Download Was Benedict Arnold a scoundrel?

ARNOLD
Was Benedict Arnold a scoundrel?
Viewpoint: Yes. Benedict Arnold was an avaricious and egocentric traitor
who acted out of injured pride after he was censured for malfeasance and
passed over for promotion.
Viewpoint: No. Benedict Arnold was an honorable man who increasingly felt
that the Revolution was being led by false Patriots; he switched his loyalty to
the British in order to preserve his reputation as a gentleman.
Benedict Arnold's participation in the Revolutionary War (1775-1783)
provided him with a golden opportunity to obtain fame; instead, he achieved
infamy by betraying the Patriot cause. Indeed, his name is synonymous with
treason. Yet, considering Arnold's enormous devotion and sacrifice for the
American cause early in the war, his villainy is both puzzling and shocking.
He helped capture Fort Ticonderoga and St. Johns and made a brave, yet
futile, assault on Quebec in 1775 that left him partially crippled for life; he successfully stymied General Sir Guy Carleton's efforts to invade the Northern
provinces in 1776; and he played an indispensable role in the Patriot victory
at Saratoga the following year. This distinguished service earned him the rank
of major general in the Continental Army, an appointment as commander of
Philadelphia and later to West Point, and the utmost respect of George
Washington, who did much to further Arnold's military career.
Why, then, in the face of these achievements, did Arnold join the enemy?
The answer to this question will never be known for certain, for as Mark Twain
observed, "a wee little part of a person's life are his acts and words. His real
life is led in his head." Of course, this fact has not dissuaded historians from
thoroughly discrediting Arnold's explanation—that he was profoundly disturbed by the French alliance and in despair over the American cause—and
offering their own conflicting conclusions. The different interpretations of
Arnold's motivations ultimately center on the enigmatic quality of his character. Traditional accounts depict Arnold as an arrogant, ambitious, and mercenary miscreant who lacked public virtue or dedication to the American cause.
When these rewards did not come fast enough for him, and when a court
martial reprimanded him for using his position to enrich himself, Arnold
offered his secrets and services to the British in return for a large sum of
money.
More recently, historians have taken a more apologetic stand on Arnold's
treason. Instead of a self-serving scoundrel, they portray him as a superpatriot so dedicated to the Revolution and its republican principles that when he
perceived an overwhelming lack of public support among Americans
engaged in the war effort, he switched sides in order to protest the sorry state
of relations between the army and American society. He hoped that his
extreme act of political defiance would be a catalyst for the collapse of the
American cause. If this goal was truly Arnold's motivation, it horribly backfired
as Americans, disgusted with his act of treason, rallied behind the Revolution.
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Viewpoint:
Yes. Benedict Arnold was an
avaricious and egocentric traitor
who acted out of injured pride after
he was censured for malfeasance
and passed over for promotion.
It is interesting that George Washington
and Benedict Arnold were the two Revolutionary War generals most alike in daring and determination. For several years Washington esteemed
Arnold as one of his best and bravest generals.
Famed for his incredible march on Quebec in
1775, Arnold later led such a spirited defense of
Lake Champlain that British general Sir Guy
Carleton chose to return to Canada. In 1777
Arnold played a major role in America's victory
at Saratoga. Yet, a quarrelsome and mercenary
nature raised a host of critics, in Congress and
out, and by 1779 he was conspiring with the
British. The result was a plot to betray West
Point (a strategic fort on the Hudson River) to
the enemy. Recent biographers have debunked
myths "explaining" Arnold's treason. There is
no evidence he was cruel to others as a youth,
nor a deserter in the French and Indian War
(1754-1763). His pre-Revolutionary War career
is that of a man of enterprise and honesty. In
1775 his commitment to public virtue and the
American cause appeared genuine. Yet, evidence
suggests that he began to use his rank in the
Continental Army for personal profit and fame.
Reverses in his military career nurtured a
self-serving and mercenary character that eventually embraced treason. By 1780 Washington
had become a symbol of patriotism; Arnold,
the epitome of treachery.
Born in 1741 in Norwich, Connecticut,
Arnold was a precocious, if aggressive, youth.
Arnold's father enjoyed success as a merchant,
but he lapsed into alcoholism and eventual financial ruin. His death in 1761 prevented Arnold
from attending Yale College. Thereafter, Arnold
devoted a great part of his life to attempting to
regain his family's name and his lost inheritance.
