Download Lecture Notes - Japan and the USA Become Colonial Powers

Lecture 5 – Lecture Notes - Japan and the USA Become Colonial
Powers - History of International Politics (East Asia focus)
Course Leader:
Dr. Senan Fox
Telephone number: 264 -5764
Email Address:
[email protected]
Room: Room 309 (General Education Hall – GEH - 総合教育 1 号館)
Consultation Times: Please email Senan Fox in advance if you wish to meet to discuss
your work and studies.
NOTE: The following lecture notes are largely based on the class textbook – Warren
Cohen (2000), ‘East Asia at the Center – Four Thousand Years of Engagement with
the World’, New York: Columbia University Press.
Lecture Title: Japan and the USA Become Colonial Powers
Korea – ‘a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan’ (Prussian advisor to the Japanese
Imperial Army from 1885 to 1888 - Major Klemens Meckel)
As we discussed in Week Five’s class, by the late 1870s, Japan was making moves to
challenge Chinese and later Russian power in northeast Asia. Korea would be the first
battleground in this power rivalry. Japan’s long-term security goals included
guaranteeing Japan’s independence from outside interference by undoing the ‘unequal
treaties’ forced upon them by foreign powers since 1854, and to become the No.1
power in East Asia. Until the 1870s, the Koreans had successfully defended
themselves and their sovereignty against foreign military attempts (from the French
and the USA for example) to force the peninsula to open up to trade and to establish
diplomatic ties. In a context where numerous once powerful East Asian kingdoms
were being controlled by outside powers, Korea still remained vulnerable to attack.
As argued by Cohen, Korea’s historical misfortune was often due to its geographical
location and its vulnerability to attack from larger and more powerful neighbours such
as China, Japan, and since its eastward expansion after the late 1700s, Russia as well.
Internally, infighting between diverse Korean groups also weakened the country’s
ability to unite and build its defences more effectively in the face of a rising threat
from the outside world (Cohen, 2000:287). The Korean Joseon dynasty’s rulers (1392
– 1897) closely watched the slow disintegration of the Qing Empire in the 1800s and
China’s humiliation with dread and concern. To avoid China’s fate, the Koreans
opted for isolation, defence, and very cautious and limited exchanges with the West.
In the 1860s, Korea’s rulers stepped up their efforts to squash the influence of
Christianity, and particularly Catholicism, which had grown in popularity since the
early 1800s. Christianity was seen as a dangerous foreign influence, which threatened
the stability of the Joseon court. Foreign Christian missionaries and their Korean
converts had also often played major roles in encouraging anti-Joseon sentiment, and
demanded the reform of the Confucian-influenced yangban ruling elite system and
for greater equality on the Korean peninsula.
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Domestic tensions between Korea’s rulers and the Christian community sharply
escalated after 1864, when Taewon’gun (the Daewon’gun or Yi Ha-eung) became
the regent of the Korean court (1864 – 1873). Shortly after coming to power,
Taewon’gun put down a serious peasant revolt in the southeast of Korea, and soon
began a systematic persecution of Catholics in the country. This campaign involved
the execution of thousands of Korean Catholic converts and several French priests.
Such actions caused outrage in France, and resulted in French retaliation against
Korea in 1866. Taewon’gun also instigated a reform program aimed at strengthening
Korea’s military capabilities and reinforcing the power of the central authorities on
the peninsula. During Taewon’gun’s reign from 1864 to 1873, the Koreans also
successfully repelled US and French attempts to force the country open to foreign
trade and diplomatic ties. When the Japanese used gunboat diplomacy to force Korea
open in 1876, Taewon’gun’s time in power had ended but he still made clear his
opposition to the treaty and to the moderation of Korea’s new rulers. He argued that
Korea should not have yielded an inch to Japan.
The new ruling elite in Korea continued with programs aimed at modernisation to
prevent foreign interference. They also saw Japan as a suitable model for how to
successfully reform and modernise. Moderate Korean elites were influenced by an
essay, which had been written in 1880 by a Chinese diplomat, Huang Zunxian, and
later presented to the Korean authorities. The essay’s central thesis was that Russia
was the main threat to Korea’s sovereignty, and that Korea’s only hope for defence
was to reform and change along Western lines, as Japan had begun to do since the
1860s. Huang also maintained that Korea should foster links with Japan, China, and
the United States – ‘Keeping close to China, Creating ties with Japan, and allying
with the United States.’ To this end, the pro-reform rulers sent students to China to
study military strategy and technology at Li Hongzhang’s schools, and embraced
efforts to catch up with the West. In 1881, the Korean government was restructured
and modernised. Reformers were also placed in positions of power within the
decision-making elite in Korea, and representatives were dispatched on cultural
missions to the US, China, and Japan.
