Download Constraints on Cabinet Formation in Parliamentary Democracies

Constraints on Cabinet Formation in Parliamentary Democracies
Kaare Strom; Ian Budge; Michael J. Laver
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 38, No. 2. (May, 1994), pp. 303-335.
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Constraints on Cabinet Formation in
Parliamentary Democracies *
Kaare Strgm, Department of Political Science, University of
California, San Diego
Ian Budge, Department of Government, University of Essex
Michael J . Laver, Department of Political Science, Trinity College,
University of Dublin
Coalition theory typically treats political parties involved in government formation in
parliamentary democracies as if they were unconstrained players in an institution-free
world. Yet actual coalition options are often severely constrained by institutional arrangements and prior commitments. We develop. a systematic
account of different constraints on
.
government formation and examine their frequency across 10 parliamentary democracies.
Hypothetical and empirical examples demonstrate how a small number of constraints can
dramatically reduce the range of coalition options and redistribute bargaining power among
political parties. More adequate coalition theories need to recognize the effects of such
constraints and to build on the theoretical lessons of the neoinstitutionalist approach to
legislative behavior.
On 22 April 1977, King Baudouin entrusted Leo Tindemans with the
task of giving Belgium a new government. On the surface, Tindemans's
task appeared unproblematic. The elections of 17 April had just boosted
his Flemish Christian People's Party's (CVP) representation in the Chamber of Representatives from 50 seats to 56 (out of a total of 212), far
ahead of any other party. Tindemans himself was an experienced political
leader, having served as prime minister without interruption since April
1974. No fewer than 10 parties gained parliamentary representation,
seemingly offering Tindemans a wide range of coalition options. Technically, these parties allowed for over a thousand different coalitions, half
of which would include Tindemans's own party. His task, it might seem,
was simply to pick and choose from this sea of possibilities. In practice,
however, Tindemans's political options were severely circumscribed, and
well over a month of difficult negotiations lay ahead before Belgium
would have a new government.
*We are grateful to the members of the Manifesto Research Group, who have conducted much of the research on which this article is based and contributed to the development of the ideas expressed herein. All interpretations and errors, however, are our own
responsibility.
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 38, No. 2, May 1994, Pp. 303-35
O 1994 by the University of Texas Press, P.O. Box 7819, Austin, TX 78713-7819
304
Kaare Srrgm, Ian Budge, and Michael J . Laver
Tindemans first sought to form a "grand coalition" of the three traditional party families in Belgium: Christian Socials, Socialists, and Liberals. This greatly "oversized" coalition would have comprised 175 out of
212 parliamentary seats and no fewer than six parties, since the Christian
Social and Liberal "families" at this point ran separate lists in the Flemish and Walloon regions, while the Liberals even had a third section in
Brussels. The Socialists quickly rejected any coalition with the Liberals,
however, and instead proposed a solution that included the three regional
parties: the Flemish Volksunie, the Walloon Rassemblement Wallon
(RW), and the Front Democratique des Francophones (FDF), operating
in Brussels. After protracted negotiations, Tindemans finally succeeded
in forging a coalition of the Christian Social and Socialist parties, the
FDF and the Volksunie. With 172 legislative seats, this coalition was
only marginally smaller than the original grand coalition. Thus, after
painstaking bargaining, Tindemans came up with a coalition that not only
seemed much larger than what he needed but which also contained parties with markedly divergent positions along all of Belgium's three dominant issue dimensions: clericalism, class, and language (Dewachter and
Clijsters 1982, 187-97). In other words, his cabinet challenges both the
coalition-theoretic size principle (Riker 1962) and the policy compactness criteria that underlie policy-based coalition theory (Axelrod 1970;
De Swaan 1973; Laver and Schofield 1990; Leiserson 1966; Schofield
1993).
Why were Tindemans's real political options much more limited than
simple arithmetic appears to suggest? Why were the negotiations so difficult? Why did he choose a coalition of so many diverse parties whose
votes were not needed for a parliamentary majority? These are puzzles
that call into question fundamental assumptions in coalition theory. To
resolve them, we have to consider the institutional environment within
which Tindemans operated.
A major source of troubles for Tindemans lay within the Belgian
Constitution itself. Its requirement that any incoming government pass a
parliamentary majority investiture vote severely limits the probability of
any minority government (Hear1 1992). Moreover, Article 86B of the
Constitution states that "with the possible exception of the Prime Minister, the cabinet comprises an equal number of French speaking and Dutch
speaking ministers" (Rudd 1986, 122). Since all the relevant parties but
the Socialists drew their support from one and only one of the two language communities, this provision meant that a careful balance had to be
struck between Flemish and Walloon parties. In practice, the implication
was that no branch of any traditional party would enter government without its counterpart in the other linguistic community and that, if one of
CONSTRAINTS ON CABINET FORMATION
3O5
the regional (i.e., linguistic) parties was included in government, steps
had to be taken to preserve the linguistic balance. Finally, Article 59B
of the Constitution presented another potential stumbling block. It states
that constitutional amendments require a two-thirds majority in parliament and a majority within each linguistic bloc. Constitutional reform
was critical to Tindemans's political agenda, and in fact the Egmont Pact
concerning federal devolution was secretly negotiated as part of his coalition bargaining (see Cove11 1982). The need for constitutional amendments to implement this plan made the options for Tindemans even
narrower. Collectively, these institutional features eliminated all but a
small number of coalitions. They go a long way toward explaining why
Tindemans's task was so difficult. In short, he had to contend with a
number of political constraints that severely circumscribed his choice set.
Institutions are a large part of what constrains parties in their bargaining. Government formation and maintenance are highly structured
processes, and a variety of institutional features impinge on the choice
set available to government formateurs. This is no news to the student
of legislative institutions or political parties. Scholars well versed in the
institutional environment of particular party systems often reject coalition
theories as inapplicable to their particular countries precisely because
most (though not all) attempts to apply deductive theories to the formation of cabinet coalitions assume a bargaining environment free from
institutional features that add complexity to coalition politics (see Laver
and Schofield 1990 for examples of such criticisms).
We concur in many criticisms thus leveled against traditional coalition-theoretic studies. We disagree, however, with the dismissive attitudes frequently found among empiricists about the general value of
game-theoretic studies of cabinet formation. There are strong reasons,
we believe, not to throw the baby out with the bath water. The neoinstitutionalist revolution in formal theories of politics holds great promise for
more realistic theories of government coalitions. Before we can elaborate
comprehensive deductive models of institutional effects, however, we
need to develop a systematic and empirically grounded account of the
main procedural constraints that are likely to bear upon government formation. That is indeed the central purpose of this article. In developing
this account, we are in the fortunate position of being able to draw on a
growing number of collections of comparative empirical studies of government formation (Bogdanor 1983; Browne and Dreijmanis 1982; Laver
and Budge 1992; Pridham 1986). We thus examine the role of bargaining
constraints both generally and in the specific practice of a number of
parliamentary democracies.
