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Carnegie Mellon University Research Showcase @ CMU Dietrich College Honors Theses Dietrich College of Humanities and Social Sciences 4-15-2012 Voting for Vichy: Careers of French Legislators, 1940‐1958 Amanda Russell Carnegie Mellon University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.cmu.edu/hsshonors Part of the European History Commons This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Dietrich College of Humanities and Social Sciences at Research Showcase @ CMU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dietrich College Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of Research Showcase @ CMU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. VotingforVichy: CareersofFrenchLegislators,1940‐1958 AmandaRussell SeniorHonorsThesis Dr.Lynch April15,2012 1 Introduction OnJuly10,1940,inthehumiliatingaftermathofatriumphantGerman invasion,570membersoftheFrenchNationalAssemblyvotedextraordinary powerstothePrimeMinister,PhilippePétain(seeTable1).1AlthoughPétainhad beeninofficelessthanamonth,heenjoyedsuchuniversaladmirationandesteem thathisrapidascensiontopowergavehopetotheshell‐shockedcitizensofthe ThirdRepublic.2ForagenerationofmenwhohadfoughtinthetrenchesofWorld WarI,nomancouldhavebeenmoresuitableorworthyofcommandthanPétain, herooftheBattleofVerdunandoneofonlytwolivingMarshalsofFrance.3Already eighty‐fouryearsoldin1940,Pétain’slifeofdutifulservicehadmarkedhimwitha reputationofbeingjust,fair,and,aboveall,devotedtotheFrenchnation.4Who couldbemoretrustedtousevirtuallyunlimitedpowerforreconstructionand renewalthanPétain,amanknowneventohisopponentsasaveritable “[incarnation][…][of]traditionalFrenchvirtues”?5 1JeanJoly,Dictionnairedesparlementairesfrançais:noticesbiographiquessurles parlementairesfrançaisde1889à1940(Paris,1960)andDictionnairedes parlementairesfrançais:noticesbiographiquessurlesparlementairesfrançaisde 1940à1958(Paris:Ladocumentationfrançaise,1988),http://www.assemblee‐ nationale.fr/histoire/cr_10‐juillet‐1940.asp;OlivierWieviorka,Orphansofthe Republic:TheNation’sLegislatorsinVichyFrance,(Cambridge,MA:Harvard UniversityPress,2009),345‐358,365. 2Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,39. 3Ibid,40. 4RobertPaxton,VichyFrance1940‐1944(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress, 2011),31. 5VincentBadie,“VivelaRépublique:Motionopposéeauprojetduloidu10juillet 1940,”Digithèquedematériauxjuridiquesetpolitiques,UniversitédePerpignan,last modified1998,www.mjp.univ.perp.fr/france/badie.htm. 2 YetratherthanprovingtobeCincinnatusreborn,Pétainpresidedoverfour ofthemostauthoritarianandmorallyabjectyearsinFrenchhistory,marredfrom thestartbyastaunchdefeatismthatledtooutrightcollaborationwithNazi Germany.WhileBelgium,Czechoslovakia,Luxembourg,theNetherlands,Norway, andPolandallmetstrategicdefeatin1939and1940withresolutedeterminationof theirleaderstocontinuefighting,Pétain’sFrancecapitulatedcompletely.Asoneof thegreatestmilitaryandcolonialpowersintheworld,Francewasina comparativelystrongpositiontoregroupandcontinueitscampaignagainstNazi Germany,butPétainandhisministerssawthedieascast.6BelievingthatBritain wouldsoonfallwithorwithoutFrance’shelp,Pétainsoughttoobtainpeacethrough collaboration,hopingultimatelytogainaplaceatthetableinthenewcontinental order.7 Insteadofthepromisedpeace,Francewitnesseditsowngovernment participateinortacitlycondoneastreamoftransgressionsagainsttheFrench people.OverthefouryearsoftheGermanoccupation,Pétainandhisgovernment repeatedlymadeallowancesforgravebetrayalsofthepublictrustonthepremise thatitservedthepublicgood.Astreamofdailyindignities,frominadequateration cardstoGermanarmycommandeeringofcivilianhousing,affectedeverysingle 6Paxton,VichyFrance1940‐1944,9;PhilippeBurrin,FranceundertheGermans: CollaborationandCompromise(NewYork:NewPress,1996),98. 7Paxton,VichyFrance,10;PhilippePétain,“Pétainfaitl’annoncedelacollaboration, 30octobre1940,”SourcesdelaFranceduXXèmesiècle,editedbyPierreMilza (Paris:Larousse,1997),210‐212;Burrin,FranceundertheGermans,13‐14,66. 3 Frenchperson.8Torture,arrests,politicalandracialdeportationsbecamerealities forthosewhomtheregimecouldnotorwouldnotprotect.Anestimated22,000 Frenchmenmarchedintobattleundertheenemy’sflagsontheEasternFront,first intheofficiallysanctionedLegionofFrenchVolunteersagainstBolshevism,and later,directlyintheCharlemagneDivisionoftheWaffen‐SS.9AndwithinFrance itself,theMilice,agovernment‐authorizedparamilitaryforce,useddetention, torture,andmurderagainstresistantsandotheropponentsoftheregimeto terrorizeciviliansandwarnthemofthedireconsequencesofdissent.10Yet,instead oftakingactiontoprotecttheFrenchpeople,Pétainandhisgovernmentbecame obsessedwithprotectingadiminishingsupplyoflegitimacyandauthority,valuing thecontinuedlifeofthestateoverthesafetyofthenation.11 FollowingtheliberationofFrancein1944,France’snewpoliticalleadership, madeupalmostentirelyofmenwhohadoperatedwithinsomepartofthe Resistance,sawtheJuly1940voteempoweringPétainasaclear,seriousbetrayalof thenationanditsinterests.12Sotheargumentwent,aselectedrepresentativesina republic,France’slegislatorshadhadadutytotheFrenchpeoplethatwentbeyond legalobligationsandintotherealmofmoralimperative.Representativeswerenot merelythedirectorsofFrance’sadministrativeaffairs;theyexistedtoprotect, 8Burrin,FranceundertheGermans,21;Evans,TheThirdReichatWar,341;Robert Gildea,MarianneinChains:DailyLifeintheHeartofFranceduringtheGerman Occupation(NewYork:MetropolitanBooks,2004),44‐45. 9Burrin,FranceundertheGermans,433,435‐436,438;Paxton,VichyFrance,254. 10Burrin,FranceundertheGermans,439,444‐446;RichardEvans,TheThirdReich atWar(NewYork:Penguin,2009),398. 11Burrin,FranceundertheGermans,466. 12Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,284. 4 defend,andspeakonbehalfoftheirconstituents.Formanymembersofthe Resistance,asfordeGaulle,“[thelegislators’]abdicationonJuly10,1940,wasseen asmerelythelatestandfinalinstanceoftheirunworthinessandirresponsibility.”13 HavinggrantedunrestrainedpowertoPétainonthebasisofwhatseemedtobe nostalgiaandheroworship,theirinadequacywasalltooobvious.14Inorderto rebuild,Franceneededacleanslate,freefromcompromisedfigureswhohad proventheirincompetence,andsotheselegislatorshadtogo—andalmostallof themdid,atratesfarexceedingthoseofanyothergrandcorps.15Whetherofficially purgedviapostwarlegislationandpartydisciplineorunofficiallyexcludedbya hostilevotingpublic,fewerthan10%ofthemenwhovotedtograntPétain extraordinarypowersservedinanofficiallegislativecapacitybetween1945and 1958(seeTable9).16 Inthispaper,Ifollowthe570menoftheFrenchNationalAssemblywho votedforPétainfromtheJuly10,1940sessionthroughthehostilepoliticalclimate oftheprovisionalgovernment(1945‐1946)andtheFourthRepublic(1946‐1958) inordertounderstandwhythesemeninparticularweredeemedresponsiblefor France’spainfulexperienceduringWorldWarII.Giventhat90%oflawmakers rejectedcollaborationismwholeheartedlyandthattwo‐thirdsormore“adoptedan attitudeoscillatingbetweenreserveandhostility”towardsVichyafterthefirsttwo 13PeterNovick,TheResistanceversusVichy:ThePurgeofCollaboratorsinLiberated France(London:Chatto&Windus,1968),95. 14Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,284. 15Paxton,VichyFrance,346;Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,284;Novick,The ResistanceversusVichy,94‐95. 16Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,286‐292,306‐314,316‐318;Paxton,Vichy France,346;JolyDictionnairede1889à1940andDictionnairede1940à1958. 5 yearsofitsexistence,whywerelegislatorswhovotedforPétainin1940punishedat exponentiallyhigherratesthanbureaucratswhocarriedoutVichy’sordersthrough 1944?17HowdidvotingforPétainchangeintheeyesoftheFrenchpeoplefrom beingavotetosaveFrancetoavotethatdestroyedit? InPartOne,beginningwiththeshockingGermaninvasionofFranceandthe LowCountriesonMay10,1940,Ifleshoutthepolitical,moral,andpractical dilemmasfacingFrance’slegislatorsatthatjunctureandexplainwhy,ashistorian OlivierWieviorkaproposes,thevoteforPétainwasanactof“abdication,” “adherence,”and“ambivalence.”18Inanalyzingabreakdownofthevote,Isuggest thatalthoughthemenwhovoted“yes”includedmembersfromallpartsofthe legislature,particulartypesofmen,onthebasisofposition,age,politicalparty,and region,weremoreorlesslikelytoadheretotheproposalforspecific,targeted reasons. InPartTwo,IexplainhowPétain’soriginalpolicyofaccommodationevolved intoaninsidiouscollaborationismthattransformedtherepublicintoaNazipuppet state. Finally,inPartThree,IturntotheaftermathoftheLiberationin1944and explorewhy,intheyears1945to1946,membersofthe“Gaullist”provisional governmentfavoredanear‐completeexclusionoftheselegislatorsasameansto cleanseatroubledsystemandmollifyanangrypublic.HereIpresentthemany 17Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,264‐265;Paxton,VichyFrance,346. 18Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,331‐333. 6 waysthatexcludedtheselegislatorsfromnationalpoliticallife—throughthehigh court,juriesofhonor,prefects,politicalparties,andevenbythepublicitself.Inthe end,Iclarifywhyonly56of570menwhohadvotedforVichyeverservedin nationalpoliticalofficeinthepostwaryearsfrom1945to1958andhowin particulartemporaryineligibilityforlocalelectionseffectivelydevelopedintode factoexclusionfromnationalpoliticallife. PartOne Invasion TheGermaninvasionofFranceandtheLowCountriesbeganonMay10, 1940;byJune10,Pariswasan“opencity,”andbyJuly10,theThirdRepublicwas dead.Intheimmediateaftermathofwholesalecollapsebeforeasuperiorfoe, France’sleaderswerestruckbyaparalyzingself‐doubtthatleftthemvacillating withoutaclearobjective.ImmediatecallsbyhawksinPrimeMinisterPaul Reynaud’scabinettorelocatethegovernmenttoNorthAfricagainedsometraction, andmotivatedindividualsmadescatteredeffortstothateffectthatcontinuedeven afterReynaudsteppeddowninfavorofPétainonthenightofJune16.19Butfor manylegislators,menforwhom“émigré”hadbecomeacrudeepithet,anyactions takentofurtherwhatseemedlikealostwarlookedlikeanirrationalbetrayalof theirresponsibilities.20Germany,France’soldenemy,appearedmorepowerfulthan 19Paxton,VichyFrance,6‐8. 20Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,26. 