As an apothecary and merchant, he worked diligently and by 1775 he became a prominent figure
in Connecticut. At the same time, according to
Paul J. Sanborn in The American Revolution,
1775-1783: An Encyclopedia (1993), he had built
a reputation as "a proud, vain, willful man,
extremely sensitive to criticism and unrepentant
for his actions." Indeed, Arnold was quick to take
offense and defend his honor by either legal suits
or dueling.
In the early years of the Anglo-American
crisis, Arnold so disapproved of Britain's colonial policies that he joined New Haven's young
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radicals and became their leader. Upon hearing
news of the skirmish between British redcoats
and militia at Lexington in April 1775, he rallied the governor's Footguards and marched
them to Massachusetts. This aggressive action
signified the beginning of a career that would
mark Arnold as the Continental Army's most
effective battlefield commander.
On his way to Boston, Arnold learned of
the vulnerability of Ticonderoga—a fort of
major strategic importance on Lake Champlain
and holding scores of cannons. The Massachusetts legislature authorized him to attempt its
capture, but he was forced to share a command
with Ethan Allen, whose Green Mountain Boys
had been sent by Connecticut for the same purpose. Although both groups would claim the
credit for Ticonderoga's capture, Arnold gained
much recognition. His reputation ascended further when he led an army on a march through
Maine and Canada and assaulted Quebec City
in late December 1775. While the Americans
ultimately withdrew, Arnold's leadership and
resourcefulness impressed Washington. Assigned
to Horatio Gates's Northern Army, Arnold—by
virtue of his experience as a merchant sea captain—was ordered to prevent the British from
using Lake Champlain in a southward invasion.
Hastily constructing a fleet, Arnold gave battle
to a British flotilla at Valcour Island in October
1776. While his outnumbered force had to
retreat, Arnold's boldness and shrewd tactics
frustrated British plans and delayed Major General John Burgoyne's march for six months—setting him up for a defeat at Saratoga in October
1777. In that clash Arnold—though wounded in
the leg—broke through the British entrenchments. By 1778 Washington held no battlefield
commander in greater esteem than Arnold,
who, in turn, considered himself Washington's
protege. Yet, within a year, Arnold was betraying both his country and friend to the British
government they supposedly condemned.
Historians have long debated why this
American Icarus fell from grace. Some argue
Arnold's quest for British gold followed, and
did not cause, his decision to defect. Execrable
though his treason was, they maintain it
stemmed from frustration and a thwarted idealism. Revolutionary historian James Kirby Martin argues that Arnold's actions were based on a
growing anger at the betrayal of republican ideals by the men supposedly responsible for
them: the Continental Congress and state leaders. As evidence, Arnold could point to the
treatment afforded capable leaders such as himself. Though he constantly put his life on the
line, Arnold found his achievements ignored or
twisted by a whimsical Congress, which promoted lesser men over neglected heroes. He
H I S T O R Y IN D I S P U T E , V O L U M E 12: THE A M E R I C A N R E V O L U T I O N
was hounded by "villains" accusing him of
financial manipulations and slighted by powerful politicians. Revolutionary ideals of independence, fair play, and individual striving had
been perverted to deny him honor and even the
repayment of monies he had spent on the war.
This situation made a mockery out of the
republican idealism of the American cause.
Clearly, republicanism had failed, and American
success would prove ruinous for colonials as
well as England.
There is some validity in this approach.
Arnold had carelessly revealed his plans to take
Ticonderoga to a fellow officer. This event led
to Connecticut's authorization of Ethan Allen
and several ambitious merchant/politicians
(Major John Brown and Colonel James Easton)
to take the fort. Later, Brown and Easton downplayed to authorities Arnold's role in the battle.
And if Arnold's epic march on Quebec finally
ended in failure, that was hardly his fault given
that a leg wound confined him to a hospital
during much of the siege. Also, Congress
caused exasperating delays in repaying him for
expenses incurred in supplying his troops and
then slighted him in awarding promotions.
Even Arnold's remarkable performance at Valcour Island was depreciated: enemies criticized
his loss of eleven ships and his failure to keep
Crown Point out of Carleton's hands. Despite
Arnold's valiant role at Saratoga, General Horatio Gates relieved him of command and later
depreciated his role. Still, Washington rewarded
Arnold for his services by appointing him military commander in Philadelphia while recovering from wounds received at Saratoga.
