment is also gradually facilitating greater harmonization with other donors
and empowering borrowing member countries while ensuring the maintenance of the Bank’s
fiduciary responsibilities. The simplification of the procurement policies and harmonization
with other multilateral development banks will facilitate joint financing and minimize
transaction costs.
25
African Development Bank, 2008: Improving Corporate Performance ADB/BD/WP/2008/104/Approved, 15
July 2008.
26
African Development Bank, 2008: The Bank’s Streamlining Procurement and Financial Management
Functions – Proposed Process Improvements. ADB/BD/IF/2007/31/Rev.1, 8 January 2008.
47
Box 8: Impact of the Restructured Procurement Function
The streamlining and restructuring of procurement and financial management services
of the Bank contributed to improved service delivery while minimizing fiduciary risks
and enhancing accountability through the following actions:
(i) Revising the rules and procedures to reduce administrative and implementationrelated burdens;
(ii) Restructuring and upgrading the incumbent organizational unit while building a critical
mass of well-trained procurement and financial management specialists decentralized at
the country and regional levels and scaled up at HQ;
(iii) Increasing the use of specialized private sector entities to undertake systematic
independent procurement post-reviews and audits for small-value contracts and financial
audits;
(iv) At the country level, conducting a greater number of diagnostic studies and
reviews in collaboration with other donors, thereby strengthening client capacity and
facilitating the targeted provision of assistance to borrowers;
(v)
Delegating adequate procurement clearing authority to procurement specialists
commensurate with their level of accreditation; and
(vi) Setting up a Bank-wide quality assurance mechanism to ensure that procurement
and financial management functions are carried out in accordance with best practices.
5.7.4 The revision to the Approval Authority for procurement and financial
management is a critical piece, well aligned with the practices of other multilateral
development banks. With its implementation, it is expected that over 90 percent of
procurement decisions will be made at the Field Office level. This should accelerate the
implementation of procurement-intensive projects significantly and enhance the development
impact of the Bank’s projects.
5.8
Improved Human Resources to Ensure Better Delivery Capacity
5.8.1 One of the key institutional challenges facing the Bank is its ability to attract, retain
and effectively utilize the capacities of qualified staff in order to deliver on its mandate.
Accordingly the Bank is implementing its Human Resources Strategy, which focuses on
(i) the recruitment and deployment of high-calibre staff to operations and
country/regional offices and (ii) a more competitive and rationalized staff Compensation
and Benefits Framework. These types of institutional human resources (HR) reforms require
a long-term time frame to take hold, particularly in a dynamic, multicultural environment.
5.8.2 A staff skills survey and general survey have allowed Management to better identify
HR and employee expectations. Within the more general context of enhancing corporate
48
services delivery27, ongoing HR reforms will move the centralized HR administration model
to a more client and partnership-focused model, enabling the HR department to provide a
wider range of services, including strategic planning, career development and advisory
services.
5.8.3 The restructured HR function, while still in progress, has already improved the
Bank’s capacity to institute the large staff increase approved by shareholders (Table 9). Key
staffing needs in the private sector, legal, safeguards, risk management and results areas as
well as other areas have been filled with the addition of over 40 relevant experts. This has
bolstered the Bank’s effectiveness and the quality of its work. Through a strong recruitment
drive, a revamped Young Professionals Program and decentralization of the recruitment
process to Complexes, the vacancy rate dropped from 15 percent in December 2008 to 8
percent in June 2009 and is expected to reach approximately 4 percent as selected candidates
assume duty and currently advertised positions are filled. A more competitive and rationalized
compensation framework28, an online performance evaluation system that has
strengthened the link between performance and reward, an improved orientation program for
new staff and other innovative initiatives have provided the institution with state-ofthe-art tools to manage and optimize the capacity of its growing staff.
Table 9: Human Resource Indicators
Baseline
Value
2007
Achieving the Capacity to Deliver
Vacancy Rate* (%)
Total number of Professional-Level staff
Gender balance index for Professional-level
staff (%)
Field-based Professional-Level staff (%)
Target
Value
2009
15
n/a
5
n/a
8
1000
22
23
24
9
15
16
Operations Complexes Professional-Level
staff (%)
45
55
*Reflects actual staff at post and excludes awaiting to assume duty
5.9
Achieved as
of June 2009
63
Improved Technology to Support ADB’s Mission
5.9.1 The institution has embarked on an ambitious technology improvement plan to
contribute to streamlined work flows and equip staff with the tools necessary for efficient
delivery.
5.9.2 The Broadband Integrated Telecommunication Services project was completed at the
end of 2008 and provided a major upgrade to the IT infrastructure. The network was further
upgraded through a fibre optic-based infrastructure at the Temporary Relocation
27
African Development Bank, 2008: Proposal to Enhance Corporate Service Delivery. ADB/BD/WP/2008/137,
13 December 2008.
28
This framework includes an amended staff retirement plan now applicable to local staff, as well as life
insurance, medical coverage and compensation for school fees.
49
Agency, which improved its reliability and throughput and offered a viable alternative
to slower satellite-based technology. IT systems will be further improved by the
implementation of the recommendations stemming from the report on the IT
architecture recently concluded by an external consultant.
5.9.3 The Bank’s Enterprise Resource Planning platform (SAP) will be upgraded to
facilitate reporting, support new financial products and provide field offices with a
secure disbursement platform and better integration with HQ. Procurement workflows
have been revised. The pilot phase currently underway will result in more automated
and streamlined processes to be rolled out by the end of 2010.
5.9.4 Finally, the Bank’s revamped website, in conjunction with the communication strategy
approved end-2008, has improved the Bank’s visibility, its knowledge-sharing capacity and
its outreach to its clients.
5.9.5 These achievements notwithstanding, the full implementation and realization of
benefits relating to IT upgrading face significant constraints intrinsically linked to the
temporary nature of the Tunis-based operations. This situation impedes medium-term
investments that would provide staff with state-of-the-art systems and work-conducive office
space.
5.10
Alignment with International Best Practices
5.10.1 The Bank is an active participant in external and peer review processes,
including the Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), an
informal network of 15 like-minded donor countries with a common interest in assessing
the organizational effectiveness of the major multilateral organizations. The MOPAN
approach assesses four strategic dimensions of organizational effectiveness: strategic,
operational, relationship and knowledge. The Bank was assessed in 2003, 2004 and 2007
and is being assessed in 2009 along with three other multilateral organizations. The results of
the assessment will be available in 2010.
5.10.2 The Bank is also an active participant in the Common Performance Assessment
System (COMPAS), which provides the seven participating multilateral development
banks and their partners with information on strengths as well as on areas for improvement
relating to managing for development results. COMPAS focuses on measuring
multilateral development banks’ capacity to apply and improve operational processes
designed to achieve on-the-ground results. The responsibility for coordinating COMPAS
reporting rotates among members; the Bank coordinated the 2007 report.
5.10.3 Overall, managing for development results performance indicators for 2008 were
satisfactory. The Bank fared well in one category (harmonization among development
agencies) and was stable in four categories (country capacity to manage for
development results, allocation of concessional resources, project management systems, and
institutional learning from operational experience).
5.10.4 The Bank’s participation in these best practice exercises helps to promote
accountability, improve bilateral and multilateral cooperation, strengthen partnerships
and provide guidance to enhance the debate on and improve development effectiveness.
50
5.11
Better communications
5.11.1 In accordance with the recently adopted communications strategy, the Bank will
ensure that all stakeholders are better informed about development issues on the continent and
the contribution the Bank is making to Africa’s development. This will include the longer
term development needs on the continent, and the impact of the current crisis. There will be
better information of the role of the Bank, its policies and operations, how it works in
partnership with others, and above all the results achieved. It will therefore contribute to the
Bank’s accountability to shareholders.
5.11.2 It will also support the development of the Bank as a voice for development in Africa,
a knowledge Bank, a source of expertise, analysis and advice. The communications effort will
be appropriately targeted to a range of audiences: regional and non-regional shareholders,
beneficiaries, the media, civil society, as well as to Bank staff. There will be an improved
internet portal and web-site.
5.12 Budget reforms: The 2006-2007 Budget Reforms introduced both greater devolution
of budget management authority at the level of individual managers and greater accountability
through the monitoring of Key Performance Indicators. Accountability and results focus will
be further enhanced through the final phase of the Bank’s Budget Reforms. The final phase of
the reform (which is on-going) is the implementation of a strategy and work program-driven
Unit of Account (UA) budgeting system, with expanded fungibility and full decentralization
of resource management for delivery of work programs, with the objective of enhancing
efficiency and accountability.
5.13 Risk Management Capacity: The Bank’s risk management framework and capacity
has continuously adapted in response to the evolving needs. All finance and financial risk
management issues are currently overseen by the Asset and Liability Management Committee
(ALCO) chaired by the Vice President, Finance, while the Operations Committee (OpsCom),
chaired by the Vice President, Country & Regional Programs & Policy oversees the Bank’s
operations proposals and programs. A reputed consulting firm29 has been appointed to review
the Bank’s risk management framework and processes. The outcome of the review shall be
reported to the Board of Governors in due course.
5.14 Governance, Controls and Safeguards: The Bank has established several entities
and functions that ensure that the Bank and its staff adhere to the highest standards of
corporate governance and integrity in executing the Bank’s mandate. These entities include
the Office of the Auditor General, the independent evaluation of operations, the Independent
Review Mechanism, and the Office of the Ethics Officer. Further details of these entities are
provided in Annex 3.
5.15 Much has been accomplished since 2006 as reforms have been initiated and
implemented with the goal of promoting a culture of efficiency and accountability. These
reforms have had a noticeable quantitative and qualitative impact on delivery and
programming. They have led to a more efficiency-driven organization and have enhanced the
Bank’s capacity to handle an enhanced volume of operations. These quality improvements
will ensure better development results. Several reforms completed recently are yet to yield
29
Oliver Wyman
51
results. Nonetheless it is expected that ongoing efforts to achieve and maintain low vacancy
rates, to enhance budget flexibility and Management capacity in the Complexes and Field
Offices, to make the planning and monitoring of the execution of work programs more
rigorous, and to better manage capital projects will result in higher performance levels going
forward. Changing mindsets in terms of decentralization and results through quality will also
be key success factors. Management has demonstrated its ability to undertake much needed
reforms to guarantee future success, and still strive to extend and deepen the reforms agenda.
It can therefore be concluded with confidence that the Bank’s institutional growth and
improved business processes have put the institution in a position to increase its development
impact through a substantial capital increase. In the coming months and years, the Bank will
continue to monitor, test and adjust its reform agenda as appropriate to create a more effective
and results-oriented institution.
6.
FINANCIAL POLICY OPTIONS TO INCREASE HEADROOM
6.1
In previous submissions to the Board of Governors, Management had indicated that
under the scenario 1, the Bank’s Debt Ratio would breach its maximum prudential limit of
100% in 2009 and its Risk Capital Utilization Rate (RCUR) would breach its limit in 2012.
Under scenario 2, it was envisaged that the RCUR would breach its prudential limit in 2011.
6.2
Given that the timeline of attaining a GCI might be lengthy and in order to better
utilize the Bank’s existing capital resources, Management considered several financial policy
options aimed at delivering a modicum of lending headroom that would allow the Bank to
increase its support to RMCs while safeguarding the financial integrity of the institution in the
period before a GCI is effected. These options however, would not ensure long term
sustainability as they might provide temporary relief but will not solve the problem over the
longer term.
6.3
The following are some of the options considered:
6.3.1 Redefining “Usable Capital” in the Bank’s Debt Ratio:
Under this option it was proposed to expand the definition of Usable Capital as employed in
the calculation of the Bank’s Debt Ratio to include the callable capital of non-borrowing
members rated A- or better. Previously only the callable capital of non-borrowing members
rated AA or better was included in the definition of Usable Capital.
This proposal was approved by the Bank’s Board of Directors in July 2009.30 Consequently,
the current formula for the calculation of the Bank’s Debt Ratio is as follows:
Debt Ratio
=
of which:
Numerator: Gross Debt:
Denominator:
Adjusted
Capital:
30
Usable
Total Outstanding Borrowings
(Paid-in Capital) + (Callable Capital of non-borrowing
member countries rated A- or better) + Reserves
See Resolution B/BD/2009/18 dated 22 July 2009
52
6.3.2 Review of the Bank’s Liquidity Policy, following changes in IASB Accounting Rules:
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has recently revised the rules
regarding the classification and measurement of financial assets. Under the revised rules, the
Held-to-Maturity (HTM) classification and related tainting rules have been eliminated. These
revised rules are effective for the year 2013, but may be adopted earlier. When adopted, these
revised rules would enable the Bank to review its current liquidity policy, particularly with
respect to the inclusion of some or all of the investments currently held in the HTM portfolio
in liquidity, thereby reducing the Bank’s borrowing requirements and creating additional
borrowing headroom. Under the revised rules, the instruments currently in the HTM portfolio
may continue to be carried at amortized cost as instruments being held for the purpose of
collecting contractual cash flows. However, it is worth noting that although the tainting rules
(the basis for the current exclusion from liquidity of HTM maturing over one year) have been
eliminated, the revised rules require an entity to reassess whether certain instruments are
indeed being held for the purpose of collecting contractual cash flows, if more than infrequent
sales are made out of the portfolio. We are discussing this new condition with our external
auditors, to ensure consistency in the application of this new condition, particularly with
respect to the Bank’s definition of liquidity. Pending clarification of the implications of this
new condition, we can for now only state that liquidity may increase by up to the amount of
the HTM portfolio (UA 3,231.34 million at October 31 2009), thereby reducing the Bank’s
borrowing requirement by a commensurate amount. If the entire amount of the HTM
portfolio was included in liquidity, the projected leverage ratio at December 31 2010 would
be 71.9 %, compared to the current estimate of 95 %.