Despite these efforts, Korea was still heavily influenced and manipulated by Qing
China. In the 1880s, the Chinese continued to treat and to perceive Korea as a vassal
state of the Qing Empire. For example, Li Hongzhang had negotiated Korea’s first
treaty with the US in 1882 – the ‘Treaty of Amity and Commerce.’ China believed
that a greater Western influence in Korea might help to delay any further Japanese
influence and interference on the peninsula (note the Japan-Korea ‘Treaty of
Ganghwa’ in 1876). Korea’s Queen Min (Empress Myeongseong) and her allies also
sought Chinese assistance to fend off potential domestic rivals within Korea, and the
threat posed by a rising Japan. In 1882, Taewon’gun and his supporters attempted to
overthrow Korea’s rulers in an unsuccessful coup. This military revolt was crushed
with Chinese assistance, and Taewon’gun was abducted by Qing troops and taken to
China. The coup had also targeted proponents of the reform approach and Japanese
supporters in Korea. A notable incident for Korea-Japan relations was the burning
down of the Japanese legation during the coup attempt.
By 1884, the pro-reform factions in Korea had tired of calling for change. In
December 1884, they staged a violent but failed coup d’etat [pronounced ‘ku-day-ta’]
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(‘the Gapsin Coup’) with the support of Japanese government officials in Seoul. The
affair witnessed the seizing of the Korean royal palace and the assassination of a
number of political opponents of the reform factions. The Qing Chinese were engaged
in a war with France over northern Vietnam (the Sino-French War of August 1884 to
April 1885) at the time of the coup, and the Japanese probably predicted that the coup
might succeed because China would be unable to effectively respond and help their
pro-Qing allies in Seoul. Korea however was still a major security concern for the
Qing court in Peking in spite of problems with the French in Vietnam. Both Li
Hongzhang and his protégé Yuan Shikai (who was the Qing court’s ‘Imperial
resident’ in Seoul) were therefore determined that the Japan-supported coup would
fail. Chinese anti-coup assistance arrived shortly after the coup had begun, and the
Japanese were reluctant to become directly involved in a war in Korea with
numerically superior Chinese forces. As a result, the coup failed. The Japanese
however did secure an agreement from the Chinese in 1885 (between Li Hongzhang
and Ito Hirobumi) whereby both Japan and China agreed not to intervene in Korean
issues without first receiving permission from the other side.
As noted by Cohen, domestic events in Korea throughout the 1800s had shown how
rival Korean political groups were willing to potentially threaten their country’s
independence for their own purposes by utilising outside aid and assistance. This was
also a period when the peninsula suffered increased instability due to the higher
number and negative influence of Japanese and Chinese businessmen and
representatives in the country. Russia was also seeking to enhance its influence in
Korea. The Russians tried to persuade the Koreans to develop closer ties with Russia
in order to weaken Qing China’s strong influence on the peninsula. The Korean King
and Queen seemed at first to react positively to the Russian approach. Great Britain,
however, a nation engaged in a rivalry with Russia (see the ‘Great Game’ rivalry
between 1813 and 1907) grew concerned about the implications for British interests
in East Asia should the Russian expand their presence into Korea and North-east Asia.
For added security, the British dispatched its navy to take control of Komun-do Island
(located just south-west of the Korean peninsula) in 1885. The British stayed on the
island for just over one year before leaving in 1887 when they came to believe that
the Russians would not make any further advances in Korea. A number of Korean
elites also made approaches to the US in the 1880s in the hope that Washington might
help to protect Korea from foreign domination by the Chinese, the Russians, or the
Japanese who all appeared to be competing for control of the peninsula.
By the 1880s, it was apparent that the Korean authorities could no longer effectively
protect the country from economic and political penetration from foreign states.
