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ARNOLD Was Benedict Arnold a scoundrel? Viewpoint: Yes. Benedict Arnold was an avaricious and egocentric traitor who acted out of injured pride after he was censured for malfeasance and passed over for promotion. Viewpoint: No. Benedict Arnold was an honorable man who increasingly felt that the Revolution was being led by false Patriots; he switched his loyalty to the British in order to preserve his reputation as a gentleman. Benedict Arnold's participation in the Revolutionary War (1775-1783) provided him with a golden opportunity to obtain fame; instead, he achieved infamy by betraying the Patriot cause. Indeed, his name is synonymous with treason. Yet, considering Arnold's enormous devotion and sacrifice for the American cause early in the war, his villainy is both puzzling and shocking. He helped capture Fort Ticonderoga and St. Johns and made a brave, yet futile, assault on Quebec in 1775 that left him partially crippled for life; he successfully stymied General Sir Guy Carleton's efforts to invade the Northern provinces in 1776; and he played an indispensable role in the Patriot victory at Saratoga the following year. This distinguished service earned him the rank of major general in the Continental Army, an appointment as commander of Philadelphia and later to West Point, and the utmost respect of George Washington, who did much to further Arnold's military career. Why, then, in the face of these achievements, did Arnold join the enemy? The answer to this question will never be known for certain, for as Mark Twain observed, "a wee little part of a person's life are his acts and words. His real life is led in his head." Of course, this fact has not dissuaded historians from thoroughly discrediting Arnold's explanation—that he was profoundly disturbed by the French alliance and in despair over the American cause—and offering their own conflicting conclusions. The different interpretations of Arnold's motivations ultimately center on the enigmatic quality of his character. Traditional accounts depict Arnold as an arrogant, ambitious, and mercenary miscreant who lacked public virtue or dedication to the American cause. When these rewards did not come fast enough for him, and when a court martial reprimanded him for using his position to enrich himself, Arnold offered his secrets and services to the British in return for a large sum of money. More recently, historians have taken a more apologetic stand on Arnold's treason. Instead of a self-serving scoundrel, they portray him as a superpatriot so dedicated to the Revolution and its republican principles that when he perceived an overwhelming lack of public support among Americans engaged in the war effort, he switched sides in order to protest the sorry state of relations between the army and American society. He hoped that his extreme act of political defiance would be a catalyst for the collapse of the American cause. If this goal was truly Arnold's motivation, it horribly backfired as Americans, disgusted with his act of treason, rallied behind the Revolution. 9 Viewpoint: Yes. Benedict Arnold was an avaricious and egocentric traitor who acted out of injured pride after he was censured for malfeasance and passed over for promotion. It is interesting that George Washington and Benedict Arnold were the two Revolutionary War generals most alike in daring and determination. For several years Washington esteemed Arnold as one of his best and bravest generals. Famed for his incredible march on Quebec in 1775, Arnold later led such a spirited defense of Lake Champlain that British general Sir Guy Carleton chose to return to Canada. In 1777 Arnold played a major role in America's victory at Saratoga. Yet, a quarrelsome and mercenary nature raised a host of critics, in Congress and out, and by 1779 he was conspiring with the British. The result was a plot to betray West Point (a strategic fort on the Hudson River) to the enemy. Recent biographers have debunked myths "explaining" Arnold's treason. There is no evidence he was cruel to others as a youth, nor a deserter in the French and Indian War (1754-1763). His pre-Revolutionary War career is that of a man of enterprise and honesty. In 1775 his commitment to public virtue and the American cause appeared genuine. Yet, evidence suggests that he began to use his rank in the Continental Army for personal profit and fame. Reverses in his military career nurtured a self-serving and mercenary character that eventually embraced treason. By 1780 Washington had become a symbol of patriotism; Arnold, the epitome of treachery. Born in 1741 in Norwich, Connecticut, Arnold was a precocious, if aggressive, youth. Arnold's father enjoyed success as a merchant, but he lapsed into alcoholism and eventual financial ruin. His death in 1761 prevented Arnold from attending Yale College. Thereafter, Arnold devoted a great part of his life to attempting to regain his family's name and his lost inheritance. As an apothecary and merchant, he worked diligently and by 1775 he became a