7 everbefore,andFranceseemedtobeinnoconditiontohaltitsmercilessadvanceor eventotry.21Howcouldthenation’slegislatorsjustifyongoingwar?22 Thereweresomedissentingvoiceswhocalledforthefightingtocontinue, buttheyfailedtogathermuchenthusiasm.Oneoftheearliestchallengestothis defeatismhasgainedareputationfarbeyonditscontemporaryimpact,butstill servesasastrongexampleofpro‐warrhetoricinearlysummerof1940,viaRadio London’sbroadcastofCharlesdeGaulle’s“CallofJune18.”23DeGaulle,then France’smostjuniorgeneralandlargelyunknowntotheFrenchpublic,issueda broadcastonRadioLondononJune18urgingFrancetotakeadvantageofitsvast colonialholdingsandthesympatheticAmericanwarindustryandtostandstrong withBritainagainstNazism.24Thewar,deGaulleclaimed,wasnotasmall‐scale conflictthathadtoendsolelybecauseofthedisastrousBattleofFrance,butatrue worldwar,and,therefore,the“destinyoftheworld”reliedonFrancerecovering and“overcom[ing][theenemy][…]with[itsown]superiormechanicalforces.”25 “Whateverhappens,”heconcluded,“theflamesofFrenchresistancemustnotbe extinguished,anditwillnotbesoextinguished.”26Butdespitetheseresolutewords, deGaullewonoveronlyonedeputy,Pierre‐OlivierLapie,alreadyinLondon,and 21Burrin,FranceundertheGermans,51. 22Paxton,VichyFrance,6‐8. 23JulianJackson,France:theDarkYears,1940‐1944(Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press,2001),389. 24Jackson,France:theDarkYears,389;Burrin,FranceundertheGermans,9;Charles deGaulle,Appeldu18juin,”SourcesdelaFranceduXXèmesiècle,editedbyPierre Milza(Paris:Larousse,1997),219‐220. 25DeGaulle,“Appeldu18juin.” 26Ibid. 8 virtuallynootherfigures,sincealmostnoonetunedintohisbroadcast.27Still,this speechcementedaprescientviewofhowthewarcould,infact,bebothfoughtand won.28 AseparateproposalbytheReynaudcabinettotransferthegovernmentto eitherMoroccoorAlgeriaprovedmoresuccessfulinattractingadherents,butit largelyfizzledoutfollowingthetransitioninPrimeMinistersonJune17.29Asmall numberoftroopsweretransferredtoNorthAfrica,andevenafterPétainbeganto questionthevalidityofthepro‐warargument,hiscabinetstillvotedonJune19to transfertheassembliesandtheadministrationtoMoroccotogainastronger positionfornegotiationwiththeGermans.30AlthoughPétain’sgovernment abandonedtheideashortlythereafterandsentatelegramforbiddinglegislators’ departure,a“diehard”remnantof27anti‐armisticerepresentatives—26deputies andasenator—sailedtoAlgeriaaboardtheshipMassilia.31Althoughtheybelieved theirabsencewouldhelptopreventanarmistice,itprovedtobeaboontoPétain; sincethelegislatorsontheMassiliahadbeenthosemostopposedtoterms,the 27Paxton,VichyFrance,42;Jackson,France:theDarkYears,389(quotation). 28CharlesdeGaulle,“Appeldu18juin,”SourcesdelaFranceduXXèmesiècle,edited byPierreMilza(Paris:Larousse,1997),219‐220(quotation);Paxton,VichyFrance, 42. 29Paxton,VichyFrance,6‐7. 30Ibid,7. 31MichèleCointetandJean‐PaulCointet,DictionnairehistoriquedelaFrancesous l’Occupation,(Paris:Tallandier,2000),48;Paxton,VichyFrance,7(quotation); Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,23.Thereisconsiderableinconsistencyabout whowaspresentontheMassilia,andIhavefoundcitationsestimatingbetween twenty‐fiveandthirtymen,butinreadingthroughJoly,onlythetwenty‐sevenmen mentionedinWieviorkaaresaidtohavebeenontheMassilia. 9 lawmakersleftinFranceposednoseriousobstacle.32Failingtostartanysortof spontaneousmovementandarrestedbypro‐Pétainistforcesupontheirarrival, theselegislatorsweredeniedtravelbacktoFrancefortheconstitutionalsessionsin July,andultimatelyhadnoimpactontheproceedingsexceptviaatelegramof protest.33 Formostlegislators,Germany’smilitarymomentumpresentedaserious challengetothenotionthatBritainandcolonialFrancecouldsustainanydefensein thelongrun.Sincetheoutbreakofwarin1939,Poland,Norway,Denmark, Luxembourg,Belgium,andtheNetherlandshadallcollapsedinfrontofGermany, andFrance’sownrecordagainsttheGermans—surrenderfollowing16daysinthe SaarlandinSeptember1939and39daysinMayandJune1940—didnotleadany Frenchmantofeelparticularlyoptimisticaboutanewcampaign.34Believingthata defeatedFrancemeantabeatenBritain,itwasdifficulttoimaginethatdefiance woulddoanythingotherthanprolongtheinevitable.35Furthermore,itseemed particularlyunreasonabletoimaginethatresistancecouldcontinueoutofthe under‐developed,poorlyequippedcoloniesinFrenchNorthAfrica.36 Formostmen,itwasunclearwhetherFrancehadthearms,themen,orthe stomachtokeepfightingandifthewarwasevenworththelossofmoreFrench 32Jackson,France:theDarkYears,127. 33CointetandCointet,DictionnairehistoriquedelaFrancesousl’Occupation; AssembléeNationale,“SéanceduMercredi10juillet1940,”AssembléeNationale, http://www.assemblee‐nationale.fr/histoire/cr_10‐juillet‐1940.asp. 34Evans,TheThirdReichatWar,130. 35Burrin,FranceundertheGermans,98. 36Jackson,France:theDarkYears,119,121;Burrin,FranceundertheGermans,98. 10 lives.TheextremerightwingofFrenchpoliticshadopposedwarfromthestart, arguingthataFrenchwaragainstGermanyonlyservedStalin.37France’sprevious coalitionsofhawksanddovesappearedtohavechangedplaces,sincethemost sincereproponentsofnationaldefenseontheright“fearedwarmorethanthey fearedHitler”whiletheleftprovidedthestaunchestanti‐Hitlermilitants.38Still,all ofFrance’slawmakerswereoldenoughtoremember“theblindwastageofyoung menin1914‐1918,whichhadmadeFranceanationofoldpeopleandcripples,”and itwasdifficultforlegislators,manyofwhomwereveteransorwhohadlostsonsin therecentfighting,tolookatthepossibilityoffuturewarwithcomplete equanimity.39 However,onetroublingissueraisedbothbypro‐andanti‐warpoliticiansin JuneandJuly1940waswhetherFrance’sprewartreatieswithPolandandBritain obligatedittocontinuestrugglingagainstNaziGermany.PolandandFrancehelda defensivetreatyrequiringthateachcometotheother’saidincaseofinvasionby Germany,andFrancehadalong‐runningalliancewiththeUnitedKingdom.40Itwas unclearwhetherFrancecouldfairlyretreatfromitsobligations,orifithaddoneall thatcouldberequiredofitbyenduringtheFallofFrance.AlthoughDeGaulle’s 37Jackson,France:theDarkYears,114;Paxton,VichyFrance,11;Wieviorka,Orphans oftheRepublic,15‐16. 38Paxton,VichyFrance,248. 39Paxton,VichyFrance,11‐12(quotation).N.B.:Whilenotalllegislatorshadseen combatineithertheFirstorSecondWorldWar,manyhad,asdescribedin Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,16‐19,and39‐41.Furthermore,whileIhaveno completesourceforthenumberofmenwholostrelativesinthefighting,Wieviorka, OrphansoftheRepublic,31mentionssomebyname,andinskimmingthroughJoly, Dictionnairede1889à1940andDictionnairede1940à1958,itdoesnotappearto havebeenanuncommonexperience. 40Paxton,VichyFrance,12. 11 speechofJune18indicatedquitestronglythathebelievedFrancehadtoremainin activecombat,manyFrenchmenfeltquitedifferently,suchasPétain,whoclaimed onJune17,inhisfirstspeechasPrimeMinisterthat: [The]admirablearmy[…][which]f[ou]ghtwithaheroismworthyof itslongmilitarytraditionagainstanenemysuperiorinbothnumber andweapons[…][has]fulfilled[France’s]dutyto[its]allies[…]byits magnificentresistance.41 AlthoughPolandhad,bysummer1940,clearlybecomeanafterthought,Britain remainedbothanallyandanactivecombatantagainstNaziGermany.Itwasnot trulyuntilJuly3,1940,whentheBritishscuttlingoftheFrenchfleetatMersEl‐ Kébir,offoftheAlgeriancoast,intheefforttoputthefleetbeyondGermanreach, killedalmost1,300Frenchsailors,thateventhemostdevotedAnglophilesgaveup hopethatFranceandtheUnitedKingdomcouldreconcile.42 ArmisticeandRenewal ByearlyJuly1940thediscussiongoingonatthehighestpoliticalechelondid notrevolvearoundwhetherwarshouldcontinuebutratherentailedbitterself‐ recrimination.Inaninfluentialandwidelyheardradiobroadcastannouncingthe armisticeonJune25,Pétainhadredefinedtheboundariesofpoliticaldiscourseby saying: 41PhilippePétain,“Discoursdu17juin1940duMaréchalPétain,”LaFondation CharlesdeGaulle,http://www.charles‐de‐gaulle.org/pages/l‐homme/dossiers‐ thematiques/1940‐1944‐la‐seconde‐guerre‐mondiale/l‐appel‐du‐18‐ juin/documents/discours‐du‐17‐juin‐1940‐du‐marechal‐petain.php. 42Jackson,France:theDarkYears,128‐129;Burrin,FranceundertheGermans,13; Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,21.TheattackatMerEl‐Kébirwasdevastating todeGaulle’sattemptstoattractadherentsinLondon,anditremainedafiercepoint ofcontentioninFranceforthedurationofthewar. 12 Youwerereadytocontinuethefight.Iknewthat.[But][…]Iwould notbeworthyofremaininginyourthoughtsifIhadagreedtoshed FrenchbloodtoprolongadreamofafewFrenchmen,misinformed abouttheconditionsofthefight.[…] Itistothefuturethatwemustnowturnourefforts,henceforth.A neworderbegins. Youhavesuffered. Youwillstillsuffer.Manyofyouwillrecoverneitheryourtradenor yourhomes.Yourlifewillbehard.[…]Donotexpecttomuchofthe state[.][…]Countonyourselfforthepresent,andforthefuture,count onthechildrenwhomyouwillraisewithasenseofduty. WehavetorestoreFrance.[…]Ourdefeatcamefromourslackening, [ourdecay].Thespiritof[self‐]enjoymentdestroy[ed][all]that[…] thespiritofsacrificebuilt.[Therefore]Iinviteyou[…]toan intellectualandmoralrecovery.[Frenchmen,Frenchwomen],youwill […]see[…]anewFrancerisingfromyourfervor.43 AsJacksonsays,throughthisspeech,“[t]helinkbetweensufferingandredemption, contritionandrenewal,alreadyvisibleinthearmisticedebate,nowbecame explicit.”44Nomatterthatthearmisticeitselfhadbeensigned,underHitler’sorders, intheveryrailwaycarinwhichthe1918armisticehadbeenconcluded,acarriage thathadbeendraggedoutofamuseumandtowedbacktoCompiègne,purelyfor humiliation;France,accordingtoPétain,hadfallenbecauseoftheFrench.45 Furthermore,byarguingthatFrance,thoughvaliant,hadfallenduetoits owninternalweaknesses,PétainredefinedwhattheFrenchpeopleshouldbe strugglingagainst.InsteadofbeingcaughtupinalosingbattleagainstGermany,the argumentwent,theFrenchshouldengageintheefforttorenewtheirspiritsand 43PhilippePétain,“Pétainjustifielasignaturedel’armistice,25juin1940,”Sources delaFranceduXXèmesiècle,editedbyPierreMilza(Paris:Larousse,1997),198‐ 200. 44Jackson,France:theDarkYears,129. 45Evans,TheThirdReichatWar,132‐133. 13 returntothestrongerdaysofold.Althoughpresentedasonlyachievablethrougha sortofSpartanstruggleofrededicationtotraditionalvalues,Pétain’sproposed renewalprocesshadonedistinctadvantageoverthepro‐warargument:itdidn’t appearfundamentallyimpossible,unlikedefeatingGermanymilitarily.46 Revision Therefore,whenPierreLaval,deputyPrimeMinisterandsenatorfromthe Auvergne,proposedinearlyJuly1940thatPétainbegivenextraordinaryregular andconstitutionalpowerstodirectanationalrenewal,heencounteredremarkably littleresistance.TwiceaPrimeMinisterinthe1930sandalwaysacontroversial figurewho“provokedmixedfeelings,sometimesinspiringrejectionand,rarely, enthusiasm,”Lavalwasalsoaconsummatepoliticianwhoseskillfuldirectionofthe votegainedsomethingofareputationaspoliticalwizardryinpostwartexts.47In reality,thelegislatorswhoarrivedatVichyonJuly1,atthethirdtowntowhichthe governmenthaddecampedsincethefallofParisonJune10,didnotrequirevery muchpersuasiontobeconvincedthatavoteforPétainwouldbeavoteforthe futureofFrance.48 A“sleepyspatown”intheAuvergne,Vichyhadlittleamusementtoofferand “[t]hesmallnessofthetownencouragedanatmosphereofgossipandintrigue[...] 