Matters came to a head in 1894 when a serious rebellion (the Donghak Peasant
Revolution) in the south, which had first started in the 1860s, re-ignited. The
rebellion worried the Korean King enough for him to request assistance from Qing
China and Li Hongzhang. Li responded almost immediately and sent Chinese forces
into Korea to quell the uprising. Japan however was worried about the security
implications of Chinese forces on the peninsula effectively governing the country
because the Korean court had proven itself unable to do so. The Chinese decision to
send troops to Korea without Japanese permission was also in breach of Li and Ito’s
1885 agreement. Japan was in a stronger position in the mid-1890s to respond. The
Japanese therefore dispatched their own soldiers to the country. The Japanese also
arrived in the capital, Seoul before the Chinese did. After arriving, the Japanese
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stormed the Korean palace, and then kidnapped the Korean king and kept him
imprisoned under their control. They also designated Taewon’gun (who had become
pro-Japanese during his power rivalry with pro-Qing factions) as the new Korean
regent. In reality, Taewon’gun was a puppet ruler for the Japanese. His instructions
from Tokyo included a Korean declaration of war against China. The Japanese had
also sunk a British-registered transport ship, which had been transporting Chinese
soldiers to Korea (the ‘Battle of Pungdo’ on July 25th 1894). Shortly afterwards,
China and Japan officially declared war on each other. The Japanese in particular
ignored foreign pressure to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the fighting and ignored
foreign attempts to end the conflict. The First Sino-Japanese War (August 1894 April 1895) had started.
The First Sino-Japanese War (August 1894 - April 1895)
One of the defining clashes of the First Sino-Japanese War was the naval battle at the
mouth of the Yalu River (the Battle of the Yalu River on September 17th 1894)
between the forces of the Japanese Imperial Navy and Li Hongzhang’s Beiyang Fleet
(meaning the Northern Ocean Fleet). This fleet was one of the four modern fleets
constructed and developed during the years of the ‘Self-Strengthening Movement’
(1861-1895). As Cohen contends, ‘the two fleets were equal in size, but in nothing
else. The Japanese proved to be better trained, equipped, and commanded’ (Cohen,
2000:289). The Beiyang Fleet suffered heavy losses in the battle and was later
completely annihilated and destroyed by the Japanese. A later investigation into why
China lost the battle found that the artillery and explosives used by the Chinese had
been of poor quality. This was due to corrupt Chinese officials and associates of Li
Hongzhang siphoning defence money for their own private purposes and then using
sand and scrap iron in their artillery shells (rather than higher quality and more
expensive materials). Many of the artillery shells were also found to have been
hollow on the inside rather than packed with explosives. Co-ordination between, and
joint action by, the four fleets of the ‘modern’ Chinese navy was also poor and in
some cases non-existent. A notable example was the refusal of the Nanyang Fleet
(meaning the Southern Oceans Fleet) to come to the assistance of the Beiyang Fleet
during the war with Japan (1894-1895). One reason for this was revenge for the
Beiyang Fleet’s unwillingness to risk their ships to help the Nanyang Fleet during the
Sino-French War (August 1894 – April 1895).
As a result of Japan’s decisive naval victories over the Chinese, the Japanese Navy
was predominant in the seas around Korea. The Japanese could therefore easily
increase its troop presence on the peninsula. Within two months, the Chinese were
forced out of Korea. The Japanese also did not confine their operations to the Korean
Peninsula. They decided to make the most of their victory over the Chinese in the
war by seeking further gains across the border in Qing Chinese territory. Within a
matter of weeks, the Japanese Imperial Army had marched into Manchuria and
captured the port of Weihaiwei on the Shandong peninsula. The proximity of powerful
Japanese armed forces so close to the centre of Qing power in Peking was the key
factor in forcing the Chinese to surrender and to negotiate a peace settlement in Japan.
The Japanese also occupied the Pescadores (Penghu) Islands off Taiwan’s west coast.
Japan’s victory in the First Sino-Japanese War created a wave of enthusiasm and
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instilled deep pride amongst the Japanese public and the Japanese elite. For many in
Japan, the war’s outcome symbolised the success of the country’s modernization and
reform program. As Cohen contends, it also represented ‘partial compensation for the
humiliations imposed by the West since Perry’s ships sailed into Edo Bay’ (Cohen,
2000:289-90).