6.3.3 Review of the Bank’s Loan Pricing: Management considered an adjustment in loan
pricing as a means of dynamic risk-adjusted portfolio management, to improve the Bank’s
risk capital base. However, at present, adjustments made to loan pricing only apply to new
loans and therefore have a limited impact on net income and consequently on the Bank’s risk
capital. For instance, a loan price adjustment of 20 basis points will only result in an increase
in net income of UA 3 million during the year following the decision, UA 15 million after 5
years and UA 30 million after 10 years. After 10 years, it will only provide approximately 2%
additional risk capital.
Management is, however, also studying the feasibility of adopting the approach followed by
the IADB whereby adjustments in loan prices were made applicable to the entire outstanding
loan portfolio and therefore have an immediate and significant impact on net income and
consequently on risk capital. The IADB has operated under this income targeting loan pricing
approach since 1989. Their recent loan price increase of 65 bps was applicable on an
outstanding portfolio of approximately $ 52 billion and is therefore expected to generate an
additional annual income of $340 million. By adopting a similar approach for all news loans,
the Bank will be in a position to respond timely to the need to generate adequate income from
changes in loan prices in future years, as the volume of outstanding new public sector loans
subject to such loan price changes is expected to reach UA 5.8 billion in 2016, and UA 14
billion in 2020. However, the benefits of following such an approach must inevitably be
weighed against the impact it may have on the competitiveness of the Bank’s lending
instruments. It must also be noted that in the case of the IADB increase, there was substantial
support from the MICs for the initiative, which they viewed as a show of support for the
institution.
53
Management is also reviewing the Bank’s loan pricing methodology and will present a paper
on the issue to the Board of Directors in early 2010. This paper is expected to address the
factors and guiding principles to be applied in the determination of loan prices, and will
analyze the possibility of implementing a cost recovery approach.
7.
ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS TO PROVIDE INTERIM RELIEF
7.1 In addition to the financial policy options outlined above, some short term measures
were considered, in order to provide additional borrowing headroom through an increase in
the Bank’s callable capital31. Doing so would enable the Bank to operate with some
flexibility, pending the finalization and effectiveness of the capital increase.
7.2
Contingent Callable Capital
7.2.1 Members of the Bank who are willing and able to do so may subscribe for non-voting
callable capital. The benefit of this option is that it can be effected in a relatively short time
period, as the Bank would need to engage with fewer shareholders. In addition, this would be
a strong signal of shareholders’ support and commitment to a GCI.
7.2.2 As of November 2009, Canada and the Republic of Korea have committed to
subscribe for additional shares of a value equivalent to UA 1.6 billion and UA 194 million
respectively. While terms are still under negotiation and subject to approval by the Board of
Governors, it is envisaged that the additional shares would be returned to the Bank in four
equal annual instalments, commencing on the fifth anniversary of the date the shares were
subscribed for. In the event that the Board of Governors of the Bank approves a GCI through
which Canada or the Republic of Korea subscribe to additional voting capital stock of the
Bank, either country would have the right to return to the Bank all of the additional shares it
had subscribed for at the time it subscribes to the additional voting capital stock of the Bank.
In the event of a call on the callable capital of the Bank, any of the additional shares
subscribed by Canada or the Republic of Korea that have not been returned to the Bank by the
date of such call would be subject to call in the same proportion as any outstanding voting
shares, and such additional shares called would no longer be subject to return to the Bank.
7.2.3 This contingent callable capital would give about 12 months’ relief in terms of the
breach of the Bank’s prudential ratios. In this regard, it is important to note that an increase in
contingent callable capital would only help to increase the Bank’s borrowing capacity; it
would not increase the risk bearing capacity of the Bank (i.e. paid-in capital and reserves),
which provides the basis for expanding the lending activities of the Bank.
7.3 Transfer of reserves to paid-in capital
7.3.1 This approach would involve an increase in paid-in capital through the transfer of
reserves to paid-in capital, with a corresponding increase in callable capital, thereby providing
additional borrowing headroom. The main benefit of this proposal would be that all
shareholders will be able to support it as no new cash payment would be required, thereby
31
Subscriptions to the capital stock of the Bank are made of paid-up capital, which are payable over a prescribed
period, and callable capital, which is subject to call.
54
ensuring full participation by all of the Bank’s members. Nonetheless, this option would not
provide the additional risk capital necessary to allow the Bank to respond to the increased
demand under lending scenarios 1 and 2, nor would it be perceived as a sign of strong
shareholder support.
7.3.2 While Management has not abandoned this option, it has not been progressed further,
given that the various authorization requirements of the Bank’s governing bodies and
members make it unlikely that the time taken to implement this alternative would be
substantially shorter than that required for a full GCI.
7.4 Restructuring paid-in to callable ratio by increasing the callable portion
7.4.1 This option contemplates increasing the callable portion of the paid-in to callable ratio
of the Bank’s authorized capital. For example, at present the ratio of paid-in to callable capital
is 10.8 to 89.2. If the ratio were adjusted to 9.1 to 90.9, this would somewhat ease the Bank’s
debt ratio and expand its capacity to borrow from the capital markets, without imposing a
financial burden on members of the Bank. However, this option would have no effect on the
RCUR and is unlikely to take less time than would be required for a full GCI.
7.5 Close monitoring of the Bank’s cash flow requirements and liquidity
7.5.1 Apart from the three measures mentioned above, all of which would require the
approval of the Board of Governors, Management has and will continue to closely monitor the
Bank’s prudential minimum liquidity and cash flow requirements and also to stress test any
future cash positions flowing from changes in the portfolio.
8.
GCI SCENARIOS
8.1
Management has developed several scenarios that examine the Bank’s financial
capacity with and without a GCI. In the first part of this section some scenarios are presented
in order to determine the level of lending that the Bank can sustain based on various levels of
a GCI, as well as in the absence of a capital increase. Next, the effect on the Bank’s key
prudential ratios of various capital increase levels under scenarios 1 and 2 is examined.
Finally, the impact of differentiated payment calendars is discussed.
8.2
Scenarios to determine the Bank’s sustainable level of lending
8.2.1 For the scenarios aimed at determining the Bank’s sustainable level of lending, the key
assumption is that a capital increase, if effective in 2011, will last for a period of 10 years,
until 2020 before another GCI becomes effective. The sustainable level of lending is defined
as the total amount of loans that the Bank can commit while maintaining all its prudential
ratios below their maximum limit of 100%, until the year 2020, when the next capital increase
is expected to become effective. This scenario analysis takes into account the contingent
callable capital to be subscribed for by Canada and Korea up to the end of 2010 in the case of
a GCI, and until 2016 in the absence of a GCI. It also assumes no rating migration in the loan
portfolio and that approximately 60% of the annual net income will be distributed for
development initiatives.
8.2.2
Sustainable level of lending in the absence of a capital increase
55
To assess the impact of a GCI on the Bank’s prudential ratios, it was deemed important to
first demonstrate the impact that the absence of a GCI would have on the Bank’s financial
resilience. In the absence of a GCI, it was determined that the Bank would have to reduce its
annual commitment to only UA 810 million from 2010 onwards, in order to maintain the
leverage ratio within its limit until 2020.
8.2.3
•
Sustainable level of lending based on level of capital increase and paid-in ratio
Having considered the impact of not having a GCI, several alternative GCI scenarios
are considered, based on various levels of total increase in authorized capital (between
100% and 250%) and diverse paid-in ratios (between 2% and 6%). Figure 12 below
shows the indicative annual lending levels the Bank would be able to achieve under
each scenario.
•
In general the larger the capital increase and the paid-in ratio, the higher the
sustainable level of lending. In the case of 100% capital increase, the annual
sustainable lending level approximates UA 2 billion, whereas for a 200% capital
increase, the Bank could lend between UA 2.5 billion and UA 3.3 billion, depending
on the paid-in ratio. It is also important to note that in these scenarios, we have
assumed a flat level of lending for the period from 2011 to 2020, whereas in the
lending scenarios presented in section 3, the lending level is expected to increase by at
least 5% on a yearly basis.
•
In summary, for a 200% increase in capital with a paid in ratio of 6%, the average
sustainable lending for the period 2011-2020 is UA 3,253 million which is
approximately 17% below the average lending of UA 3,919 million for scenario 1 for
the same period.
Figure 12 ‐ Annual Lending Levels depending on GCI Levels
4000
6% paid in
SLL (UA Million)
3500
4% paid in
3000
2500
2% paid in
2000
1500
1000
No GCI
500
0%
50%
100%
150%
200%
250%
Capital Increase
8.3.
Effect on the Bank’s key prudential ratios of various capital increase levels under the
scenario 1
56
8.3.1 The base case scenario 1 without a GCI, but factoring the contingent callable capital
provided by Canada and the Republic of Korea, is presented in Table 10 below. As mentioned
in earlier sections of this document, this contingent callable capital will provide one year’s
relief by postponing the breach of the leverage limit to 2011 instead of 2010. However the
RCUR is still projected to reach 100% by 2013.
Table 10 – Prudential Ratios for scenario 1 without a GCI
Lending Program
(UA millions)
Prudential Ratios
(at year end)
RCUR
Gearing
Leverage
New Leverage32
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
5,704
4,145
2,890
3,292
3,457
3,629
3,811
4,001
4,202
4,412
67%
48%
91%
79%
78%
70%
109%
95%
84%
78%
125%
109%
93%
88%
147%
128%
104%
98%
169%
148%
115%
108%
192%
168%
124%
117%
204%
184%
131%
125%
220%
206%
137%
134%
235%
228%
141%
142%
248%
248%
8.3.2 Figure 13 below illustrates the Bank’s Debt to Usable Capital ratio and the RCUR for
scenario 1 under several options of capital increase and for a 6% paid-in ratio. For instance,
assuming a 150% GCI with 6% paid-in, both the RCUR and the Debt to Usable Capital ratio
would breach the 100% limit by 2015 while under a 200% GCI the Debt to Usable Capital
ratio limit of 100% would be breached in 2018, and the RCUR limit in 2019.
8.4
A similar analysis for scenario 2 shows that the Bank’s prudential ratios are exceeded
2 to 3 years earlier than in the case of scenario 1, due to a significantly higher lending
programme. For an average sustainable lending over the period 2011-2020 of approximately
UA 5.323 billion, which approximates the conditions under scenario 2, a capital increase of at
least 350% with a paid-in level of 8% would be required.
8.5
The scenarios presented above are for illustrative purposes, and are not exhaustive.
Several additional scenarios are also presented in Annex 4, reflecting various combinations of
capital increases and paid-in ratios. The general conclusion is that prior to a GCI taking
effect, the binding constraint is the Debt to Usable Capital ratio, whereas after a GCI either
the RCUR or the Debt to Usable Capital ratio may become a constraint, depending on the
capital increase and the paid-in ratio. Indeed, the higher the amount of the GCI, the lower the
Debt to Usable Capital ratio, while the greater the paid-in ratio, the better the RCUR.
Therefore, in contemplating a GCI, due consideration should be given to an optimal
combination of the paid-in ratio and the size of the capital increase.
32
Leverage ratio assuming UA 1,834 million contingent callable capital from Canada and Korea.
57
Figure 13.a: Debt Ratio with 6% paid‐in Ratio and 8 year encashment under different GCI‐VI options – Scenario 1
No GCI
260%
240%
220%
200%
180%
160%
140%
120%
100%
80%
60%
40%
100%
150%
200%
250%
Leverage Limit
300%
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
Figure 13.b: RCUR with 6% paid‐in Ratio and 8 year encashment under different GCI‐VI options – Scenario 1
No GCI
140%
100%
120%
150%
Limit
200%
100%
250%
300%
80%
60%
2009
8.6
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
Simulations for differentiated payment calendars
In order to ease the financial burden of a GCI on shareholders, in particular for ADF-only
RMCs, scenarios have been run on a differentiated payment calendar between shareholders.
The simulations indicate that proposing an encashment period for Non RMCs (NRMC) and
MICs (ADB-only and Blend RMCs) over 5 or 8 years, while extending the encashment
schedule from 8 to 12 years for ADF-only countries, marginally affects the sustainable level
of lending of the Bank. As illustrated in Figure 14, regardless of the GCI level and the paid in
ratio, annual commitments would decrease by less than UA 50 million except in the case of a
200% GCI with a 4% paid in capital, where loan approvals could be reduced by UA 200
million per year if Non-RMCs and MICs encashment period remain at 8 years but would not
change should their encashment period be shortened to 5 years. Therefore, Management
believes that a longer encashment period can be considered for ADF-only countries without
affecting the Bank’s sustainable lending program.
58
Capital Increase Scenario
Figure 14: Impact of Differentiated Encashment Schedule on the Bank's Annual Commitments from 2011 to 2020
Amount in UA Billion
3.23
3.25
3.24
200% GCI 6% PIC
3.05
3.03
2.91
200% GCI 4% PIC
2.59
2.61
2.60
150% GCI 6% PIC
2.54
2.55
2.55
150% GCI 4% PIC
‐
0.5
1.0
1.5
8Y NRMC&MIC/12Y ADF‐only
9.
8Y All
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
5Y NRMC&MIC/12Y ADF‐only
SUBSCRIPTION FOR SHARES
The following section offers an innovative process for determining GCI-VI subscriptions
based on pre-emptive rights and an array of options that would mitigate the financial burden a
GCI could impose upon the most economically vulnerable members of the Bank.
9.1
Allocation and Subscriptions of Shares
9.1.1 In accordance with Article 6 (2) of the Bank Agreement, when a GCI is approved,
each member has the right but not the obligation to subscribe to a portion of the capital
increase that would maintain its pro-rata share in the capital of the Bank equal to the
proportion of shares it held immediately before the capital increase. This principle of preemptive rights will apply to the allocation of any shares issued under the proposed GCI-VI.