46Burrin,FranceundertheGermans,16. 47Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,44‐45(quotation);Paxton,VichyFrance,24, 29;Joly,Dictionnairede1889à1940,seeLaval,Pierre. 48Jackson,France:theDarkYears,142. 14 withlittletodoexceptplotandhate.”49AsJacksondescribesit,“[n]everwerethe corridorsofVichy’shotelsmorebuzzingwithconspiracies,speculation,andfantasy thaninthefirstweeks.50Here,rumorsswirledintheairaboutapossibleParis SovietandaboutthelikelyatrocitiesGermanywouldinflictuponadefiantFrance.51 Thefearofwhatcouldhappentothenationatthe“eclipseofthestate”wasvery realandpresent,andthereweremanymeneagertoexplorealternatepathwaysfor thefutureofFrance.52 MorethanafewofthedeputiesandsenatorswhoarrivedatVichyfelt stronglythatchangewasnotmerelypossible,butimperative,andthatthose politicianswhomtheybelievedhadledtoFrance’sdisastershouldbeheld accountablefortheircrimesagainstthestate.Onesuchman,therightwingdeputy Jean‐LouisTixier‐VignancourfromtheBasses‐Pyrénées,announcedintheopen sessionofJuly9,1940,thathewantedthoseresponsibleforthe“murdered country”—namelyReynaudandhiscolleagues—tobepunished,butmostothers optedforamoremeasuredapproachthatheldoffonpunishmentuntilaffairsofthe stateweresettled.53Mostprominently,onJuly7,arightwingdeputyfromtheParis regionnamedGastonBergerygainedninety‐sevensignaturesfromacrossthe politicalspectrumonastatementcallingforFrancetoacceptthedisaster,topunish abroadclassof“guilty”men,butfirsttoreintegrateFranceintotheemergingnew 49Ibid,142‐143. 50Ibid,143. 51Paxton,VichyFrance,16;CointetandCointet,DictionnairehistoriquedelaFrance sousl’Occupation,695‐696. 52Paxton,VichyFrance,16. 53Joly,Dictionnairede1889à1940andDictionnairede1940à1958,seeTixier‐ Vignancour,Jean‐Louis. 15 orderofEurope.54Denouncingtheoldpoliticalsystem,whichhebelievedhad subordinatedstateintereststoothergoals,Bergerywasthefirsttocallexplicitlyfor collaboration,saying: The[…]policy[…]ofMarshalPétain[…]implies–throughamixof collaborationwithLatinpowersandwithGermanyitself–the establishmentofanewcontinentalorder.[…][W]ecanhopefora collaborationthatdoesnotmeanastateofservitude.[…][W]edonot basethishopeonthegenerosityofthewordofourconqueror[;][w]e […]bas[e]thisontheunderstandingthatGermany’sownleadershave ofGermany’sinterests.55 ForBergeryandhisco‐signers,itwasimpossibletoimagineaworldinwhich Germanywouldlose,andequallyimpossibletoimagineaGermanythatwouldnot behaveaccordingtorationalworldstandards.Whynotoptforactionsthatwould benefitFrance? Inthisconfusingatmosphereofdefeatism,self‐recrimination,andyet hopefulexpectation,LavalfounditfairlyeasyonJuly9,1940,toconvincethe nation’slawmakerstoopenuptheconstitutionforrevision.Havingmadeitclear thathespokenotforhimselfbutonbehalfoftheMarshal,Lavaldeclaredpointedly that“‘agreatdisasterlikethiscannotleaveintacttheinstitutionswhichbroughtit about.’”56Furthermore,usinghischaracteristicmixof“charmandbullying,”Laval promisedlawmakersthatPétainwastrustworthyandhonorablebutthreatened themthatifPétainwasnotgiventhesepowers,theGermanswouldseizethe 54GastonBergery,“PouruneFranceintégréeàlanouvelleEurope,7juillet1940,” SourcesdelaFranceduXXèmesiècle,editedbyPierreMilza(Paris:Larousse,1997), 200‐202;Jackson,France:theDarkYears,143. 55Bergery,“PouruneFrance,”201. 56Jackson,France:theDarkYears,132. 16 opportunityandinterferewiththegovernment.57Hiseffortsprovedtobea resoundingsuccess:of628votescast,624ofthemapprovedthebill.58 ExtraordinaryPowers Thefollowingday,onJuly10,1940,570membersofthe847‐strongNational AssemblyapprovedabillgivingPétainextraordinarypowerstodirecttheaffairsof thestatewhilewritingadraftforanewFrenchconstitution.Noone,leastofall Pétain’sgovernment,knewatthetimehowmanyrepresentativeswerecrammed intothecasinoatVichy.59Attendancecouldbeestimatedbyvotescast,though:570 votingyes,80votingno,and20abstaining,whilethePresidentoftheSenate,Jules Jeanneney,didnotvotebecausehedirectedthesession.60Byanymeasure,thiswas anoverwhelminglevelofapproval,butthevoteonJuly10,1940wasnotatypical legislativesession,andthetextthatitapprovedwasnotastandardtext. Thetextthatwasapprovedwashighlyunusual: TheNationalAssemblygivesallpowertotheGovernmentofthe Republic,undertheauthorityandsignatureofMarshalPétain,tothe effectofpromulgating,byoneormanyacts,anewconstitutionofthe FrenchState.Thisconstitutionwillguaranteetherightsofwork,the family,andthecountry. ItwillberatifiedbytheNationandappliedbytheAssembliesthatit willcreate.Thecurrentconstitutionallaw,deliberatedandadopted bytheNationalAssembly,willbeexecutedasthelawoftheState.61 57Jackson,France:theDarkYears,132. 58Ibid. 59AssembléeNationale,“SessionduMercredi10juillet1940.” 60AssembléeNationale,“SessionduMercredi10juillet1940;”Wieviorka,Orphans oftheRepublic,365. 61AssembléeNationale,“SessionduMercredi10juillet1940.” 17 Inthisshorttext,bothextraordinaryandconstitutionalpowerswereframedin waysthatbrokesignificantlywithThirdRepublictradition.62Furthermore,although theNationalAssemblyhadtherighttorevisetheConstitution,grantingPétain constitutionalpowersseriouslydeviatedfromFrenchprecedentandfellsomewhat atoddswiththreeimportantpointsinthelaw.Thefirstwasthatalthoughthe NationalAssemblywasfreetorevisetheConstitution,theassumptionhadalways beenthattheywoulddoitthemselves;byrefrainingfrominvolvementwiththe draft,theyhadtransferredoneofthemostsignificantpowersofthelegislative branchbacktotheexecutive,whichbrokewithcenturiesofprecedent.63Secondly, althoughArticle2oftheConstitutionalAmendmentofAugust1884hadforbidden theprincipleofrepublicanismfrombeingsubjecttorevision,thebilltoauthorize Pétaindidnotholdhimtotheseconstraints.64Thirdly,infailingtolimitthescopeof Pétain’spowers,theresolutionbrokewithexistingtradition,sinceextraordinary powers,initspreviousincarnations,hadalwaysbeenlimitedinduration,and renewableonlybythecontinuingaffirmationofthelegislature.65Theultimateeffect ofthesethreeirregularitiesinthebillthatauthorizedPétainonJuly10,1940,was toallowPétaintotransformFrancefromarepublicanstatetoanauthoritarianone, 62Paxton,VichyFrance,30. 63KarlLoewenstein,“TheDemiseoftheFrenchConstitutionof1875,”TheAmerican PoliticalScienceReview34.5(1940),875. 64AssembléeNationale,“Loidu14août1884portantrévisionpartielledeslois constitutionelles,”Digithèquedesmatériauxjuridiquesetpolitiques,Universitéde Perpignan,lastmodified1998,http://mjp.univ‐perp.fr/france/co1875r.htm. 65Loewenstein,“TheDemiseoftheFrenchConstitutionof1875,”884. 18 courtesyofwhatoneobservertermed,“déconstitutionalisationpareffetde révolution.”66 Itisclearfromthelegislature’soverwhelmingapprovalofthebillto authorizePétainthatfewmenhadaninklingofwhatthevotecouldultimately authorize.Overall,ThirdRepubliclegislatorsadheredtotheproposalatremarkable rates,Of670votescast,570,or85%,wereinfavorofgrantingPétainfull, extraordinary,constitutionalpowers(seeTable1).Perhapsifsomeofthediehard republicans,likethemenwholeftontheMassilia,hadbeenpresent,orifthe Communists,whosepartyhadbeenoutlawedonSeptember26,1939,hadnotbeen near‐whollyexcludedfromthepoliticalprocess,thevotemighthavereflectedmore openoppositiontohandingoverpowertoasinglefiguresuchasPétain.67Instead, ambivalencewasaprominentforce,asmenwhomighthavecalledforoutright rejectionoftheproposalinothersituationsabdicatedtheirresponsibilityforthe administration,passingitalongtoPétain.Intheend,adherenceruledtheday, althoughtherewassignificantvariationinbehavioramonglegislatorsaccordingto theirposition,age,politicalparty,andregion. Position AlthoughbothsenatorsanddeputiesgenerallyvotedforthePétainist proposal,atratesof82.4%and89.3%,respectively,theyexpressedoppositionand concernsthroughdifferentmeans(seeTable2). 66Ibid,889. 67Jackson,France:theDarkYears,114. 19 Senatorialoppositionwaslargelycharacterizedbyoperationswithinthe boundariesofthepoliticalsystem,usingmechanismssuchasrevisedbillsand abstentiontosuggestmisgivingsratherthanoptingforopensplits.Forexample, JeanTaurines,asenatorfromtheLoireandaveteranoftheFirstWorldWar, submitted,alongwithsome25otherSenateveterans,acounterproposalthat expressedcompleteconfidenceinPétainbutgavestrictlimitstohispowers.68In additiontorequiringthatPétainconsultwiththeassembliesinwritingadraft,these senatorscalledforhispowerstoconsistofonlythosenecessaryfor“maintaining order,forthelifeandrecoveryofthecountryandfortheliberationofterritory.”69 Althoughthisproposalwasonlyreadincommittee,andTaurines,like569other men,votedforPétain,therevisionstillsuggestedapprehensionaboutthelatitudeof powersofferedtothePrimeMinister.70Othersenatorsexpressedtheirconcerns moreactively,withabout10%ofsenatorsrefusingtoadheretotheprojectatall, buteventhesesenatorstendedtobecautiousratherthanreckless:one‐quarterof thesenatorswhorefusedtovoteforPétainabstainedratherthanvotingno,and onlyoneman,TonyRévillon,leftontheMassilia.71 TheChamberofDeputies,ontheotherhand,hadsomememberswhoused radicallyassertivemeanstocriticizetheproposal.Twenty‐sixofthe27menwho hadtakentheMassiliatoAlgiersweredeputies,andevenatVichy,thegenerally 68Paxton,VichyFrance,32;Joly,Dictionnairede1889à1940andDictionnairede 1940à1958. 69JeanTaurines,“Leprojetdessénateursancienscombattants,”Digithèquedes matériauxjuridiquesetpolitiques,UniversitédePerpignan,lastmodified1998, http://mjp.univ‐perp.fr/france/taurines.htm. 70AssembléeNationale,“SessionduMercredi10juillet1940.” 71Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,345‐358. 20 younger,somewhatmorerecklessdeputyclasshaditshotheadsreadyandwilling toopenlybreakwiththePétanistproject.72Twenty‐sevenrepresentativessigneda handwrittendefenseoftheRepublicbytheyoungVincentBadie,aRadicaldeputy fromtheHéraultintheSouth,whoheldthat: [Althoughwe]consideritessentialtograntallpowers[…]to MaréchalPétain[…][inorderthathecancarryoutdirectivesfor] publicsafetyand[…]peace[,][we]refusetovoteforaprojectthat wouldnotonlygivesomeofourcolleaguesdictatorialpowerbut wouldinevitablyleadtothedemiseoftheRepublicanregime.