Unbeknownst to Washington, he had
placed Arnold in a politically hostile environment. Joseph Reed, the state council president,
made Arnold a target for all those fearing military control in the new republic. In turn,
Arnold's abrupt demeanor brought him citywide censure and accusations of malfeasance.
Arnold demanded a court martial for vindication. Before the court martial returned a verdict, he had made his first overtures to the
British. Arnold's patience was at an end; retribution must follow.
All these facts cannot absolve Arnold of
blame, however. He brought much of his misery
upon himself. Arnold hungered for recognition
and status, and when war came he linked it to
his own fame and reputation, demanding that
his achievements be duly recognized. Yet, to
always demand one's just due is naive. By expecting a gentleman's code of strict accountability,
he insured his own frustration. As the Canadian
campaign wound down, Arnold failed to keep
Massachusetts apprised of his efforts. That fact,
and his abrasive treatment of Easton and Brown
RISK AND REWARD
Th& following is a decoded tetter from American general Benedict Arnold
to British major John Andre, dated 23 May 1779. In it, Arnold demonstrates his willingness to cooperate with the British by offering intelligence concerning American political, military, and diplomatic affairs. The
letter also reveals the monetary motivations behind Arnold's decision to
loin %w wwmy.
Our friend Stansbury acquaints me that the proposals made by him in my name are agreeable to Sir Henry
Clinton, and that Sir Henry engages to answer my warmest expeotations for; arty ;stivfces rtmtersA As I esteem
the interest of America and Great Britain inseparable Sir
Henry may depend on my exertions and intelligence. It
will be impossible to cooperate unless there is a mutual
confidence. Sir Henry shall be convinced on every occasion that his i$ not misplaotC
Gen. Washington and ilia army move to the North
River as soon as forage can be obtained. Congress have
given up Charles Town if attempted. They are in want of
arms, ammunition and men to defend it. 3 or 4 thousand
militia Is tha most ctn bf mustered to fight on my emergency. Seizing papers is impossible. Their contents can
be known from a member of Congress, 4 montis since,
the French Minister required Congress to vest their
agents with powers to negotiate peace with Britain. The
time is elapsed In disputing if they shall demand independency with their ortgtert terms or insist on the addition of Newfoundland. No decision, no measure taken to
prevent the depreciation of money; no foreign loan
obtained. France refused to beeome surtfy; no encouragement from Spain. The French fleet has conditional
orders to return to this continent. They depend on great
part of their provision torn hence. A transport originally a
64 and a foreign 28 guns are daily expected here for pro*
vision*
I will cooperate when an opportunity offers, and as
life and everything Is at stake \ wilt expect some otrtainty, my property here secure and a revenue equivalent
to the risk and service done. I cannot promise success; I
will deserve it. Inform me what I may expect. Could I
know Sir Henry's intentions ht should never be at a loss
for intelligence. 1 shall expect a particular answer thro
our Mend Stansbury*
Source: Carl Van Doren, Secret History of the American Revolution (Mow Ywte Wm Wft J&M1-4&.
(who became bitter opponents), reveal a political blindness. According to Willard M. Wallace
in Traitorous Hero: The Life and Fortunes of Benedict Arnold (1954), Arnold lacked the ability to
"recognize his own faults, the moral stature to
forgive or overlook slights, or the patience to
endure persecution." Constant agitation and
demands for courts of inquiry reveal a pride and
lack of self-control that finally destroyed him.
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Simply, he "could never rise above the personal
issue." His military exploits in Canada are a case
in point. When the Americans abandoned their
campaign, significant amounts of goods taken
from Montreal merchants disappeared. After
Arnold laid the blame on Colonel Moses
Hazen, the latter demanded a court martial.
When Arnold's chief witness was not permitted
to testify, Arnold exploded, prompting the
court to demand his arrest. Although Gates
refused this request, the episode revealed
Arnold's sense of persecution. Shortly thereafter, his Ticonderoga nemesis, Brown, hurled various charges against him: from misconduct to
incompetence. Regulations required Gates to
forward these to Congress. Meanwhile, another
figure from that campaign, Hazen, triumphed
when a military court ruled that Arnold had
slandered him. Even his courage at Saratoga led
to grief. Once friendly with Gates, Arnold
became involved in a growing feud with him.