However, it is worthy to recall that based on the subscription experience of GCI-V, where 20
regional members representing 9.38 percent of the Bank’s total voting power did not
subscribe to the shares arising from the capital increase. As a result Management has made
some proposals to minimize the incidence of non-subscription to GCI-VI shares as outlined
below.
9.1.2 Under GCI-VI, it is expected that all shares issued will be allotted in accordance with
the pre-emptive or pro-rata rights of member states. In order to ensure that this happens in as
smooth a manner as possible, Management proposes the following four-step process for the
allotment and subscription of shares that would be incorporated in the GCI-VI Resolution:
•
Step One: Once the Board of Governors has approved the amount of the GCI-VI,
Management will write to each member state notifying it of the number of shares it is
entitled to subscribe in accordance with its pro-rata rights. Member states will be given
a period of time during which to indicate whether they intend to (i) subscribe to all of
the shares allocated to them, (ii) only to a portion of them, (iii) or not to subscribe to
any shares at all.
59
•
Step Two: At the end of the period of time specified in the initial letter in Step One, all
the shares that have been renounced and any other unallocated shares shall be divided
into two pools. One pool will be for regional members and the other for non-regional
members. All members shall then be invited again to indicate their interest to
subscribe to the shares from their respective pools within another specified time
period.
•
Step Three: At the end of this second time period all the shares that were not initially
subscribed in Step One will be allotted to interested members states in each group that
have indicated an interest in acquiring more shares in accordance with their pro-rata
rights adjusted to sum up to 100%.
•
Step Four: In this last step the shares allocated to each member in Steps One and Three
will be combined to obtain the member’s total allocation for GCI-VI. Each member
will then be notified of the shares it is entitled to, and will be requested to subscribe
accordingly. It is only at the end of this step four that subscription notices will be sent
to members requesting them to honour their subscription obligations.
•
9.1.3 A similar procedure has been used by comparator regional MDBs and has been
effective in minimizing the incidence of unsubscribed shares following general capital
increases.
9.1.4 It may be recalled that the share allocation process for previous GCIs was a one step
process, whereby shares were allocated to each member in accordance with the member’s
preemptive rights. For GCI-VI, the proposed allocation process will entail allocating
unsubscribed shares, identified during the subscription period, in accordance with the relative
preemptive rights of interested members.
For illustrative purposes only, Box 9 below describes the new process is as if it were applied
retroactively to GCI-V allocations to regional members.
60
Box 9 : Illustration of the workings of the 4-step shares’ allocation process under GCI-V:
The allocation process for previous GCIs was a one step process, whereby shares were
allocated to each member in accordance with the member’s preemptive rights. The
distinguishing feature of the proposed GCI-VI allocation process is that all shares renounced
during the subscription period shall be allocated to interested members in proportion to their
preemptive rights during the subscription period. For illustrative purposes regarding how the
four-step process under GCI-VI will work, the proposed new process is hereby applied
retroactively to GCI-V allocations.
Step I: Management would have communicated to members the number of shares to which
each member would have been entitled to subscribe pursuant to its preemptive rights,
requesting them to indicate whether the member intended to (i) subscribe to all shares
allocated to it, (ii) only to a portion of them, (iii) or not to subscribe to any shares at all. At the
end of the time period specified, the intentions would have been as in the Table below.
GCI-V Regional Member Subscriptions
Number
Shares allocated
of
Members Number
Members
Percentage
Subscribing
Not
Subscribing
33 232,200
83.89
20 44,583
16.11
53 276,783
Total
Source: ADB Subscription Statistics
100.00
Step 2: Management would have again informed members that 44,583 GCI-V shares
renounced during step 1 were still available and invited them to indicate their willingness to
subscribe to additional shares. For the purposes of this example, we shall assume that 33
subscribing members would have expressed the desire for more shares.
Step 3: At the end of the time period specified in Step 2, all the 44,583 shares would have
been allocated to either all of the 33 regional members or those among them who would have
indicated their interest for a second round of subscription based on their pre-emptive rights,
scaled up to add up to 100%.
Step 4: For the 33 regional members or a subset of them who would have indicated an interest
to subscribe to additional shares during Step 3, their GCI-V subscriptions would have been
the sum of their subscriptions during Step 1 and the supplementary shares obtained during the
second round of allocation in Step 3. Finally, all 33 members would have been notified of
their GCI-V allocations and requested to subscribe by the end of the subscription period. The
illustrative detailed final subscriptions are presented in Annex 5.
61
9.2
Financing the subscriptions of members with vulnerable economies
9.2.1 It is highly desirable that the voice of all African countries be heard at the Bank and that
their voting powers are commensurate with their relative economic strength, keeping in mind that
under GCI-V, 20 regional members did not subscribe to the shares arising from that capital
increase. At the request of some member countries, and similar to the approach used by some
other multilateral development banks, Management proposes the establishment of a trust fund,
which sole purpose would be to receive donations from countries with relatively strong economies
to subsidize the subscriptions of poorer countries, specifically those classified as fragile states
under the Bank’s Strategy for Enhanced Engagement in Fragile States.33
9.2.2 It is envisaged that the trust fund would receive pledges from donors, and payments as a
lump sum, which would be used to subsidize the GCI-VI subscriptions costs of eligible LICs, and
to pay for part of an eligible country’s GCI-VI allocation.
9.3
Share forfeiture period
9.3.1 The Bank’s current policy is for shares allocated under GCI-V to be paid for within 90 days
of the date payments are due. Any member failing to pay the Bank within that time period
immediately forfeits the shares that remain unpaid, which are then offered for subscription to
other member countries. In order to take account of administrative procedures that may cause
delays in payment, Management proposes an extension of the payment period for any paid-in
amount due, from 90 days to 120 days. The shares forfeited would be allocated to members
requesting additional shares according to the Bank’s Share Transfer Rules.
9.4
Differentiated Payment Calendars
9.4.1 To alleviate the financial burden of the most vulnerable economies, and ensure the highest
amount of participation of shareholders, different payment schedules for Non-regional members
and Middle Income Countries on one hand and ADF Countries on the other hand could be
considered. For GCI-IV for example, a differentiated payment calendar between regional
members (10 years) and non-regional members (5 years) had been adopted. A similar mechanism
between LICs and MICs/non-regional would assist the former in maintaining relevant voting
rights in the institution. Table 11 shows the paid-in period adopted by our peers.
Table 11 – Comparative paid-in payment periods
Capital Increase
ADB GCI-V – 1998
ADB GCI-IV – 1987
AsDB GCI-V- 2009
IBRD
Regional shareholders
8 years
10 years
5 years
5 years
Non-regional shareholders
8 years
5 years
5 years
5 years
9.4.2 While the proposed payment calendars are linked to the size of a GCI, a 5 to 8 year
payment period for non-regional members and MICs would be evaluated in that context, as well
as an 8 to 12 years payment period for LICs. As mentioned in section 8.6 above, simulations have
been made to ascertain the impact of maintaining an encashment period for all non-LICs at 8
33
See Document ADB/BD/WP/2008/37
62
years, while extending the encashment schedule for LICs from 8 to 12 years. These proposals will
be firmed up once the paid-in ratio and size of the capital increase have been determined.
9.5
Currency of Payments
9.5.1 As was the case under GCI-V, member countries shall pay their subscriptions in any freely
convertible currency. In order to mitigate translation losses between the UA and the various
currencies used for payment, a mechanism has been established to determine the applicable
exchange rate. Specifically, the UA/foreign currency rate will be set as the average of their
exchange rates prevailing during the 30 day period ending 7 days before each payment date.
9.5.2 It should be noted that since 1982, the UA/USD exchange rate applied for capital
payments in US dollar has always been set at the historical rate of USD 1.20635. Moreover, for
GCI-V, the exchange rate for the Euro (i.e. Euro 1.3777 per UA) was fixed for all Euro payments,
and was arrived at by applying the average of the exchange rates of the UA vis-à-vis the Euro,
prevailing during the 30 day period ending 7 days before the effectiveness of the GCI-V
resolution.
9.5.3 Under GCI-V, 65% of the subscription payments were made in USD and 21% in Euro.
Given that the market exchange rates have been consistently above the historical USD and Euro
rates, the Bank has had to bear certain losses on subscriptions. These losses, referred to as
Currency Exchange Adjustment on Subscriptions (“CEAS”), amounted to UA 161 million as of
31 December 2008.
9.5.4 One way to minimize the translation losses of the Bank on subscriptions (which losses
reached as high as UA 323 million in 1999), would be to apply to the USD and the Euro the same
exchange rate determination mechanism as that applied in respect of the other freely convertible
currencies.
10
GCI-VI PROCESS
10.1 As outlined in the document34 submitted to the Governors' Consultative Committee
(“GCC”), if approved, a Sixth General Capital Increase would be undertaken by the Bank in
conformity with the relevant provisions of the Bank Agreement, particularly Articles 5(3) and (4),
6, 7, 9(a) and 29.
10.2 On 11 September 2009, the GCC met to discuss Management’s proposals relating to an
increase in the Bank's capital. The dates and location of future meetings of the GCC will be set by
the Chairman of the GCC, in consultation with other GCC members and the management of the
Bank. Before the next meeting of the GCC and to facilitate full participation in the consultative
process, consultations will be held with regional and non-regional member countries.
10.3 At the close of the consultations and its work, the GCC will adopt a report containing its
recommendations to be submitted to the Boards of Governors at the 2010 Annual Meetings to be
held in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire.
34
The Sixth General Increase in the Capital Resources of the African Development Bank: Issues Document #2
63
10.4 Management will continue to prepare all of the technical material necessary to accomplish
the GCI under the guidance of the Board of Directors, and all such work shall be reviewed by the
GCC before submission for adoption by the Board of Governors.
10.5 The G20 Leaders at Pittsburgh in September 2009 and the G20 Finance Ministers met at
St Andrews in November 2009 and have indicated that they will complete the review of MDBs’
capital “to ensure that they have sufficient resources conditional on reforms to ensure
effectiveness, by the first half of 2010.”
10.6 Given below is an indicative timeline for the GCI-VI process from December 2009 until
the conclusion of the proposed GCI. Dates shown therein are merely indicative, and will be
adjusted in accordance with the instructions of the Chairman of the GCC.
Table 12: Indicative timeline for the GCI-VI process
Indicative
Timeline
GCI VI
1 Preparation of Issue Papers requested by the GCC
December 2009 January 2010
2 Consultations with regional member countries (Tunis)
12 February 2010
3 Consultations with non-regional member countries (Cape Town)
Second Meeting of the GCC, final approval of the GCI-VI Papers
4 by the GCC and submission of Draft Resolution to Board of
Governors
24 February 2010
5 Annual Meeting: Vote on Draft Resolution
11
April 2010
May 2010
6 Subscription Period
To be agreed
7 Payment Period
To be agreed
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
11.1 The developments needs of Africa are enormous and have increased due to the recent
global financial and economic crises. This is reflected in the significant increase in demand for
financing from the Bank recently, across most of its RMCs. As this paper outlines, the Bank has
been proactive and responsive to its shareholders in implementing comprehensive reforms
throughout its operations, enhancing its capacity to deliver and mobilizing additional resources for
its LICs. Furthermore, its increased visibility and presence on the international stage, its exclusive
focus on Africa, coupled with its track record across the continent, have rendered it the
development partner of choice for many of its RMCs
11.2 The increased demand for Bank resources has led to a quicker utilization of resources than
earlier anticipated in the Bank’s MTS with a resulting breach of prudential limits expected by the
end of 2010.
11.3 In order for the Bank to maintain its current and projected level of activity beyond 2010,
Management has concluded that there is an immediate and urgent need for a General Capital
Increase.
64
11.4 The Board of Directors is hereby requested to consider this document and to authorize its
transmission to the GCC35.
35
Resolution B/BG/2009/11 of the Board of Governors
65
Annex 1: Basic Data on Middle Income and Blend Country Members of the Bank
GDP per capita,
2008
(USD million)
GDP
Growth
2005-08
Net
Transfers
from
abroad
(USD
million),
2008
Human
Development
Index (2006)
(Rank
179
countries)
Ease of Doing
Business Index
2008
(World
Bank)
Country
Region
Populat
ion
2008
Algeria
Egypt
Tunisia
Libya
Morocco
Nigeria
Cape Verde
Seychelles
Botswana
Mauritius
Namibia
South Africa
Swaziland
Zimbabwe
North Africa
North Africa
North Africa
North Africa
North Africa
West Africa
West Africa
East Africa
Southern Africa
Southern Africa
Southern Africa
Southern Africa
Southern Africa
Southern Africa
34.4
76.8
10.4
6.3
31.6
151.5
0.54
0.087
1.9
1.3
2.1
48.8
1.12
13.5
4,624.92
2,160.57
4,066.70
13,982.11
2,804.64
1,430.93
3,598.61
9,675.44
6,046.87
7,219.33
3,881.08
5,313.15
2,250.54
353.8*
2.8
7
5.7
6.8
5
6
8
4.8
4.5
4.71
4.9
4.5
3
-5.6
2,264.33
9,338.00
199.57
-1,889.00
5,470.68
3,400.00
343.9
51.77
1,107.23
195.36
1,151.77
-2,821.21
363.83
171.51*
0.75(100)
0.72(116)
0.76(95)
0.84(52)
0.65(127)
0.5(154)
0.7(118)
0.84(54)
0.66(126)
0.8(74)
0.63(129)
0.67(125)
0.54(141)
0.51**(n/a)
132
114
73
(n/a)
128
118
143
104
38
24
51
32
108
158
Equatorial Guinea
Gabon
Central Africa
Central Africa
0.52
1.4
29,881.65
12,251.92
8.5
4
-49.81
-412.45
0.72(115)
0.73(107)
167
151
Note for Zimbabwe “*” is equal to 2007 and “**” to 2005.