[We] declarethat[we]remain,nowmorethanever,committedto democraticfreedoms,inwhosedefensefellthebestsonsofour country.73 Byopenlyrejectingthedraftonthegroundsthatitsinherentstructurewasanti‐ republican,Badieandhisco‐signersengagedinunmistakabledissentthatheldno pretentionsofrevisionism.Similarly,unliketheircolleaguesintheSenate,mostof the17%ofnon‐adheringdeputiessplitwiththeregimeopenlyandconspicuously, actionsthatspokevolumesaboutthedifferentrhetoricpresentinthemorerarified “aristocraticclub”oftheSenateandtheraucous,“pedestrian”Chamber.74 Age Agedidnotseemtoaffectvotingpatternsamongmenwhowerepresentat thesession,butthesemenwererathermoremiddle‐agedthantheNational Assemblyasawhole,andlackedinfluencefromboththe“YoungTurks”presenton 72Ibid. 73Badie,“VivelaRépublique”;Paxton,VichyFrance,32; 74Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,71‐72. 21 theMassiliaandsomeoftheelderstatesmendevotedtotheRepublic(seeTables3‐ 4).75 Themiddle‐agedcompositionofthesessionstemmedfromseveralcauses, rangingfromhotheadedradicalismamongsomeoftheyoungtodifficultyreaching Vichyforelderlylegislators.Absenteeismwasshockinglyhighforoldermen,with 33%ofmenovertheageof70absentatthevote(seeTable4).Whilesomeofthese menwerehyper‐conservative,othershadservedinthelegislatureforoverforty yearsandwerebastionsofRepublicanism.IntheRadicalparty,forexample,a republicanstronghold,menwhowerefirstelectedpriorto1914weremarkedly morelikelytoresistthanthoseelectedafter1918,agapWieviorkatakesas evidencethat“theancientshadastrongerattachmenttotheRepublicthantheir youngercounterparts.”76Itisnotunreasonabletobelievethattheabsenceofmore ofthesemen,mainstaysoftheirpartiesandstalwartsoftheirregion,hadsome effectonthevoteitself. FeweryoungermenwereabsentfromVichy,butabout20%oflegislators undertheageof45didnotvoteatthesession,largelyforreasonsofmilitaryservice orcommitmenttothefledglingopposition,andthosemenwhowerepresenthada devastatingimpactontheopposition(seeTables4).Ofthethirty‐sevenyoungmen whodidnotvoteatthesession,6hadleftontheMassilia,1hadjoineddeGaullein London,and20werestillinarmedserviceorhadbeencapturedbytheGermans, 75Ibid,94‐95. 76Ibid. 22 leavingonlytenmenabsentforotherreasons.77Especiallyassomeofthecaptured men,suchasthe“hothead[ed]”SocialistMaxLejeune,wereimprisonedlargelydue totheirreputationaspossibleopponents,dissentersandmenabsentassoldiers wereoftenclosetooneandthesame.78 Ontheotherhand,younglegislatorswithcombatexperiencewhoarrivedat Vichyforthevotewereprominentamongtheranksofthedefeatistsandtheyhada significantinfluenceonthevote.Havingseenaction,youngveteranswere pessimisticandofteninspiredpro‐surrendersentimentthroughtheirtestimony.79 Inhismemoirs,CharlesPomaretnotedtheextentofthisinfluence,sayingthatmany whohadplannedonresistingendedupvotingforPétain: chieflyaftercontactwithdeputieswhohadbeenmobilizedand recountedwhatthehadjustseenthatwouldleadthemtosupportthe governmentinmetropolitanFranceandthesigningofanArmistice.80 Itislikely,therefore,thatjustaswitholdermen,theparticularmakeupofyoung menwhowerepresentatthesessionhadasignificantimpactonthediscussionthat tookplacethere. Party Men’spoliticalaffiliationdidnotapparentlydictatethevote,butmenofthe leftweresignificantlymorelikelythanmenoftherighttorejecttheproposal(see Table5).Roughlyone‐quarterofleftistspracticeddissent,whereasnon‐adherence 77Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,76. 78Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,17;Joly,Dictionnairede1889à1940and Dictionnairede1940à1958,seeLejeune,Max. 79Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,31. 80Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,30‐31. 23 ontherightwasanentirelyindividualizedphenomenon,practicedbyonly15 men.81 “ThecongruenceofthevaluesofVichywithconservativevalues[…] encourage[d]formerrepublicanstocollaboratewithl’Étatfrançais,”leadingto almost96%ofright‐wingmenpresentvotingforVichy,leavingnon‐adherenceasa scatteredaffairmostlylimitedtomeninsmall,fringeparties.82Forexample,ofthe7 menoftherightwhovotedno,4wereeithermembersorcloseaffiliatesoftheParti DémocratePopulaire,atiny,right‐wingChristianpartyholdingonlyahandfulof members.83Theotherthreerightiststovotenoincludedtwomembersofthe DemocraticAllianceandonemanfromtheIndependentRepublicansforSocial Action,bothmoderategroupswithconsiderableleftistelements.84Abstentionand presenceontheMassiliawereevenmoreindividualizedformenontheright,with theeightmenwhoabstainedorwereontheMassiliarepresentingfiveseparate politicalparties.85Generallyspeaking,althoughahandfulofright‐wingmendid choosetorejecttheproject,membersofright‐wingpartieswereextremely reluctanttorejecttheproject,hoping,primarily,tosecurepeaceandanew beginning.86 81Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,345‐358. 82Ibid,101. 83Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,103,357;inDictionnairede1889à1940and Dictionnairede1940à1958,JolyholdsthatPierredeChambrunandAuguste ChampetierdeRibeswerealsomembersofthePartiDémocratePopulaire. 84Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,98‐99,355. 85Ibid,352‐358. 86Ibid,98‐99. 24 LeftistmenwereconsiderablymoreskepticalofthePétainistproject,witha littleover23%oftheirmembersdissenting,andrefusalwaspresentathighrates throughout4ofthe5leftistparties.Twenty‐threeofthe27menontheMassilia wereleftists;seventy‐threeof80novotescamefromleftists;andsixteenof20 abstentionscamefrommenontheleft.ExceptforthemenintheRepublican SocialistUnion,aSocialistsplintergroup,whodisplayednoopennon‐adherence, ratesofdissentamongleftistpartiesrangedfromashadeunder20%forthe moderateRadicalSocialiststoalmost44%amongtheIndependentLeft.87 Region Region,infact,wasperhapsthestrongestfactorassociatedwiththevoteto grantfullpowerstoPétain(seeTables6‐7).AlthougheveryregioninFrancehada pluralityvoteforPétain,non‐adherencerangedwidely,fromanabsolutelowof 0.0%inAlsaceandinPoitou‐Charentestoahighof42.9%inCorsica.Asageneral rule,duetogreaterexposuretothewar,adherencewasmuchhigherthroughoutthe northandcenterofthecountrythanintheeightsouthernmostregionsorinthe scattereddepartmentsoftheEmpire. AdherencethroughouttheNorthlargelyrevolvedaroundfearsresulting frompersonalexposuretotheconflict.Wieviorkaarguesthat“[t]hemoreclosely lawmakerswereincontactwiththewar,themoretheirwilltoresistweakened,” and,certainly,nonorthernregionsexceptforHaute‐NormandieandChampagne‐ 87Ibid,90,346‐351. 25 Ardenneshadratesofnon‐adherenceabovethenationalaverageof15%.88 Interestingly,whetheritwasactually“thedoubletraumaofdefeatandexodusthat ledmembersofparliamentfromthenorthtovoteoverwhelminglyinfavorofthe cessationofhostilities,”itdoesappearthatthewilltoresistdecreasedastimewent on.89Infact,menwholeftontheMassiliainJuneaccountedforalmost35%of dissentintheNorthcomparedtoonly12%intheSouth,suggestingthat,byJuly10, 1940,therewasacomparativelylargercontingentofsouthernersstillwillingto openlydissent(seeTable7). InAlsace,thetraditionallycontestedGerman‐speakingterritoryinthe Northeast,existentialdreadofwarwasexponentiallygreaterthaninmostof France,andfearthatvocalizingdissentmeantexpressingsupportforHitlerled 100%ofAlsatianlegislatorsatVichytoadheretothePétainistproposal.PaulHarter fromtheMosellearguedafterthewarthat InvotingtodelegateconstitutionalpowertoPhilippePétain,Ididnot attachapoliticalmeaningtothatvote;myattitudewasruledbythe desiretodemonstratepublicly[…]myattachmenttoFrance,andby theconcerntoprotecteverythingthatcouldbeprotectedinaregion thatwasgoingtobeseizedbyforce.Anotherattitude,abstentionora vote“against,”wouldunfailinglyhavebeenexploitedbyGerman propagandaasamanifestationofdetachmentfromFrance.90 ConcernedthatNaziGermanywouldinterpretanynegativevoteasasignof secessionandseizethepretexttoannexAlsaceintoGreaterGermany,theentire 88Ibid,33. 89Ibid,34. 90Ibid,42. 26 rhetoricofthevotethereforehadtobeshiftedtoadeclarationofloyaltyanda protectionofnationalunity.91 IntheSouth,ontheotherhand,“[d]istantfromthetheaterofoperationsand feelingtheeffectsofthewarlessdirectly,”non‐adherencewasnotuniformlyseenas afailureofloyaltytotheregime.92Everysinglesouthernregionhadmoredissenters thanFranceasawhole,withthreeregionshoveringclosetothenationalaverageof 15%whilefiveothershadratesexceeding25%(seeTable7).Furthermore,this dissentwasexpressedfarmoreopenly,asonlyabout12%ofsouthernnon‐ adherenceconsistedofmenwhohadleftontheMassilia(seeTable8).Therestof thedissentconsistedofmenwhoexpressedtheirmisgivingsatVichy,withvoting no,inparticular,appearingtohavebeen“largelyconditionedbyageographythat favoredtheSouth”.93 Finally,intheEmpire,consistingofscattereddepartmentsinAfrica,the Caribbean,SouthAmerica,theIndianOcean,andAsia,althoughalllawmakers presentatVichyvotedforPétain,ahighabsencerateappearstohaveincludedmore dissentthaninFranceasawhole(seeTable6).Unlikeotherregions,itlookslikethe dissentersintheEmpirefounditeasiertotalkwiththeirfeetandtraveltoafamiliar location;thetwoAlgeriansandtheSenegalesehadalltakenpartintheMassilia(see tables7‐8).94 91Ibid,104,358. 92Ibid,34. 93Ibid,33. 94Joly,Dictionnairede1889à1940andDictionnairede1940à1958. 27 VivelaFrance? Despitethevariationsinvotinghabitspresentamongmenbasedupontheir legislativeposition,age,politicalparty,andregion,thedeputiesandsenatorsofthe ThirdRepublicvotedoverwhelmingonJuly10,1940tograntPétainextraordinary powersandallowhimtowriteanewconstitution.Hopeswerehighthattheheroof Verdunwouldprovethe“surestguardianofterritorialintegrity”andthatthe “Mar[éch]al’sprestigewouldallowhimtostanduptotheFührer”;noonecould haveenvisionedhowcompletelyhewouldfailtofulfillthismandate.95 WhenMarcelAstier,aleftistsenatorfromtheArdèchewhohadvotedno exitedtheCasinofollowingthevote,hecried,“VivelaRépubliquequandmême”— “LongLivetheRepublic,JusttheSame,”towhichmanymenshoutedback,“Vivela France!”96Inhindsight,Astier’sdefiantproclamationthatthenewregime,whatever itwouldbe,signaledtheinevitabledeathknelloftheRepublicseemsalltoo prescient.Yetitisclearfromtheexchangethatothermen—someofthe570men whovotedyes—feltdifferently,believingthatthroughtheirvoteforPétaintheyhad donetheirparttosecurethefutureofFrance.TheirfaithinPétainwastouching,but inhindsighttheirtrustwasremarkablymisplaced.Asamatteroffact,overthefour yearsofitsexistence,Pétain’sVichyproveditselfrepressiveandaccommodatingto 95Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,41‐42. 96Jean‐PierreAzemaandOlivierWieviorka,Vichy:1940‐1944(Perrin,2000),46. 