Gates was likely jealous of a potential rival and
was irritated at Arnold's opposition to his strategy at Saratoga. However, Arnold's blind friendship with Gates's critics reveals a political
naivete on his part. While not denying Arnold's
bravery, Gates's battle report gave him little
credit. Given Gates's defensive strategy, which
Arnold ignored, Gates might have thought it
warranted. Anyway, he disliked Arnold's tendency to disregard orders—though the latter
always expected obedience to his commands.
Finally, Gates had admirers in Congress. In
short, by 1778 many leaders had wounded
Arnold's pride.
Perhaps most insulting of all was the Continental Congress's 1777 decision to pass over
Arnold in its military promotions. Most legislators considered him deserving. Yet, Congressmen, as leaders of a tenuous coalition still
lacking a sense of nationalism, had to take state
sensibilities into account. To a large extent
Arnold was denied promotion to major general
because Connecticut already had its quota of
officers at that rank. James Thomas Flexner in
The Traitor and the Spy: Benedict Arnold and
John Andre (1953) observes that more-radical
Congressmen also feared that promotion by
seniority "might end in a dictatorship . . . making the army independent of legislatures." It
was Arnold's misfortune to be caught up in this
controversy, and his protests aggravated many
both in and out of Congress. When at last he
was promoted, Congress—irritated at his apparent challenge of their authority—did not restore
his seniority. Angrily, Arnold resigned his commission in July 1777 but asked that it be suspended so he might take part in the Battle of
Saratoga. One may regret Congress's decision
(Washington did); yet, it stemmed from a desire
for union. However, Arnold saw it as weakness,
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or worse, a hatred for him. Of course, anyone
mistreated may protest or resign. Ultimately,
Patriots must choose to put the larger cause
before themselves. Arnold could not, and
nursed his resentment. Wallace believes the
slight was "an implied impeachment on his
character." As historian Martin notes in "Benedict Arnold's Treason as Political Protest":
when "Arnold started putting more emphasis
upon personal honor than on the pursuit of liberty . . . his change in outlook clearly appears
during the period of the promotion controversy in 1777."
Arnold's insulted vanity also played on his
other character flaw—a growing avarice and willingness to use his rank to feed this hunger. If
"victim" he must be, Arnold would miss no
opportunity to obtain his due. He had come to
despise politicians, and his anger with Congress
for failing to supply necessities to the troops
was unfeigned. Martin suggests Arnold sincerely believed in offering soldiers better pay or
pensions. Yet, Congress was painfully short of
money. A strong government—which Arnold
valued—might have commandeered the goods,
but the tenuous federation that existed could
only request them from the states. In addition,
with a shortage of funds, Congress was hesitant
to make blanket reimbursements, whatever the
recipient's "honor." (Given his notorious
self-indulgent lifestyle, Arnold experienced this
hesitancy soon enough.) The fact that he was as
generous with others as with himself made little
difference. Arnold thought that any gentleman's claim for expenses, however ill supported, should be paid without question. So he
seethed at Congress's examination (and reexamination) of his claims for money spent in Quebec and for the fleet on Lake Champlain.
Arnold saw this development as further evidence of Congress's parsimony, disdain for him,
and willingness to listen to cowardly detractors.
Moreover, while some accusations of financial
irregularity were false, his anger at Congress
and its questions hid an avaricious egotism.
Congress was unduly slow but hardly betrayed
republican values by reviewing all claims carefully. Yet, to Arnold it was all "villainy." As he
explained to Washington, "Having . . . become a
cripple in the service of my country, I little
expected to meet such ungrateful returns."
Arnold's leg wound sustained at Saratoga
required a long recovery. If Washington
intended an easy assignment for him during
recuperation, an appointment as military commander in Philadelphia was a great error. First,
it gave Arnold a chance to become enamored of
Peggy Shippen, the young and beautiful daughter of a Philadelphia Tory. He began wooing
her in the summer of 1778, and they married in
HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE A M E R I C A N R E V O L U T I O N
April of the following year. According to Wallace, "Though marriage into one of Philadelphia's leading families brought Arnold great
social status, in his pursuit of Peggy and his
attempts to keep her in the style to which she
was accustomed, he was forced to live far
beyond his means. Hard-pressed, he developed
a number of money-making schemes, most of
them of a dubious character." Already hostile to
the French alliance, Arnold now had Peggy to
persuade him that America's cause was ill conceived and his services to it unappreciated.
Thus, his Philadelphia command was a disaster
waiting to unfold. Keeping peace among bitter
political factions and maintaining ties with leaders jealous of national authority required high
political skills—of which Arnold had none.