Source: Statistics Department, ADB
66
Annex 2: MICs Profiles
ALGERIA
Background and Prospects: Following a decade of instability, Algeria has enjoyed a number of
years of relative peace. The Government has put in place policies for economic consolidation,
with a view to enabling larger swathes of the population to benefit from the sizeable oil
exploration and allied activities that have transformed the economy in recent years. Like its
neighbours in the Maghreb, Algeria has benefitted from its proximity to Europe in terms of
markets, and also tourism. The country signed an association agreement with the European Union
in March 2002. Poverty is, however, proportionally higher than for other countries at the same
level of per capita income—although it is common in countries increasingly reliant on oil
exploitation for economic livelihood.
Impact of the Financial Crisis: Growth prospects for Algeria have been revised to take into
account the decline in production in the hydrocarbons sector, the drop in demand for
hydrocarbons and oil prices, as well as the economic downturn in developed countries. 2008
recorded a growth rate of 3%, however a further decline is expected in 2009 (1.7% instead of the
earlier projected 4.1%) and 2010 (3.5% instead of the projected 5.3%). Furthermore, exports are
generally expected to decline by about 30%, due to the fall in world oil prices. Indeed, oil prices
declined from an average of US$ 99.86 per barrel at end 2008 to about US$ 70 during the second
half of 2009. As for inflation, it is expected to drop to 4.1% in 2009 following an increase in 2008
when it reached 4.4%, mainly as a result of the increase in the prices of imported food products.
However, the negative impact of the imported inflation was mitigated thanks to stabilization of
the real exchange rate of the dinar. Despite the decline in Government revenues as a result of the
fall in world demand and prices, Algeria accumulated significant official foreign exchange
reserves estimated at nearly US$ 150 billion, which reinforced its external financial position.
Thrust of the Bank’s Assistance Strategy: Support to Algeria was premised on the following
areas: support to structural/sectoral reforms; infrastructure rehabilitation; private sector
development, notably medium-scale enterprises; and support to local development. Overriding the
bank’s strategy was to help the country create an environment for economic reconstruction and
social rehabilitation following a long period of civil strife.
Demand for Resources for Development: The financial and economic crisis has had no impact
on public investment, because the Government has maintained its investment programme of US$
150 billion to modernize infrastructures and improve availability of housing. Nevertheless, there
could be a negative impact on the private sector as a result of the combined effect of the crisis and
measures taken recently by the Government concerning foreign private investment which could
be seen as restrictive. Algeria intends to carry out a huge investment programme under the 20102014 Five Year Plan, comprising several large infrastructure projects in sectors as varied as roads,
railway, ports, electricity, and housing. The proposed investment for achieving the set objective
will stand at more than 10% of GDP. However, demand for financing will depend on world
economic and oil price trends.
Overview of ADB support: Algeria has not borrowed from the Bank recently, but was a keen
borrower in the past. In the first half of 2000s, it borrowed a total of close to UA 1.8 billion (about
US$3 billion) from the ADB.
67
BOTSWANA
Background and Prospects: Botswana has posted exceptionally good economic performance
since independence, largely as a result of good leadership and the discovery of diamonds. It has
been fiscally prudent, economically and politically well-managed, and despite its dependence on
minerals, it grew continuously for the past four to five decades. However, prosperity has been
mixed with surprisingly high levels of poverty. Above all, the country has a stubbornly high rate
of inequality, one of the highest in the world. A small population, arid land and monoculture, have
limited the country’s opportunities for serious diversification. It is also landlocked making
venturing into manufactures for export expensive. However, with its reputation for economic
stability and peace, Botswana is becoming an attractive tourist destination. It has also benefitted
from tourist visitors to bigger South Africa who wish to see other landscapes in the region. It also
has the potential to become a major power supplier in the region.
Botswana is a member of SACU, the customs union embracing a number of countries in the
region, but revolving around South Africa. Its currency, the Pula is linked to the Rand, giving it
regional stability, but also implying that it has limited flexibility on monetary policy. Botswana
faces major environmental and development challenges, typical of an arid country. These include
land degradation, water scarcity and pollution. It is embarking systematically on efforts to address
these challenges. The country depicts a poorer record in the areas of poverty prevalence, income
inequality and health (mainly combating HIV-AIDS) than comparable middle income countries.
Impact of the Financial Crisis: Prior to the financial crisis, real GDP growth averaged 4% over
the previous five years. However, in 2008 real GDP growth is estimated to have slowed down to
2.8%, as a result of a decline in mining output. During 2008, the demand for exports remained
strong for the first three quarters but drastically declined in the last quarter and in the first quarter
of 2009. The economy is now projected to contract sharply by 7.3% in 2009 reflecting a sharp
contraction in global demand for diamonds. As a result of a sharp fall in prices, Debswana
suspended production in early 2009 and a number of mines were closed. The downturn in the
diamond sector is likely to contribute to slower growth in the non-mining sector in the short term,
although large public expenditures for several ongoing infrastructure projects should help sustain
non-mining growth of 5% in 2009.
The Government has increased both recurrent and development expenditures, in order to mitigate
the impact of the crisis, given the exceptional circumstances facing the economy in 2009/10.
Initially, the Government intended to spend P27.36 billion (about U$4 billion) on its recurrent
budget and P10.56 billion (about US$1.6 billion) on development budget for the 2009/10 fiscal
year. During the period 2009/10-2011/12, the government is forecasting a budget deficit of about
10-13% of GDP which will be financed through reserves and external financing.
Thrust of the Bank’s Assistance Strategy: . The pillars of the Bank’s country strategy for
Botswana during 2009-2013 are twofold: (i) actions to support private sector investment; (ii)
removal of infrastructure bottlenecks to enhance competitiveness and growth. Diversification and
increased competitiveness are important features of the country’s 10th National Development Plan
as well as its Vision 2016. Bank interaction with Botswana will continue to be strategic, with a
good mix of lending and economic and sector work.
Demand for Resources for Development: Botswana is in the privileged position of possessing
sizeable reserves. However, many of the development efforts that it has embarked on in recent
years in the areas of infrastructure development, greater regional linkage and institutional capacity
enhancement, will require sizeable inflows of external investment and support to succeed. The
68
effects of climate change also need to be addressed. For the latter and to ensure access to safe
water for the population and livestock, the country will need to embark on a range of strategies,
many without the privilege of previous experience. The country is keen to increase its power
production, in a fast growing region but with critical power shortages, and many power projects
are currently under study.
Overview of ADB support: During the last CSP period (2004-2008) the Bank concluded a P 300
million bond issue as a means to develop the country’s capital market. This was buttressed by a
line of credit to a major commercial bank for on-lending to SMEs. In June 2009, the Government
borrowed an unprecedented US$1.5 billion from the ADB for budget support. The Bank is also
co-financing the Morupule B power station (600 MW).
69
CAPE VERDE
Background and Prospects: Cape Verde is a small island economy (composed of ten islands)
which has been able to overcome poor resource endowments to build a rapidly growing economy.
It has maintained growth rates that have surpassed those of its neighbours on the mainland. As a
result of strong performance and higher per capital income levels, the country is likely to graduate
formally to Category B (Blend country), which will enable it to access both ADB and ADF
resources. The economy is primarily based on tourism, transport services and commerce. The
country has taken advantage of its location vis-à-vis Europe to provide sea transport services.
However, within the country (the ten islands) transport is rudimentary and expensive.
The country’s vulnerability to climate change is a major concern. The serious droughts of the
mid-1990s in Cape Verde reduced the annual crop by more than three quarters, causing massive
famine. Climate change has changed rainfall patterns and lowered precipitation. Low rainfall and
previous overexploitation of ground water threaten agriculture and food security.
Impact of the Financial Crisis: The global financial and economic crisis will slow down growth
in 2009-2010. GDP is expected to grow by 3.3% in 2009 and 4.4% in 2010, the lowest levels
since 2000. As from 2011, an upturn is expected, with a GDP growth rate of 6.6% in 2011 and
2012; however, these projections are far below those before the crisis and in Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper (PRSP) II. According to the IMF, the crisis will in 2009 bring about a 14% decline
in FDI flows and 7% decline in tourism activities. The current account is projected to deteriorate,
with its deficit increasing from 13% to 14.7% of GDP, before stabilizing from 2010 at 13.9% of
GDP in 2010 and 12% in 2011 and 2012. The level of reserves will be affected by the crisis.
However, it will stay above 3 months of imports as a result of the decline in imports in 2010 and
increase in grants and concessional loans. Inflation, which stood at more than 10% in October
2008, has since fallen again, and is expected to fall to 3.3% in 2009, and stabilise close to 2% by
2011. The Cape Verdean Escudo (ECV) is pegged to the Euro, and the Banco de Cabo Verde
(BCV) is unlikely to change its monetary policy. The credibility of the fixed Euro/ECV exchange
rate policy is one of the factors of mobilizing savings from immigrants.
The financial crisis has significantly slowed down real estate transactions for tourism, particularly
in Sal Island, and thereby led to loss of tax revenues for the Government.
Thrust of the Bank’s Assistance Strategy: The Bank’s country strategy for Cape Verde has two
pillars: (i) Help the country to sustain economic and financial gains. This will touch on capacity
enhancement to strengthen public finance management. It will also focus on improvements to the
business climate, competitiveness and the promotion of the private sector; (ii) infrastructure
development, with focus on transport, energy and water resource mobilization in light of threats
from climate change.
Demand for Resources for Development: In 2009, the demand for financing is estimated at
EUR 20 million. The demand is expected to stabilize in 2010, and may start to decline as from
2011. Bank assistance will focus on budget support and infrastructure development. A series of
budget support operations (about EUR 50 million) will be financed over the 2009-2012 period to
help the country in overcoming the effects of the crisis and improving its gains in economic and
financial good governance. With respect to infrastructure projects, the Bank’s assistance will aim
at: (i) supporting the tourism sector, which fuels growth in the country; (ii) increasing electricity
production; and (iii) improving the efficiency of the administration and competitiveness of the
economy. The projects expected to be financed include: (i) extension of Praia Airport (UA 20
70
million); (ii) interconnection, distribution and transmission of electricity in 6 islands (UA 10
million); (iii) access Road to Mindelo Port (UA 8 million); and (iv) building a Data Centre (UA
35 million).
It should be noted that the poverty reduction strategy puts the country’s infrastructure
development programme at about ECV 48 billion (EUR 445 million) over the 2008-2011 period.
Overview of ADB support: Cape Verde’s active portfolio comprises 5 operations. The entire
portfolio amounts to UA 17.53 million (about US$ 26million). 30 percent of this is infrastructure.
71
EGYPT
Background and Prospects: Egypt is a key regional economy, with trade links that stretch
throughout Africa. Its economy has performed well and it has been able to diversify into a number
of other sectors, and importantly to reduce poverty. Tourism remains a key segment of the
economy and recent signs that the decline in tourist numbers was levelling off have raised
sentiment as the sector is a source of livelihood for many urban households. Besides, the economy
has benefitted from FDI targeted to the region and remittances from Egyptians resident abroad are
also significant. However, the Egyptian population is huge and urbanized and the demand for
services—notably power, transport, water and sanitation services in heavily populated Cairo—
will require considerable private and public investment in the medium- to long run.
Impact of the Financial Crisis: Driven primarily by private consumption and large-scale foreign
and domestic investments, real GDP growth averaged over 7% per year during the period 2006 to
2008. However, the international financial crisis and global economic downturn has resulted in a
significant slowdown in Egypt’s economic growth—with real growth in 2009 expected at about
4% in 2009 and 2010. Official unemployment has remained persistently at 8.5%. Net
international reserves were US$ 35 billion in October 2008 although this is expected to ease to
US$ 31.7 billion by 2009/10 as a result of a drop in export earnings, remittances and receipts from
tourism and the Suez Canal. The Egyptian banking sector has remained resilient during the crisis,
with no bank bail-out expected, thanks to continual restructuring, consolidation and removal of
non-performing loans. FDI is expected to fall sharply to 3.1% of GDP by 2009/10 from a peak of
8.1% of GDP as recently as 2006/07. To date the Government’s main response to the crisis has
been a supplementary fiscal stimulus package in 2008/09 of Egyptian Pound (LE) 15 billion (US$
2.7 billion), focusing on infrastructure development. Egypt’s balance of payments has deteriorated
as a result of the crisis and the Government is proceeding cautiously by restructuring the public
finances to support medium-term consolidation and boost private investment. With the crisis
having disproportionately affected the poor, the youth and the migrant workers, the Government’s
financing requirements are expected to remain in the region of 10% of GDP per annum for the
period up until 2015.
`
Thrust of the Bank’s Assistance Strategy: The Bank’s country strategy (2007-2011) for Egypt
has two strategic pillars (i) promoting private sector development through direct support to the
sector and via infrastructure and financial sector development; (ii) social protection, through
increased institutional support. The Bank intends to help the country address the power deficit,
which constrains activities in vital sectors of the economy, including manufacturing, tourism and
agriculture. The thrust of the current country strategy is similar to that of the previous
programming cycle. The Bank’s strategies follow those of the Government, which focus on
employment creation, environmental protection, gender equality and desert land development.
Demand for Resources for Development: Government continues to focus on developing
infrastructure with particular emphasis on power generation to meet projected electricity demand,
rehabilitation of the aging irrigation-related canal and pump systems and promotion of private
sector activities. Key projects underway include the Ain Soukhna Power Project (US$ 415 million
and the Nuweiba Power Project (US$ 300 million). The financing of is in line with the Bank CSP
(2007-2011). However, with the Government keen to compensate for lost revenue under the crisis
the Bank is in consultations with the Ministry of Finance with respect to fiscal budgetary support.