Our purpose is first to consider real-world constraints on cabinet
306
Kaare Srr$rn, Ian Budge, and Michael J . Laver
coalitions in ways that allow their incorporation in formal models; second, explicitly to identify some common constraints operating in realworld coalition systems; and third, to explore the effect of constraints on
the distribution of bargaining power and actual coalition outcomes. Thus,
in the next section, we discuss the role of institutions and their place in
coalition theory. The following part presents a general account of constraints on coalition bargaining. We then consider five specific types of
constraint, giving empirical examples of their forms and effects. Following this account, we provide a survey of the incidence of different constraints in 10 parliamentary democracies. We then discuss the potential
interactive effects of different constraints, giving a hypothetical illustration of how the interaction of just a few very simple coalitional constraints
can radically change the feasible set of coalition options and thereby
transform the bargaining power of different parties. From this example,
we return to the case of Belgium at the time of Tindemans and show that
constraints actually were a better guide to coalition formation than any
conventional coalition theory. We conclude by discussing the lessons of
bargaining constraints for the study of cabinet coalitions in parliamentary
democracies.
Institutions and Government Formation
In its application to government formation, coalition theory tends to
be institution free. Most theorists assume that parties shop around freely
for potential cabinet partners in a world in which all possible combinations of parties represent feasible governments. The predicted outcomes
are entirely preference induced, or in Riker's (1980) words "equilibria of
tastes." Such assumptions have been embedded in cooperative coalition
theory, where the object has been to characterize the set of equilibria,
which is generically large and unstable.' Empirically, this institution free
approach is commonly applied in cross-national research, where the approach is quite convenient, since it allows theories to be operationalized
at a level general enough to bear upon a range of political systems. Thus,
identical hypotheses and techniques can be applied to broadly comparable data sets. Indeed this approach can be, and often is, applied by investigators with no country-specific specialization, since typically many of
the data come from standard sources and are used with no contextual
interpretation. The ease with which "unconstrained" coalition theories
can be applied clearly represents a major advantage. However, the as-
'The classic theoretical work, of course, is Riker (1962).
CONSTRAINTS ON CABINET FORMATION
307
sumptions upon which they are based are hardly realistic. The real world
of coalition politics is one of constraints, in which it is quite definitely
not the case that everything is possible. To the extent that we neglect
such constraints, our theories of government formation will be unrealistic
in their assumptions, and their predictions may well lead us astray. The
parsimony of conventional coalition theory comes at a huge cost in plausibility (Laver 1986).
Yet the importance of political institutions has not gone unnoticed
in the recent literature on legislative behavior. Studies of U.S. legislative
politics have been revolutionized over the last decade or so by attempts
to model the effects of institutional structures (see Shepsle 1986, 1989). Increasingly, formal theorists have turned to extensive-form games, which
allow structural features of the bargaining situation to be taken into account much more explicitly than previously. A similar revolution is beginning in the cross-national study of cabinet coalitions, as neoinstitutional
approaches have begun to explore the consequences of procedures for
bargaining (Austen-Smith and Banks 1988, 1990; Baron 1991, 1993; Baron
and Ferejohn 1989; Laver and Shepsle 1990a, 1990b). Though so far only
selected procedural effects have been considered, typically those that
generate a high theoretical payoff in formal modeling, we have no doubt
about the fruitfulness of a broader exploration of these lines of inquiry.
We seek to contribute to an empirically informed development of
that tradition by identifying ways in which structure impinges on government formation through constraints on coalition bargaining. In large part,
constraints are institutions, by which we mean "rules about behavior,
especially about making decisions" (Riker 1980, 432; see also Ostrom
1986). Constraints affect many aspects of coalition politics, such as cabinet formation, portfolio allocation, coalition termination, and the process
of coalition governance itself. In this article, however, our focus is on
coalition formation. This is the area in which coalition theory has been
most adequately applied; yet there is much to be gained by systematically
taking constraints into account. Although our main interest is in the initial
formation of executive coalitions, our account of the institutional environment cannot confine itself narrowly to the government formation
process. Coalition bargaining may be affected by a variety of rules that
operate in other arenas where parties interact. Thus, the politics of government formation is nested within other games that parties play and
must be understood in this broader context (see Austen-Smith and Banks
1988; Laver and Shepsle 1990b; Strem 1990a; Tsebelis 1990). Hence,
coalition bargaining constraints must be broadly conceived. It is to the
more precise definition of this term that we now turn.
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Kaare Strpim, Ian Budge, and Michael J . Laver
Constraints
A constraint on coalition bargaining can be defined as any restriction
on the set of feasible cabinet coalitions that is beyond the short-term
control of the players. Constraints need not be etched in stone for all
time, but can nonetheless be taken as given for the particular bargaining
situation to which they are attributed.* Note that what we take to be a
bargaining constraint depends upon the time frame. If the time frame is
long enough, all constraints may possibly be "endogenized," that is,
explained as products of the interaction between political players, rather
than taken as limitations on their freedom of action. The institutions in
which many constraints are embedded are, after all, themselves political
artifacts. If we had a fully developed and historically comprehensive
model of political behavior, then there would be no need to invoke constraints in our account of government formation. Since the current understanding of party competition falls very far short of this mark, however,
many constraints must be taken as given. Also, any given player will face
constraints not of his or her own choosing. Treating limitations on the
behavior of key actors as exogenous constraints on coalition bargaining
therefore has considerable heuristic value in furthering our understanding
of party behavior.
Although exogenous institutional constraints are the most clear-cut
restrictions on the set of feasible coalitions, they are not the only ones.
Political parties may also impose "endogenous" constraints upon themselves to strengthen their hand in bargaining. In late 1986, for example,
the Irish Labour party, having faced disastrous losses in the opinion polls
during its coalition with Fine Gael, decided to enter no further coalitions
until its electoral fortunes had improved substantially. This formal decision by the party conference effectively bound the party leadership. No
coalition could form that included the Labour party unless the party membership gave its approval in a specially convened delegate conference.
Although the party clearly had imposed this constraint upon itself, its
leaders nonetheless faced a major restriction on their freedom of a ~ t i o n . ~
'In our definition, the "short term" refers to the particular bargaining situation under
consideration. We assume that in the short run the resources (e.g., parliamentary representation) of each party remain constant.
j ~ f t e rmore than doubling its legislative representation in the November 1992 Dail
election, the Labour party became pivotal in Irish government formation. The Labour
leader convened a special delegate conference in January 1993, when he recommended that
the party enter a coalition with Fianna Fail. The conference had the clear power to reject
this proposal, and this possibility was a significant constraint on coalition bargaining. In
the event, the conference approved the proposal, and Labour entered a coalition government with Fianna Fail.
CONSTRAINTS ON CABINET FORMATION
3O9
Other examples of self-imposed constraints include governing coalitions
that commit themselves to continue in office in the event that the electorate renews their parliamentary majority, or parties that pledge themselves
never to go into coalition with some particular rival.
Not all constraints are equal. We distinguish between hard constraints, which effectively eliminate particular combinations of parties,
and soft constraints, which simply make certain coalitions more or less
likely. Hard constraints must be both speciJic and enforceable (i.e., they
must clearly specify which coalitions are or are not permissible, and they
must be backed up by credible enforcement mechanisms). For constitutional rules, an independent judiciary clearly may serve this latter function. But even less formalized enforcement mechanisms may do, such as
the anticipated wrath of the voters or activists in cases where politicians
consider breaking their solemn promises (party rules) concerning coalitional bedfellows. Soft constraints, which are less specific, less enforceable, or both, simply reflect the way that institutional arrangements "load
the dice" in coalition bargaining.