Although some military men are deficient in
political skills, Arnold was clueless. Indeed, few
have been so self-obsessed and unaware of
human relations. His clash with the Pennsylvania Council and Reed was a case in point. The
latter took it upon himself to make Arnold a
target for those suspicious of the military or a
potential aristocracy. The clash ended in a list of
charges against Arnold, who requested a court
martial. If Congressional politicians were overly
dutiful to Pennsylvania's complaints, they did
find Arnold innocent save on two charges. Both
concerned his avarice: that he had used public
wagons to save personal property from capture
and that he gave the Loyalist ship, Charming
Nancy, permission to enter Philadelphia harbor
without its cargo being confiscated. The latter
action was all the more questionable since
Arnold later obtained an interest in the ship.
Washington was told to reprimand him (which
he did, much to Arnold's mortification). In
fact, Arnold was guilty of these, and perhaps
other, crimes. Washington's language was a bit
harsher than required by the military court but
conveyed no lack of confidence in him. Indeed,
Washington had already decided to offer
Arnold command of the army's left wing. However, neither the verdict nor reprimand drove
his protege into the enemy's arms, for Arnold
had already contacted the British months
before. Personal vanity and a growing appetite
for money had done their work.
The negotiations with Clinton—which
Arnold initiated—are further evidence of his
greed. Even if he changed sides on principle, it
was reasonable to want some financial support.
After all, he would lose his American property.
Yet, Arnold spent the spring and summer of
1779 haggling over his price (demanding up to
£20,000) as he fed the British bits of military
information. Money was now the crucial objective. Indeed, if nothing had been said of West
Point to that point, it was still true that Arnold
had already committed treason "in his heart."
His final betrayal, however, was a personal
one: that of his close friend and mentor, Washington. The latter had been Arnold's staunch
supporter; no one had done more to befriend
him. Washington's only rebuke, in 1780, was in
obedience to Congress. However, by then
Arnold had already sold out the American
cause. Later, Arnold wrote to Washington, the
clear attempt of a guilty conscience to justify
itself. Whether his plot included Washington's
capture (historians disagree on this matter),
nothing could have threatened Washington's
defensive line—and perhaps even led to his capture—so much as the enemy seizure of West
Point. Only a complete British victory could
have repaired Arnold's reputation. Patriot virtue demanded that everyone must put the
cause ahead of individual interests, success
ahead of individual glory. An exaggerated
ambition or financial greed must never eclipse
the revolution. In the end, Washington's reputation grew because he understood this point;
Arnold did not, and he reaped the contempt of
later generations.
-EVERETT W. KINDIG,
MIDWESTERN STATE UNIVERSITY
Viewpoint:
No. Benedict Arnold was an
honorable man who increasingly
felt that the Revolution was
being led by false Patriots; he
switched his loyalty to the British
in order to preserve his reputation
as a gentleman.
While Benedict Arnold's name is synonymous with the word traitor in American lore,
such a tidy characterization conceals the complex and honorable reasons that motivated
Arnold to break with the American cause and
return his loyalty to Great Britain in 1780. In
the early years of the Revolutionary War (17751783) Arnold emerged as a bold and courageous military leader who helped the fledgling
republic secure critical victories against Britain.
Despite the sacrifices and risks that Arnold and
other military leaders endured in the name of
republican virtue and honor, Arnold became
increasingly disillusioned with a civilian government and a general populace who were unwilling to make a similar commitment to the
revolutionary struggle. Arnold believed that
experienced soldiers were not receiving the support or recognition they deserved because the
Continental Congress dismissed them as a band
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of mercenaries who threatened civil society.
After the Continental Congress failed to promote him and acknowledge his heroism,
Arnold concluded that the American people
and their government lacked the ability to
attain the republican ideals of the Revolution.
Arnold joined the British cause to protest the
gap between revolutionary rhetoric and political reality and to disassociate his own reputation from such a dishonorable movement.
Arnold's repudiation of the American war
effort did not happen overnight or because of
some preexisting character flaw. Instead, the
transformation happened incrementally after
repeated skirmishes with an unsupportive public and government.