The Government is also continuing to assess whether to make use of the Bank’s Emergency
Liquidity Facility (ELF) or the Trade Finance Initiative (TFI). During the period 2009 to 2010
Egypt’s external resource requirement is expected to rise from US$ 9.37 billion to US$ 10.79
billion. With the country’s debt indicators having improved considerably in recent years (external
72
debt is at US$ 32 billion by end-June 2009, less than 17% of GDP) the demand for finance in the
medium and long term is projected to rise steadily. A 10% per annum rise in financing
infrastructure demand, in the period 2012 to 2014, is considered realistic, as the country’s
population continues to grow at close to 3% annually and increased urbanization puts more
pressure on the authorities to respond with much-needed infrastructure to support expanding
urban areas.
Overview of ADB Support: Coming before the global financial crisis, the Bank’s business plan
for the earlier part of the country strategy period (2007-2008) was to provide support to the
financial sector in order to enhance the activities of the country’s SMEs. In the longer term,
however, focus would revert to energy generation—especially power supply to Cairo. The Bank
has also plans to extend PBL support to the country.
73
GABON
Background and Prospects: Since 2003, Gabon has been implementing a strategy for economic
diversification to reduce dependence on oil, which still accounts for over 40% of the economy, 80
percent of exports and for the bulk of Government revenue. It has been noted that the impact of
the “resource curse” on Gabon has been particularly severe. Expenditure patterns during the boom
years had envisaged continuous flow of oil revenue. They favoured large national projects, subject
to import of capital and availability of technical expertise. Other sectors such as manufacturing
and agriculture have been marginalized, particularly owing to high cost. The country incurred
unsustainable external debts similar to other developing country oil exporters. The benefits of the
oil revenues have not reached the poorest in society, leading to poor social statistics, comparable
to the poorest low income countries. The new Government has promised a more inclusive
approach in the country’s development.
Impact of the Financial Crisis: Gabon is estimated to have grown a meagre 2.4% in 2008,
compared to 5.6% in 2007. The GDP growth rate is expected to fall to 0.7% in 2009. The crisis is
expected to reduce Government revenues. The budgetary balance is projected at 2.2 % of GDP in
2009 as against 11.8 % in 2008. There will be a slight improvement in 2010, with a surplus of
7.5% of GDP. The current account balance is projected at 1.3% of GDP in 2009 as against 16.9%
in 2008. The country’s international reserves were estimated at CFAF 1,015 billion in April 2009.
Inflation is reported to be on the decline, and is projected to be 3.5 % in 2009 as against 5.3 % in
2008, as a result of a slowdown in demand.
The iron ore exploitation programme in Belinga has been delayed pending signs of an upturn on
the world market.
Thrust of the Bank’s Assistance Strategy: The Bank Strategy for 2006-2010 aimed to improve
the effectiveness of public spending, delivery of basic services, and the promotion of basic
infrastructure to improve the well being of the poor. Also important was the building of capacities
through Bank’s promotion of economic and sector work and provision of advisory services.
Furthermore, the strategy emphasized the importance of collaboration with other donors, through
a process of systematic harmonization of activities.
Demand for Resources for Development: In the long term (2009-2020), the total demand for
financing of Gabon is estimated at about US$ 8 billion, or an average of nearly US$ 700 million
per year. The demand mainly concerns infrastructure.
Overview of ADB Support: The areas in which demand for financing is felt and in which the
Bank will intervene over the 2009-2012 period are infrastructure and economic diversification.
The major operations concerned are: (i) the River Water Sanitation Project for UA 100 million;
(ii) the Road Programme Phase II for UA 68 million; and (iii) the Support Project for Improving
the Quality of Higher Education for UA 99.3 million.
74
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
Background and Prospects: Owing to a rich oil endowment, Equatorial Guinea has one of the
highest per capita incomes in Africa. The country has enjoyed double digit growth until recently.
However, the rapid growth of the economy, based on oil exploitation, has not yet translated into
improved social welfare for the rest of the population. More than 60 percent of the population
lives below the poverty line. Still, the country has considerable wealth which can be used to
develop human resources and to invest in infrastructure to improve the lives of the people.
Impact of the Financial Crisis: As a result of the impact of the financial crisis on the real sector
(oil and forestry), real GDP growth is expected to be negative in 2009 at -4.1%, as against the
estimated 12% in 2008, according to projections made in October 2009. The economy will remain
subdued in 2010, with GDP expected to decline further by 2.6%. The 43% decline in oil exports
in 2009 (90% of total export earnings) following the fall in the price of a barrel of oil and the
7.9% decline in timber exports will reduce the current account balance which, nevertheless, will
still show a surplus. Consequently, in 2009 the foreign currency reserves, which represented the
equivalent of 7.4 months of imports, are expected to decline.
Thrust of the Bank’s Assistance Strategy: The Bank’s strategy in Equatorial Guinea has
focused on helping to lay the foundation for sustainable development. This touches on issues of
institutional fragility, the need for economic diversification and the importance of advisory work
based on critical economic analysis.
Demand for Resources for Development: Equatorial Guinea had accumulated huge foreign
currency reserves in Banque des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale (BEAC) estimated at more than
CFAF 100 billion at the end of 2008, which was a sign of confidence. On the other hand,
improvement in resource management capacity and project implementation remain a key
requirement for Equatorial Guinea, which rather tends to give priority to financing with internal
resources. The most significant investments are in the oil and gas sector, and the sector’s output is
expected to be either maintained or increased. The social sectors are among the strategic
priorities of the National Economic and Social Development Plan (PNDES) of the Government to
reduce poverty which affects 77% of the population and strengthen social cohesion. Any
adjustments of expenditures are not expected to significantly affect these sectors.
The expected upturn in the timber, gas and oil sectors will maintain significant foreign direct
investments estimated at more than CFAF 800 billion (about US$ 1.726 million) in 2007.
Similarly, the Government continues to invest at least 18% of its GDP (about US$ 3000 million)
in its ambitious public investment programme, which is above the minimum of 5% required from
MICs. In addition, the financing requirements generated under the scenario (MICs- Financing
Infrastructure Demand) will be fully covered in view of the commitments made by the
Government under the PNDES and the huge financial reserves of the country.
Overview of ADB Support: The Bank intends to finance in 2010 an institutional support
operation for agricultural production support structures for UA 35 million so as to create the
institutional capacities and technical skills required for boosting the economic diversification
strategy.
75
LIBYA
Background and Prospects: Following Libya’s rapprochement with the West, the country has
once again been able to raise its oil production and to attract FDI in large volumes. Although state
ownership and control were central to the country’s development strategy in the past, the
Government has liberalized the oil sector and a number of leading companies now operate in the
country. The country has encouraged external diversification of investments. Libyan-owned
companies have important interests in businesses in many African countries.
Impact of the Financial Crisis: The impact of the global financial crisis on the Libyan economy
is mainly through its effect on oil revenues due to the fall in oil prices. Growth prospects in Libya
have been revised downwards for 2009, and real GDP growth is now projected to slow to 1.7%,
down from an estimated 4% in 2008. Growth is expected to recover to 4.8% in 2010, reflecting in
part the recovery expected in the global economy. Government revenue fell sharply due to lower
oil prices, but is projected to increase again in 2010. Libya’s foreign reserves are currently at
around 39 months of imports. The trade balance, however, has not developed in Libya’s favour, as
the oil price has decreased while demand for oil has remained at about the same level. Libya’s
exchange rate is pegged to the SDR, which has served the country well in terms of
macroeconomic stability. Inflation is projected to fall to about 5% in 2009 and is expected to
moderate further over the medium term. Libya has virtually no debt, so the financial crisis has had
little impact on debt sustainability.
Since the Bank does not have on-going projects in Libya, there have been no cancellations or
postponements due to the financial crisis. Libya has been largely shielded from the crisis, since
its banking sector is isolated from the global financial system and most foreign capital is invested
in the oil sector, and has thus not been withdrawn. We are not aware of any delayed or postponed
investment projects.
Thrust of the Bank’s Assistance Strategy: The Bank’s intervention in Libya has been limited to
economic and sector work in the past. However, the Bank’s Country Engagement Note approved
by the Board in early 2009 indicates that the time is right to engage in further collaboration. This
will include co-financing operations, technical assistance to Government agencies in areas of the
bank’s comparative advantage, including diagnostic and analytical work and regional cooperation
and integration initiatives.
Demand for Resources for Development: Given its policy approach and the high oil income,
Libya has had little need for direct external financing in recent years. With the fall in oil price,
however, the trade balance worsened, while government spending increased. As a result, Libya’s
external financing demands are now estimated at US$ 1.86 billion and US$ 2.4 billion in 2009
and 2010, respectively. More of these needs might increase in the future. The country is currently
opening up to trade and FDI and needs to improve its infrastructure in all fields (roads, ports,
utilities, hotels etc.). Thus, over the next decade Libya’s external resource requirement may
amount to over US$ 4 billion per year
Overview of ADB Support: Libya has not made use of any of the bank’s lending services to date
and is just now engaging in technical cooperation and requesting a number of studies. Bank
support to Libya is thus taking off. In recent consultations, the country has discussed the
possibility of a project to support a road project linking several neighbouring countries, which the
country’s aid agency intends to underwrite.
76
MAURITIUS
Background and Prospects: Although Mauritius has a small population and is geographically
isolated, it has been able to post impressive growth in the past several years. The absence of
natural resources in large amounts has helped the country to diversify into manufacturing.
Tourism remains an important sector, in spite of the sharp reduction in tourist arrivals during the
crisis. However, a number of structural limitations are evident. Human capital endowment is low
and relatively high wages for available factors have eroded the country’s comparative advantage.
The country ranks highly in the Doing Business index. The governments reform agenda,
announced in 2006, is fourfold: consolidating public sector performance, improving trade
competitiveness, improving investment climate, and strengthening opportunities for the
population
Impact of the Financial Crisis: Mauritius has been affected by the global financial crisis. Real
Growth is now forecast to decelerate to 2.0% in 2008/2009 down from 5.4% in 2007/2008. The
budget situation is expected to deteriorate in 2009 reflecting lower tax revenues and higher
spending arising from the fiscal stimulus introduced by the government to try to prop up growth.
The current account is expected to widen to 12% of GDP in 2009 due to lower international
demand in key sectors, tourism, textiles and offshore financial services. Foreign exchange
reserves were $1.8 billion in May 2009, compared with $2.0 billion in May 2008. The crisis has
also affected the major investment projects as Shaxi Tianli and Integrated Resort Schemes have
been put on hold. Some of the more advanced projects, mostly hotel developments, are being
secured and funding would be needed to preserve them.
As part of the countercyclical fiscal and monetary policy to cope with the adverse effects of the
financial crisis, the Government is implementing a stimulus package amounting to about US$330
million (3.8% of GDP) during 2009-2011 that comprises several major infrastructure projects as
well as other measures to support the private sector and provide increased social protection. The
package is intended to provide confidence to public and private investment, by fast-tracking
already-earmarked public spending projects and new infrastructure programs, and accelerating
private sector investment.
Thrust of the Bank’s Assistance Strategy: The Bank’s strategy for Mauritius follows closely the
country’s own development strategy. It seeks to assist the Government in addressing the challenge
of how to continue to diversify the economy, to invest in education and in creating physical
infrastructure that can help raise human capital and attract FDI.
Demand for Resources for Development: Government continues to focus on infrastructure
development with emphasis on transport, health, sewerage and public sector reform.. Planned
public investment is estimated at about 14.3% of GDP, with main priorities being, road transport,
airport, ports, water, education, power, social protection and urban development. Furthermore,
about 20% of this planned public investment will be targeted at the promotion of “Maurice Ile
Durable” Initiative, which aims for sustainable development. The Government wants to boost this
further by making Mauritius the ICT gateway to Africa.
Overview of ADB Support: At the end of 2008, total accumulated assistance from the ADB
reached UA 180 million. A total of 26 operations had been approved. In the second half of 2009,
the Bank reached agreement with the country to provide further substantial support in the form of
general budget support to the amount of US$700 million, over three years. This marked a
departure from the small and limited financing requested and provided in the past.
77
MOROCCO
Background and Prospects: The Kingdom of Morocco has enjoyed high growth rates during the
past decade, in spite of persistent drought that has affected agriculture, which still accounts for a
significant portion of the economy. However, there are challenges to bringing services and
employment opportunities to the widely dispersed population. The urban employment rate is
estimated to be as high as 20 percent, although informal or casual employment is common. A
national program, National Initiative for Human Development, was introduced in 2005 as a first
step in efforts to create an inclusive economic environment and to enhance the living conditions
of the people. Proximity to the European Union has provided a lucrative market for agricultural
products for Morocco. It reached an Association Agreement with the European Union in 2006.
Impact of the Financial Crisis: In view of the gradual deterioration of the country’s balance of
trade (deficit of US$ 3.5 billion during the first quarter of 2009) and, consequently the balance of
payments as a result of the sharp decline in exports, the foreign exchange reserves could drop in
the short term.
Since the Moroccan Government has undertaken to: (i) reduce, as much as possible, the impact of
the crisis, (ii) pursue and complete ongoing major infrastructure projects, and (iii) attract foreign
investments, the demand for foreign financing is expected to increase.
Thrust of the Bank’s Assistance Strategy: The three pillars of he Bank’s country strategy
(2007-2011) for Morocco are as follows: (i) improvement of the governance system; (ii)
development and modernization of infrastructure and enterprises; and (iii) promotion of human
development. These draw on the Government’ policy approaches which emphasize modernization
of public administration as well of infrastructure, and rapid reduction of social inequalities.
