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John Locke
Locke’s earliest known political writings were the Essays on the
Law of Nature, written in Latin between 1660 and 1664 but not
known until the Lovelace Collection was examined in 1946.
They were first published in 1954 with a translation by W. von
Leyden. Though much in these essays appears in the Essay
Concerning Human Understanding and the Two Treatises, there
remain many points at which the early essays are in conflict
with parts of both later works. This fact and the bother of
translating them may have deterred Locke from publishing
them, despite the urging of Tyrrell. Since von Leyden can find
no evidence of direct influence of these essays on anyone other
than Tyrrell and Gabriel Towerson, the student of Locke is
referred to von Leyden’s publication for additional information.
The “Two Treatises.” The Two Treatises of Government
appeared anonymously in 1690, written, it is said, to justify the
revolution of 1688, or, according to the preface, “to establish
the Throne of Our Great Restorer, our present King William; to
make good his Title, in the Consent of the People.” Locke
acknowledged his authorship only in a codicil in his will listing
his anonymous works and giving to the Bodleian Library a
corrected copy of the Two Treatises. He never felt that any of
the editions printed during his lifetime had satisfactorily
rendered his work. Only in 1960 did Peter Laslett publish a
critical edition based on the Coste master copy of the Two
Treatises.
The first treatise. It has long been suspected that the first
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treatise was written in 1683 and that the second treatise was
written in 1689. Laslett has presented much evidence to show
that the second treatise was the earlier work, written between
1679 and 1681. If his thesis is correct, it was a revolutionary
document, whose purpose was not primarily to philosophize but
to furnish a theoretical foundation for the political aims and
maneuvers of Shaftesbury and his followers in their struggle
with Charles II. Only further scholarly probing will resolve this
question.
In his preface, Locke stated that the greater part of the original
work had been lost. He was satisfied that what remained was
sufficient, since he had neither the time nor the inclination to
rewrite the missing sections. The evidence is clear that is was
portions of the first treatise that were lost.
The first treatise is a sarcastic and harsh criticism of Sir Robert
Filmer’s Patriarcha, which argued for the divine right of kings.
Locke’s treatise is more of historical than philosophical
importance. It argued that Adam was not, as Filmer claimed,
divinely appointed monarch of the world and all his
descendants. Neither was the power of absolute monarchy
inherited from Adam. Adam had no absolute rights over Eve or
over his children. Parents have authority over children who are
dependent upon them and who must learn obedience as well as
many other things for life. The function of the parent is to
protect the child and to help him mature. When the child comes
to maturity, parental authority ends. In any case, the relation of
parent and child is not the same as that of sovereign and
subject. Were Filmer right, one would have to conclude that
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every man is born a slave, a notion that was utterly repugnant to
Locke. Even if Filmer were correct, it would be impossible to
show that existing rulers, especially the English kings, possess
legitimate claims to their sovereignty by tracing it back to
lawful descent from Adam.
The second treatise. Locke began the second treatise with the
proposition that all men are originally in a state of nature, “a
state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of
their possessions, and persons as they think fit, within the
bounds of the Law of Nature, without asking leave, or
depending upon the Will of any other man” (II.ii.4). Although
Locke sometimes wrote as if the state of nature were some
period in history, it must be taken largely as a philosophical
fiction, an assumption made to show the nature and foundation
of political power, a fiction at least as old as Plato’s treatment
of the Prometheus myth in the Protagoras. It is a state of
equality but not of unbounded license. Being rational and being
a creature bound by God, man must be governed by the law of
nature.
Natural law. Though the concept of the law of nature is as old
as antiquity, it flourished in the seventeenth century in the
minds of a considerable number of ethical and political
thinkers. In general it supposed that man by the use of reason
could know in the main the fundamental principles of morality,
which he otherwise knew through Christian revelation. Locke
was extremely vague about the law of nature, but in his Essays
on the Law of Nature he held that the law rests ultimately on
God’s will. Reason discovers it. It is not innate. When,
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however, Locke spoke of it as “writ in the hearts of all
mankind,” he suggested some kind of innateness. There are
obvious difficulties here, for sense and reason may fail some
men, even though the law of nature is binding on all. Moreover,
the various exponents of the law of nature differ on what it
consists of, except that it presupposes the brotherhood of man
and human benevolence.