Viewing itself as a great power, Ito Hirobumi and the Japanese demanded major and
humiliating concessions from the defeated Chinese under the Treaty of Shimonoseki
on April 17th 1895. These included the ceding of Taiwan, the Pescadores (Penghu)
Islands, and the Liaodong peninsula to Japan (which would mean Japanese soldiers
positioned on Peking’s doorstep), a Chinese recognition of Korea’s independence
(from Chinese interference), a huge indemnity to be paid to Japan, and further
business concessions for Japan, which included the opening up of four new Chinese
ports to the Japanese. Of all these concessions, the potential loss of the Liaodong
peninsula was the greatest threat to the security of the Qing Empire. Before the
Japanese could reinforce their presence in the area, the Chinese petitioned the
Russians to diplomatically pressure the Japanese to relinquish their claim to the
Liaodong peninsula. Russia was a suitable choice because Moscow feared the security
and economic implications of a stronger Japanese presence in areas such as
Manchuria and Korea. Russia used its alliance with France (under the ‘FrancoRussian Alliance’ of 1892 to 1917) and a German desire for Russian support in
Europe in the 1890s to garner a diplomatic attempt by Russia, France, and Germany
to force Tokyo to give up its possession of Liaodong. Faced with the superior
political, economic, and military power of three European powers (see the Triple
Intervention of April 23rd 1895), the Japanese decided that their best option was to
accept their demands, and to return the Liaodong peninsula to China and then to
accept an added indemnity in its place. After the Triple Intervention, the Russians
pressured the Chinese to lease the peninsula to Russia and to permit the Russian navy
to use the strategically important warm water port of Port Arthur (Lushunkou) as a
naval base. The loss of face for Japan created deep resentment and anger amongst
the Japanese people and elites who felt that Ito and his foreign minister, Mutsu
Munemitsu, had failed to defend the gains won by Japan. The humiliation of the
Triple Intervention would linger within the Japanese mind-set for many years
afterwards and fed calls for vengeance and for a greater strengthening of Japan’s
armed forces.
In late Qing China, the consequences of the First Sino-Japanese War were profound
and far-reaching. For the Chinese people, the war represented all that was wrong and
rotten about the Qing regime. The failure to fend off the Japanese in Korea, the
pathetic performance of the Chinese military, the corruption of high level Chinese
officials, and the further humiliation created by the Treaty of Shimonoseki shattered
the legitimacy of the Qing system and its elites. It also served as a stark reminder of
the failure of the ‘self-strengthening movement’ (1861-1895). The defeat inspired a
wave of protest and anger within China, especially amongst China’s intellectual class,
who led calls to dismantle the Treaty of Shimonoseki, and for the Qing court to
immediately commence a program of substantive and meaningful reforms. It also
revealed once again both the weakness of China and the urgent need for change. In
the months and years immediately after 1895, the Europeans, and especially Russia,
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demanded more and more business and territorial rights in China. The Russians
sought to reinforce their presence in Manchuria in particular. They also emphasised
receiving a reward from Peking for having prevented the loss of the Liaodong
Peninsula to Japan. The French sought to secure greater rights (in areas such as
mining and the railways) in the south of China in areas near to Indochina. This was in
a period when outside states were competing with each other to take control of more
and more key areas and territories within Qing China. A phrase used to describe this
development in China was ‘slicing the Chinese melon.’ By the turn of the twentieth
century, the Qing Empire looked at if it would soon be replaced by an occupied
China which was cut up into different spheres of influence and foreign-controlled
areas.
In 1896, the Chinese and the Russians signed a secret alliance (the Li–Lobanov
Treaty) aimed at preventing further Japanese influence in East Asia. The Russians
also won railway rights that permitted them to run the Trans-Siberian Railway across
Manchuria. At the height of the new imperialism era (1830 to 1914) in the world, the
rising Germany (under its Weltpolitik policy (World Policy) after 1897) also wanted
to establish a foothold in East Asia and viewed the Shandong peninsula as an
attractive location (as an aside see also the concept of Social Darwinism and the
‘White Man’s Burden’). In November 1897, two German Christian missionaries
were murdered (the Juye Incident). Germany used this incident to forcefully take
control of Qingdao (Tsingtao) and then to secure a 99-year lease of the city as well as
mining and railroad rights on the peninsula. The incident set off a chain of events,
which resulted in a scramble for concessions between most of the world’s most
powerful nations in different parts of China. Shortly afterwards, the Russians
followed Germany’s example and grapped Port Arthur (Lushunkou) and Dalien in
1898 and then secured the right to join these new possessions to each other via the
Trans-Siberian railway. This meant that, in the late 1800s, Russia was the
predominant foreign power in Manchuria by the turn of the century. The British also
took control of the naval base at Weihaiwei on the Shandong Peninsula (from 1898 to
1930). Even Italy made demands and won concessions from the Chinese. By the end
of 1898, the Qing Empire was effectively sliced up into different spheres of
influences, and was dominated by numerous foreign powers and their political,
business, and military representatives.