28 Germandemands,tothepointofbecomingahollowshellofastatethatboreno resemblancetothehopesanddreamsofthemenwhohadcreatedit.97 PartTwo CollaborationandBetrayal DespitetheNationalAssembly’salmostmessianichopesforPétain,Vichy wasaregime“forwhich,rightupuntilthemomentwhenitcollapsedininfamy,the redefinitionofapoliticalpacttookpriorityoverthesalvationofthenation.”98Inthe eyesofthepostwargovernmentandtoday’shistorians,Vichy’soffensesweremany, butaboveall,theirgravestcrimelayinhowtheirsteadfastcollaborationism transformedarepublicintoaGermanpuppetstate,viciouslyclingingtothelast remnantsofanylegitimacyorauthority. CollaborationisminVichyfirstemergedin1940intheguiseof accommodation.99PétainbelievedthatbycooperatingwiththeGermans,who,being reasonable,wouldnotaskforanythingtoosevere,Francewouldemergefromthe waragreatpoweronceagain,batteredyetunbroken.100Collaborationwouldbe“a wayofsecuringimprovementsintheconditionsofdailylifeinFrance,”notalong‐ termpoliticalstrategyofnationalcommitmenttotheGermanwarmachine.101 Germany,hebelieved,withsomejustification,wasmoreinterestedingaining 97Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,42(quotation),41(quotation);Assemblée Nationale,“SessionduMercredi10juillet1940”. 98Burrin,FranceundertheGermans,84,466. 99Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,143. 100Pétain,“Pétainfaitl’annoncedelacollaboration,”211‐212. 101Jackson,France:theDarkYears,174. 29 Vichy’ssupportforapossibleMediterraneanstrategyagainstBritainthanin squeezingitsconqueredterritoryforallitwasworth.102 Vichyhadaboutonelargelyautonomousyear,untilthesecondhalfof1941, duringwhichPétainconcentratedallpowersinhisperson,dismissedthe legislature,andexcludedhis“enemies”—Jews,Communists,Freemasons,andold Republicanelites—fromcertainprofessionsandfrompoliticaloffice.103Starting withdecreesinJuly1940thatallowedPétaintodismisscivilservantsatwill,Vichy begantospecificallytargetJews,withtheFirstJewishStatuteappearingwithout GermanpressureinOctober1940.104Inthistime,Vichydismissedoneofoutevery twolawmakerswhohadheldlocalofficefromtheirposts,ameasurethatmostly affectedleftists,andwasaimedattargetsofoldgrudges.105ButPétainhadlittle practicalpowerwhendealingwiththeGermans.FollowingtheGermaninvasionof theUSSRinJune1941,andapredictablesubsequentupswinginCommunist ResistanceactivityinFrance,Pétainhadnopowerbytreatytointerveneinthemass anti‐CommunistreprisalstakingplaceintheOccupiedZone.106Nordidhehaveany abilitytohaltdiehardcollaborationists’creationofaFrenchLegionofVolunteers 102Ibid,172,174(quotation). 103Evans,TheThirdReich,133;Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,112,115‐116; CointetandCointet,DictionnairehistoriquedelaFrancesousl’Occupation,19. 104CointetandCointet,DictionnairehistoriquedelaFrancesousl’Occupation,19; Paxton,VichyFrance,142. 105Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,112. 106Gildea,MarianneinChains,228. 30 againstBolshevism(LVF),whichwouldfightunderGermancommandersonthe EasternFront.107 Beginninginthesummerof1942,Vichysignificantlydeepenedits involvementwithitsNazioccupiers,abandoningaccommodationinfavorofactive collaboration.ForordinaryFrenchpeople,oneofthegreatestaffrontswasthe Relèvesystem,laterreformulatedastheServiceduTravailObligatoire(Obligatory LaborService,STO),whichfirstcalledforvolunteers,andthendraftedyoungmento workintheGermanReich.108Althoughhypotheticallyeverythreeworkerswho wenttoGermanyensuredthatoneFrenchprisonerofwarwouldreturntohis family,theSTOwaswildlyunpopular,andoneofthemajorResistanceactors,the “Maquis,”orbushfighters,waslargelyformedofyoungmenwhohadfledtheforced labordraft.109 Butotherformsofcollaborationweremuchmoresinister.Acharacteristic exampleofVichy’scollaborationistlogiccameinJune1942,when,toprotestthe GermandeportationofFrenchJewsintheOccupiedZone,Lavalproposedthatthe FrenchpolicearrestforeignJewsinbothzonesinstead.110UponLaval’sinsistence thatsplittingupfamilieswouldundulyupsetpublicopinion,theNazisoptedto deportchildrenaswellastheirparents,insteadofonlyadults,ashadpreviously beenplanned.111Therefore,thankstoVichy’sassistance,some30,000peoplewere 107Burrin,FranceundertheGermans,418. 108Ibid,187. 109Ibid,151,186. 110Ibid,156. 111Ibid,157. 31 senttoAuschwitzbetweenJulyandSeptember1942,includingthousandsof childrenwhomighthaveotherwisehadachanceofsurvival.112Vichy’schangeof allegiancewasexemplifiedinaspeechonJune22,1942,inwhichLaval,Pétain’s PrimeMinisteroncemoredeclared,“Jesouhaîtelavictoireallemande”—“Idesirethe victoryofGermany.”113 FollowingtheGermanOccupationoftheentiretyofFranceonNovember11, 1942,Vichy’scollaborationismbecamedesperate,entrenched,andevenmore thoroughlyiniquitous.PhilippeBurrinsuggeststhatVichy“hadbecomeafiction maintainedbythewishofHitler,whoreckonedit‘clever’tokeeponaPétain government,asakindofghost,”butthefictionwasstillcapableofveryreal terror.114ToclampdownonResistanceactivitybythevariousgroupsofMaquisand byCommunistfighters,liketheFrancs‐TireursPartisans,Vichycreatedamilitiain early1943,theMilice,which“setitselfabovethelawandwassoonoperating outsideofit.”115OrdinaryFrenchpeoplewererepulsedbytheMiliceandterrifiedof them,becauseinadditiontoordinarycrimeslikerobberyandlooting,miliciens engagedintortureandsummaryexecutions.116 Ineffect,asJacksonsuggests,“[a]stheVichyregimelostcontrol,itbecame moreviolentandunpredictable.”117Bythespringof1944,“[e]nfeebledfromabove bytheGermans,fromwithinbythecollaborationists,frombelowbytheResistance, 112Ibid. 113Jackson,France:theDarkYears,215. 114Burrin,FranceundertheGermans,167. 115Ibid,451. 116Ibid. 117Jackson,France:theDarkYears,530. 32 andfromoutsidebydeGaulle,theVichygovernmentexistedinonlythemost nominalsense.”118AsJacksonsuccinctlyargues: In1940,Vichy’srhetorichadoscillatedbetweenthreethemes: regeneratingFrance,protectingthepopulationfromthe consequencesofthewar,andpreservingorder.In1944onlythelast themeremained:Vichypresenteditselfasthelastbulwarkagainst revolutionandanarchy.119 TheFrenchstatecouldnolongerfairlyclaimanysenseofindependence;itshope thatcollaborationwouldleadtopeacewithGermanyhadbeenthoroughlyrebuked. Inmaking“graveconcessionsinordertoachieveanillusoryregeneration”ofpower, Vichyhadboxeditselfin;itcouldnoteasilyseparateitselffromtheoccupying power,andsoithopeddesperatelyforaGermanvictory.120 OnlywhenitwasclearthattheAllieswouldregaincontrolofFrancedid Vichy,nowa“parodyofastate,”makeineffective,legalisticgesturestodistance itselffromitscollaborationismwithNaziGermany,butbythispointitwasfartoo lateforsuchgesturestohaveanyimpact.121PétainwroteletterscondemningMilice brutalityandtriedtoestablishcontactwithdeGaulle,whileLavalconspiredto reconvenetheNationalAssemblyandestablishatransitionalgovernmentthatcould bepresentedtotheAlliesasalegitimatefaitaccompli.122Thesegestures,unlikelyto evokemuchsympathyanyway,werecutshortinlateAugustwhentheGerman armycartedoffVichy’sleadersandsentthemtoSigmaringen,asmalltownin 118Ibid,529. 119Ibid,531. 120Burrin,FranceundertheGermans,466. 121Jackson,France:theDarkYears,568. 122Burrin,FranceundertheGermans,453. 33 southwesternGermany,whereNaziofficialshopedtoinstallaFrenchpuppet‐ government‐in‐exile.123 InSigmaringen,bothPétainandLaval,withaneyetowardsthefuture, decidedtopresentthemselvesasprisonersratherthanparticipateina“parodyofa parody”ofagovernment.124Pathetically,foraregimethathadbeenmeanttosave Francefromitshumiliation,Vichyfadedawaywithoutevenitsleaders’support. Onlyextremists,clingingtofantasy,wereleft,spendingthefallandwinterof1944 “bus[ying]themselvesreconstructingthesemblanceofastate,completewith ministries,planningcharts,laws,andaJournalofficiel.”125 PartThree Liberation OnAugust25,1944,whileshotswerestillbeingfiredinthebattletoliberate Paris,DeGaulle,ResistanceleaderandheadoftheProvisionalGovernmentofthe FrenchRepublic,addressedaeuphoricParisiancrowdwithaspeechthatwould definethemoraloutlinesofcivicdutyinthepostwarperiod.DeclaringthatParis “outragé[,][…]brisé[,][…]martyrisé”wasnow“Parislibéré,”hestressedthat France’sliberationfromitsoppressorswasnoluckyaccidentbutratherahard‐won victorythathadbeenalongtimecoming.126France,heinsisted,hadgainedits freedomnotsolelyduetomilitarymeans,butbythoseindividualsandgroupswho 123Ibid,455. 124Ibid,453,568(quotation). 125Burrin,FranceundertheGermans,454. 126CharlesdeGaulle,“Discoursdel’HôteldeVilledeParis,25août1944,”Fondation CharlesdeGaulle,http://www.charles‐de‐gaulle.org/pages/l‐ homme/accueil/discours/pendant‐la‐guerre‐1940‐1946/discours‐de‐l‐hotel‐de‐ ville‐de‐paris‐25‐aout‐1944.php. 34 hadremainedresolutelyfaithful,representing“theonlyFrance,thetrueFrance,the eternalFrance.”127Leftunspoken,butobvioustoanycontemporarylistener,was theresultingassertionthatthosewhohadnotsecuredFrance’sfreedomhadno claimtomoralrighteousnessorfortitude;whattheyrepresentedwasnotFrench. Inthepostwarperiod,especiallypriortothepublicrehabilitationof Pétainistsintheearly1950s,writersoftheResistancereferredtoVichyasa usurper,allegingthatithadcriminallyseizedpowerbyavilemanipulationof republicaninstitutionsandfrailtieswhilethetrueRepublicitselflivedonandfought on.128Despitepretentionstolegitimacy,courtesyofthefrantic,desperatevoteon July10,1940,accordingtotheGaullistsVichywasandhadalwaysbeenawholly futileandinvalidexercise,andthevoteitself,“merelythelatestandfinalinstance […]ofunworthinessandirresponsibility”byFrance’spoliticalcadres.129Itwasclear totheresistantswhohadcometopowerinthemidstoftheLiberationthat“there [c]ouldbenoplaceinthepoliticallifeofliberatedFranceforthemenofVichyor thosewhohadcollaboratedwithGermany,”andsoitwasimperativethatthe provisionalgovernmenttakesomeactiontoprotecttheincipientFourth Republic.130 127DeGaulle,“Discoursdel’HôteldeVilledeParis.” 128Jackson,France:theDarkYears,608;onpages571‐572ofFrance:theDarkYears, JacksonrelateshowDeGaullerefusedtoproclaimtherestorationoftheRepublicon August25,1944,arguingthattheRepublichadneverceasedtoexist;inJoly’s Dictionnairede1889à1940andDictionnairede1940à1958,quotationsfromthe juryd’honneurfrequentlyreferenceVichyas‘l’usurpateur,’e.g.,seeBurrus,Maurice. 129Loewenstein,“TheDemiseoftheFrenchConstitutionof1875,”874;Novick,The ResistanceversusVichy,95(quotation). 130Novick,TheResistanceversusVichy,95. 35 ThePurge Yet,despitethisvenomousrhetoric,the“purge”of1945to1946can accuratelyandjustlybedescribedasaGaullistattempttostabilizeashattered nationratherthanmerelyanactofvengeance.Thepreviousfouryearshadbeen markedbydestructionandanguish—theNaziinvasion,deportations,civic betrayal—and,inordertomaintainsomedegreeofstability,purgeswouldserveto: settletheaccountfortheexperiencesoftheoccupationbyidentifying andsinglingoutagroupofpeopledeemedaccountable,uponwhich thecollectivefeelingsoftheFrench[couldbe]thenconcentratedand vented,[…]purging[…]ambivalences,ambiguities,and uncertainties.131 Punitivemeasuresbytheprovisionalgovernmenttakenagainstspecific partieshadtofulfilltwoconditions:theyhadtosatisfythepublicandnotimpede keymeasuresofstate.Thepublic,partsofwhichhadengagedinbloody, extrajudicialpurgesofitsowninsummer1944,wouldnotbesatisfiedwithtoken chastisementsofinsignificantFrenchmen.132Andyet,deGaulle’sprovisionalstate, strugglingtoassertitsdominanceagainstotherResistanceentities,couldnotabide bythesenselesswasteofneededmen,norcoulditallowotherbodiestodecidewho wouldbeallowedbackintopubliclife.133Inallfairness,thepurgecouldnotbe directedagainstordinaryFrenchmenwhohadmerely“obey[ed]theinstructionsof 131Burrin,FranceundertheGermans,460. 