State of nature. In a state of nature, according to Locke, all men
are bound to preserve peace, preserve mankind, and refrain
from hurt to one another. The execution of the law of nature is
the responsibility of each individual. If any man violates this
law, he thereby puts himself in a state of war with the others,
who may then punish the offender. The power that one man
may hold over another is neither absolute nor arbitrary and must
be restrained by proportion. The state of nature was for Locke a
society of men, as distinct from a state of government, or a
political society.
Social contract. There are certain inconveniences in a state of
nature, such as men’s partiality and the inclination on the part
of some men to violate the rights of others. The remedy for this
is civil government, wherein men by common consent form a
social contract and create a single body politic. This contract is
not between ruler and ruled, but between equally free men. The
aim of the contract is to preserve the lives, freedom, and
property of all, as they belong to each under natural law.
Whoever, therefore, attempts to gain absolute power over
another puts himself at war with the other. This holds in the
political state as well as the state of nature. When a rule
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becomes a tyrant, he puts himself in a state of war with the
people, who then, if no redress be found, may make an appeal
to heaven, that is, may revolt. This power is but an extension of
the right of each to punish an aggressor in the state of nature.
Unlike Hobbes, Locke was persuaded that men are capable of
judging whether they are cruelly subjected and unjustly treated.
Since one reason for men entering into the social contract is to
avoid a state of war, the contract is broken when the sovereign
puts himself into a state of war with the people by becoming a
tyrant.
Slavery. Curiously, Locke justified slavery on the grounds that
those who became slaves were originally in a state of wrongful
war with those who conquered them and, being captive,
forfeited their freedom. Apart from being bad history, this
argument ignores the rights of the children of slaves. Locke’s
inconsistency here may mercifully be passed over.
Property. Property was an idea which Locke used in both a
broad and a narrow sense. Men have a right to self-preservation
and therefore to such things as they need for their subsistence.
Each man possesses himself absolutely, and therefore that with
which he mixes his labor becomes his property. “God has given
the earth to mankind in common.” No man original, exclusive
rights to fruits and beasts of the earth. Nevertheless, man must
have some means with which to appropriate them. This consists
of the labor of his body and the work of his hand. By labor,
man removes things from a state of nature and makes them his
property. Without labor, the earth and things in general have
but little value. However, only so much as a man improves and
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can use belongs to him, nor may a man deprive another of the
means of self-preservation by overextending his reach for
property.
Though the right to property is grounded in nature, it is not
secured therein. It is one of the primary ends of the state to
preserve the rights of property, as well as to make laws
governing the use, distribution, and transference of property. In
communities or countries under government, there are fixed
boundaries to the common territory, and there is land and
property held in common which no one may appropriate to
himself and to which those not members of the community have
no right at all. Money, being something which does not spoil,
came into usage by mutual consent, serving as a useful means
of exchange. At the same time it made possible the
accumulation of wealth greater than warranted by need or use.
Political society. Having established several rights and duties
belonging to men by nature and having shown certain
inconveniences and disadvantages of the state of nature, Locke
turned to political society. The first society consists of the
family, whose aims are not initially or primarily those of
political society, but which may be included under political
society.
In political society “any number of men are so united into one
Society, as to quit everyone of his Executive power of the law
of nature, and to resign it to the public (II.vii.89). The
legislative and executive powers are a “a right of making laws
with penalties of Death, and consequently all less Penalties, for
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the regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the
force of community, in the execution of such laws, and in the
defense of the commonwealth from foreign injury, and all this
only for the public good” (II.i.3). By the social contract men
give up, not all their rights, but only the legislative and
executive right the originally had under the law of nature. This
transference of power is always subordinate to the proper and
true ends of the commonwealth, which are “the mutual
preservation of their lives, liberties and estates.”
Each man must voluntarily consent to the compact either
explicitly or implicitly. An individual who at age of discretion
remains a member of the community tacitly consents to the
compact.
Since the compact is made between the members of the
community, sovereignty ultimately remains with the people.
The sovereign, in the form of a legislative body, and executive,
or both, is the agent and executor of the sovereignty of the
people. The community can act only by the rule of the majority,
everyone is bound by it, because an agreement of unanimity is
virtually impossible. It is the people who can establish the
legislative, executive, and judiciary powers. Thus, an absolute
monarch is incompatible with civil society.
