Download John Stuart Mill Utilitarianism

JOHN STUART MILL
UTILITARIANISM
Introduction to Ethical Theory
Benjamin Visscher Hole IV
Hedonistic Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism: “An act is right
if and only if (and because) it
would (if performed) likely
produce at least as high a
utility (net overall balance of
welfare) as would any other
alternative action one might
perform instead.”
Hedonism: Pleasure is the
one and only intrinsic
value and pain is the one
and only intrinsic disvalue.
(Timmons, 8)
Bentham is a “Quantitative Hedonist”
Mill is a “Qualitative Hedonist”
Recapitulation of Bentham’s HU
Features of Bentham’s HU
Bentham makes a felicific
calculus for maximizing
utils. On this view:
Sentience is the source
of moral value.
2. Pleasures are
homogenous with
respect to value.
3. Pleasures are given.
1.
Problems with Bentham’s HU
1.
2.
3.
4.
Sentience is the source
of moral value.
Pleasures are
homogenous with
respect to value.
Distributive objection
Demandingness
a.
b.
Psychological
Substantive
(5. Pleasures are given / bad
pleasures objection.)
John Stuart Mill
(1806-1873)
Greatest happiness principle
“Actions are right in
proportion as they tend to
promote happiness; wrong as
they tend to produce the
reverse of happiness.”
−
The happiness of all affected
parties counts equally.
−
Happiness: Pleasure and the
absence of pain.
John Stuart Mill
(1806-1873)
• Child of James Mill, who was
a close friend of Bentham
• Raised as a living exhibit of
the power of utilitarianism
• A celebrity as a child, touring
Europe to defend
utilitarianism
• Read Greek at three …
Mill has a mental breakdown at age 20:
“
[I] had what might truly be called an
object in life; to be a reformer of the world. My
conception of my own happiness was entirely
identified with this object. . . .[I]t occurred to
me to put the question directly to myself:
"Suppose that all your objects in life were
realized; that all the changes in institutions
and opinions which you are looking forward
to, could be completely effected at this very
instant: would this be a great joy and
happiness to you?" And an irrepressible selfconsciousness distinctly answered, "No!" At
this my heart sank within me: the whole
foundation on which my life was constructed
fell down.
(From Mill’s Autobiography:
http://www.utilitarianism.com/millauto/five.html
)
Mill’s Hedonistic Utilitarianism
“the summum bonum, or, …
the foundation of morality”
What is value?
Mill’s Hedonistic Utilitarianism
“… pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things
desirable as ends; and that all desirable things … are
desirable either for pleasure inherent in themselves or as
a means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention
of pain”
Intrinsic vs. Instrumental value
The Fetishism Argument
The Reductionist Move
The Fetishism Argument
Worries
• Hedonism: pleasure is the only
1.
“bad pleasures”
objection
2.
“hedonism monster”
objection
intrinsic value.
• All other apparent values are
only, at best, instrumentally
valuable towards pleasure.
• The fetishism argument claims
that if you deny the above
bullet point, you’re fetishizing
some instrumental value as an
intrinsic one.
What are higher pleasures?
“Human beings have
faculties more elevated than
the animal appetites and,
when once made conscious
of them, do not regard
anything as happiness which
does not include their
gratification”
Mill Reformulates Bentham’s
Hedonism
Qualitative vs. Quantitative
i.
Higher pleasures are qualitatively
better than lower pleasures.
ii.
Higher pleasures are immeasurable
and therefore incommensurable
with one another.
iii.
No matter how much lower
pleasure you have, it is not as good
as a higher pleasure.
Possible Objection
“Doctrine worthy of a swine”
Mill’s Response:
The HP vs. LP Distinction
Higher Pleasures
(human/intellectual)
vs.
Lower Pleasures
(animal/bodily)
“It is better to be a human being
dissatisfied than a pig satisfied;
better to be Socrates dissatisfied than
a fool satisfied”
The Pig
CONTENTMENT: Lower Pleasures
HAPPINESS:
No Higher Pleasures
Socrates
No Lower Pleasures
Higher Pleasures
Higher Pleasures
(human/intellectual)
vs.
Lower Pleasures
(animal/bodily)
“It is better to be a human being
dissatisfied than a pig satisfied;
better to be Socrates dissatisfied than
a fool satisfied”
Discussion Question
Do you agree with Mill?
Higher Pleasures
(human/intellectual)
vs.
Lower Pleasures
(animal/bodily)
The Argument from Value Measurement
Another problem for HU?
1) Utilitarianism is true only if there is a
precise unit of measurement that can
determine the value of an action’s results.