132Jackson,France:theDarkYears,579. 133Jackson,France:theDarkYears,571;Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,285; Novick,TheResistanceversusVichy,95‐96. 36 anapparentlylegitimateregime.”134Furthermore,Franceneededitshigh bureaucratsandcivilservantstodirectpublicadministrationmorethanever before.135WhatpostwarFrancedidnotneed,forthemostpart,wasthesecond comingofthesameNationalAssemblywhosemajorityhadvotedforVichyinthe firstplace.136Thus,inadditiontotheobviouscollaborationists,theGaullists’ postwarpurgedirecteditselflargelyagainsttheseformerpoliticalelites,who,even ifnotpersonallyguiltyofcrimesagainstthestate,hadsomedegreeofbackground culpabilityforthewartimedisaster.137 Inkeepingwithalloftheseconcerns,thepurgeagainstformerlegislators duringtheyears1945and1946wascharacterizedbylegalism,thecentralizationof authority,andyetasurprisingsubjectivityandsensitivitytolocalneeds.Itwas legal,becausetheprovisionalgovernmenthadnoparticularenthusiasmfor allowingviolenceanddisordertocontinueunabated.138Thepurgewascentralized, becausetheGaullistleadershipfeltnodesiretoallowdecentralizedpowertoleech outtowardsalternativesourcesofauthority,suchaslocalCommunistResistance fightersortothelocal“Maquis,”theso‐called“bushfighters.”139Particularlyinthe Southwest,wheretheMaquiswereespeciallybeloved,thefleeingGermanshad committedincredibleatrocitiesandtheGaullistandAlliedpresencewasvirtually 134Paxton,VichyFrance,333. 135Ibid,334. 136Ibid,346. 137Ibid. 138Jackson,France:theDarkYears,578‐579. 139Jackson,France:theDarkYears,579. 37 nil.140Allowinglocalleaderstodecideonlocalpunishmentswouldhavebeen unwise.141Andyet,whendeemedappropriate—particularlyintheNortheast—the purgeprovedremarkablysensitivetolocalsentiments.Itoccurredthroughseveral separatemechanisms,allmeanttoseparatewheatfromchaff.Inorderoftheir decreasingstringency,theseincluded:thecourts,thepoliticalparties,theprefects, theJuryd’honneur,andlocalconstituencies. TheCourts Roughlyonelegislatoroutofeverytwelvewhohadheldpoliticalofficeon July10,1940,facedajudicialtrialinthepostwarera,butthejudicialpurgesproved “surprisingin[their]relativeclemency.”142Theyhandedoutonlythreedeath sentencesforlawmakers,andonlyLavalandtheAlsatiantraitorJean‐PierreMourer wereeverexecuted.143Mostlegislators,iffoundguiltyofanything,wereconvicted ofbeinginthestateof“nationalindignity,”apostwarinnovationthatmarkedlesser formsoftreason.144Theresultingpunishment,“nationaldegradation,”meantaloss ofrightsasaFrenchcitizen,rangingfromtherighttovoteandstandforelectionto 140Ibid,574. 141Ibid. 142Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,328. 143Ibid,328‐329. 144Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,328‐329;Novick,TheResistanceversusVichy, 147‐148.Onpages147‐148,Novickexplainstheconceptofthecivildeath.So‐called “nationalindignity”wasastateenteredasaresultofspecificactionsduringthe Occupation,suchasbeingamemberofPétain’scabinet,belongingtoa collaborationistgroup,orhavingpubliclyexpressedsupportfortheGermansorfor authoritarianism. 38 therighttoparticipateincertainprofessions,butdidnotalwaysincludeprison terms.145 AttheHighCourt,where21legislatorswhohadheldhighofficeatVichy wereprosecutedfortheirpoliticalconduct,ahandfulofmenwerepunishedbylong prisonsentencesortermsofhardlabor,andfivetotenyearsormoreofnational degradation.Yetofthe21legislatorstofaceaHighCourttrial,10wereeither exoneratedoracquittedfortheirResistanceactivity,onehadhischargescompletely dismissed,andanother,chastisedforhisincompetence,hadhiscasetransferredtoa lowercourt.146AcquittalforparticipationintheResistanceappearstohavebeen reservedformenwithnear‐impeccableResistancerecords,whileexoneration,at leastinthisinstance,seemstohaveappliedtothosewithlessstellarrecords,orto menwhojoinedtheResistanceatalaterdate.147Forexample,oneofthemen acquittedforhisserviceasaministeratVichywasthedeputyRobertSchuman,the futurefatheroftheEuropeanUnion,whohadresignedfromhispositioninPétain’s governmentonJuly12,1940,andhadbrokenwithVichyentirelylaterthatyear.148 Othermen,whohadmorethantwodaysofservicetotheVichyregime,werenot alwayssolucky.Infact,ofthe21legislatorswhoappearedbeforetheHighCourtfor theirserviceinahighofficeatVichy,onlytwohadservedagaininanational 145Novick,TheResistanceversusVichy,149. 146Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,361. 147Joly,Dictionnairede1889à1940andDictionnairede1940à1958.SeeLémery, Henry;Parmentier,André;andYbarnegaray,Jeanforexoneration;andFévrier, André;Mireaux,Émile;Pomaret,Charles;Portmann,Georges;Rivière,Albert;and Schuman,Robertforacquittal. 148Joly,Dictionnairede1889à1940andDictionnairede1940à1958,seeSchuman, Robert. 39 politicalofficeby1958—theaforementionedSchumanandGeorgesPortmann,a senatorfromtheGirondewho,thoughloyaltoVichyuntil1941,hasanofficial biographyreadinglikethatofaResistancesaint.149 PoliticalParties In1944and1945,whileprefectsandlatertheJuryweredebatingover whethercertainformerlawmakersshouldbeallowedtorunforoffice,theSocialists, Radicals,Communists,andtheRepublicanFederationallexcludedanumberof legislatorsfromtheirparties,which,inessence,communicatedthattheywouldnot defendthembeforeanylegalexclusion.150TheSocialists,eagertocleartheirparty ofacollaborationistelement,heldathorough,“rootandbranch”purgeannounced theweekaftertheliberationofParis,whichexcludedevenahandfulofmenwho wouldlatergoontobeexoneratedbyprefectsandtheJuryd’honneur.151The Radicals,inaweakerpositioninthepostwaraftermath,hadalessthorough, althoughnot“inconsiderable”purgethatalsorejectedseveralmenwhowerelater exonerated.152 Therestofthepartypurgesoccurredatamuchsmallerscale.The Communists,mostofwhoserepresentativeshadlosttheirmandatesforrefusingto 149Joly,Dictionnairede1889à1940andDictionnairede1940à1958. 150Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,359;Novick,TheResistanceversusVichy,107‐ 109. 151Novick,TheResistanceversusVichy,107(quotation);Wieviorka,Orphansofthe Republic,359‐360;HerbertR.Lottman,ThePurge,(NewYork:WilliamMorrowand Company,1986),187. 152Novick,TheResistanceversusVichy,108(quotation);Wieviorka,Orphansofthe Republic,359‐360. 40 disavowtheirpartyinSeptember1939,turnedgrimlytopunishthefourteenmen whohadbrokenwiththepartyandremainedinoffice.153Theirfurywasapplied regardlessofbehaviorduringthewarorvoteonJuly10,1940,exemplifiedwhen partyhardlinerstriedvigorouslytogetRenéNicod,adissidentfromtheAin,oneof theeightymentovotenoandfouryearsimprisonedunderVichy,excludedfromthe ProvisionalConsultativeAssembly.154TheRepublicanFederation,theonlyrightist partytoholdapurge,playeditevensafer,directingtheirexclusionsalmostentirely towardsprominentdiscreditedmenwithlonghistoriesofcollaborationism,whom noonewouldfeelinclinedtodefend.155Forthemostpart,however,theseparty purgesprovedextremelysuccessfulatremovingmenfromnationallife;ofthemen excludedbytheirpoliticalparties,onlyEmmanuelTempleoftheRepublican Federationmanagedtoregainnationalpoliticalofficebetween1945and1958. Prefects PriortoApril1945,prefectshadtherighttorehabilitatelocalmembersof parliamentwhohadvotedfororhadclosetieswithVichysothattheycouldrunfor officeorparticipateinlocaladministration.156UnlikethelatercentralizedJury d’honneur,whichwaslargelyuninterestedinlocalorregionalpolitics,prefects wereoftenextremelysensitivetotheseconcerns.157Theywereinterestedin 153Novick,TheResistanceversusVichy,109. 154Novick,TheResistanceversusVichy,109;Joly,Dictionnairede1889à1940and Dictionnairede1940à1958,seeNicod,René. 155Novick,TheResistanceversusVichy,109;Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,359‐ 360. 156Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,319. 157Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,306. 41 ensuringthat“powerfulnotables,wellestablishedinthecountryside,and supportedbytheirconstituents[,][wereallowedtoremaininoffice][,][…]to maintainpublicorderandtoallowtherighttokeepsomeofitsleaders.”158 Therefore,dependingonthesituation,theycouldbesurprisinglyforgivingoferrors thattheJurywouldhavefoundinexcusable,asituationthatprovedfavorablefor legislatorswhohadtheircasesheardbetweentheLiberationandtheestablishment oftheJury.159InthecasesofAlsace,forexample,whichhadhaditstwodepartments annexeddirectlyintoNaziGermany,itsprefectsweresokindastobe“indulgen[t],” exoneratingsevenmenwhowouldhaveremainedineligibleinanyotherregion, becausethey“s[ought]tokeepinpositiontheexperiencednotablesofa traumatizedprovince.”160 TheJuryd’honneur TheJuryd’honneur,formedinApril1945anddissolvedbyOctober1946, hadabroadergoal,determiningwhethermenwhohadvotedyesonJuly10,1940 orwhohadheldapostatVichyafterApril,1942,hadResistancerecordssuggesting thattheybedeclaredeligibleforparticipationinthepublicsphere.161Although ineligibilitywasinitiallyframedasatemporaryrestrictionfromrunningforoffice onprovisionalmunicipalordepartmentalassemblies,therestrictionwas 158Ibid,306‐307. 159Ibid,320. 160Ibid. 161Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,286‐287.Wieviorkaexplainsthat 42 indefinitelyextendedin1946,andmendeclaredineligibleremainedsountila generalamnestyin1951.162 FormedoftheVicePresidentoftheCouncilofState,thePresidentofthe NationalCounciloftheResistance,andtheChancelloroftheOrderofLiberation,the Juryd’honneurwasinstructed,wheneveranexcludedrepresentativeappealedhis lot,tolookforsignificantevidenceofResistanceactivitythatwould“relieve”himof hisineligibility.163AsthethreemeninchargewereallmenoftheResistance,they wereoftenquitehostiletowardsthosewhomtheyconsideredtohaveperformed “insufficient”Resistance.Thetermstoregaineligibilitywerefairlystringent: behaving‘correctly,’orprovidingaidtothosewhohadengagedinResistancewas generallyinsufficient,although,ofcourse,“octogenarianswerenotexpectedtorace aboutblowingupbridges.”164Forsenatorsanddeputieswhohadnotproven themselvessufficientlydevotedtothecauseoftheResistance,theJuryfrequently invokedthephrase: Theactswhich[thisman]performed[on]behalfofFrenchmenand theResistancedonotindicatethat[degreeof]participationinthe struggleagainsttheenemy[that]thenationhadarighttoexpectfrom itselectedrepresentatives.165 Althoughtheywerenotanimpossiblyrigorousbody,and114of416 legislatorswhoappliedtohavetheirineligibilityliftedweregrantedthatfreedom, 162Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,286,329;Burrin,FranceundertheGermans, 460;Joly,Dictionnairede1889à1940andDictionnairede1940à1958,seePébellier, GastonandBeauguitte,André. 