The Americans Reinforce their Presence in East Asia
The US had opened up Japan in 1854 and was the first Western country to sign a
treaty with the isolationist Koreans in 1882. Despite this, by the late 1800s, the US
still possessed no colonies or territories in East Asia. From 1898 onwards however,
US power and involvement in East Asia dramatically increased as a consequence of
two developments. Firstly, January 1898 witnessed the establishment of the
‘American Asiatic Association’. This organization aimed to use its considerable
power and influence to pressure Washington to work harder to defend and enhance
American interests in China. Secondly, the defeat of Spain by the US in the SpanishAmerican War (April to August 1898) had resulted in the once Spanish-dominated
Philippines (and Guam) being first liberated by a combination of local rebels and
American naval and military forces and then being taken over by the US. After
centuries of Spanish rule, the islands were now American colonies. The US, despite
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an ideological commitment to anti-imperialism and democracy, was now an imperial
power in East Asia. Ironically, the US, having helped the Filipinos to rebel against
Spain and to win their freedom, went on to brutally and ruthlessly crush a threeyear Filipino revolt against American occupation (the Philippine-American War
from 1899 to 1902).
The reasons for the US decision to join the club of imperial powers in East Asia (by
taking control of the Philippines and Guam) were numerous. Most notably, there
were strong calls from the American business community to establish a presence in
East Asia in order to defend their commercial interests, particularly in the huge
market of China. In order to respond quickly and at short notice if necessary to any
threat to American interests, and to compete with other powers in the race for
resources and commercial opportunities in East Asia, many US political and business
elites called on Washington to establish a permanent presence in the region. The
higher number of US commercial and military vessels in the western Pacific also
increased the demand for suitable and stable ports in which American ships could load
and offload materials, refuel with coal for example, and stop for repairs. As argued by
Richard Leopold, ‘the desire for the Philippines and a concern for China became
mutually supporting’ (see Cohen, 2000:293). In a period of heightened new
imperialism, many Americans also expressed a wish for their country to have a say in
the world’s balance of power and international diplomacy. Such views were supported
by influential elites like the future US president Theodore Roosevelt (President from
1901 to 1909) and the naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan. In September 1899,
John Hay, the US Secretary of State, conceded to pressure from the business lobby to
secure the protection of American interests in China (from possible interference by
the Qing Chinese and other powers). In the so-called ‘Open Door Policy’, the US
called on other powers within China to keep the country open to trade for all the
major powers (despite different spheres of influence), and for no one country to
attempt to take control of China. All the powers agreed in principle but not in official
writing to the policy. The US was seeking equal treatment for its trade objectives in
China in exchange for a promise that America would not challenge the key economic
interests of other states in the country, such as with mining and railway rights.
The Russo-Japanese War (February 1904 – September 1905)
In the last years of the 1800s, it was Russia and not Japan who remained the greater
danger to Qing China’s security. Russian forces had taken advantage of China’s
problems after the Boxer Rebellion (1899 -1901) to establish a long-term political and
military presence in the resource-rich region of Manchuria. This was despite the fact
that they had agreed to withdraw under treaty terms set out following the Boxer
Rebellion (see the Boxer Protocol). The Russians also continued to interfere with and
influence domestic politics on the Korean peninsula, to the irritation of Japan. Both
the Koreans and the Chinese were very uncomfortable with the ‘foreign’ influence in
Korea but both were too weak to challenge the might of Russia’s military. The UK
and the USA were also concerned about Russia’s intentions in the region but did not
want to risk starting a war unless its vital interests were at stake. For Japan however
Russian power and influence in Korea and Manchuria was a danger to Japan’s
immediate security and economic interests, as well as to Japanese hopes of being
respected as a great power by the West. Tokyo’s fears were further heightened by
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Russia’s unwillingness to meet the Japanese halfway in talks with Ito Hirobumi.
Rejected suggestions included a trade-off between the two countries. For example,
Korea for the Japanese, and Manchuria for the Russians.
In 1901, Japan tried to convince the US to join forces with Japan to hinder Russian
expansion in Northeast Asia. Washington however was not interested and made clear
its position that it would not use force in Asia unless it was a matter of vital interest
to the United States. The UK, on the other hand, had important strategic interests in
Asia in the early 1900s that complemented Japan’s quest for Western allies. The
British had become increasingly concerned about the rise of Germany since the 1890s
as a European power and of possible German moves closer to the French and the
Russians (who were allies under Franco-Russian Alliance). In China, this alliance
could pose a threat to British trade and security interests there. After failing to find
any middle ground with Saint Petersburg (the Russian Imperial capital), the Japanese
accepted London’s offer of a military alliance. In January 1902, the two countries
signed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. As a result, Japan’s position as a great power
was reinforced and its bargaining power with Russia greatly enhanced.