The growing tensions between the American colonies and Britain during the 1770s
introduced Arnold to military service and the
republican ideas of virtue and honor that provided the intellectual basis for American independence. The Crown's revenue measures
directly affected Arnold as a merchant, and he
quickly sided with the Patriot cause. When hostilities broke out between British troops and
the residents of Lexington and Concord, Massachusetts, in 1775, communities throughout
the Thirteen Colonies organized themselves
into militia companies to support the Patriot
effort. The city of New Haven selected Arnold
to lead its militia, reflecting the level of respect
and admiration that he engendered in his
adopted home. Upon his appointment, Arnold
demonstrated his commitment to revolutionary ideals by leading the New Haven Footguards to Massachusetts to reinforce the militia
companies. Overnight, the inexperienced
Arnold had been transformed from merchant
to military leader.
The early years of the American Revolution
illustrated the gap between military leadership
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and civilian support that produced Arnold's
eventual disillusionment. When Arnold led the
Footguards from Connecticut to Massachusetts, the decision to declare independence was
still one full year away, with popular and political opinion in the colonies equally divided. In
the meantime, the military response to Britain
was undertaken by a ragtag group of militiamen
in need of coordination, leadership, and a clear
mission. From 1775 until 1778 Arnold engaged
in a series of daring military actions that
enabled the American forces to gain strength
and confidence in preparation for the decisive
battles they would face later. Arnold's successes
led to his rapid rise in the American military
from the rank of captain to major general. As he
advanced the American cause, he increasingly
believed that the Continental Congress undercut the war effort by failing to support the
republic's military leaders. Arnold realized that
American independence was not attainable if
civilian leaders were not as committed to the
struggle as their military counterparts.
Arnold's first encounter with military success and civilian disappointment occurred in
May 1775 when he joined Ethan Allen and his
Green Mountain Boys in securing Fort Ticonderoga on Lake Champlain in Upstate New
York. Although Arnold had planned to lead
more troops to Massachusetts, he decided that
Allen's mission deserved his attention instead.
Proceeding to Upstate New York without the
Footguards, Arnold joined the effort to gain
control of this fort before the British did. With
Ticonderoga temporarily under American control, tensions grew between Arnold and Allen
as competing accounts of the event reached the
Massachusetts Provincial Congress. Since this
body had authorized Allen to undertake the
attack, they supported his account, which lionized his efforts and ignored Arnold's role.
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Although disappointed by Allen's omission of
his exploits, Arnold decided not to dwell on
this episode and instead turned his attention to
the larger war effort.
In August 1775 Arnold advanced his military career when he traveled to Cambridge,
Massachusetts, to meet with George Washington, the new commander of the Continental
Army, to offer his services. Washington
shrewdly observed that the risk-taking Arnold
possessed the necessary determination and
drive to lead troops through the dense Maine
wilderness for an invasion into Canada. Arnold
accepted the assignment and earned the rank of
colonel in the Continental Army. With an expeditionary force of one thousand men, Arnold
began the arduous trek through Maine in September 1775, arriving outside Quebec in
November. Because the British troops outnumbered the Americans, the Rebels suffered a decisive defeat on 31 December. Despite the
considerable obstacles facing Arnold, including
a wound to his leg, he worked to contain British
counterattacks during January and February.
Congress recognized his heroic efforts in Quebec by promoting him to brigadier general,
while the American public praised him as
"America's Hannibal." Washington concurred
with Congress and the public, declaring that
the continuing blockade of Quebec was "fresh
proof of Arnold's ability and perseverance in
the midst of difficulties." Recognizing the
importance of Canada to the American war
effort, Washington sent reinforcements from
Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire to assist Arnold and his troops. Although
the British expelled American forces from Canada by the summer of 1776, Arnold's determination and sacrifices earned him, at least
temporarily, public and civilian accolades.
Soon afterward Arnold's exalted reputation suffered a stinging blow. The Continental
Congress embarked on investigations to assign
blame for the defeat, while Arnold's fellow soldiers accused him of thievery during the Canadian campaign. Although Arnold was
eventually vindicated, the charges tarnished his
reputation and inflicted psychological wounds
to match his physical ones. Arnold expressed
his hurt feelings to General Horatio Gates in
September 1776, declaring, "I cannot but think
it extremely cruel when I have sacrificed my
ease, health and a great part of my private property, in the cause of my country, to be calumniated as a robber and thief." The attacks to his
reputation continued a year later when the Continental Congress appointed five major generals
on 19 February 1777 but did not include
Arnold among the promotions. Despite
Arnold's military contributions, five less quali-
fied officers now outranked him in the Continental Army. Civilian disrespect for his heroism
caused Arnold to believe that the Continental
Congress did not recognize the qualities or ideals associated with the revolutionary struggle.