Even soft constraints, however, can have a major influence on coalition bargaining. For example, when Socialist Franqois Mitterrand won
the 1988 French presidential election, beating Prime Minister Jacques
Chirac of the rival Gaullist party (RPR), Chirac immediately resigned as
prime minister, giving way to a quite different cabinet under Socialist
Michel Rocard. No law required this change of government-and nothing
had changed in the legislature. Yet the presidential contest suggested that
the Socialists would gain in a legislative election, and the Constitution of
the Fifth Republic gave the president the power to dissolve the legislature
and call such an election. This constitutional provision shifted power
toward the Socialists, even before the legislative election was called
shortly afterward. The 1988 French presidential election thus had a very
strong effect on legislative bargaining, deriving from the president's constitutional power to dissolve the legislature. If the president's powers had
been weaker, Chirac very likely would have decided differently.
Before we proceed to a more systematic account of bargaining constraints, a note of caution is in order. Although even soft bargaining
constraints may well be important, we should require of any account of
government formation that its constraints be identifiable objectively and
ex ante from a defensible comprehensive conception of the bargaining
process. There are obvious dangers involved in constructing a "theory"
of government formation that can be customized to any particular bargaining situation by picking and choosing, in a post hoc manner, from
an open-ended menu of constraints. Considerations of parsimony and
intersubjectivity alike militate against such explanations.
3 10
Kaare Str$m, Ian Budge, and Michael J . Laver
Cabinet Formation Rules
Many of the most important institutional constraints on coalition
bargaining are rules concerning the cabinet formation process itself.
Many of these in turn derive from constitutional provisions that can be
specified in a reasonably straightforward manner. We can easily identify
several important ways in which the formal rules of the political game in
a particular country affect coalition bargaining by "loading the dice":
(1) the constitution or other laws may contain rules concerning the size
or composition of the executive coalition; (2) the rules of government
investiture may privilege certain parties and coalitions by creating hurdles
for coalition formation; and (3) recognition rules may vest special powers
in a partisan head of state or privilege the status quo coalition.
Size and Composition Requirements
As might be expected, no European constitution actually prohibits
any particular political party from entering government once it has won
seats in the legislature. In a number of countries, however, electoral law
precludes certain parties from winning seats in the legislature in the first
place, either as a result of specific proscriptions (as was the case with
the Communist party of Germany between 1956 and 1972) or as a result
of electoral thresholds (set at 5% in Germany, for example, and at 4% in
Sweden). Thus, parties that may be electorally salient are institutionally
prevented from cabinet participation.
Given a particular distribution of legislative seats, however, hard
institutional constraints on bargaining are uncommon. The main exceptions can be found in divided societies that have consociational provisions
in their constitutions, the most obvious example of which is Belgium. As
mentioned above, Articles 59B and 86B of the Belgian Constitution impose very explicit and rigid constraints on coalition membership that
dramatically reduce the range of options. The British government imposed a similar provision for the representation of the two major religious
communities during the short life of the ill-fated Northern Ireland Assembly (1973-75). Beyond these examples, however, formal institutional constraints on the parties that can go into government are rare, a product no
doubt of the fundamental principle of equality before the law enshrined
in most European constitutions. Given such equality (or, more precisely,
"anonymity" or "undifferentiatedness") provisions, institutional factors
more often "softly" constrain coalition bargaining.
One significant qualification of the basic norm of parliamentary democracy is the requirement of a "constructive" vote of no confidence.
Under this provision found in the German and Spanish constitutions, a
CONSTRAINTS ON CABINET FORMATION
311
successful vote of censure must simultaneously propose an alternative
government. Thus, a government can be defeated only by a coalition that
is explicitly prepared to take office together (and which must, of course,
include a member of the outgoing government if the latter controls a
majority). In this case, the government cannot be dislodged by a "coalition" that is no more than a disparate gang of disaffected legislators, by
the kind of "snipers" (franchi tiratori) that have sometimes brought
down Italian governments. Thus, the constructive vote of no confidence
effectively prohibits minority governments and favors the status quo in
bargaining.
Investiture Rules
The process by which a new cabinet is formed and installed can
significantly affect coalition bargaining. The rules in many countries, Italy
among them, require any incoming government to present itself to the
legislature and gain its approval in the form of an investiture vote before
taking office. In some countries in which an investiture vote is required,
however, there is a strong presumption that the outgoing government will
re-present itself to the legislature. The search for alternatives, then, only
formally begins if the incumbent government is defeated. In other cases,
the "candidate government" presenting itself for investiture is favored
by the investiture decision rules. In Italy, for example, abstentions on
investiture votes effectively count in the government's favor. Thus, in
1976 Giulio Andreotti's famous government of non sfiducia ("non-no
confidence") was supported by no more than 258 deputies out of 630;
yet Andreotti comfortably gained office, since all but 44 of the remaining
members abstained.
In many parliamentary democracies, particularly those shaped by
the Westminster tradition, no formal investiture vote is required, and the
existing government remains in office until it loses a vote of ~onfidence.~
Any constitutional presumption in favor of the incumbent government
obviously places it in a privileged position compared to all others. The
incumbents represent the reversion point in the event the other parties
fail to agree on an alternative. The existence of such a status quo coalition, which completely transforms the bargaining game, is rarely taken
into account by formal coalition theories (though see Laver and Shepsle
40bviously, all governments implicitly face an investiture vote whenever they first
expose themselves to the possibility of a parliamentary no confidence vote. Yet when no
investiture vote is required, the "burden of proof" shifts to the opposition. And some
parties may find it acceptable tacitly to lend their weight to a government that they could
not openly support in an investiture vote.
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Kaare StrQm, Ian Budge, and Michael J . Laver
1990a, 1990b, and Lupia and Strem 1993, for models incorporating a
status quo government).
Recognition Rules
A third important feature of the government formation process concerns the recognition rule, which specifies which parties will be asked to
form governments, and in what order. Few constitutions make specific
provisions in this area, but in some countries, relatively clear conventions
have been established, such as giving the task first to the largest party,
the party recommended by the majority of party leaders, or the party
most responsible for bringing about the resignation of the previous government (see Hermeren 1976; von Beyme 1970). Interestingly, recent
neoinstitutionalist theories of government formation have begun to explore this aspect of the bargaining environment (Austen-Smith and Banks
1988; Baron 1991, 1993; Baron and Ferejohn 1989) that until now too
often has been neglected.
In the absence of hard and fast recognition rules, considerable discretion may be vested in the head of state, who may be allowed or obliged
to play a more or less active role in setting the agenda of cabinet formation. Under some constitutions, especially republican ones, the head of
state is integral to the bargaining process. Typically in such states, of
which Finland and Italy are good examples, the president may influence
the choice of prime minister and occasionally the set of governing parties.
The Finnish president has used this influence extensively (Anckar 1987;
Nousiainen 1988). In 1987 the unprecedented coalition of Conservatives
and Social Democrats came about in large part at the insistence of President Koivisto (Berglund 1987).5
Even in monarchies, the head of state may play a significant role in
government formation. The Netherlands is a good example, where the
monarch designates a formateur, who initiates coalition bargaining and
is normally expected to lead the incoming government. If there is conflict
over who the formateur should be, the head of state may nominate a
senior politician as inforrnateur, whose task is to identify a formateur
after consultations with the relevant parties. In other cases, however, the
head of state effectively plays no part in government formation. In Ireland
or Germany, for example, the president simply acts on the nomination
of the legislature. The extreme case is Sweden, where the king does not
even play a ceremonial role in appointing a new government, a role given
instead to the Speaker of the Parliament. Only in this latter case is the
' ~ n1992 the Finnish Parliament initiated constitutional reforms that may restrict the
president's power over cabinet formation.