prominent figure in Connecticut. At the same time, according to Paul J. Sanborn in The American Revolution, 1775-1783: An Encyclopedia (1993), he had built a reputation as "a proud, vain, willful man, extremely sensitive to criticism and unrepentant for his actions." Indeed, Arnold was quick to take offense and defend his honor by either legal suits or dueling. In the early years of the Anglo-American crisis, Arnold so disapproved of Britain's colonial policies that he joined New Haven's young 10 radicals and became their leader. Upon hearing news of the skirmish between British redcoats and militia at Lexington in April 1775, he rallied the governor's Footguards and marched them to Massachusetts. This aggressive action signified the beginning of a career that would mark Arnold as the Continental Army's most effective battlefield commander. On his way to Boston, Arnold learned of the vulnerability of Ticonderoga—a fort of major strategic importance on Lake Champlain and holding scores of cannons. The Massachusetts legislature authorized him to attempt its capture, but he was forced to share a command with Ethan Allen, whose Green Mountain Boys had been sent by Connecticut for the same purpose. Although both groups would claim the credit for Ticonderoga's capture, Arnold gained much recognition. His reputation ascended further when he led an army on a march through Maine and Canada and assaulted Quebec City in late December 1775. While the Americans ultimately withdrew, Arnold's leadership and resourcefulness impressed Washington. Assigned to Horatio Gates's Northern Army, Arnold—by virtue of his experience as a merchant sea captain—was ordered to prevent the British from using Lake Champlain in a southward invasion. Hastily constructing a fleet, Arnold gave battle to a British flotilla at Valcour Island in October 1776. While his outnumbered force had to retreat, Arnold's boldness and shrewd tactics frustrated British plans and delayed Major General John Burgoyne's march for six months—setting him up for a defeat at Saratoga in October 1777. In that clash Arnold—though wounded in the leg—broke through the British entrenchments. By 1778 Washington held no battlefield commander in greater esteem than Arnold, who, in turn, considered himself Washington's protege. Yet, within a year, Arnold was betraying both his country and friend to the British government they supposedly condemned. Historians have long debated why this American Icarus fell from grace. Some argue Arnold's quest for British gold followed, and did not cause, his decision to defect. Execrable though his treason was, they maintain it stemmed from frustration and a thwarted idealism. Revolutionary historian James Kirby Martin argues that Arnold's actions were based on a growing anger at the betrayal of republican ideals by the men supposedly responsible for them: the Continental Congress and state leaders. As evidence, Arnold could point to the treatment afforded capable leaders such as himself. Though he constantly put his life on the line, Arnold found his achievements ignored or twisted by a whimsical Congress, which promoted lesser men over neglected heroes. He H I S T O R Y IN D I S P U T E , V O L U M E 12: THE A M E R I C A N R E V O L U T I O N was hounded by "villains" accusing him of financial manipulations and slighted by powerful politicians. Revolutionary ideals of independence, fair play, and individual striving had been perverted to deny him honor and even the repayment of monies he had spent on the war. This situation made a mockery out of the republican idealism of the American cause. Clearly, republicanism had failed, and American success would prove ruinous for colonials as well as England. There is some validity in this approach. Arnold had carelessly revealed his plans to take Ticonderoga to a fellow officer. This event led to Connecticut's authorization of Ethan Allen and several ambitious merchant/politicians (Major John Brown and Colonel James Easton) to take the fort. Later, Brown and Easton downplayed to authorities Arnold's role in the battle. And if Arnold's epic march on Quebec finally ended in failure, that was hardly his fault given that a leg wound confined him to a hospital during much of the siege. Also, Congress caused exasperating delays in repaying him for expenses incurred in supplying his troops and then slighted him in awarding promotions. Even Arnold's remarkable performance at Valcour Island was depreciated: enemies criticized his loss of eleven ships and his failure to keep Crown Point out of Carleton's hands. Despite Arnold's valiant role at Saratoga, General Horatio Gates relieved him of command and later depreciated his role. Still, Washington rewarded Arnold for his services by appointing him military commander in Philadelphia while recovering from wounds received at Saratoga. Unbeknownst to Washington, he had placed Arnold in a politically hostile environment. Joseph Reed, the state council president, made Arnold a target for all those fearing military control in the new republic. In turn, Arnold's abrupt