Demand for Resources for Development: Despite the international financial crisis, demand for
the financing of large-scale national projects and programmes is growing. To date, for the 20092011 period, the demand for financing amounts to UA 1,946 million. Most of the selected projects
and programmes are in the public sector and shared between infrastructure (55%) --- comprising
transport, electricity and water and sanitation sectors --- and the other sectors, particularly policybased lending and private sector projects. The infrastructure projects form part of the Government’s
major projects for the 2008-2012 period and the national energy strategy.
Provisional Demand for Financing 2009-2011 (UA million)
2009
2010
2011
%
Infrastructure
346.08 480.00 250.00
55
Policy-based lending
364.67 100.00
24
Private sector
113.70
70.00 200.00
20
Other sectors
1.10
20.00
1
Total
825.55 650.00 470.00
In the long term, the demand for financing will be higher than recorded recently. The Moroccan
Government has embarked on the implementation of one phase of the major infrastructure
projects (highways, railway, ports, airports, and electricity production) for direct and indirect
impacts on economic growth, job creation and improvement of the competitiveness of the
Moroccan economy. Furthermore, the Azur project, which aimed at the annual arrival of 10
million tourists in 2010, has been postponed to 2013-2014. To achieve these objectives and others
relating to reduction of regional disparities, minimum investments of about 7-8% of GDP will be
required.
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Overview of ADB Support: The country strategy paper (2007-2011) indicates that the bulk of
support to Morocco will be in the area of infrastructure. The Bank delivered a total of about UA 2
billion (US$3 billion), between 2001-2006, with the bulk going to water and sanitation, transport
and energy, respectively. There was also support to the environment, an area of increasing
concern in the country. More recently, the Bank has continued to support the country in its
priority areas of operation—with emphasis on assisting the Morocco to defray the impact of the
crisis.
79
NAMIBIA
Background and Prospects: The Namibian economy has performed reasonably well since
Independence in 1990.The economy depends largely on mining, although fishing and tourism are
also important sectors. The country is implementing its 3rd National Development Plan, which
will cover the period up to 2012. The Government has also devised a long-term strategy, Vision
2030.The medium to long-term goals for the country include promotion of sustainable growth,
employment creation, poverty reduction, reduction of social and gender inequality, economic
empowerment and combating HIV/AIDS.
Impact of the Financial Crisis: Prior to the crisis, average real GDP growth rate for 2008 – 2011
was projected at about 5.3%. GDP growth rate for 2009 has been revised from 4% to -1.4% as a
result of the crisis. The demand for exports has declined largely affecting mineral commodity
sales and in particular diamond sales. Diamonds constitute a big component of exports and export
prices have declined significantly such that operators had stopped the sales and even production
for now. Growth in key economic sectors is expected to decelerate over the next three years as a
result of the crisis. The severity of the impact is disproportionately felt in the mining sector. The
impact is felt through export prices due to falling demand for exports. Namibia supports a highly
open economy with a trade to GDP ratio of about 100%. Job losses are mainly in the mining
sector, both in the production and processing segments of the sector. The losses came about as a
result of declining demand for mineral exports inducing scaling down, or even halting, production
and eventual processing activities. The high oil prices which prevailed during 2008 also exerted
enormous difficulties on, among others, the capital-intensive extractive sectors, including the
fisheries sector.
Thrust of the Bank’s Assistance Strategy: The Bank’s country strategy (2007-2011) for
Namibia includes: (i) enhancing the competitiveness of the private sector through infrastructure
development, (ii) enhancing agricultural productivity and food security through irrigation
technologies. The overall goal is to target poverty and to create employment.
Demand for Resources for Development: The 2008/9 budget provided for increased spending
on infrastructure development going forward. Financing for additional development expenditure
is sourced from revenue from own source as well as additional borrowing. This eliminates
potential funding gaps and all planned major public projects are not expected to face funding
risks. Namibia’s external financing requirements hover around 6% of GDP which may increase
from 6% of GDP to 15% of GDP. Total expenditure as a percentage of GDP is expected to
increase from 27.5% in 2007/08 to 35.7% in 2010/11. Though the crisis has adversely affected
Namibia’s main export sector, mining. It is expected that in the long term the economy will
recover from the crisis and so long term demand for external financing will be much less. Planned
projects in the areas of utilities, construction and infrastructure as well as mining are largely on
schedule. No large-scale fall out of planned investment is foreseen, although mineral exploration
activities have slowed down.
Overview of ADB Support: Namibia has not borrowed extensively from the Bank, though a
number of discussions have been undertaken in the recent past and a viable project pipeline has
been discussed.
80
NIGERIA
Background and Prospects: Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa (about 140 million)
and the largest economy in West Africa. The country’s leaders envisage that Nigeria will have
become a major industrial power in Africa within a decade and one of the 20 leading economies
in the world by 2020. These achievements will have important regional implications in terms of
consumer markets, trade, regional flow of resources and policy coordination. Still, while
economic performance has improved in the past few years, the average Nigerian remains poor.
Social inequalities have persisted, while the unequal distribution of oil wealth has caused serious
disturbances in key oil producing states in the country. However, Nigeria is a big country and
although its industries are plagued by production problems owing to inadequate infrastructure,
especially power, it exports to most of West Africa. Its financial houses have even gone further a
field and can be found in many parts of Africa. Moreover, Nigeria plays an influential role in the
region as peacemaker and agent of restraint.
Impact of the Financial Crisis: Macro balances have been adversely impacted. Real GDP
growth is expected to decelerate sharply from a projected 6.3% in 2008 to 3% in 2009, before
recovering to 5% in 2010 in line with the anticipated recovery of the global economy. Lower oil
revenues have driven the fiscal accounts and balance of payments into deficits, Oil and gas
production continue to be adversely affected by security problems in the Delta valley. Nigeria’s
financial and capital markets have also been affected, forcing the central bank to take decisive
action to intervene in several important banks.
Thrust of the Bank’s Assistance Strategy: According to the country strategy for Nigeria (20052009), Bank support is based on two strategic pillars: (i) human capital development, (ii) private
sector led diversification of the economy.
Demand for Resources for Development: Nigeria is a vast country, with a large demand for
infrastructure of all types. The oil industry has special requirements, which have been easier to
meet thanks to the participation of partners in the international oil industry. Estimates of what
Nigeria needs to finance infrastructure to sustainable levels equal about US$14 billion in the
medium term. This amount will increase as the economy becomes more industrialized and
sophisticated.
Overview of ADB Support: Nigeria has so far confined its public borrowing from the Bank to
the ADF window. However, the private sector in the country has borrowed from the ADB
window.
81
SEYCHELLES
Background and Prospects: Seychelles has achieved a high standard of living and rapid social
development in the past decades. It has the highest GDP per capita in Africa and was ranked 50th
globally in the 2007 UNDP Human Development Index. Land, capital and human resources are
limited, however. The country has not been able to achieve economies of scale in production or
diversification. It depends on imports for all its raw materials, finished and semi-finished
products, and specialized services. Tourism remains the country’s predominant sector,
accounting for 22% of GDP, 30% employment and 70% of the country’s foreign exchange
earnings. Fishing (especially tuna) is the second most important sector, contributing 15% of GDP,
97% of visible exports and employing 17% of the workforce.
The country has faced economic challenges in recent years. Growth was low during 2001-2007 at
an average of only 1%, mainly reflecting the contraction in real GDP growth in three out of the
seven years (2001, 2003 and 2004). Seychelles was among the most indebted countries in the
world until recently. It has taken steps to address the issues and bring back its indebtedness onto a
sustainable basis. This has involved a comprehensive debt restructuring involving a substantial
reduction in the debt service burden, consistent with Seychelles' long-term ability to pay. The
Government has established a Public Debt Management Committee to closely monitor parastatal
borrowing and a new Public Debt Law to define a legal framework for debt management was
presented to Parliament in December 2008.
Impact of the Financial Crisis: The financial crisis has had an adverse impact on Seychelles,
especially coming at a time when the country was in the midst of own efforts to negotiate for debt
reduction with its creditors. Part of the reform depended on the country’s ability to restructure part
of the tourist assets and other parastatals accumulated by government. Lower tourist arrivals make
commercialization of the hotels and associated businesses a less attractive option. The crisis also
means that the Government’s plans to create employment opportunities will be more difficult to
realize.
Thrust of the Bank’s Assistance Strategy: In its Interim Strategy for Seychelles the Bank
identified a single pillar: “support the creation of a stable and enabling macroeconomic
environment.” This derived from lessons that the Bank had learnt from previous engagement with
the country, namely that a stable macroeconomic environment, domestic capacity to ensure that it
is sustainable and commitment to social protection of the vulnerability are important ingredients
of policy. It also follows the Government’s own “Seychelles 2007 Strategy” which emphasizes
sound economic management, competitiveness and governance, social equity and improvements
to infrastructure, land use and concern for biodiversity.
Demand for Resources for Development: Seychelles has been starved of capital in the past few
years owing to its debt burden and problem with arrears. It is now taking steps to restructure its
debt as well as the economy. It has plans to hold investor conferences, with potential projects in
tourism, ports, agriculture and fisheries.
Overview of ADB Support: The Bank provided Seychelles with a quick disbursing budget
support loan of about US$20 million in 2008 in conjunction with IMF and World Bank. It also
helped to launch the debt resolution process sought by the Government.
82
SOUTH AFRICA
Background and Prospects: South Africa is the largest economy in Africa. Its influence on the
continent has increased since majority rule was achieved in the country. South Africa’s railways
and ports serve as conduits for commerce for the landlocked countries of Botswana, Zimbabwe,
Lesotho, Swaziland and Zambia. It also provides goods and services for many other countries
further a field. Its companies provide financial services and infrastructure in East and West
Africa, and they also have a strong presence in the financial sector; its breweries have bought
stakes in many leading breweries in many parts of Africa. Crucially, it is also steeped into the
regional economy. Its power hungry industries will rely on supplies from neighbours, while
demand for its output will require the markets of countries from the neighbourhood and further
afield. However, the legacies of the past, including inequalities in incomes and employment
opportunities and low education, are yet to be overcome.
Inadequate power supply has emerged as the most challenging problem for Southern Africa.
Although there were concerns about the power headroom, and policy makers were urged to take
action, not much action was taken toward addressing this concern through increased investment in
power generation. Moreover, the private sector was not encouraged to participate initially, as the
Government underlined big aggregates and economies of scale. In the event, when economic
growth reached unprecedented levels in the 2000s, there was not enough power to sustain it. Since
power plants take a long time to commission, the energy deficit problems that emerged in the
mid-2000s will take time to eradicate. Thus, neighbouring countries with own plans to generate
power will have a ready market.
Impact of the Financial Crisis: The impact on the overall economy is manifested by the decline
in growth rate from 5.1% in 2007 to an estimated 3.1% in 2008, and a decline of 2.1% in 2009.
The financial crisis impacted negatively on the demand for South Africa’s exports. Platinum and
gold exports have fallen and export earnings contracted by 27 percent between the fourth quarter
of 2008 and the end of the first quarter of 2009. Given that the South African financial sector had
limited exposure to US sub-prime assets, it has remained robust and so far no bail-out has been
necessary. The contraction of the South African economy for the first time since majority rule was
achieved has led to labour unrest. It has also had a negative impact on neighbouring countries that
depend on remittances from workers in South Africa.
Thrust of the Bank’s Assistance Strategy: The country assistance strategy for South Africa
(2008-2012) has three pillars: (i) enhancing private sector competitiveness, (ii) partnership for
regional integration and development, (iii) knowledge management and capacity building. The
approach falls well within the areas emphasized in the Government’s development programs
notably the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Programme from 1996.
Demand for Resources for Development: Infrastructure spending has been driven by increased
public outlays in the short run, part of counter-cyclical expenditure by the government. The
government through its parastatals plans to spend around R787 billion (about US$100 billion) for
infrastructure development alone, accounting for around 10% of GDP over 2009–2012. Longterm demand for infrastructure financing by the public sector is expected to stabilize at around 45% of GDP. A number of projects have been started involving a host of participants. They include
port expansion, mining, power generation, airports and railway improvements. Many of the
projects have private sector participation or are wholly owned by the private sector. Thus
investment overall will be much higher as the private sector embarks on plans to close the power
and associated infrastructure gaps.
83
Overview of ADB Support: The Bank is geared to support the government in its infrastructure
development programs through a number of projects, including a loan to Eskom for the
construction of the Medupi Power Project. Other South African parastatals and private companies
have also approached the Bank for support.
84
SWAZILAND
Background and Prospects: In per capita income terms (about US$ 2500 in 2007), Swaziland is
richer than many other sub-Saharan African countries. However, it has in other areas of
performance not been able to make the transition to a middle income country. Inequality is
pervasive as is poverty, especially among the rural population. It ranks close to Africa’s fragile
states on the Human Development Index. The unemployment rate at 30% is high and constitutes a
major threat to social stability. Unemployment is expected to increase due to retrenchment in
manufacturing and of mineworkers in South Africa’s platinum and gold mines.
However, Swaziland’s growth prospects are quite good in the medium term. Indeed the shift from
agriculture as a major source of income to manufacturing and services is indicative of a transition
to industrialization. The African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) has been quite beneficial for
manufacturing, attracting FDI to the country. Tourism presents and opportunity for growth and
diversification. Although entirely surrounded by South Africa, Swaziland’s has access to the sea
and there are ready markets for agricultural produce in the urban centres of South Africa.
Membership in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and pegging the currency to the
rand, ensure a certain discipline in economic policy, but also put the country at some disadvantage
in terms of economic policy.
Impact of the Financial Crisis: Swaziland has seen a decline in growth during the crisis. Real
GDP growth is expected to be only 0.4% in 2009, a decline of up to 3% points on recent years.