CONSTRAINTS ON CABINET FORMATION
3I3
head of state unable to exert any direct influence on coalition bargaining.
In all other cases, the head of state may effectively attempt to impose
an agenda of protocoalitions for consideration. At the very least, the
preferences of the head of state may then be a factor if there are multiple
viable options.
Cabinet Operation Rules
Once an executive coalition has been successfully forged, the rules
of cabinet decision making (or operation) continue to affect its viability
and success. Of course, to the extent that such rules significantly impinge
on interparty relations, parties will anticipate their effects in their initial
coalition bargaining. For these reasons, two sets of rules concerning
executive operation are particularly likely to be salient in coalition
bargaining: (1) cabinet decision rules and (2) rules regarding cabinet
termination.
Cabinet Decision Rules
The internal rules of cabinet decision making may well affect coalition bargaining. The doctrine of collective cabinet responsibility, for example, imposes common policies on all coalition parties, even those that
argued strongly against them at the cabinet table. This may force some
parties to defend publicly policies that contradict their commitments in
their election programs. Where the doctrine of collective cabinet responsibility is weaker, parties that lose out in cabinet may be able to distance
themselves more explicitly from government policy. In the former case,
there may hence be a premium on finding ideologically congenial coalition
partners; in the latter case, this may be less important. This effect may
apply even if the party leaders in question have adopted their policy
positions for purely opportunistic reasons. To the extent that voters or
activists take policy commitments seriously, party leaders have to worry
about whether they appear to live up to them.
Individual ministerial responsibility, especially as it affects the delegation of policymaking authority within the cabinet, is also important.
The more autonomous each cabinet member is within his or her jurisdiction, the less feasible mutually beneficial policy compromises may be.
This is because each party distrusts its ability to enforce policy positions
outside the ministries it controls. At the limit, each party may be an effective dictator in the policy areas its ministers control but have no influence
in the areas controlled by its coalition partners. Laver and Shepsle
(1990a, 1990b) have demonstrated analytically how this institutional arrangement may drastically restrict the range of otherwise feasible coalitions. At the very least, a decentralized cabinet decision-making
3 I4
Kaare StrGm, Ian Budge, and Michael J . Laver
environment forces parties to look for partners with compatible portfolio
preferences (see Budge and Keman 1990).
Rules of Cabinet Termination
The rules concerning cabinet resignation can affect the expected duration (and thereby the "value") of different coalition options. The more
the rules favor certain coalitions (e.g., majority cabinets), the more attractive such coalitions will be relative to the alternatives. A defining
feature of parliamentary democracies is that governments must resign
if censured by the legislature. Not every legislative defeat is fatal to a
government; only defeats designated as no confidence votes have this
effect. Obviously, the precise procedures concerning no confidence motions are important in this regard. Some constitutions, such as those of
France and Spain, place various restrictions on the use of no confidence
motions (Huber 1992; Lopez Pina 1985). As mentioned above, the constructive vote of no confidence, found in Germany and Spain, effectively
favors the status quo in coalition bargaining situations. Moreover, if the
government has a firm grip on the legislative agenda, it can manipulate
this agenda to avert those defeats that might provoke votes of no confidence. The greater the cabinet's agenda control, the more attractive otherwise feeble coalitions will be.
Legislative Rules
Coalition bargaining is affected not only by the rules of the executive
branch but also by those pertaining to the legislature. Three types of
legislative rules are particularly likely to affect coalition bargaining:
(1) the effective decision rule for legislation and budgeting; (2) rules concerning legislative dissolution; and (3) the legislative electoral system.
Decision Rules
Certain systems, such as Belgium's, require a qualified majority of
the legislature (two-thirds in the Belgian case) before a constitution can
be amended. When constitutional reform is an issue, a viable coalition
(one that has effective control of the legislature on issues that matter)
may well need more than a majority of all seats.6 This may in effect
give veto powers to some of the larger parties. In Finland until 1992,
supermajorities were needed even for some nonconstitutional legislation.
The need for a qualified majority is not strictly a hard constraint on
government formation, since not all members of the legislative coalition
6 0 n the concept of a viable coalition, see Budge and Laver (1986).
CONSTRAINTS ON CABINET FORMATION
3I5
need to be represented in the cabinet. It is, however, a major influence
on bargaining, one that can impede the formation of stable and effective
cabinet coalitions. Similarly, in France restrictive legislative rules such
as the guillotine and the package vote may facilitate minority government
formation (Huber 1992).
Dissolution Rules
The precise rules for dissolving the legislature and calling elections
can also have a considerable bearing on coalition bargaining. In Finland
and Italy, for example, government resignations have rarely caused
premature elections. This is at least partly because the power to call
elections in these countries rests with the president, who is less likely
than a prime minister to resort to this option opportunistically. But even
monarchies may severely restrict the use of premature elections. Under
the new Swedish Constitution, parliamentary elections are held every
three years, even if early elections have occurred in the meantime. So
far, this constitutional provision has prevented any early dissolution of
the Riksdag. The extreme case, however, is Norway, whose Constitution
permits no early dissolution of the Storting.
In other countries, however, a government's collapse precipitates a
new election, a factor that can have a major impact on coalition stability.
Political elites today have access to voluminous opinion poll data about
the likely results of elections. Thus, governing parties expecting to do
well electorally may have a greater incentive to bring down the government and force an election than those that are doing badly. In anticipation
of this, parties gaining in opinion polls should acquire more bargaining
power within existing governments (Lupia and Strem 1993). If elections
are effectively fixed in time, there may be less of an incentive to launch
a preemptive strike, since there is no opportunity to gain bargaining
power by consulting the voters prematurely.
Electoral Rules
The electoral system can affect the coalitional process in a number of
ways. The most obvious effect lies in the incentives provided by certain
electoral systems, notably the Irish STV system, the French doubleballot system, and the British simple plurality system, for parties to form
preelectoral coalitions. A similar effect exists in proportional representative (PR) electoral systems with apparentement, where parties themselves can form electoral alliances for the purpose of sharing their "excess" votes. Apparentement has been used in the Netherlands, in the
316
Kaare Strgm, Ian Budge, and Michael J . Laver
French Fourth Republic, and in Norway and Sweden until the late 1940s.'
The so-called swindle law, under which the Italian elections of 1953 were
contested, was an especially potent (and controversial) form of apparentement. This electoral law would have given two-thirds of the seats
in the Chamber of Deputies to any electoral alliance of parties that collectively polled a majority of the popular vote.
Electoral laws do not favor particular coalitions as much as electoral
coalitions in general. They may shift the coalition-formation phase of
party politics to the preelectoral period and encourage preelectoral coalitions that can be sold to voters as well as to legislators. The Irish STV
electoral system particularly encourages coalitions to form before rather
than after elections, since cooperating parties may systematically transfer
votes among themselves to their mutual benefit (Laver 1992). Preelectoral
coalitions were announced explicitly in 1973, 1977, and 1989-winning
and forming in 1973, losing in 1977 and 1989. There were also implicit
preelectoral coalitions in 1981 and twice in 1982-winning and forming
in 1981 and once in 1982, losing once in 1982.