demeanor brought him citywide censure and accusations of malfeasance. Arnold demanded a court martial for vindication. Before the court martial returned a verdict, he had made his first overtures to the British. Arnold's patience was at an end; retribution must follow. All these facts cannot absolve Arnold of blame, however. He brought much of his misery upon himself. Arnold hungered for recognition and status, and when war came he linked it to his own fame and reputation, demanding that his achievements be duly recognized. Yet, to always demand one's just due is naive. By expecting a gentleman's code of strict accountability, he insured his own frustration. As the Canadian campaign wound down, Arnold failed to keep Massachusetts apprised of his efforts. That fact, and his abrasive treatment of Easton and Brown RISK AND REWARD Th& following is a decoded tetter from American general Benedict Arnold to British major John Andre, dated 23 May 1779. In it, Arnold demonstrates his willingness to cooperate with the British by offering intelligence concerning American political, military, and diplomatic affairs. The letter also reveals the monetary motivations behind Arnold's decision to loin %w wwmy. Our friend Stansbury acquaints me that the proposals made by him in my name are agreeable to Sir Henry Clinton, and that Sir Henry engages to answer my warmest expeotations for; arty ;stivfces rtmtersA As I esteem the interest of America and Great Britain inseparable Sir Henry may depend on my exertions and intelligence. It will be impossible to cooperate unless there is a mutual confidence. Sir Henry shall be convinced on every occasion that his i$ not misplaotC Gen. Washington and ilia army move to the North River as soon as forage can be obtained. Congress have given up Charles Town if attempted. They are in want of arms, ammunition and men to defend it. 3 or 4 thousand militia Is tha most ctn bf mustered to fight on my emergency. Seizing papers is impossible. Their contents can be known from a member of Congress, 4 montis since, the French Minister required Congress to vest their agents with powers to negotiate peace with Britain. The time is elapsed In disputing if they shall demand independency with their ortgtert terms or insist on the addition of Newfoundland. No decision, no measure taken to prevent the depreciation of money; no foreign loan obtained. France refused to beeome surtfy; no encouragement from Spain. The French fleet has conditional orders to return to this continent. They depend on great part of their provision torn hence. A transport originally a 64 and a foreign 28 guns are daily expected here for pro* vision* I will cooperate when an opportunity offers, and as life and everything Is at stake \ wilt expect some otrtainty, my property here secure and a revenue equivalent to the risk and service done. I cannot promise success; I will deserve it. Inform me what I may expect. Could I know Sir Henry's intentions ht should never be at a loss for intelligence. 1 shall expect a particular answer thro our Mend Stansbury* Source: Carl Van Doren, Secret History of the American Revolution (Mow Ywte Wm Wft J&M1-4&. (who became bitter opponents), reveal a political blindness. According to Willard M. Wallace in Traitorous Hero: The Life and Fortunes of Benedict Arnold (1954), Arnold lacked the ability to "recognize his own faults, the moral stature to forgive or overlook slights, or the patience to endure persecution." Constant agitation and demands for courts of inquiry reveal a pride and lack of self-control that finally destroyed him. HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE A M E R I C A N R E V O L U T I O N 11 Simply, he "could never rise above the personal issue." His military exploits in Canada are a case in point. When the Americans abandoned their campaign, significant amounts of goods taken from Montreal merchants disappeared. After Arnold laid the blame on Colonel Moses Hazen, the latter demanded a court martial. When Arnold's chief witness was not permitted to testify, Arnold exploded, prompting the court to demand his arrest. Although Gates refused this request, the episode revealed Arnold's sense of persecution. Shortly thereafter, his Ticonderoga nemesis, Brown, hurled various charges against him: from misconduct to incompetence. Regulations required Gates to forward these to Congress. Meanwhile, another figure from that campaign, Hazen, triumphed when a military court ruled that Arnold had slandered him. Even his courage at Saratoga led to grief. Once friendly with Gates, Arnold became involved in a growing feud with him. Gates was likely jealous of a potential rival and was irritated at Arnold's opposition to his strategy at Saratoga. However, Arnold's blind friendship with Gates's critics reveals a political naivete on his part. While not denying Arnold's bravery, Gates's battle report gave him little credit. Given Gates's defensive strategy, which Arnold ignored, Gates might have thought it warranted. Anyway, he disliked Arnold's tendency to disregard orders—though the