Despite Japan’s stronger position after 1902, Russia still refused to make any
substantive concessions to Japan in relation to Korea and Manchuria, for example a
spheres of influence trade-off. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance meant that if an ally of
Russia provided military assistance to Russia during a war with Japan then the ally
would also have to fight Great Britain, who possessed the world’s most powerful
army and navy in the early 1900s. Tokyo understood this and concluded that a war
with the Russians was the preferred option at an opportune time if Japan was to
protect its interests in the region. In February 1904, Tokyo cut off its diplomatic ties
with Saint Petersburg. On the night of February 8th the Japanese attacked the Russian
navy’s fleet in Port Arthur, a few hours before Tsar Nicholas II had formally received
a declaration of war. The Russo-Japanese War was a disaster for the poorly
equipped and outnumbered Russians who struggled to respond quickly, and to
transport their men and hardware across a great distance from the center of the
Russian Empire to the area of conflict in the Far East. Though victorious, Japan had
also suffered from logistical and financial challenges in conducting its campaign
against Russia and was eager in the end to reach a settlement favorable to the winning
side, Japan.
Under the guidance of US President, Theodore Roosevelt, the Japanese and the
Russians negotiated the Treaty of Portsmouth on September 5th 1905. For strategic
and economic reasons, both the British and the Americans were pleased that Japan
had won the war and not Russia. Under the treaty’s terms, Japan won control of
southern Manchuria (including railway rights and the control of Port Arthur and
Dalien). The Russians also agreed that Japanese interests on the Korean peninsula
were paramount. In addition, Japan gained control over southern Sakhalin while
Russia maintained its hold over the northern half of the island. Russia however
refused to pay any indemnity for the war and this outraged many Japanese.
Nonetheless, the Russo-Japanese War was significant for a number of key reasons.
For the first time in the modern era, a non-white power had defeated a white power in
a major war. The idea of the innate superiority and invincibility of the white nations
had been shattered. Having defeated the Russian bear, Japan was now
unquestionably the dominant power in northeast Asia. Its alliance with Great Britain
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also symbolized its successful forty-year journey from a feudal and secluded country
to a modern and industrialized world power. Its advanced navy was unchallenged in
the waters of the region, and its army and political representatives were de facto rulers
over Korea and the resource-rich southern half of Manchuria. This new reality
however also caused the West to ponder the future for East Asia and to wonder
whether or not a powerful Japan might one day in the future come to threaten Western
interests in the region. As Theodore Roosevelt noted, the Western states were
distracted by ‘divided interests, divided cares’ in places throughout the whole world.
Japan however would center its interests on East Asia and would have ‘one care,
interest, one burden.’ Over the next four decades in East Asia, Roosevelt’s
observation in the early 1900s would prove accurate.
Key Points:
•
Even though it was an ally of Great Britain, Japan’s victory over Russia in the
Russo-Japanese War in 1905 symbolized the challenge that a powerful Japan
could pose to Western dominance in East Asia. Japan was now a global power.
•
‘Eastern’ Japan’s defeat of ‘Western’ Russia shattered the myth of white
invincibility. This indirectly influenced the growth of anti-imperial and antiWestern groups in East Asia.
•
Having been a victim of Western imperialism for many decades, Japan became
a victimizer power in East Asia.
•
In 1899, the Japanese successfully revised the post-1853 ‘unequal treaties’.
•
Qing China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 represented the end
of China’s centuries-long position as East Asia’s number one power. In the
early 1900s, the Qing Chinese struggled to keep China together and intact
after the Western powers and the Japanese began ‘slicing the Chinese melon’
(taking control of key Chinese territories and cities and forming spheres of
influence). The presence of foreigners and their military forces on Chinese soil
and in Chinese waters was an added humiliation.
•
The Qing Empire was replaced by states such as Japan and France as the
dominant powers in areas such as Korea and Vietnam. The tributary system,
which saw China as the central power and hegemon in East Asia, had been
destroyed.
•
Korea, having held off outside interference for most of the 1800s, started to
lose its independence after the 1870s, and by 1905 had become a Japanese
protectorate.
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