The French double-ballot system provides strong inducements for
parties to make electoral deals between the first and the second ballots
(see Tsebelis 1990). In the 1988 presidential elections, for example, the
second ballot involved a runoff between the Socialist candidate, Franqois
Mitterrand, and Gaullist Jacques Chirac. Particularly among supporters
of various first-round candidates on the right, there was very considerable
interparty maneuvering to build an antisocialist electoral coalition and
thereby to mount a credible challenge to Mitterrand before the second
ballot.
In short, the electoral system has a major effect on coalition bargaining. Systems not based on PR lists tend to force parties to coalesce
before elections in order to exploit electoral economies of scale. The
more disproportional the electoral system, the greater the incentives for
preelectoral alliances. For this strategy to be effective, it is often necessary for the parties in the electoral coalition to declare their intention to
collaborate after the election is over. Coalition bargaining is thus moved
forward to the period before the election. Whether preelectoral coalitions
subsequently transform themselves into executive coalitions is, of course,
an empirical matter. There is no doubt, however, that there is a strong
tendency for this to happen. It is very rare and presumably quite damaging for a combination of parties to fight an election as a coalition and
then to refuse to share power once they have the chance to do so.
' ~ nNorway apparenternent was reintroduced for the election of 1985 and subsequently
abolished again before the 1989 election.
CONSTRAINTS ON CABINET FORMATION
3I7
Party Rules
In addition to the institutional constraints discussed above, particular
coalition systems may well feature powerful endogenous constraints.
These are limitations that parties impose upon themselves for tactical
purposes, yet they may be no less potent restrictions on the set of feasible
coalitions. Party leaders may declare that they will, or will not, form
particular coalitions. As long as they are simply "cheap talk," such declarations do not strictly constitute constraints on behavior. But party leaders may find ways of binding themselves to these commitments-for example, by passing party conference resolutions that cannot legally be
undone without the consent of the conference, thereby giving these declarations the force of private law, or simply by putting their reputations on
the line (on credible commitment, see Schelling 1960; Dixit and Nalebuff
1991; Elster 1989).
The systematic exclusion of certain parties from coalition bargaining
is the most striking party constraint found with any regularity. While
most constraints that exclude specific parties from office are specific to
particular countries and particular historical periods, we can identify a
few general trends. The examples of the Gaullists or Communists in the
French Fourth Republic, Sinn FCin in Ireland, or the Italian Communists
in the 1950s show that certain parties, as a consequence of their strong
"antisystem" stance, can effectively be discounted as members of any
potential government. Such a stance involves fundamental and nonnegotiable points of opposition to the existing constitution, which might conflict with the policy commitments of potential coalition partners. Consequently, there is no prospect of agreement on a policy package, and the
party concerned is effectively excluded from office unless it can "go it
alone. ' '
Such exclusions may be self-imposed, or they may be imposed by
rival parties. After the advent of Eurocommunism, for example, some
communist parties were prepared to join governments, and their demands
became negotiable. Notwithstanding this change of heart (or strategy)
among the communists, most other parties still treated them as antisystem outcasts and refused to bargain. Besides antisystem parties, taboos
are often attached to parties associated with previous political regimes,
especially undemocratic ones. Thus, the neo-Fascist MSI in Italy has, for
most of its history, been treated as a pariah by the other Italian par tie^.^
To a lesser extent, this was also true of the now-defunct Monarchists.
'The exclusion of the MSI from coalition bargaining has been based less on its policy
program, which has certainly been conservative though not really extremist, than on its
ties to a discredited and embarrassing Fascist past.
318
Kaare Strqim, Ian Budge, and Michael J . Laver
In other cases, perfectly "coalitionable" parties may voluntarily forgo coalitions with any other party. One such case, the Irish Labour
party in 1986, has been discussed above. Another case is the Italian
Socialist party, which took itself out of the coalition game from the breakdown of the center-left coalition in the early 1970s until the end of the
"historic compromise" in 1979. The Norwegian Labor party, which
adopted an anticoalition policy in the 1930s and which has never entered
a peacetime coalition government, is a third example.
While refusal to consider coalition membership can severely reduce
a party's bargaining power in the government formation game, it may be
an effective electoral strategy for a party hoping to win a legislative majority on its own. Such a strategy may allow the party to cast itself as a
strong, stable alternative to the squabbles, inefficiencies, and instabilities
of coalition government. Thus, a strategy that seems self-defeating in the
government formation game may make sense in electoral competition
(Strem 1990a). One of the most striking examples of this strategy can be
seen in Britain. Both Labour and the Conservatives scorn the possibility
of coalitions during election campaigns, even when opinion polls indicate
that a hung Parliament is a distinct possibility. Their intention clearly is
to dissuade a sufficient number of strategic voters from voting for minorparty opponents. With a little help from the electoral system, they have
been successful so far. If the two big British parties were to open themselves to the possibility of coalitions with the center, the likelihood of a
hung Parliament might indeed increase significantly.
Yet not all self-imposed constraints can be explained through reference to the competition between parties, even if our attention extends to
the electoral arena. Intraparty politics may be just as important, as senior
politicians interact with activists in their own parties. Party leaders may
believe that some coalitions would be sufficiently detrimental to their
recruitment of candidates or activists to be avoided under all circumstances. Or they may believe that the benefits of a potential coalition
would be outweighed by the costs their own activists would impose in
irate retaliation. Such costs may consist in an increased likelihood of
being removed from party leadership positions (see Luebbert 1986). Consciousness of these risks may induce party leaders to refrain from otherwise attractive coalitions.
In some such situations, a party may decide to impose rigid restrictions on its participation in particular coalitions. This could be because
party leaders themselves suspect "weakness of will" if they were
tempted to make concessions during coalition bargaining (see Elster
1984). Alternatively, lower-ranking officers and activists may not trust
their leaders ("agents") to put the interests of the party above the lure
CONSTRAINTS ON CABINET FORMATION
3I9
of the trappings of office. In practice, this may lead an annual party
conference to pass a resolution proscribing particular coalitions. In the
long run, of course, a party that can bind itself to a particular strategy
can also unbind itself, and spectacular, strategic U-turns are by no means
unknown. Yet since cabinet bargaining is typically played against the
clock (see Strgm 1994), parties may find ways to bind themselves so that
the constraint cannot be lifted during this process.
External Veto Players
Finally, constraints may come in a less obvious guise when they
reflect restrictions imposed by players outside the parliamentary arena
altogether, such as influential foreign governments. As De Swaan notes,
"Certain institutions and organizations in the surrounding society, e.g.,
business, finance, churches, trade unions, the army, universities, may
entertain ties with only a relatively small number of representatives in
parliament and yet such interests may occupy a position that makes it
necessary to seek their consent, or to form large majorities in order to
overcome their opposition, if the parliamentary decision is not to remain
ineffective" (1973, 86). We refer to such institutions and organizations
as external veto players.
The exclusion of communists from governments all over Western
Europe in the late 1940s and early 1950s was in no small part caused by
the anticipated resistance of the United States to such coalitions. Given
its military and economic power, its role as provider of economic assistance, and in some cases its involvement as an occupation power, fear of
U. S. displeasure at, and even active intervention to prevent, communist
participation in the government of a NATO country acted as a potent
constraint on coalition bargaining in several places, notably I t a l ~ . ~
External veto players need not be foreign. Domestic interest groups
may equally well be able to proscribe coalition options. The armed forces
may play such a role, especially in less stable democracies. During the
transitions to democracy in Spain and Portugal, and particularly in their
early phases, certain coalitions were effectively ruled out by the military.