latter always expected obedience to his commands. Finally, Gates had admirers in Congress. In short, by 1778 many leaders had wounded Arnold's pride. Perhaps most insulting of all was the Continental Congress's 1777 decision to pass over Arnold in its military promotions. Most legislators considered him deserving. Yet, Congressmen, as leaders of a tenuous coalition still lacking a sense of nationalism, had to take state sensibilities into account. To a large extent Arnold was denied promotion to major general because Connecticut already had its quota of officers at that rank. James Thomas Flexner in The Traitor and the Spy: Benedict Arnold and John Andre (1953) observes that more-radical Congressmen also feared that promotion by seniority "might end in a dictatorship . . . making the army independent of legislatures." It was Arnold's misfortune to be caught up in this controversy, and his protests aggravated many both in and out of Congress. When at last he was promoted, Congress—irritated at his apparent challenge of their authority—did not restore his seniority. Angrily, Arnold resigned his commission in July 1777 but asked that it be suspended so he might take part in the Battle of Saratoga. One may regret Congress's decision (Washington did); yet, it stemmed from a desire for union. However, Arnold saw it as weakness, 12 or worse, a hatred for him. Of course, anyone mistreated may protest or resign. Ultimately, Patriots must choose to put the larger cause before themselves. Arnold could not, and nursed his resentment. Wallace believes the slight was "an implied impeachment on his character." As historian Martin notes in "Benedict Arnold's Treason as Political Protest": when "Arnold started putting more emphasis upon personal honor than on the pursuit of liberty . . . his change in outlook clearly appears during the period of the promotion controversy in 1777." Arnold's insulted vanity also played on his other character flaw—a growing avarice and willingness to use his rank to feed this hunger. If "victim" he must be, Arnold would miss no opportunity to obtain his due. He had come to despise politicians, and his anger with Congress for failing to supply necessities to the troops was unfeigned. Martin suggests Arnold sincerely believed in offering soldiers better pay or pensions. Yet, Congress was painfully short of money. A strong government—which Arnold valued—might have commandeered the goods, but the tenuous federation that existed could only request them from the states. In addition, with a shortage of funds, Congress was hesitant to make blanket reimbursements, whatever the recipient's "honor." (Given his notorious self-indulgent lifestyle, Arnold experienced this hesitancy soon enough.) The fact that he was as generous with others as with himself made little difference. Arnold thought that any gentleman's claim for expenses, however ill supported, should be paid without question. So he seethed at Congress's examination (and reexamination) of his claims for money spent in Quebec and for the fleet on Lake Champlain. Arnold saw this development as further evidence of Congress's parsimony, disdain for him, and willingness to listen to cowardly detractors. Moreover, while some accusations of financial irregularity were false, his anger at Congress and its questions hid an avaricious egotism. Congress was unduly slow but hardly betrayed republican values by reviewing all claims carefully. Yet, to Arnold it was all "villainy." As he explained to Washington, "Having . . . become a cripple in the service of my country, I little expected to meet such ungrateful returns." Arnold's leg wound sustained at Saratoga required a long recovery. If Washington intended an easy assignment for him during recuperation, an appointment as military commander in Philadelphia was a great error. First, it gave Arnold a chance to become enamored of Peggy Shippen, the young and beautiful daughter of a Philadelphia Tory. He began wooing her in the summer of 1778, and they married in HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE A M E R I C A N R E V O L U T I O N April of the following year. According to Wallace, "Though marriage into one of Philadelphia's leading families brought Arnold great social status, in his pursuit of Peggy and his attempts to keep her in the style to which she was accustomed, he was forced to live far beyond his means. Hard-pressed, he developed a number of money-making schemes, most of them of a dubious character." Already hostile to the French alliance, Arnold now had Peggy to persuade him that America's cause was ill conceived and his services to it unappreciated. Thus, his Philadelphia command was a disaster waiting to unfold. Keeping peace among bitter political factions and maintaining ties with leaders jealous of national authority required high political skills—of which Arnold had none. Although some military men are deficient in political skills, Arnold was clueless. Indeed, few have been so self-obsessed and unaware of human relations. His clash with the Pennsylvania Council and Reed was