Its lack of commitment to the revolutionary
cause continued to erode his faith in the viability of republican ideals.
Arnold's greatest moment on the battlefield occurred on 7 October 1777, when he led
a daring assault at the Battle of Bemis Heights
near Saratoga, New York. Ten days later Major
General John Burgoyne surrendered to the
Americans. This victory marked a critical turning point for the American war effort because
it resulted in France's joining the war effort
and led ultimately to the defeat of the British.
Although Arnold should have been remembered as the "Hero of Saratoga," this title went
to his commanding officer, Gates, who chose
to downplay Arnold's decisive contribution to
the victory. Arnold, who had sustained another
debilitating leg wound during the battle,
became increasingly bitter toward the American cause as he contemplated the lack of recognition for his heroic efforts and sacrifices.
Congress eventually upgraded Arnold to the
grade of major general, but the damage had
already been done as Arnold lost faith in the
American cause.
Arnold's assignment as the commander of
Philadelphia proved to be disastrous because it
brought his contempt for the civilian authorities to the point of no return. Washington,
wanting to place the convalescing general in a
position worthy of his talents, appointed
Arnold as commander of the city in June 1778.
Serving in this position required political sensitivity, tact, and respect for the civilian government, qualities that the disillusioned Arnold
lacked. The ailing general repeatedly clashed
with the Continental Congress and the Council
of Pennsylvania, which were both headquartered in the city. While Arnold's earlier disagreements with the Continental Congress
centered upon rank, recognition, and support
for the cause, the new disagreements assumed a
more personal cast. During his tenure in Philadelphia, Arnold made some profits from trade,
which was not unusual for post commanders in
the eighteenth-century military. However, his
business dealings led the civilian authorities to
accuse him of abusing his power for personal
gain. Although acquitted of fraud, Arnold was
found guilty of imprudent and improper conduct, and he suffered an official reprimand from
Washington. From Arnold's perspective, the
Continental Congress's campaign against him
merely confirmed his belief that they were
small-minded officials with no regard for the
H I S T O R Y IN DISPUTE, V O L U M E 12: THE A M E R I C A N R E V O L U T I O N
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revolutionary cause or its military officers. Having lost faith in the republic's civilian leadership, Arnold began to take steps to return his
loyalty to Great Britain in 1779. With his firsthand experience of the Continental Congress's
limitations, Arnold concluded that a republican
government premised on virtue and honor was
an illusion. In protest against the civilian government's failed leadership and to defend his
own reputation, Arnold donned the redcoat of
a British brigadier general in late 1780 and commanded a royal force against his home state of
Connecticut the following year. Ultimately, his
actions represented a stinging critique of his
erstwhile comrades and their revolution.
-SANDY MOATS,
UNIVERSITY OF REDLANDS
References
John Richard Alden, A History of the American
Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1969).
Issac N. Arnold, The Life of Benedict Arnold; His
Patriotism and His Treason (Chicago: Jansen,
McClurg, 1880).
16
H I S T O R Y IN D I S P U T E , V O L U M E 12: THE A M E R I C A N
Clare Brandt, The Man in the Mirror: A Life of
Benedict Arnold (New York: Random
House, 1994).
James Thomas Flexner, The Traitor and the Spy:
Benedict Arnold and John Andre (New York:
Harcourt, Brace, 1953).
James Kirby Martin, Benedict Arnold, Revolutionary Hero: An American Warrior Reconsidered
(New York: New York University Press,
1997).
Martin, "Benedict Arnold's Treason as Political
Protest," Parameters, 11 (1981): 63-74.
Willard Sterne Randall, Benedict Arnold: Patriot
and Traitor (New York: Morrow, 1990).
Randall, George Washington: A Life (New York:
Holt, 1997).
Paul J. Sanborn, "Arnold, Benedict (17411801)," in The American Revolution, 17751783: An Encyclopedia, volume 1, edited by
Richard L. Clanco and Sanborn (New York:
Garland, 1993), pp. 46-56.
Willard M. Wallace, "Benedict Arnold: Traitorous Patriot," in George Washington's Generals, edited by George Athan Billias (New
York: Morrow, 1964), pp. 163-192.
Wallace, Traitorous Hero: The Life and Fortunes of
Benedict Arnold (New York: Harper, 1954).
REVOLUTION