Thus, a very left-wing government in Spain or a very right-wing government in Portugal would have met with (perhaps armed) military resistance. The anticipation of such intervention clearly constrained the leading politicians. Other interest groups, such as trade unions or churches,
may occasionally play a similar role. When Christian Democratic Prime
Minister Ferdinand0 Tambroni in 1960 attempted to govern Italy with the
active support of the neo-Fascist Italian Social Movement (MSI), the
9Whether or not this fear was realistic, it was certainly real.
Table 1. Constraints and Their Effects on Coalition Bargaining
Class of Constraint
Example
Impact on Bargaining
Germany: Constructive
vote of no confidence
Precludes minority governments and changes
bargaining power
Constitution specifies
composition of coalition
Belgium: Combination
of Flemish and Walloon parties
Specified parties gain
bargaining power:
Where two or more
specified parties exist,
relative bargaining
power will be unpredictable, a matter of
pure strategic interaction
Investiture requirement
Belgium
Israel
Italy
Favors majority coalitions
Particular coalition
forms status quo in
the event of stalemate
Finland
Ireland
Status quo coalition
may gain bargaining
power
Head of state plays active role in formation
process
Italy
Finland
President's preferred
party may gain bargaining power
Sweden
United Kingdom
Favors policy-compact
coalitions
Italy: Patronage ministries especially
Denmark
Disfavors parties with
strong policy preferences
Legislative rules:
Extraordinary majority decision rules Belgium: Constitutional
amendments
Favors parties capable
of forming blocking
coalitions
Guillotine and similar restrictive rules
France: Guillotine and
package vote
Favors minority coali- tions Easy to call elections
Ireland Denmark Favors policy-compact
coalitions
Cabinet formation rules:
Constitutional provisions preclude governments below a size
threshold
Cabinet operation rules:
Collective cabinet responsibility
Cabinet authority delegated to individual
ministers or legislative committees
CONSTRAINTS ON CABINET FORMATION
32 I
Table 1 (continued)
Class of Constraint
Electoral systems: Plurality , STV, apparentement, doubleballot
Example
Impact on Bargaining
United Kingdom
Ireland
France
Favors preelectoral alliances
Italy: MSI, PC1
Ireland: Sinn Fein
Disfavors excluded parties
Norway: Nonsocialist
parties
Germany: Preelectoral
alliances
May favor allied parties
Italy: U.S. ban on PC1
participation
Italy: Union ban on
MSI participation
Favors permissible parties
Favors permissible parties
Party rules:
Particular parties or
combinations of parties excluded from
government
Preelectoral party coalitions
External veto players:
Foreign governments
Domestic interest
groups
trade unions displayed their readiness to mobilize against the government
in strikes and civil disorder. The Christian Democrats forced Tambroni
to resign, recognizing this constraint on their ability to cut deals with the
extreme right.
Constraints and Coalition Bargaining
The general constraints that we have discussed are summarized in
Table 1, which provides more specific examples and identifies their likely
effects on coalition bargaining. Table 2, which complements Table 1,
presents an empirical overview of the incidence of different constraints
in 10 post-World War I1 multiparty democracies, using data drawn from
Laver and Budge (1992).1° From Table 1, we see that some constraints
affect bargaining power in systematic ways (e.g., party exclusions and
status quo coalitions), whereas the effects of others (e.g., preelectoral
coalitions) may be more difficult to predict.
"Because of the difficulty of objectively identifying them ex ante, we have excluded
external veto player constraints from the ,examples in Table 2.
CONSTRAINTS ON CABINET FORMATION
323
Table 2 demonstrates a great deal of variation in the frequency of
various constraints. Note, for example, that Belgium and Italy both exhibit a wide range of constraints on coalition bargaining. The same two
countries are notoriously difficult cases for most coalition theories, with
frequent departures from the size principle and other solution concepts.
Israel and Sweden, by contrast, have simpler bargaining environments.
While the interaction of only a few constraints can create quite a complex
strategic situation, constraints generally reduce the range of feasible coalitions and thus simplify bargaining. In extreme cases, indeed, the interaction of a set of constraints can leave only one or even no feasible
possibility. In other cases, a large number of initial possibilities may be
reduced very dramatically. For example, if only one out of six parties is
excluded from the set of feasible coalitions, the effect is to reduce the
number of arithmetically possible coalitions from 63 to 31, excluding the
null coalition (Laver 1989). One of the most striking effects of constraints
is that, through reductions of the set of feasible coalitions, bargaining
power is redistributed. This is because bargaining power is based on the
ability to threaten rivals with alternative coalitions. As the range of such
threats is altered, so is bargaining power.
A Hypothetical Example
The effects we have described can be illustrated by a hypothetical
example. Table 3 describes a simple four-party system and imposes on
this six bargaining constraints discussed above. Twelve different scenarios are constructed, each characterized by a particular combination
of constraints. For each scenario, Table 3 illustrates the effects on the
set of feasible coalitions. Through these examples, we show how constraints can shift the feasible set of coalitions away from the predictions
of institution-free cooperative coalition theory.
The first scenario depicts a completely unconstrained bargaining situation, in which all 15 coalitions (again excluding the null coalition) are
feasible. Given the well-documented possibility of viable minority governments (Budge and Laver 1986; Strqm 1990b), we have not a priori
excluded such coalitions from our feasible sets." All our scenarios but
the first, however, involve some form of majority requirement and hence
eliminate minority cabinets. The next two scenarios involve a single
" w e make no assumption, of course, that minority coalitions are feasible in all realworld institutional settings. Clearly they are not. Nor do we assume that such governments
are as valuable to their participants as coalitions with majority support. Our point is simply
to insist that any constraint on minority coalition formation be modeled explicitly. If minority coalitions remain in the feasible set, whether they emerge will depend on the preferences of the relevant parties.
CONSTRAINTS ON CABINET FORMATION
325
constraint; the following eight, a combination of two; and the final scenario, a set of three. Table 3 demonstrates that every possible majority
coalition is in the feasible set of at least one scenario, whereas none is
feasible in all scenarios. Note also that, as the number of constraints
increases, the set of feasible coalitions diminishes quickly. In scenario 3,
for example, a single constraint reduces the number of feasible coalitions
to five. In general, the interaction effects of various constraints can be
quite striking. Thus, the two constraints in scenario 7 permit no more
than two feasible coalitions. In the most extreme case, which we have
not illustrated here, a small set of constraints may render no feasible
coalition at all. One example would combine a qualified majority constraint with the exclusion of a party large enough to have a blocking vote.
In this event, no coalition can simultaneously satisfy both constraints. If
a communist party with 40% of the seats was excluded from office, for
example, and constitutional reform was on the agenda, then no government could form that consisted of "permissible" parties and that controlled a two-thirds majority.
Note that different constraints vary as to whether they shift the feasible set of coalitions toward oversized or undersized solutions. Preelectoral coalitions and consociational solutions may permit only very large
coalitions. Party exclusions, on the other hand, have the opposite effect.
Note also how frequently minimum winning coalitions may be blocked
by different combinations of constraints. Coalition AD (52 seats), the
smallest minimal winning coalition in our example, is excluded in all but
three of our constrained scenarios. This result suggests that deviations
from the size principle may be structure induced as well as preference
induced.