a case in point. The latter took it upon himself to make Arnold a target for those suspicious of the military or a potential aristocracy. The clash ended in a list of charges against Arnold, who requested a court martial. If Congressional politicians were overly dutiful to Pennsylvania's complaints, they did find Arnold innocent save on two charges. Both concerned his avarice: that he had used public wagons to save personal property from capture and that he gave the Loyalist ship, Charming Nancy, permission to enter Philadelphia harbor without its cargo being confiscated. The latter action was all the more questionable since Arnold later obtained an interest in the ship. Washington was told to reprimand him (which he did, much to Arnold's mortification). In fact, Arnold was guilty of these, and perhaps other, crimes. Washington's language was a bit harsher than required by the military court but conveyed no lack of confidence in him. Indeed, Washington had already decided to offer Arnold command of the army's left wing. However, neither the verdict nor reprimand drove his protege into the enemy's arms, for Arnold had already contacted the British months before. Personal vanity and a growing appetite for money had done their work. The negotiations with Clinton—which Arnold initiated—are further evidence of his greed. Even if he changed sides on principle, it was reasonable to want some financial support. After all, he would lose his American property. Yet, Arnold spent the spring and summer of 1779 haggling over his price (demanding up to £20,000) as he fed the British bits of military information. Money was now the crucial objective. Indeed, if nothing had been said of West Point to that point, it was still true that Arnold had already committed treason "in his heart." His final betrayal, however, was a personal one: that of his close friend and mentor, Washington. The latter had been Arnold's staunch supporter; no one had done more to befriend him. Washington's only rebuke, in 1780, was in obedience to Congress. However, by then Arnold had already sold out the American cause. Later, Arnold wrote to Washington, the clear attempt of a guilty conscience to justify itself. Whether his plot included Washington's capture (historians disagree on this matter), nothing could have threatened Washington's defensive line—and perhaps even led to his capture—so much as the enemy seizure of West Point. Only a complete British victory could have repaired Arnold's reputation. Patriot virtue demanded that everyone must put the cause ahead of individual interests, success ahead of individual glory. An exaggerated ambition or financial greed must never eclipse the revolution. In the end, Washington's reputation grew because he understood this point; Arnold did not, and he reaped the contempt of later generations. -EVERETT W. KINDIG, MIDWESTERN STATE UNIVERSITY Viewpoint: No. Benedict Arnold was an honorable man who increasingly felt that the Revolution was being led by false Patriots; he switched his loyalty to the British in order to preserve his reputation as a gentleman. While Benedict Arnold's name is synonymous with the word traitor in American lore, such a tidy characterization conceals the complex and honorable reasons that motivated Arnold to break with the American cause and return his loyalty to Great Britain in 1780. In the early years of the Revolutionary War (17751783) Arnold emerged as a bold and courageous military leader who helped the fledgling republic secure critical victories against Britain. Despite the sacrifices and risks that Arnold and other military leaders endured in the name of republican virtue and honor, Arnold became increasingly disillusioned with a civilian government and a general populace who were unwilling to make a similar commitment to the revolutionary struggle. Arnold believed that experienced soldiers were not receiving the support or recognition they deserved because the Continental Congress dismissed them as a band HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE A M E R I C A N R E V O L U T I O N 13 of mercenaries who threatened civil society. After the Continental Congress failed to promote him and acknowledge his heroism, Arnold concluded that the American people and their government lacked the ability to attain the republican ideals of the Revolution. Arnold joined the British cause to protest the gap between revolutionary rhetoric and political reality and to disassociate his own reputation from such a dishonorable movement. Arnold's repudiation of the American war effort did not happen overnight or because of some preexisting character flaw. Instead, the transformation happened incrementally after repeated skirmishes with an unsupportive public and government. The growing tensions between the American colonies and Britain during the 1770s introduced Arnold to military service and the republican ideas of virtue and honor that provided the intellectual basis for American independence. The Crown's revenue measures directly affected Arnold as a merchant, and he quickly sided