2) There is no such unit of measurement.
3) Therefore, utilitarianism is false.
The Competent Judges Test
Mill’s case for the HP vs. LP Distinction
i.
Competent judges are people who have
experienced both higher and lower
pleasures.
ii.
They choose higher pleasures over the
qualitatively different lower pleasures
because the higher ones are qualitatively
better.
iii.
If someone chooses lower pleasures, he is
not a competent judge (has not fully
experienced the higher pleasure).
Discussion Question
Mill’s case for the HP vs. LP Distinction
Can the ‘competence’ of the judges
be decided in a non-circular way?
Does Mill’s case for the distinction
beg the question at hand?
Mill responds to critics …
Objection
Demandingness
“there is not time, previous
to action, for calculating
and weighing the effects”
Response
“The answer to the
objection is that there has
been ample time, namely
the whole past duration of
the human species”
Mill responds to critics …
Objection
1) The correct moral theory
will never require us to
commit serious injustices.
2) Utilitarianism sometimes
requires us to commit
serious injustices.
_____________________
3) Therefore, utilitarianism
is not the correct moral
theory.
Utilitarianism tells us to perform
morally repugnant acts because it
asks us to privilege the aggregate
good over a just distribution.
Rule Consequentialism
“RC

An action is right if and only if (and because) it is
permitted by a rule whose associated acceptance
value is at least as high as the acceptance value of
any other rule applying to the situation” (Timmons, 10).
This seems to solve the problem ...
Rules and Justice
Imperfect duties
Rules in which the particular occasion of performing is left to our choice.
•
Example: Charity
Perfect duties
Rules in virtue of which a correlative right resides in some person or persons.
•
Example: Property
Justice corresponds to our perfect duties.
The content of our perfect duties is fixed by the principle of utility.
The Collapse of Rule Consequentialism
Does RC admit
exception cases?
If yes
If no
Distribution Objection
Rule Worship
Proof of the principle of utility
Questions of ultimate ends are incapable of demonstrative
proof. But considerations may be given in their favor.
Mill's argument
1.
Questions about ends are questions about what is desirable.
2.
The only proof that something is desirable is that it is desired.
3.
The only thing people desire for its own sake is happiness.
4.
Therefore, happiness is the only thing that is desirable for its
own sake.
Mill’s “Proof”
Mill’s Empiricism
a.“Visible” =df “able to be seen”
b.“Desirable” =df “able to be
desired”
c.“valuable” =df “what we
desire”
Quote
“No reason can be given
why the general happiness
is desirable, except that
each person, so far as he
believes it to be attainable,
desires his own happiness”
Mill’s “Proof”
Mill’s Empiricism
a.“Visible” =df “able to be seen”
b.“Desirable”
desired”
=df
“able to be
c.“valuable” =df “what we
desire”
Upshots
ACCORDING TO MILL:
 Virtue is instrumentally
valuable …
 Virtue is instrumentally
valuable a fortiori when it is
valued as an end in itself, i.e.,
as an intrinsic value.
So what can Mill say about the
Deluded Sadist?
Mill’s “Proof”
Mill’s Empiricism
a.“Visible” =df “able to be seen”
b.“Desirable” =df “able to be
desired”
c.“valuable” =df “what we
desire”
G.E. Moore’s Objection
“Well, the fallacy in this step is so
obvious, that it is quite wonderful
how Mill failed to see it. The fact is
that 'desirable' does not mean 'able
to be desired' as 'visible' means
'able to be seen.' The desirable
means simply what ought to be
desired or deserves to be desired;
just as the detestable means not
what can but what ought to be
detested and the damnable what
deserves to be damned...Is it
merely a tautology when the
Prayer Book talks of good desires?
Are not bad desires also possible?”
(Principia Ethica, §40)
Mill’s “Proof”
Mill’s Empiricism
a.“Visible” =df “able to be seen”
G.E. Moore’s Objection
THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY
 Value cannot be defined in
b.“Desirable” =df “able to be
desired”
c.“valuable” =df “what we
desire”
naturalistic terms (e.g.,
pleasure, what we desire).
 Any naturalistic definition of
value is not true “by
definition.”
 Whether the definition is true
is an open question.
 So whether “value is what we
desire” is also an open
question.
Comparison
Problems with Bentham’s HU
1.
2.
3.
4.
Sentience is the source of
moral value.
Pleasures are
homogenous with respect
to value.
Distributive objection
Demandingness
a.
b.
Psychological
Substantive
(5. Pleasures are given / bad pleasures
objection.)
Discussion Question
How does Mill’s revised
version of Bentham’s HU
stand up to the criticisms?