Bargaining Power
Table 3 gives us some clear examples of the ways in which constraints may shift coalition bargaining power. It thus illustrates the limitations of most conventional indices of bargaining power, which assume
away most of the constraints that interest us here (see Banzhaf 1965;
Holler 1982; Shapley and Shubik 1954). While it is beyond the scope of
this article to develop more adequate measures of bargaining power, it is
possible to get some sense of the changes brought about by our various
scenarios. We do this in the form of modified Shapley and Shubik power
indices for each of the various scenarios. We have modified the Shapley
and Shubik index only by (1) counting as pivotal the party that brings the
coalition into conformity with all the applicable constraints and (2) discounting coalition sequences in which an "impermissible" party is included before the coalition satisfies all constraints. These power indices
are presented in Table 4.
326
Kaare StrGm, Ian Budge, and Michael J . Laver
Table 4. Bargaining Power under Different Sets of Constraints Partv
Scenario
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
A
B
SO0
.583
.250
,417
.600
SO0
.I67
.333
.417
SO0
.083
.I67
.250
.083
,083
.200
SO0
.333
.333
.083
,167
,250
C
D
.I67
.083
.583
.417
.I67
.083
,083
.083
,200
0
0.
.I67
0
.250
.I67
.417
0
.333
.333
.250
.I67
.250
Note: Entries are modified Shapley and Shubik
values under constraint scenarios described in
Table 3. See text for further detail.
Note the striking variations in the bargaining power of different parties, depending on constraints. A comparison of scenarios 2 and 3 shows
that, compared to a pure majority, a supermajority constraint seems to
boost the bargaining power of the larger parties. Yet a comparison of
scenarios 6 and 7 reveals that raising the majority requirement may not
always benefit the largest party. Obviously, the exclusion of a party from
coalitions reduces its short-term bargaining power, as clearly can be seen
from the same two scenarios.12 Scenarios 8 and 9, compared with 2 and
3, suggest that if two parties announce a preelectoral coalition, they may
significantly enhance their bargaining power. Given a majority constraint,
a preelectoral coalition between two parties who, combined, gain a legislative majority can give these parties collectively all of the bargaining
power, just as if they were a single majority party. But since a credible
preelectoral coalition equalizes bargaining power among its members, it
favors smaller parties more than larger ones. Consequently, we should
expect large parties to form preelectoral coalitions with small ones only
where the latter have other bargaining advantages, such as, for example,
I2If a party excludes itself from coalitions, it may, of course, do so in the hope or
expectation of making electoral gains. Thus, in the longer term, it may gain power by
gaining seats.
CONSTRAINTS ON CABINET FORMATION
327
a position close to the core of the policy space. German and Norwegian
evidence on preelectoral coalitions of unequally sized parties suggests
that this may indeed be the case. Finally, we see from scenario 12 that
a set of seemingly innocuous constraints may have the effect of totally
transforming bargaining power, to the extent that the largest (and in most
scenarios most powerful) party is almost totally emasculated.
The Case of Belgium, 1977-80
Having explored the general effects of constraints on coalition bargaining, we now return to the historical case that provided the starting
point for our excursus. In this section, we more systematically explore
the effects of institutional constraints on coalition bargaining in Belgium
in the period 1977-80, the time of the constitutional resolution of the
country's devolution into distinctive linguistic regions. The Egmont Pact,
which proposed a partial devolution of power to Belgium's three regions
(Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels), was drawn up at the time of the
negotiation of the Tindemans V coalition and implemented in a modified
form in August 1980. We consider the five bargaining situations that
occurred at the height of debate over the "community problem" in Belgian politics (see Cove11 1981, 1982), that is, the situations resulting in
the formation of the governments Tindemans V through Martens I11
(Dewachter and Clijsters 1982; Hear1 1992; Rudd 1986). The first two
of these bargaining situations occurred during the Parliament elected on
17 April 1977, the latter three after the election of 17 December 1978.
In this set of cases, we can straightforwardly identify four important
bargaining constraints discussed in the introductory section: (1) the requirement of a two-thirds legislative majority for constitutional amendments (Article 59B); (2) the stipulation that equal numbers of Flemishand French-speaking ministers be represented in the cabinet (Article 86B);
(3) the related party rule that no linguistic segment of any of the national
parties would enter the government without its counterpart in the other
linguistic community; and (4) the similar rule that any representation of
the purely regional parties would have to be balanced. To this we add a
party exclusion rule: (5) no coalition would form involving either of two
independent deputies elected in 1978.13 Note that none of these constraints was perfectly hard. While the constitutional provisions were certainly enforceable, they did not specifically dictate the composition of
130neof these deputies represented the extreme right-wing Vlaams Blok, whereas the
other represented the "Poujadist" UDRT-RAD (Dewachter 1987,290). There is no evidence
that either played any role in coalition bargaining, and we have no measure of their policy
positions.
328
Kaare StrGm, Ian Budge, and Michael J . Laver
the cabinet. For example, a cabinet lacking two-thirds legislative support
could conceivably have negotiated such support for the Egmont Pact
from opposition parties on an ad hoc basis. The set defined by these
constraints therefore does not exhaust the set of feasible outcomes.
Rather, it represents the set of solutions most favored by critical rules
impinging on cabinet formation.
The purpose of our analysis here is to assess how much knowledge
of the operable bargaining constraints helps us in understanding cabinet
formation. As a way to accomplish this, we compare the explanatory
power of the relevant bargaining constraints alone to those of several
prominent solution concepts in the coalition-theoretic literature. The first
of these solution concepts is Riker's (1962) size principle, the proposition
that coalitions should be minimal winning. We take "winning" in this
context to mean controlling the number of legislative votes necessary to
win an investiture vote. Second, we consider a traditional policy-based
solution concept developed by Axelrod (1970), requiring government coalitions to be minimal connected winning in unidimensional policy space.
Finally, we consider two versions of the prediction that coalitions should
include the core party in policy space, that is, in a unidimensional policy
space the party controlling the median legislator (Laver and Schofield
1990). The most radical version of this theory predicts that the core party
should be able to govern alone, since there is no alternative that is preferred by a legislative majority on policy grounds alone. Alternatively,
we also offer the more permissive prediction that the coalition formed
should at least include the core party. For data on coalitions and party
policy positions, we rely on Hear1 (1992).14
The third column of Table 5 reports the number of arithmetically
possible coalitions (excluding the null coalition), whereas the next column
gives the number of feasible coalitions under the specific constraints identified above.'' The remaining columns (C-F) represent the prediction sets
of the different solution concepts identified above. A plus indicates that
the actual coalition belongs to this prediction set. Note that different
I4Several of the coalition theories tested here require that parties be ordinally ranked
in a unidimensional policy space. While the Belgian policy space is clearly multidimensional,
we have for analytical purposes adopted Hearl's left-right dimension, which he claims
"provides an eminently interpretable one-dimensional view of Belgian politics during the
study period" (1992, 247), which includes the era that interests us here.
he fluctuation in the number of possible coalitions across bargaining situations
reflects changes in the party system. In 1978 the Socialist party officially split into two
separate parties: one Flemish and one Walloon. As noted above, the December 1978 election resulted in the election of two independent deputies. Two regional Liberal parties, the
PRWL of Wallonia and the P L of Brussels, merged to form the PRL on 23 June 1979.