with the Patriot cause. When hostilities broke out between British troops and the residents of Lexington and Concord, Massachusetts, in 1775, communities throughout the Thirteen Colonies organized themselves into militia companies to support the Patriot effort. The city of New Haven selected Arnold to lead its militia, reflecting the level of respect and admiration that he engendered in his adopted home. Upon his appointment, Arnold demonstrated his commitment to revolutionary ideals by leading the New Haven Footguards to Massachusetts to reinforce the militia companies. Overnight, the inexperienced Arnold had been transformed from merchant to military leader. The early years of the American Revolution illustrated the gap between military leadership 14 and civilian support that produced Arnold's eventual disillusionment. When Arnold led the Footguards from Connecticut to Massachusetts, the decision to declare independence was still one full year away, with popular and political opinion in the colonies equally divided. In the meantime, the military response to Britain was undertaken by a ragtag group of militiamen in need of coordination, leadership, and a clear mission. From 1775 until 1778 Arnold engaged in a series of daring military actions that enabled the American forces to gain strength and confidence in preparation for the decisive battles they would face later. Arnold's successes led to his rapid rise in the American military from the rank of captain to major general. As he advanced the American cause, he increasingly believed that the Continental Congress undercut the war effort by failing to support the republic's military leaders. Arnold realized that American independence was not attainable if civilian leaders were not as committed to the struggle as their military counterparts. Arnold's first encounter with military success and civilian disappointment occurred in May 1775 when he joined Ethan Allen and his Green Mountain Boys in securing Fort Ticonderoga on Lake Champlain in Upstate New York. Although Arnold had planned to lead more troops to Massachusetts, he decided that Allen's mission deserved his attention instead. Proceeding to Upstate New York without the Footguards, Arnold joined the effort to gain control of this fort before the British did. With Ticonderoga temporarily under American control, tensions grew between Arnold and Allen as competing accounts of the event reached the Massachusetts Provincial Congress. Since this body had authorized Allen to undertake the attack, they supported his account, which lionized his efforts and ignored Arnold's role. H I S T O R Y IN D I S P U T E , V O L U M E 12: THE A M E R I C A N R E V O L U T I O N Although disappointed by Allen's omission of his exploits, Arnold decided not to dwell on this episode and instead turned his attention to the larger war effort. In August 1775 Arnold advanced his military career when he traveled to Cambridge, Massachusetts, to meet with George Washington, the new commander of the Continental Army, to offer his services. Washington shrewdly observed that the risk-taking Arnold possessed the necessary determination and drive to lead troops through the dense Maine wilderness for an invasion into Canada. Arnold accepted the assignment and earned the rank of colonel in the Continental Army. With an expeditionary force of one thousand men, Arnold began the arduous trek through Maine in September 1775, arriving outside Quebec in November. Because the British troops outnumbered the Americans, the Rebels suffered a decisive defeat on 31 December. Despite the considerable obstacles facing Arnold, including a wound to his leg, he worked to contain British counterattacks during January and February. Congress recognized his heroic efforts in Quebec by promoting him to brigadier general, while the American public praised him as "America's Hannibal." Washington concurred with Congress and the public, declaring that the continuing blockade of Quebec was "fresh proof of Arnold's ability and perseverance in the midst of difficulties." Recognizing the importance of Canada to the American war effort, Washington sent reinforcements from Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire to assist Arnold and his troops. Although the British expelled American forces from Canada by the summer of 1776, Arnold's determination and sacrifices earned him, at least temporarily, public and civilian accolades. Soon afterward Arnold's exalted reputation suffered a stinging blow. The Continental Congress embarked on investigations to assign blame for the defeat, while Arnold's fellow soldiers accused him of thievery during the Canadian campaign. Although Arnold was eventually vindicated, the charges tarnished his reputation and inflicted psychological wounds to match his physical ones. Arnold expressed his hurt feelings to General Horatio Gates in September 1776, declaring, "I cannot but think it extremely cruel when I have sacrificed my ease, health and a great part of my private property, in the cause of my country, to be calumniated as a