The Government expects a large fiscal deficit, in 2009/10, largely reflecting higher public
expenditures and a decline in SACU revenues. South Africa has been seriously affected by the
crisis, experiencing a recession for the first time since 1990. The Government has increased capital
expenditure by about 31% in 2009/10 as part of its countercyclical stimulus package in response
to the global economic crisis. This will enable it to continue implementing infrastructure projects
already underway that have greatest impact on economic growth and employment. Although
inflation rose sharply to 12.6% in 2008, it is expected to drop below double digits in 2009 and
2010, reflecting favourable developments in food and international prices and in line with
developments in South Africa, the source of over two-thirds of the country’s imports. The
country’s banks have remained financially sound as their ownership is dominated by South
African banks, which have not been seriously affected by the direct contagion of the crisis.
Thrust of the Bank’s Assistance Strategy: The country strategy for Swaziland covers the period
2009-2013. It has two strategic pillars: (i) Infrastructure investment to improve productivity and
competitiveness, (ii) Enhancing skills delivery and skills development. The Bank sees the issue of
competitiveness as critical, especially for a small country with a number of large neighbours. A
substantial part of that competitiveness will come from enhanced human capital—making training
and skills development important parts of the development strategy.
Demand for Resources for Development: In the short to medium term the Government’s
emphasis is on expanding the road infrastructure, including a program of tarred and all-weather
roads; road maintenance. A tolling system has been introduced on a major highway through a
public/private partnership. Other infrastructure projects requiring financing include the
completion of the Sikhuphe international airport; laying an optic fibre ring across the country;
providing an additional rail link to the new Sikhuphe airport; construction of a Dry Port in
Matsapa; building of dams and reservoirs, water supply infrastructure in rural areas, and water
treatment plants for Siteki, Lomahasha and Nhlangano; and attracting private sector investment
into domestic thermal power generation as well as increasing electricity distribution in rural areas.
However, infrastructure bottlenecks continue to constrain private sector development and
85
economic growth. Thus, Swaziland will in the long term continue to place emphasis on providing
support for infrastructure to foster the enabling environment for business and improve
productivity and competitiveness. Swaziland’s financial requirements in the area of infrastructure
will increase by 50% between 2013 and 2020 to about US$ 300 million per year.
Overview of ADB Support: The Bank commenced operations in Swaziland in 1972. A total of
37 operations have been approved since, with a total commitment estimated at UA 235.45 million
(about US$ 350 million). The portfolio had performed above the Bank’s average. Economic and
sector work is going to be a key accompanying feature of Bank operations in the country.
86
TUNISIA
Background and Prospects: Tunisia has enjoyed an impressive rate of growth in the past
decades, helping it to reach a per capita income of close to US$ 3000 by 2007. The government
has pursued a development strategy which has highlighted the importance of human capital
improvement and the provision of social services to the broader population. A policy of
subsidization of essential good and services has been used as a safety net for the urban and rural
poor, while public works projects have also been used to provide urban employment. Importantly,
the Government has put emphasis on family planning and the promotion of women. Female
representation in public life and the private sector rank among the highest in the region. Partly as
a result of these factors, population growth was only about 1.2% in 2008.
Economic planning has remained a key policy feature of Tunisia and the Bank’s country strategy
for Tunisia coincided with 11th Five-Year Plan (2007-2011). Growth was high in the first year of
the Plan, at 6.3%, but fell to 4.7% in 2008, the beginning of the global economic crisis. Inflation
remained below 5% in 2008. A key to the country’s success has been the Government’s ability to
embark on reform before the issues became too critical and obstructive to growth and
development. Social policies have also enabled the maintenance of peace. The poverty rate in
Tunisia was 6% in 2000 and 3.8% in 2007. It is expected the poverty MDG as well as many
others will have been reached by 2015.
Tunisia’s proximity to the European Union has been a blessing, but also a challenge. First, it
ensures a good destination for European tourists, and a potentially good market for the country’s
produce of manufactures, agricultural products and other services. In these cases, the country
faces stiff competition from neighbours and countries from far afield. Structural and sector
reforms, including refurbishments to the country’s energy and transport infrastructure, are seen by
the Government to improving the countries competitiveness and creation of employment.
Unemployment reached 14.2 percent in 2008, youth unemployment is much higher.
Impact of the Financial Crisis: The crisis has significantly affected the implementation of the
public investment programs. Major construction projects have been cancelled, postponed or
slowed down. There have initially been difficulties in trade financing for exporters among the
offshore companies. Government is trying to redress these shortfalls through a package of
finance. Lower tourism receipts and remittances have put pressure on the external position. FDI is
forecast to decrease by 35% in 2009. Government revenue is expected to fall sharply in 2009
leading to deterioration in the budget deficit. However, the Government’s countercyclical
stimulus package, adopted in early 2009, targeting domestic demand has succeeded in reducing
the impact of the global recession on the economy. However, to return to the growth path of its
11th National Development Plan of over 6 percent, and to tackle unemployment external financing
will be required.
Thrust of the Bank’s Assistance Strategy: The Bank’s assistance strategy for Tunisia covers the
period 2007-2011. It had three pillars (i) the reinforcement of macroeconomic policies and the
acceleration of reforms –targeted at enhancing the business environment, (ii) infrastructure
modernization and consolidation of the productive sector, (iii) the consolidation of human capital.
The bank aimed to be selective during the implementation of the strategy which focuses on raising
the competitiveness of the Tunisian economy. A mid-term review of the strategy indicated that
considerable success had been achieved, in spite of the onset of the crisis in 2008. Tunisia is the
most competitive African country, but employment creation remains a serious challenge.
87
Demand for Resources for Development: In the near term it is estimated that the country will
need between US$ 7-10 billion of external financing to meet the requirements of its 11th National
Development Plan. Tunisia’s demand for finance in the medium to long term is also projected to
rise rapidly. The Tunisian Government has drawn ambitious plans to expand and rehabilitate its
transport network, and improve other economic and physical infrastructure such as the ports
facilities. Government is also targeting partnership with foreign capital in overhauling physical
infrastructure in support of its tourism activities, industry and rural development. Tunisian finance
requirements for public-funded basic infrastructure alone are projected in the base scenario to
increase from US$ 3 billion in 2009 to US$ 4 billion by 2015. Private sector requirements in
power and transport are of similar magnitude.
Overview of ADB Support: Since 1968, the Bank has approved 99 projects to Tunisia worth an
accumulated total of about UA 3.5 billion (US$4.7 billion). The existing portfolio comprises 11
projects worth about UA 860 million, with an average age of 2.6 years. Up to 71% are
infrastructure projects. With a rating of 2.7 out of a possible 3, the portfolio is well performing.
An important aspect of the Bank’s strategy, emphasized the need for economic and sector work to
help boost the Bank’s analytical and advisory role.
88
ZIMBABWE
Background and Prospects: Zimbabwe was once referred to as the breadbasket of Southern
Africa. Rapid growth, infrastructure expansion and focus on human capital development were key
features of the policies pursued by the Government that assumed power in 1980. With a relatively
high per capita income, it received blend status at the Bank. However, following a decade of
steady growth, the country entered an economic downturn from which it has found it difficult to
extricate itself. Since 2000, the economy has declined by half in real terms. Key sectors of the
economy, mining and tourism suffered sharp decline and a parallel economy emerged, and the use
of foreign currencies became common. The financial system was paralyzed. Hyperinflation
effectively destroyed the Zimbabwe dollar; the country now operates with the US Dollar and SA
Rand.
The economic decline and political confrontation have reversed the achievements of the postindependence decades, especially in social development. A large part of the country’s well
educated labour force fled the country. It is estimated that close to 30 percent of the total
population is now resident in South Africa and other neighbouring countries. The economic and
social consequences of a decade of poor performance are pervasive. Although Zimbabwe once
was the breadbasket of the region, it is now a food importer. Its external debt is estimated by the
Government at US$5.7 billion.
The regional dimension spurred SADC to broker a political solution and to engage the
international community on behalf of Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe’s political parties reached a Global
Political Agreement (GPA), followed by the creation of an Inclusive Government (IG) in
February 2009. The new Government moved swiftly to produce a Short Term Emergency
Recovery Program (STERP). Although the initial results are encouraging, Zimbabwe remains in
crisis. The political situation is fragile; much will depend on the ability of the Government to
engineer economic recovery.
Impact of the Financial Crisis: Zimbabwe’s crisis has certainly been aggravated by the financial
crisis. Being a landlocked country, it imports food and oil through neighbouring countries. The
crisis certainly raised the country’s unprecedented inflation to even higher levels. Ironically, it
might have forced the Government to see the futility of using the Zimbabwe dollar as a currency
in the circumstances. It is difficult to separate the country’s own sharp economic crisis from that
of the financial crisis.
Thrust of the Bank’s Assistance Strategy: The Bank’s Strategy for Zimbabwe is anchored on
supporting the Government to implement its recovery program. The goal is, however, to help the
country reach full reengagement with the Bank and other donors in the medium term. The
expected outcomes of this strategy include: a full Bank Country Strategy Paper based on the
Government’s medium-term development strategy; full arrears clearance; Zimbabwe’s eligibility
under the HIPC initiative; and the resumption of normal Bank operations. The Bank’s leverage in
Zimbabwe will not only be financial, but will also include provision of advice and technical
support to assist the Government move its agenda forward. A major task of the extended mission
and the Bank strategy in this regard would be to work with the Government to convene and
coordinate support from other donors.
89
Demand for Resources for Development: The Government of Zimbabwe presented the STERP
in early 2009 as a prelude to a fully fledged 6-year Medium Term Plan covering the period 20102015. STERP had estimated that the country needed about US$8 billion to meet its emergency
needs in 2009 alone. This was largely not forthcoming, owing to the difficult relations that
Zimbabwe has had with the donor community. The Medium Term Plan (2010-2015) estimates
that Zimbabwe will need US$0.5 billion per year in FDI and will need to borrow about US$300
million per year to meet its needs.
Overview of ADB support: Arrears are currently the most important impediment to full fledged
support to Zimbabwe by the bank and other multilaterals. ADB arrears clearance will require
additional resources, which the Government with assistance from the Bank will solicit from the
international community. Currently, the Bank has afield an “extended” mission to Zimbabwe,
which has developed capacity building initiatives for the Government. The Bank’s contribution
will be focused on the priority areas of statistics, enhancing economic management skills, revenue
generation, and strengthening oversight agencies. The private sector has requested for quick
disbursing lines of credit. The country has been isolated from much of the international
community and International Financial Institutions, and will need support on reengagement. In
providing assistance, the Bank distinguishes between the short-term goal of unlocking donor
resources to Zimbabwe and the longer-term one of supporting a strong private sector-led
economy, capable of meetings its recurrent expenditures from its own taxes
90
Annex 3: Governance, Controls and Safeguards in the Bank
1
The Office of the Auditor General (OAGL):
1.1 In accordance with the Financial Regulations of the Bank, the Office of the Auditor General
(OAGL) is responsible for directing and supervising the Internal Audit and Integrity and
Anti-corruption functions. The Office of the Auditor General reports functionally to the Audit
and Finance Committee (AUFI) and the Committee on Development Effectiveness (CODE)
of the Board of Directors.
1.2 Internal Audit provides independent, objective assurance and advisory services designed to
add value and improve the Bank’s operations. It does this through a systematic and
disciplined approach to evaluate and enhance the effectiveness of risk management, control,
and governance processes. It prepares a 5-year risk-based long term coverage plan. The plan
is revisited yearly to take into account any new risks and challenges. As part of its activities,
Internal Audit conducts audits of the finance and corporate complexes as well as audits of
Trust and Grant funds. It also audits selected projects in RMCs and the respective field /
regional offices. It periodically conducts a quality assessment (peer and external review) of its
processes.
1.3 Within OAGL, Integrity and Anti- Corruption function is the main investigative body for
fraud and corruption in the Bank. It undertakes unhindered investigations into allegations of
fraud, corruption and misconduct affecting Bank-financed activities. The core functions are
investigative and preventative to support the Bank’s zero tolerance for corruption. The
Division undertakes risk assessments to determine what further controls the Bank might
implement to reduce vulnerability to corruption and fraud. It also raises awareness about
corruption and fraud within the Bank and in RMCs. Collaborative efforts to strengthen anticorruption and anti-fraud measures are enhanced through regular interactions with other
MDBs. The Bank’s Whistle-blowing Policy provides and avenue for complaints on fraud or
corruption and offer protection from retaliation.
1.4 The Division is currently designing an electronic system for procurement red-flagging that
would guide preventative programs and assist staff in detecting fraud and corruption. The
main driving factor to resource requirements is the anticipated caseload volume. The evolving
nature of the Bank’s operational orientation points to corruption risks for which Integrity and
Anti- Corruption division must be prepared.
2
Independent evaluation of operations (OPEV):
2.1 Independent evaluation of operations, conducted via the Bank’s Operations Evaluation
(OPEV) Department, helps to ensure quality and efficiency of policies and operations, and to
maintaining a focus on good practice and development effectiveness. It helps to ensure that
the Bank is publicly accountable, and that it systematically draws lessons from
implementation of policies and programs to feed back into decision making at various levels.
2.2 The independence of the Operations Evaluation Department (OPEV) was strengthened in
2006, and an updated policy was approved the following year. The Board’s Committee on
Development Effectiveness (CODE) approves OPEV’s work programme and budget each
year and considers OPEV’s reports, which are supplemented by a formal Management
Response to evaluation recommendations.