Locke’s theories so far are compatible with either monarchy,
oligarchy, or democracy, so long as it is recognized that
ultimate sovereignty lies with the people. He believed that a
constitutional monarchy with executive power, including the
judiciary, in the hands of the monarch, and legislative powers in
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a parliamentary assembly elected by the people was the most
satisfactory form of government. The supreme power he held to
be the legislative, for it makes the laws that the executive must
carry out and enforce. Whenever the executive violates the trust
that he holds, no obligation is owed him and he may be
deposed. The legislature may also violate its trust, though
Locke believed it less likely to do so. Whenever this occurs, the
people have a right to dissolve it and establish a new
government. For this reason a regularly elected legislative body
is desirable.
Rebellion. Locke explicitly recognized, as the events during his
lifetime had shown, that men may become tyrants to those
whom they were bound to serve. It may be a king, an assembly,
or a usurper that claims absolute power. In such cases the
people have a right to rebellion if no other redress is possible.
Locke was not unmindful of the fact that the executive needs
latitude and prerogative so that he may govern, and that the
legislative body must deliberate and make laws which they
believe to be in the public good. The right to rebellion is
warranted only in the most extreme conditions, where all other
means fail. Locke did not believe that men would lightly avail
themselves of this power, for men will suffer and endure much
before they resort to rebellion.
In transferring to the government the right to make and execute
law and make war and peace, men do not give up the natural
light of reason, by which they judge good and evil, right and
wrong, justice and injustice. In specific laws or executive
decisions judgment must be allowed to the legislature and the
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executive. If, however, a long train of acts shows a tyrannical
course, then men, judging that the sovereign has put himself
into a state of war with them, may justly dethrone the tyrant.
On the other hand, the legislative and executive power can
never revert to the people unless there is a breach of trust.
The dissolution of government is not the dissolution of society.
The aim of revolution is the establishment of a new
government, not a return to the state of nature. The dissolution
of government may occur under many circumstances, but
foremost among them are when the arbitrary will of a single
person or prince is set in place of the law; when the prince
hinders the legislature from due and lawful assembly; when
there is arbitrary change in elections; when the people are
delivered into subjection by a foreign power; and when the
executive neglects and abandons his charge. In all such cases
sovereignty reverts to the society, and the people have a right to
act as the supreme power and continue the legislature in
themselves, or erect a new form, or under the old form place
sovereignty in new hands, whichever they think best. On the
other hand, “the power that every individual gave the society,
... can never revert to the individuals again, as long as the
society lasts” (II.xix.243).
As theory, Locke’s second treatise is full of inadequacies, but
its magnificent sweep of ideas prepared the ground for popular
and democratic government.
Locke’s thought on education and religion was not presented in
strictly philosophical terms. It was, however, deeply rooted in
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the fundamental concepts of the Essay and the Two Treatises.
His works in these areas display clearly the liberal bent of his
mind as well as his love of freedom, tolerance, and truth. His
attitude was pragmatic and based on considerable psychological
insight into the motives, needs, passions, and follies of men.
Some Thoughts Concerning Education, several letters on
toleration, and The Reasonableness of Christianity profoundly
affected educational and religious thought in the eighteenth
century and after. Two of these works, Some Thoughts
Concerning Education and the first Letter on Toleration,
continue to be fresh and relevant.
Education. When Locke was in Holland, he wrote a number of
letters to Edward Clark advising him on the education of his
son, a young man of no particular distinction. Locke had in
mind the education of a gentleman who would one day be a
squire. In 1693 Locke modified these letters somewhat and
published the contents as Some Thoughts Concerning Education
in response to “so many, who profess themselves at a loss how
to breed their children.” His thought was marked by a ready
understanding of, and warm sympathy with, children. Three
main thoughts dominate the work. First, the individual
aptitudes, capacities, and idiosyncrasies of the child should
govern learning, not arbitrary curricular or rote learning taught
by the rod. Second, Locke placed the health of the body and the
development of a sound character ahead of intellectual learning.