163Novick,TheResistanceversusVichy,101. 164Ibid,102,103(quotation). 165Ibid,102. 43 thetermsoftheJurycould,attimes,appeardesperatelyunfair.166Oneofthemost draconianrulingsconcernedSulpiceDewez,aCommunistdeputyfromtheNordand acard‐carryingvolunteerResistancefighterwhohadbeendeportedtoBuchenwald forhisactivities,whowasdeniedexonerationonthegroundsthat: Whiletheinterestedpartymanifestedhisoppositiontotheenemy andtheusurper,notablybythedistributionofundergroundleaflets andnewspapers,thesefactsnonethelessdonotconstitutesufficient personalparticipationinthestruggle[.][…][I]tisnotestablishedthat hisarrestinJuly1944hadanyconnectiontoResistanceactivity.167 OtherseeminginjusticesincludedmenlikeCharlesVallin,arightwingnationalist deputybeforethewar,whojoineddeGaulle’scabinetinLondonin1942,proved himselfawarheroinAfricaandFrance,andledachargeintoSigmaringenin1945, yetwasstillineligibledueto“‘theveryimportantpoliticalrolethatheplayedfrom 1940to1942whichcontributedtotheweakeningofthenation’smorale.’”168 Ingeneral,however,theJuryhadonepersistentbias:theyrequiredgreater evidenceofResistanceactivityfromleft‐winglegislatorsthanright‐winglegislators. AsNovicksuggests,thelogicwassimple:“iftheRightwastosurviveasahealthy (andabove‐ground)forceinFrenchpolitics,itneededallthecharityitcouldget.”169 Furthermore,themenoftheJury,forthemostpart,respectedtheideathat favorabletreatmenttowardsrightwingmenwouldprotectFrance’sstabilityinan 166Ibid,104. 167Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,275,313(quotation);Joly,Dictionnairede 1889à1940andDictionnairede1940à1958,seeDewez,Sulpice. 168Novick,TheResistanceversusVichy,103(quotation);Joly,Dictionnairede1889à 1940andDictionnairede1940à1958,seeVallin,Charles. 169Novick,TheResistanceversusVichy,106. 44 erawhenCommunistinfluencewasontherise.170Inpractice,therefore,while SocialistswithmediocreResistancerecordswereoftendeniedexoneration,rightists withanysuchrecordatallweretypicallyrehabilitated.171 LocalConstituencies WhenFrenchmenand,forthefirsttime,Frenchwomen,wenttothepollson October1,1945,toelectaConstituentAssemblythatwoulddraftanew constitution,theylargelyrejectedthosemenwhohadbeenintheThirdRepublic’s lastclassoflegislators.172Of586newrepresentatives,only121hadheldofficein theprewarChambers,including44Communistswho,havingbeendismissed,had nevervotedforVichyinthefirstplace.173Andofthe77menwhohadheldactive mandatesonJuly10,1940,whofoundthemselvesreelectedinthefirstpostwar election,only24hadvoted“yes”tograntpowerstoPétain—andsoonlyslightly morethan4%ofthe570“yesmen”foundtheirwaybackintoofficeinthefirst roundofelections.174 Forfollowingelections,thepatternheld:ThirdRepublicrepresentativesin generalwerevotedbackintonationallegislativeofficeatlowrates,andmenwho hadvoted“yes’onJuly10,1940,werereadmittedevenlessfrequently(seeTable9). Inanenvironmentwhere“eventhe80whohadvoted“no”inJuly1940foundno 170Novick,TheResistanceversusVichy,106‐107. 171Ibid,90. 172Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,330. 173Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,330;Joly,Dictionnairede1889à1940and Dictionnairede1940à1958,countreachedbycomparinglistsforthe1936andthe 1945Assemblies. 174Joly,Dictionnairede1889à1940andDictionnairede1940à1958. 45 automaticreturntopubliclifeafter1944,”itisperhapsunsurprisingthat, throughoutthetwolegislaturesoftheProvisionalGovernment(1945‐1946),and throughthethreelegislaturesoftheshort‐livedFourthRepublic(1946‐1958),only about15%ofthelawmakersinofficeonJuly10,1940,regainedtheiroffice.Even formenwhowereexoneratedfortheirmisjudgment,eligibilitywasnoguaranteeof reelection.Ultimately,ofthe570menwhohadvotedforVichyonJuly10,1940, only56menwereclearedforre‐electionandsuccessfullygainedre‐admittanceto nationalofficebetween1945and1958.175 The56“YesMen”whoRegainedLegislativeOffice,1945‐1958 The56menwhovotedforVichyyetregainedanationalpoliticalmandate between1945and1958wereextremelyunusual,allmarked,insomewayor another,bystrongResistancerecords,whethertheresultofasustained commitmenttoanorganization,anindividualactofgreatbravery,orstalwart oppositiontotheNazis,Vichy,orboth. Twenty‐sixmenofthe56“yesmen”whoservedagainafterbeingexonerated wereclearedbytheJuryd’honneurbeforetheirre‐election,andeverysingleoneof themhadsomehistoryofoppositionthatclearedthemforimmediatere‐admittance tothepoliticalscene.176Atoneextremeofaction,theParisiandeputyLouisRollin, whobrokewithVichyonJuly11,1940,hadconnectedwithnumerousResistance organizations,creatingfalsepapersandfindinglodgings,evenforthefamousleader 175Joly,Dictionnairede1889à1940andDictionnairede1940à1958. 176Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,360,incomparisonwithJoly,Dictionnairede 1940à1958. 46 ColonelRémy.177Atanotherextreme,therightwingsenatorRenéCotygained eligibilitynotforhisactionsonbehalfoftheResistance,butforhisconstantrefusal toallowPétaintoplacehimasamayororadepartmentalcouncilor.178Somewhere betweenthesetwopoles,thesenatorCharlesDesjardinsgainedhisre‐admittanceto eligibilityforelectionforone,singularbraveact,when,in1943,hedeclaredhis objectionstotheObligatoryLaborService(STO)beforetheprefectoftheAisne,the GermanFeldkommandant,and130mayors,sayingthat:“Amayoristhefatherofhis constituents.Wouldafathersendhischildrentotheenemy?”179 Twenty“yes”menwhoservedagainregainedadmittancetoofficethrough prefecturaldecree.180Althoughahandfulofmenhadnear‐perfectResistance credentials,mosthadmixedrecords,oftenbecausetheyhadbrokenwithVichyata fairlylatedate.181Agoodexampleofthetypeofmanwhowasre‐electedbut regainedadmittancetopoliticallifethroughprefecturaldecreewasJeanCrouan,a RepublicanFederationdeputyfromBrittany.Crouan,whoservedintheNational CouncilofVichy,theconsultativebodydrawnuptoaidPétaininwritinghis constitution,becamegraduallymoreinvolvedwiththeResistanceoverthefour yearsofthewar.182CourtesyofhisofficeasmayorofQuéménéven,asmalltownin theFinistière,Crouanissuedfalseidentificationcardsforrequisitionedlaborers, 177Joly,Dictionnairede1889à1940andDictionnairede1940à1958,seeRollin, Louis. 178Ibid,seeCoty,René. 179Ibid,seeDesjardins,Charles. 180Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,360,incomparisonwithJoly,Dictionnairede 1940à1958. 181Ibid. 182Joly,Dictionnairede1889à1940andDictionnairede1940à1958,seeCrouan, Jean. 47 organizedprotestsagainstGermandemands,andhiddownedAlliedairmen.183 DeportedtoDachauin1943,followingliberationin1945,herepresentedprisoners anddeporteesattheFirstConstitutionalAssembly,andwas,thus,oneofthe24“yes men”toserveatthatpost.184ThoughCrouanhadhadcontactwithVichyatafairly intimatelevelforalongerperiodoftimethanmostofthemenclearedcourtesyof theJury,hewasalsorenownforhiscommitmenttoResistanceandexoneratedfor thisdevotion. Finally,therewere10“yesmen”whowerecompletelyexcludedduringthe purgeyetreturnedtoofficeinthe1950s,whohadeitherbrokenverylatewith Vichyorhadhadintimateconnectionswiththeregime.185However,despitethese pooroverallwartimerecords,these10mencarriedabalanceofcharacteristics, including,asarule,stillsomeformofResistance,thatmadethemappealingtothe electoratebetweentheyears1951and1958,followingthetwogeneralamnestiesof 1951and1953. OneexamplewasthecaseofdeputyGastonPébellier,amayorwhowent fromshowingwarmgesturestowardsPétainin1941tobeingarrestedbythe GestapoandgrantingaidtotheAlliesin1944,whosemixledtheJuryd’honneurto declarethat“thecasewastooambiguousforineligibilitytobelifted.”186Pébellier, therefore,hadtowaiteightyearsfortheamnesty,havingfirsthisfatherEugèneand thenhisbrotherJeanholdhisseatforhimintheearly1950s,beforehewasfinally 183Ibid. 184Ibid. 185Joly,Dictionnairede1889à1940andDictionnairede1940à1958. 186Ibid,seePébellier,Gaston. 48 clearedandthenre‐electedforofficeinNovember1953.187Anotherexamplewas senatorGeorgesPortmann,amemberoftheArmisticeCommissionwhohad communicatedVichy’spositionstotheGermanoccupationforce,andhadbriefly beenahighofficialatVichy,thejuniorministerforInformation.188Despitebreaking withtheregimein1940andbecomingafamousmemberoftheResistance, PortmannwasexcludedfromofficeforhisseveralmonthsofservicetoVichyuntil aftertheamnesties,anddidnotregainnationalpoliticalofficeuntil1955.Afinal example,andperhapsthemostcurious,wasthatofJean‐LouisTixier‐Vignancour, thedeputywhohadcalledforthearrestofReynaudandhiscabinetonJuly9,1940. Hardlyanyone’simageofaresistant,andalwayssomethingofareactionary,hehad brieflybeenthejuniorministerofInformationfollowingPortmann’sresignation, andyetcompletelyescapedtrialafterthewar,sinceapparentlynoone,noteventhe postwarResistancegovernment,doubtedthedepthsofhishatredofVichyandthe Germansfollowing1941.189Therefore,despiteneverengaginginResistance,per say,Tixier‐Vignancour’sinabilitytoletanyoneremainunsureabouthispolitical leaningsbecameitselfsomethingofapoliticalboon,and,followingtenyearsof ineligibility,hereturnedtoofficein1956,andlaterranforPresidentin1965.190 Conclusion 187Ibid. 188Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,361;Joly,Dictionnairede1889à1940and Dictionnairede1940à1958,seePortmann,Georges. 189Joly,Dictionnairede1889à1940andDictionnairede1940à1958,seeTixier‐ Vignancour,Jean‐Louis. 190Joly,Dictionnairede1889à1940andDictionnairede1940à1958,seeTixier‐ Vignancour,Jean‐Louis. 49 The570menoftheFrenchNationalAssemblywhovotedforPétainonJuly 10,1940weremembersofaninformedbutmisledpoliticalclasswhobetwrongon adesperategamble.Intheiremotionallychargedattempttosavethenation, France’slawmakersoperatedunderseriouslyflawedbasicpostulatesaboutthe relativeabilitiesofFrance,theUnitedKingdom,andGermany,aswellasaboutthe faithfulnessoftheirgreatwarhero,MarshalPétain.HadGermanytrulybeenan unstoppableforce,continuingthewarwouldhavedrawnFranceintothesecond bloodbathinageneration.AndhadPétainbeenastrustworthyastheybelieved, limitinghispowerwouldhavehamstringedFrance’ssaviorwhenitneededhim most.Giventheabsenceoffeasible‐soundingalternativesfromcrediblesources,and aseriousmisunderstandingaboutNaziGermany’struegoals,itisnosurprisethat France’slawmakersoptedforachangeindirectionthattheybelievedwouldleave toapeacefulfuture. SincetheentiretyoftheNationalAssemblyadheredtoPétainathighrates,it isincorrecttocharacterizehisascenttopowerasright‐wingextremismrunamok, seekingtoinstallhomegrownfascismonFrenchsoil.AlthoughPétainquicklycame topresideoverarepressivestatethatwasaccommodatingtothepointofiniquity, neitherthevotenorthetextinstalledPétainasadictator;strictlyspeaking,no legislatorsvotedforVichy,asitcametobe.Instead,thevotetrulywasanabdication ofpower,wherebythemenofFrance’slegislaturevotedthemselvesoutofcontrol, handedoverauthoritytoPétainwithnoguaranteethatitwouldbeusedfairlyor well,ashockingdisplayoftrustandnaïveté. 