91
2.3 OPEV examines and validates a wide range of Bank activities, including Project Completion
Reports and undertakes project-level evaluations on a sample of operations. It also undertakes
policy and program evaluations at sector and country levels, as well as thematic studies, for
example on internal Bank processes such as Decentralization. OPEV’s evaluations are
routinely published on the Bank’s external website, and disseminated electronically and in
hard copy, ensuring public access to evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations.
OPEV evaluations are an important component of corporate processes such as ADF reviews.
2.4 OPEV is an active member of the Evaluation Cooperation Group (ECG) established to
harmonize procedures, promote joint evaluation and share best practice across the evaluation
offices of the MDBs. OPEV has recently been restructured and had its staffing upgraded in
order to efficiency tackle an evaluation program which is growing in line with the Bank’s
increasingly complex policy agenda and increasing scale of operations.
3
The Independent Review Mechanism (IRM):
3.1 The IRM was established by the Boards’ Resolution of 30 June 2004 and reports directly to
the Bank’s Board of Directors. It has been operational since 2006 with establishment of the
Compliance Review and Mediation Unit (CRMU) to administer the IRM. CRMU currently
employs three professionals and two support staff and its Roster of Experts comprises 3
external experts, who are called upon to conduct compliance reviews.
3.2 As of July 2009, CRMU has received four complaints, including for the Bujagali
Hydropower and Interconnection project. A further three complaints have been registered in
2009, which are at either problem-solving stage or at an initial responses stage.
3.3 This indicates increased awareness about the IRM and its contribution to enhancing the
effectiveness of the Bank’s operations. The CRMU has developed an Outreach Strategy for
sensitizing stakeholders and civil society about its existence and procedures. The strategy,
which is already being implemented, includes reaching project affected people and civil
society via printed media and web as well as workshops. It also organizes seminars for Bank
staff at HQ and field offices, including sensitizing all new staff about the IRM through the
Bank’s on-boarding program.
3.4 As the Bank’s operations increase, especially with financing of larger and complex
infrastructure projects, the capacity of the IRM will be enhanced in tandem. CRMU proposes
to increase its staffing in 2010 and will continue to monitor its capacity going forward.
4
The Ethics Officer (EO):
4.1 The primary function of the EO is to provide impartial confidential advice as well as
guidance to Management and staff on matters pertaining to ethics and conduct of the Bank’s
staff in the carrying out of their duties.
4.2 The EO’s duties include clarifying conflict of interest concerns, assisting staff in making full
disclosure of such conflicts, and providing guidance on ethical issues involving the Bank’s
Rules and Regulations and Code of Conduct. The principal aim is to provide assistance in
resolving ethical matters in a manner that contributes to the good governance of the Bank and
helps to maintain its reputation for probity, integrity, and impartiality.
92
4.3 The EO is also responsible for advising and assisting in the development of a framework and
guidelines which sets out acceptable standards of conduct as well as the administration and
interpretation of the Staff Code of Conduct.
4.4 The scope of the EO’s functions is limited to staff members and does not extend to Elected
Officers, who are covered by a separate framework. The EO acts independently of any
official, department, office or other organizational unit of the Bank, although, for
administrative purposes, the EO reports to the Chief Operating Officer of the Bank.
93
Annex 4: GCI Scenarios36
Scenario 1 - GCI Scenarios assuming 8% Paid-In Capital and 8 years encashment
100%
GCI
RCUR
Gearing
Leverage
150%
GCI
RCUR
Gearing
Leverage
200%
GCI
RCUR
Gearing
Leverage
250%
GCI
RCUR
Gearing
Leverage
300%
GCI
RCUR
Gearing
Leverage
2009 2010
67% 78%
48% 70%
91% 109%
2011
81%
43%
76%
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
86% 92% 99% 103% 106% 109% 109% 113% 115%
48% 53%
58%
63%
68%
72%
76% 81% 85%
89% 101% 114% 121% 130% 139% 146% 154% 158%
2009 2010
67% 78%
48% 70%
91% 109%
2011
79%
35%
64%
2012
83%
39%
74%
2013
87%
43%
85%
2014
92%
48%
95%
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
95% 97% 98% 98% 102% 105%
51%
55%
59%
62%
66%
69%
100% 108% 115% 121% 128% 131%
2009 2010
67% 77%
48% 70%
91% 109%
2011
77%
29%
55%
2012
79%
33%
63%
2013
83%
37%
72%
2014
86%
40%
81%
2015
88%
43%
86%
2016
89%
46%
92%
2017
90%
49%
98%
2018 2019 2020
90% 93% 96%
52%
55%
58%
103% 109% 112%
2009 2010
67% 77%
48% 70%
91% 109%
2011
76%
26%
48%
2012
77%
29%
56%
2013
79%
32%
63%
2014
81%
35%
71%
2015
82%
37%
75%
2016
83%
40%
80%
2017
83%
43%
86%
2018
82%
45%
90%
2019
86%
48%
95%
2020
88%
50%
98%
2009 2010
67% 77%
48% 70%
91% 109%
2011
74%
22%
43%
2012
74%
25%
49%
2013
75%
28%
56%
2014
77%
30%
63%
2015
77%
33%
66%
2016
77%
35%
71%
2017
77%
38%
76%
2018
76%
40%
80%
2019
79%
42%
85%
2020
82%
44%
87%
36
The projected strategic limit ratios are subject to changes linked to the continuous updating of the portfolio, financial statements
and assumptions.
94
Scenario 2 - GCI Scenarios assuming 6% Paid-In Capital and 8 years encashment
100%
GCI
RCUR
Gearing
Leverage
150%
GCI
RCUR
Gearing
Leverage
200%
GCI
RCUR
Gearing
Leverage
250%
GCI
RCUR
Gearing
Leverage
300%
GCI
RCUR
Gearing
Leverage
2009 2010
67% 78%
48% 70%
91% 109%
2011
82%
43%
76%
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
88% 95% 102% 108% 112% 115% 116% 119% 122%
48% 53%
58%
63%
68%
72%
76% 81% 85%
88% 101% 115% 121% 131% 140% 148% 155% 159%
2009 2010
67% 78%
48% 70%
91% 109%
2011
80%
35%
63%
2012
85%
39%
74%
2013
91%
43%
84%
2014
97%
47%
95%
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
101% 104% 106% 106% 110% 112%
51%
55%
59%
62%
66%
69%
101% 109% 116% 123% 129% 133%
2009 2010
67% 78%
48% 70%
91% 109%
2011
79%
29%
54%
2012
83%
33%
63%
2013
87%
36%
72%
2014
92%
40%
82%
2015
95%
43%
86%
2016
97%
46%
93%
2017
98%
49%
99%
2018 2019 2020
98% 102% 105%
52%
55%
58%
105% 111% 114%
2009 2010
67% 78%
48% 70%
91% 109%
2011
78%
25%
48%
2012
80%
28%
55%
2013
84%
31%
63%
2014
88%
34%
71%
2015
90%
37%
75%
2016
91%
40%
81%
2017
92%
43%
87%
2018
92%
45%
92%
2019
95%
48%
97%
2020
98%
50%
100%
2009 2010
67% 78%
48% 70%
91% 109%
2011
77%
22%
42%
2012
78%
25%
49%
2013
81%
28%
56%
2014
84%
30%
63%
2015
85%
33%
67%
2016
86%
35%
72%
2017
86%
38%
77%
2018
86%
40%
81%
2019
89%
42%
86%
2020
92%
44%
89%
95
Scenario 3 - GCI Scenarios assuming 4% Paid-In Capital and 8 years encashment
100%
GCI
RCUR
Gearing
Leverage
150%
GCI
RCUR
Gearing
Leverage
200%
GCI
RCUR
Gearing
Leverage
250%
GCI
RCUR
Gearing
Leverage
300%
GCI
RCUR
Gearing
Leverage
2009 2010
67% 77%
48% 70%
91% 109%
2011
82%
42%
75%
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
89% 98% 106% 112% 117% 121% 123% 127% 128%
47% 53%
58%
63%
67%
72%
76% 81% 85%
88% 101% 115% 122% 132% 141% 149% 157% 161%
2009 2010
67% 77%
48% 70%
91% 109%
2011
82%
34%
63%
2012
88%
38%
73%
2013
95%
43%
84%
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
102% 107% 111% 115% 116% 119% 121%
47%
51%
55%
59%
62%
66%
69%
96% 101% 110% 118% 124% 131% 135%
2009 2010
67% 77%
48% 70%
91% 109%
2011
81%
29%
54%
2012
86%
32%
63%
2013
92%
36%
72%
2014
99%
40%
82%
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
103% 106% 109% 109% 113% 115%
43%
46%
49%
52%
55%
58%
87% 94% 101% 107% 113% 116%
2009 2010
67% 77%
48% 70%
91% 109%
2011
80%
25%
47%
2012
84%
28%
55%
2013
90%
31%
63%
2014
95%
34%
72%
2015
99%
37%
76%
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
101% 103% 104% 107% 110%
40%
43%
45%
48%
50%
82% 88% 93% 99% 102%
2009 2010
67% 77%
48% 70%
91% 109%
2011
79%
22%
42%
2012
82%
25%
49%
2013
87%
27%
56%
2014
92%
30%
64%
2015
95%
32%
68%
2016
97%
35%
73%
96
2017
98%
37%
78%
2018
98%
40%
83%
2019 2020
102% 105%
42%
44%
88% 91%
Scenario 4 - GCI Scenarios assuming 2% Paid-In Capital and 8 years encashment
100%
GCI
RCUR
Gearing
Leverage
150%
GCI
RCUR
Gearing
Leverage
200%
GCI
RCUR
Gearing
Leverage
250%
GCI
RCUR
Gearing
Leverage
300%
GCI
RCUR
Gearing
Leverage
2009 2010
67% 77%
48% 70%
91% 109%
2011
83%
42%
75%
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
91% 101% 111% 118% 124% 129% 131% 135% 136%
47% 52%
58%
62%
67%
72%
76%
81%
85%
88% 101% 115% 122% 133% 143% 151% 159% 163%
2009 2010
67% 77%
48% 70%
91% 109%
2011
83%
34%
62%
2012
90%
38%
73%
2013
99%
42%
84%
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
108% 115% 120% 125% 127% 130% 132%
47%
51%
55%
58%
62%
66%
69%
96% 102% 111% 119% 126% 133% 137%
2009 2010
67% 77%
48% 70%
91% 109%
2011
82%
28%
53%
2012
89%
32%
63%
2013
98%
36%
72%
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
106% 112% 117% 121% 123% 127% 128%
39%
43%
46%
49%
52%
55%
58%
82%
88%
95% 102% 109% 115% 118%
2009 2010
67% 77%
48% 70%
91% 109%
2011
82%
25%
47%
2012
88%
28%
55%
2013
96%
31%
63%
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
104% 110% 114% 118% 119% 123% 125%
34%
37%
40%
43%
45%
48%
50%
72%
77%
83%
90%
95% 101% 104%
2009 2010
67% 77%
48% 70%
91% 109%
2011
82%
22%
41%
2012
88%
24%
49%
2013
95%
27%
56%
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
102% 107% 111% 115% 116% 119% 121%
30%
32%
35%
37%
40%
42%
44%
64%
68%
74%
80%
85%
90%
93%
97
Annex 5: GCI-V Share Subscriptions under 4 Step Process
Regional
Members
% of
Regional
Shares
(Ini-GCI-IV)
Shares
Allocated
in Step 1
(1)
Relative
Reemptive
Shares not
Supplementary
Rights of
Total GCIAllocated in
Allocation in
Members with
V
Step 1
Step 3
Allocations in
Allocation
(GCI-V)
(3)* 44,583
Step 1
(1) + (4)
(2)
(4)
(3)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
Algeria
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Cent.Afr. Rep
Chad
Comoros
Congo
Cote d'Ivoire
Dem.Rep.Con
go
Djibouti
Egypt
Eq.Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia,The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Morocco
6.308
1.936
0.324
3.554
0.760
0.479
1.537
0.155
0.119
0.184
0.037
0.806
7.501
15,057
4,495
751
8,252
1,764
3,569
1,871
-
2.561
0.128
8.522
0.316
0.265
2.650
2.521
0.221
3.393
0.760
0.056
2.416
0.253
0.471
6.086
1.079
0.599
0.743
0.518
1.074
5.507
19,789
89
6,154
514
7,879
1,765
5,611
588
14,132
2,506
1,726
2,494
12,788
7.836
2.405
0.402
4.415
0.944
3,493
1,072
179
1,968
421
1.909
851
1.001
446
1,112
359
294
501
86
17,417
6,474
322
10.587
0.393
4,720
175
3.293
1,468
0.275
4.216
0.944
123
1,879
421
3.002
0.315
1,338
140
7.561
1.341
3,371
598
0.923
412
1.334
6.842
595
3,050
615
5,854
129
1,277
1,391
1,203
98
18,550
5,567
930
10,220
2,185
4,420
2,317
24,509
264
7,622
637
9,758
2,186
6,949
728
17,503
3,104
2,138
3,089
15,838
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Sao Tome &
Principe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Somalia
South Africa
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Tunisia
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Total
Regionals
1.049
0.564
0.512
14.792
0.226
2,436
1,309
34,347
525
0.148
1.706
0.110
0.506
0.217
3.497
1.074
0.553
1.420
0.336
2.324
0.958
2.152
3.858
3,961
255
51,875
1,283
3,297
5,396
1,768
4,996
8,958
100.000
232,200
1.303
0.700
581
312
18.376
0.281
8,193
125
2.119
0.136
945
61
4.344
1,937
0.686
1.764
306
786
2.887
1,287
2.673
4.793
1,192
2,137
4,906
316
53,812
1,589
4,083
6,683
1,768
6,188
11,095
100.000
44,583
276,783
1,188
344
1,223
592
2,892
853
457
44,583
Source: ADB Financial Statistics
99
3,017
1,621
42,540
650