In the third place, he saw that play, high spirits, and the
“gamesome humor” natural to children should govern the
business of learning wherever possible. Compulsory learning is
irksome; where there is play in learning, there will be joy in it.
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Throughout he placed emphasis on good example, practice,
and use rather than on precepts, rules, and punishment. The
work was an implicit criticism of his own education at
Westminster and Oxford, which he found unpleasant and
largely useless.
Writing almost as a physician, Locke advised “plenty of open
air, exercise, and sleep; plain diet, no wine or strong drink, and
very little or no physic; not too warm and straight clothing;
especially the head and feet kept cold, and the feet often used to
cold water and exposed to wet.” The aim in all was to keep the
body in strength and vigor, abel to endure hardships.
Locke urged that early training must establish the authority of
the parents so that good habits may be established. The prime
purpose is the development of virtue, the principle of which is
the power of denying ourselves the satisfaction of our desires.
The child should be taught to submit to reason when young.
Parents teach by their own example. They should avoid severe
punishments and beatings as well as artificial rewards. Rules
should be few when a child is young, but those few should be
obeyed. Mild, firm, and rational approval or disapproval are
most effective in curbing bad behavior. Children should be
frequently in company of their parents, who should in turn
study the disposition of the child and endeavor to use the
child’s natural desire for freedom and play to make learning as
much like recreation as possible. High spirits should not be
curbed, but turned to creative use. Curiosity too should be
encouraged, and questions should be heard and fairly answered.
Cruelty must always be discouraged and courageousness
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approved.
As the child grows, familiarity should be increased so that the
parent has a friend in the mature child. Virtue, breeding, and a
free liberal spirit as well as wisdom and truthfulness were the
goals set by Locke in all his advice. Affection and friendship
were for both means and ends of good education.
Learning, though important, Locke put last. First, he would
have the child learn to speak and read his own language well by
example and practice, not by grammar. In the study of all
languages, he would put off the study of grammar until they can
be spoken well. He would begin the learning of a second
modern language early. Reluctantly he would allow a
gentleman’s son to learn Latin, but he did not recommend much
time on Greek, Hebrew, Arabic, rhetoric, or logic, which
constituted the curricula of the universities of his day. Rather,
time should be given to the study of geography, arithmetic,
astronomy, geometry, history, ethics, and civil law. Dancing he
encouraged, and music as well, in moderation. He was less
sympathetic to poetry. Remarkably, he urged that everyone
learn at least one manual trade and make some study of
accounting. Finally, travel was valuable if not done before one
could profit by it.
If much of this is familiar and even trite, it must be remembered
that Locke was among the first to formulate these ideas. His
influence on educational thought and practice was enormous
and is still very much with us in its fundamental outlook and
method.
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Religion. Locke saw some merits in all the competing claims of
various religious groups. He also saw the destructive force that
was released when these claims sought exclusive public
dominion at the expense of individual conscience. He looked in
several directions at once. This tendency has earned him the
reputation of being timorous and compromising. Nonetheless, it
is on this trait of mind that much of his great influence and
reputation rests. For Locke, fidelity to the evidence at hand
always outweighed cleverness, consistency, and dialectic. It is
the chief testimony to his claim that truth was always his aim,
even when he might have won an easy victory by dogmatic
consistency.
Locke’s writings on religion are voluminous. When he died he
was working on extensive commentaries on the Epistles of Saint
Paul, as well as a draft of a fourth Letter on Toleration. Earlier
he had written and published three letters on toleration, The
Reasonableness of Christianity (1695), and two Vindications
(1695 and 1697) of the latter work. Moreover, Locke’s three
letters to Stillingfleet, the bishop of Worcester, are concerned
with religious questions as well as epistemological ones.
Religious Tolerance. Locke’s first Letter Concerning
Toleration stated his position clearly, and he never deviated
from it substantially. It was originally written in Latin as a letter
to his Dutch friend Philip van Limborch. In 1689 it was
published on the Continent in Latin, and in the same year a
translation of it by William Popple appeared in English.
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Locke was not the first to write in advocacy of religious
toleration. His was, however, a powerful, direct, and passionate
plea. It was linked with the Essay by it recognition of the limits
of human knowledge and human fallibility, and with the Two
Treatises by his deep commitment to individual rights and
freedom.