50 Althoughfundamentallyincompetentinthedemandingroleofresistant‐ legislator,thevastmajorityofthe570yesvotersdistancedthemselvesfromPétain andLavalastimerevealedthegreatdeficitsoftheVichyregime.Althoughroughlya thirdofmenhadsomeconnectionwithVichyand10%joinedtheranksofthe collaborationists,thevastmajorityofyesmenretreatedtotheirhomecommunities, spendingthewarintheircapacityasmayorsandnotables,attendingtolocal concernsandrefrainingfrominvolvementinnationalpolitics.191 Resistancewasoverrepresentedamonglegislatorscomparedtothenationas awhole,butmostlawmakers’resistancewasexpressedonsmall,locallevelsthat didnotseemheroicinpostwarFrance.192SincebeingasenatororadeputyinThird RepublicFrancewaspoorpreparationforundergroundsabotage,legislators distinguishedthemselvesasdoctors,attendingtowoundedResistancefighters;as bureaucrats,constantlymisplacingforcedlaborformsorpassingillicitmessages;or aslocalleaders,hidingdownedAlliedairmenincellarsorattics.193Fewwereso heroicastodeserveaccolades,unlesstheactofremainingasabulwarkofstability andpre‐Occupationauthoritycanbedeemedanactofheroism;fewwereintegrally tiedtotheexcessesandcrimesoftheVichyregime.Ratherthanbeingheroesor villains,mostwhovotedforVichywere,aboveall,exceedinglyordinarymenwho weresimplynotcutoutforthetypeofdecisiveactionthatthepostwarnation wishedhadbeenperformedonitsbehalf. 191Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,265(percentages),109‐283;Joly, Dictionnairede1889à1940andDictionnairede1940à1958. 192Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,270. 193Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,270;Joly,Dictionnairede1889à1940and Dictionnairede1940à1958. 51 Thepurge,therefore,revolvednotaroundpunishinganyoverallcriminality butonaneedtoremovediscreditedmenfrompositionsofinfluence.Outof necessity,thispurgewassubjectiveandtookintoaccountpoliticalconsiderations towardsmen,theirvotes,andtheirrecordsduringthewar.The56menwhovoted forVichyyetservedasdeputiesorsenatorsbetween1945and1958were exceptionalmen,allofwhomhadsomereasonableclaimtostrongResistance credentials.ForthehundredsofothermenwhovotedforVichy,theirwarrecord failedtoendearthemtothenewResistancepowersthatbe. Althoughthepurgewasmeantasatemporarymeasure,itsextension between1946and1951effectivelyexcludedmostformerlegislators,eventhose withmuchtoofferthenation,fromfutureparticipationinnationalpoliticallife. Althoughmostretainedsomeinfluenceonalocal,regional,orcommerciallevel, theyneverreturnedtothepositionsofhonortheyhadheldbeforethewar.Onlyten legislatorswereineligiblebetween1945and1951andregainedofficepriortothe endoftheFourthRepublic,joinedbyahandfulofothersafterthe1958 establishmentoftheFifthRepublic,whenmostofthepostwarfervorhaddied down.194Overall,however,despitethefactthatmostoftheThirdRepublic’s legislatorshadlittleinvolvementwithVichyafteritscreation,themenwhovoted forVichywerepermanentlytaintedfortheiroverlycredulousoptimism.Therefore, 194JeanJoly,Dictionnairedesparlementairesfrançais:noticesbiographiquessurles parlementairesfrançaisde1889à1940(Paris,1960)andDictionnairedes parlementairesfrançais:noticesbiographiquessurlesparlementairesde1940à1958 (Paris:Ladocumentationfrançaise,1988),http://www.assemblee‐ nationale.fr/histoire/cr_10‐juillet‐1940.aspSeeLouisDeschizeaux,HervéNader, etc. 52 onlyaselect,extraordinaryfewwereabletobypasssystematicexclusionandreturn tonationalpoliticaloffice. 53 Table1:VotingbreakdownoftheNationalAssemblyontheJuly10,1940proposal grantingMaréchalPhilippePétainextraordinarypowerstocontrolthegovernment andrewriteanewconstitutionforaFrenchState. Vote Yes No Abstain NoVote–Massilia195 NoVote–Job196 NoVote‐Other197 Total NumberofMen 570 80 20 27 1 149 847 PercentofTotalMen 67.3 9.4 2.4 3.2 0.0 17.6 99.9 Source:Joly,Dictionnairede1889à1940andDictionnairede1940à1958; Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,345‐358,365. 195Twenty‐sevenrepresentativeswhofledtoNorthAfricaontheMassiliainlate June1940anticipatingananti‐armisticegovernmentwereunabletoattendthe session. 196JulesJeanneney,asPresidentoftheSenate,wasunabletovoteatthesession. 197NoVote‐Otherreferstoallmenabsentfromthesessionwhowerenotonthe Massilia. 54 Table2:BreakdownofvotesfortheJuly10,1940sessionoftheFrenchNational Assembly,bypositionasdeputyorsenator,includingrateofnon‐adherencetothe Pétanistproject. Position Yes No Abstain No No No Vote‐ Vote‐ Vote Massilia Job ‐ Other Deputy 359 58 12 26 0 90 Senator 211 22 8 1 1 59 Total 570 80 20 27 1 149 Total %Non Adherence198 545 302 847 17.6 10.3 15.0 Source:Joly,Dictionnairede1889à1940andDictionnairede1940à1958; Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,345‐358,365. 198Non‐adherenceisdefinedasavoteofno,abstention,orMassiliaabsence. 55 Table3:BreakdownofvotesfortheJuly10,1940sessionoftheFrenchNational Assembly,byage,includingrateofnon‐adherencetothePétainistproject. Total %Non‐ Adherence Yes No Abstain No No No Vote‐ Vote Vote Massilia ‐Job – Other 60 8 3 1 1 36 Older than70 45‐69 Younger than45 Total 109 11.0 412 60 14 20 82 588 16.0 98 6 31 150 14.0 570 80 20 27 1 149 847 15.0 12 3 Source:Joly,Dictionnairede1889à1940andDictionnairede1940à1958; Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,345‐358,365. 56 Table4:Byageoflegislators,rateofabsenteeismfortheJuly10,1940sessionofthe FrenchNationalAssembly. Olderthan70 45‐69 Youngerthan45 Total %Absentee 33.0 14.5 20.6 17.6 Source:Joly,Dictionnairede1889à1940andDictionnairede1940à1958; Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,345‐358,365. 57 Table5:BypoliticalaffiliationoflegislatorsaccordingtoWieviorka,breakdownof votesfortheJuly10,1940sessionoftheFrenchNationalAssembly,includingrate ofnon‐adherencetothePétainistproject. Left Right Total Yes No Abstain No Vote‐ Massilia 294 73 16 23 276 7 4 4 570 80 20 27 No Vote ‐Job 1 1 No Vote‐ Other 75 74 149 Total %Non‐ Adherence 481 366 847 23.3 4.1 15.0 Source:Joly,Dictionnairede1889à1940andDictionnairede1940à1958; Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,96,102,345‐358,365.Wieviorkacategorizes theCommunists,theSocialists,themembersoftheSocialistandRepublicanUnion, IndependentLeftists,andtheRadical‐Socialistsasleftistsandcategorizesallother parliamentarygroupsasrightist.WieviorkaappearstohaveomittedPaulRamadier, aSocialistfromtheAveyronwhovotedno,fromhistables. 58 Table6:BreakdownofvotesfortheJuly10,1940sessionoftheFrenchNational Assembly,byregion,includingrateofnon‐adherencetothePétainistproject. Yes No Abstain No Vote‐ Massilia 17 29 10 1 2 25 4 1 1 17 1 1 No Vote Job No Vote‐ Other 8 5 1 9 Total %Non‐ Adherence Alsace 25 0.0 Aquitaine 47 27.7 Auvergne 32 18.8 Basse‐ 28 7.1 Normandie Brittany 38 7 6 51 13.7 Burgundy 26 2 1 8 37 8.1 Centre 29 3 2 7 41 12.2 Champagne‐ 22 1 4 2 29 17.2 Ardennes Corsica 3 1 1 1 1 7 42.9 Empire 14 3 10 27 11.1 Franche‐ 21 2 1 1 1 26 11.5 Comté Haute‐ 16 1 1 2 6 26 15.4 Normandie Île‐de‐ 38 4 1 3 11 57 14.0 France Languedoc‐ 23 10 1 34 29.4 Roussillon Limousin 14 3 1 3 21 19.0 Lorraine 16 2 1 19 38 7.9 Midi‐ 42 6 1 2 2 53 17.0 Pyrénées Nord‐Pas‐ 28 1 1 14 44 4.5 de‐Calais Pays‐de‐la‐ 37 1 8 46 2.2 Loire Picardy 14 1 1 1 12 29 10.3 Poitou‐ 25 8 33 0.0 Charentes Provence 26 6 3 1 3 39 25.6 Rhône‐ 50 16 6 1 4 77 29.9 Alpes Total 570 80 20 27 1 176 847 15.0 Source:Joly,Dictionnairede1889à1940andDictionnairede1940à1958; Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,345‐358,365. 59 Table7:Ascendingratesofnon‐adherencebyregiontothePétainistprojectatthe July10,1940sessionoftheFrenchNationalAssembly. Region Alsace0.0 Poitou‐Charentes Pays‐de‐la‐Loire Nord‐Pas‐de‐Calais Basse‐Normandie Lorraine Burgundy Picardy Empire Franche‐Comté Centre Brittany Île‐de‐France Average: Haute‐Normandie Midi‐Pyrénées Champagne‐Ardennes Auvergne Limousin Provence Aquitaine Languedoc‐Roussillon Rhône‐Alpes Corsica %NonAdherence 0.0 0.0 2.2 4.5 7.1 7.9 8.1 10.3 11.1 11.5 12.0 13.7 14.0 15.0 15.4 17.0 17.2 18.8 19.0 25.6 27.7 29.4 29.9 42.9 Source:Joly,Dictionnairede1889à1940andDictionnairede1940à1958; Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,345‐358,365. 60 Table8:Breakdownofnon‐adherencebyregiontothePétainistprojecttheJuly10, 1940sessionoftheFrenchNationalAssembly,includingpercentofnon‐adherence stemmingfromtheMassilia. No Abstain NoVote– Massilia TotalNon‐ Adherence North199 South200 Empire201 Total 24 6 16 46 %Massiliaof TotalNon– Adherence 34.8 56 14 10 81 12.3 3 3 100.0 80 20 27 127 21.3 Source:Joly,Dictionnairede1889à1940andDictionnairede1940à1958; Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,345‐358,365. 199NorthisdefinedasAlsace,Basse‐Normandie,Brittany,Burgundy,Centre, Champagne‐Ardennes,Franche‐Comté,Haute‐Normandie,Île‐de‐France,Lorraine, Nord‐Pas‐de‐Calais,Pays‐de‐la‐Loire,Picardy,andPoitou‐Charentes. 200SouthisdefinedasAquitaine,Auvergne,Corsica,Languedoc‐Roussillon, Limousin,Midi‐Pyrénées,Provence,andRhône‐Alpes. 201EmpireisdefinedasAlgeria,FrenchIndochina,FrenchIndia,Guyane,Guadalupe, LaReunion,Martinique,andSenegal. 61 Table9:Rateofparticipationassenator,deputy,orpresidentinpostwar government,byvoteoflegislatorattheJuly10,1940sessionoftheFrenchNational Assembly,1945‐1958. 1945‐ 1958 Service % Postwar Service 1940 Vote Total 570 Yes No Abstain NoVote– Massilia NoVote– Job NoVote– Other Total 56 9.8 80 31 38.8 20 7 35.0 27 10 37.0 1 0 0.0 149 25 16.8 847 129 15.2 Source:Joly,Dictionnairede1889à1940andDictionnairede1940à1958; Wieviorka,OrphansoftheRepublic,345‐358,365.Thisinformationwasobtainedby comparingthenamesoflegislatorsservingin1940withnamesoflegislatorsin postwarlegislatures,1945‐1958. 62 Bibliography AssembléeNationaledeFrance.“SéanceduMercredi10juillet1940.” http://www.assemblee‐nationale.fr/histoire/cr_10‐juillet‐1940.asp. ‐‐.“Loidu14août1884portantrévisionpartielledesloisconstitutionelles.” Digithèquedematériauxjuridiquesetpolitiques.UniversitédePerpignan.Last modified1998.http://mjp.univ‐perp.fr/france/co1875r.htm. 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