Table 5. Cabinet Coalitions in Belgium, 1977-80
(A)
Year
Cabinet Formed
Different
Coalitions
1977
1978
1979
1980
1980
Tindemans V
van den Boeynants I1
Martens I
Martens I1
Martens I11
1,023
2,047
8,191
4,095
4,095
Predictive success: (no. correctlno. cases)
Predictive efficiency: (no. correctlno. predictions)
(B)
Feasible
Coalitions
under
Constraints
Minimal
Winning
18+
18 +
17
17
17+
7
7
8
8+
8
.60 (315)
.034 (3187)
.20 (115)
.026 (1138)
Minimal
Connected
Winning
Core
Party
Alone
Core
Party
Included
0
0
0
0
1
(515)
.016 (51320)
Note: Entries represent the number of coalitions that qualify under each criterion. A plus indicates that this set includes the coalition that actually
formed.
Source: Hear1 (1992).
330
Kaare Strqm, Ian Budge, and Michael J . Laver
solution concepts yield prediction sets of very different sizes. For example, there is in each case a unique solution consisting of the core party
alone (col. E), whereas an additional 63 possible coalitions include the
same party (col. F). Simply comparing the success rates (the number of
correct predictions) of these two is obviously unfair to the more parsimonious solution concept (see Taylor and Laver 1973). We compensate for
such differences by considering the efjciency as well as the success rates
of each solution concept. Success (no. correctlno, cases) refers to the
proportion of cabinets correctly predicted (postdicted). Efficiency (no.
correctlno. predictions), on the other hand, measures the proportion of
all predictions that are correct.
For analytical simplicity, we have excluded from the prediction sets
of all the behavioral theories any coalition that violates either constraint 3
(i.e., one linguistic branch of a major national party joining a coalition
without the other) or constraint 5 (the party exclusion rule).16 The effect
of these simplifications is to improve the fit of these coalition theories,
since a large number of implausible coalitions are removed from their
prediction sets, while no coalition that actually formed is similarly deleted. The theories (solution concepts) with large prediction sets (C and
F) benefit in particular.
Several conventional coalition theories clearly are at a loss to explain
the five Belgian cabinets from Tindemans V through Martens 111. Not one
of these coalitions was minimal connected winning, and none consisted of
the core party (the Socialist party in the first two cases and the Christian
Socials thereafter) alone. Though the actual coalition invariably fell
within the set of coalitions that included the core party, this solution set
is so large that its predictive efficiency is nevertheless unimpressive. On
the other hand, the constraints we have identified eliminate the vast majority of all possible coalitions, nowhere less than 98% and in the case of
Martens I, 99.8%! And in three out of five cases, the actual coalition
fell within the constraints set. The deviant coalitions (Martens I and 11)
resulted from the successive withdrawals of two regional parties from
van den Boeynants's original coalition. In the first case, the resignation
of the Volksunie left the cabinet linguistically unbalanced (constraint 4)
and caused a three-and-a-half-month cabinet crisis. The subsequent withdrawal of the French-speaking FDF left Martens I1 two votes short of a
two-thirds parliamentary majority (constraint 1). Both of these cabinets
proved short-lived.
I 6 ~ h isimplification
s
was necessary because we do not have separate measures of the
policy positions of the different linguistic branches of the national parties or of the independent deputies.
CONSTRAINTS ON CABINET FORMATION
33I
As the bottom line of Table 5 shows us, the bargaining constraints
alone provide a more efficient way to identify the actual coalition than
any of the behavioral theories we have tested. Despite the advantages
our test has given to the behavioral coalition theories, and despite the
fact that Martens I and I1 fell outside the set of coalitions most favored by
the institutional constraints, these rules nevertheless are our best guide to
coalition formation in Belgium in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In at
least some cases, cabinet formation has more to do with structural constraints than with choice. Clearly, if we can synthesize our recognition
of institutional determinants with a theory of choice under those constraints, we should be able to make considerable progress in our understanding of party coalitions that have so far baffled the analysts.
Conclusion
Using an apparently anomalous case as our point of departure, we
have given a systematic account of constraints on coalition bargaining, a
previously neglected topic in the study of parliamentary governments.
Although the effects of constraints have been casually recognized in
many studies of coalition politics, there has been no systematic or comprehensive account of such effects. We have identified different types of
constraint, surveyed their incidence in a number of parliamentary democracies, and discussed their effects on bargaining power and coalition outcomes. The basic lessons to be drawn from this exercise are quite
straightforward, though putting them into practice is not easy. Most theoretical approaches to the study of government formation are "institution
poor," in the sense that their accounts of the institutional environment
are extremely spartan stylizations. Empiricists have long pointed out that
these assumptions are both unrealistic and misleading. Simultaneously,
neoinstitutionalist analyses of the U.S. Congress have demonstrated that
the institutional environment within which political bargaining takes place
can have a fundamental impact on outcomes. Our survey of constraints
on government formation in parliamentary democracies highlights a similar problem.
This leaves us where a behavioral theory of government formation
could profitably begin. Once we have identified the set of feasible outcomes and the rules by which a decision might be reached, we need to
consider the parties involved in the bargaining process, their preferences,
and the information they possess. A successful model of their bargaining
process requires that we specify preferences as well as structure. Yet the
latter task has until now been more seriously neglected, and it is to this
task that this article has been devoted. A full consideration of the impact
of constraints could proceed in one of two ways. One option would
332
Kaare StrQm, Ian Budge, and Michael J. Laver
involve careful modeling of coalition politics on a country-by-country
basis. Alternatively, the theorist could begin exploring the effects of prevalent constraints under different behavioral assumptions. In any case, we
believe a set of conceptual tools and an inventory of the sort we have
provided will be of great value to the theorist.
The emerging theory of noncooperative games would probably provide the best behavioral foundation for such efforts. Whereas conventional cooperative coalition theory can only recognize constraints as exogenous restrictions on the set of feasible coalition, noncooperative
theory can generate constraints endogenously through more explicit modeling of the bargaining process. Neoinstitutionalist approaches, using the
powerful tools of extensive-form games, allow us to distinguish between
constraints imposed by ex ante agenda control (e.g., presidential appointment powers or party precommitments) and those resulting from ex post
vetoes (e.g., investiture requirements or external veto players). But such
theoretical projects can be a daunting task. Austen-Smith and Banks
(1988), for example, look at the effect of a simple recognition rule, which
specifies the order in which different parties are given the chance to form
a government. Even in their rudimentary three-party, one-dimensional
game, the analysis quickly gets complex. To model in any complete sense
the game generated by the interaction of two or three constraints and,
say, a five-party system with two salient issue dimensions, would be
quite challenging. The challenges multiply when we consider the range
of potentially relevant rules and the cross-national variation in such
institutions.
Obviously, these challenges go far beyond the scope of the present
analysis. The main purpose of this article, therefore, is heuristic. It provides the first systematic survey of the constraints that future theories
need to consider and accounts for their effects on coalition bargaining.
Above all, it shows how the feasible set of potential coalitions can be
radically altered, and bargaining power transformed, by a few simple and
apparently common constraints. This will not surprise country specialists, long accustomed to elaborating the institutional detail of the political
systems in which they specialize. But comparative theorists of government formation are only beginning to appreciate the importance of institutional and other constraints on bargaining. And this lesson is critical. It
is not just that adding institutions makes our theories richer and more
realistic; it changes them completely.
Manuscript submitted 4 June 1992
Final manuscript received 10 June 1993
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