robber and thief." The attacks to his reputation continued a year later when the Continental Congress appointed five major generals on 19 February 1777 but did not include Arnold among the promotions. Despite Arnold's military contributions, five less quali- fied officers now outranked him in the Continental Army. Civilian disrespect for his heroism caused Arnold to believe that the Continental Congress did not recognize the qualities or ideals associated with the revolutionary struggle. Its lack of commitment to the revolutionary cause continued to erode his faith in the viability of republican ideals. Arnold's greatest moment on the battlefield occurred on 7 October 1777, when he led a daring assault at the Battle of Bemis Heights near Saratoga, New York. Ten days later Major General John Burgoyne surrendered to the Americans. This victory marked a critical turning point for the American war effort because it resulted in France's joining the war effort and led ultimately to the defeat of the British. Although Arnold should have been remembered as the "Hero of Saratoga," this title went to his commanding officer, Gates, who chose to downplay Arnold's decisive contribution to the victory. Arnold, who had sustained another debilitating leg wound during the battle, became increasingly bitter toward the American cause as he contemplated the lack of recognition for his heroic efforts and sacrifices. Congress eventually upgraded Arnold to the grade of major general, but the damage had already been done as Arnold lost faith in the American cause. Arnold's assignment as the commander of Philadelphia proved to be disastrous because it brought his contempt for the civilian authorities to the point of no return. Washington, wanting to place the convalescing general in a position worthy of his talents, appointed Arnold as commander of the city in June 1778. Serving in this position required political sensitivity, tact, and respect for the civilian government, qualities that the disillusioned Arnold lacked. The ailing general repeatedly clashed with the Continental Congress and the Council of Pennsylvania, which were both headquartered in the city. While Arnold's earlier disagreements with the Continental Congress centered upon rank, recognition, and support for the cause, the new disagreements assumed a more personal cast. During his tenure in Philadelphia, Arnold made some profits from trade, which was not unusual for post commanders in the eighteenth-century military. However, his business dealings led the civilian authorities to accuse him of abusing his power for personal gain. Although acquitted of fraud, Arnold was found guilty of imprudent and improper conduct, and he suffered an official reprimand from Washington. From Arnold's perspective, the Continental Congress's campaign against him merely confirmed his belief that they were small-minded officials with no regard for the H I S T O R Y IN DISPUTE, V O L U M E 12: THE A M E R I C A N R E V O L U T I O N 15 revolutionary cause or its military officers. Having lost faith in the republic's civilian leadership, Arnold began to take steps to return his loyalty to Great Britain in 1779. With his firsthand experience of the Continental Congress's limitations, Arnold concluded that a republican government premised on virtue and honor was an illusion. In protest against the civilian government's failed leadership and to defend his own reputation, Arnold donned the redcoat of a British brigadier general in late 1780 and commanded a royal force against his home state of Connecticut the following year. Ultimately, his actions represented a stinging critique of his erstwhile comrades and their revolution. -SANDY MOATS, UNIVERSITY OF REDLANDS References John Richard Alden, A History of the American Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1969). Issac N. Arnold, The Life of Benedict Arnold; His Patriotism and His Treason (Chicago: Jansen, McClurg, 1880). 16 H I S T O R Y IN D I S P U T E , V O L U M E 12: THE A M E R I C A N Clare Brandt, The Man in the Mirror: A Life of Benedict Arnold (New York: Random House, 1994). James Thomas Flexner, The Traitor and the Spy: Benedict Arnold and John Andre (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1953). James Kirby Martin, Benedict Arnold, Revolutionary Hero: An American Warrior Reconsidered (New York: New York University Press, 1997). Martin, "Benedict Arnold's Treason as Political Protest," Parameters, 11 (1981): 63-74. Willard Sterne Randall, Benedict Arnold: Patriot and Traitor (New York: Morrow, 1990). Randall, George Washington: A Life (New York: Holt, 1997). Paul J. Sanborn, "Arnold, Benedict (17411801)," in The American Revolution, 17751783: An Encyclopedia, volume 1, edited by Richard L. Clanco and Sanborn (New York: Garland, 1993), pp. 46-56. Willard M. Wallace, "Benedict Arnold: Traitorous Patriot," in George Washington's Generals, edited by George Athan Billias (New York: Morrow, 1964), pp. 163-192. Wallace, Traitorous Hero: The Life and Fortunes of Benedict Arnold (New York: Harper, 1954). REVOLUTION