Locke took toleration to be the chief characteristic mark of the
true church, for religious belief is primarily a relation between
each man and God. True religion regulates men’s lives
according to virtue and piety, and without charity and love
religion is false to itself. Those who persecute others in the
name of Christ abjure His teachings, seeking only outward
conformity, not peace and holiness. Who can believe that in
torture and execution the fanatic truly seeks the salvation of the
soul of his victim? Moreover, the mind cannot be forced or
belief compelled. All efforts to force or compel belief breed
only hypocrisy and contempt of God. Persuasion is the only
level that can truly move the mind.
A church is “a voluntary society of men, joining themselves
together of their own accord in order to the public worshipping
of God in such manner as they judge acceptable to Him, and
effectual to the salvation of their souls.” It is sharply distinct
from a state, or commonwealth. The state is concerned with the
public good, protecting life, liberty, and property. It has no
authority in matters of the spirit. “Whatever is lawful in the
commonwealth cannot be prohibited by the magistrate in the
church.”
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It is to be doubted that any man or group of men possess the
truth about the one true way to salvation. In the Scriptures we
have all that may reasonably be claimed by Christians to be the
word of God. The rest are the speculations and beliefs of men
concerning articles of faith and forms of worship. Sincere and
honest men differ in these matters, and only tolerance of these
differences can bring about public peace and Christian charity.
Jews, pagans, and Muslims are all equally confident in their
religious faith. Mutual tolerance is essential where such
diversity exists. This is most evident when we observe that it is
the most powerful party that persecutes others in the name of
religion. Yet in different countries and at different times power
has lain in the hands of different religious groups. It is physical
power, not true faith, which decides who is persecuted and who
persecutes.
Throughout Lock’s argument the liberty of persons and the
liberty of conscience are decisive. He limited this liberty only
by denying to religion the right to harm directly another person
or group or to practice clearly immoral rites. By a curious and
probably prudential exception, he denied tolerance to atheists,
because promises, covenants, and oaths would not bind them,
and to any church so constituted “that all those who enter into it
do thereby ipso facto deliver themselves up to the protection
and service of another prince.”
Despite these limitations, Lock’s letter moved subsequent
generations to a greater spirit of tolerance in religious matters.
It is still part of the liberal democratic ideal and transcends the
time of its composition.
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Faith and Reason. The Reasonableness of Christianity and the
Vindications are works more bound to Locke’s own time.
Locke was probably neither a Socinian nor a deist, even though
certain deists and Unitarians found comfort and inspiration in
his work. He was a sincere Christian, who tried to diminish the
flourishing schisms and sects by proposing a return to the
Scriptures and an abandonment of the interminable theological
disputes of his day. He accepted the divine inspiration of the
Bible. Nevertheless, he held that even revelation must be tested
by reason. In the New Testament, Christianity is rational and
simple. The core of Christian faith lies in the belief in t he
fatherhood of God, the divinity of Christ the Messiah, the
morality of charity, love, and divine mercy. Justification by
means of faith in Christ, whose essential revelation is that God
is merciful and forgives the sinner who truly repents and strives
to live a life of Christian morality. The Mosaic law, God’s
mercy, and Christian morality are all consonant with human
reason. Revelation discloses to man what unaided reason could
not discover - the mysteries, the Virgin Birth, the Resurrection,
the divinity of Christ. But when disclosed, these do not violate
the canons of reason. Here as elsewhere, Locke’s emphasis on
reason was circumscribed, reason must be followed where
possible, but it does not carry us far enough by itself.
Locke’s influence was wide and deep. In political, religious,
educational, and philosophical thought he inspired the leading
minds of England, France, America, and to some extent,
Germany. He disposed of the exaggerated rationalism of
Descartes and Spinoza; he laid the groundwork for a new
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empiricism and advanced the claims for experimentalism.
Voltaire, Montesquieu, and the French Encyclopedists found in
Locke the philosophical, political, educational, and moral basis
that enabled them to prepare and advance ideas which
eventuated in the French Revolution. In America, his influence
on Jonathan Edwards, Hamilton, and Jefferson was decisive.
Locke’s zeal for truth as he saw it was stronger than his
passions for dialectical and logical niceness, and this may
account for the fact that his works prepared the ground for
action as well as thought.
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